15. Bienvenido m. Cadalin, Et Al. v. Poea Administrator g.r. No. 104776 December 5, 1994

8/12/2019 15. Bienvenido m. Cadalin, Et Al. v. Poea Administrator g.r. No. 104776 December 5, 1994

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 104776. December 5, 1994.]

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and

the rest of 1, 767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty.GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENTADMINISTRATIONS ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIAINTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, Respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 104911-14. December 5, 1994.]

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIA

INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, Respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 105029-32. December 5, 1994.]

ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and BROWN & ROOTINTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.EVANGELISTA, ROMEO PATAG, RIZALINO REYES, IGNACIO DE VERA,

SOLOMON B. REYES, JOSE M. ABAN, EMIGDIO N. ABARQUEZ, ANTONIOACUPAN, ROMEO ACUPAN, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRE, WILFREDO D. ALIGADO,MARTIN AMISTAD, JR., ROLANDO B. AMUL, AMORSOLO ANADING, ANTONIO

T. ANGLO, VICENTE ARLITA, HERBERT AYO, SILVERIO BALATAZO, ALFREDOBALOBO, FALCONERO BANAAG, RAMON BARBOSA, FELIX BARCENA,

FERNANDO BAS, MARIO BATACLAN, ROBERTO S. BATICA, ENRICO BELEN,ARISTEO BICOL, LARRY C. BICOL, PETRONILLO BISCOCHO, FELIX M. BOBIER,

DIONISIO BOBONGO, BAYANI S. BRACAMANTE, PABLITO BUSTILLO,GUILLERMO CABEZAS, BIENVENIDO CADALIN, RODOLFO CAGATAN, AMANTE

CAILAO, IRENEO CANDOR, JOSE CASTILLO, MANUEL CASTILLO, REMARCASTROJERES, REYNALDO CAYAS, ROMEO CECILIO, TEODULO CREUS,

BAYANI DAYRIT, RICARDO DAYRIT, ERNESTO T. DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO DEGUZMAN, ONOFRE DE RAMA, IGNACIO DE VERA, MODESTO DIZON,

REYNALDO DIZON, ANTONIO S. DOMINGUEZ, GILBERT EBRADA, RICARDOEBRADA, ANTONIO EJERCITO, JR., EDUARTE ERIDAO, ELADIO ESCOTOTO,

JOHN ESGUERRA, EDUARDO ESPIRITU, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, RODOLFOESPIRITU, NESTOR M. ESTEVA, BENJAMIN ESTRADA, VALERIO EVANGELISTA,OLIGARIO FRANCISCO, JESUS GABAWAN, ROLANDO GARCIA, ANGEL GUDA,

PACITO HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO HILARIO, HENRY L. JACOB, HONESTOJARDINIANO, ANTONIO JOCSON, GERARDO LACSAMANA, EFREN U. LIRIO

LORETO LONTOC, ISRAEL LORENZO, ALEJANDRO LORINO, JOSE MABALAY,HERMIE MARANAN, LEOVIGILDO MARCIAL, NOEL MARTINEZ, DANTE

MATREO, LUCIANO MELENDEZ, RENATO MELO, FRANCIS MEDIODA, JOSE C.


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MILANES, RAYMUNDO C. MILAY, CRESENCIANO MIRANDA, ILDEFONSO C.MOLINA, ARMANDO B. MONDEJAR RESURRECCION D. NAZARENO, JUAN

OLINDO, FRANCISCO R. OLIVARES, PEDRO ORBISTA, JR., RICARDO ORDOEZ,ERNIE PANCHO, JOSE PANCHO , GORGONIO P. PARALA, MODESTO PINPIN,

JUANITO PAREA, ROMEO I. PATAG, FRANCISCO PINPIN, LEONARDO POBLETE,

JAIME POLLOS DOMINGO PONDALIS, EUGENIO RAMIREZ, LUCIEN M.RESPALL, GAUDENCIO RETANAN, JR., TOMAS B. RETENER, ALVIN C. REYES,RIZALINO REYES, SOLOMON B. REYES, VIRGILIO G. RICAZA, RODELIO RIETA, JR., BENITO RIVERA, JR., BERNARDO J. ROBILLOS, PABLO A. ROBLES, JOSE

ROBLEZA, QUIRINO RONQUILLO, AVELINO M. ROQUE, MENANDRO L. SABINO,PEDRO SALGATAR, EDGARDO SALONGA, NUMERIANO SAN MATEO,

FELIZARDO DE LOS SANTOS, JR., GABRIEL SANTOS, JUANITO SANTOS,PAQUITO SOLANTE, CONRADO A. SOLIS, JR., RODOLFO SULTAN, ISAIASTALACTAC, WILLIAM TARUC, MENANDRO TEMPROSA, BIENVENIDO S.

TOLENTINO, BENEDICTO TORRES, MAXIMIANO TORRES, FRANCISCO G.TRIAS, SERGIO A. URSOLINO, ROGELIO VALDEZ, LEGORIO E. VERGARA,

DELFIN VICTORIA, GILBERT VICTORIA, HERNANE VICTORIANO, FRANCISCOVILLAFLORES, DOMINGO VILLAHERMOSA, ROLANDO VILLALOBOS,ANTONIO VILLAUZ, DANILO VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO VILLANUEVA, ANGELVILLARBA, JUANITO VILLARINO, FRANCISCO ZARA, ROGELIO AALAGOS,

NICANOR B. ABAD, ANDRES ABANES, REYNALDO ABANES, EDUARDO ABANTE,JOSE ABARRO, JOSEFINO ABARRO, CELSO S. ABELANIO, HERMINIO ABELLA,MIGUEL ABESTANO, RODRIGO G. ABUBO, JOSE B. ABUSTAN, DANTE ACERES,

REYNALDO S. ACOJIDO, LEOWILIN ACTA, EUGENIO C. ACUEZA, EDUARDOACUPAN, REYNALDO ACUPAN, SOLANO ACUPAN, MANUEL P. ADANA,

FLORENTINO R. AGNE, QUITERIO R. AGUDO, MANUEL P. AGUINALDO, DANTEAGUIRRE, HERMINIO AGUIRRE, GONZALO ALBERTO, JR., CONRADO

ALCANTARA, LAMBERTO Q. ALCANTARA, MARIANITO J. ALCANTARA,BENCIO ALDOVER, EULALIO V. ALEJANDRO, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRO,

EDUARDO L. ALEJANDRO, MAXIMINO ALEJANDRO, ALBERTO ALMENAR,ARNALDO ALONZO, AMADO ALORIA, CAMILO ALVAREZ, MANUEL C.ALVAREZ, BENJAMIN R. AMBROCIO, CARLOS AMORES, BERNARD P.

