Agwanit ¿Como se anxionó Marruecos el Sáhara auritano (English)
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AGWANIT-COMO SE ANEXION MARRUECOS EL SAHARA MAURITANO? Como
Marruecos boicote el Acuerdo de Argel: inicialmente intentando un
golpe militar en Mauritania y luego anexionando esa parte del
Sharasbado 15 de septiembre de 2007CMO SE ANEXION MARRUECOS EL
SHARA MAURITANO? Texto actualizado y reformado por ltima vez el 14
de noviembre 2009*El 11 de Agosto de 1979 las tropas marroques
toman la prefectura de Dajla, antigua Villa Cisneros, Marruecos
alega un supuesto derecho de retracto para anexionarse el Shara
Occidental que correspondi a Mauritania en los Acuerdos Tripartitos
de Madrid de 1975. Este territorio tiene una extensin de unos
90.000 kilmetros cuadrados y contaba en 1979 con alrededor de
18.000 habitantes, casi todos nmadas. En este territorio,
rigurosamente desrtico, se encontraban tres localidades de cierta
entidad: la capital, Dajla, antigua Villa Cisneros, puerto pesquero
sobre el Atlntico, donde se encuentra concentrada la mayor parte de
la poblacin sedentaria, y, aislados en el desierto, los dos puestos
de Ausserd (en el centro) y de Tichla (al Sur).
Forzada por su delicada situacin interna, por la presin
internacional de ciertas potencias y por la Marcha Verde . el 8 de
noviembre de 1975, Espaa, como potencia colonial del Shara Espaol
firma, unilateralmente a espaldas de la ONU el Acuerdo Tripartito
de Madrid por el que transfiere la administracin del Shara a
Marruecos y Mauritania hasta el 26 de febrero de 1976, fecha en la
que se retira del territorio sin celebrar el referndum de
autodeterminacin por el cual los saharauis deberan decidir su
destino, en clara contradiccin con la Opinin Consultiva de la Corte
Internacional de Justicia 16-10-75 en cuyo dictamen estableca que
no haba elementos para impedir la convocatoria del referendum
previsto al no reconocer ejercicio de soberana a Marruecos y
Mauritania sobre la zona en el periodo previo a la
colonizacin.
El 27 de febrero de 1976, el Frente Polisario proclam la RASD en la
localidad de Bir Lelh, inicindose una guerra entre la RASD contra
Marruecos y Mauritania.
El 14 de abril de 1976 Marruecos y Mauritania firman un Tratado
Internacional de fronteras por el que se reparten el territorio:
correspondiendo 2/3 partes a Marruecos y un tercio del territorio a
Mauritania (en realidad es reflejo de lo que cada uno habia
ocupado).
Fruto de la guerra de desgaste del Frente Polisario el 10 de julio
de 1978 se produce un golpe de estado que derroca al presidente de
Mauritania Mohtar Uld-Dadach y aunque inicialmente pareca que el
golpe no afectara a la poltica exterior mauritana , especialmente
en lo que concierne al Shara Occidental y a las islas Canarias;
sta, se va a orientar a la bsqueda de un acuerdo con el Frente
Polisario para salirse de la guerra.
El problema para Mauritania era como hacerlo sin enemistar a
Marruecos que haba sido su aliado natural desde 1975. El 10 de
noviembre de 1978 el Presidente Salek declar a la prensa
internacional su voluntad de llegar a un acuerdo en el que no
descartaba ceder el Shara mauritano al Frente Polisario. Su idea
inicial consista en llegar a un acuerdo global regional entre
Marruecos, Mauritania, Argelia y el Frente Polisario consistente en
la cesin del Shara ocupado por Mauritania al Frente Polisario y a
lograr algn tipo de acuerdo para el territorio ocupado por
Marruecos entre las otras partes (Frente Polisario, Argelia y
Marruecos) a lo que Rabat se neg alegando que no permitira la
creacin de un "microestado hostil" entre "su frontera" y
Mauritania, por otra parte el Frente Polisario se mostr contrario a
una divisin del territorio.A partir de este momento Mauritania
intentar llegar a un acuerdo bilateral con el Frente Polisario para
buscar la paz.En el mes de mayo de 1979 a travs de varios actos
Mauritania manifiesta que est totalmente decidida a salirse de la
guerra, siendo expuesto este planteamiento a una delegacin del
gobierno argelino que visit Nuakchott, as como durante una gira
realizada a varios paises por el ministro Ahmed Uld Buseif entre
ellos al coronel Gadafi en Trpoli, y en Espaa al entonces
Presidente del gobierno Adolfo Surez.
