Disarmament Deja Vu

7/31/2019 Disarmament Deja Vu

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DisarmamentDj-VuRecommendationsforPeacefulCivilianDisarmamentinJonglei

OnJanuary20,2012,theGovernmentofSouthSudanannouncedacompulsorycivilian

disarmamentcampaigninJongleiState,thefourthintheStatesince2005.Thedisarmament

campaignisinresponsetoayearofescalatingviolenceagainstciviliansinJonglei.2011sawa

dramaticincreaseinviolenceagainstLouNuer,DinkaBor,andMurlecivilians,theresurgenceof

theLouNuer-ledWhiteArmy,andthelaunchandsubsequentstallingofanall-Jongleipeace

process.InthewakeoffurtherescalationinDecember,agovernment-ledpeaceprocessandinquiry

intotheviolencewasannounced.Onemonthon,thegovernmenthasnotidentifiedthestructure,

composition,ormandateofeitherthepeaceprocessortheinquiry;governmentsecurityforcesand

UNMISSarenotyetinpositiontoadequatelyprotectscatteredandvulnerablecivilianpopulations

acrossJonglei;andviolentrhetoriconallsidesisescalating,withparticularlyconcerninglanguage

usedagainsttheMurlecommunityduringthemostrecentattack.Forcedciviliandisarmamentisto

belaunchedinthisvolatilecontextandrisksfurtherdestabilizingJonglei.

SincethesigningoftheComprehensivePeaceAgreement(CPA)in2005therehavebeen

disarmamentcampaignsalmostannuallyinJongleiState.1DisarmamentinJongleihasbeen

characterizedbyviolenceagainstcivilians,includingsummaryexecution,torture,rape,andarmed

theftandhasbeenaccompaniedbythedisplacementofcivilians.2Thusfar,disarmamentinJonglei

hasnotbeenlinkedtoanoverarchingframeworkthatintegratessecurity,governance,andpolitical

interventions.Onthecontrary,communitiesinJongleioftenperceivedisarmamentcampaignsas

governmentattemptstopunishorcontrolwaywardethnicgroupsand/orasintimatelylinkedto

ongoingpoliticalprocesses.3Disarmamentsfailuretoadequatelyreduceviolentconflictis,inpart,

becausedisarmamentisnotviewedasneutral,hasbeenincomplete,hasnotguaranteedcivilian

safety,hasnotmettheexpectationsandneedsofthepopulation,andhasnotbeenlocatedwithinbroaderprocessesthataddressthekeydriversofconflict.Thecurrentdisarmamentprogramfor

Jongleishouldbecarefullydesigned,articulated,andimplementedandmustdrawonthesuccesses

andfailuresofpriorcampaignsaswellascommunityneedstoavoidfurtherunnecessaryviolence,

destructionofproperty,anddisplacementofcivilians.

TotheGovernmentofSouthSudan

Civiliandisarmament,needstobeconflictsensitiveandshouldbesituatedwithinabroaderconflictmitigationstrategywhichincludeslong-termprovisionofsecurity,justice,anda

widelydisseminatedpeace-buildingstrategytobuildcitizenconfidenceinadvanceof

disarmament; Civiliandisarmamentshouldbesequencedsuchthatitdoesnotincreasecommunity

perceptionsofinsecuritywhichmayfuelfurtherviolence;

1TherewerealsomorethantwentyseparatedisarmamentcampaignsinotherareasofSouthSudan.2Noonetointervene:gapsincivilianprotectioninSouthSudan ,HumanRightsWatch(2009);Anatomyof

civiliandisarmamentinJongleiState ,SmallArmsSurvey(2007).3InterviewswithgovernmentofficialsandciviliansinJubaandJongleiState,2011and2012.


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Thedisarmamentneedstobeinformedbycitizensviewsofwhataneffectivedisarmamentprocesswouldentail;

Considerutilizingalternativestructures,suchastraditionalandlocalauthorities,toleadthedisarmamentprocesses;

Mechanismsshouldbecreatedtosupportmonitoringofciviliandisarmamentcampaignstopreventabusesandenablecivilianoversight.Localleveloversightshouldbeencouragedto

increaseconfidenceandreducesuspicion;

Thedeploymentofprosecutorsandjudgestotheareasbeingdisarmedshouldbestandardpracticeandtheirsecurityshouldbeguaranteedinordertodemonstrateeffectiveruleof

law;

CiviliandisarmamentshouldbesimultaneousamongJongleiscommunitiesandsecurityforcesshouldprovidesecurityalongJongleisborderswithEasternEquatoriaandUpper

NileStatetoensurecommunitiesarenotvulnerabletoneighborswhohavenotbeen

disarmed.

