CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von - Dos Cartas sobre Estrategia (en inglés)

8/12/2019 CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von - Dos Cartas sobre Estrategia (en ingls)

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CSI REPORT

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ:

TWO LETTERS ON STRATEGY

Edited and translated byPeter Paret and Daniel Moran


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NOTE: The original edited and translated version o Carl von Clausewitz: Two Letters onStrategy !as "#$lished earlier $% the U&S& Ar'% War College Art o War Collo(#i#' inNove'$er )*+,& This edition has retained the editing st%le o the original& The "resent te-t.ho!ever. re/oins the original letters into !hole do0#'ents. 0ontradi0ting !hat thetranslators indi0ate as their intentions in "aragra"h 1. 2A Note on the Te-t.2 "age 3&4ro essor 4aret has granted his 5ind "er'ission to allo! #s to revise the irst "ages oCla#se!it67s te-t in a00ordan0e !ith the translation o#nd in 4eter 4aret. UnderstandingWar: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power 84rin0eton. )**9 &

The "ortrait o Cla#se!it6 is ta5en ro' a lithogra"h in the "ossession o 4eter 4aret& The"ortrait o Roeder !as originall% "#$lished in the i th vol#'e o ;#rt von 4riesdor .Soldatisches !hrerru"# & The "age o Cla#se!it67s letter o 99 ?e0e'$er )+93!as irst "#$lished as an e-a'"le o Cla#se!it67s hand!riting in R#dol von Caen#nerer.

Clausewitz# @erlin. )* B&

TABLE OF CONTENTS

4age

a"s vii

4re a0e i-

Introd#0tion 8essa% $% 4eter 4aret )

A Note on the Te-t 3

)& The Dirst 4ro$le' *

9&M 7s Sol#tion ))1& Roeder7s Sol#tion )3

,& Cla#se!it6 to Roeder 899 ?e0e'$er )+93 9)

B& The Se0ond 4ro$le' ,B

& Roeder7s Sol#tion ,3

3& Cla#se!it6 to Roeder 89, ?e0e'$er )+93 B)

Co"%right F )*+, $% Ar'% War College Do#ndation. In0&The introd#0tion. 0o"%right F $% 4eter 4aret. )*+,&

MAPS
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)& The irst "ro$le' )

9&M 7s and Roeder7s sol#tions )11& The se0ond "ro$le' ,


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PREFACE

This edition o Carl von Cla#se!it67s Two Letters on Strategy !as 'ade "ossi$le $% the Ar'% War College Do#ndation and $% the Art o War Collo(#i#' o the Ar'% War College.!hi0h s"onsors the vol#'e as "art o its "rogra' o re"#$lishing 'ilitar% 0lassi0s or the"ro essional develo"'ent o the o i0er 0or"s& The Ar'% War College !ishes to e-"ress itsgratit#de to the 0o editors and translators. 4ro essor 4eter 4aret. S"r#an0e 4ro essor oInternational Histor% at Stan ord Universit%. and ?r& ?aniel oran&

In re0ent %ears. Carl von Cla#se!it67s $n War has attra0ted 'an% ne! readers in this0o#ntr%. sti'#lated in large "art $% the "#$li0ation in )*3 o a ne! translation and editiono the !or5 $% 4ro essors i0hael Ho!ard and 4eter 4aret& Generall% readers have0on0entrated on Cla#se!it67s "hiloso"h%. theor%. and strategi0 0on0e"ts. as develo"ed in@oo5s One. T!o. Three. and Eight o $n War & His vie!s on o"erations. on the other hand.

have $een largel% negle0ted& The "resent !or5 "rovides #s !ith an o""ort#nit% to st#d%Cla#se!it67s thin5ing on o"erational iss#es in a s"e0i i0 strategi0 0onte-t&

Two Letters on Strategy deals !ith the "lanning and 0ond#0t o a 0a'"aign. $ased on"ro$le's set $% the Chie o 4r#ssian General Sta in )+93& In reading Cla#se!it67sdis0#ssion. !e '#st re'e'$er that he generall% #sed the ter' 2strateg%2 in its nor'al)*th 0ent#r% 0onnotation. !hi0h he hi'sel !as instr#'ental in esta$lishing that is the0ond#0t o 'a/or o"erations and not the 'ore 0o'"rehensive de inition o#nd in the

Ar'%7s Dield an#al ) B& ) Three levels o !ar are de ined in D ) B:

Strategic o!erational and tactical le"els are t#e broad di"isions o$ acti"ity in !re!aring $orand cond%cting &ar'

Military strategy e(!loys t#e ar(ed $orces o$ a nation to sec%re t#e ob)ecti"es o$ national!olicy by a!!lying $orce or t#e t#reat o$ $orce' Military strategy sets t#e $%nda(entalconditions $or o!erations'

T#e o!erational le"el o$ &ar %ses a"ailable (ilitary reso%rces to attain strategic goals &it#ina t#eater o$ &ar' Most si(!ly it is t#e t#eory o$ larger %nit o!erations' It also in"ol"es!lanning and cond%cting ca(!aigns' *

Cla#se!it6 dis0#sses the o"erational level o !ar in @oo5 Dive. Cha"ter T!o o On +ar .!here he relates the a0tors o s"a0e. 'ass. and ti'e to theater o o"erations. the ar'%.and the 0a'"aign& He 'a5es the distin0tion $et!een levels o 'ilitar% a0tion !hen herelates the' to ti'e and s"a0e& He states. 2the 0on0e"ts 0hara0teristi0 o ti'e !ar.

0a'"aign and $attle are "arallel to those o s"a0e 0o#ntr%. theater o o"erations and"osition&&&&2, Cla#se!it6 also sa%s: 2Ta0ti0all%. ever% engage'ent &&& at the strategi0 levelthe 0a'"aign re"la0es the engage'ent and the theater o o"erations ta5es the "la0e othe "osition& At the ne-t stage. the !ar as a !hole re"la0es the 0a'"aign. and the !hole0o#ntr% the theater o o"erations&2 B Cla#se!it6. altho#gh re0ogni6ing the three levels o!ar. generall% #ses the ter' strateg% to des0ri$e the o"erational level& An o#tline o his0on0e"t o the levels o !ar ollo!s:

Classi$ication Ti(e S!ace


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re erred to as thene-t stage 8strateg% the !ar the 0o#ntr%

strateg% 8o"erations the 0a'"aign the theater o o"erations

ta0ti0s 8ta0ti0s the $attle the "osition

The ter's in "arenthesis are #sed toda% to des0ri$e these levels&

In @oo5 Three. Cha"ter T!o o $n War# Cla#se!it6 lists the ele'ents o strateg%: 'oral."h%si0al. 'athe'ati0al. geogra"hi0al and statisti0al 8logisti0s & In @oo5 Do#r. Cha"terOne. he 0alls the' the o"erative ele'ents in !ar& 3 He states that strateg% 2"resentse-traordinar% di i0#lties. and it is air to sa% that ver% e! "eo"le have 0lear ideas a$o#t itsdetails&2+ Cla#se!it6 then goes on to list so'e o the o$vio#s a0ts a$o#t strateg%: 2thats#00ess is al!a%s greatest at the "oint !here the vi0tor% !as gained. and that0onse(#entl% 0hanging ro' one line o o"erations. one dire0tion. to another 0an $est $e

regarded as a ne0essar% evil. that a t#rning 'ove'ent 0an onl% $e /#sti ied $% generals#"eriorit% or $% having $etter lines o 0o''#ni0ations or retreat than the ene'%7s thatlan5 "ositions are governed $% the sa'e 0onsideration that ever% atta05 loses i'"et#s asit "rogresses&2 * @oo5s Si- and Seven o $n War 0over the 0ond#0t o o"erations !ithin atheater. dis0#ssing s#0h 0on0e"ts as $ase o o"erations. lines o 0o''#ni0ations. andt#rning 'ove'ents& Two Letters on Strategy relates these 0on0e"ts to a "arti0#lar0a'"aign "lan&

Two Letters on Strategy e-"ands on 'an% o the ideas e-"ressed in $n War# "arti0#larl%those that deal !ith 0a'"aign "lans& Dor this reason. Two Letters on Strategy sho#ld $e oval#e to the US Ar'% in its e ort to st#d% large #nit o"erations& This !or5 deals !ith the"ositioning and 'ane#ver o 0or"s as !ell as the eval#ation o 0a'"aign "lans& Altho#gh

!ritten or a h%"otheti0al sit#ation in )+93. the "rin0i"les dis0#ssed are as ti'eless asthose 0overed $% Cla#se!it6 in $n War & The serio#s reader '#st ollo! the te-t on the'a"s at the $a05 o the vol#'e in order to #nderstand the arg#'ents "#t or!ard $%Roeder and Cla#se!it6& The relationshi" o ti'e. distan0e. and 'ass in these "ro$le'sand sol#tions 0an onl% $e a""re0iated thro#gh a 5no!ledge o the geogra"h% o thistheater o o"eration&

Re eren0es to $n War in the introd#0tor% 'aterial and in the endnotes are to the revisedand e-"anded edition $% i0hael Ho!ard and 4eter 4aret. "#$lished $% 4rin0etonUniversit% 4ress in )*+,&

+allace P' Fran,

Colonel In$antry-S Ar(y +ar CollegeMay ./01

ENDNOTES


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)& Carl von Cla#se!it6. $n War . rev& ed&. edited and translated $% i0hael Ho!ard and4eter 4aret. 4rin0eton Universit% 4ress. )*+,. "& 3 &

9& Dield an#al 8D ) B. $%erations . ?e"art'ent o the Ar'%. Washington. ?&C&. 9 A#g#st )*+9. "& 9 1&

General H#go von Dre%tag Loringhoven dis0#sses the levels o !ar as #nderstood in theGer'an Ar'% at the end o World War I:

In t#e 2er(an Ar(y t#en starting in t#e general sta$$ t#e e(!loy(ent o$ t#e ter(3strategisc#3 4strategical5 #as $allen (ore and (ore into dis%se' +e re!lace it as a r%le byt#e ter( 3o!erati"3 !ertaining to o!erations and t#ereby de$ine (ore si(!ly and clearly t#edi$$erence $ro( e"eryt#ing t#at is re$erred to as 3ta6tisc#3 4tactical5' All t#at !ertains too!erations as s%c# ta6es !lace on t#e ole inde!endently o$ act%al co(bat ereas int#e ter( 3strategisc#3 4strategical5 t#ings beco(e easily con$%sed as #as been !ro"ed byt#e e7a(!le o$ o%r ene(ies o are &ont to s!ea6 o$ strategical conditions en it is(erely a 8%estion o$ !%rely local (atters' At any rate t#e ter( 3strategy3 o%g#t to becon$ined to t#e (ost i(!ortant (eas%res o$ #ig# co((and'

@aron von Dre%tag Loringhoven. &eneralshi% in the World War . translated $% the Ar'%War College. Washington. ?&C&. )*1,. "& 1,&

1&'(id &. ""& 9+ 9+)&

,& '(id &. "& 13*&

B&'(id &. "& 1B+&

& '(id &. "& )+1&

3&'(id &. "& 99B&

+&'(id &. "& 3 &

*&'(id &. "& 3)&


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INTRODUCTION

In )+93 the 4r#ssian general sta o i0er. a/or von Roeder. re(#ested Cla#se!it67s0o''ents on sol#tions o t!o o"erational "ro$le's that had $een set $% his s#"erior.Lie#tenant General von J ling. Chie o the General Sta & J ling. $est 5no!n or hisservi0e as 4r#ssian liaison o i0er in Wellington7s head(#arters d#ring the Waterloo0a'"aign. never reed hi'sel ro' the 0a#tio#s strategi0 0on0e"ts 0#rrent in the 4r#ssian

Ar'% $e ore )+ & 4osition !ar are and the o00#"ation o territor% do'inated his thin5ing.rather than the de eat o the ene'%7s or0es& @#t he !as an e i0ient "ea0eti'e 0hie osta . !ho too5 the training o his o i0ers serio#sl%. and !hose o"erational e-er0ises. !arga'es on the 'a" and on the gro#nd. and innovations in 0o''#ni0ations and 'a"'a5ing. 0ontri$#ted to the gro!ing "ro essionali6ation o the general sta &