Por su parte Adolfo Suarez en una visita a Argel realiza un
reconocimiento de facto del derecho de autodeterminacin de los
saharauis y del Frente Polisario. Este pronunciamiento producira
una reaccin airada de Marruecos que intent presionar a Espaa con
los contenciosos de la pesca y el territorial de Ceuta y Melilla
.
No obstante, a pesar de estas tensiones, este posicionamiento
produjo un cierto alivio entre las autoridades mauritanas dado que
as no caeria sobre Mauritania toda la presin marroqu.
Adems,fueron aspectos decisivos sobre la decisin mauritana, el
convencimiento de que las tesis marroques iban a tener escaso eco
en la cumbre de la OUA que se iba a celebrar el mes de julio en
Monrovia y la situacin de bancarrota del pais con la necesidad
urgente de una ayuda de 140 millones de dlares para poder pagar a
la administracin y el ejercito. No obstante, el hecho de que esta
deuda pudiera ser cubierta por paises rabes moderados con los que
Marruecos mantiene excelentes relaciones y la amenaza del
presidente senegals Leopold Senghor (gran aliado de Marruecos en la
OUA) de solicitar la autodeterminacin de la poblacin negra
mauritana en caso de que sta reconociese el derecho de
autodeterminacin de los saharauis, hacan concebir a Rabat
esperanzas de que Mauritania no ira demasiado lejos en el
reconocimiento de los derechos saharauis.
El 2 de Agosto el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores marroqu Mohamed
Bucetta, declara que si Mauritania cede el shara mauritano al
Frente Polisario estara violando los tratados en vigor entre los
dos paises.
El 5 de Agosto se produce el Acuerdo de Argel por el cual
Mauritania reconoce al Frente Polisario como representante legtimo
de los saharauis y su derecho a la autodeterminacin , y en los que
adems renuncia a toda pretensin territorial sobre el Shara
Occidental.
Por estes acuerdos Mauritania realizara una retirada ordenada del
territorio que durara varios meses; por otra, parte mientras no se
lograse la independencia, por motivos de seguridad, Mauritania
seguira ocupando la peninsula de La Gera. Este acuerdo tuvo su
aprobacin inmediata por los gobiernos de Gran Bretaa y Tanzania, y
se esperaba que muy pronto que muchos estados se adheriesen al
mismo, Francia no se quiso pronunciar oficialmente aunque realiz
movimientos diplomticos.
Este acuerdo en lugar de involucrar a Marruecos por la via del
dilogo y la concertacin produce una reaccin beligerante por su
parte.
La primera reaccin oficial de Hasn II fue por medio de su ministro
de exteriores Mohamed Bucetta declarando que los Acuerdos de Argel
eran nulos y que no comprometian a Rabat. Adems, Marruecos tom
algunas medidas militares como ordenar la retirada de las tropas
marroques que se encontraban en Mauritania (6000) as como , la
repatriacin del contingente de tropas marroques estacionadas en
Zaire desde el ao anterior(sta ltima en previsin de aumentar su
presencia militar en el Shara). Ante esta postura, el gobierno
mauritano solicit a Marruecos que evitara incidentes desagradables
en el Tiris el Garbia. Dado que se especula con distintos
escenarios de conflicto, como la ocupacin marroqu del Tiris el
Garbia o un enfrentamiento armado argelino-marroqu.Aunque tras una
reunin del Consejo de Ministros, Marruecos se limit a informar
pblicamente de que enviara emisarios a la OUA y las Naciones Unidas
con el dossier de Marruecos sobre el Shara, la mayora de la prensa
marroqu pide una intervencin militar en el Tiris el Garbia, y en
algunos casos como el diputado comunista Ali Yata en la propia
Mauritania.Adems, la prensa marroqu reflejaba un supuesto
descontento de la poblacin de Dajla ya que el diputado mauritano y
gobernador de Dajla, Hurmullah Dlimi, antiguo miembro de la Yemaa
saharaui, fue detenido por oponerse a la entrega de esa parte del
Shara al Polisario.
El dia 10 de agosto antes de celebrarse la reunin en Rabat entre el
rey Hasn II y el primer ministro mauritano Junna Uld Haidala en la
que Mauritania pretenda explicar a Marruecos el Acuerdo con el
Frente Polisario, se anunci en Rabat la creacin de un Comit de
Oficiales Libres Mauritanos opuestos a la capitulacin del gobierno
de Nuakchott, dirigido por el ex comandante en jefe de la aviacin,
coronel Mohamed Uld Ba Abdelkader, fue calificado por la delegacin
mauritana como una provocacin y un claro intento de promover un
golpe militar en Mauritania.
