El Mito de Un Dictodor

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The Myth of a Central American Dictators' LeagueAuthor(s): Kenneth J. GriebSource: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Nov., 1978), pp. 329-345Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156032.

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. Lat. Amer. Stud. 10, 2, 329-345 Printed in Great Britain

The Myth of a Central AmericanDictatorsLeagueby KENNETH J. GRIEBA series of military dictatorscame to power in the four northern republicsof Central America during the Great Depression of the i93os and perpetu-ated themselves in office through continusmo tactics until roughly the con-clusion of the Second World War: General Jorge Ubico, the first andstrongest of these caudillos, ruled Guatemala from 1931 to 1944; GeneralMaximiliano Hernandez Martinez governed El Salvador from DecemberI93I to 1944; General Tiburcio Carias Andino dominated Honduras fromI933 to i946; and General Anastasio Somoza Garcia controlled Nicaraguafrom I936 to I956.

Noting the apparent surface similarities of militarist regimes emphasizingpersonalismo and dedicated to continuismo, contemporary observers pre-sumed that some sort of mutual assistancepact united these tyrantsin a blocdedicated to their personal aggrandizement and perpetuationin office. Thissupposed alliance became known as the Dictators League. The term origi-nated in press reports during 1937 and 1938, and was promptly acceptedinto the vocabulary of the period. During those years it was employed innumerous well-known newspapers, news magazines, and wire servicesthroughout the United States, Latin America, and Europe. Belief in theexistence of the League was fueled by suspicion, rumor, intuition, ceremonialrhetoric, and occasional circumstantial indications of actual cooperationbetween the regimes. It never occurred to contemporaryobservers to ques-tion the lack of evidence, for the agreement was assumed to be secret andconspiratorial,since it linked tyrants who were undesirable in the NorthAmerican mind, and hence capableof all sorts of skullduggery. The reputa-tion of the periodicals that employed the term, and the same logic, passed itinto history. Recent availability of documentary records, however, rendershistorical assessment possible, and careful scrutiny of Guatemalan ForeignMinistry Archives and United States State Department Papers reveals theDictators League as a myth. It was both a figment of the imagination ofthe contempora media and a masterstroke of propaganda, for it wasoriginally conjuredup by disgruntled exiles.Initial reports of a Dictators League came from newspapers in Mexico

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330 Kenneth J. Grieband Costa Rica - two countries which were havens for Central Americanand particularly Guatemalan emigres. Those members of the exile com-munity who had suffered harassment and even deportation from neighbor-ing dictatorships after abandoning their own nations harbored suspicionsof an alliance and also recognized the potential impact of such propagandain damaging the image of the governments they sought to undermine.Consequently, the exiles initiated charges of such a pact through the pressof the nations in which they found themselves. The Guatemalan ForeignMinistry Archives reveal that meticulous investigations of such allegationsinvariably traced them to Guatemalan expatriates.The accusationssurfacedafter the last of the four strong men, Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua,assumed office, and during the period when continuismo was already inoperation in the other republics, for by this time each of the three originalcaudillos had extended his tenure.1

The prevalence of the charges was coincidental with alarm in the NorthAmerican press about the spreadof Fascism. The resulting sensitivity causedYankees to perceive Fascist influence throughout the world, much as ina subsequent era they would do the same with Communism. This mentalityrendered the North American press susceptible to tales of a Central Ameri-can Dictators League, which was presumed to be the extension of somevast plot hatched in Germany or Italy, since dictatorshipwas equated withFascism in the Yankee mind. Even regimes such as that of General JorgeUbico, who was strongly pro-American and constantly proclaimed himselfthe United States staunchest ally in the Caribbean,became subject to suchaccusations. Although Ubico, having realistically concluded that Yankeepower mandated a posture of cooperation,effusively professed his friendshipfor the Northern Colossus, the wiley caudillo meticulously pursued Guate-malan national interests throughout his tenure of office. His pro-American-ism reflected his perception that these interests, as well as his personalambitions, frequently paralleled Yankee objectives in the isthmus.2 He didnot hesitate, however, to pursue an independent policy when Guatemalanand United States interestsdiverged.The initial references to a Dictators League coincided with Central

1 It should be noted, however, that reports of the Dictators League exhibited considerablevariance, and while some included Somoza, others describedit as a triumvirateencompas-sing only Ubico, Martinez, and Carias. This study considers relations among all fourdictators. For an examinationof the continuismo campaign in Guatemala, see Kenneth J.Grieb, The United States and General Jorge Ubico s Retention of Power , Revista deHistoria de Ame rica,71 (January o June I971), pp. II9-35.2 The basic factors in Ubico s pro-Americanismare also discussed in Kenneth J. Grieb,American Involvement in the Rise of Jorge Ubico , CaribbeanStudies, x, No. I (AprilI970), pp. 5, I7-20.



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The Myth of a Central American Dictators League 331American diplomatic manoeuvers which North Americans incorrectlyinterpreted as indications of friendship with the Fascist nations. DuringNovember 1936, Guatemala became the first nation to extend diplomaticrecognition to Generalissimo Francisco Franco s rebel regime in Spain. ElSalvador took a similar step a day later, and Nicaragua announced itsrecognition in January I937, although the press failed to note that Hondurasdid not follow this pattern.4 Guatemala subsequently received the firstminister accredited by Franco s government.5 During 1936, Guatemala alsowithdrew from the League of Nations, and, unfortunately, this announce-ment came on the heels of the Ethiopian crisis. Again, El Salvador emulatedthis action, in this case the following year.6 Notwithstanding NorthAmerican press reports, none of these steps reflected association with orfriendship for the Fascist bloc, and ideological or alliance considerationsplayed no role in the Guatemalan decisions. Guatemalan recognition ofFranco reflected a focus on Spain, the common Hispanic authoritariantradition, and a militant anti-communism fueled by the abortive I932 up-rising in Salvador.7 As in many Latin American countries, friendship forFranco did not necessarily extend to the other Fascist leaders. Ubico admired

3 Gerald Drew (United States Charge in Guatemala)to Cordell Hull (Secretaryof State), 9Nov. 1936, United States State DepartmentPapers, National Archives, Washington, D.C.,RG 59, 701.52I4/Io, and for the press account, WashingtonPost, II Nov. I936. HereinafterStateDepartmentDocuments are cited by numberonly.4 Division of Inter-American Affairs Memo., Sidney E. O Donoghue to R. Walton Moore(Assistant Secretaryof State) i6 Nov. 1936, I6.oo/Iooo regarding the Salvadoran actionand, for the Nicaraguan step, Boaz Long (United States Minister in Managua)to Hull, 9Jan. I937, 702.I752/Io. On 2 March I939 the New York Times published a tabulation ofnations that had recognized the Franco Government and those that had not, but this is theonly press referencefound that indicated the Honduran action, and articlesdealing with theso-called Dictators League consistently failed to note this policy difference among itssupposedmembers.

