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Grand Tactics at GaugamelaAuthor(s): A. M. DevineReviewed work(s):Source: Phoenix, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter, 1975), pp. 374-385Published by: Classical Association of CanadaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1087282 .

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GRAND TACTICS AT GAUGAMELAA. M. DEVINE

LIKE SO MANYofthedecisive attles fhistory, augamela ecame hesubject of a number fconflictingccountsnotlong after t was fought.As a result, t has been a perennial ource of difficulty,nd indeed ofcontroversy, ormodern cholars.In particular, xtensivedisagreementover Alexander's tactics on this fieldhas been productiveof severalattemptsnrecentyearstoreconstruct hatactuallyhappenedduring hecourseof the battle.' Most of theseattemptshave been marredby theevidentdesire f their uthors o force heengagementntoa preconceivedtacticalmould,one derivedessentiallyfrom hemilitary ystemsoftheeighteenthnd nineteenthenturies. oo oftenhave webeheld Alexanderwearingthe cockedhat ofNapoleon or performinghe PrussiandrillofFrederick heGreat. Hence it is myaim in thispapertoput forward etanother ttempt t reconstructinghe eventsof thebattleofGaugamela-this time,however,avoiding the intrusion f tactical anachronisms.This will involve,amongotherthings, he presentation f a somewhatunorthodox iewofAlexander'suse hereofthegrandtacticsofattackinoblique order.

THE MACEDONIAN ORDER OF BATTLESinceGaugamelawasfoughtnanopenplain,2henormallymportantfactorf errainlayed nly n ndirectole nAlexander'slans, ndhadlittle ffectn thecourseof thebattleother hanthatof facilitatingthePersian actics fdouble nvelopmentith avalry.ts nfluenceas,however,isiblentherather nusualnature ftheformationakenup

bytheMacedonian orcesrioro the peningf he ngagement.avingno naturalobstacleon which o rest either fhis flanks,nd henceexpectingo be easilyoutflankedythenumericallyuperior ersians,'The most interestingrecent reconstructions f the battle are to be found in SirWilliamTarn, Alexander heGreat Cambridge 1948), Part I Narrative, 6-51, and Part IISources and Studies 182-190; G. T. Griffith,Alexander's Generalship at Gaugamela,"7HS 67 (1947) 77-89; A. R. Burn,"Notes onAlexander'sCampaigns, 332-330," 7HS 72(1952) 81-91; J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalshipof AlexandertheGreat (London 1958)163-180; E. W. Marsden, The Campaign ofGaugamela (Liverpool 1964) 40-64; R. D.

Milns, AlexandertheGreat (London 1968) 110-126; F. Schachermeyr,AlexanderderGrosse Vienna 1973) 267-276; R. Lane Fox, Alexander heGreat London 1973) 233-243;and P. Green,AlexanderofMacedon (Harmondsworth1974) 286-296. These works willbe cited by author's name.2Forthesiteofthebattlefield,ee Schachermeyr, 68, sketch-map , and 270, note311.374

PHOENIX,Vol. 29 (1975)4.

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GRAND TACTICS AT GAUGAMELA 375Alexander rewup his army n whatmight e looselydescribeds atactical square."At both ends of the Macedonianfrontwereplacedflank-guards,rawn ackfromten chelon. ecauseof thenecessityfmaintainingacticalflexibility,he angleat which heseflank-guardsweredrawn ackcouldnothave been toogreat. t wasprobablyome-thingike450.3Asa consequencef theMacedonianrmy's eploymentin this ong-basedrapezoid ormation,ts second ine of nfantry asunable o cover hefull engthf tsrear, factwhichwouldnot fail ohave an effect,lbeit minorne,onthecourse fthebattle.The flank-guardftherightwing ooktheformfa roughly edge-shaped arrangementfcavalry nd infantrynits, ach with tsfrontparallelto thatof theopposing ersianbattle-line. hese units weredeployedn three otentialines,which ould,when heneedarose,beeasily ormednto hree ctual ines, till et at anangle o themainfrontofthe rmy, utnowfacingutward romhecentre.n therearmostftheseines, ostednorder romeft oright,ndfromrontorearward,wereone halfoftheAgrianians12],4 ommandedyAttalus, rison'sMacedonianarchers 13], and, rightflankrear of the entire rmy,Cleander'smercenarynfantry14].PositionednfrontftheAgrianiansandthe rchers,nthe econd fthethreeines,were he7rpbpopoLrres[15], nderAretes,ndthePaeonian avalry16], nderAriston.inally,infrontfthem,ndhencenfrontf hewhole ody,were tationedhemercenaryavalry fMenidas 17],forming,s itwere, hepoint fthe"wedge."5The left lank-guardassimilarlyrranged, ith tsconstituentnitsdrawn back en echelon t approximatelyhe same angle. Roughly