At the ti'e. the general sta !as still ar ro' the ar'%7s 0entral "lanning and. in e e0t.e-e0#tive organ it $e0a'e so'e ort% %ears later #nder olt5e& In )+9) it had $eendeta0hed ro' the inistr% o War $#t the Chie o Sta 0ontin#ed to re"ort to the 'inisteron all 'a/or $#siness. and his right to re"ort dire0tl% to the 'onar0h !as severel%0ir0#'s0ri$ed he !as still an advisor. !ho res"onded rather than initiated& The sta itsel!as s'all or a 'a/or "o!er !ith a "ea0eti'e ar'% o so'e )93. o i0ers and 'en.!hi0h 0o#ld $e e-"anded to over , . i the reserves !ere 0alled #"& The 0entral $od%.or Great General Sta . in @erlin n#'$ered )* o i0ers. in0l#ding the 0hie 93 o i0ersserved !ith the g#ards. the eight ar'% 0or"s. and the artiller% ins"e0torate general& Diveo i0ers holding other assign'ents !ere atta0hed to the sta and 5e"t in or'ed o its !or5.tho#gh the% "arti0i"ated in it onl% !hen their s"e0ial e-"ertise !as needed& The senior inthis gro#" !as Cla#se!it6. sin0e )+)+ ?ire0tor o the War A0ade'%&

Trigono'etri0 and to"ogra"hi0 se0tions. an ar0hive. and a d#"li0ating o i0e 0o'"leted theorgani6ation& )

Roeder !as the head o the General Sta s 2Central Theater o War.2 the se0tion that dealt!ith o"erations against A#stria& @orn in )3+3. seven %ears %o#nger than Cla#se!it6. hehad $een S0harnhorst7s st#dent at the A0ade'% or Yo#ng O i0ers in )+ , and )+ B.d#ring !hi0h ti'e he irst 'et Cla#se!it6& A ter serving in the War o )+ he resigned his0o''ission and st#died at the Universities o @erlin and Heidel$erg. $e ore re entering.the 4r#ssian Ar'% as a se0ond lie#tenant at the $eginning o the Wars o Li$eration in)+)1& In the $attle o GrKssgors0hen he !as severel% !o#nded. $#t re0overed to"arti0i"ate in the ighting that a#t#'n and in the 0a'"aign o )+),& ?#ring the H#ndred?a%s. Roeder. $% then a 0a"tain on the general sta . !as assigned to one o the $rigadesin III Cor"s. !hose 0hie o sta !as Cla#se!it6& He o#ght in the $attles o Lign% andWavre. in !hi0h the 0or"s. $% t%ing do!n Gro#0h%7s ar stronger or0e. hel"ed 'a5e thevi0tor% o Waterloo "ossi$le& A ter the !ar Roeder 0ontin#ed to serve as a general stao i0er and ro%al ad/#tant #ntil he retired !ith the ran5 o 'a/or general in )+,)& Si- %earslater he !as "ro'oted to the no'inal ran5 o lie#tenant general& 9

While not a 'an o stri5ing originalit%. Roeder !as an intelligent o i0er. $roadl%e-"erien0ed as a "lanner and in the ield& His earl% asso0iation !ith S0harnhorst and other'e'$ers o the re or' 'ove'ent le t a "er'anent 'ar5 on his ideas and attit#des& He


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!as one o the 'en !ho 0arried a hint o the re or' era7s idealis' and inde"enden0e o /#dg'ent to the ar'%7s "ea0eti'e ro#tine in the sl#ggish. 0onservative de0ades a ter)+)B& His 'e'oirs indi0ate that he loo5ed #" to Cla#se!it6. !ho in t#rn li5ed hi' and as

the ollo!ing letters sho! tr#sted hi' s# i0ientl% to e-"ress his o"inions at length andran5l%. to the "oint o o"enl% 0riti0i6ing J ling7s o"erational and strategi0 vie!s&

The "ro$le's J ling assigned to Roeder and others on the sta to!ard the end o )+93!ere. li5e the 'a/orit% o his e-er0ises. de ensive in nat#re& 4r#ssia had $e0o'e a 'a/or"o!er. her territor% no! stret0hing ro' the Nie'en and the Re"#$li0 o Cra0o! in theeast to the Rhine and $e%ond in the !est $#t larger. ri0her. $etter ar'ed neigh$ors la% onher $orders& Neither a "reventive stri5e nor an o ensivel% !aged de ensive !ere "art oJ ling7s thin5ing& In an% #t#re !ar. he e-"e0ted 2an ene'% to invade 4r#ssia ro' !est.east. or so#th& 4oliti0al !ea5ness 0o'"el 4r#ssia to ight on the de ensive on hero!n territor%&21 Within these 0onstraints. Roeder !or5ed o#t his ans!ers. and thenor!arded J ling7s e-er0ises to Cla#se!it6. together !ith his sol#tions and a sol#tion to

the irst "ro$le' $% another o i0er. !ho signed hi'sel 'erel% !ith the initial M "ossi$l%Dirst Lie#tenant Co#nt onts o the Great General Sta &

In a irst re"l%. dated 99 ?e0e'$er. Cla#se!it6 0riti0all% dis0#ssed the ter's o J ling7s"ro$le' and then t#rned to the sol#tions $% M and Roeder& In a #rther letter t!o da%slater. he anal%6ed J ling7s se0ond e-er0ise and Roeder7s sol#tion& Together the t!oletters !ere !ell over +. !ords in length& Cla#se!it6 never o#nd it di i0#lt to e-"resshis tho#ghts in !riting. $#t the ti'ing o Roeder7s re(#est 'a% have 0ontri$#ted to thee-tensiveness and thoro#ghness o his res"onse& Onl% a e! 'onths earlier he hadde0ided that the 'an#s0ri"t o $n War . !hi0h had o00#"ied hi' or nearl% a de0ade.sho#ld $e 2thoro#ghl% re!or5ed on0e 'ore&2 The revisions he had in 'ind. !o#ld. heho"ed. 2$ring o#t the t!o t%"es o !ar !ith greater 0larit% at ever% "oint&2 @% this he 'eant.

on the one hand. !ars !aged or 'a/or o$/e0tives. !hi0h 0an $e a0hieved onl% $% the arrea0hing destr#0tion o the ene'%7s "o!ers and !ill o resistan0e and. on the other.li'ited !ars !aged or li'ited ends& He also !anted his revisions to develo" 'ore #ll%another. related "oint: 2that !ar is nothing $#t the 0ontin#ation o "oli0% !ith other'eans&2 , Roeder7s re(#est th#s rea0hed Cla#se!it6 d#ring a "eriod o intense intelle0t#alrea""raisal. and he see's to have !el0o'ed the o""ort#nit% to a""l% his ideas on#nda'ental iss#es o !ar to s"e0i i0 o"erational sit#ations& B

The o"ening "aragra"hs o Cla#se!it67s letter o the 99nd 0riti0i6e J ling7s irst "ro$le'or its ail#re to indi0ate the "oliti0al "#r"oses o the antagonists. and to esta$lish the levelo signi i0an0e the 'ilitar% o"erations "ossessed or the o""osing govern'ents& Witho#tthis in or'ation. sensi$le strategi0 and o"erational "lanning !as o#t o the (#estion& That

this !as not 'ere "edantr% on Cla#se!it67s "art. that a li'ited 0on li0t $et!een 4r#ssiaand A#stria la% as '#0h in the real' o the "ossi$le as the des"erate str#ggles o theSilesian and Seven Years Wars. is sho!n $% the Ca'"aign o )33+. the so 0alled 24otatoWar.2 $et!een the t!o "o!ers. !hi0h 0onsisted "ri'aril% in eints and ar'edde'onstrations !hile a di"lo'ati0 settle'ent !as !or5ed o#t& Then. and at all ti'es."oliti0al interest largel% deter'ined or sho#ld deter'ine the s0ale and t%"e o 'ilitar%e ort& In the rather 0as#al 0onte-t o a "rivate letter to a %o#nger 0o'rade. Cla#se!it6tests and a""lies h%"otheses that event#all% re0eive their #lti'ate or'#lation in the"olished. 0o'"a0t "rose o the revised o"ening 0ha"ter o @oo5 I o $n War &


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Sin0e Cla#se!it6 !rote in rea0tion to J ling7s e-er0ises. his letters o0#s on "ro$le's ode ense. a 0ir0#'stan0e that led the Ger'an editor. !hen the letters !ere "#$lished in

@erlin in )*13. to give his edition the s#$title Thoughts on )efense* A0t#all%. their s0o"e isar $roader& A'ong i'"ortant the'es $esides the "oliti0al nat#re o !ar are

Cla#se!it67s arg#'ents or the need or le-i$le "lanning. $alan0ing the geogra"hi0.e0ono'i0. and so0ial givens !ith the 0onstantl% 0hanging "oliti0al sit#ation. the strengthsand !ea5nesses o the "oliti0al and 'ilitar% leadershi". and other i'"ondera$les histhesis o the re0i"ro0al relationshi" o atta05 and de ense his re/e0tion o J ling7s stati0do0trine in avor o an aggressive. a0tive de ense& Another re0#rring the'e is the dis'issalo "et "hrases s#0h as 2 reedo' o a0tion2 or 2'o$ile o"erations.2 !hi0h he eared !eretoo o ten s#$stit#tes or hard thin5ing a$o#t the realities o s"e0i i0 sit#ations&

Toda%. over a 0ent#r% and a hal sin0e the e-0hange $et!een Cla#se!it6 and Roeder. !ere0ogni6e the t!o letters as a val#a$le gloss on 'a/or the'es o $n War & That $n War

does not. and sho#ld not. 0ontain the 5ind o e-tensive. s%ste'ati0 anal%sis o a "arti0#laro"erational "ro$le' that is develo"ed in the letters. #rther in0reases their signi i0an0e&Certainl%. in 'an% res"e0ts !ar has 0hanged al'ost $e%ond re0ognition& @#t the reader!ho ta5es the tro#$le to i'agine the realities o !ar at the $eginning o the ind#strialrevol#tion. !ill ind Cla#se!it67s anal%sis interesting in its o!n ter's& @e%ond that. the t!oletters s#ggest ho! Cla#se!it6 'ight have dealt !ith the di erent and %et related"ro$le's o !ar toda% and in the #t#re& I !e ta5e a00o#nt o the te0hnologi0al andta0ti0al 0onditions o the )+9 s. and thin5 or "la% thro#gh the strategi0 and o"erationalsol#tions Cla#se!it6 "ro"oses to Roeder. !e !ill ind o#rselves a0e to a0e !ith thetheorist in his !or5sho"& In ne! or' !e en0o#nter. and "erha"s 0o'e to #nderstand$etter. the intera0tion o "ra0ti0al 5no!ledge. "oliti0al and "s%0hologi0al insights. and thea$ilit% to a$stra0t and generali6e !itho#t ever de"arting ro' the hard a0ts. that lies at the

0ore o Cla#se!it67s #ni(#e and lasting a0hieve'ent&

ENDNOTES


11/41

)& The ig#res. !hi0h do not "re0isel% 0oin0ide !ith the n#'$er o "ositions a#thori6ed atthe ti'e. are ta5en ro' the Ar'% List or )+93: +ang, und -uartier,Liste der ./niglichPreussischen 0r"ee# @erlin. )+93&

9& Roeder7s 'e'oirs. !r Euch# "eine .inder1# "#$lished "osth#'o#sl% in @erlin in )+ ).are an interesting so#r0e or the 0ond#0t o o"erations in the 4r#ssian ar'% ro' the"ers"e0tive o a /#nior sta o i0er& The% re"eatedl% 'ention Cla#se!it6 see. or instan0e.""& B . 1 B. 1 . 1),. 1)B. and 1)*&

1& Her$ert von @K05'ann. 2?as geistige Er$e der @e rei#ngs5riege.2 in 2on Scharnhorstzu Schlieffen# ed& Driedri0h von Co0henha#sen. @erlin. )*11. "& )99& @K05'ann7s essa%0ontains a good anal%sis o J ling7s ideas& See also 2C& v& W&2 . 3etrachtungen !(er die grossen $%erationen und Schlachten der eldz!gevon 4546 und 4547 . @erlin and 4osen. )+9B and the dis0#ssion o J ling as Chie oSta in ;#rt von 4riesdor . Soldatisches !hrertu"# IV. Ha'$#rg. . ""& 1)1 )+&

,& Carl von Cla#se!it6. 2Note o ) #l% )+93.2 $n War . rev& ed&. edited and translated $%0hael Ho!ard and 4eter 4aret. 4rin0eton. )*+,. "& *&

B& Dor a 'ore e-tensive dis0#ssion o Cla#se!it67s thin5ing at the ti'e he re0eivedRoeder7s letter. see 4eter 4aret. Clausewitz and the State# O- ord and Ne! Yor5. )*3 .""& 13+ +)&

A NOTE ON THE TEXT

O#r edition is $ased on 8wei 3riefe des &enerals von Clausewitz: &edan9en zur 0(wehr#a s"e0ial iss#e o the Milit rwissenschaftliche +undschau# a "eriodi0al "#$lished $% theinistr% o War and the General Sta o the Ar'%. @erlin. )*13& The editor o the iss#e!as not identi ied& The originals o Cla#se!it67s letters !ere in the "ossession o theGeneral Sta ar0hives 8;riegsar0hiv des Grossen Generalsta$es. an#s5ri"te. ;a"& IV.Nr& 9,1 . and disa""eared or !ere destro%ed d#ring the Se0ond World War&