TotheSecurityForcesofSouthSudan4

Toensuredisarmamentisperceivedasneutral,securityforcesdeployedfordisarmamentshouldnotbefromJongleisconflictingethnicgroups;

Theuseofforceshouldbeemployedonlyasalastresortandafteratleastthreemonthsofwidespreadcommunityconsultationfollowedbyatleastsixmonthsofvoluntarycollection

toallowcommunitiestoshapetheprocessandthesecurityforcestoadequatelypreparefor

deployment;

Securityforcesshouldhaveasustainablesupplychainbewell-equipped,adequatelyresourced,andcapableofprovidingsecurityforlongperiodsoftime-toensuretheydonot

relyoncivilianpopulationsforsustenance;

Securityforcesshouldbeaccountablefortheiractionsduringdisarmamentandciviliansshouldbeinformedofhowtoaccessaccountabilitymechanisms;

Securityforcesshouldnotimpedetheworkofnationalandinternationalmonitorsandobservers.

ToCivilSocietyandtheInternationalCommunity

SouthSudaneseandinternationalmonitorsshouldbepresentduringciviliandisarmamenttoreportrightsviolationsduringthedisarmamentprocesstotherespectiveauthorities;

Civilsocietyandtheinternationalcommunity,especiallydonorssupportingsecuritysectorreform,shouldsupporttrainingofthesecurityforcesininternationalhumanitarianand

humanrightsstandardsandsupportthedeploymentofprosecutorsandjudgesduring

disarmament;

Maintainafocusonlong-term,integratedprocessesandresponses.

4AtthetimeofwritingtheSouthernPeoplesLiberationArmy(SPLA),SouthSudanPoliceService(SSPS),

WildlifeBrigade,andFireBrigadeareanticipatedtoparticipateinthedisarmamentexercise.


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TotheUnitedNationsMissioninSouthSudan(UNMISS)

UNMISSmustfinalizeitsProtectionofCivilians(PoC)strategyforSouthSudanandensureclearimplementationmodalitiesareinplacetorealizeitsChapterVIImandate;

UNMISSmustdevelopaspecificplantoprotectciviliansundergoingdisarmament; UNMISSmustclearlycommunicateitsprotectionstrategy,implementationplans,androlevis--vissecurityforcestoaffectedcommunitiesbefore,during,andafterdisarmament; UNMISSshoulduseitsgoodofficestosupportanintegratedresponsetotheconflictin

Jongleiwhileprioritizingitsprotectionofciviliansmandate;

UNMISSshouldbepartofmonitoringtheproposeddisarmamentcampaignandshouldleverageitsnetworks,goodofficesanditscoordinationroletosupportoversightofthe

disarmamentprocess.

ThisbriefingnoteisajointcommunicationpreparedbytheDanishDeminingGroup,Pactand

Saferworld.Thisbriefingnoteisintendedtoprovidelessonslearnedfrompreviousdisarmament

exercises,counselagainstforcedciviliandisarmamentatthisjuncture,andprovidebroader

recommendationsforanoverarchingframeworkforconflict-reductioninJongleiinthecoming

months.Thisbriefingspecificallyaddressesthechallengesassociatedwithforcedcivilian

disarmamentbecauseitrisksaggravatingthevolatilesituationinJonglei.Futurebriefingswill

discussstrategiesforarealisticapproachtoreducingconflictinJonglei.Questionsandcommentsmaybedirectedtowardsanyofthecontactsbelow.

DanishDeminingGroup

[email protected]

[email protected]

Pact

[email protected]

[email protected]

Saferworld

SaraSkinnerProjectCoordinator,[email protected]


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1. BackgroundIn2011,JongleisawanincreaseinviolenceagainstLouNuer,Dinka,andMurlecivilians,the

resurgenceoftheLouNuer-ledWhiteArmy,andthelaunchandsubsequentstallingofanall-

Jongleipeaceprocess.5TheviolencespikedinDecemberwhenciviliansfromallthreeofJongleis

conflictingcommunitieswereattacked,withtheattackontheMurlecommunitythemost

devastating.Intheabsenceofaviablepeaceprocessandtheannouncementthatcommunitieswill

beforciblydisarmed,highlevelsofviolenceareanticipatedtocontinueinthedryseason.