5 El Imparcial, 17 July I937. A Guatemalanenvoy to the Franco Governmentwas dispatchedlater the same year, New York Times, II Dec. I937.6 For the official notice of Guatemalan withdrawal, Lie. Jose Gonzalez Campo (ActingMinister of Foreign Relations) to the SecretaryGeneral of the League of Nations, I4 May1936, Papers of the Ministry of RalacionesExteriores, Archivo General de Centroamerica,Guatemala City, Guatemala, 1938, C1. 340-L. For the Costa Rican action, Diario Latino(San Salvador), 27 July I937. Hereinafter records from the Guatemalan Foreign Ministryare cited as AGCA/RE and the number.7 All newspapersin the Guatemalancapital followed the Spanish civil war intensely, invari-ably headlining its action daily. This focus on Spain was reflected in El Imparcial, ElLiberal Progresista, and Nuestro Diario throughout the period. The Salvadoranuprising,which was unquestionably communist-inspiredand very serious, served to alarm all ofCentral America, and made the communist threat much more real to these governmentsthan to other regimes in Latin America. The revolt is examined in Thomas P. Anderson,Matanza: El Salvador s Communist Revolt of I932 (Lincoln, Nebraska, I97I).



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332 Kenneth J. GriebFranco as a military officer, but considered Hitler a peasant .8 Guatemalanwithdrawal from the world organization reflected financial exigencies whichrendered payment of the dues a strain on the national treasury and disgustregarding the League s ineffective response to aggression in Ethiopia.9 Theproximity of this move to the conquest of Ethiopia and the fact that theItalian propaganda machine was quick to acclaim the action distortedGuatemalan motives.?1 The other isthmian nations apparently acted fromsimilar motives and, despite the coincidence of timing, there were no con-sultations or attempts to concert policy among the Central American regimes.The North American press, however, focused on the surface parallels, theItalian statements, and the apparent timing, to interpret these events interms of a global confrontation with Fascism, and thereby helped spawn themyth of the Dictators League.l1

Guatemalan rivalry with Mexico constituted another factor. A mutualsuspicion had long characterized Guatemalan-Mexican relations, and theMexican Revolution had exacerbated this aspect. As a result, there wererecurring charges that Guatemala aided or abetted counter-revolutions inMexico. These declarations were frequently combined with accusations of

8 Lie. Guillermo Saenz de Tejada, Minister of Gobernacion in the Ubico Government, toauthor in a personal interview, Guatemala City, 15 July 1969, and Lic. Jose Gonzalez.Campo, Minister of Hacienda in the Ubico Government, in a personal interview with theauthor, Guatemala City, 17 July 1969. The quote, which comes directly from Ubico, wasused by Lie. Saenz de Tejada, but both ministers presented similar accounts of Ubico sview of the European leaders, indicating his friendship for Franco, a benevolent attitudetoward Benito Mussolini, and contempt for Hitler. Both ministers stressed Ubico s preferencefor military officers and the role this played in his attitude toward Franco. Lic. ErnestoRivas, PrivateSecretary o PresidentUbico, also presenteda similar accountof Ubico s viewsin an interview with the author, GuatemalaCity, 23 August I969.9 The official government press release explaining the financial factors appeared in ElImparcial, 15 May 1936, and the New York Times, 17 May 1936. The GuatemalanMinisterto Spain and the League of Nations, Virgilio Rodriguez Beteta, had previously issued asimilar statement, 16 May 1938, AGCA/RE, Cl. 342-L, which was printed in the PanamaAmerican, I8 May 1936. The New York Times placed the article on page 36, where itslocation and small size ensured that it would not attract sufficient attention to counter theTimes previous charges that the Guatemalan action reflected friendship with the Fasciststates, and particularlyItaly. The Times printed several articles speculatingon these factorson 16 May 1936.10 The WashingtonPost quoted official League sources as fearing that the Guatemalanactionpresaged a stampede of withdrawals, and charging that it was based on Italian com-merical pressure(I6 May I936) while the New York Times cited Italian propagandastate-ments, which were quick to seize upon the Guatemalanwithdrawal and hail it as indicatingsolidaritywith the Italian action, on x6 May 1936.11 The New York Times of x6 May 1936 even contended that the Guatemalanaction could becoupled with the recent Salvadoranrecognitionof the Japanese conquest of Manchukuo, toindicate that the entire isthmus was going Fascist, overlooking the fact that Guatemalahad withheld recognitionof Manchukuo.



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The Myth of a CentralAmericanDictators League 333Fascism and contributed to the concept of a chimerical Dictators League.This was particularlytrue during 1938, when newspapers charged that therebellion led by General Saturnino Cedillo had Fascist connexions, andwas being supplied by Germany, through Guatemala and the Fascistoriented Dictators League.l2 The absurdity of such a charge is readilyapparent from a glance at a map, since Cedillo s revolt was based in hishome state of San Luis Potosi, in northern Mexico, meaning that armscrossing the frontier from Guatemala would have had to traverse virtuallyall of Mexico to reach him. It is significant that initial charges about theLeague occurred during the presidency of Lazaro Cardenas, for Mexicowitnessed several revolts as part of the power struggles attendant onhis rise.