The Ger'an edition "rinted Cla#se!it67s letters ver$ati'. $#t 'oderni6ed his orthogra"h%and 'ade a e! 0hanges in his "#n0t#ation& J ling7s "ro$le's and the sol#tions $%Roeder and M !ere "artl% (#oted. "artl% "ara"hrased& We have translated all (#oted

'aterial. $#t have restated the "ara"hrased "assages in o#r o!n !ords&With so'e ad/#st'ents. !e have ado"ted the Ger'an editor7s "ra0ti0e o "rintingCla#se!it67s letters in se0tions. ea0h "art a ter the te-t $% J ling. Roeder. and M to!hi0h it re ers&M The arrange'ent involves neither deletions o . nor 0hanges in.Cla#se!it67s !ording. $#t sho#ld assist the reader in ollo!ing his arg#'ent&

MSee note on "age vi&


12/41

Cla#se!it67s Ger'an. tho#gh "re0ise and s#""le. is s# i0ientl% 0o'"le- to de'and arelativel% ree translation& He !rote in the so"histi0ated idio' o the Goethe "eriod. 'an%o !hose ter's and e-"ressions have #ndergone so'e 0hange in 'eaning in the

intervening 0ent#r% and a hal . and sho#ld not $e translated literall%& To 0onve% the logi0aland rhetori0al lin5s $et!een senten0es. !hi0h re le0t Cla#se!it67s diale0ti0. o ten 0alls orthe s#$stit#tion o !ords or the re"hrasing o senten0es&

In a ver% e! instan0es. !hi0h !e 'ar5. !e !ere #na$le to resolve an a'$ig#it% o'eaning& O00asionall%. to 0lari % an ante0edent or the 'eaning o a ter'. !e have addedan e-"lanator% !ord or t!o in $ra05ets& Several ootnotes !ere ta5en over ro' the )*13Ger'an edition. and identi ied as s#0h& The re'aining notes. signed 2Eds&.2 are $% the"resent editors& Itali0i6ed !ords and "hrases are Cla#se!it67s o!n&

@rie "assages ro' the o"ening "art o Cla#se!it67s irst letter are (#oted in 4eter 4aret.Clausewitz and the State# O- ord and Ne! Yor5. )*3 . ""& 13* + and in the sa'e

a#thor7s 2The Genesis o $n War .2 in Carl von Cla#se!it6. $n War . rev&. ed&. edited andtranslated $% i0hael Ho!ard and 4eter 4aret. 4rin0eton. )*+,. "& 3& A longer seg'entro' the sa'e letter is "rinted as an a""endi- in Ale-ander At5inson Social $rder and the&eneral Theory of Strategy . London. )*+). ""& 9+, *9. a version that is 0lose to a literaltranslation and 0onse(#entl% 0ontains n#'ero#s errors and in eli0ities& These seg'entsaside. the "resent edition. to the $est o o#r 5no!ledge. is the irst "#$li0ation o the'aterial in English&


13/41

1. THE FIRST PROBLEM

The ollo!ing 0onditions sho#ld $e ass#'ed


14/41

The A#strians 0an advan0e )& thro#gh Silesia 9& $et!een the Oder and the El$e. alongthe shortest ro#te to @erlin or 1& along the le t $an5 o the El$e& In erior to these three'ain o"tions 2are all others. !hi0h see5 to a0hieve their "#r"ose $%


15/41

In the third 0ase. an o ensive along the le t $an5 o the El$e 0overs 11 5ilo'eters& I theene'% advan0es over Lei"6ig. and intends to 0ross the El$e at ?essa#. he !ill rea0h@itter eld. hal !a% $et!een the 4r#ssian rontier and ?essa#. on the 99nd da% 8, &

The 0o#rse o the El$e ro' @ohe'ia to Witten$erg is nearl% the sa'e as the ro#te to@erlin& Torga# lies ))1 5ilo'eters ro' the "oint !here the El$e 0rosses the @ohe'ianSa-on $order. and ))1 5ilo'eters ro' @erlin& The A#strians 0an 'ove a siege train $%$arge to Torga#. a ver% 0onsidera$le advantage or the'& I the% $ase their o"erations onthis "ossi$ilit%. this is the "lan that "oses the greatest threat to 4r#ssia 8B &

The A#strian 0ol#'ns 0o#ld advan0e on $oth $an5s o the El$e. !ith "ontoon $ridges$et!een the'. #ntil the% 0o'$ine at the 4r#ssian $order and o"erate /ointl%. so'ething2the de ensive s%ste'2 8 0annot "revent& It ollo!s ro' this a that the 4r#ssian ar'%0annot ta5e #" "ositions ar ro' Torga# 83 . and $ that it sho#ld not $e "#shed or!ard tothe Sa-on $order. so that 2#nder all 0ir0#'stan0es it retains its reedo' o a0tion28+ &

The general de"lo%'ent o the 4r#ssian ar'% sho#ld $e as ollo!s


16/41

In the third 0ase. an A#strian advan0e on the le t $an5 o the El$e. the 4r#ssian ar'%asse'$les on the right $an5. its right lan5 at Witten$erg. its le t at Torga#& In thisi'"regna$le "osition. !ith a $ridgehead at ea0h !ing. the 0o''anding general !o#ld $eree to sei6e the initiative as soon as he dee'ed it a""ro"riate 8) & I . ho!ever. theene'% advan0es on $oth $an5s o the El$e. the $est area o 0on0entration or the4r#ssian ar'% !o#ld $e at Her6$erg& I the A#strians re'ain divided. the advan0e on theright $an5 sho#ld $e atta05ed. sin0e it "resents the greater threat& I the A#strians #nite onthe right $an5. the ortresses at Torga# and Witten$erg. as !ell as the El$e and Elsterrivers. o er a'"le o""ort#nit% or 'o$ile o"erations. #ntil the ti'e has 0o'e to o er $attle&

These re0o''endations "res#""ose that the loss o @erlin !o#ld have no i'"a0t on theo#t0o'e o the !ar. and i ne0essar% 0o#ld $e tolerated $% 4r#ssia& I the 4r#ssian ar'%!ere ordered to 0over @erlin. !hi0h !o#ld 'ean !ithdra!ing ro' the advantageo#s"osition on the El$e. its sit#ation !o#ld $e0o'e 0riti0al& Dor instan0e. a "osition at L#05a#.!ith the le t !ing on the S"ree!ald. !o#ld leave the right !ing dangling 8)) & The ene'%0o#ld den% the 4r#ssian ar'% all reedo' o 'ove'ent 8)9 . or 0o'"el it 2to resort !itho#thesitation to $attle2 8)1 & A general !ho !ished to ris5 nothing 0o#ld !ithdra! $ehind theN#the and Notte rivers. $#t !o#ld then $e thro!n so 0o'"letel% on the de ensive that theene'% 0o#ld i''o$ili6e hi' there. !hile la%ing siege to Torga#& 8), & It !o#ld $e ver%di i0#lt to relieve the ortress&

In 0on0l#sion. i the ar'% !ithdra!s ro' the El$e. it !o#ld not $e "ossi$le to devise an%tr#l% "ro'ising de ensive strateg% or it& I . on the other hand. the 0o''anding general


17/41

#nderstands ho! to e-"loit the river "osition. A#stria 20an a0hieve lasting advantages onl%$% !inning a 'a/or $attle2 8)B &

3. ROEDER'S SOLUTION

The A#strian ar'% 0an advan0e )& on the right $an5 o the El$e. over R#'$#rg and Zitta#thro#gh L#satia to!ard @erlin 9& over the Er6 o#ntains on the le t $an5 o the El$e intoSa-on% or 1& thro#gh Silesia& The Sa-on ar'% !ill "ro$a$l% asse'$le at ?resden. or. ithe 4r#ssians enter the 0o#ntr% $e ore the A#strians. !ithdra! into or $ehind the Er6o#ntains. or entren0h itsel aro#nd ?resden& In all 0ir0#'stan0es it see's advantageo#s

or the A#strians to /oin #" !ith the Sa-ons as soon as "ossi$le. and either the irst or these0ond o"tion !o#ld $ring a$o#t an earl% /#n0tion&

O these t!o o"tions. the advan0e on the right $an5 o the El$e thro#gh L#satia a""earsthe 'ore de0isive8) 1 sin0e it is the shortest ro#te to @erlin. and is ree o 4r#ssianortresses. !hi0h !o#ld $e di i0#lt to $%"ass or !hose invest'ent !o#ld re(#ire deta0hingtroo"s ro' the advan0e&

The se0ond o"tion la05s a de inite o$/e0tive& The A#strians !o#ld "ro$a$l% 0hoose it onl%i the% !ish to avoid $attle at the $eginning o the 0a'"aign. and ind it s# i0ient to 0ontrolSa-on% and the le t $an5 o the El$e. and "ossi$l% to invest Er #rt 89 &

In the third o"tion. the A#strian o$/e0tive 0o#ld onl% $e to invest so'e o the Silesianortresses& In that 0ase. the 4r#ssians !ill 0ertainl% advan0e and or0e a $attle& Even !erethe A#strians to !in this $attle. the% !o#ld still not gain the advantages the% 'ight derivero' the irst o"tion 81 &

As to the ti'e re(#ired or these o"erations: In the irst 0ase 8a 'ar0h thro#gh L#satia .the ene'% 0o#ld rea0h Ho%ers!erda on the 9)st da% a ter leaving the ?an#$e& In these0ond 0ase 8an advan0e on the le t $an5 o the El$e . he !o#ld rea0h the Er6 o#ntains$e ore ?resden on the 9 th da%& In the third 0ase 8an atta05 on Silesia . i the ene'% !ereto 'ove thro#gh Tra#tena#. he !o#ld rea0h Landesh#t on the )3th da%& These esti'ates'a5e no allo!an0e or o""osition& The sit#ation !o#ld $e di erent i even !ea5 4r#ssiandeta0h'ents !ere to o00#"% the 'o#ntains. and harass the ene'% along his rontier or on

the 'ar0h&2It '#st $e a""arent that the atta05 on @erlin thro#gh L#satia "resents the greatest dangerto 4r#ssia. sin0e. as 'entioned a$ove. it ta5es the shortest ro#te to the 0a"ital. thro#gh anarea !itho#t ortresses28, &

In 0onsidering ho! 4r#ssia 'ight $est 0o#nter ea0h o these threats. !e '#st leave o#t oa00o#nt the "ossi$ilit% that 4r#ssian #nits stationed near the $order enter Sa-on% ando00#"% the 'o#ntains $e ore the A#strians& A "reventive strateg% is e-0l#ded $% thenat#re o the e-er0ise. !hi0h sti"#lates that 4r#ssia '#st a!ait the A#strian o ensive&


18/41

Conse(#entl% it is "ro"osed that the 'ain 4r#ssian or0e 8the G#ards and the 9nd and 1rd0or"s de"lo%s $et!een Ho%ers!erda. Sen ten$erg. S"re'$erg. and ;ala#


19/41

In the event the A#strians "ro0eed over Tra#tena# to Landesh#t 8the third o"tion . theiro$/e0tive !o#ld $e to la% siege to the Silesian ortresses& To 0over the siege. the% !o#ld"ro$a$l% de"lo% along the ;at6$a05 River


20/41

#nderstand !hat reall% 'atters& It is this "rin0i"le that 'a5es the entire histor% o !ar0o'"rehensi$le. !hi0h in its a$sen0e re'ains #ll o the greatest a$s#rdities&

Ho! then is it "ossi$le to "lan a 0a'"aign. !hether or one theater o !ar or several.!itho#t indi0ating the "oliti0al 0ondition o the $elligerents. and the "oliti0s o theirrelationshi" to ea0h other=

Ever% 'a/or !ar "lan gro!s o#t o so 'an% individual 0ir0#'stan0es. !hi0h deter'ine itseat#res. that it is i'"ossi$le to devise a h%"otheti0al 0ase !ith s#0h s"e0i i0it% that it0o#ld $e ta5en as real& We are not re erring si'"l% to trivialities. $#t to the "ost i"%ortantissues# !hi0h nevertheless have al'ost al!a%s $een ignored& Dor instan0e. @ona"arteand Drederi05 the Great are o ten 0o'"ared. so'eti'es !itho#t 5ee"ing in 'ind that one'an r#led , 'illion s#$/e0ts. the other B& @#t let 'e 0all attention to another. lessnoti0ea$le and %et ver% signi i0ant distin0tion: @ona"arte !as a #s#r"er. !ho had !on hisi''ense "o!er in a 5ind o "er"et#al ga'e o 0han0e. and !ho. or the greater "art o his