Theconflictintheworldsnewestnationhasattractedinternationalattentionformanyreasons:

theunprecedentedscaleandnatureofviolence;theuseofethnichatredasaneffectiverhetorical

device;andthestrugglesofoutmannedandoutgunnedSPLA,SSPSandUNMISSforcestryingto

protectandprovideearlywarningtociviliansinthisremoteregionofSouthSudan.Underlyingthe

currentviolenceanditshumanitarianconsequencesarepoliticalandsocialfaultlinesthathave

enabledtheescalationofviolencebetweencommunitiesacrossJongleiin2011andinto2012.

Jongleisconflictsaredeeplyrootedincompetitionovernaturalresourcesandpoliticalpower,widespreadperceptionsthatgovernancestructuresarebiasedinfavorofcertaingroups,theeffects

ofdecadesofviolence,andthelackofaccountabilityandreconciliationbetweencommunities.6In

Jonglei,competitionforaccesstoandcontrolofwaterandgrazinglandisexacerbatedbythe

militarizationofentiresocieties,alegacyofthecivilwar,theongoingneedforcommunityself-

defencestructuresintheabsenceofsufficientstatecapacitytoprovidesecurity,andthewide

availabilityofsmallarmsandlightweapons.

2.DisarmamentasaResponsetoJongleisSecurityChallenges

Duetothehighlevelsofviolenceandthewidespreadpossessionofsmallarmsandlightweapons

byciviliansinJonglei,civiliandisarmamentcampaignshavebeenapartofthegovernmentefforts

toimprovesecurityforanumberofyears.Thefollowingsectionprovidesabriefoutlineofprevious

civiliandisarmamentcampaignsandhighlightslessonsthatshouldinformthecurrentcampaign.2.1CiviliandisarmamentinNorthernJongleiDecember2005May2006

FollowingthesigningoftheCPA,a2005civiliandisarmamentcampaignwasinitiatedtoenable

peacefultransitionduringgrazingseasonoftheLouandGawaarNuerpastoralistsfromAyodand

FangakintolandsofDinkaHolandNyarwengofDuk.Asnegotiationprocessesfailedtoachieve

resolutiononthecarryingofweaponsduringmigration,forceddisarmamentwasannouncedfor

thosethatwouldnotsurrendertheirweapons.TheLouNuerandWhiteArmydidnotwantto

5TheWhiteArmyemergedfromcattlecampsinlargelyLouNuerareasincentralandeasternUpperNile

regiontoprotectpastorallivelihoodsandcommunityproperty.TheWhiteArmy,whichiscapableof

mobilsinglargegroupsofarmedmentogetherforcommunitysecurity,becamemilitarilyactiveinthesecond

civilwarfollowingthe1991splitintheSPLM/Aandutilizeddifferentloyaltiesandpowerbasestosecureits

objectives.SeetheSudanHumanBaselineAssessment(HSBA)formoredetailedanalysisandup-to-datefacts

andfiguresonJongleisarmedgroups. 6Thisisbutabriefoverviewofthehistoricaltrajectory,roots,andcurrentdriversofconflictinJonglei.


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surrendertheirweaponsbecausetherivalMurlefactionswerenotdisarmedandweaponswere

integraltocommunityself-defenceduringseasonalinter-ethnicviolence.Theprocessbecame

violentastheSPLAandWhiteArmyclashed.

ThedisarmamentcampaignwastobethedownfalloftheWhiteArmy.Violentconfrontation

characterizedthedisarmamentcampaignanditwasonlyafteramajorconfrontationbetweentheWhiteArmyandtheSPLAon18May2006inwhich113WhiteArmyfightersand1SPLAsoldier

werekilledthatvoluntaryciviliandisarmamentwaspursued.TheSPLAdrovetheWhiteArmyout

ofcrucialareasinJongleiafterwhichagovernment-ledprocesswasinitiatedtoworkwiththelocal

chiefstoconvincecivilianstohandoverweapons.Morethan3000weaponswerecollected.Some

oftheseweaponswerekeptbytheSPLAandsomeremainedinthehandsofthecommunities.The

disarmamentcampaigncamewithahighcosttohumansecurity;morethan1000WhiteArmy

fighters,approximately400SPLA,anestimated213civilianswerekilledandvillageswereburnt

andlootedastheopposingforcessweptthrough.Thisdisarmamentcampaignwasalsofollowedby

aperiodofintensefoodshortagesasgoatsandcattlewerelootedandagriculturalproductionwas

severelyinterrupted.TheforceddisarmamentoftheLouNuerin2005remainsperceivedamongstsomesectorsofthecommunityasapoliticallymotivatedinterventiontoreducethepotentialofthe

WhiteArmytomobiliseandcauseinstability.7Afterthedisarmamentcampaign,theWhiteArmy

wasrelativelydormantuntilitsresurgencein2011.