3There can be no question but that the flank-guardswere placed at an angle to theenemy battle-line and not simply, as Marsden, 48-51 and diagram 2, has them, toAlexander's allegedlyoblique front.The phrase is ~brartaLtv is used by Arrian to des-cribe thepositioning fboth the right 3.12.2) and left 3.12.4) flank-guards.n thecaseof the former, he reason given forthis disposition s el 7rov vdAyKt araXa2&dvotLdwvarlr'7ra vyXElc arV dXayya. Now, if thisflank-guardwere already parallelto the Persian front, herecould be no question of using it to extend (dvaarrdat) thephalanx stillfurther, hileusing t to close up (vuyKXE^iau) thephalanx would involve aretreat n the face of the enemy,whichcould well be dangerous, fnot disastrous.4The numbers n square brackets correspondto those used to indicate the relevantunits in Figs. 1 and 2.

5This nterpretation fArr.3.12.2-3 is based on Burn,85-86. Griffith,8-79, however,interprets his passage as meaning that Menidas' cavalry was, in fact, posted on theextremerightflankrear of the army,at an angle to themain front,withthe rest of theflank-guardn line with t on its left. Like that ofMarsden, Griffith'sxegesis s open todoubt on tactical grounds: for, f it is accepted, then, as Marsden observes (48), "it isextremelydifficult o explain why the Persians did not attempt to stop Alexander'smovement to the right by attacking the Companions themselves" (rather than byclashingwithMenidas' cavalry).


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Persian Positions

232 21810a8

20 24 2

25FIG. 1. ALEXANDER'S ORIGINAL ORDER OF BATTLE (BASED ON


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95 3

24 24

24FIG. 2. ALEXANDER'S ATTACK IN OBLIQUE ORDER (THE SITUATION AT


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378 PHOENIXwedge-shapedike theflank-guardftheotherwing, t, too,was deployedin threepotential ines: two of cavalry, supported n rearby a thirdofinfantry.At the pointof this "wedge" stood the mercenary avalryofAndromachus23],whilebehind hemwere tationed he lliedcavalry 21],underCoeranus,and Agathon's Odrysianhorse 22].The third nd rear-most line was made up of Sitalces' Thracianjavelin-men 18], togetherwithtwounitsomittedby Arrian,but mentionedby Diodorus,namely,theCretanarchers 19] and the Achaean mercenarynfantry20].6Formidable as these flank-guardswere, the real strengthof theMacedonian force ay in its centre. Here was arrayedthe iron core ofAlexander's rmy, hefront-linenfantry halanx.Drawnup inorderfromright o leftwere: first,n their ccustomedplace ofhonour, heHypas-pists [2], under Nicanor, then the taxeis of Coenus [3], Perdiccas [4],Meleager [5], Polyperchon 6], Simmias [7], and Craterus 8]. On eitherflank ftheinfantrywerestationedthe best cavalryunits of the entirearmy:on theleft, hesuperbThessalian cavalry [10],underPhilip, sup-portedby a bodyofallied Greek horse 9],commandedbyErigyius, nd,on the right, the Companion cavalry [1], officially ommanded byPhilotas,but led in battlebyAlexanderhimself.Needless to say, Dariuscouldnot,andwouldnot,riskthedestructionfhisownfirst-rateavalryin a directassault on so invulnerable n enemyfront.Rather,commonsensedictatedthat thePersian attackwouldbe made againstthe Mace-donianflanks;henceAlexander's added concernwithproviding articu-larlystrongmobiledefencesfor hese flanks.