"erilo#s 0areer. did not even "ossess an heir !hile Drederi05 the Great dis"osed o a tr#e"atri'on%& Had nat#re given $oth 'en identi0al "s%0hologi0al (#alities. !o#ld the% havea0ted in the sa'e 'anner= Certainl% not. and that alone 'a5es it i'"ossi$le or #s to'eas#re the' $% the sa'e standard& In short. it is i'"ossi$le to 0onstr#0t a h%"otheti0al0ase in s#0h a !a% that !e 0an sa% that !hat !as le t o#t !as not essential& We 0an o0o#rse thin5 o 'an% 0hara0teristi0s o the o""osing ar'ies and states that are identi0al.and have the e e0t o 0an0eling ea0h other o#t $#t solving s#0h "ro$le's !o#ld $e no'ore than a useful e;ercise* O#r $est sol#tions 0o#ld not $e a""lied to real conflicts*

I . there ore. s#0h e-er0ises allo! #s to leave 'an% things o#t o 0onsideration $e0a#se!e $elieve the% ne#trali6e ea0h other. !e still 0annot ignore those 0onditions that have$ro#ght a$o#t the !ar and that deter'ine its "oliti0al "#r"ose& The "oliti0al "#r"ose and

the 'eans availa$le to a0hieve it give rise to the "ilitary o(


21/41

instr#'ent that does not #n0tion on its o!n $#t is 0ontrolled $% so'ething else. $% thehand o "oli0%&


22/41

The greater the e-tent to !hi0h "oli0% is 'otivated $% 0o'"rehensive interests. a e0ting

the ver% e-isten0e o the state. and the greater the e-tent to !hi0h the iss#e is 0ast inter's o s#rvival or e-tin0tion. the 'ore "oli0% and hostile eelings 0oin0ide& As "oli0%dissolves into hostilit%. !ar $e0o'es si'"ler it "ro0eeds a00ording to the "#re 0on0e"t oor0e and destr#0tion. and satis ies !hatever de'ands 0an $e logi0all% develo"ed ro'this 0on0e"t. #ntil all its 0o'"onent "arts 0o'e to "ossess the 0oheren0e o a si"%lenecessity* S#0h a !ar 'a% see' entirel% a%olitical . and on that a00o#nt has $een0onsidered the nor'& @#t o$vio#sl% the "oliti0al ele'ent e-ists here no less than it does inother 5inds o !ar& It 'erel% 0oin0ides so 0o'"letel% !ith the 0on0e"t o or0e anddestr#0tion that it vanishes ro' sight&

In light o this dis0#ssion. I have no need to "rove that !ars e-ist in !hi0h the o$/e0tive iseven 'ore 0ir0#'s0ri$ed a $are threat. ar'ed negotiations. or in the 0ase o allian0es.

the 'ere "rete-t o a0tion & It !o#ld $e #nreasona$le to 'aintain thats#0h !ars are $eneath the art o !ar& As soon as !e 0on0ede that logi0all% so'e !ars'a% not 0all or e-tre'e goals. the #tter destr#0tion o the ene'%. !e '#st e-"and the arto !ar to in0l#de all gradations o 'ilitar% 'eans $% !hi0h "oli0% 0an $e advan0ed& War inits relation to "oli0% has a$ove all the o$ligation and the right to "revent "oli0% ro' 'a5ingde'ands that are contrary to the nature of war# to save it ro' 'is#sing the 'ilitar%instr#'ent ro' a ail#re to #nderstand !hat it 0an and 0annot do&

Conse(#entl% I '#st insist that the 'ilitar% goals o $oth sides are stated !henever astrategi0 "lan is dra!n #"& Dor the 'ost "art these goals arise o#t o the "oliti0al relationso the t!o antagonists to ea0h other. and to other states that 'a% $e involved& Unlessthese relations are o#tlined. a "lan 0an $e nothing 'ore than a 0o'$ination o te'"oral

and s"atial relationshi"s. dire0ted to!ard so'e ar(itrary goal a $attle. siege. et0& To thee-tent that this goal 0annot $e sho!n as ne0essar% or s#"erior to others. it 0an $e0hallenged and 0ontradi0ted $% other "ro/e0ts. !itho#t these 0o'ing an% nearer thea$sol#te tr#th than did the irst "lan& That is. indeed. the histor% o all strategi0 dis0#ssions#ntil toda%& Ever%one rotates !ithin so'e ar$itrar% 0ir0le& No one tries to "#sh hisarg#'ent $a05 to the origins o the !ar that is to $e o#ght. to its tr#e 'otive. to the oneand onl% "oint !here the logi0al develo"'ent and 0on0l#sion o the 'ilitar% o"erations 0analone originate& Whatever 0orre0t and e e0tive strategi0 de0isions are 'ade. res#lt ro'the instin0tive ta0t o talented 0o''anders. !ho !ith a glan0e "enetrate and assess a'ass o 0ir0#'stan0es& This instin0t s# i0es or a0tion. $#t o$vio#sl% not or anal%sis.even tho#gh a0tion is so'ething ar greater than the la$orio#s #n olding and la%ing $are oa0ts&

Yo# see ro' this. dear riend. ho! little I 0an 'a5e o %o#r assign'ent& 3 A$ove all. I '#stas5: do the A#strians intend. or 0o#ld the% intend. to de eat and disar' 4r#ssia !ith)B . 'en. or !o#ld the% $e satis ied !ith a li'ited o$/e0tive= In the Seven Years Warthe% !ere #n(#estiona$l% in a "osition to a0hieve the or'er their "ri'ar% 'eans !o#ld.have $een an advan0e thro#gh Sa-on% and L#satia on @erlin& The% ailed to do so. andthis ail#re !as rightl% 0o#nted as a great error on their "art. /#st as it !as 0onsidered anerror that the% dire0ted their o"erations 'ore to!ard Silesia than L#satia& @#t i0ir0#'stan0es are s#0h that the total de eat o the 4r#ssian 'ilitar% 'onar0h% is not


23/41

"ossi$le. then an advan0e thro#gh L#satia to!ard @erlin !o#ld no longer $e the "ostsuita(le o"eration and 0onse(#entl% no longer "resent the greatest danger to 4r#ssia& +

Yo# !ill agree. o 0o#rse. that in 0ir0#'stan0es in !hi0h A#stria has onl% eno#gh "o!er tosei6e so'e territor% !ith one or a e! ortresses. and in !hi0h onl% a "odest %lan

%ro"ises success . !hile a 'ore a'$itio#s one "ro'ises none $e0a#se it disregards the'eans availa$le. the 'odest A#strian "lan !o#ld 0arr% the greatest threat to 4r#ssia& Yo#0an see that the (#estion as to !hi0h o"eration is the 'ost dangero#s ass#'es an a#ra o#niversalit%. in this "ro$le' as !ell as in $oth sol#tions. that it does not reall% "ossess. anerror that re0#rs 0onstantl% in a strategi0 dis0#ssion. !ith the res#lt that general strategi0arg#'ents nearl% al!a%s "rove ina""li0a$le to realit%& The greatest threat or 4r#ssia 0anonl% $e deter'ined i !e 5no! !hat the A#strian o$/e0tive 0an $e or !ill $e& In the "resentinstan0e this o$/e0tive '#st either res#lt ro' a de inition o the overall "oliti0al sit#ation.or it '#st $e ar$itraril% s"e0i ied as a given o the e-er0ise& @oth the "ro$le' as !ell asthe sol#tions as0ri$e an o$s0#re 8that is. #narti0#lated i'"ortan0e to the 0a"ital 0it%.

!hi0h in realit% @erlin 0annot "ossess& The Seven Years War de'onstrated this 0learl%eno#gh& * E(#all% o$s0#re is the notion. involved in the irst ass#'"tion. that an A#strianthr#st thro#gh L#satia !o#ld. so to s"ea5. s"lit the 4r#ssian 'onar0h% into t!o "arts.$e0a#se i o#r ar'% !ere de eated and relentlessl% "#rs#ed. it !o#ld have to de0ide!hether to !ithdra! $ehind the Oder or es0a"e a0ross the lo!er El$e& This !o#ld $e aserio#s 0risis $#t onl% in the a0e o an ene'% a(le to carry out s#0h a great "ro/e0t& It 0anhardl% $e do#$ted that or the A#strians s#0h an o"eration. lan5ed ro' @ohe'ia $%Silesia on the right. and on the le t $% the El$e ortresses. !o#ld $e very difficult* It 0o#ldonl% s#00eed i the di i0#lties !ere o set $% a great %re%onderance o or0e& O this"re"onderan0e the "ro$le' has nothing to sa% it a""ears on the 0ontrar% to ass#'e a5ind o e(#ili$ri#' o strength&

D#rther'ore it see's to 'e that this "ro$le' assigns #nd#e signi i0an0e to the (#estionas to !hi0h A#strian o"eration "oses the greatest threat& Atta05 and de ense deter'inetheir 'eas#res reci%rocally & @#t s#rel% in theor% that is. or the "#r"oses o generalanal%sis the se(#en0e o ideas arising ro' this intera0tion '#st start so'e!here= #iteso& The se(#en0e $egins. I a' 0onvin0ed. !ith the de ensive. in "art $e0a#se "ea0eti'e'ilitar% arrange'ents are dire0ted "ri'aril% to!ard de ense. !hi0h th#s "re0edes theo ensive in "art $e0a#se o ensive "lans de"end on the dis"osition o the de ense.!itho#t !hi0h the% !o#ld have no a0t#al $asis& The de ensive. on the other hand. doesnot la05 the ne0essar% data in the a$sen0e o an atta05. $e0a#se these reside in theoverall 0hara0ter and 0ir0#'stan0es o the 0o#ntr%& At the general level. then. the 'ain0hara0teristi0s o de ensive o"erations develo" dire0tl% o#t o e-isting 0onditions& 'ns%ecific cases# however# this is (y no "eans always necessary# $#t onl% i one 0annot

dis0over the ene'%7s intentions earl% eno#gh to ta5e the re(#ired 0o#nter'eas#res& This0ertainl% does not see' to $e the 0ase here& Dro' the dire0tion o their advan0e. thelo0ation o their 'aga6ines. the 'o$ili6ation o their trans"ort. and other in or'ation. one!o#ld soon learn !hether the A#strians !ere dire0ting their 'ain or0e to!ard Silesia orSa-on%& Whether the% intend to advan0e along one $an5 o the El$e or the other. the%'ight "erha"s 0on0eal #ntil the last 'o'ent& @#t this !o#ld 'a5e ver% little di eren0e to#s sin0e the slightest 'ove'ent right or le t on o#r "art !o#ld 0o'"ensate or it& I . as is'ost nat#ral !ith res"e0t. to o#r "ea0eti'e de"lo%'ent. !e asse'$le o#r three Silesiandivisions at Neisse. Liegnit6. and S"rotta# res"e0tivel%. the Se0ond and Third Cor"s andthe G#ards in Lo!er L#satia. and the Do#rth Cor"s on the right $an5 o the El$e at Torga#.