En este ambiente se celebr la reunin en la que Mauritania no logra
flexibilizar la posicin marroqu y tras la cual Marruecos manifiesta
que no se considera obligado a retirar sus tropas del shara
mauritano (Marruecos por un acuerdo de defensa firmado en 1977 con
el entonces presidente Mohtar Ould Daddach mantena tropas
estacionadas tanto en el Shara mauritano como dentro de las
fronteras internacionalmente reconocidas de Mauritania desde su
independencia en 1960).
El sbado 11 de Agosto, Marruecos alegando un supuesto derecho de
retracto de nula validez desde el punto de vista del derecho
internacional, inicia la anexin militar del shara mauritano, que
culmin con la ocupacin de Dajla (Villa Cisneros) donde a partir de
ese momento ondea la bandera marroqu.
El dia 12 Marruecos anuncia que el territorio sahariano de Tiris el
Garbia est ya bajo administracin marroqu, ese dia cuatro ministros
del Gobierno marroqu fueron a transmitir a la poblacin de Dajla la
decisin del rey Hasn II de no abandonar a sus sbditos. La prensa
marroqu del dia siguiente recogia en sus pginas amplios reportajes
fotogrficos sobre manifestaciones populares en Marruecos, de apoyo
al rey Hasn de reintegrar al reino esa parte del Shara.
Esta zona fue rebautizada con su antiguo nombre de Ro de Oro (en
rabe Oued-Eddahab) y su anexin fue calificada por el ministro del
interior marroqu Driss Basri como un acto de autodeterminacin de
sus pobladores ante periodistas franceses, nica prensa a la que
estaba permitido cubrir la ocupacin militar y los actos de anexin ,
a los que mostraban fotos de la retirada de los antiguos
administradores mauritanos.
El dia 14 Mauritania pidi ayuda a la ONU y la OUA para proteger sus
fronteras despus de la anexin por Marruecos del Shara administrado
por Mauritania, aunque algunas fuentes prximas a las tesis
marroques quisieron sealar que Mauitania no puso demasiados reparos
a que Marruecos ocupara el Tiris el Garbia (sealaron que esta
decisin fuera anunciada por parte de Marruecos al finalizar la
reunin del viernes 10 ) Mauritania conden la anexin y manifest que
tal ocupacin agreda su pretensin de cumplir sus compromisos
internacionales tal como refleja la Carta al Secretario General de
la ONU de 18 de Agosto. La condena de este acto de fuerza por parte
de la ONU se produce mediante la Resolucin de la Asamblea General
de 21 de noviembre de 1979 .
En esos momentos el nmero de soldados marroques en la ciudad de
Dajla se increment a ms de 3000. En respuesta a la anexin de Tiris
el Garbia por Rabat, a pocos kilmetros del lugar, fuerzas saharauis
embistieron durante seis horas en Bir Enzaran, aniquilando cerca de
dos batallones marroques, de los cuales cuatrocientos hombres
murieron , trescientos heridos y 175 fueron hechos
prisioneros.
El Frente Polisario advirti que lanzara contra las tropas marroques
operaciones similares en cualquier parte que las encuentre,
producindose un serio agravamiento del conflicto en las semanas
siguientes.
Por otra parte, en lo que se interpreta como una consecuencia de
Acuerdo de Argel, 61 prisioneros mauritanos fueron puestos en
libertad por el Frente Polisario, que fueron entregados a las
autoridades militares mauritanas en Nuadhib.
El dia 15 da Agosto el departamento de Estado norteamericano aboga
por buscar un solucin pacfica al conflicto del Shara Occidental y
por su parte Argelia advirti que podra usar la fuerza en el
conflicto del Shara, al tiempo que hizo un llamamiento a los
Estados africanos para que condenaran los actos de agresin , por
parte de Rabat, en el Shara Occidental, y exijan la retirada total
e inmediata de las fuerzas armadas marroques del territorio
sahariano.
El dia 16 de Agosto una representacin de algunos jefes tribales de
Tiris el Garbia se desplazaron hasta Rabat para testimoniar su
vasallaje al rey de Marruecos. La mayora personas de avanzada edad
vinculadas a la tribu Ouled Dlim y al coronel mayor del Ejrcito
marroqu, Ahmed Dlimi, originario de la regin, que estuvo presente
en la ceremonia al lado del soberano alauita donde se nombr nuevo
gobernador a Cherif Dlimi del mismo entorno familiar del anterior
gobernador mauritano.