THE BATTLE

The battle itselfwas precipitatedby Alexander'smovementcbs ' rbbeb6v,7whichalarmed Darius, who was afraidthat, if the Macedonianarmyreachedthegroundwhichhad not been evelledbythePersians,his(supposed) advantageinweaponry,n theform fscythe-chariots,ould6Diod. 17.57.4;cf.Curt.4.13.31,Arr.3.12.4-5. The reconstructionereof the eftflank-guards basedonBurn, 6-87.7Arr..13.1. t isgenerallyccepted hat heMacedonian dvance ook heformf nobliquemovementowards hePersian eft.Althought is probable hat,due to thefactorfsimple hysical onvenience,heMacedonians idadvance t an angle otheenemy rontthough ot t toopronouncednangle;otherwise,ariuswouldnothavefeared hattheywouldmoveoff heprepared round eforemaking ontactwithhisforces),heirAufmarschascometobeconnected ith he voidance fenemy mine-fields"Curt. .15.1;cf.Polyaenus .3.17), ndwith nopening eneral ttacknobliqueorder Diod. 17.57.6).However, hepropinquityfanykindofminefields rendereddubiousbythePersian ttempt oenvelopAlexander'sight lank,while heattack nobliqueorderdoesnotappearto have takenplaceuntilthecrisis f thebattle seebelow, 82).


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GRAND TACTICS AT GAUGAMELA 379be nullified.8hereforeheordered headvance-guard f his own leftwing(probably the thousand Bactrian cavalry and the regiment f Dahae,also a thousandstrong,mentionedby Curtius4.12.6) to ride aroundtheMacedonian rightwing,which Alexander was leading in person,andhalt its march. This placed Alexanderon thedefensive, nd, in ordertoregainthe initiative,he detailedMenidas [17] to chargethe envelopingPersians.The counter-attack, owever,failed, nd Menidas' small force(a merefourhundredhorsemen9)was drivenback bythesuperiorweightof the enemy cavalry.Alexandernow ordereda chargeto be made byAretes'prodromoi15]10 nd the Paeonians ofAriston 16],stiffened ithCleander'smercenarynfantry14].As this econdcounter-attack,arriedout by farmoreformidableMacedonianunits,was meetingwithgreatersuccess than the first, essus, Darius' leftwingcommander, hrew ntothefray herestoftheBactrians,possibly s manyas eightthousand nnumber.11 hese were themselves epulsed,and theirbattle-formationsbroken, fter a long,hard fight12ulminating n a vigorous chargebythe troops of the Macedonian flank-guard.13 eanwhile, the Persianscythe-chariotswere demonstratingheir neffectiveness ith a chargeagainst the Macedonian rightcentre.They were promptlyrouted byBalacrus' avelin-men nd theremaining alfoftheAgrianian ontingent[11],whohad beenstationed n a forward osition n orderto screentheCompanioncavalry[1].Now came thecrisis fthebattleas Alexanderhaltedhis ateral marchand began a directadvance on the Persianpositions.The movement fsomecavalry,whichDarius had toldoff osupport hetroops ttemptingtheenvelopment ftheMacedonianright, ad left gap in thefrontineof the Persian leftcentre.14t was towards this gap that Alexander,seizingthe tactical initiativeonce more,now wheeled,and, makingawedge (FqBoXov)f the Companion cavalry [1] and part of the infantryphalanx[2,3, 4, 5, 6],16ed the attackin thedirection fDarius himself.At thisdevelopment, he Great King fled.