2.1.1Lessonslearnt

Apoliticalprocessofengagementisanintrinsicpartofciviliandisarmamentandthereshouldbeclearagreementondisarmamentbeforeanyattemptsaremadetoremove

weapons;

Thereneedstobeguaranteesofsecurityforcommunitiesthatsurrendertheirweaponsandsustainedsecurityserviceprovisionafterthedisarmamentcampaignhasbeenconcluded;

SPLAdeploymentsneedtobeaccompaniedbysufficientlogisticalsupport,especiallyfoodsupplies,andclearstandardsofbehaviorandenforceabledisciplinarycodesofpractice

withmechanismsforaccountabilityandoversight;

Thepotentialforviolentresistanceishighwhentheprocessisnotperceivedasbeingequitableandnon-partisan.

2.2CiviliandisarmamentinAkobo:March-August2006

Throughout2004and2005,effortsweremadebyinternationalpartnersandlocalgovernmentin

Akobotolaythefoundationforapeacefuldisarmamentprogramme.Thisincludedtheformationofcommunitygroupstomobilisesupportfordisarmament,securityguarantees,andcompensation

mechanisms.However,followingtheviolenceduringdisarmamentinnorthernJongleiinlate2005

andearly2006,thestategovernmentandSPLApushedformorevisiblesuccesswithdisarmament

inAkoboinasignificantlyshortenedperiodoftime.Localgovernment,civilsociety,and

7DiscussionswithLouNuercommunitymembersin2011.


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internationalnon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)madeconcertedeffortsforvoluntarycivilian

disarmamentwithouttheinvolvementoftheSPLA.AsexplainedinaSmallArmsSurveyreport:

AplanforreciprocaldisarmamentbeganinJuly2006,organizedthroughchiefsand

administeredbycounty,payam,andcommunity-leveldisarmamentcommittees.

Schoolteachersweretrainedtosafelyclear,register,andstoretheweaponsintendisarmamentcentres.Mobilizationteamswerealsocreated,andpublicsensitization

programmeswerelaunched,supportedbytheUN,withmanytravellingalongthePiborand

AgveiRivers.TheAkobodisarmamentprogrammegeneratedsomeimportantandvisible

successes.By30July,anestimated1,400serviceablerifles,machineguns,rocket-propelled

grenades,andmortarswereturnedin.

AlthoughtheAkoboprocessproceededpeacefully,waslargelyvoluntary,anddidnotinvolvethe

military,thereweresignificantfactorsatplaywhichcreatedcoercivepressure,nottheleastof

whichwasthepotentialimpactofaforcefuldisarmamentprocessimplementedbytheSPLA.

2.2.1Lessonslearnt

ThedeploymentoftheSPLAinactivedisarmamentoperationsshouldbeatooloflastresortandcanfunctionasacoerciveincentiveinfavourofpeacefuldisarmamentwithoutbeing

operationallyemployed;

Civiliandisarmamentcanbedonethroughlocalauthoritystructures; Nationalandinternationalcivilsocietyactorscanmobilisesupportforvoluntary

disarmament.

2.3Morecomprehensivedisarmament2009

ViolenceinJongleiincreasedin2009withmorethan1800peoplekilled.Thespikeinviolenceandtheneedtoensurestabilityfornationalelectionswhichwereheldin2010andanindependence

referenduminearly2011ledthegovernmenttoorderanationaldisarmamentprogrammeundera

Presidentialdecree.Duetoheightenedtensionsassociatedwiththehighlevelofviolence,veryfew

peoplevoluntarilysurrenderedweapons.Duringthe2009campaigntheSPLAwasunabletodeploy

tolocationsaroundthecountrysimultaneouslyandtherewasnoscheduleofwhichareasshouldbe

disarmedwhen.8

2.3.1Lessonslearnt

Disarmamentisasmuchapoliticalexerciseasitisaboutregulatingthepotentialuseofforce;

Thereneedstobeanoverarchingstrategyfordisarmamentwhichenablescoordination,communication,andsequencingbetweenessentialstakeholders;

Politicalwillandadequateresourcesmustaccompanyadisarmamentcampaign.

8Seeforexample:CecileBrewer(2009),DisarmamentinSouthSudan.CenterforComplexOperations,Naval

PostgraduateSchool:USA.InternationalCrisisGroup(2009),Jongleistribalconflicts:counteringinsecurityin

SouthSudan.