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!e 0an a!ait in or'ation that !e !o#ld 0ertainl% re0eive on the. dire0tion o the ene'%7s'ain or0e. and then lead o#r 'ain or0e against it& Dor this reason it see's to 'e that this"arti0#lar e-er0ise ranges (#ite #nne0essaril% into the real' o s"e0#lative re le0tion&

Wherever 0on0rete 0onditions are de0isive. s#0h s"e0#lations. !hi0h all too o tendegenerate into hair s"litting. are no longer o interest& I the (#estion o 4r#ssia7s greatest'ilitar% !ea5ness is to $e raised. the "ro$le' !o#ld have to $e totall% re0ast&

Having no! sho!n that the e-er0ise is too in0o'"lete to "er'it a sol#tion that is not totall%ar$itrar% and #rther'ore that the "arti0#lar iss#e that is s#""osed to $e the 5e% to asol#tion na'el% the (#estion as to the 'ost dangero#s line o advan0e !o#ld in "ra0ti0enever or' a $asis or o#r a0tions& I shall "ro0eed to the individ#al "oints o the se0ond sol#tion& I shall anal%6e these "oints histori0all%. sin0e the sol#tion is too illogi0al to"er'it a stri0tl% logi0al re$#ttal& )

Criti8%e o$ M' s Sol%tion

)& Wh% !o#ld an atta05 on Silesia reveal A#strian intentions sooner than atta05selse!here= @e0a#se the $order is so'e!hat arther ro' @erlin= That is too "ett% andinsigni i0ant a 0onsideration to in l#en0e the 0hoi0e o o"erational lines& I the A#strians seto#t ro' Vienna and the ?an#$e to!ard o#r $order. !e !ill 0ertainl% gras" that !e aretheir target. and "re"are o#rselves to $e in the right "la0e at the right ti'e& We !o#ld notdela% o#r 'eas#res #ntil the A#strians had 0rossed the rontier&

9& The advantage o initiative here 'eans the advantage o s#r"rise& Onl% !hen s#r"rise is"resent does the initiative 0on er an advantage other!ise. in !ar as in 0ard ga'es. it is adisadvantage& )) This inheres in the nat#re o things. $#t or !ant o s"a0e 0annot $edis0#ssed here& I 3erlin is to $e s#r"rised. this 0an 0ertainl% $e a0hieved 'ore easil% $%!a% o Sa-on% i it sho#ld $e Silesia. that !o#ld not $e the 0ase& O$vio#sl% the A#strians0an atta05 #s '#0h earlier in so#thern Silesia than in the ar5 @randen$#rg&

1& The reason or the A#strians to "re er an advan0e on @erlin is that if 4r#ssia "la0es ahigh val#e on "rote0ting her 0a"ital she !ill $e or0ed into a 'ost disadvantageousde ensive& On the 'ere "ossi$ilit% that 4r#ssia !o#ld 'a5e this 'ista5e. the A#strians ares#""osed to $ase their line o advan0e& Again. this 0onsideration is ar too insigni i0ant&

And !h% sho#ld 4r#ssia7s de ensive $e 'ost disadvantageo#s= What an e'"t% "hrase A

strong "osition $ehind the Notte and N#the rivers. t!o ortresses on the ene'%7s le t lan5. an entire "rovin0e on his right ho! 0an an%one 0all thatdisadvantageo#s= I do not sa% that this is !here !e sho#ld 'a5e a stand I 'erel% !ant tosho! that the reason given here itsel needs /#sti i0ation&

,& What is the "#r"ose o indi0ating the three distan0es ro' Vienna to @erlin and to t!o"oints on the 4r#ssian rontier= At 'ost the ig#res 'ight $e #sed to deter'ine ho! aror!ard !e 0o#ld asse'$le o#r or0es& @#t the a#thor does not #se the' or this "#r"ose.to !hi0h. in an% 0ase. the distan0e ro' Vienna to @erlin !o#ld $e irrelevant& It see's astho#gh this distan0e is 'eant to de'onstrate the danger or 4r#ssia o the se0ond o"tion&


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@#t the a#thor does not dra! this 0on0l#sion rather he $elieves the danger to derive ro'so'ething else the El$e and Torga#& )9 In the end. ho!ever. that 'ane#ver leaves the i'"ortan0e o @erlin (#ite o#t o the a00o#nt& I @erlin reall% !ere the

5e%"oint o 4r#ssia7s entire. de ensive s%ste'. its distan0e ro' Vienna !o#ld not 'atterver% '#0h. sin0e this sit#ation #nli5e so'e other s#$ordinate strategi0 o"tions de'ands'ore than a 'ere ra0e& )1 That 4r#ssia !o#ld not learn the dire0tion o the A#striano ensive #ntil her rontier had $een 0rossed. is an ar$itrar%. i'"ro$a$le ass#'"tion. totall%#ns#ited to "rovide a "re'ise or strategi0 anal%sis& I 0on ess. then. that I ind these0al0#lations o ti'e and s"a0e #nne0essar% on the one hand. and !itho#t "ra0ti0al val#eon the other&

B& The a0t that A#stria 0an 'ove a siege train $% !ater to Torga# is relevant onl% to asiege o Torga#& Wh% it sho#ld "ose the greatest danger to the 4r#ssian state !o#ld irsthave to $e de'onstrated& Again this is 'erel% an unsu%%orted assertion* There 'a% $e0ases !hen a siege o Torga# !o#ld $e 'ore dangero#s to the 4r#ssian state than a

siege o Glat6. $#t the o""osite 0o#ld also $e tr#e& I Torga# is invested !itho#t greats#"eriorit% o or0e. s#00ess !o#ld hardl% $e 0on0eiva$le& The then $e0o'es the $est'eans or 4r#ssia to gain a general siege strategi0 vi0tor%& So long as the relationshi"$et!een the t!o sides is not 'ore #ll% s"e0i ied. !e 0annot reall% thin5 a$o#t theseiss#es in a "ra0ti0al !a%& % anal%sis 'erel% tries to sho! that the "ro"osition on !hi0hthe a#thor7s reasoning rests is. as so ver% o ten in strategi0 theori6ing. an entirel%#n"roven thesis. a 'ere "hrase&

& The A#strians are s#""osed to $e a$le to "ro0eed sa el% on (oth $an5s o the El$e #ntilthe% rea0h the vi0init% o ?resden& ), This is in erred ro' the defensive syste" o 4r#ssia&I $% this ter' the a#thor 'eans the 4r#ssian intention to ight the 0a'"aign on thestrategi0 de ensive. then his in eren0e is alse& I 0ir0#'stan0es !ere as des0ri$ed.

nothing !o#ld $e 'ore 0o'"ati$le !ith this intention than to atta05 one o the A#strian0ol#'ns $e ore the t!o 0o#ld #nite& I the a#thor 'eans a s"e0i i0 de ensive s%ste'.!hi0h 'ight "erha"s 0onsist in a deli(erate !ithdra!al. !e !o#ld have to ass#'e that thiss%ste'. !hi0h in0identall% is not 'entioned in the assign'ent. had $een $etra%ed to the

A#strians& Other!ise the% !o#ld al!a%s have to a00e"t the "ossi$ilit% o having to "a% a"ri0e or se"arating their or0es& I !e 0onsider that !hile the A#strians are asse'$lingtheir ar'% on the Eger. the 4r#ssians asse'$le theirs on the Elster. it is hard to "redi0t!ith 0ertaint% !ho !o#ld arrive irst in the vi0init% o ?resden& And I do#$t that the A#strian0o''ander !o#ld ris5 an advan0e in t!o 0ol#'ns on $oth $an5s o the El$e& Instead oenvisioning the sit#ation o $oth ar'ies shortl% $e ore the 0a'"aign $egins. and as5ing!hat the 'ost advisa$le 0o#rse o a0tion or ea0h !o#ld $e. a general 0on0e"t. na"elythe conce%t of the defensive# on0e again is ta5en as the $asis or a 0on0l#sion that is not

onl% !itho#t "ra0ti0al val#e. $#t also inherentl% !rong&3& The 0on0l#sion the a#thor no! dra!s. that the 4r#ssians sho#ld "la0e the'selves nearTorga#. again see's entirel% illogi0al to 'e& It is not 0lear !h% the 4r#ssians 0o#ld noto00#"% 'ore advan0ed "ositions and !ithdra! ro' the' in ti'e to 0on0entrate onTorga#& @esides. the 0on0l#sion ass#'es an intention that '#st at least $e dis0#ssed.sin0e it is $% no 'eans inevita$le I 'ean the intention o the 4r#ssian 0o''ander to0over Torga# and "revent a siege& Dar ro' $eing a #niversal ne0essit%. this intention is#nda'entall% 0ontrar% to the nat#re o things& Dortresses e-ist to $e $esieged& A siege!ea5ens the ene'%. and hastens the 'o'ent !hen !e 0an de eat hi' 'ore easil%& This


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is a nat#ral se(#en0e in theor%. and in all !ars o#ght over 'a/or iss#es it is also thenat#ral 0o#rse o events& On the other hand. in li'ited !ars. the "la% o $alan0ed or0esre(#entl% 0a#ses ar'ies to 0over ortresses& The histor% o !ar is #ll o e-a'"les& It

!o#ld ta5e 'e too ar a ield to disentangle this see'ing ano'al% here. and to sho! that itis entirel%. nat#ral and /#sti ied& I onl% assert that in the "resent 0ase this intention


27/41

$e dis0overed on the s"ot& Ho! 'an% $attles are o#ght in !hi0h onl% one !ing o thede ender7s "osition is se0#re

)9& The ene'% 0o#ld no 'ore deter'ine the 'ove'ent o the 4r#ssian ar'% at L#05a#than an%!here else& This is one o the 'ost a$o'ina$le strategi0 0li0hPs& @asi0all% it sa%sa$sol#tel% nothing. sin0e. a ter all. the a0tions and 'ove'ents o one 0o''ander doal!a%s strongl% in l#en0e the 0ond#0t and 'ove'ent o the other& I the state'ent 'eansan%thing at all. it 0an onl% $e that one general 0an 0o'"el the other to ollo! hi'ever%!here. to s#$'it to hi' !holl%. to de"rive hi' even o the "ossi$ilit% o indire0tresistan0e $% 'eans o retaliator% 0o#nter'ove'ents& This does not in an% sense see' to'e to hold tr#e or a 4r#ssian ar'% at L#05a#. and !e 'a% ass#'e that had the a#thordevelo"ed his ideas in greater detail. their inade(#a0% and one sidedness !o#ld have$e0o'e o$vio#s&

)1& @attle is here "resented as so'ething evil . at least that $attle that is resorted to !itho#t

hesitation& Here !e enter the 'orass o '#ddled 0on0e"ts that 'ade #" the general stas0ien0e o the Old Regi'e& Against a deter'ined ene'%. !ho does not sh% a!a% ro'ighting. $attle is the onl% e e0tive 'eans o resistan0e& We 'a% ight hi' #nder the 'ostadvantageo#s 0ir0#'stan0es "ossi$le. $#t !e '#st $e resolved to ight& In s#0h 0asesthere is no s#$stit#te or $attle& I the de ender has o00#"ied an e-0e"tionall% strong"osition. he !ill or0e the atta05er to $%"ass hi'& I this "osition is !ell "la0ed strategi0all%.to $e $%"assed o ers an advantage to the de ense& @#t the advantage $e0o'es realit%onl% i it 0at0hes the atta05er in the "ro0ess. en flagrant delit# as @ona"arte !o#ld sa%& Inshort. a $attle is inevita$le: either a (attle in the tactical defensive# i the atta05er inds$%"assing too dangero#s. and there ore "ro0eeds to atta05 o#r "osition or an offensive(attle# i the atta05er "#rs#es his o$/e0tive and ris5s $%"assing o#r "osition& I theta0ti0al eat#res and strategi0 lo0ation o the de ender7s "osition are so strong that the

ene'% dares to do neither and gives #" his advan0e entirel%. then this s#00ess !itho#t$attle arises onl% ro' the strictly necessary %resu%%osition that the de ender !as in a0t"re"ared to ight&

I the attac9ing ar"y does not advance resolutely# i it does not "lan an energeti0o ensive. i it has ta5en the ield 'erel% to a!ait so'e avora$le o""ort#nit%. and !ill onl%atte'"t so'ething should this o%%ortunity arise. then the de ense 0an 0ertainl% doli5e!ise& Against s#0h an o""onent. the de ense 'a% 'a5e it its $#siness to avoid (attleentirely# to regard it as an evil . and to dire0t all a0tions and 'ove'ents to!ard ens#ringthat the advantageo#s 0onditions or $attle that the ene'% see5s !ill not o00#r&

It is i'"ortant not to 0on #se the t!o 0ases& To e-"e0t avora$le res#lts ro' "assiveresistan0e against a deter'ined o""onent goes against the nat#re o things& On the0ontrar%. nothing is so 0ertain as that s#0h an a""roa0h !o#ld lead to hal 'eas#res.!asted ti'e. 0on #sion. and ollo!ing this s"lendid "#rgator% to the 'ost 0o'"letede eat&

All this $eing said. the advan0e on L#05a# and Her6$erg s#rel% s#ggests that the A#strians are see5ing a de0isive $attle&

),& I the 4r#ssian 0o''ander retreats north over Torga# si'"l% to $ring this ortress into"la%. o$liging the A#strians to $esiege it. and then. a ter the% have $een !ea5ened $% the


28/41

siege. to atta05 the'. I !o#ld ind this 'ost sensi$le& In that 0ase. ho!ever. the 4r#ssian0o''ander has no need to !ithdra! $ehind the N#the River& Rather he !ill tr% to halt$ehind the Elster& Sho#ld the A#strians !ant to drive hi' o and or0e hi' either to

!ithdra! $ehind the N#the or to give $attle. the 4r#ssian 0o''ander 'a% "re er to a00e"t$attle. even i the ene'% had not !ea5ened hi'sel signi i0antl% $% la%ing siege to Torga#&In light o the general 0ir0#'stan0es there see's to $e no reason to shrin5 ro' this$attle. !hile a retreat to the vi0init% o @erlin !o#ld $e #nderta5en onl% on the 'ost"ressing gro#nds&