8Arr. .13.2;cf.3.8.7.9Arr. .5.1.See alsoJ.R. Hamilton, Q5 (1955)217-218.1oAretes'second" harge t Arr. .14.1 and 3.14.3appears obea doublet ftheoneat Arr. .13.3."Cf. Curt.4.12.6.12Arr..13.4.Therepeated ssaults fBessus'cavalryndicate hatthis truggle asof engthyuration,nding, erhaps,ust after lexander'smajor ttack n theenemycentre,while hefactthatthe heavier ossesherewere ncurred ythe Macedonianssuggestshattheretreat fthePersianeftwasduemore odemoralization,s a resultofDarius'flightromhefield,han oactualtactical efeat t thehands fAlexander'stroops."aGriffith,0-81, ndBurn, 7,note ,areagreednexcludingheCompanion avalryfromhispartoftheaction;cf.TarnII 185-186.14Arr..14.2;cf.Curt.4.15.20.16Arr..14.2and 3.14.4.


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380 PHOENIXI suggestthatthisevolution ntoa wedge-shaped ormation,videntlycarriedout only duringthe actual crisisof the battle, has led to the

Macedonian armybeingcreditedby both Curtius and Diodoruswithabattle-linenoblique orderfrom heverybeginning f theengagement.16The identityof the source,or sources,utilizedby these two historiansfor heirbattle-narrativess itself majorcrux, nd neednot concern shere. t ispossible hat Curtius nd Diodorusbothmuddled heir ccountsofGaugamela themselves.However, t is more ikelythatthey nheritedan alreadydefective radition.Nor, indeed, s it hard to see howsuchanerroneous ersiongotits start. t may,at first, ave been a case ofmereover-simplification.or, whatever its originaltactical disposition,thefront ine of the Macedonian armywas, at this stage of the conflict,actually advancing n oblique order.The wedgeofArrian3.14.2 was, itshould be stressed,no meremetaphor,but rather a complexformationof units arrangeden echelon n two oblique lines, slanting n oppositedirections utmeetingna broadpoint.The left-hand ideofthismassivewedgewas madeup ofthe first-linenfantrynitsofthephalanxfrom sfar eftas (and including)Polyperchon's axis [6],while the ilae of theCompanioncavalry 1]constituted oth the muchshorter ight-handideand the broad apex of the formation."A sharperpointwas doubtlessprovidedby thepersonand body-guard fAlexanderhimself,wingingleftward to assail Darius. At the same time, the flank-guard f theMacedonian rightwing,also in oblique order,was swinging utward tothe rightin close combat with the Bactrian cavalry of Bessus.18Amilitary gnoramus, specially fhe had not been presentat the battle,mightwell have becomeobscure,or even genuinely onfused,whenen-deavouringto describe o complicateda tacticalsituation.Not so, how-ever,theexperienced oldierPtolemy,who (we mayreasonablyassume)rode with the0auttXKic throughout heengagement. tolemymaynothave had a veryclear idea ofwhat was goingon in otherparts of thefield-his coverageoftheproceedings n theMacedonian left s farfromcomprehensive-but it is only thanks to him (and to Arrian,who pre-serves his account,at least in outline) that an accurate reconstructionofAlexander'soblique ordertactics,and henceof the decisivemomentofthebattle,can be made.Meanwhile, n thecentre,due to boththepace ofAlexander's dvancetowardsthegap in thePersian front nd theevolutionofhisrightwinginto wedge-formation, gap developed in the Macedonian army'sown

16Curt. .15.1; Diod. 17.57.6.17Foralternativereconstructions f Alexander's wedge, see Fuller, 171, diagram 11,and 174; Marsden, 57; Milns, 118 (diagram) and 123; Schachermeyr, 73; and Green,293."sThere s no reason to suppose, as Griffith,4-85, does, thatAlexanderhad to wheelto his rightand drive Bessus' wingoff he fieldhimself.