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3.2.1AbsenceofEffectiveAccountabilityforHumanRightsAbuses

AstheSPLAisstillundergoingaprocessofdefencetransformationandprofessionalizationthere

areconcernsabouttheefficacyofinternalandexternalcontrolandaccountabilitymechanisms.

ThisraisesquestionsabouttheSPLAsabilitytorespectfundamentalhumanrightsduring

disarmamentandtheleadershipspublicandprivatestatementsindicatethatmanybelievethatusingforcetocounterresistancetodisarmamentispartofasuccessfuldisarmament

deployment.11Moreencouragingly,securityforcesarewillingtoaccepthumanrightstrainingin

advanceofthedisarmamentexercise.Tobeeffective,trainingmustbepairedwithaccountability

mechanisms;suchmechanismsarenotyetestablishedforsecurityforcesinruralJongleiandwill

bedifficulttoputintoplaceandpublicizeintheimmediatefuture.Theabsenceofsufficientand

accessiblemechanismsforaccountabilitycreatesanenvironmentthatcontributestocommunity

perceptionsofvulnerabilityandincreasesthepotentialfortheunwarrantedandunregulateduseof

forceagainstarmedandunarmedcivilians.

3.2.2SecurityForcesandEthnicLoyalties

ViolenceinJongleiisstructuredaroundethniclinesandsuccessfuldisarmamentwillbebasedon

anunderstandingoftheroleofethnicityandextremesensitivitieswhichfuelmistrustonallsides.

Thesesensitivitiesarebasedonethnicrepresentationingovernmentandthesecurityforces,

ethnicallymotivatedviolence(perceivedorreal),andwidespreadpovertyandunderdevelopment

thatisalsofelttoplayintoequityissuesaroundethnicity.InJonglei,theleadershipisprimarily

DinkaandLouNuerwithlimitedMurlerepresentationatthehighestlevels;Murlebelievetheirlack

ofrepresentationmeanstheywillbetargetedfordisarmamentfirst.12Further,someinthesecurity

forcesfindtheirloyaltiestornbetweentheSPLAandtheirownethnicgroup;duringtheLouNuer

attackonPibortowninDecember2011,fifteenLouNuersoldiersreportedlydefectedfromthe

SPLAandjoinedtheattackers.13Communitiesaresuspiciousofrivalethnicgroupsmotivesfor

disarmingtheircommunityandwillrespondaccordingly.

Thesechallengesarenotinsurmountable.Forexample,Jongleiscommunitiesbelievesomegroups

canimpartiallyinterveneandprovidesecurity.Communitiesstatethattheysupportthe

deploymentofsecurityforcesfromGreaterEquatoriaandGreaterBahrelGhazal.Communities

believethesegroupscanbeimpartialinwayssecurityforcesfromJongleisethnicgroupscannot.14

Communitiesresponsestodisarmamentwillbeinfluencedbytheethniccompositionoftheforces

broughttodisarmthemandthepotentialforviolentresistancecanbeminimizedthrough

sensitivitytothesefactors.

3.2.3SupplyingTroops

GiventheaccesschallengestoreachruralareasinJonglei,thereareconcernsthatthesecurity

forcesmaynotbeabletosustainthelogisticalsupplyroutesthatarenecessaryforlong-term

11Interviewswithrepresentativesofthegovernmentandsecurityforces,2011and2012.12InterviewsinJongleiandJuba,January2012.13InterviewswithSPLAandciviliansinPibor,January2012.14InterviewswithciviliansinJubaandJonglei,January2012.


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deployment.15Gapsinthesupplychainandinadequatesuppliesoffoodandwaterarelikelytolead

tosecurityforcesdependingoncommunitiesfortheseessentialsupplies;thiscouldresultin

violentconfrontationgiventhehighlevelsofscarcitythatprevailintheseareas.Theconcomitant

violence,appropriationoffoodassets,abuseofciviliansandinsecuritycausingincreased

displacement,couldfurtherexacerbatethecurrenthumanitariancrisisexperiencedacrossthe

state.Furthermore,theabilityofhumanitarianactorstomaintainorscaleupthesupplyofessentialfoodandnon-fooditemscouldbenegativelyaffectedduetoinstabilityarisingfromthe

disarmamentprocess.

3.2.4ConstraintsonUNMISS

ManylooktoUNMISStoprovideprotectionforciviliansinJongleibutthemilitarycapacityand

logisticalconstraintsoftheMissionpreventthatfrombeingarealisticoption.Atthetimeof

writing,UNMISShasjustover1,000deployabletroopsandthetroopsrelianceonhelicoptersfor

movementandre-supplymakeslong-termdeploymentsinruralJongleilogisticallychallenging,

astoundinglyexpensive,andunpopularamongcountriesseekingareductioninUNMISSsizeand

troopnumbers.16UNMISSmustalsobalancedeploymentsinJongleiagainstchallengeselsewhereinSouthSudan.