ANCHETA, TIMOTEO O. ANCHETA, JEOFREY ANI, ELINO P. ANTILLON,ARMANDRO B. ANTIPONO, LARRY T. ANTONIO, ANTONIO APILADO, ARTURO

P. APILADO, FRANCISCO APOLINARIO, BARTOLOME M. AQUINO, ISIDROAQUINO, PASTOR AQUINO, ROSENDO M. AQUINO, ROBERTO ARANGORIN,

BENJAMIN O. ARATEA, ARTURO V. ARAULLO, PRUDENCIO ARAULLO,ALEXANDER ARCAIRA, FRANCISCO ARCIAGA, JOSE AREVALO, JUANITO

AREVALO, RAMON AREVALO, RODOLFO AREVALO, EULALIO ARGUELLES,WILFREDO P. ARICA, JOSE M. ADESILLO, ANTONIO ASUNCION, ARTEMIO M.ASUNCION, EDGARDO ASUNCION, REXY M. ASUNCION, VICENTE AURELIO,

ANGEL AUSTRIA, RICARDO P. AVERILLA, JR., VIRGILIO AVILA, BARTOLOMEAXALAN, ALFREDO BABILONIA, FELIMON BACAL, JOSE L. BACANI, ROMULO

R. BALBIERAN, VICENTE BALBIERAN, RODOLFO BALITBIT, TEODORO Y.BALOBO, DANILO O. BARBA, BERNARDO BARRO, JUAN A. BASILAN, CEFERINO

BATITIS, VIVENCIO C. BAUAN, GAUDENCIO S. BAUTISTA, LEONARDO


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BAUTISTA, JOSE BAUTISTA, ROSTICO BAUTISTA, RUPERTO B. BAUTISTA,TEODORO S. BAUTISTA, VIRGILIO BAUTISTA, JESUS R. BAYA, WINIEFREDO

BAYACAL, WINIEFREDO BEBIT, BEN G. BELIR, ERIC B. BELTRAN, EMELIANOBENALES, JR., RAUL BENITEZ, PERFECTO BENSAN, IRENEO BERGONIO,

ISABELO BERMUDEZ, ROLANDO I. BERMUDEZ, DANILO BERON, BENJAMIN

BERSAMIN, ANGELITO BICOL, ANSELMO BICOL, CELESTINO BICOL, JR.,FRANCISCO BICOL, ROGELIO BICOL, ROMULO L. BICOL, ROGELIOBILLIONES, TEOFILO N. BITO, FERNANDO BLANCO, AUGUSTO BONDOC,

DOMINGO BONDOC, PEPE S. BOOC, JAMES R. BORJA, WILFREDO BRACEROS,ANGELES C. BRECINO, EURECLYDON G. BRIONES, AMADO BRUGE, PABLITO

BUDILLO, ARCHIMEDES BUENAVENTURA, BASILIO BUENAVENTURA,GUILLERMO BUENCONSEJO, ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, VIRGILIO BUTIONG,

JR., HONESTO P. CABALLA, DELFIN CABALLERO, BENEDICTO CABANIGAN,MOISES CABATAY, HERMANELI CABRERA, PEDRO CAGATAN, JOVEN C.CAGAYAT, ROGELIO L. CALAGOS, REYNALDO V. CALDERON, OSCAR C.

CALDERON, NESTOR D. CALLEJA, RENATO R. CALMA, NELSON T. CAMACHO,

SANTOS T. CAMACHO, ROBERTO CAMANA, FLORANTE C. CAMANAGEDGARDO M. CANDA, SEVERINO CANTOS, EPIFANIO A. CAPONPON, ELIAS, D.CARILLO, JR., ARMANDO CARREON, MENANDRO M. CASTAEDA, BENIGNO A.

CASTILLO, CORNELIO L. CASTILLO, JOSEPH B. CASTILLO, ANSELMOCASTILLO, JOAQUIN CASTILLO, PABLO L. CASTILLO, ROMEO P. CASTILLO,

SESINANDO CATIBOG, DANILO CASTRO, PRUDENCIO A. CASTRO, RAMOCASTRO, JR., ROMEO A. DE CASTRO, JAIME B. CATLI, DURANA D. CEFERINO,

RODOLFO B. CELIS, HERMINIGILDO CEREZO, VICTORIANO CELESTINO,BENJAMIN CHAN, ANTONIO C. CHUA, VIVENCIO B. CIABAL, RODRIGO

CLARETE, AUGUSTO COLOMA, TURIANO CONCEPCION, TERESITOCONSTANTINO, ARMANDO CORALES, RENATO C. CORCUERA, APOLINAR

CORONADO, ABELARDO CORONEL, FELIX CORONEL, JR., LEONARDOCORPUZ, JESUS M. CORRALES, CESAR CORTEMPRATO, FRANCISCO O.

CORVERA, FRANCISCO COSTALES, SR., CELEDONIO CREDITO, ALBERTO A.CREUS, ANACLETO V. CRUZ, DOMINGO DELA CRUZ, AMELIANO DELA CRUZ,

JR., PANCHITO CRUZ, REYNALDO B. DELA CRUZ, ROBERTO P. CRUZ,TEODORO S. CRUZ, ZOSIMO DELA CRUZ, DIONISIO A. CUARESMA, FELIMONCUIZON, FERMIN DAGONDON, RICHARD DAGUINSIN, CRISANTO A. DATAY,

NICASIO DANTINGUINOO, JOSE DATOON, EDUARDO DAVID, ENRICO T. DAVID,FAVIO DAVID, VICTORIANO S. DAVID, EDGARDO N. DAYACAP, JOSELITO T.

DELOSO, CELERINO DE GUZMAN, ROMULO DE GUZMAN, LIBERATO DEGUZMAN, JOSE DE LEON, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, NAPOLEON S. DE LUNA,RICARDO DE RAMA, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, ALBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSE

DELA CRUZ, LEONARDO DELOS REYES, ERNESTO F. DIATA, EDUARDO A.DIAZ, FELIX DIAZ, MELCHOR DIAZ, NICANOR S. DIAZ, GERARDO C. DIGA,

CLEMENTE DIMATULAC, ROLANDO DIONISIO, PHILIPP G. DISMAYA,BENJAMIN DOCTOLERO, ALBERTO STO. DOMINGO, BENJAMIN E. DOZA,BENJAMIN DUPA, DANILO C. DURAN, GREGORIO D. DURAN, RENATO A.

EDUARTE, GODOFREDO E. EISMA, ARDON B. ELLO, UBED B. ELLO, JOSEFINOENANO, REYNALDO ENCARNACION, EDGARDO ENGUANCIO, ELIAS


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EQUIPANO, FELIZARDO ESCARMOSA, MIGUEL ESCARMOSA, ARMANDOESCOBAR, ROMEO T. ESCUYOS, ANGELITO ESPIRITU, EDUARDO S. ESPIRITU,REYNALDO ESPIRITU, ROLANDO ESPIRITU, JULIAN ESPREGANTE, IGMIDIO

ESTANISLAO, ERNESTO M. ESTEBAN, MELANIO R. ESTRO, ERNESTO M.ESTEVA, CONRADO ESTUAR, CLYDE ESTUYE, ELISEO FAJARDO, PORFIRIO

FALQUEZA, WILFREDO P. FAUSTINO, EMILIO E. FERNANDEZ, ARTEMIOFERRER, MISAEL M. FIGURACION, ARMANDO F. FLORES, BENJAMIN FLORES,EDGARDO C. FLORES, BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO, MANUEL S. FRANCISCO,

ROLANDO FRANCISCO, VALERIANO FRANCISCO, RODOLFO GABAWAN,ESMERALDO GAHUTAN, CESAR C. GALANG, SANTIAGO N. GALOSO, GABRIEL

GAMBOA, BERNARDO GANDAMON, JUAN GANZON, ANDRES GARCIA, JR.,ARMANDO M. GARCIA, EUGENIO GARCIA, MARCELO L. GARCIA, PATRICIO L.

GARCIA, JR., PANCIANO G. GARCIA, PONCIANO G. GARCIA, JR., RAFAEL P.GARCIA, ROBERTO S. GARCIA, OSIAS G. GAROFIL, RAYMUNDO C. GARON,ROLANDO G. GATELA, AVELINO GAYETA, RAYMUNDO GERON, PLACIDO

GONZALES, RUPERTO H. GONZALES, ROGELIO D. GUANIO, MARTIN V.