El dia 17 de Agosto Hasn II en una rueda de prensa en tono
conciliador sugiere un encuentro con el presidente argelino Chadli
Benyedid en la que no descartaba la negociacin sobre el Shara. El
temor a un conflicto armado entre Marruecos y Argelia aparece
latente entre la comunidad internacional.
El dia 19 de Agosto Marruecos comienza a retirar sus tropas de
Mauritania tal como anunciara a principios de mes y a requerimiento
del gobierno mauritano.
El dia 21 el ministro espaol de exteriores ,Marcelino Oreja
afirmaba a un diario francs que el Shara "ahora como ayer era un
territorio internacional" reiterando la postura espaola por la que
Espaa transfiri la administracin del Shara a Marruecos y Mauritania
pero no la soberana porque como potencia colonial no tena soberana
sobre el territorio, y que el gobierno espaol apoya un referndum
para resolver la cuestin. Estas declaraciones provocaron una
reaccin agresiva de la prensa marroqu que peda que se tomasen
represalias contra Espaa: retomando la reivindicacin de Ceuta y
Melilla, anulando los acuerdos de pesca, o cuestionando la soberana
espaola sobre Canarias. Por otra parte, en esos dias el PSOE
presenta un proposicin en el parlamento para que el gobierno espaol
reconociese diplomticamente al Frente Polisario.
El dia 25 de agosto la Marina de guerra espaola recomienda la
retirada de los barcos de pesca que faenaban en el banco
canario-sahariano, esta medida preventiva se produce tras la
declaraciones del ministro Marcelino Oreja, y la reaccin del
gobierno marroqu que amenaz con tomar medidas contra Espaa. Esta
poltica de hostigamiento va a continuar hasta hoy, cuyo incidente
ms grave fue el ametrallamiento el 17 de enero de 1980 del
destructor de la armada espaola Almirante Ferrandiz por un Mirage
de las fuerzas areas marroques cuando acuda en auxilio de un
pesquero espaol a unas cinco millas de las costas del shara
mauritano actualmente ocupado por Marruecos, el incidente se intent
ocultar y dias ms tarde el gobierno espaol quit una nota oficial
calificando lo ocurrido como no alarmante. Aunque oficialmente
Marruecos declara que el territorio est totalmente controlado,
durante el mes de septiembre en medios internacionales ya se prev
que la guerra del Shara iba a ser una guerra de desgaste, como as
fue concluir con el alto el fuego de 1991. Diversos rastreos
realizados por parte del ejrcito marroqu por todo el territorio
ante prensa extranjera en los que no se encuentra ningn efectivo
del Frente Polisario no convencen a los observadores
internacionales de que la ocupacin marroqu estuviera consolidada en
todo el territorio.
En esta guerra el ejrcito marroqu gracias a los muros defensivos
consigue en 1987 ocupar aproximadamente 2 tercios de esta parte del
territorio llegando incluso a penetrar en territorio mauritano tal
como se refleja en mapa poltico-militar no oficial de la Minurso;
quedando al este del muro y bajo control de la RASD del antiguo
shara mauritano, localidades como Agwanit, Zug, o Dougaj.
En la actualidad desde el puesto de control marroqu de Guerguerat
hay una zona de tierra de nadie hasta el primer puesto de control
mauritano, que est plagada de minas y que constituye una zona
importante de contrabando fundamentalmente de automviles.
Y por ltimo la localidad de La Gera en la costa que en la
actualidad est totalmente deshabitada sigue bajo control mauritano;
por eso cuando Marruecos se anexion el sahara mauritano su
principal preocupacin era buscar saharauis originarios de La Gera
que pudieran ser afines a su causa.