Acknowledgingtheselimitations,sixmonthsintothemission,UNMISShasnotfinalizeditsoverall

civilianprotectionstrategynorhasitindicatedhowitwillutilizeitslimitedresourcestoprotect

civiliansagainstviolenceaccompanyingforceddisarmament.ItisimperativethatUNMISSdevelop

anddisseminateacivilianprotectionstrategyinadvanceofdisarmament.Duringdisarmament,

UNMISSislikelytobecalledupontoprotectciviliansagainsttheverysecurityforcesthey

partneredwithjustonemonthago.ThepresenceoftheUNMISSdeploymentinJongleicanbeused

asadeterrentforviolentresistancetodisarmament,asavisiblepartofinterimsecurityprovision

arrangementsandcouldserveaspartofamonitoringfunctionofthedisarmamentprocess.

3.3CompulsoryCivilianDisarmamentasanInappropriateSecurityResponse

Asmuchassecurityinterventionswererequiredbeforeandduringthemostrecentepisodeof

violence,thenatureandcontentofasecurityresponseneedsseriousconsideration.Thereisthe

potentialthathardsecurityoperations,suchasforcedciviliandisarmament,couldexacerbate

existingperceptionsofmarginalizationandvulnerability,furtherendangerciviliansandbecome

partofthecycleofconflictinJonglei.Inthisregard,itishighlyconcerningthatcivilian

disarmamentisboththeimmediateandprimarysecurityresponseinJonglei.

EndingconflictinJongleirequirescommunitiestohaveconfidencethatthegovernmentwill

providesecurity.Effectiveciviliandisarmamenttendstobeaby-productofruleoflawandsecurity,

notaprecondition.Ifdisarmamentisnotcoupledwithprotectingciviliansfromaggressive

neighbors,communitieswillre-armforself-defense.Aforceddisarmamentcampaignnotfollowed

bygovernmentprotectionofcivilianswouldfueldiscontentandmistrustinthegovernmentand

mayexacerbatetheveryconflictitseekstoaddress.

15InterviewswithGovernment,SPLA,andUNofficialsinJubaandJonglei,January2012.16InterviewswithUNMISS,January2012.


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3.3.1CivilianDisarmamentorDisarmament,DemobilizationandReintegration?

ItisimportanttonotethatciviliandisarmamentandDisarmament,Demobilizationand

ReintegrationofcombatantsinSouthSudanareseparateprogramsdesignedfordifferentarmed

populations.InviewofthemilitarycommandstructureandnatureoftheWhiteArmyandthehigh

levelsoforganizationamongstMurleandDinkaarmedyouth,thereisaneedtoreviewtheappropriatenessoftheciviliandisarmamentparadigminJonglei.Civiliandisarmamentdoesnot

includeprogramstodemobilizearmedyouthoncetheirarmsarecollectednorfortheirintegration

intonon-militarizedpowerstructures,economicactivitiesandsocialnorms.Infact,thefailureto

situatedisarmamentwithinbroaderpoliticalandsecurityprocessesanddemobilizearmedyouth

meansthatthosewhoaredisarmedwillremainmobilizedandmotivatedtore-armquickly.

3.4AnEffectiveDisarmamentProcess

AnyciviliandisarmamentprocessinJongleihastobepartofamorecomprehensivestrategyaimed

atviolencereduction,conflictresolutionandsustainablehumansecurity.Disarmamentneedstobe

partofapackageofmutuallyreinforcinginterventionstoenhancestability.Withoutanoverarchingpoliticalprocesstoovercomegrievancesanddiscontent,aprocessofreconciliationthataddresses

theneedforaccountabilityformassviolence,andincreasedsecurityservices,disarmamentonits

ownmayinciteratherthanreduceviolence.Withoutaddressingtheagentsandinstitutionsthat

enableandmaintainviolence,removingtheinstrumentsofviolencewillprovidetemporary

security,ifthat.