GUERRERO, JR., ALEXIS GUNO, RICARDO L. GUNO, FRANCISCO GUPIT,DENNIS J. GUTIERREZ, IGNACIO B. GUTIERREZ, ANGELITO DE GUZMAN, JR.,CESAR H. HABANA, RAUL G. HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO HERNANDEZ,

JOVENIANO D. HILADO, JUSTO HILAPO, ROSTITO HINAHON, FELICISIMOHINGADA, EDUARDO HIPOLITO, RAUL L. IGNACIO, MANUEL L. ILAGAN,

RENATO L . ILAGAN, CONRADO A. INSIONG, GRACIANO G. ISLA, ARNEL L.JACOB, OSCAR J. JAPITENGA, CIRILO HICBAN, MAXIMIANO HONRADES,

GENEROSO IGNACIO, FELIPE ILAGAN, EXPEDITO N. JACOB, MARIO JASMIN,BIENVENIDO JAVIER, ROMEO M. JAVIER, PRIMO DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE

JESUS, CARLOS A. JIMENEZ, DANILO E. JIMENEZ, PEDRO C. JOAQUIN, FELIPEW. JOCSON, FELINO M. JOCSON, PEDRO N. JOCSON, VALENTINO S. JOCSON,PEDRO B. JOLOYA, ESTEBAN P. JOSE, JR., RAUL JOSE, RICARDO SAN JOSE,

GERTRUDO KABIGTING, EDUARDO S. KOLIMLIM, SR., LAURO J. LABAY,EMMANUEL C. LABELLA, EDGARDO B. LACERONA, JOSE B. LACSON, MARIO J.

LADINES, RUFINO LAGAC, RODRIGO LAGANAPAN, EFREN M. LAMADRID,GUADENCIO LATANAN, VIRGILIO LATAYAN, EMILIANO LATOJA,

WENCESLAO LAUREL, ALFREDO LAXAMANA, DANIEL R. LAZARO, ANTONIOC. LEANO, ARTURO S. LEGASPI, BENITO DE LEMOS, JR., PEDRO G. DE LEON,

MANOLITO C. LILOC, GERARDO LIMUACO, ERNESTO S. LISING, RENATOLISING, WILFREDO S. LISING, CRISPULO LONTOC, PEDRO M. LOPERA,

ROGELIO LOPERA, CARLITO M. LOPEZ, CLODY LOPEZ, GARLITO LOPEZ,GEORGE F. LOPEZ, VIRGILIO M. LOPEZ, BERNARDITO G. LOREJA, DOMINGO

B. LORICO, DOMINGO LOYOLA, DANTE LUAGE, ANTONIO M. LUALHATI,EMMANUEL LUALHATI, JR., LEONIDEZ C. LUALHATI, SEBASTIAN LUALHATI,FRANCISCO LUBAT, ARMANDO LUCERO, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, THOMAS

VICENTE O. LUNA, NOLI MACALADLAD, ALFREDO MACALINO, RICARDOMACALINO, ARTURO V. MACARAIG, ERNESTO V. MACARAIG, RODOLFO V.

MACARAIG, BENJAMIN MACATANGAY, HERMOGENES MACATANGAY, RODELMACATANGAY, ROMULO MACATANGAY, OSIAS Q. MADLANGBAYAN,NICOLAS P. MADRID, EDELBERTO G. MAGAT, EFREN C. MAGBANUA,


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BENJAMIN MAGBUHAT, ALFREDO C. MAGCALENG, ANTONIO MAGNAYE,ALFONSO MAGPANTAY, RICARDO C. MAGPANTAY, SIMEON M. MAGPANTAY,

ARMANDO M. MAGSINO, MACARIO S. MAGSINO, ANTONIO MAGTIBAY,VICTOR V. MAGTIBAY, GERONIMO MAHILUM, MANUEL MALONZO, RICARDO

MAMADIS, RODOLFO MANA, BERNARDO A. MANALILI, MANUEL MANALILI,

ANGELO MANALO, AGUILES L. MANALO, LEOPOLDO MANGAHAS, BAYANIMANIGBAS, ROLANDO C. MANIMTIM, DANIEL MANONSON,. ERNESTO F.MANUEL, EDUARDO MANZANO, RICARDO N. MAPA, RAMON MAPILE,

ROBERTO C. MARANA, NEMESIO MARASIGAN, WENCESLAO MARASIGAN,LEONARDO MARCELO, HENRY F. MARIANO, JOEL MARIDABLE, SANTOS E.

MARINO, NARCISO A. MARQUEZ, RICARDO MARTINEZ, DIEGO MASICAMPO,AURELIO MATABERDE, RENATO MATILLA, VICTORIANO MATILLA, VIRGILIO

MEDEL, LOLITO M. MELECIO, BENIGNO MELENDEZ, RENER J. MEMIJE,REYNALDO F. MEMIJE, RODEL MEMIJE, AVELINO MENDOZA, JR., CLARO

MENDOZA, TIMOTEO MENDOZA, GREGORIO MERCADO, ERNANI DELAMERCED, RICARDO MERCENA, NEMESIO METRELLO, RODEL MEMIJE,

GASPAR MINIMO, BENJAMIN MIRANDA, FELIXBERTO D. MISA, CLAUDIO A.MODESTO, JR., OSCAR MONDEDO, GENEROSO MONTON, RENATO MORADA,RICARDO MORADA, RODOLFO MORADA, ROLANDO M. MORALES, FEDERICO

M. MORENO, VICTORINO A. MORTEL, JR., ESPIRITU A. MUNOZ, IGNACIOMUNOZ, ILDEFONSO MUNOZ, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ERNESTO NAPALAN,

MARCELO A. NARCIZO, REYNALDO NATALIA, FERNANDO C. NAVARETTE,PACIFICO D. NAVARRO, FLORANTE NAZARENO, RIZAL B. NAZARIO, JOSUENEGRITE, ALFREDO NEPUMUCENO, HERBERT G. NG, FLORENCIO NICOLAS,ERNESTO C. NINON, AVELINO NUQUI, NEMESIO D. OBA, DANILO OCAMPO,

EDGARDO OCAMPO, RODRIGO E. OCAMPO, ANTONIO B. OCCIANO,REYNALDO P. OCSON, BENJAMIN ODESA, ANGEL OLASO, FRANCISCO

OLIGARIO, ZOSIMO OLIMBO, BENJAMIN V. ORALLO, ROMEO S. ORIGINES,DANILO R. ORTANEZ, WILFREDO OSIAS, VIRGILIO PA-A, DAVID PAALAN,

JESUS N. PACHECO, ALFONSO L. PADILLA, DANILO PAGSANJAN, NUMERIANOPAGSISIHAN, RICARDO T. PAGUIO, EMELIO PAKINGAN, LEANDRO

PALABRICA, QUINCIANO PALO, JOSE PAMATIAN, GONZALO PAN, PORFIRIOPAN, BIENVENIDO PANGAN, ERNESTO PANGAN, FRANCISCO V. PASIA,

EDILBERTO PASIMIO, JR., JOSE V. PASION, ANGELITO M. PENA, DIONISIOPENDRAS, HERMINIO PERALTA, REYNALDO M. PERALTA, ANTONIO PEREZ,

ANTOLIANO E. PEREZ, JUAN PEREZ, LEON PEREZ, ROMEO E. PEREZ, ROMULOPEREZ, WILLIAM PEREZ, FERNANDO G. PERINO, FLORENTINO DEL PILAR,

DELMAR F. PINEDA, SALVADOR PINEDA, ELIZALDE PINPIN, WILFREDOPINPIN, ARTURO POBLETE, DOMINADOR R. PRIELA, BUENAVENTURA

PRUDENTE, CARMELITO PRUDENTE, DANTE PUEYO, REYNALDO Q. PUEYO,RODOLFO O. PULIDO, ALEJANDRO PUNIO, FEDERICO QUIMAN, ALFREDO L.QUINTO, ROMEO QUINTOS, EDUARDO W. RACABO, RICARDO C. DE RAMA,

RICARDO L. DE RAMA, ROLANDO DE RAMA, FERNANDO A. RAMIREZ, LITO S.RAMIREZ, RICARDO G. RAMIREZ, RODOLFO V. RAMIREZ, ALBERTO RAMOS,

ANSELMO C. RAMOS, TOBIAS RAMOS, WILLARFREDO RAYMUNDO,REYNALDO RAQUEDAN, MANUEL F. RAVELAS, WILFREDO D. RAYMUNDO,


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ERNESTO E. RECOLASO, ALBERTO REDAZA, ARTHUR REJUSO, TORIBIO M.RELLAMA, JAIME RELLOSA, EUGENIO A. REMOQUILLO, GERARDO RENTOZA,

REDENTOR C. REY, ALFREDO S. REYES, AMABLE S. REYES, BENEDICTO R.REYES, GREGORIO B. REYES, JOSE A. REYES, JOSE C. REYES, ROMULO M.