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GRAND TACTICS AT GAUGAMELA 381front ine. While all the units fromPolyperchon'staxis [6] rightwardsurgedforwardn thegreat ttackon the Persiancentre, immias,unableto push forward s rapidly,and hearingthat the leftwas in difficulties,halted hisown taxis 7]tosuccour t.Through heresultant ap therenowpenetrated force fIndian and Persiancavalryfrom hedisintegratingenemycentre.19 eachingthe Macedonian baggage-park 25],20theyfellupon its defenders, verwhelmed hem, nd liberatedthoseoftheirowntroopswhom they foundthereas prisoners.At this, the Macedoniansecond-linenfantry24], n accordance withpreviousorders, acedaboutand put theraidersto flight.While all this was taking place, the left,underthe commandofPar-menion,was sustaining n attemptedenvelopment, s well as a frontalassault,bythe as yetundefeatedPersianright, ommandedbyMazaeus.Being thus hard-pressed,Parmeniondespatched riders to Alexander,asking forassistance.2' It is almost certain,despite statements to thecontrary n our sources,22 hat this message was never delivered.ForwhenParmenion'smessengers eached theMacedonian right, heyfoundthat Alexander was already faradvanced in his pursuitof Darius andreturned, apparently without having accomplished their mission.23Fortunately,however,for heMacedonian cause, Parmenion ucceeded,withouthelp, n checking hePersianattack withhis Thessalian cavalry[10].Then, as newsofDarius' flight rom hefieldfilteredhrough o thefalteringnemyright, herepulserapidlybecame a rout.

"The account of an attack on the Macedonian camp itself,by cavalry sent fromthePersian rightby Mazaeus (Curt. 4.15.5; Diod. 17.59.5-8; Plut. Alex. 32.3), is probablyas apocryphal as the fantasticstoryof the refusalof Darius' mother, isygambis, to berescued (Diod. 17.59.7; cf. Curt. 4.15.10-11), withwhich it is connected. Plut. Alex.32.3-4 and Curt. 4.15.6-8 render the alleged attack on the camp even moredubious bylinking t withthe tale of a weak-kneedParmeniondemandingaid from n unperturbed,if contemptuous,Alexander (see below,note 21).20Arr. .14.5-6. As this raid was dealt withby the second-line nfantry Arr.3.14.6),it is evident that its object (whether ntendedor not) was merely hefieldbaggage-park,and not Alexander's fortified our-daycamp (Arr. 3.9.1; Curt. 4.10.15), some 16-17miles away, or either of his two alleged night-camps Curt. 4.12.17 and 4.12.24; cf.Arr.3.9.3-4, whichhas only one such camp), also some 3-4 miles distant.21Anappeal forhelp fromParmenion at this stage is quite credible,and need not beassociated with any deliberatelydiscrediting toryof cowardice or irresolutionon hispart, as it is in Plutarch and Curtius (above, note 19), though, verysignificantly, otin Diodorus (note especially, 17.60.8). For the roleof Callisthenes as the creator of theanti-Parmeniontradition, ee Tarn II 352-353 and 357, and J. R. Hamilton, Plutarch:Alexander,A CommentaryOxford 1969) 89.22Arr. .15.1; Curt. 4.15.6-8 and 4.16.2-3; Plut. Alex. 32.3-4 and 33.6.21Diod. 17.60.7. The dust and chaos of battle (Curt. 4.15.32-33; Diod. 17.60.4),togetherwiththelikelihoodthatAlexander was by thena couple ofmilesor so fromhisoriginal position at the start of the battle, render t most unlikelythat anyone comingfromthe leftwing could have reached him while he was pursuingDarius. Cf. Fuller,178, and Lane Fox, 241.