@#t even s#""osing s#0h gro#nds !ere "resent. I !o#ld not ind the retreat asdisadvantageo#s as the a#thor does& He sa%s that the 4r#ssian 0o''ander !o#ld $ethro!n $a05 on the "ost disadvadvantageous defensive# a !ell 5no!n. read% 'ade ig#reo s"ee0h ro' the strategist7s !or5sho"& )B I the e-"ression disadvantageous re ers to thede ense itsel . the state'ent is 0learl% !rong. or a de ensive "osition $ehind s#0h a line o'arshes as e-ists along the N#the 0annot "ossi$l% $e 0onsidered a disadvantage& Sho#ld

the e-"ression re er to the a0t that i the ene'% la%s siege to Torga#. de ensiveo"erations !o#ld no longer $e a""ro"riate. and !o#ld there ore $e detri'ental. then I0annot "ers#ade '%sel that o#r ar'% !o#ld ind it all that di i0#lt to advan0e ro' this"osition $% one ro#te or another to relieve Torga#&

)B& Here !e '#st irst as5. !hat is the 'eaning o leaving the El$e= ?oes the a#thor'ean. eva0#ate the entire area. and let the A#strians ta5e Torga# at leis#re or is he'erel% re erring to a sit#ation in !hi0h one !ing o the ar'% is not at all ti'es 0overed $%the river= Again. #n ort#natel%. !e are dealing !ith /argon. !hi0h. as #s#al. $ears onl% aaint rese'$lan0e to !ell de ined. s"e0i i0 0on0e"ts& Even a retreat $ehind the N#the!o#ld 'a5e the s#$se(#ent relie o Torga# neither i'"ossi$le nor ver% di i0#lt. asan%one !ill agree !ho thin5s o the n#'ero#s !a%s or doing this that are o"en to the

4r#ssian ar'%& Onl% i the 4r#ssians !ere to ta5e no ste"s to relieve the ortress. 0o#ld the A#strians o00#"% Torga# !itho#t a $attle and so a0(#ire an end#ring advantage& @#t thisis an e'"t% s#""osition& I . on the other hand. the a#thor 'eans that as long as !e retreatat least one da%7s 'ar0h ro' the El$e. the A#strians !o#ld s#00eed in ta5ing Torga#. hela05s all $asis in a0t& A ter all. !e 0an advan0e ro' an% "oint to atta05 the'&

In general. it is not 0lear ho! an atta05ing ar'% 0an a0hieve a "er'anent advantage overa de ending or0e that is its e(#al "h%si0all% and in 'orale. without defeating it in (attle* Is#0h a vi0tor% is ne0essar% to the s#00ess o the A#strian 0a'"aign. this ne0essit% is not a0onse(#en0e o an% "arti0#lar strategi0 0o'$ination on the "art o the 4r#ssians. $#tollo!s >uite si"%ly fro" the nature of things* That the a#thor again regards $attle as anevil. an incongruity# re le0ts the sa'e 0on #sion that !e have dis0#ssed #nder "oint )1.

a$ove&With this I 0on0l#de '% re'ar5s on Sol#tion M & I eel onl% too 5eenl% ho! 0#rsor% the% are.and ho! '#0h the% 'a% leave #n0lear& @#t to 'a5e good these ailings. I !o#ld need agreat deal 'ore ti'e&

Yo# see. '% dear riend. I have s0ar0el% le t an% "ro"ositions #n0hallenged that are 'eantto %ield a sol#tion to the "ro$le'& It is not so '#0h the sol#tion as this t%"e o arg#ing thatI sho#ld eel o$liged to atta05. !ere I 0o'"etent to do so& ) I hate the sort o te0hni0allang#age that leads #s to $elieve !e 0an red#0e the individ#al 0ase to a #niversal. to the


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inevita$le& Strategists 'ani"#late these ter'inologies as i the% !ere alge$rai0 or'#lae.!hose a00#ra0% has long $een esta$lished. $rie or'#lae that 'a% $e #sed as s#$stit#tesor the original realit%& @#t these "hrases do not even re"resent 0lear and de inite

"rin0i"les& Rather the% are ne$#lo#s. a'$ig#o#s e-"ressions. !hose tr#e 'eaningre'ains o"en to (#estion& This is no a00ident& Their vag#eness is intended. $e0a#se the%did not derive ro' !hat is essential and 0o#ld $e "resented as #niversal tr#th&Conse(#entl% the inventors o these ter's o#nd it nat#ral to allo! a 0ertain latit#de intheir 'eaning&

I re0ogni6e that '% inding a#lt !ith 'ore or less ever%thing in Sol#tion M 0onve%s astrong i'"ression o a 'ind alread% 'ade #"& @#t I a' 0onvin0ed that I do not hold"re0on0eived o"inions. nor 0o#ld I. $e0a#se I do not ollo! a "arti0#lar s%ste'.and de'and nothing $#t the "lain. straight or!ard tr#th. the si'"le lin5ing o 0a#se ande e0t& I ho"e %o# !ill not s#s"e0t that 'ere 0ontrariness or. !orse. "ersonal anti"ath% areinvolved& 4ointless 0ontradi0tion is #tterl% re"#gnant to 'e and !ith res"e0t to the a#thor.

I a' tr#l% sorr% not to ind hi' arther along the road to!ard a nat#ral vie! o strategi0iss#es. a road I have "#rs#ed or 'an% %ears !ith the greatest enth#sias'. $e0a#sedes"ite ever%thing I agree !ith his "ra0ti0al /#dg'ents 'ore o ten "erha"s than !ithan%one else7s& )3

Criti8%e o$ Roeder3s Sol%tion

A ter all this. '% anal%sis o %o#r sol#tion !ill re(#ire ar less ti'e. I #ll% a""rove o its

si'"li0it% and realis'& Yo# set #" no s0a olding o s#"er l#o#s 0ir0#'stan0es %o#rreasoning is not $ased on 'ere 0li0hPs& @#t let 'e $e 'ore s"e0i i0 a$o#t "arti0#lariss#es&

)& Yo# are right to 0hara0teri6e the o"eration thro#gh L#satia as the "ost decisive & This isthe !a% to "#t it& The 'ost de0isive o"eration. ho!ever. is not al!a%s the one that $ests#its the ene'%7s 0ir0#'stan0es& O 0o#rse. the e-er0ise de'ands that in "lanning the"reli'inar% 0on0entration o the ar'%. %o# deter'ine !hatatta05 !o#ld $e the 'ost de0isive& @#t. as I have alread% noted. this !o#ld not $ene0essar% in "ra0ti0e& )+

9& Yo#r des0ri"tion o this o"tion is a00#rate& It "roves the so#ndness o %o#r "oint o vie!

that %o# 0hara0teri6e the o"tion as a "ossi$ilit% and not si'"l% as an o#tright error. asdoes Sol#tion M &

1& This also holds tr#e or the third o"erational o"tion& @#t %o#r assertion that or the A#strians a vi0torio#s $attle !o#ld $e 'ore advantageo#s in Lo!er L#satia than at the ooto the Silesian 'o#ntains is $ased on the one sided ass#'"tion that the A#strians are inthe "osition to ight a war ai"ing at "a


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B& Yo#r 0al0#lations o ti'es are si'"le and so#nd. !itho#t the alse i'"li0ations o theother sol#tion& S#0h 0al0#lations are. o 0o#rse. al!a%s ne0essar% $#t in this 0ase the%

la05 the great signi i0an0e that the "ro$le' see's to attri$#te to the'& Nothing is lessli5el% than that the A#strians !o#ld 'ar0h ro' the ?an#$e to o#r $order in one ells!oo"& There ore !e sho#ld not $e 0on0erned that the Land!ehr #nits o the 9nd Cor"s!o#ld not $e availa$le& @#t that %o# have e'"hasi6ed or rather. 'entioned this"ossi$ilit% 'a5es %o#r 0al0#lations s#"erior to those o the other sol#tion. sin0e it is onl%on account of such %ossi(ilities that these 0al0#lations are ne0essar% at all&

& I have nothing to sa% against the details o o#r dis"osition given here. e-0e"t that s#0hs"e0i i0s 0annot reasona$l% $e re(#ired or given in advan0e& With the in or'ation that theene'% has 0rossed o#r $order !ill nat#rall% 0o'e '#0h other ne!s a$o#t the n#'$er andstrength o his 0ol#'ns& Onl% then !ill !e de0ide the details o o#r dis"osition&

3& I 0onsider this e00entri0 de"lo%'ent the one tr#e a#lt o %o#r ans!er&)*

In s#0h a0on ined s"a0e. at a 'o'ent !hen a great $attle 'a% $e e-"e0ted. a divided de"lo%'entis al!a%s an error. #nless it is !ith its ive distin0t "hases has sho!n& Over longer distan0es s#0h an envelo"ingor' o atta05 or de ense $e0o'es less dangero#s. and i distan0es are reall% great. as inR#ssia in )+)9. a division o or0es 'a% 0ease to $e dangero#s at all. and its s"e0ial0hara0teristi0 !ill then nat#rall% $e0o'e advantageo#s& In )+)1 the distan0es !ere airl%large. and %et there !as al!a%s the greatest danger that @l#0her !o#ld $e over!hel'ed$% the 'ain ene'% ar'%. !hi0h. in a0t. did de eat S0h!ar6en$erg at ?resden& Theenvelo"ing or' o atta05 is al!a%s the "ore decisive# the one that leads to greatest

success . $#t or that reason also the ris9ier . in !hi0h s#00ess is less certain* S#00ess anddanger al!a%s stand side $% side. and or' the d%na'i0 la! o !ar& I !e !ish to in0reasethe irst. the se0ond rises as !ell. and it then $e0o'es. a (#estion o !hether or not this isin a00ord !ith the needs and "arti0#lar 0hara0teristi0s o o#r sit#ation& Th#s. i o#r0ir0#'stan0es do not allo! #s to ta5e great ris5s. !e 0an in0rease o#r s#00ess onl% !hendanger itsel is not great. that is. !hen !e "ossess a "re"onderan0e o "h%si0al and 'oralor0e& This #tterl% si'"le "rin0i"le. gro#nded dire0tl% in the 0on0e"ts the'selves. allo!s or 0lear and de inite sol#tions in a great variet% o strategi0(#estions. over !hi0h. in the #s#al !a% "eo"le arg#e r#itlessl%&

It is ver% te'"ting. i one o o#r territories lies to one side or $ehind the ene'% advan0e. to$ase a 0onsidera$le or0e there& This idea has sed#0ed %o#. $#t one '#st resist& That is

not to sa% that !e '#st give #" the advantage o this 0ir0#'stan0e entirel%& Rather !eo#ght to deta0h a e! s'all #nits o rangers. !hose 0o'$ined strength is not so essentialto the !hole that it 0o#ld not $e s"ared in a de0isive $attle& 9 In an ar'% o )9 . 'en.or instan0e. B. 'en !o#ld not $e 'issed& @#t these B. . in 0o'$ination !ith theor0es in the area that the% 0o#ld $ring into a0tion Land!ehr #nits. garrison troo"s.reservists. et0& 0an a0t ver% e e0tivel% against the ene'%7s lines o o"eration& This t%"e oo"eration against an atta05er7s lines o 0o''#ni0ation. !hi0h arises. in a sense.a#to'ati0all% as he advan0es. leaving territor% to his le t and right that he 0annot o00#"%.is the onl% 5ind that o ers an a$sol#te advantage& It is a #ni(#e advantage o the strategi0


31/41

de ensive. $#t it 0annot $e a0hieved $% deta0hing signi i0ant or0es to a0t against theene'%7s lan5s. sin0e those !ho ight on his lan5 0annot ight on his ront&

+& The division7s !ar o 'ane#ver is one o those 'isera$le 0at0h"hrases& Yo# !ill orgive'e i I sa% that %o# did not or' a 0lear 0on0e"tion o !hat this !o#ld 'ean&

*& I $elieve I have alread% said that i the A#strians !ere to advan0e on Silesia rather thanSa-on%. !e !o#ld dis0over it earl% eno#gh to asse'$le o#r 'ain ar'% in Silesia itsel .rather than irst in Lo!er L#satia& The "ro$le' is at a#lt here&

) & Yo#r 0on0l#sion is ver% sensi$le. and sho!s that %o# regard the 'a/or $attle ro' the0orre0t "oint o vie!& And no!. eno#gh& 4erha"s I have alread% !orn %o# o#t& I I haveno! and again ailed to 'a5e '%sel #nderstood. or i I have not $een a$le to 0onvin0e%o# on ever% "oint. !e 0an 0ertainl% 0ontin#e o#r dis0#ssion in "erson&


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Yo#r Driend.