Reports of a Dictators League against Communism surfaced during1937 and 1938 in Costa Rican and Mexican newspapers. La Prensa ofMexico City was the principal source, printing a lengthy series on the sub-ject and openly attributing the story to the so-called Guatemalan PopularUnion, an exile organization headed by JoirgeGarcia Granados, which wasbased in Mexico Cilty.3 The United States Minister in Guatemala City,Fay Allen Des Portes, denounced these charges, as part of an organizedcampaign from Mexico against Carias and Ubico carried on by emigres.He concluded that there was no basis for the allegations.14The accusations reached the United States through the New York Times,which received the story from its Mexico City correspondent, Frank L.Kluckhohn.l5 Relations between Kluckhohn, the Times, and the UbicoGovernment had previously been strained by false reports, stemming froman article of 26 September I934, alleging a revolt against Ubico and a des-12 Articles alleging supportfor Cedillo appearedin La Tribuna (San Jose), II April I937, El

Universal Grdfica Mexico City), 22 April 1937, and La Prensa (MexicoCity), I6, I7, I9, 20May I937.13 There were numerous such reports in several of the papers in San Jose and Mexico Cityduring both periods. For examples, see La Tribuna (San Jose), ii April I937, and ElUniversal Grdfica(Mexico City), 22 April I937. The La Prensa series appearedon i6, 17,19, 20 and 21 May 1938. The article of 21 May cites the Guatemalan exiles. Articles alsoappearedin such publicationsas El Machete(Mexico City), 5 FebruaryI938, and Mediodia(a weekly published in Mexico City), 9 May I938. Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations,Eduardo Hay issued a formal statement denying the accusations,noting that the MexicanGovernment had investigated charges of Guatemalanassistanceto Mexican revolutionaries,which constituted part of the reports, and found them baseless. His statement appearedinNovedades (Mexico City), 28 May I938.14 Fay Allen Des Portes (United States Minister in Guatemala City) to Hull, 29 July 1937,712.14/112.15 New York Times, 20 July I937. Kluckhohn claimed that his story was based on an inter-view with President Carias of Honduras, but Carfas denied the declarations Kluckhohnquoted, El Cronista(Tegucigalpa),17 Aug. I937.



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334 KennethJ. Griebpatch of 25 September 1936, claiming that Ubico was seriously ill.1 Accept-ing the exile charges about the Dictators League as fact, without indicat-ing that they originated with the emigres, Kluckhohn followed with a seriesof articles, denouncing what he called Fascist influence in the CentralAmerican republics, alleging that the Rome-Berlin-Tokyopact against Com-munism was received with glee in the Central American semi-Fascistnations, repeating the charges of a Dictators League, comparing it to theFascist alliance, and speculating on the likelihood that the Central Americandictatorships might formally join the Axis bloc through adherence to theRome-Berlin-Tokyo Treaty.17 Throughout the period, Kluckhohn s storieswere the subject of severaldiplomatic protests.An article of 7 January I938,alleging that a revolt was in progressin Guatemala and characterizingUbicoas having extremely friendly relations with Hitler and Mussolini, resultedin a formal protest. Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Carlos Salazar, chargedthat the Times began some time ago a campaign, which could already beconsidered as systematic, against the Central American Governments, par-ticularly. .. Guatemala . Privately, Guatemalan officials attributed thearticles to Kluckhohn s personalpique becauseUbico, in accordancewith hisnormal procedures, refused to receive the reporter when he journeyedthrough Central America. State Department memoranda supported theGuatemalan charges, characterizing Kluckhohn s articles as irresponsible ,and Undersecretaryof State, Sumner Welles, sent the Guatemalan protestinformally to Times publisher, Arthur Hays Sulzberger for your infor-mation . Sulzberger pledged an investigation which resulted in a retractionof the report of a revolt, on II February 1938.18Wire services and other

publications based their information on the Times stories. Newsweekcharacterized the pact as a private promise to help each other remain inpower , on the principle You jail my enemies. I ll jail yours .1 During1938 an article in a short-lived Yankee anti-Fascist propaganda journal16 Regarding the 1934 article, which again originated in Mexico and Costa Rica via exilesources, see El Universal Grdfica(Mexico City), and Diario de Costa Rica (San Jose), both26 Sept. I934. The Kluckhohn articles are New York Times, 26 Sept. 1934, and 25 Sept.

I936.17 New York Times, 14 Nov. I937.18 New York Times, 7 January1938. The exchanges are Carlos Salazar (GuatemalanMinisterof Foreign Relations)to Walter S. McKinney(United States Charg6in GuatemalaCity), andSalazar to Adrian Recinos (GuatemalanMinister in Washington), I2 Jan. 1938, AGCA/RE,C1. 795; McKinneyto Hull, I2 Jan. 1938, 8I4.00 Revolutions/94;Unsigned Latin AmericanDivision Memoranda dated 14 and 24 Jan. 1938, Sumner Welles (Undersecretaryof State)to Arthur Hays Sulzberger(Publisher,New York Times), 25 Jan. 1938, all 814.00 Revolu-tions/95, and Sulzberger to Welles, 8 Feb. 1938 814.00 Revolutions/97. For the retractionsee New York Times, II Feb. I938.19 Newsweek, 7 Aug. 1937.



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The Myth of a CentralAmericanDictators League 335entitled Ken, under the headline The Secret Fuse under Mexico , charac-terized Guatemala as the most thoroughly organized Fascist country inCentral or South America , and alleged that German arms were landedthere for shipment to Mexican rebels.20The Guatemalan Government wasso incensed that the Foreign Minister directed the Consul-General inChicago, where the journal was based, to retain a local attorneyto investigatethe possibility of bringing suit for libel.21 Despite voices of moderation,attempting to indicate the inaccuracyof these articles, such as the columnsof H. R. Knickerbocker in the Panama Amnerican,a new round of accus-ations surfaced during I940, through another propaganda journal entitledLiberty, and new allegations by Kluckhohn in the Times.22In all instancesthe articles linked speculation regarding the Dictators League to allegedFascist influence in the region.