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382 PHOENIXWhether rnot he receivedParmenion's ppeal forhelp,Alexanderdidturnback, mostlikelybecause of the loss of Darius' trail at the River

Lycus (probablythe Khazir Su) and thegrowing arknessofevening.24It was duringthisrearwardride26 hatAlexanderbecame involved n ashortbutbloodyclash witha largebodyofretreating ersiancavalry, ncompany with some Parthian and Indian horse. Here, according toArrian,26 ookplace thehardestfought avalryactionofthe entirebattle.Afterhaving slain sixty of Alexander's Companion cavalry [1] andwounded his favourite, ephaestion,27heremnants fthe Persianhorsebrokethrough heMacedonian squadronsand made good their scape.When he had assured himselfof the fact that his armywas com-pletelyvictorious, nd thathencetherewas no moreglory o be wononthe field,Alexanderrenewed his pursuitof Darius. Meanwhile, Par-menionadvanced and took the Persian camp, along with the enemy'sbaggage-trainand elephants. Having crossed the Lycus, Alexanderbivouackedon the far ide and restedhiscavalryuntilaroundmidnight,whenhe rode on to Arbela,some fortymiles away, where he hoped tocapturebothDarius and hisfield-treasury. hen he reachedArbela thefollowing ay, he did in factfind here hePersianfield-treasury,s wellas his defeatedopponent'schariot,but no Darius. The Great King hadriddenon tomeet an ignominious nd-at thehandsofhis ownsubjects.24Curt. 4.16.16-19; cf. Plut. Alex. 33.6-7. That "Alexanderwas no PrinceRupert,andGaugamela no Edgehill"-as Marsden, 61, puts it-has becomea dogmainrecent tudiesof the battle. It is highly probable that, after the battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C. (whereDemetrius, pursuingthe beaten cavalry of Seleucus and Lysimachus too farfromthefield, eft his father,AntigonusMonophthalmus,to be defeated and killed), thehistorio-graphical emphasis changed fromone of execratingParmenion forbeing responsible,throughhis "unnecessary" appeals for ssistance, fortheescape ofDarius (Curt. 4.16.3is mostsignificant ere), to thatofglossingover the tactically rresponsible haracter ofAlexander'sprolongedpursuitoftheGreat King (note Curt. 4.16.29-30). The linkingofthehistorianAristobuluswiththe battle of Ipsus at Arr.7.18.5 is certainly vidence forthisview.26Arr. .15.1-2; Curt. 4.16.20-25. Hardly thevast envelopingmovement, imed at thecompleteencirclement fthePersian centreand left, hatMarsden, 61, seems tomake it.Alexander lacked both the required effective uperiority n numbers and the tacticalpositionfromwhich to carryout such an encirclement.n any case, thegrand tacticsofcentralpenetrationwould have held a greaterappeal, because oftheirdirectness, ortheking's "heroic" spirit (here note, forexample, Arr. 1.11.7-8; 1.12.1; 3.3.1-2; 5.26.5;

6.9.3-6; and 6.24.2-3; Plut. Alex. 8.2), as well as being bettersuited to the task ofdealing with the rather oose tactical formations f thePersians.2"Arr. .15.2; cf. Curt. 4.16.20. The importanceand ferocity scribed to this clash byour sourcesprobablyhave theirorigin n thepersonalreminiscences fPtolemyhimself."'Arr. 3.15.2. No tactical conclusions can be drawn fromArrian's inclusion here ofCoenus and Menidas; cf. Griffith, 6-87, and Milns, 124. It is evident fromDiod.17.61.3 and Curt.4.16.31-32 thatArrianhas simplyconflated mention fthewoundingofHephaestion and the loss of sixtyCompanions in thisencounterwitha casualty listof seniorofficers; f. Burn, 88, and also R. M. Errington,CQ 19 (1969) 237.