von Cla#se!it6&

5. THE SECOND PROBLEM

Dor the "#r"oses o this e-er0ise. the 0onditions des0ri$ed in the irst "ro$le' are 'odi iedin several res"e0ts& Dirst. it is ass#'ed that the 4r#ssian troo"s !ill not 0ross the Sa-on$order. $#t '#st a!ait the A#strian atta05 on their o!n soil& The% '#st there ore orego allo ensive o"erations at the start o the 0a'"aign. even tho#gh. i ti'e "er'itted. these'ight "rove 'ost advantageo#s& D#rther'ore. it is ass#'ed that the entire A#strian or0e!ill advan0e $et!een the El$e and S"ree rivers&

Anal%6e t!o "ossi$le de"lo%'ents or the 4r#ssian ar'%. !hi0h 0onsists o ive 0or"s o1 . 'en ea0h


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one 0or"s at Torga#. and three 0or"s on the right $an5 $et!een the El$e and @la05Elster rivers&

Co'"are these t!o de"lo%'ents&

6. ROEDER'S SOLUTION

Roeder addressed the "ro$le' $% irst anal%6ing the s"e0i i0 ste"s ta5en at the $eginningo the 0a'"aign in ea0h o the t!o 0ases then $% 0o'"aring the t!o o"ening stages othe 0a'"aign and inall% $% dra!ing a 0on0l#sion ro' his 0o'"arison&

I . Roeder arg#ed. A#strians !ere a0ed !ith the 4r#ssian de"lo%'ent given in the irst0ase 8 o#r 0or"s $et!een Sen ten$erg and S"re'$erg. the i th at GKrlit6 . the% !o#ldhave to leave a signi i0ant 0overing or0e at GKrlit6. "erha"s as '#0h as one and a hal0or"s. sin0e the 4r#ssians there threaten the A#strian line o retreat& I the A#strians !ereto lose a $attle. this threat 0o#ld $e0o'e "arti0#larl% dangero#s& It !o#ld "ro$a$l% $ei'"ossi$le to de eat the 4r#ssians at GKrlit6. !ho !o#ld avoid engaging a s#"erior or0e&8) 9) A ter deta0hing the 0overing or0e. the A#strians !o#ld retain three and a hal 0or"sor their o ensive& Ho! sho#ld the% $e e'"lo%ed= To $%"ass the le t !ing o the 'ain4r#ssian or0e !ith an advan0e $et!een the S"ree and Neisse rivers is o#t o the(#estion& 89 I the% $%"ass the right !ing. the A#strians 0o#ld 0ross the @la05 Elster$et!een Elster!erda and Sen ten$erg& @#t the terrain !o#ld $e di i0#lt or the'. and !e

0o#ld atta05 the' #nder avora$le 0onditions& I the% 0ross $elo! Elster!erda. the% !o#ldhave the El$e and Torga# to their rear. and a $attle !o#ld "ro$a$l% $e o#ght $et!eenSen ten$erg and S"re'$erg&

Sho#ld the 4r#ssian ar'% lose this $attle. it !o#ld "ro$a$l% have to retreat to @erlin& Agood "osition 0an $e ta5en #" on the heights near the 0it% i !e did not eel strong eno#ghto a00e"t $attle there. !e !o#ld have to !ithdra! $ehind the Havel River& 81 I in the'eanti'e the ene'% la%s siege to Torga# !ith hal a 0or"s. and !e $ring #"rein or0e'ents. !e !o#ld o#tn#'$er hi' and 0o#ld ta5e the o ensive&

I the entire 4r#ssian ar'% de"lo%s on the El$e 8the se0ond 0ase . an A#strian advan0e onthe le t $an5 o the river is #nli5el%& I . on the other hand. the A#strians 0ross the @la05Elster and advan0e on its right $an5. the% !o#ld lose dire0t 0o''#ni0ations !ith their0o#ntr%. and it isn7t 0lear !hat the% !o#ld gain& Conse(#entl% this 'ove is also #nli5el%& 8,

An A#strian advan0e $et!een the El$e and the @la05 Elster is their 'ost li5el% 'ove& Ho!sho#ld !e res"ond= We 0an de"lo% either $et!een the El$e and the @la05 Elster. 8B or$e ore the $ridgehead at Torga#& 8 We 'ight also 0ross to the le t $an5 o the El$e. andta5e #" a "osition near Torga#& In this 0ase the ene'% 0o#ld $ridge the El$e atJhlen$erg. 0ross to the le t $an5. and advan0e& The 4r#ssians. ho!ever. !o#ld still havethe o"tion to avoid $attle& I the% a00e"t $attle and lose. the% 'ight 0ross to the right $an5at Torga#. and retreat to Witten$erg& 83


34/41

These t!o de ensive "lans are 0o'"ara$le in several res"e0ts& In either 0ase the ene'%'#st !in a $attle $e ore he 0an $esiege Torga#& In $oth 0ases a 4r#ssian vi0tor% !o#ldsee' to lead to si'ilar res#lts& A 4r#ssian de eat $et!een Sen ten$erg and S"re'$erg

!o#ld ta5e the ar'% #rther ro' Torga#. $e0a#se it !o#ld have to !ithdra! to @erlin& @#tthe retreat !o#ld leave the ar'% in to#0h !ith the 'ain "art o its ho'eland. and th#s !ithits rein or0e'ents& Stationing one 0or"s at GKr)it6 see's advisa$le. $e0a#se it !o#ldthreaten the A#strian lan5& The or0e sho#ld. ho!ever. $e 0o''anded $% a s5ill #l.energeti0 general& I s#0h a 'an is not availa$le. it !o#ld $e "re era$le not to deta0h the0or"s&

It !o#ld hel" #s to 0hoose $et!een the t!o "lans. i !e 5ne! the e-a0t la% o the land!here $attles are li5el% to o00#r& One !o#ld also li5e to 5no! 'ore a$o#t the environ'ento the ortresses at Torga# and Witten$erg. $e ore de0iding !hether o#r or0es sho#ld $ede"lo%ed there& 8+

In 0on0l#sion. i GKrlit6 !ere orti ied it !o#ld o er a "osition that 0o'$ines theadvantages o $oth "lans& We !o#ld threaten the ene'% lan5. !hatever he 'ight do !e!o#ld retain 0onta0t !ith the 'ain 'ass o 4r#ssian territor% and !e !o#ld re'ain ree tot#rn to!ard Silesia& 8* O 0o#rse. !e !o#ld not $ene it to the sa'e e-tent ro' theadvantages o the El$e !ith its t!o ortresses& The 0hoi0e o o#r de"lo%'ent !o#ld alsode"end on !hether !e 0o#ld e-"e0t to $e rein or0ed $% the )st Cor"s ro' East 4r#ssia.and the 3th and +th 0or"s ro' the Rhine&


35/41

7. CLAUSEWITZ TO ROEDER

9, ?e0e'$er )+93

?ear Driend:

@elieving that I had dis0harged '% de$t to o#r riendshi" $% the lengthiness o '% re'ar5si $% nothing else. I no! see that %o# 0all on 'e or a #rther e-er0ise& I shall ta5e #" "en

again. not !itho#t the ear that %o#r "atien0e has alread% $een e-ha#sted $% '% irstletter&

In that letter I "ointed o#t the e-tent to !hi0h the irst "ro$le' la05s the s"e0i i0in or'ation that alone !o#ld "er'it a sol#tion that is not !holl% ar$itrar%& 99 The se0ond"ro$le' is an e-tension o the irst& Ad'ittedl%. it is 'ore detailed. not as generali6ednevertheless its ter's are s#0h that the s"e0i i0s I 'issed in the irst e-er0ise !o#ld also$e ver% signi i0ant here& On the other hand. !e see that as the 0onditions o the e-er0iseare "resented in greater detail. the s"e0i i0 arrange'ents o the ene'% ass#'e in0reasingi'"ortan0e& Sin0e it is i'"ossi$le to generate all essential a0ts in a h%"otheti0al e-er0ise.it is evident that the 'ore detailed o#r a00o#nt. the 'ore ill#sor% it $e0o'es& We 'a5e an%n#'$er o ta0it ass#'"tions. and develo" an anal%sis that in the end 'ight not $e relevant

to one 0ase in a h#ndred& Reasoning o this 5ind 'a% still $e #se #l to train o#r /#dg'ent.o 0o#rse& @#t it is 0lear that s#0h an anal%sis 0an never $e satis a0toril% re #ted $% e(#all%ar$itrar% arg#'ents& I !e are 0ontentio#s !e !on7t $e a$le to rea0h agree'ent i !ehonestl% see5 a sol#tion !e !ill event#all% all into a disagreea$le state o "er"le-it%. in!hi0h !e 'ight al'ost des"air o the validit% o an% theor% !hatever&

@% "ositing t!o di erent 'eans o e-e0#tion. and as5ing %o# to 0hoose $et!een the'. these0ond e-er0ise e-"e0ts %o# to 0riti0i6e ea0h $% 'eans o the other& This see's to 'e"arti0#larl% ina""ro"riate sin0e the t!o a""roa0hes di er onl% in one #ni'"ortant "oint& Inan% strategi0 "ro$le'. $#t 'ost es"e0iall% in those that "ose alternatives and as5 #s to0hoose $et!een the'. I eel the need to red#0e the iss#e to general "rin0i"les. that is toreveal the relationshi" $et!een one or the other o"tion and the a0ts that inevita$l% res#ltro' the nat#re o the sit#ation& In this !a%. at least. !e 0an re0ogni6e the nat#re o ea0h'eas#re. and its #ni(#e 0hara0teristi0s& In the event that !e '#st e-e0#te one s0he'e orthe other in real li e. !e 0an then de0ide or o#rselves !hether the 0hara0teristi0s o one orthe other are $etter s#ited to o#r re(#ire'ents and 0ir0#'stan0es& In short. !hen !eeval#ate h%"otheti0al "lans. !e '#st s#s"end inal /#dg'ent on 'an% "oints. !hile onothers !e 0an $e 0on0l#sive. $e0a#se the% violate 0onditions that are set do!n 0learl%eno#gh in the "ro$le'& I shall no! o er s#0h 0o''ents on the vario#s as"e0ts o %o#ranal%sis&

Yo# sa% that a s#"erior ene'% or0e 0o#ld not de eat the 4r#ssian 0or"s at GKrlit6. or


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rather. %o# assu"e it . and indeed it is no 'ore than an ass#'"tion& @oth e-"erien0e andthe nat#re o the sit#ation tea0h #s that it is ver% di i0#lt to avoid a develo"ing$attle i !e are to 'aintain 0onta0t !ith the ene'% and 'iss no avora$le o""ort#nities& An

envelo"ing atta05 8!hat o'ini 0alls o"erating on e-terior lines is there ore al!a%s ver%dangero#s. and is !arranted onl% $% a "re"onderan0e o or0e or the 5no!ledge that theene'% is not see5ing a de0isive a0tion& Nor 0an %o# $e 0ertain that the ene'% !ill al!a%s5ee" one and a hal 0or"s against %o#r 0or"s at GKrlit6& When he is a$o#t to atta05 %o#r'ain or0e. he 'a% leave onl% hal a 0or"s there& In an% 0ase. the or0e at GKrlit6 does not"resent all that '#0h o a danger or hi'. sin0e in an e'ergen0% he 0an !ithdra! to theEl$e and $% 'eans o a "ontoon $ridae 0ross the river $elo! ?resden as !ell& The0al0#lations "ertaining to the 0or"s at GKrlit6 are th#s e-tre'el% #n0ertain it !o#ld $e a'ista5e to tr#st the' rather than the ar sa er 'ethod o 'aintaining a #ni ied or0e&

In strateg% !e '#st disting#ish $et!een outflan9ing and (y%assing a "osition& It is onething to envelo" a "osition !ith individ#al 0or"s or even !ith the !hole ar'%. and atta05 it

ro' the lan5 or rear& It is o$vio#sl% so'ething (#ite di erent to $%"ass the "osition inorder to "#rs#e the o$/e0t o the atta05. !itho#t regard to the ene'% $eing le t $ehind& Inthe irst 0ase. the "osition retains its strategi0 e e0tiveness indeed. the atta05de'onstrates that it 0annot $e ignored. and it onl% re'ains or the ta0ti0al eat#res o the"osition to "rove their strength& In the other 0ase. the "osition has lost its strategi0e e0tiveness& It is e-tre'el% rare that an atta05er 0an $%"ass a "osition that isn7t ver%$adl% sit#ated& @#t it is e(#all% rare that a "osition 0annot $e o#t lan5ed& In 'ost 0ases thede ender '#st $e "re"ared or this event#alit%. and 'a5e his arrange'ents a00ordingl%& A"osition that is given #" $e0a#se it is $eing envelo"ed. is hardl% !orth ta5ing in the irst"la0e& I do not thin5 the A#strians 0o#ld $%"ass %o#r "osition either on the right or the le t&The% 0o#ld 0ertainl% envelo% it 'ore easil% on the right than on the le t $#t %o# 0annotassert that envelo"ing it on the le t !o#ld $e o#t o the (#estion&