Desde el inicio del conflicto los marroques fueron hostiles a
cualquier tipo de afirmacin de territorio liberado de la RASD tanto
en esta parte del Shara como en la zona norte en las localidades de
Tifariti (localidad arrasada por los marroques poco antes del alto
el fuego en la denominada por los marroques "operacin cascabel" o
Batalla de Tifarity.)y Bir Lelh, en este sentido tambin cabe
destacar las presiones que ejerca Marruecos durante la gestacin de
Los primeros Planes de Paz de la ONU para que las tropas del Frente
Polisario se acantonasen en Argelia y no en "zona tampn" segn
terminologa marroqu, tal como se refleja en el Informe de la Misin
del Consejo de Seguridad enviada al Sahara Occidental del 3 al 9 de
junio de 1995
Por eso, la nica solucin que da unidad a todo el territorio es un
referndum libre y justo que permita ejercer el derecho de
autodeterminacin al pueblo saharaui y determine el estatuto
definitivo del territorio sin exclusin de opciones. Ignorar este
principio sobre la base de que un referndum es irrealizable supone
en la prctica, no slo hurtar la legalidad internacional sino al fin
y al cabo defender que para el conflicto del Shara no hay solucin
democrtica, dado que sera el colmo del cinismo hablar de solucin
democrtica ignorando la voluntad de los saharauis.
Buscar otro tipo de soluciones de carcter unilateral que obvian
este principio como el "plan de autonoma marroqu" en base a un
supuesto "realismo" supone una falsificacin de la realidad, dado
que tal como aparece reflejado en el ltimo informe de abril del
Secretario General de la ONU Sr. Banki Mon InformeSGabril2008.pdf a
raz del alto el fuego el territorio se divide en varias zonas: 2
exclusivas de la Minurso que abarcan 30 Kms al este del muro y
otros 30 kms en el oeste del muro en territorio ocupado marroqu (y
esta es la "zona tampn" no la que alegan los marroques sobre
Tifariti). El resto del territorio denominado de restriccin
parcial, de facto de un lado son administracin marroqu al oeste, y
de administracin de la RASD al este, esto supone que la repblica
saharaui est administrando 2 bolsas de territorio una en la zona de
Tifariti en el Norte y la otra en la zona de Agwanit en el Sur, por
lo que buscar soluciones al margen de la legalidad y la voluntad
del pueblo saharaui nos pueden conducir a reactivar o anquilosar el
conflicto, o bien a admitir una divisin del territorio. Documento
elaborado por Roberto Barral profesor del IES "Ramn Aller" de Laln
(Galicia). Fuentes principales utilizadas para su elaboracin:Una
documentacin esencial para conocer el Shara Occidental. Carlos Ruiz
MiguelPgina web de Domingo del Pino
http://www.domingodelpino.com/Hemeroteca de el Diario El Pais.
http://www.elpais.com/Hemeroteca del diario ABC.
http://hemeroteca.abc.es/
AGWANIT-AS THE MAURITANIAN SAHARA WERE ANNEXED MOROCCO? As Morocco boycotted the Agreement of Algiers: initially trying a military coup in Mauritania and soon annexing that part of the Sahara Saturday 15 of September of 2007 HOW WERE ANNEXED MOROCCO THE MAURITANIAN SAHARA? Text updated and reformed for the last time the 14 of November 2009* The 11 of August of 1979 the Moroccan troops takes the prefecture from Dajla, old Villa Cisneros, Morocco alleges a right assumption of withdrawal to annex the Western Sahara that corresponded to Mauritania in the Tripartite Agreements of Madrid of 1975. This territory has an extension of about 90,000 square kilometers and counted in 1979 with around 18,000 inhabitants, almost all nomads. In this territory, rigorously desert, were three localities of certain organization: the capital, Dajla, old Villa Cisneros, fishing port on the Atlantic, where one is concentrated the sedentary population most of, and, isolated in the desert, both put of Ausserd (in center) and Tichla (to the South). Forced by its delicate internal situation, the international pressure of certain powers and by the Green March. the 8 of November of 1975, Spain, like colonial power of the Spanish Sahara signs, unilaterally behind the back of the UN the Tripartite Agreement of Madrid by which it transfers the administration from the Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania until the 26 of February of 1976, date in that it retires of the territory without celebrating the self-determination referendum by which saharauis would have to decide their destiny, in clear contradiction with the Consultative Opinion of the Court the International of Justice 16-10-75 in whose opinion it established that there were elements no to prevent the call of the referendum anticipated when not recognizing sovereignty exercise Morocco and Mauritania on the zone in previous period to the colonization. The 27 of February of 1976, the Polisario Front proclaimed the RASD in the locality of Bir Lelh, beginning a war between the RASD against Morocco and Mauritania. The 14 of April of 1976 Morocco and Mauritania sign a Treaty the International of borders by which they distribute the territory: corresponding 2/3 parts to Morocco and a third from the territory to Mauritania (in fact habia is reflected than each occupied). Fruit of the war of attrition of the Polisario Front the 10 of July of 1978 takes place a coup d'etat that the president of Mauritania Mohtar Uld-Dadach overthrows and although initially it seemed that the blow would not affect the Mauritanian foreign policy, especially concerning the Western Sahara and to the Canary Islands; this one, is going away