Although no Dictators League ever existed, some brief exploratorynegoti-ations were conducted among the Central American regimes during 1936and 1937. The talks proved abortive due to the rivalries and jealousies thatmore than negated any urge Itocooperatebut of which the North Americanpress was totally unaware. The timing of these negotiations suggests thatthe original charges may have been based, in part, on rumors of the dis-cussions which reached the exiles. Somoza did propose an anti-communistpact, though withoultresult.2 Negotiations between Guatemalaand Salvadorseeking cooperation to prevent rebellions were attempted, but GuatemalanForeign Office Archives indicate that they never progressed beyond thepreliminarystages.24The pertinent State Department files reveal that the Department con-sistently rejected the notion that any Central American Dictators Leagueever existed, with both the diplomats in the various capitals and the LatinAmerican Division personnel scarcelymentioning the idea, except for refer-ences to newspaper charges. Department officers and American diplomats20 Ken, 21 April 1938, pp. I5-I6.21 Salazar to Octavio Barrios Solis (GuatemalanConsul General in Chicago), 27 April 1938.Solis retained McCullough, McCullough and McLaren,but the attorneysfound no groundsfor a suit under United States law, Solis to Salazar, 3 May I938, and Frank McCulloughto Solis, 5 May I938, AGCA/RE, C1. 794. Further action became unnecessarywhen the

magazine was barred from the United States mails by PostmasterGeneral James A. Farley,in a totally unrelatedmatter, for printing an allegedly obscene story, Chicago Daily News,4 May 1938.22 PanamaAmerican, 8, 9, Io April I939, Liberty, 21 Sept. 1940, an article entitled Swastikaover Guatemala , and New York Times, 4 July 1940.23 Guy Ray (United States Charge in Managua)to Hull, 26 and 28 Nov. I936, 8Io.ooB/II2and /Io7.24 Francisco E. Toledo (Guatemalan Minister in San Salvador) to Salazar, 28 April I937,AGCA/RE, C1. 549.



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336 Kenneth J. Griebwere far too familiar with the numerous disputes among the regimes tocredit such stories, as they were constantly being called upon to mediate andcool potentially explosive situations.In reality, the relations between the mutually suspicious and always ambi-tious Central American strongmen were characterized by constantmanoeuvering and contention rather than alliance or cooperation. Theemergence of a series of caudillos did not eradicate the traditional nationalrivalries in the isthmus, and each of the leaders found it boithnecessaryandexpedient to operate within his own domestic exigencies. Jorge Ubico, thefirst of the strong men to rise to power, was also the most firmly entrenched.Recognized as the strongest, most dynamic and most charismaticpersonalityof the group, he initially enjoyed a largepersonalistafollowing in Guatemala,and a reputation for administrative efficiency and energy that earned himgrudging admiration throughout Central America. These factors, with hisfirm control of the largest, most powerful nation in the isthmus, inevitablytempted him to pursue the traditional Guatemalan goal of dominating theregion. Being a Liberal, he had a propensity to aid the Liberal Parties inneighboring republics, particularly Nicaragua and Honduras. Yet thesesame factors also engendered resentment and fear of Ubico. As the secondmost populous country in Central America, El Salvador traditionally con-stituted Guatemala s principal rival for dominance within the isthmus. Itwas natural that the regime of General Martinez would emerge as a primecompetitor to that of Ubico and that it would focus its activity in the tradi-tional Salvadoransphereof Honduras.In considering the reports of cooperation between Jorge Ubico andMaximiliano Hernandez Martinez, it is important to realize that at theoutset Ubico bitterly opposed the rise of the Salvadoran general. Theinstallation of Martinez created a grave crisis throughout the isthmus, sincethe United Sltatesand the other Central American nations withheld recogni-tion for several years, invoking the I923 Washington pact which barredrevolutionary leaders and cabinet members from office. Ubico became theCentral American leader of the resistance to recognition of Martinez.25This stand may have reflected Ubico s cognizance that his own rise hadbeen made possible by enforcement of the treaty, and his concern with apotentially strong ruler in Salvador.26As in many other instances, whatappeared to be support of a United States policy in fact comported with25 The non-recognitioncontroversyis examined in Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States andthe Rise of General Maximiliano HernandezMartinez , Journalof Latin American Studies,

iI, No. 2 (November 1971), 151-72.26 See Grieb, American Involvement in the Rise of Jorge Ubico , CaribbeanStudies (April

I970), pp. 8-io, and 14-15.



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The Myth of a CentralAmericanDictators League 337Guatemalan interests, as well as serving Ubico s ends. The crisis lasted fromDecember I93I until January 1934, and throughout this period the relationbetween the two governments was one of antagonism. At the peak of thetension, the Guatemalan caudillo told an envoy from Martinez point blankthat Martinez must stop all these negotiations and abandon the Presidencyassoon as possible .27Nuestro Diario, at this time considered to reflect Ubico sopinion, repeatedly declared that the only course open to the Salvadorangeneral was resignation.28When Martinez proved strong enough internallyto resist the diplomatic pressure and retain office despite non-recognition,the Guatemalan Government proposed some further step to the UnitedStates, hinting at economic sanctions or even joint military intervention.29Although Washington rejected these proposals, they illustrate the intensityof the duel between the two caudillos, which soon enveloped the entireisthmus as each sought support from other countries. A two-year cold warscarcely constituted a basis for future cooperation for, whatever the sub-sequent arrangements,the scarsand sensitivitiesremained.A similar, though not as protracted, situation occurred in Honduras,where Ubico actively supported the Liberal Party candidate, Angel Ziuniiga-Huete, against the Conservative Party candidate, General Tiburcio CariasAndino. Proceeding on the time-honored formula of seeking governmentsof the same party in the neighboring republics,Ubico received envoys of theLiberal candidate and provided financial aid to his campaign.30 Thisexacerbated Conservative sentiment against Ubico, producing editorialattacks in El Cronista, the Conservative party publication.31On the eve ofthe October I932 elections, Ubico informed the United States Minister thathe expected Ziuiiga-Huete to triumph, and that any irregularitieswould be27 Sheldon Whitehouse (United States Minister in Guatemala City) to Henry L. Stimson