REYES, SERGIO REYES, ERNESTO F. RICO, FERNANDO M. RICO, EMMANUEL

RIETA, RICARDO RIETA, LEO B. ROBLES, RUBEN ROBLES, RODOLFOROBLEZA, RODRIGO ROBLEZA, EDUARDO ROCABO, ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ,BERNARDO RODRIGUEZ, ELIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ALMONTE ROMEO, ELIASRONQUILLO, ELISE RONQUILLO, LUIS VAL B. RONQUILLO, REYNOSO P.

RONQUILLO, RODOLFO RONQUILLO, ANGEL ROSALES, RAMON ROSALES,ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, TEODORICO DEL

ROSARIO, VIRGILIO L. ROSARIO, CARLITO SALVADOR, JOSE SAMPARADA,ERNESTO SAN PEDRO, ADRIANO V. SANCHA, GERONIMO M. SANCHA,ARTEMIO B. SANCHEZ, NICASIO SANCHEZ, APOLONIO P. SANTIAGO,

JOSELITO S. SANTIAGO, SERGIO SANTIAGO, EDILBERTO C. SANTOS, EFREN S.SANTOS, RENATO D. SANTOS, MIGUEL SAPUYOT, ALEX S. SERQUINA,

DOMINADOR P. SERRA, ROMEO SIDRO, AMADO M. SILANG, FAUSTINO D.SILANG, RODOLFO B. DE SILOS, ANICETO G. SILVA, EDGARDO M. SILVA,ROLANDO C. SILVERTO, ARTHUR B. SIMBAHON, DOMINGO SOLANO,

JOSELITO C. SOLANTE, CARLITO SOLIS, CONRADO SOLIS, III, EDGARDOSOLIS, ERNESTO SOLIS, ISAGANI M. SOLIS, EDUARDO L. SOTTO, ERNESTO G.

STA. MARIA, VICENTE G. STELLA, FELIMON SUPANG, PETER TANGUINOO,MAXIMINO TALIBSAO, FELICISMO P. TALUSIK, FERMIN TARUC, JR., LEVY S.

TEMPLO, RODOLFO S. TIAMSON, LEONILO TIPOSO, ARNEL TOLENTINO,MARIO M. TOLENTINO, FELIPE TORRALBA, JOVITO V. TORRES, LEONARDO

DE TORRES, GAVINO U. TUAZON, AUGUSTO B. TUNGUIA, FRANCISCO UMALI,SIMPLICIO UNIDA, WILFREDO V. UNTALAN, ANTONIO VALDERAMA, RAMON

VALDERAMA, NILO VALENCIANO, EDGARDO C. VASQUEZ, ELPIDIOVELASQUEZ, NESTOR DE VERA, WILFREDO D. VERA, BIENVENIDO VERGARA,ALFREDO VERGARA, RAMON R. VERZOSA, FELICITO P. VICMUNDO, ALFREDO

VICTORIANO, TEOFILO P. VIDALLO, SABINO N. VIERNEZ, JESUS J. VILLA,JOVEN VILLABLANCO, EDGARDO G. VILLAFLORES, CEFERINO VILLAGERA,

ALEX VILLAHERMOZA, DANILO A. VILLANUEVA, ELITO VILLANUEVA,LEONARDO M. VILLANUEVA, MANUEL R. VILLANUEVA, NEPTHALI VILLAR,

JOSE V. VILLAREAL, FELICISIMO VILLARINO, RAFAEL VILLAROMAN,CARLOS VILLENA, FERDINAND VIVO, ROBERTO YABUT, VICENTE YNGENTE,

AND ORO C. ZUNIGA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUIASON, J.:

The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al. v. Philippine OverseasEmployment Administrations Administrator, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised


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Rules of Court:chanrob1es virtual1aw library

(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460;

(2) to render a new decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in default; (ii) declaring the saidlabor cases as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders Corporation (AIBC) andBrown and Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the claims of the 1,767 claimants in said laborcases; (iv) declaring Atty. Florante M. de Castro guilty of forum-shopping; and (v) dismissingPOEA Case No. L-86-05-460; and

(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of the NLRC, denying the motion forreconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).

The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al., v. Hon. National

Labor Relations Commission, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:chanrob1es virtual1aw library

(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799 and L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-yearprescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines instead of the ten-year prescriptiveperiod under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied the "three-hour daily average"formula in the computation of petitioners overtime pay; and

(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion forreconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).

The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International Builders Corporation, et. al., v.National Labor Relations Commission, et. al." was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules ofCourt:chanrob1es virtual1aw library

(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims of 149claimants; and

(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as it denied the motions forreconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-230).

The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified the decision of POEA infour labor cases: (1) awarded monetary benefits only to 149 claimants and (2) directed LaborArbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive evidence on the claims dismissed bythe POEA for lack of substantial evidence or proof of employment.

Consolidation of Cases

G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the Third Division while G.R. Nos.


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pre-trial conference.

On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion to Strike Out of the Records"filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed outin the order.

On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply with the Order ofOctober 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA Administratordirect the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers, after which the case should bedeemed submitted for decision. On the same day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed anothercomplaint for the same money claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of whomwere also claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).

On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the Order dated October 2, 1984and an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA direct the parties to submitsimultaneously their position papers after which the case would be deemed submitted for

decision. On the same day, AIBC asked for time to file its comment on the "Compliance" and"Urgent Manifestation" of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a second motion forextension of time to file the comment.

On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that its motion for extension oftime was granted.

On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time andasked that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their answers.

On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying, among other reliefs, thatclaimants should be ordered to amend their complaint.

On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII tofile their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.

On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the reversal of the said orderof the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory andpraying that AIBC and BRII be declared in default.

On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended Complaint and/or Position Paper"dated March 24, 1985, adding new demands: namely, the payment of overtime pay, extra nightwork pay, annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay, retirement and savings benefits andtheir share of forfeitures (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEAAdministrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the amended complaint (G.R. No. 104776,Rollo, p. 20).

On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary Judgment." On the same day,the POEA issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers to the "AmendedComplaint," otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present evidence and


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the case would be resolved on the basis of complainants evidence.

On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as Improper Class Suit and Motionfor Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated March 24, 1985." Claimants opposed themotions.

On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his directive to AIBC and BRII to filetheir answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.

On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC, together with a petition forthe issuance of a writ of injunction. On September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEAAdministrator from hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for the filing of the answersof AIBC and BRII.

On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to include additionalclaimants in the case and to investigate alleged wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their respective

lawyers.