to orient to the search in an agreement with the Polisario Front to leave the war. The problem Mauritania was like doing it without enemistar to Morocco that had been their natural ally from 1975. The 10 of November of 1978 President Salek declared to the international press his will to reach an agreement in which he did not discard to yield the Mauritanian Sahara to the Polisario Front. Its initial idea consisted of reaching a regional global agreement between Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria and consisting of the Polisario Front the cession of the Sahara occupied by Mauritania to the Polisario Front and to obtain some type in agreement for the territory occupied by Morocco between the other parts (In front Polisario, Algeria and Morocco) to which Rabat refused alleging that it would not allow the creation of " microstate hostil" between " his frontera" and Mauritania, on the other hand the Polisario Front was in opposition to a division of the territory. As of this Mauritania moment it will try to reach a bilateral agreement with the Polisario Front to look for La Paz. In the month of May of 1979 through several Mauritania acts it indicates that she is totally determined to leave the war, being set out east exposition a delegation of the Algerian government who visited Nuakchott, as well as during one he turns realised to several countries by minister Amhed Uld Buseif among them to colonel Gadafi in Tripoli, and Spain to the then President of the government Adolph Surez. On the other hand Adolph Suarez in a visit to Algiers de facto realises a recognition of the right of self-determination of saharauis and the Polisario Front. This uprising would produce an angry reaction of Morocco that tried to press to Spain with contentious of the fishing and territorial of Ceuta and the Melilla. However, in spite of these tensions, this positioning produced a certain lightening between the Mauritanian authorities since thus not caeria on Mauritania all the Moroccan pressure. In addition, they were decisive aspects on the Mauritanian decision, the conviction of which the Moroccan theses were going to have little echo in the summit of the OUA that was going away to celebrate the month of July in Monrovia and the situation of bankruptcy of the country with the urgent necessity of a aid of 140 million dollars to be able to pay to the administration and I exercise. However, the fact that this debt could be covered by moderate Arab countries with which Morocco maintain excellent relations and the threat of the president senegals Leopold Senghor (great ally of Morocco in the OUA) to ask for the self-determination of the Mauritanian black population in case this one recognized the right of self-determination of saharauis, made conceive to Rabat hopes of which Mauritania would not too much far go in the recognition of the rights saharauis. The 2 of August the minister of Outer Subjects Moroccan Mohamed Bucetta, declares that if Mauritania yields the Mauritanian Sahara to the Polisario Front it would be violating treaties in force enters countries both. The 5 of August the Agreement of Algiers takes place by which Mauritania recognizes the Polisario Front like legitimate representative of saharauis and his right to the self-determination, and in which in addition it resigns to all territorial pretension on the Western Sahara. By estes Mauritania agreements would realise organized withdrawal of the territory that would last several months; on the other, part while independence was not obtained, by reasons for security, Mauritania would continue occupying the peninsula of the Gera. This agreement had its immediate approval by the governments of Great Britain and Tanzania, and it hoped that in a moment that many states were adheriesen to the same, France was not wanted to pronounce officially although it realised diplomatic movements. This agreement instead of to involve to Morocco by the way of the dialogue and the agreement produces a belligerent reaction on the other hand. The first official reaction of Hasn II was by means of its Secretary of State Mohamed Bucetta declaring that the Agreements of Algiers were null and which they do not comprometian to Rabat. In addition, Morocco took some military measures like ordering the retirement of the Moroccan troops who were in Mauritania (6000) as well as, the repatriation of the contingent of stationed Moroccan troops in Zaire from the previous year (this one last one in forecast to increase its military presence in the Sahara). Before this position, the Mauritanian government asked for Morocco that avoided disagreeable incidents in the Tiris the Garbia. Since it is speculated on with different scenes from conflict, like the Moroccan occupation of the Tiris the Garbia or a armed confrontation Algerian-Moroccan. Although after a meeting of the Cabinet, Morocco were limited to inform publicly into which it would send emissaries to the OUA and the United Nations with the dossier of Morocco on the Sahara, the majority of the Moroccan press requests an armed intervention in the Tiris the Garbia, and some cases like communist deputy Ali Yata in own Mauritania. In addition, the Moroccan press reflected a displeased assumption of the population of Dajla since the Mauritanian and governing deputy of Dajla, Hurmullah Dlimi, old member of the Yemaa saharaui, was stopped to be against to the delivery of that part from the Sahara to the Polisario. Day 