4.ThePotentialImpactsofForcefulCivilianDisarmament

Civiliandisarmamentislikelytohavewiderangingimpactsonarmedandunarmedcivilian

populationsinJongleiifitispursuedinthecurrentenvironmentandseparatefromacomprehensiveapproachtoreducingviolence.Communitiesarenotopposedtocivilian

disarmament;infactcommunity-ledpeaceprocessesregularlycallforciviliandisarmament.For

communities,disarmamentmustbedonedifferentlythaninthepastand,foryears,theyhave

outlinedhowciviliandisarmamentshouldfunction.17Communitieswillbemoreacceptingof

civiliandisarmamentwhenthefollowingconditionsarepresent:

Governmentprovisionofsecurity; Disarmamentconductedbyneutralforces; DisarmamentdonesimultaneouslyacrossJongleiscommunities(andincludingimmediate

neighborsinEasternEquatoriaandUpperNile);

Adisarmamentprocessorganizedinconsultationwithcommunities.Adisarmamentprocessthatisnotpartofabroadereffortthataddressestoaddressconflictin

Jongleiislikelytoleadtoviolentconfrontations,increasecivilianvulnerabilities,feedintothecycle

ofviolence,furtherentrenchmistrustbetweenethnicgroupsandthegovernment,andimpactthe

abilitytoprovidehumanitarianassistanceatatimeofincreasedhumanitarianneed.

17ConsolidatedGreaterUpperNileRegionPeaceAgreements,2004-2009,Pact(2009)


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4.1IncreasingCivilianVulnerabilities

Acentralpartofthechallengetocommunityacceptanceofciviliandisarmamentisrecognizingthat

armedyouthgroupsprovidesecurityfortheircommunitiesandlivelihoods.Inthesepastoralist

cultures,cattlekeepingisthemainstructurearoundwhichwealth,power,andstatusiscreatedand

sustained.Assuch,armedyouthareintegratedintothesocietiesthattheyserveandreflectcertainvaluesandbehaviorsthatarereinforcedbythosesocieties.Inasmuchasthelevelsofviolenceare

unacceptableandpeopleareextremelyawareoftheinsecurity,thepolarizedinter-ethnicnatureof

theviolencesupportsthecontinuedneedforself-defencestructuresandfurthernecessitatesthe

functioningofarmedyouthgroups.

4.1.1IncreasingPotentialforfurtherAttacksonCivilians

NewsofforcedciviliandisarmamentspreadquicklyinJongleiandisalreadyinfluencingtheconflict

cycle.TherearerumorsthattheMurlewillbedisarmedfirstwhichcreatethepotentialfora

revengeattackontheLouNuerbeforetheyaredisarmed.Conversely,theWhiteArmy,whichwas

consideringanotherattackinrevengeforkillingsinWalgakandaroundAkoboinJanuary,maywaituntiltheMurlearedisarmedtoattack.Disarmamentwillimpacthowandwhencommunities

choosetolaunchrevengeattacksanddisarmamentthatisnotsimultaneousleavesthedooropento

attacksonthecommunitythatwasdisarmed.

4.1.2EnhancingPerceptionsofEthnicMarginalization

ManyaspectsoftheviolenceinJongleiimpactequallyoncommunitiesbuttounderstandthenature

oftheconflictinJonglei,itmustbeacceptedthatdifferentcommunitieshavedifferent

vulnerabilitieswhichmustbedealtwithsensitively.Perceptionsofmarginalizationcouldbe

exacerbatedbyforcefuldisarmamentassomecommunitiesrelyonself-defencestructuresinthe

faceofperceivedvulnerabilitiestoethnically-biaseddecision-making.FortheMurle,theyarepoliticallyunderrepresentedattheStateandnational-levelandhavefewpoliticalallies.Theyhave

adeepmistrustofthepoliticalclassinthestatecapitalandtendtowithdraworturninwardasa

communitywhenattackedorsubjectedto,whattheyviewas,politicalmanipulation.Atthetimeof

writing,MurleMembersofJongleisparliamenthavephysicallyexpressedthisestrangementby

leavingthestatecapital.ThismeansthattheMurlehavealmostnorepresentationatthestate-level

whilekeydecisionsaboutdisarmament,suchaswhichcommunitytodisarmfirst,aremade.18

TheMurlecommunityisoftenpresentedasthesourceoftheconflictinJonglei,ratherthanasone

ofthemanycommunitiesembroiledinit.19TherhetoricandviolencetargettheMurlecommunity

asawhole,includingchildren,women,andtheelderly.Forexample,LouNuerandDinkayouth

criticizedtheprovisionofhumanitarianassistancetoMurleciviliansandarmedDinkayouthtried

18TheMurlehavelittleornorepresentationinotherbranchesofthestategovernment,suchasinthe

otherwisemulti-ethnicstatecabinet.TheSPLAinJongleiisalsoledbyDinkaBorandLouNuer.19ThissectiondoesnotintendtoindicatethattheMurleareblamelessormerelyvictims.Infact,theyhave

beenaggressors,havekilledciviliansandkidnappedchildren,andtheyhaveareputationasfearsome

fighters.