(Secretaryof State), reporting Ubico s statement, 3 March 1932, 8I6.oo Martinez, Max/5.28 Editorials n Nuestro Diario, 4 and io Feb. and 29 April I932.29 Whitehouse to Stimson, reportingthe remarksof GuatemalanMinister of Foreign Relations,Alfredo Skinner Klee, 27 April 1932, 8I6.0I/I69. The quote is from Skinner Klee. TheGuatemalan Foreign Minister later told United States Charge George K. Donald thatMartinez has put something over on the United States , unless strongeraction were taken,Donald to- Stimson, I8 June 1932, 816.01/202. For further discussion of Ubico s desire tointervene, see Grieb, The United States and the Rise of General Maximiliano HernandezMartinez , Journalof Latin AmericanStudies, loc. cit., p. I67.30 Julius G. Lay (United States Minister in Tegucigalpa) to Stimson and Whitehouse, 5 May

I932, United States State Department Papers, National Archives, Washington, D.C., RG84, Post Records, Legation in Guatemala City, I932, C1. 800, and William J. McCafferty(United States Chargein San Salvador)to Stimson, 20 June 1932, 8i6.00 General Conditions/32. Hereinafter items from the Post Records are cited as PR Guatemala.31 The articlesappearedin El Cronista(Tegucigalpa)throughout June I932 and were also thesubject:to a report by LawrenceHiggins (United States Charge in Tegucigalpa) to Stimson,28 June I932, 8I4.00I Ubico, Jorge/26.

L.A.S.-IO



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338 Kenneth J. Griebthe fault of General Carias. Ubico even expressed willingness to send armsto the Honduran Liberals in the event of disturbances . The State Depart-ment felt sufficiently concerned to warn Ubico against such a measure.32Thus relations between Ubico and Cariascertainlydid not begin on a cordialnote. Yet, in this case the Guatemalan caudillo quickly re-considered hisstance after the election returns showed an impressive triumph for Carias.Ubico s reversal in Honduras reflected the continued crisis with Salvador,for the Honduran situation provided an opportunity which Martfnez wasquick to grasp. Both sides in Honduras sought arms and support through-out the isithmus for the inevitable post-election confrontation. AlthoughUbico refused aid to the Liberals, he could not quite bring himself to assistthe Conservatives.3 Martinez promptly rushed into the breach, providingCarias with half a million rounds of ammunition and 500 rifles, which wereflown to Tegucigalpa by the Salvadoran Air Force.34 Thus Martinez choseto back Carias, perhaps on ithe assumption that Ubico would continue tosupport the Liberals.This, in turn, arousedthe suspicionsof the GuatemalanGovernment, which feared that Martinez had received a pledge of recogni-tion in return for his aid, and at worst suspected a Salvadoran-Honduranalliance against Guatemala.35Carias, however, resisted such pledges, andapparentlyMartinez was sufficiently concerned about the initial Guatemalansupport for the Liberals to feel compelled to send the munitions withoutsecuring a firm commitment. Martinez s actions rendered it expedient forUbico to drop his opposition to Carias. Ubico prudently sent his privatesecretary as the Guatemalan special representativeto Carias inauguration.In private discussionswith Carias, the envoy secured assurances hat the newHonduran Government would not align itself with Salvador againstGuatemala. This, however, was the extent of the understanding.3632 Whitehouse to Stimson, reporting a conversation with Ubico, 7 Oct. 1932, 815.00/4539;Stimson to Whitehouse, 27 Oct. 1932, 815.00/4539, and Whitehouse to Stimson, 31 Oct.

1932, 814.00GeneralConditions/59.33 Matthew Elting Hanna (United States Minister in Managua) to Stimson, 30 Nov. 1932,815.00/4563. An editorial in Nuestro Diario, 15 Nov. x932, condemning the rebels inHonduras, publicly indicatedthe Guatemalanstand.34 Lay to Stimson, x6, 17 and I9 Nov. 1932, 815.00 Revolutions/345, /346, and /352, andMcCafferty o Stimson, 23 Nov. x932, 8I5.oo Revolutions/362.35 Rafael Ordofiez Solis (GuatemalanMinister in Tegucigalpa) to Skinner Klee, i June 1932,AGCA/RE, x932, Memorandumof Conversationbetween George K. Donald (United StatesCharge in Guatemala)and Juan Pinillos (GuatemalanConfidential Agent in San Salvadorhome to consult his government), 5 July 1932, PR Guatemala,Cl. 80o; Donald to Stimson,31 July I932, 814.00 General Conditions/56, and ConversationMemorandum, Edward P.Lawton (Third Secretaryof the United States Legation in Guatemala)with Lie. EduardoGir6 (GuatemalanUndersecretary f ForeignRelations),6 Sept. 1932, PR Guatemala,C. 8oo00

36 The full report of the mission is in Antonio Najera Cabrera(PrivateSecretaryto PresidentUbico) to SkinnerKI6e,9 Feb. 1933, AGCA/RE, B 99/28/II.



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The Myth of a CentralAmerican Dictators League 339The Guatemalan-Salvadoranduel continued during 1932 and 1933, withvarious border incidents and mutual recriminationsthreatening armed con-flict.37Throughout this dispute, Honduras and Nicaragua adhered to non-

recognition, and it was Costa Rica, which traditionally viewed Salvador asa counterweight to Guatemalan ambitions, that broke the Central Americanfront, denouncing the 1923 treatyand extending recognition to the MartinezGovernment.38At length the United States also reversedits position, arrang-ing for a Nicaraguan initiative to mask the shift.39 Ubico proved highlyresistant, and direct StaiteDepartment pressure was necessary to secure hisreluctant assent to a plan for recognition of the Salvadoran regime and theconvocation of a Central American Conference in Guatemala City.40 Thecourse of the 1934 conclave scarcely improved Guatemalan-Salvadoranrela-tions, for the diplomats split on virtually every issue, rejecting broad drafttreaties proposed by Ubico that were designed to lead to eventual CentralAmerican union, presumably under his aegis. Consequently, while the con-ference officially terminated the recognition controversy,it served to exacer-bate sensitivities and scars remaining between Guatemala, Salvador, andHonduras, and certainly did not foreshadow any cooperation between thethree dictators then in office.