10 of August before holding the meeting in Rabat between king Hasn II and Mauritanian prime minister Juna Uld Haidala in whom Mauritania tried to explain to Morocco the Agreement with the Polisario Front, the creation of a Committee of opposed Mauritanian Free Officials to the capitulation of the government of Nuakchott, directed by the ex- Commander-in-Chief of aviation announced in Rabat, colonel Mohamed Uld Ba Abdelkader, was described by the Mauritanian delegation like a provocation and a clear attempt to promote a military coup in Mauritania. In this atmosphere the meeting was held in which Mauritania does not manage to make flexible the Moroccan position and after which Morocco show that it is not considered forced to withdraw his of the Mauritanian Sahara (Morocco by an agreement of defense signed in 1977 with then president Mohtar Ould Daddach so much in the Mauritanian Sahara as within the borders internationally recognized of Mauritania maintained troops stationed from its independence in 1960). Saturday 11 of August, Morocco alleging a right assumption of withdrawal of null validity from the point of view of the international right, initiates the military annexation of the Mauritanian Sahara, that culminated with the occupation of Dajla (Villa Cisneros) where as of that moment the Moroccan flag waves. The day 12 Morocco announces that the Saharan territory of Tiris the Garbia is already under Moroccan administration, that day four ministers of the Moroccan Government went to transmit to the population of Dajla the decision of king Hasn II of not leaving its subjects. The Moroccan press of the following day recogia in its ample pages news article
photographic on popular manifestations in Morocco, of support to king Hasn to refund to the kingdom that part of the Sahara. This zone was red-baptize with its old name of Gold River (in Oued-Eddahab Arab) and its annexation was described by the minister as the Moroccan interior Driss Basri like an act of self-determination of its settlers before French journalists, unique press to which was allowed to cover the military occupation and the acts with annexation, to whom showed photos of the retirement of the old Mauritanian administrators. The day 14 Mauritania requested aid to the UN and the OUA to protect its borders after the annexation by Morocco of the Sahara administered by Mauritania, although some sources next to Moroccan theses wanted to indicate that Mauitania did not put too many repairs to that Morocco the Garbia (they indicated that this decision was announced on the part of Morocco when finalizing the meeting of Friday 10) Mauritania occupied the Tiris condemned the annexation and showed that such occupation attacked its pretension to fulfill its commitments international as it reflects the Letter to the Secretary General of the UN of 18 of August. The sentence of this act of force on the part of the UN takes place by means of the Resolution of the General Assembly of 21 of November of 1979. At those moments the number of Moroccan soldiers in the city of Dajla was increased to more than 3000. In response to the annexation of Tiris the Garbia by Rabat, to few kilometers of the place, forces saharauis attacked during six hours in Bir Enzaran, annihilating near two Moroccan battalions, of who four hundred men died, three hundred wounded and 175 were made prisoners. The Polisario Front noticed that it would anywhere send against the Moroccan troops similar operations find that them, taking place a serious worsening of the conflict in the following weeks. On the other hand, in which he interprets himself like a consequence of Agreement of Algiers, 61 Mauritanian prisoners were set free by the Polisario Front, who were given to the Mauritanian military administrations in Nuadhib. Day 15 department gives August of State North American pleads to look for solution pacific conflict of the Sahara Western and on the other hand Algeria warned that force could to use in conflict of the Sahara, while made a call to the African States so that they condemned the aggression acts, on the part of Rabat, in the Western Sahara, and demand the total and immediate retirement of the Moroccan Armed Forces of the Saharan territory. Day 16 of August a representation of some tribal heads of Tiris the Garbia moved until Rabat to attest their vasallaje to the king of Morocco. The majority outpost people tie age to the tribe Ouled Dlim and the greater colonel of the Moroccan Army, Amhed Dlimi, original of the region, that was present in the ceremony next to the alauita sovereign where new governor to Cherif Dlimi of the same familiar surroundings of the previous Mauritanian governor named. Day 17 of August Hasn II in a press conference in tone conciliator suggests an encounter with Algerian president Chadli Benyedid in which it did not discard the negotiation on the Sahara. The fear to a conflict armed between Morocco and Algeria appears latent between the international community. Day 19 of Morocco August begins to withdraw its of Mauritania as it announced at the beginning of month and to requirement of the Mauritanian government. Day 21 Spanish minister of exteriors, Marcelino Oreja affirmed to a French newspaper that the Sahara " now like internacional" was a territory yesterday; reiterating the Spanish position by which Spain transferred the administration from the Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania but not it sovereignty