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Patterns of Development and Nationalism: Basque and Catalan Nationalism before the SpanishCivil WarAuthor(s): Juan Diez MedranoSource: Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Aug., 1994), pp. 541-569Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/657890

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Patterns of development and nationalism: Basque and

Catalan

nationalism before

the

Spanish

Civil

War

JUAN

DfEZ MEDRANO

University

of California,

San

Diego

Bizkaya,

if

dependent

on

Spain,

cannot address

God, cannot, in practice, be Catholic.

Sabino

Arana

From its

constituting

a

nationality,

Catalonia

derives

its

right

to form a

separate

state,

a

Catalan

state.

From

the current

political

arrangements,

from Catalonia's

long standing

cohabitation

with

other

peoples,

derives a certain

element

of

unity,

of

community,

which these

peoples ought

to

preserve

and

consolidate.

ValentiAlmirall

These

quotations

from two of the

major

ideologues

of

Basque

and

Catalan

nationalism,

respectively,

reflect

two

radically

different con-

ceptions

of

what the nation is and two

significantly

different

political

programs

for the

Basque Country

and

Catalonia:

independence

and

adherence to tradition for the

former,

federalism/confederalism

and a

secular and

capitalist organization

of

society

for

the latter. The

Basque

and Catalan nationalist movements

differed

substantially

in

their

char-

acter

despite

the

fact that

they

developed

simultaneously

in

two

ethni-

cally

distinct

Spanish

communities,

that

stood out

in

terms of their

high

level

of

industrial

development

relative to

the rest of

Spain,

and that

had

experienced

intense

immigration

from

the

poorest

regions

of

Spain.

Therefore,

this contrast between

Basque

and Catalan

national-

ism

questions

the

suitability

of

explanations

of

peripheral

nationalism

that stress the role of relative levels of

development,

of cultural distinc-

tiveness,

and

of

the

socially

disruptive

effects of

the

arrival

of

large

numbers of

immigrants.

While

these

explanations

may

be

useful to

explain

the

emergence

and

dynamics

of

nationalism,

they

are

ill-suited

to

explain

what

constitutes the

exclusive

focus

of

this

article,

that

is,

dif-

ferences

in

the

character of

nationalist

movements.

Theory

and

Society

23:

541-569,

1994.

? 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



542

To

explain

these

programmatic

differences,

I

analyze

how

specific

pat-

terns of

development impinged

on

the

different

social

groups

that

formed

Basque

and

Catalan

society.

More

precisely,

I

focus on

how

pre-industrial

social

groups

in

these

societies

experienced

capitalist

development

and on

the

type

of

ties

that the

Basque

and Catalan

capi-

talist elites

established with

the

Spanish

economy

and

polity.

Relative

levels of

development

and

peripheral

political

nationalism

Contrary

to what

scholars

in

the

modernization

theory

tradition,

the

internal colonialism

tradition,

and other

theoretical traditions1

would

predict,

nationalism

in

Spain

has

always

been

stronger

in

its

most

developed

areas,

the

Basque

Country

and

Catalonia,

than

in

its less

developed

areas,

such as

Galicia.

In

1977,

Nairn

suggested

that

uneven

development

is the

primary

explanation

of

nationalism

and,

therefore,

that

peripheral

nationalism

is as

likely

in

overdeveloped

as

in under-

developed

peripheral

areas.2 Nairn

sees uneven

regional development

as an inevitable outcome of

capitalist

expansion

that leads to

periph-

eral nationalism whenever

regional

inequalities overlap

with

ethnic dif-

ferentiation.3 Like Linz

and

Douglass,4

Nairn

posits

that

having

im-

perial possessions

keeps

states from

seeing

a

need to build

national

identities,

largely

because

they

are

able to extract

large

revenues

from

their colonies.5

According

to these

authors,

while

empires

last and

do

not

weigh

too

heavily

on

the

peripheral regions

of

the

core

state,

pe-

ripheral regions

tend to

accept

subordination to the

core.

However,

when the empire begins to unravel, peripheries will rebel against the

new

financial,

political,

and

military

demands made

by

the core.

Nairn

emphasizes

the role of

uneven

development

as a

mobilizing

force: both

underdeveloped regions

and

over-developed 6

regions

are

likely

to

promote

nationalist movements

when

state

membership

no

longer presents advantages.

In

underdeveloped regions

nationalist

movements

mobilize the

population against

the

persistence

of ethnic

economic inequality, while in over-developed regions nationalist move-

ments

mobilize the

population

to

push

for state reforms

that

will

pro-

mote further

regional

development.7

The

Spanish

case fits Nairn's

explanation

for the

development

of

pe-

ripheral

nationalism

quite

well. The

development

of

Basque

and Cata-

lan nationalism

was

in

part

an indirect

consequence

of

Spain's

loss

of

its

imperial

possessions.

The achievement

of

independence

by

the



543

Latin American colonies

throughout

the

nineteenth

century

worsened

the

state of

Spain's public finances, already

strained

by

the

European

wars of the late

eighteenth

and

early

nineteenth

centuries.8 Faced

with

this

crisis and

in

order to extract more revenues

and to

promote

eco-

nomic

development

in

Spain,

absolutist and

constitutional

monarchs

enacted centralization measures

(political, juridical,

and

cultural).