While intensifying ill-feeling among the various caudillos, these episodesalso caused Ubico to modify his policy. The rejection of his proposals at the1934 conclave apparentlywounded his pride, as the following year, when aGuatemalan envoy reported rumors of a projected economic conference,Foreign Minister Alfredo Skinner Klee characterizedthe idea as a farce ,referring to the previous conference, and commenting: Experience oughtto serve for something. 41Ubico consequently began to stress the principles37 See, for example, New York Times, 28 June 1932; McCaffertyto Stimson, 5 Sept. I932,

714.16/50 and Donald to Stimson, 8 Sept. 1932, 714.16/51.38 For the announcementof the Costa Rican denunciation of the treaty, Charles C. Eberhardt(United States Minister in San Jose) to Stimson, I4 Dec. 1932, 7I3.I311/142. According tothe treaty stipulations,one year s notice was requiredfor denunciation,and consequentlytheCosta Rican action took effect in January1934, at which time Costa Rica extended recogni-tion to the Martinezregime. El Salvadorfollowed Costa Rica s lead and also denounced thetreaty, McCaffertyo Stimson, 27 Dec. 1932, 713.II/I44.39 William Phillips (Under Secretaryof State) to Arthur Bliss Lane (United States Minister inManagua), 8 January 1934, 816.01/349, and Lane to Hull, io Jan. I934, 8I6.o0/356, IIJan., 713.1311/I95, 13 Jan., 816.0I/355, and 13 Jan., 8I6.o0/356. See also Grieb, TheUnited States and the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez , loc. cit., pp.169-70.40 It proved necessaryto reveal the Department s role to Ubico in order to persuade him toconsider the proposal for a new Conference: Phillips to Whitehouse, I2 Jan. I934, 8i6.oi/355, I5 Jan., 8I6.0o/355, and Whitehouse to Hull, 15 Jan. 1934, 816.01/360.41 Skinner Klee to Lic. Alfonso Carrillo (GuatemalanMinister in San Jos6), 15 Aug. I935,AGCA/RE, B 99/23/I.



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340 Kenneth J. Griebof neutrality , non-intervention , and Good Neighborhood , emphasiz-ing pointedly that these were coupled with a firm defence of nationalsovereignty, and the rejection of foreign intervention in Guatemala.42Thisattitude may have been intended to suggest the type of conduct Ubicosought from his neighbors, in return for his assumption of a similar stance.The re-election campaign of President Martinez in Salvador providedUbico with an opportunity to demonstrate his sincerity. Despite the linger-ing hostility between the two strongmen, Ubico studiously refrained fromany moves *thatcould be interpreted as assisting or resisting Martinez scandidacy. Apparently, Ubico had concluded that since he had failed tounseat Martinez during the early phase

of his regime, he had best acceptthe fact that at least his continuance in office assured a strong regime thatwould prevent internal disorders which might spill over into Guatemala.Lic. Eduardo Giron, the GuatemalanMinister in Salvador, visited Martinezimmediately after the returns were announced to congratulate him on histriumph, and reporteda lengthy discussion in which the Salvadorancaudillo,obviously appreciativeof Ubico s stance, expressed a desire to improve rela-tions between the two governments and to confer with Ubico personally.Guatemalan Foreign Minister Alfredo Skinner Klee replied that he andUbico shared Martinez s desire for more cordial relations, and even indicatedthat Ubico was willing to meet his Salvadoran counterpart. The ForeignMinister surprisingly apologized profusely for his inability to attendMartinez s inauguration personally, emphasizing pressure of work.43 Sincehe had never attended any other inaugurations, and Ubico had not yet metwith any of his neighboring caudillos, these declarationsindicate a consider-able Guatemalan willingness to seek a rapprochement. Despite severalexpansive statements by the SalvadoranForeign Minister, however, nothingever resulted from the references to meetings. There were some indicationsof improving relations during 1935, such as an effusive letter of congratula-tions by Martinez on the occasion of the inauguration of Ubico s secondterm. The Salvadoran Government also deported a number of Guatemalanexiles, and hinted at a willingness to prevent anti-Ubico propaganda.4442 Such statements appear recurrently hroughout the Guatemalan Foreign Office correspon-dence, and the public statementsof its officials, and of PresidentUbico. See, for example,a compilation of InformationAbout Guatemala, designed for release to the press during

I935 to explain Guatemalanprogress and objectives, AGCA/RE, 1939, Cl. 75I.43 Lie. Eduardo Girn (Guatemalan Minister in San Salvador)to Skinner Klee, 9 Feb. I935,and Skinner Klee to Gir6n, 12 Feb. 1935, AGCA/RE, B 99/28/II.44 Frank P. Corrigan(United States Minister in San Salvador)to Hull, 30 Sept. 1935, 8I4.00

/I264, and Sidney E. O Donoghue (United States Charg in Guatemala)to Hull, I Oct.935, 814.00./ 264, both commenting on the cordiality of Martinez s letter, and for theincidents:with the Guatemalan exiles and the glowing statements regarding friendshipbetween the regimes, Gir6n to Skinner Klee, 5 June 935, AGCA/RE, B 99/30/4, and I3



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The Myth of a Central American Dictators League 341This new-found spirit of cordiality proved shortlived, however, due todifferences regarding continuismo in Honduras and the rise of Somoza in