On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII with the POEA, demanding monetary claims similar to thosesubject of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same month, Solomon Reyes also filed his owncomplaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-779) against AIBC and BRII.

On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates asked for thesubstitution of the original counsel of record and the cancellation of the special powers ofattorney given the original counsel.

On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the claim to enforceattorneys lien.

On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-555.

On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on February 27, 1985 andSeptember 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.

In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA Administrator, it is not amiss tomention that two cases were filed in the Supreme Court by the claimants, namelyG.R. No.72132 on September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May13, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing thePOEA Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions and oppositions filed in POEACases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460 and to decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch.

AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489), questioning the Order datedSeptember 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer


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the amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November 9,1987, we dismissed the petition by informing AIBC that all its technical objections may properlybe resolved in the hearings before the POEA.

Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on September 22, 1988 by

claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants against the POEA Administrator and severalNLRC Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the Secretary of Laborand Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. Thesecond was filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R. Lobetacharging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor and social legislations. The third was filed byJose R. Santos, Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII ofviolations of labor laws.

On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution datedDecember 12, 1986.

On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its motion for suspensionof the period for filing an answer or motion for extension of time to file the same until theresolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC dismissing the two appeals.On April 28, 1987, NLRC en banc denied the motion for reconsideration.

At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the complaint. At the samehearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit theirrespective position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants filed their "Urgent Motion to Strike OutAnswer," alleging that the answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their"Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with the POEA Order of June 19,1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988,claimants filed their "Ex-parte Motion to Expunge from the Records" the position paper of AIBCand BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.

On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro filed their memorandum inPOEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted theirSupplemental Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its "Reply to Complainants

Memorandum." On October 26, 1988, claimants submitted their "Ex-parte ManifestationalMotion and Counter-Supplemental Motion," together with 446 individual contracts ofemployments and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a "ConsolidatedReply."cralaw virtua1aw library

On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated cases, which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in favor ofonly 324 complainants. chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal Memorandum for Partial Appeal" fromthe decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion for reconsiderationand/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of Appeal" filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by anothercounsel for AIBC.


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On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal," praying for the dismissal of theappeal of AIBC and BRII.

On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to Complainants Appeal Memorandum,"

together with their "newly discovered evidence" consisting of payroll records.

On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their "Manifestation," stating among othermatters that there were only 728 named claimants. On April 20, 1989, the claimants filed their"Counter-Manifestation," alleging that there were 1,767 of them.

On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for Execution" of the Decision datedJanuary 30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII had failed to appeal on time and AIBC had not postedthe supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44.

On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve the labor cases.

On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their "Manifestational Motion," praying that all the 1,767claimants be awarded their monetary claims for failure of private respondents to file theiranswers within the reglementary period required by law.

On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, disposing as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the POEA in these consolidated cases ismodified to the extent and in accordance with the following dispositions:chanrob1es virtual1aw library

1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified and listed in Annex "A" hereof are dismissed forhaving prescribed;

2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the149 complainants, identified and listed in Annex "B" hereof, the peso equivalent, at the time ofpayment, of the total amount in US dollars indicated opposite their respective names;

3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19 complaints classified and listed in Annex "C" hereof,who appear to have worked elsewhere than in Bahrain are hereby set aside.

4. All claims other than those indicated in Annex "B", including those for overtime work andfavorably granted by the POEA, are hereby dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in supportthereof or are beyond the competence of this Commission to pass upon.

In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and authority under Article 218 (c) ofthe Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, hereby directs Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco of thisCommission to summon parties, conduct hearings and receive evidence, as expeditiously aspossible, and thereafter submit a written report to this Commission (First Division) of theproceedings taken, regarding the claims of the following:chanrob1es virtual1aw library


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(a) complainants identified and listed in Annex "D" attached and made an integral part of thisResolution, whose claims were dismissed by the POEA for lack of proof of employment inBahrain (these complainants numbering 683, are listed in pages 13 to 23 of the decision ofPOEA, subject of the appeals) and,

(b) complainants identified and listed in Annex "E" attached and made an integral part of thisResolution, whose awards decreed by the POEA, to Our mind, are not supported by substantialevidence" (G.R. No. 104776; Rollo, pp. 113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 85-87; G.R. Nos.105029-31, pp. 120-122).

On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12 co-claimants, who were formerclients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a petition for certiorariwith the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos.120741-44). The petition was dismissed in a resolution dated January 27, 1992.

Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991 Resolution of the NLRC were filed.The first, by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo; the second, by the claimants

represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII.

In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the motions for reconsideration.

Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776),the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro (G.R. Nos. 104911-14) and by AIBC and BRII(G.R. Nos. 105029-32).

II

Compromise Agreements

Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and AIBC and BRII havesubmitted, from time to time, compromise agreements for our approval and jointly moved for thedismissal of their respective petitions insofar as the claimants-parties to the compromiseagreements were concerned (See Annex A for list of claimants who signed quitclaims).

Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a compromise agreement andthe corresponding motions for the approval of the agreements were filed by the parties andapproved by the Court:chanrob1es virtual1aw library

1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio Abarquez and 47 co-claimants

dated September 2, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R. Nos. 105029-32,Rollo, pp. 470-615);

2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Bienvenido Cadalin and 82 co-petitionersdated September 3, 1992 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 364-507);

3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose M. Aban and 36 co-claimants datedSeptember 17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 613-722; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.


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518-626; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 407-516);

4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio T. Anglo and 17 co-claimantsdated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.650-713; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 530-590);

5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio Bobongo and 6 co-claimantsdated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp.629-652);

6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio A. Evangelista and 4 co-claimantsdated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.1815-1829);

7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants Palconeri Banaag and 5 co-claimantsdated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp.

655-675);

8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Benjamin Ambrosio and 15 other co-claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R. No. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R. Nos. 104911-14,Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1773-1814);

9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio Evangelista and 3 co-claimants dated May10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);

10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Quiterio R. Agudo and 36 co-claimantsdated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,pp. 748-864; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1066-1183);

11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo J. Alonzo and 19 co-claimantsdated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1173-1235; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 896-959);

12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo C. Dayrit and 2 co-claimantsdated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-3, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 972-984);

13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante C. Aceres and 37 co-claimantsdated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1257-1375; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1280-1397);

14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V. Abella and 27 co-claimants datedJanuary 10, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, Vol. II);

15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B. Solano and six co-claimants datedAugust 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No. 104776; G.R. No. 104911-14).


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III

The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than fifty volumes now comprising therecords of these cases. From the records, it appears that the complainants-appellants allege thatthey were recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown &Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at various projects undertakenby Brown & Root in several countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, UnitedArab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the Philippine Government, allthe individual complainants signed standard overseas employment contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter, reference to the records would be sparingly made, considering their chaoticarrangement) with AIBC before their departure from the Philippines. These overseas

employment contracts invariably contained the following relevant terms and conditions.

PART B

(1) Employment Position

Classification :

(Code) :

(2) Company Employment

Status :

(3) Date of Employment

to Commence on :

(4) Basic Working

Hours Per Week :

(5) Basic Working

Hours per Month :

(6) Basic Hourly Rate :

(7) Overtime Rate


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Per Hour :

(8) Projected Period of Service

(Subject to C (1) of this [sic]) :

Months and/or

Job Completion

x x x

3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION

a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as set out in Part B of thisDocument.

b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and Employer may, at his soleoption, change or adjust such hours as maybe deemed necessary from time to time.