because as colonial power did not have sovereignty on the territory, and that the Spanish government supports a referendum to solve the question. These declarations brought about an aggressive reaction of the Moroccan press that asked that against Spain were retaliated: retaking the vindication of Ceuta and Melilla, annulling the fishing agreements, or questioning the Spanish sovereignty on the Canary Islands. On the other hand, in those days the PSOE presents/displays a proposal in the parliament so that the Spanish government recognized the Polisario Front diplomatically. Day 25 of August Spanish Navy military recommends the retirement of the fishing boats that worked in the canary-Saharan bank, this preventive measure takes place after the declarations of minister Marcelino Ear, and the reaction of the Moroccan government who threatened taking measures against Spain. This policy of harassment is going to continue until today, whose more serious incident was the strafing the 17 of January of 1980 of the destroyer of the Spanish Navy Admiral Ferrandiz by a Mirage of the Moroccan Air Force when it came to the aid of a Spanish fishing boat to five miles of the coasts of the Mauritanian Sahara at the moment occupied by Morocco, the incident was tried to hide and day later the Spanish government cleared an official note describing the happened thing like nonalarming. Although officially Morocco declare that the territory totally is controlled, during the month of September in international means already is anticipated that the war of the Sahara was going to be a war of attrition, as thus were concludes with the 1991 cease-fire. Diverse trackings realised on the part of the Moroccan army by all the territory before foreign press in which is not any cash of the Polisario Front do not convince the international observers of which the Moroccan occupation was consolidated in all the territory. In this war the Moroccan army thanks to the defensive walls is able in 1987 to even occupy approximately 2 thirds of this part of the territory arriving to penetrate in Mauritanian territory as nonofficial of the Minurso is reflected in military-political map; being to the east of the wall and under control of the RASD of the old Mauritanian Sahara, localities like Agwanit, Zug, or Dougaj. At present from the Moroccan control post of Guerguerat there is a zone of no-man's land to the first Mauritanian control post, that is plagued of mines and that an important zone of contraband of automobiles constitutes essentially. And finally the locality of the Gera in the coast that at present totally is vacated follows under Mauritanian control; for that reason when Morocco the Mauritanian Sahara was annexed its main preoccupation was to look for saharauis original of the Gera that could be compatible to their cause. From the beginning of the conflict the Moroccans were hostile to any type of affirmation of territory released of the RASD as much in this part of the Sahara like in the North zone in the localities of Tifariti (locality devastated by the Moroccans shortly before the cease-fire in denominated by the Moroccans " operation cascabel" or Battle of Tifarity.) and Bir Lelh, in this sense also is possible to emphasize the pressures that exerted Morocco during the gestation of the first Plans of Peace of the UN so that the troops of the Polisario Front quartered themselves in Algeria and not in " zone tampn" according to Moroccan terminology, as it is reflected in the Report of the Mission of the Security Council sent to the Western Sahara from the 3 to the 9 of June of 1995 For that reason, the unique solution that gives unit to all the territory is a free and right referendum that allows to exert the right from self-determination to the town saharaui and determines the definitive statute of the territory without exclusion of options. To ignore this principle on the base of which a referendum is unrealizable supposes actually, not only to steal the international legality but after all to defend that for the conflict of the Sahara there is no democratic solution, since it would be the overflow of the cynicism to speak of democratic solution ignoring the will of saharauis. To look for another type of solutions of unilateral character that avoid this principle like " autonomy plan marroqu" on the basis of an assumption " realismo" it supposes a falsification of the reality, since as he appears reflected report in the last of April of the Secretary General of the UN Mr. Banki Mon InformeSGabril2008.pdf as a result of the cease-fire the territory is divided in several zones: 2 exclusive rights of the Minurso that include 30 km to the east of the wall and other 30 km in the west of the wall in occupied territory Moroccan (and this are " zone tampn" not the one that alleges the Moroccan on Tifariti). The rest of the denominated territory of partial restriction, de facto of a side is Moroccan administration to the west, and of administration from the RASD to the east, this supposes that the republic saharaui is administering to 2 bags of territory one in the zone of Tifariti in the North and the other in the zone of Agwanit in the South, reason why to look for solutions besides the legality and the will of the town saharaui can lead to us to reactivate or to anchylose the conflict, or to admit a division of the territory.
Document drafted by Barral Robert professor of the is " Ramon Aller" of Lali'n (Galicia).