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GRAND TACTICS AT GAUGAMELA 383CONCLUSION

Having thus reconstructedhe battle of Gaugamela, we may appro-priatelyconclude with an appraisal of Alexander'sgeneralship n thisfield.That he showedgreat competenceheregoeswithout aying.Whatis open to question is the consistencywith whichAlexanderdisplayedthiscompetencenhisconduct f the battle.Certainly heforesighthownin providing dequate mobileprotection or heflanks ftheMacedonianarmy duringthedefensivephase of the actionmerits mmediatepraise.Yet the wisdomof Alexander's order forMenidas and his mercenarycavalry[17]to open theengagement n theirownis farfrom bvious. Itcertainly eems rresponsibleo launcha smallbodyofhorseon a chargeagainsta muchstronger ormationfenemycavalry,even if,as was thecase here,supportwere close at hand. Viewed in this light,Menidas'chargedoes appear to have been an error-and an error fcarelessnessat that.But simplecarelessness, specially t crucialmoments,s hardly ypicalofAlexander.Everythinghe did was carefully lanned n advance. Thisis not to say thathe nevermiscalculated.Rather,hismistakes, ikethoseofother menofgreatmilitary r politicalgenius,wereby and largedueto passionormegalomania.Such a mistake, s we shall see,was hispro-longedpursuitof Darius from his verybattlefield.And that was theresultnotofanyimpetuousdecision,butrather fyetanother ttempt-despitea similarfailure t Issus-to carry ut his ong-standing,foverlyhazardous,plan to end the war at one blowby seizingthepersonoftheGreatKing. Likewise,Menidas' chargewas no ill-consideredmanoeuvre,butpartofa carefullyaid tacticalplan thathappenedtomisfire.t was,in fact, device to "draw" theenemy.28 t theGranicusAlexanderhadsacrificed isadvance-guard fcavalry norder o throw hePersianhorseguarding he ford nto confusion.29nly thenhad he launchedhismainattack with the Companion cavalry. Here, at Gaugamela, Alexanderfaceda similarproblem-how to open theenemy'sranksfor hedecisiveassault. Since Bessus' Bactriansand the Dahae weremoving round hisflank n a disciplinedmanner,30Alexanderhad to "draw" them.The onlyway that he coulddo this was bysending smallunitforward o attack,and be driven back in disorder-a disorder whichwould include thepursuers.Having thusdissolvedtheirbattle-formation,lexander ouldexploittheirdisorganization ysending n strongeravalryunits. n theeventthis s exactlywhat he did. And, but forthevastlysuperiornum-bersofthePersiancavalry,hewouldprobablyhave wonhis battlethere

28I am particularly rateful oProfessorE. Badian for uggesting his nterpretation ome.29Arr. .15.1-3.IOCf.Arr.4.5.4-5.


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384 PHOENIXandthen. he fact hat his actical loyfailed houldnotblind s to tsviability.t had workedefore,nd should aveworked ere, adnot hePersians,sseems ery ossible,een xpectingt. Atanyrate,Alexanderdid make mistake orwhich emust e held ccountable,hat funder-estimatinghestrengthf theforceswithwhichDarius couldcounterhisopeningmove.But the nitial ailure asbynomeans rretrievable.On the ontrary,topened hewayfor stab at theheart fthePersianarmy, ince n order o meetthe threatDarius haduncovered is eftcentre.Brilliantand subtle tactician that he was, Alexander, ike Napoleon,worked n theprinciple f"a plan withbranches."Once hisoriginalplanhad bogged down in a hard-fought avalry engagementon the right,Alexanderput into effectts mainbranch-the centralattack in wedge-formation. his major attack was the high-light f the battle in moreways thanone, and, as such,warrants omediscussion.The manoeuvreitselfwas well-conceived, nd-apart fromthe consequentdisjunctionin theMacedonian frontine-skilfullyexecuted. That Alexanderchosethis tactic,ratherthan,say, an ordinaryfrontal ssault, was evidentlydue to two separate considerations. irst,he meant to seize the oppor-tunity o enveloptheinternal eftflank f the Persiancentreby way ofthe gap that had just opened. Secondly,he soughtto enable his Com-panion cavalry 1],thetacticalspearheadofthewedge,to advance aheadof the infantry,whileneitherdepriving tselfof close supportfrom hephalanx nor disruptingthe army's main battle-line. n devising themanoeuvre fattack inwedge-formation,r,moretechnically,n doubleoblique order,Alexanderevinced a striking riginalityn the sphereofgrandtactics.Foralthough heobliqueorder ttackhadbeen nventedbyEpaminondassomeforty earsbefore,31Alexander ppears to have beenthe first eneralto develop the manoeuvre n any tacticallysignificantway.32But from hispointon Alexander'stactics are not so commendable.Putting his long-term olitical interests head of the requirements fthe immediatetacticalsituation,he at once set offn pursuitofDariushimself.Admittedly, he successful aptureof the Great King's personwould have outweighed ny incidentaldisaster, uch as thedestructionoftheMacedonian leftby an undefeatedPersianright.But it must beconceded, in view of the ease of retreataffordedDarius by the openterrain of the battlefield, hat there was never very much chance ofAlexander ctuallyovertakinghis quarry. Moreover, cross theenemy's