Nicaragua. By January1936,when a ConstituentAssembly extended Ubico snew term several years, Martinez pointedly stated publicly that he wasopposed to the extension of his own term. The American Minister in SanSalvador noted that the implication of the declaration was obvious due toits timing in relation to Guatemalan events, commenting that it did littleto improve relationsbetween the two countries .5The expiration of Carias term in Honduras and the usual continuismocampaign brought renewed strains. Despite the fact that Ubico expressedsome doubts about whether Carias had a sufficient following or was a strongenough personality to maintain himself in office, the Guatemalan Govern-menitrejected his opponents appeals for aid.46This time, ironically, it wasMartinez who aided Zuniiga-Huete, now leading an opposition movementfrom exile, and Ubico who backed Carias - a precise reversal of the rolesin the previous election, but one which still preserved the Guatemalan-Salvadoranantagonism. Apparently, Martinez still resentedthe earlier with-holding of recognition by Carias, and felt that, since this administration wasweaker than that of Ubico, it migh,tbe unseated.47When a revolution brokeout in Honduras, Ubico dispatched a police official to supervise the re-organization of the Honduran secret police to introduce Guatemalanefficiency, and also rushed troops to the border with orders to intern anyonewho crossed the line.48 Mounting indications of support by Martinez for

June I935, AGCA/RE, B 99/34/9; Skinner Klee to Miguel Angel Araujo (Minister ofForeign Relations of El Salvador), i8 June 1935, AGCA/RE, B 99/34/9, and Araujo toGiron, 8 Aug. 1935, AGCA/RE, B 99/30/4.45 Corriganto Hull, 15 Jan. 1936,8i6.00/997.46 Reports of Carias appeals to Ubico for support and Ubico s reservations about Cariasstrength came from Julius G. Lay (United States Minister in Tegucigalpa) to Hull, 7March 1935, 8I5.00/4612, Raleigh A. Gibson (United States Charge in Tegucigalpa) toHull, 2 May 1935, 815.00/64I4, and Leo J. Keena (United States Minister in Tegucigalpa)to Hull, 15 Nov. 1935, 815.00/4640. The GuatemalanCharge in Tegucigalpa also expresseddoubt about Carias strength, Mauricio Rosal to Skinner Klee, 2 Sept. 1935, AGCA/RE,B 99/23/i.47 The United States Minister in Tegucigalpa noted that Salvadoran-Honduranrelations werestrained because of the close relationshipbetween Honduras and Guatemala,and PresidentMartinez rather unfriendly attitude toward General Ubico , Keena to Hull, 15 Nov. 1935,815.00/4640. The Minister in San Salvador reported that members of the SalvadoranForeign Office indicated that their stance in relation to Honduras was governed by theirfear of Guatemala; Corrigan to Hull, 5 Sept. 1936, 815.oo Revolutions/537. A Legationreport from Tegucigalpanoted that the SalvadoranGovernment would change its attitudeof friendship for Carias the moment that it feels the opposition is strong enough to offereffective armed resistance ; Keena to Hull, 7 Feb. I936, 8I5.00/4671. Zuiiga Hueste was inSalvadorduring much of the manoeuvering, Keena to Hull, 17 Aug. 1936, 815.00/47I3.48 Keena to Hull, 24 April I937, 815.00/4730.



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342 Kenneth J. Griebthe rebels caused Ubico to dispatch a warning telegram to San Salvador,expressing the hope and conviction that El Salvador would maintain strictneultrality n the face of the Honduran trouble .49 Naturally, Martinez wasoutraged, but he took the hint at least to the extent of refraining from overtactions. The Honduran revolt collapsed after its military leader, GeneralJustoUmana, was apprehendedby Guatemalantroops after crossing the line,and subjected to the ley fuga, again infuriating Martinez.50 In addition tocooling relations between Ubico and Martinez still further, the Salvadorancaudillo s support for the Honduran rebels exacerbatedthe hostility betweenMartinez and Carias.

The rise of General Anastasio Somoza Garcia in Nicaragua also intensifiedSalvadoran-Guatemalan ensions. As in all such crises, envoys of PresidentJuan Bautista Sacasa and General Somoza sought support in all neighbor-ing countries, and particularly in Guatemala.51Ubico, who though aidingSacasa s initial campaign was never enthusiastic about his qualities, viewedSomoza favorably. The Guatemalan caudillo preferred military men tocivilians, and saw in Somoza the strength he felt Sacasa lacked.52Martinez,who regarded Somoza as a potential competitor, backed the Sacasafaction.53Various Salvadoran statements and mediation proposals led Ubico toindicate his views through the press, and Guatemalan editorialists praisedSomoza as the type of man of action as against that of the theoreticalpolitician , a quieting influence for the country , and an individual whomGuatemalans were in a position to appreciate . Once again the two49 Corriganto Hull, 5 Sept. I936, 8i5.oo Revolutions/537.50 Fay Allen Des Portes (United States Minister in Guatemala)to Hull, 5 Aug. 1937, 815.00

/4736, and I9 Aug. 1937, 815.00/474I, reporting the incident and noting that rumorsindicated that General Umafia was shot on Ubico s orders. For press accounts, see PanamaAmerican, io Aug. I937.51 Reportsof Nicaraguan factions seeking aid came from Guatemala. Hanna to Hull, 22 Jan.1935, 8I7.00/8I80, Memorandum by O Donoghue, 4 Oct. I935, PR Guatemala, I935, Cl. 800,O Donoghue to Hull I6 Oct. 1935, PR Guatemala,1935, Cl. 800, and Hanna to Hull, 9 Dec.1935, 8I7.00/8345; Tegucigalpa, Gibson to Hull, 2 June 1936, 8I7.00/8489, and Conversa-tion Memorandum, Willard L. Beaulac (Latin American Division) and Julio Lozano(Honduran Ministerin Washington), I June 1936, 817.00/8506; and San Salvador, Corriganto Hull, 4 June 1936, 817.00/8490.52 Ubico s preference for military men was emphasized by two of his cabinet ministesrs ininterviews with the author, Lie. Guillermo Saenz de Tejada, Ministerof Gobernacion, 15July 1969, and Lic. Jose Gonzalez Campo, Minister of Hacienda, 17 July I969.53 Reportsof Salvadoranoppositionto Somoza and to mediation proposals,came from BoazLong (United States Minister in Guatemala)reporting a conversationwith the SalvadoranMinister in Guatemala, 8 May 1936, 8I7.00/8405, Corrigan to Hull, 14 May 1936, 8I7.00/84i6, and Corrigan to Hull, reporting a conversation with Martinez, and quoting theSalvadoranPresidentas stating that Somoza would never come to the Presidency by propermethods and hinting at the prospectof a revolt, 19 Aug. I935, 815.00/462I.54 Nuestro Diario, 25 Nov. 1935.