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tophysicallystopthedeliveryoffoodaidtotheirenemytheMurle.20Thesefactorsmakethe

Murlehostiletoforceddisarmamentandmakethecommunityasawholeuniquelyvulnerable

whendisarmed.Thissenseofvulnerabilityfurtherfuelstheperceivedneedforviolentresistanceto

disarmamentandtheneedtoresorttoviolenceasasurvivalmechanism.

Similarly,thereareperceptionsofmarginalizationonthesideoftheLouNueraspartofthesecondmostpopulousethnicgroupinSouthSudanandofinequalitywithinaDinka-dominated

governmentstructuresthatareallegedtohaveethnically-alignedpriorities.Giventheperceptions

ofmarginalizationexperiencedbothbytheMurleandLouNuer,theuseofforceduring

disarmamentcouldsignificantlydamagerelationsbetweenethnicgroupsandfurtherfueltensions.

4.3FuelingMistrustandHostilitytowardtheGovernment

TherelationshipbetweentheLouNuerandMurlecommunitiesandtheJongleiStategovernmentis

understress.Increasingcitizentrustinthegovernmentisfundamentaltostoppingthecycleof

violence.Communitiesexpresstheviewthatdisarmamentisaformofpunishmentandthatethnic

favoritismisatplayinthegovernmentsdecisionsregardingdisarmament21

.

AnaddedconcernisthatbyusingtheSPLAastheprimarytoolfordisarmament,thiswillincrease

thepotentialfortheunwarrantedandunregulateduseofforceandcouldresultinhumanrights

abusesashashappenedinpreviousdisarmamentexercises.HavingtheSPLAattheforefrontof

suchaprocessincreasesthepotentialforviolencegivenalackoftrustinthemilitarysabilityto

provideprotectioninanon-partisanandrights-respectingmanner.

4.4ExacerbatingtheHumanitarianCrisisandImpactingtheProvisionofAid

ForcedciviliandisarmamenthasthepotentialtoincreasethehumanitariancrisisinJongleiand,at

thesametime,makehumanitarianaccessmoredifficult.Therearealreadyover120,000civiliansin

desperateneedofhumanitarianassistanceandthecampaignissettobeginduringtheannual

hungergapattheendofthedryseason.22Securityforcesrelianceoncommunityfoodandwater

resourcesduringdisarmamentcampaignsmaydepletealreadylimitedfoodstoresleaving

communitiesinaprecariousposition.Displacementassociatedwithciviliandisarmamentmay

displacecommunitiesasecondtimeorcreatenewdisplacementandhumanitarianneeds.The

increasedpotentialforviolenceasaresultofforcedciviliandisarmamentwillfurtherlimit

humanitarianaccessandcouldrestricttheabilityofhumanitarianactorstodistributeessentialaid.

20InterviewswithLouNueryouthandUNandNGOofficials,January2012.21DiscussionswithcommunitiesinPiborandAkoboin2011and2012.22InterviewwithLiseGrande,UNHumanitarianCoordinator,ReconciliationisthekeysolutiontoJonglei

RadioMiraya.


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Resources

SmallArmsSurvey(2007),AnatomyofciviliandisarmamentinJongleiState.Availableonlineat:

http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SIB-3-Jonglei.pdf

CecileBrewer(2009),DisarmamentinSouthSudan.CenterforComplexOperations,Naval

PostgraduateSchool:USA.Availableonlineat:http://ccoportal.org/sites/ccoportal.org/files/7_tn_disarmament_in_sudan.pdf

RichardGarfield(2007),Violenceandvictimizationafterciviliandisarmament:thecaseofJonglei .

SmallArmsSurvey.Availableonlineat: http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-

11-Jonglei-violence.pdf

InternationalCrisisGroup(2009),Jongleistribalconflicts:counteringinsecurityinSouthSudan.

Availableonlineat:http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-

africa/sudan/Jongleis%20Tribal%20Conflicts%20Countering%20Insecurity%20in%20South%20S

udan.pdf

HumanRightsWatch(2009),Noonetointervene:gapsincivilianprotectioninSouthSudan.

Availableonlineat:http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/06/21/no-one-intervene-0

AdamOBrien(2009),Shotsinthedark:the2008SouthSudanciviliandisarmamentcampaign.Small

ArmsSurvey:Geneva.Availableonlineat:http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-

SWP-16-South-Sudan-Civilian-Disarmament-Campaign.pdf

Disarmament Deja Vu

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