a"For the firstwell-authenticated ccurrenceoftheoblique orderattack, at thebattleofLeuctra in 371 B.C.,see Diod. 15.55.1-15.56.4.32The"Alexandrinewedge" seems to have made its debut duringAlexander's Illyriancampaign in 335 B.c. (see Arr. 1.6.3).


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GRAND TACTICS AT GAUGAMELA 385natural ineofretreat here ay the RiverLycus, completewith a bridgethatcouldbe brokendownbythe GreatKing or-as indeedhappened-hopelesslyblockedby his fleeing ollowers fterhis crossing.33 lthoughit is possible that Alexander was unaware of the problemof the river-crossing ntilhe got to it,the natureofthe terrainn rearofthePersianpositioncould scarcelyhave escaped his notice.In thesecircumstances,thetactically orrect ourseofaction wouldhave been forhim to returnto thebattlefield roper s soonas the routofthe Persian centrewas seento be complete.That he did not in fact do so is an instanceof tacticaldelinquencywhich can be countedagainsthim,at least from hestand-pointofa critiqueofpure generalship.His Homericattitudeto war hadagain led him off n fruitlessuest ofthe"spolia opima."Needless to say,Alexanderwas fortunaten havingas the commanderofhis left o competent tacticianas Parmenion,to whombelongstheglory fwinninghere-as at Issus-what was virtually separatebattle.Parmenion'swingofthearmyhad certainlybeenplaced in eopardy bythe king's preoccupationwith Darius. The gravityof the situation isindicated by Parmenion's (unanswered) appeal forhelp. Nevertheless,two considerations an be advanced in partial defenceof Alexander'sconduct. n thefirst lace, hehad providedhisgeneralwiththe excellentThessalian cavalry [10] to act as a nucleus foroffensive ction. In thesecond, his apparent confidence n the ability of Parmenion and histroopsto withstand heonslaughtsof the Persianrightwas justifiedbythe successful utcomeofa remarkably imilar ituation at Issus.34It is generally greed by militaryhistorians hat Alexander'svictoryat Gaugamela was a tactical masterpiece.This judgment,thoughsub-stantiallycorrect,does require some qualification.As we have seen,Alexander'stactics in this battle,while on the whole brilliant n theiroriginalitynd subtlety,werenot altogether lawlessn theirexecution.The masterpiecewas marredby the victor's heroicpretensions nd mis-conceivedorderofpriorities.Gaugamela,we mustremember,was, afterall, thevictory fa verygreatbut as yet immaturegeneral.35

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, EDMONTON33Curt. .16.8-9 and 4.16.16-17.34Arr. .11.1-3; cf.2.11.6-7 (suspicious); Curt.3.11.13-15; cf.3.11.16 (also suspicious).See above, note 24.35I am greatly ndebted to ProfessorsE. Badian, A. B. Bosworth,D. Fishwick andJ. King-Farlow, as well as to an anonymous referee,for their helpful comments onearlierdraftsof thispaper.

Devine 1975

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