1& A retreat $ehind the Havel River !o#ld indi0ate that !e intend to $ase o#rselves on the!estern "art o the 'onar0h%& I that !ere not the 0ase. the 'ove !o#ld $e entirel%ina""ro"riate&

,& 4res#'a$l% the real (#estion is !hether the A#strians i the% !ant to 0arr% o#t theiro ensive. 0an do an%thing other than ight a $attle& % ans!er is that the% 0an7t& Dirst.$e0a#se the% are not stronger than !e are se0ondl%. $e0a#se the% are entirel%s#rro#nded $% o#r territories. and th#s 0learl% at a disadvantage& Their a$ilit% to or0e #s to!ithdra! and then to $esiege and 0a"t#re Torga# is red#0ed $% these t!o 0ir0#'stan0esto s#0h an e-tent that it !o#ld 'a5e little sense or the' to $ase their "lans on this"ossi$ilit%& I the% !ant to ight. the% '#st 0ross to the right $an5 o the El$e !here !e are.

and nat#rall% the% !o#ld "re er to 0ross so'e!here o#t o o#r rea0h& @#t it is o$vio#sl%!rong to hold that the% 0o#ld not see5 $attle $% advan0ing on the right $an5 !ith "art or allo their ar'%& Crossing the river !o#ld 0o'"li0ate their 0o''#ni0ations $#t. as I have /#stindi0ated. the% 0an hardl% $%"ass #s or or0e #s $a05 & 91

B& I !e de"lo% $et!een the El$e and the Elster. it !o#ld have to $e so#th o Torga#&He''ed in $et!een t!o rivers that "resent real o$sta0les to 'ove'ent. the one $e0a#seo its si6e. the other $% the nat#re o its $an5s. "la0es #s in a sit#ation in !hi0h o#r lines oretreat are e-0e"tionall% li'ited. a a0t that e-erts a ver% #ndesira$le in l#en0e on the0ond#0t o $attle& I . to ta5e advantage o a strong "osition. !e 0hoose to ight in


37/41

this area. !e sho#ld at least 5ee" o"en a line o retreat in Torga# itsel & That de'ands that!e de"lo% so#th o the to!n. and not too near to it&

& ?e"lo%ing $e ore Torga#. !ith o#r $a05s against the to!n. li5e a $ridgehead o leshand $lood. !o#ld 'ean needlessl% resorting to a 'eas#re o des"air& S#0h a "osition.$ene itting ro' t!o "rote0ted lan5s. $#t !ith a ront that $eing 0onve- is ver% !ea5.and !hi0h in general restri0ts the de ender to e-tre'e "assivit%. is s#ita$le onl% to a or0ethat $e0a#se o its !ea5ness 0an no longer sta% in ield& It has $een driven into a 0ornerits $a05 is against the !all $e0a#se it is on the verge o giving !a% $e ore the s#"eriorstrength o the ene'%&

3& A large river. lo!ing in s#0h a dire0tion that the de ense 0an 'aintain its lines o0o''#ni0ation or several da%s7 'ar0h on $oth $an5s. 0ertainl% o ers the de ense so'eavora$le o""ort#nities& This is even 'ore tr#e !hen a ortress !ith a $ridgehead "rote0ts

his 'ove'ent ro' one $an5 to the other. as Torga# does. and !hen another ortress. asWitten$erg. so'e distan0e to his rear. '#lti"lies the n#'$er o o"tions& It see's. indeed.that. at the 'o'ent the ene'% advan0es. the de ender 0an avoid $attle $% 0rossing to theother side o the river. !itho#t 0easing to 0over the area thro#gh the overall strategi0e e0tiveness o his "osition& At irst glan0e it is not o$vio#s !h% this ga'e 0o#ld not $ere"eated inde initel%& @#t. irst o all. it '#st $e said that in 'ost 0ases the strategi0 val#eo a "osition de0lines 'ar5edl% !hen a large river se"arates the de ense ro' the atta05er.sin0e this allo!s the atta05er to divide and 'ane#ver his or0es in !a%s that !o#ld not $e"ossi$le !itho#t this $arrier& Se0ondl%. it is rare that the lines o 0o''#ni0ation on $oth$an5s o the river are o e(#al val#e to the de ense. and that either one 0o#ld $e given #"at an% 'o'ent& Thirdl%. the retreat o a large ar'% over a $ridge a0ross a river is not atrivial a0t on the 0ontrar%. in the "resen0e o the ene'% it is $arel% "ossi$le& Do#rth. to

$rea5 o#t on the ene'%7s side o the river. sho#ld this $e0o'e ne0essar%. is no si'"le'atter. even in the vi0init% o a riendl% ortress& Di th. and inall%. it !o#ld $e ver% di i0#ltre"eatedl% to shi t all those ele'ents that 0onstit#te the rear o the ar'% into theira""ro"riate "ositions& Dor all these reasons. a de ender 0o#ld s0ar0el% 0ross the river'ore than. a 0o#"le o ti'es. even #nder the 'ost avora$le 0onditions. $e ore. in hise ort to 0o#nter the 'ove'ents and a0tions o the ene'%. a "art or the !hole o his ar'%!o#ld s#ddenl% ind itsel on the sa'e $an5 as the atta05er&

I !e a""l% these 0onsiderations to the 4r#ssian ar'% at Torga#. !e '#st agree thatadvantages 0o#ld indeed $e o$tained $% s5ill #l #se o the El$e in 0o'$ination !ith thet!o ortresses. !hether to avoid $attle or a ti'e. or to give it #nder avora$le0ir0#'stan0es& @#t !e 0annot sa% in advan0e e-a0tl% ho! this 'ight $e done. $e0a#se no

h%"otheti0al 0ase 0an s"e0i % all the #ni(#e. 'o'entar% 0onditions that give rise too""ort#nit%& It '#st also $e added that !e o#ght not e-aggerate the a$sol#te val#e othese avora$le 0onditions the% 'erel% "rovide the o""ort#nit% or a#s"i0io#s 0o#rses oa0tion& I the 4r#ssian 0o''ander does not sei6e this o""ort#nit% !ith great s5ill. theadvantages o his "osition !o#ld soon disa""ear&

+& As %o# have 0orre0tl% re'ar5ed. the "osition on the El$e "res#""oses that the ar'% !ill$ase itsel on the !estern "art o the 'onar0h%. and give #" its 0onne0tion !ith the east&Sho#ld this not $e in a00ord !ith the general


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It see's to 'e that overall the di eren0e $et!een de"lo%ing $ehind the @la05 Elster andat Torga# is not great& I !e !ant to re'ain realisti0. !e !o#ld have to sa% that in theevent o a 'a/or $attle. this "arti0#lar di eren0e !o#ld $e onl% a 'in#te a0tor in the inal

res#lt& The degree to !hi0h $oth 0o''anders have #nited their or0es or 0o'$at. thegood "lanning and s5ill #l 0ond#0t o the $attle. the "erseveran0e o the 0o''anders. the0o#rage o the troo"s. their 0on iden0e in their leader. the o$edien0e o the s#$ordinategenerals are these not all a0tors that have greater signi i0an0e and that a e0t theo#t0o'e 'ore dire0tl%=

Whether the R#ssians in )+)9 !ithdre! ro' os0o! to Vladi'ir or t#rned so#th to;al#ga this one $asi0 alternative. !hile not "ri'aril% deter'ining the dire0tion o theDren0h retreat. as is so'eti'es 0lai'ed. !as nevertheless a 'atter o e-traordinar%i'"ortan0e& 9, There 0an $e no do#$t that the 0hange o a single strategi0 line 'a% havede0isive in l#en0e& @#t !e o#ght not to s#""ose that it is there ore i'"ortant !hether the

4r#ssians ight at Sen ten$erg or at Torga#. #nless !e !ish to i'"#te strategi0 val#e tothings that have nothing to do !ith strateg%&

*& ?e"lo%ing the 'ain ar'% at GKrlit6 8ass#'ing the "la0e is orti ied . !hi0h is %o#r#lti'ate 0on0l#sion. !o#ld "#t the ar'% in a flan9ing %osition & Nat#rall% the territor% thatlan5ing "ositions are s#""osed to 0over does not lie dire0tl% $ehind the'& S#0h "ositions0an there ore $e ado"ted onl% i the ar'% has a ver% $road $ase o o"erations. so that thelan5ing or0e retains a line o retreat& That is the 0ase here& @#t this line o retreat !illal!a%s $e rather 0onstri0ted. so'eti'es 'ore so. so'eti'es less& The danger that thear'% !ill $e or0ed into an e00entri0 line o retreat. a!a% ro' the 'ain "art o its ho'eterritor%. ro' the 0enter o gravit% o the entire 'ilitar% $ase. 0onstit#tes a gravedisadvantage o "ositions o this 5ind& The "osition '#st 'a5e #" or this la! $% its very

great ta0ti0al strength. so that the ene'% either 0annot atta05 it at all. $eing i''o$ili6ed asit !ere $% its strategi0 "o!er. or is #nli5el% to s#00eed i he does atta05& This /#sti ies thelan5ing "osition. $#t !e still la05 the real reason or it: its strategi0 e e0tiveness& I %o#0onsider the "resent 0ase !ith these "oints in 'ind. %o# !ill agree that i the ar'% atGKrlit6 !ere de eated. it !o#ld have to retreat on the high!a% to @resla#. and !o#ldthere ore $e in danger o $eing driven so#th to Silesia& A strategist o the old s0hool !o#ldsa%: in that 0ase the ar'% is lost& I !on7t. $e0a#se it !o#ld $e an entirel% #n/#sti iedassertion& @#t %o# !ill 0on0ede that a tho#sand serio#s disadvantages !o#ld res#lt ro's#0h a retreat& Dinall%. a strong ta0ti0al "osition has not %et $een lo0ated in the areaaro#nd GKrlit6. and its strategi0 e e0tiveness !o#ld not $e ver% great in an% 0ase. sin0ethe A#strians 0o#ld $ase the'selves on the El$e&

Yo#r third st#d% 'eets '% entire a""roval


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ENDNOTES

)& A 4r#ssian 0or"s. at !ar strength 0onsisted o t!o divisions. one artiller% $rigade. one? ger deta0h'ent o t!o 0o'"anies. and one engineer deta0h'ent& A reserve in antr%regi'ent. a reserve Land!ehr in antr% $attalion. and a reserve Land!ehrs(#adron 'ight also $e added&

The division 0onsisted o a line in antr% $rigade and a Land!ehr in antr% $rigade o t!oregi'ents ea0h. and o a 0avalr% $rigade& @esides the t!o reg#lar 0avalr% regi'ents. the0avalr% $rigade "ro$a$l% also in0l#ded a Land!ehr 0avalr% regi'ent at an% rate. a 0or"shad a total o o#r line and t!o Land!ehr 0avalr% regi'ents&

The artiller% 0onsisted o nine heav% artiller% $atteries. and o three light or horse artiller%

$atteries& Ed& o the )*13 Ger'an te-t&

9& N#'erals in "arenthesis in M s te-t !ere added $% Cla#se!it6& His 0o''ents aresi'ilarl% identi ied. and re er to the n#'erals in the te-t& Eds&

1& N#'erals in "arenthesis in Roeder7s te-t !ere added $% Cla#se!it6& His res"e0tive0o''ents are si'ilarl% identi ied& Eds&

,& In "ea0eti'e. the 9nd Cor"s !as stationed on the @alti0. several h#ndred 5ilo'etersarther a!a% ro' the theater o o"erations than the G#ards and the 1rd. ,th. Bth. and th0or"s& Eds&

B& Cla#se!it6 !rites 2!ie die sogennannte Strategie.2 !hi0h. ta5en literall%. !o#ld 'a5elittle sense& The rest o the senten0e 'a5es it a""arent that he is re erring to the 2s0ien0e2or 2dis0i"line2 o strateg%& Eds&

& Co'"are $n War . @oo5 I. 0h& ). se0tions 9B and 9 8""& +3 ++ & Eds&

3& 2Z!ei @rie e des Generals von Cla#se!it6: Gedan5en 6#r A$!ehr.2 s"e0ial iss#e o theMilit rwissenschaftliche +undschau# ar0h )*13. B *&

+& The editor o the Ger'an te-t "oints o#t that it is Roeder !ho 0alls an A#strian advan0ethro#gh L#satia on @erlin the 'ost dangero#s threat to 4r#ssia& See "& 99& Eds&

*& ?#ring the Seven Years War @erlin !as $rie l% o00#"ied. on0e $% the A#strians. on0e$% the R#ssians& Eds&

) & As !ill $

CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von - Dos Cartas sobre Estrategia (en inglés)

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Transcript of CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von - Dos Cartas sobre Estrategia (en inglés)