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The Myth of a CentralAmericanDictators League 343northernrepublics effectivelyparriedeach other s thrusts,preventing outrightinterventionby either.

To be sure, there were some signs of rapprochement during I937 and1938. Salvador and Guatemala signed a new trade treaty, abolished touristcards for Itrafficon their frontier, and dedicated a new highway bridge tofacilitate travel and commerce.55Ubico once again maintained a benevolentneutrality during Martinez s next election campaign in 1938. PresidentSomoza s trip to the United Sltates n i939, which included stops in all theCentral American capitals en route, served as the occasion for grandioserhetoric regarding Central American Union and effusive praise between therespective presidents that fostered rumors of new attempts at union.56 AGuatemalan campaign to build up Latin American support for its claims toBelice also received unanimous endorsement throughout Central America,with the various legislatures passing resolutions of solidarity and the presseditorializing enthusiastically about Guatemalan righ,ts.57These, however,were merely surfacemanifestations.Throughout the period, borderincidentscontinued and the old jealousies and rivalries persisted among all theisthmian republics, particularlybetween Guatemala and Salvador.The mistaken impression of mutual cooperation occasionally led to grossdistortion of events in the area, based on supposition. For example, duringthe I944 revolt in Salvador, rumors of aid from neighboring dictatorshipsabounded. Apparently over-reacting hastily in the crisis, the State Depart-menlt telegraphed the American Minister in Tegucigalpa, directing him toinvestigate a report that Honduras had dispatched several tanks to Salvadorto aid the government forces. Obviously incensed, the Minister replied:Since Honduras has no (repeat no) tanks, it could not have supplied anyto El Salvador. 58 A subsequent request to check on reports that theHonduran Air Force was assisting the Salvadoran Government broughtanother sharp retort that revealed the minister s disgust: Despite sinisterand absurd rumors to the contrary, the downstream Honduran lamb is not(repeat not) muddying the waters of the upstream Guatemalan and Salva-55 For the trade treaty, El Imparcial, 15 Dec. I937, and 25 May 1938; for the Tourist Cards,El Diario de Occidente (Santa Ana, El Salvador), 6 and 12 Jan. and 6 June I938; and

regardingthe bridge, El Imparcial,I7 Sept. 1937.56 The Nicaraguan President s visits in all of the Central American capitals engendered con-siderable press coverage in each nation, and can be followed in all the papers of each

country.57 For details see Kenneth J. Grieb, Jorge Ubico and the Belice Boundary Dispute , TheAmericasxxx, No. 4 (April I974), pp. 448-74.58 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (Secretaryof State) to John S. Erwin (United States Ambassadorin Tegucigalpa), 17 Nov. I944, 8I3.00/II-I744, Erwin to Stettinius, I7 Nov. 813.00/II-

I744.



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344 Kenneth1. Griebdoran wolves. He concluded: The only non-routine activity of theHonduran Air Force in the past week has been assiduous attendance atnumerous cocktail parties given in honor of the departing secretaryof myActing MilitaryAttache. 5It is apparent from a survey of relations between the Central Americanregimes ithat a Dictators League never existed. Incidents produced by thehistoric national rivalries continued throughout the I93os. To be sure, therewas some transitory cooperation to the extent of supplying arms orexpelling exiles from a neighboring country, but this scarcelyconstituted analliance. Such actions reflected temporary expediency, and represented arecognition of reality which came only after or between repeated attemptsto aid revolutionaries.Eventually the internal strength of each of the respec-tive regimes imposed a kind of stability, by rendering it impossible ltopur-sue objectives of dominance and aggrandizement without assuming un-acceptable risks. The result was a grudging acceptance of reality, and alocal balance of power . The so-called cooperation was based on fearrather than friendship, and did not reduce the normal incidents and tensionsof the historicrivalries.It simplymeant that each of the dictatorsrelinquishedthe traditional ambition to dominate the isthmus, and settled for the factthat his neighbors had done likewise, thus reducing any menace to hisregime. Yet even this mutual toleration was at best sporadic and chimeri-cal. Each of the dictators clearly pursued his own ends whenever thereappearedto be any prospect for advantage. This was particularlyevident inMartinez s: shifts in supporting the various Honduran and Nicaraguanfactions,

It is difficult to categorize the resulting situation. In a sense, the dictatorsmerely forced each other to apply the principles of non-intervention con-tained in the I907 and 1923 Washington Treaties. This degree of coopera-tion has frequently existed in Central America, both before and after theperiod under discussion. Certainly noithing approaching an alliance, formalor informal, ever existed among the dictators of the I930S and I940S.Diplomatically, one is tempted to suggest that the situation could at best becharacterizedby the term entente cordiale, but even that would be mislead-ing, for cordiality was conspicuously absent, except in formalities.The French equivalent of grudging would appear more appropriate.Even modus vivendi and detente presume more negotiation than was thecase. What existed can best be stated in a kind of perverse golden rule -namely that having failed to do one s neighbor in, it became prudent to59 Stettinius to Erwin, 15 Dec. 1944, 8I6.O0/I2-1544, and Erwin to Stettinius, 15 Dec. 1944,

816.00/I2-I544.



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The Myth of a Central American Dictators League 345refrain from doing unto him as he would do unto you, in the hope that hewould reciprocate. This produced a tenuous balance based on mutualtolerance, but it must be realized that it stemmed not from friendship, butfrom mutual frustration, and from fear rather than respect. It never gene,r-ated a degree of cooperation meriting so broad a term as league. Indeed,the reports of the existence of the phan,tomDictators League were closelyrelated to an attempt to identify these regimes with Fascism and employphraseology that would play on the new-found phobia of the United States.The origin of the term must be credited to imaginative exiles, efficientpropagandists, the hysteria of an era, and gullible journalists.

El Mito de Un Dictodor

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