4. TERMINATION

a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement, the Employer may, at hissole discretion, terminate employees service with cause, under this agreement at any time. If the

Employer terminates the services of the Employee under this Agreement because of thecompletion or termination, or suspension of the work on which the Employees services werebeing utilized, or because of a reduction in force due to a decrease in scope of such work, or bychange in the type of construction of such work. The Employer will be responsible for his returntransportation to his country of origin. Normally on the most expeditious air route, economyclass accommodation.

x x x

10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS

a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory completion of contract, employeeshall be entitled to 12-days vacation leave with pay. This shall be computed at the basic wage

rate. Fractions of a years service will be computed on a pro-rata basis.

b) Sick leave of 15 days shall be granted to the employee for every year of service for non-workconnected injuries or illness. If the employee failed to avail of such leave benefits, the same shallbe forfeited at the end of the year in which said sick leave is granted.

11. BONUS


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A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be accrued and payable only uponsatisfactory completion of this contract.

12. OFFDAY PAY

The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day of rest with 8 hours regular pay. If workis performed on this day, all hours work shall be paid at the premium rate. However, this offdaypay provision is applicable only when the laws of the Host Country require payments for restday.

In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were deployed, His MajestyIsa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976,otherwise known as the Labour Law for the Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This decree tookeffect on August 16, 1976. Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant tothe claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows (Emphasis supplied):chanrob1es virtual1aw library

Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wageentitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-five per centum thereof for hours worked duringthe day; and by a minimum of fifty per centum thereof for hours worked during the night whichshall be deemed to being from seven oclock in the evening until seven oclock in the morning . .

. ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.

. . . an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on his weekly day of rest ifcircumstances so require and in respect of which an additional sum equivalent to 150% of hisnormal wage shall be paid to him . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shallbe paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.

Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years continuous service with his employer shallbe entitled to leave on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to aperiod not less than 28 days after five continuous years of service."cralaw virtua1aw library

A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion ofhis service in that year." cralaw virtua1aw library

Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminatedby either party thereto after giving the other party thirty days prior notice before suchtermination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days notice in respect of

other workers. The party terminating a contract without giving the required notice shall pay tothe other party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for theperiod of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.

Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment,


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a leaving indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen dayswages for each year of the first three years of service and of one months wages for each year of

service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon aquantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed within a year." cralaw virtua1aw library

All the individual complainants-appellants have already been repatriated to the Philippines at thetime of the filing of these cases (R.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 59-65).

IV

The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were: chanrob1es virtual1aw library

First:Whether or not complainants are entitled to the benefits provided by Amiri Decree No.23 of Bahrain;

(a) Whether or not the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits.

(b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly prescribing a more favorable treatmentof alien employees) bars complainants from enjoying its benefits.

Second:Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain is applicable in these cases, whetheror not complainants claim for the benefits provided therein have prescribed.

Third:Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class suit.

Fourth:Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision thatis the subject of these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due process;

(a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was denied its right to due process;

(b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by the POEA after these cases were submitted fordecision was valid;

(c) Whether or not the POEA acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root International, Inc.;

(d) Whether or not the judgment awards are supported by substantial evidence;

(e) Whether or not the awards based on the averages and formula presented by the complainants-appellants are supported by substantial evidence;

(f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond what the complainants-appellants prayedfor; and, if so, whether or not these awards are valid.

Fifth:Whether or not the POEA erred in holding respondents AIBC and Brown & Rootjointly are severally liable for the judgment awards despite the alleged finding that the former


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was the employer of the complainants;

(a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root;

(b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC was a licensed construction contractor

precludes a finding that Brown & Root is liable for complainants claims.

Sixth:Whether or not the POEA Administrators failure to hold respondents in defaultconstitutes a reversible error.

Seventh:Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in dismissing the following claims:chanrob1es virtual1aw library

a. Unexpired portion of contract;

b. Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund;

c. Retirement and Savings Plan benefits;

d. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;

e. Area Differential Pay;

f. Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits;

g. Salary differential pay;

h. Wage differential pay;

i. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS;

j. Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR;

k. Fringe benefits under B & Rs "A Summary of Employee

Benefits" (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);

l. Moral and exemplary damages;

m. Attorneys fees of at least ten percent of the judgment award;

n. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and theaccreditation of B & R issued by POEA;

o. Penalty for violations of Article 34 (prohibited practices), not excluding reportorialrequirements thereof.


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Eight:Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in not dismissing POEA Case No. (L)86-65-460 on the ground of multiplicity of suits (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51-55).

Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules onEvidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple

copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector). NLRCinvoked Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, vesting on the Commission amplediscretion to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case without regardto the technicalities of law or procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that theAmiri Decree No. 23, being more favorable and beneficial to the workers, should form part ofthe overseas employment contract of the complainants.

NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the claimants, who workedin Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA Administrator in favor of the claimants, whoworked elsewhere.

On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of thecomplainants was three years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year asprovided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the labor cases cannot betreated as a class suit for the simple reason that not all the complainants worked in Bahrain andtherefore, the subject matter of the action, the claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not ofcommon or general interest to all the complainants.

On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the cardinal rules of administrativedue process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA Administrator to consider the evidencepresented by AIBC and BRII; (2) some findings of fact were not supported by substantialevidence; and (3) some of the evidence upon which the decision was based were not disclosed toAIBC and BRII during the hearing.

On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA Administrator that BRII and AIBCare solidarily liable for the claims of the complainants and held that BRII was the actualemployer of the complainants, or at the very least, the indirect employer, with AIBC as the laborcontractor.

NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA Administrator throughthe summons served on AIBC, its local agent.

On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was correct in denying the Motionto Declare AIBC in default.

On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based on the Amiri Decree No. 23,NLRC ruled:chanrob1es virtual1aw library


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(1) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the claims for refund of the SSSpremiums and refund of withholding taxes and the claimants should file their claims for saidrefund with the appropriate government agencies;

(2) the claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the claims which are not based on the

overseas employment contracts nor the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;

(3) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over claims for moral and exemplarydamages and nonetheless, the basis for granting said damages was not established;

(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract may beallowed if filed within the three-year prescriptive period;

(5) that the allegation that complainants were prematurely repatriated prior to the expiration oftheir overseas contract was not established; and

(6) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the complaint for the suspension orcancellation of the AIBCs recruitment license and the cancellation of the accreditation of BRII.

NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 shouldhave been dismissed on the ground that the claimants in said case were also claimants in POEACase No. (L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460, the POEA justresolved the corresponding claims in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other words, the POEAdid not pass upon the same claims twice.

V

G.R. No. 104776

Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorarion the following grounds: chanrob1es virtual1aw library

(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to a speedy disposition of theircases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The POEA Administratorallowed private respondents to file their answers in two years (on June 19, 1987) after the filingof the original complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its own rules,affirmed the action of the POEA Administrator;

(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default and

should have rendered summary judgment on the basis of the pleadings and evidence submittedby claimants;

(3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding that the labor cases filed by AIBCand BRII cannot be considered a class suit;

(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten years; and


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(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have dismissed POEA Case No. L-86-05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de Castro (Rollo, pp. 31-40).

AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776, argued: chanrob1es virtual1aw library

(1) that they were not responsible for the delay in the disposition of the labor cases, consideringthe great difficulty of getting all the records of the more than 1,500 claimants, the piece-mealfiling of the complaints and the addition of hundreds of new claimants by petitioners;

(2) that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it was impossible to prepare theanswers within the ten-day period provided in the NLRC Rules, that when the motion to declareAIBC in default was filed on July 19, 1987, said party had already filed its answer, and thatconsidering the staggering amount of the claims (more than US$50,000,000.00) and thecomplicated issues raised by the parties, the ten-day rule to answer was not fair and reasonable;

(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRCs finding that there was no common or general

interest in the subject matter of the controversywhich was the applicability of the AmiriDecree No. 23. Likewise, the nature of the claims varied, some being based on salariespertaining to the unexpired portion of the contracts while others being for pure money claims.Each claimant demanded separate claims peculiar only to himself and depending upon theparticular circumstances obtaining in his case;

(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that prescribed by Article 291 of the LaborCode of the Philippines (three years) and not the one prescribed by Article 1144 of the CivilCode of the Philippines (ten years); and

(5) that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA Case No. L-86-05-460 should bedismissed, this being a private quarrel between the two labor lawyers (Rollo, pp. 292-305).

Attorneys Lien

On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike out the joint manifestationsand motions of AIBC and BRII dated September 2 and 11, 1992, claiming that all the claimantswho entered into the compromise agreements subject of said manifestations and motions werehis clients and that Atty. Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said agreements.He also claimed that the claimants were paid less than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty.De Castro collected additional attorneys fees on top of the 25% which he was entitled to

receive; and that the consent of the claimants to the compromise agreements and quitclaims wereprocured by fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution dated November 23,1992, the Court denied the motion to strike out the Joint Manifestations and Motions datedSeptember 2 and 11, 1992 (G.R. No. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609).

On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorneys Lien,"alleging that the claimants who entered into compromise agreements with AIBI and BRII withthe assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement with his law firm (G.R. No.104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535).


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Contempt of Court

On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del Mundo to cite Atty. De Castroand Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and for violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly misled this Court, by making it appearthat the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements were represented by Atty. DeCastro, when in fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.1560-1614).

On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges against Atty. De Castro forunethical practices and moved for the voiding of the quitclaims submitted by some of theclaimants.

G.R. Nos. 104911-14

The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for certiorarion the grounds thatNLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) applied the three-year prescriptive period underthe Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied the claimants formula based on an average

overtime pay of three hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22).

The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself during the negotiation for anamicable settlement of their money claims in Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum dated April16, 1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22).

BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R. No. 104776 that theprescriptive period in the Labor Code of the Philippines, a special law, prevails over thatprovided in the Civil Code of the Philippines, a general law.

As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the method of computing theovertime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that they were not bound by what appeared therein,because such memorandum was proposed by a subordinate Bahrain official and there was noshowing that it was approved by the Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that theaveraging method was discussed in the course of the negotiation for the amicable settlement ofthe dispute and any offer made by a party therein could not be used as an admission by him(Rollo, pp. 228-236).

G.R. Nos. 105029-32

In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it:(1) enforced the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and not the terms of theemployment contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime and leave indemnity pay andother benefits, on evidence admitted in contravention of petitioners constitutional right to dueprocess; and (3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for the 683 claimantswhose claims had been dismissed for lack of proof by the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself.


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Lastly, they allege that assuming that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable, NLRCerred when it did not apply the one-year prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30).

VI

G.R. No. 104776

G.R. Nos. 104911-14

G.R. Nos. 105029-32

All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although they disagreed as to the timethat should be embraced within the prescriptive period.

To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years, applying Article 1144 of theCivil Code of the Philippines. NLRC believed otherwise, fixing the prescriptive period at threeyears as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14, invoking different grounds,insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive period applicable to the claims was threeyears, instead of ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator.

The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive period was one year asprescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred to the ruling of NLRC thatArticle 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative law.

The POEA Administrator held the view that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code) refer to those arising from theemployers violation of the employees right as provided by the Labor Code.

In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the rights of the workers as provided bythe Labor Code, but the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which ipsofacto amended the workers contracts of employment. Respondents consciously failed toconform to these provisions which specifically provide for the increase of the workers rate. Itwas only after June 30, 1983, four months after the brown builders brought a suit against B & Rin Bahrain for this same claim, when respondent AIBCs contracts have undergone amendmentsin Bahrain for the new hires/renewals (Respondents Exhibit 7).

Hence, premises considered, the applicable law of prescription to this instant case is Article 1144of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides: chanrob1es virtual1aw library

Art. 1144. The following actions may be brought within ten years from the time the cause ofaction accrues:chanrob1es virtual1aw library

(1) Upon a written contract;


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(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

Thus, herein money claims of the complainants against the respondents shall prescribe in tenyears from August 16, 1976. Inasmuch as all claims were filed within the ten-year prescriptive

period, no claim suffered the infirmity of being prescribed" (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, 89-90).

In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the prescriptive period is three years asprovided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the NLRC argued as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Labor Code provides that all money claims arising from employer-employee relations . . .shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shallbe forever barred (Art. 291, Labor Code, as amended). This three-year prescriptive period shallbe the one applied here and which should be reckoned from the date of repatriation of eachindividual complainant, considering the fact that the case is having (sic) filed in this country. Wedo not agree with the POEA Administrator that this three-year prescriptive period applies only to

money claims specifically recoverable under the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291 gives nosuch indication. Likewise, We can not consider complainants cause/s of action to have accruedfrom a violation of their employment contracts. There was no violation; the claims arise from thebenefits of the law of the country where they worked. (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 90-91).

Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as provided by the Amiri Decree No.23 of 1976, NLRC opined that the applicability of said law was one of characterization, i.e.,whether to characterize the foreign law on prescription or statute of limitation as "substantive" or"procedural." NLRC cited the decision in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d.152, 2d Cir. [1955], where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a casefiled in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims wouldhave prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of NewYork. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it wasnot "specifically intended to be substantive," hence, the prescriptive period provided in the lawof the forum should apply. The Court observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and itis not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside aswell as within the foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statutepertains, we think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose this test is themost satisfactory one. It does not lead American courts into the necessity of examining into theunfamiliar peculiarities and refinements of different foreign legal systems. . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

The court further noted:chanrob1es virtual1aw library

x x x

"Applying that test here it appears to us that the libelant is entitled to succeed, for therespondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question wasspecifically aimed against the particular rights which the libelant seeks to enforce. The Panama


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Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives, viz: The present Code regulates the relationsbetween capital and labor, placing them on a basis of social justice, so that, without injuring anyof the parties, there may be guaranteed for labor the necessary conditions for a normal life and tocapital an equitable return to its investment. In pursuance of these objectives the Code gives

laborers various rights against their employers. Article 623 establishes the period of limitation

for all such rights, except certain ones which are enumerated in Article 621. And there is nothingin the record to indicate that the Panamanian legislature gave special consideration to the impactof Article 623 upon the particular rights sought to be enforced here, as distinguished from theother rights to which that Article is also applicable. Were we confronted with the question ofwhether the limitation period of Article 621 (which carves out particular rights to be governed bya shorter limitation period) is to be regarded as substantive or procedural under the rule ofspecifity we might have a different case; but here on the surface of things we appear to be

dealing with a broad, and not a specific, statute of limitations" (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.

92-94).

Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the

Philippines, which was applied by NLRC, refers only to claims "arising from the employersviolation of the employees right as provided by the Labor Code." They assert that their claimsare based on the violation of their employment contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No.23 of 1976 and therefore the claims may be brought within ten years as provided by Article 1144of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 18-21). To bolster theircontention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).

AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under the Amiri DecreeNo. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing law," which isSection 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such kind of law exists, it takesprecedence over the common-law conflicts rule (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).

First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on theAmiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of oneyear from the date of the expiry of the contract" (G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters,such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, aregoverned by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreignsubstantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private InternationalLaw 131 [1979]).

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may beviewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied the statute of


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limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showingthat the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being consideredmerely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum onprescription of actions.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomesirrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practicaleffect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statuteof limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts 183 [1975]). Whilethere are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one from provides that an action barred by thelaws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the localstatute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). Section 48of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is

also barred in the Philippines Islands."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to which wereinconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which isinconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, PhilippineConflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigoreinsofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23of 1976.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums publicpolicy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713[1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 asregards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development" (Sec. 10).

"The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workersand promote their welfare" (Sec. 18).

In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized andunorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all." cralaw virtua1aw library

Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law, the next


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question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is three years, asprovided by the Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144 of the Civil Code ofthe Philippines, which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The following actions must be brought within ten years from the right of action accrues: chanrob1es virtual1aw library

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment."cralaw virtua1aw library

NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article 291 of the Labor Codeof the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during theeffectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of actionaccrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.

x x x"

The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA(1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at bench(Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the correct computation of overtime pay as provided in thecollective bargaining agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.

As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not make any reference as to thecomputation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494)and instead insisted that work computation provided in the collective bargaining agreementsbetween the parties be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored onthe written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art.1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by R.A. No. 19933)provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be commenced within three yearsafter the cause of action accrued otherwise such action shall be forever barred, . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

The court further explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 asamended) will apply, if the claim for differentials for overtime work is solely based on said law,and not on a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract. In the instant case, the claim


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for overtime compensation is not so much because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amendedbut because the claim is demandable right of the employees, by reason of the above-mentionedcollective bargaining agreement."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period for filing "actions to

enforce any cause of action under said law." On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code ofthe Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing "money claims arising from employer-employee relations." The claim is the cases at bench all arose from the employer-employeerelations, which is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the collectivebargaining agreement.

The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive period under Article291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverableunder said Code does not find support in the plain language of the provision. Neither is thecontention of the claimants in G.R. No. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arisingfrom the employers violation of the employees right," as provided by the Labor Code supported

by the facial reading of the provision.

VII

G.R. No. 104776

A. As the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776, claimants aver: (1) that whiletheir complaints were filed on June 6, 1984 with POEA, the case was decided only on January30, 1989, a clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2) that NLRC andthe POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp. 31-35).

Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987 Constitution, which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." cralaw virtua1aw library

It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to theaccused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil andadministrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officialswho are tasked with the administration of justice.

However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy disposition ofcases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded to theaccused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It isconsistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitutionprohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.

Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into consideration in determining whether ornot the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" has been violated, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph


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"In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certainfactors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason forthe delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. Thesame factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person

officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the speedy disposition ofcases."cralaw virtua1aw library

Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991), we held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right tospeedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious,and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,or when without cause or justified motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without theparty having his case tried."cralaw virtua1aw library

Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served with a copy of the amendedcomplaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure tofile their answers within the ten-day period provided in Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of theRules and Regulations of the POEA. At that time, there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRIIto strike out of the records the amended complaint and the "Compliance" of claimants to theorder of the POEA, requiring them to submit a bill of particulars.

The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their final disposition in theadministrative level after seven years from their inception, cannot be said to be attended byunreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedydisposition of the cases of complainants.

The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767 claimants. Said complainthad undergone several amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985.

The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were deployed in differentareas, one group in and the other groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling morethan US$65 million according to Atty. Del Mundo, included:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Unexpired portion of contract;

2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;

3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;

4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;

5. Area Differential pay;

6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;


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7. Salary differential pay;

8. Wage Differential pay;

9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to Social Security System;

10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to Bureau of Internal Revenue (B.I.R.);

11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Roots "A Summary of Employees Benefits consisting of 43

pages (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);

12. Moral and Exemplary Damages;

13. Attorneys fees of at least ten percent of amounts;

14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and issued bythe POEA; and

15. Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited practices) not excluding reportorialrequirements thereof" (NLRC Resolution, September 2, 1991, pp. 18-19; G.R. No. 104776,Rollo, pp. 73-74).

Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness and clarity of some facts,the claimants were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars. Whenclaimants filed their "Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike out the complaintfrom the records for failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the POEAAdministrator denied the motion to strike out the complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correctthe deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC.

Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the complaint, the records ofemployment of the more than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved from various countries in theMiddle East. Some of the records dated as far back as 1975.

The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA Administrator were interrupted severaltimes by the various appeals, first to NLRC and then to the Supreme Court.

Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases were filed against AIBC andBRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases No. L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaintwas filed on May 29, 1986 (POEA Case No. L-86-05- 460). NLRC, in exasperation, noted thatthe exact number of claimants had never been completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991,G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three new cases were consolidated with POEA Case No.L-84-06-555.

NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in terminating the proceedings, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph


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"These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route towards resolution had theparties and their counsel been more interested in pursuing the truth and the merits of the claimsrather than exhibiting a fanatical reliance on technicalities. Parties and counsel have made thesecases a litigation of emotion. The intransigence of parties and counsel is remarkable. As late aslast month, this Commission made a last and final attempt to bring the counsel of all the parties

(this Commission issued a special order directing respondent Brown & Roots resident agent/s toappear) to come to a more conciliatory stance. Even this failed" (Rollo, p. 58).

The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay in the disposition of the cases,to the lament of NLRC, which complained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is very evident from the records that the protagonists in these consolidated cases appear to benot only the individual complainants, on the one hand, and AIBC and Brown & Root, on theother hand. The two lawyers for the complainants, Atty. Gerardo Del Mundo and Atty. FloranteDe Castro, have yet to settle the right of representation, each one persistently claiming to appearin behalf of most of the complainants. As a result, there are two appeals by the complainants.

Attempts by this Commission to resolve counsels conflicting claims of their respective authorityto represent the complainants prove futile. The bickerings by these two counsels are reflected intheir pleadings. In the charges and countercharges of falsification of documents and signatures,and in the disbarment proceedings by one against the other. All these have, to a large extent,abetted in confounding the issues raised in these cases, jumble the presentation of evidence, andeven derailed the prospects of an amicable settlement. It would not be far-fetched to imagine thatboth counsel, unwittingly, perhaps, painted a rainbow for the complainants, with the proverbialpot of gold at its end containing more than US$100 million, the aggregate of the claims in thesecases. It is, likewise, not improbable that their misplaced zeal and exuberance caused them tothrow all caution to the wind in the matter of elementary rules of procedure and evidence"(Rollo, pp. 58-59).

Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the listing of some of thecomplainants in both petitions filed by the two lawyers. As noted by NLRC, "the problemcreated by this situation is that if one of the two petitions is dismissed, then the parties and thepublic respondents would not know which claim of which petitioner was dismissed and whichwas not."cralaw virtua1aw library

B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be consolidated in a "class suit" because"all the name complainants have similar money claims and similar rights sought irrespective ofwhether they worked in Bahrain, United Arab Emirates or in Abu Dhabi, Libya or in any part ofthe Middle East" (Rollo, pp. 35-38).

A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or generalinterest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all beforethe court (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).

While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain Law, many of the claimantsworked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia underdifferent terms and conditions of employment.


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NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that inasmuch as the firstrequirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on the Amiri Decreeof the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitledto file their claims in a class suit.

While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same(for employees benefits), there is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are

based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, butwere deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not inthe claims of the other employees of defendants. The named claimants have a special orparticular interest in specific benefits completely different from the benefits in which the othernamed claimants and those included as members of a "class" are claiming (Berses v. Villanueva,25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears that each claimant is only interested in collecting his own claims.A claimants has no concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by thefact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate

compromise settlements of their respective claims. A principle basic to the concept of "class suit"is that plaintiffs brought on the record must fairly represent and protect the interests of the others(Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimantswho worked in Ba

15. Bienvenido m. Cadalin, Et Al. v. Poea Administrator g.r. No. 104776 December 5, 1994

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Transcript of 15. Bienvenido m. Cadalin, Et Al. v. Poea Administrator g.r. No. 104776 December 5, 1994