These

policies impinged

most

severely

upon

the two

communities that

had

preserved

their

particular political

and

juridical

institutions the

longest

and that were still

distinguished

from

the rest of

Spain by

lan-

guage:

Catalonia and the

Basque

Provinces.

In

both

communities,

cen-

tralization

policies

were

opposed by

significant

segments

of their socio-

economic

elites,

who

by

the

end

of

the

nineteenth

century,

in

the

spirit

of

the

time,9

began

to

articulate

their

grievances

through

nationalist

mobilization.

In

the case

of

Catalonia,

the

independence

of

Cuba in

1898 also

had harmful economic

consequences

that intensified con-

flict

between the

Catalan

bourgeoisie

and the

Spanish

state.

The

impact

of the

loss

of

the

colonies on

the

development

of

Basque

and Catalan

nationalism,

however,

should not be

over-emphasized,

for

it

cannot account for

their

programmatic

features.

Nairn

cannot

explain,

for

instance,

the

separatist

and

reactionary

character of

Basque

nationalism,

which

differed

dramatically

from the

pro-capitalist

and

generally

non-separatist

character of

Catalan

nationalism.

Only

the

latter fits

his

expectations

about

the

character

of

nationalism

in

an

overdeveloped

region.

The Basque anomaly raises serious doubts about the validity of a

sociological

explanation

of

types

of

nationalism

based

on

levels of

development.

Differences in

the

character of

Basque

and

Catalan

nationalism also

reveal the

limitations of

previous

sociological

work

on

the

relationship

between

economic

development

and

nationalism

(modernization

theory,

ethnic

competition

theory,

the

reactive

ethnicity

perspective).10

Indeed,

neither

underdevelopment

nor

relative

levels of

ethnic

competition

can

explain

differences in

the

character of

Basque

and Catalan nationalism, since both regions were overdeveloped and

characterized

by

similar

levels of

ethnic

competition.

To

account for the

different

types

of

nationalism

that

developed

in

the

Basque

Country

and

Catalonia one

needs

to

stress the

role of

class

interests in

mediating

the

effects of

development

processes

on

na-

tionalist

political

mobilization.

This

strategy,

which

by

no

means

implies

that

ethnic

conflict

is

only

class

conflict

in

disguise,l2

has been



544

used

by

many

historians

or

comparative

historical

sociologists13

who

have studied nationalism. It treats ethnic

groups

as

socially

differenti-

ated

groups

in which

social actors

pursue

both ethnic

and

class

inter-

ests

through political

action.14

In

doing

so,

it

opens up

alternative

ways

of

explaining

peripheral

nationalism,

focused as

much on

class conflict

within ethnic

groups

as

on

center-periphery

conflict.15

Unfortunately,

work

in

this

historically

oriented

tradition

focuses

almost

exclusively

on

the

relationship

between class

interests

and

nationalism.

What is

missing

in

this work but

present

in

the

three

socio-

logical

traditions criticized above is an

emphasis

on the

relationship

between

development

and nationalism.

In

this

article,

I link the

two

approaches

by analyzing

how

development processes

shape

national-

ism

by creating

constellations

of class

and

ethnic

interests

that

provide

a context

for

center-periphery

relations

and

for

class

relations

within

peripheral

regions.

However,

unlike

previous

work

on

the

relationship

between

development

and

nationalism,

I

stress

specific

patterns

of

development

instead

of levels

of

development.

I

demonstrate

the

rele-

vance of two

major components

of these different patterns of develop-

ment

in

accounting

for the

differences

between

Basque

and

Catalan

nationalism:

The extent

to which

traditional

societies

were able

to

benefit

from

capitalist development

during

the

transition

to the

capital-

ist mode

of

production

and

the

strength

of the

ties established

by

emer-

ging

capitalist

elites

with the

state's

economy

and

polity.

My

two

hypo-

theses

are:

1) That traditionalist and separatist political nationalism was more

intense

in

the

Basque

Country

than

in

Catalonia

because

the Catalan

peasantry

and

pre-industrial

elites

were better

able

to

adapt

to and

benefit

from

nineteenth-century capitalist

industrialization

than

were

the

Basque peasantry

and

pre-industrial

elites.

2)

That

the relative

weight

of

traditionalist

and

separatist

political

nationalism

was

more intense

in the

Basque

Country

than

in

Catalonia

because the Basque capitalist elite was not nationalist while the Catalan

capitalist

elite

was.

Although

the

Catalan

capitalist

elite

was

not

separa-

tist,

it

became nationalist

because,

unlike the

Basque

elite,

it was

not

able

to

directly

influence the

Spanish

state's

decisions

-

through

presence

in

the

government

or

through

the

lobbying power

of

its indus-

trial

associations.



545

The

relative

prosperity

of

Catalan

agriculture

compared

with

Basque

agriculture

and the

predominance

of

a

capital goods industry

in

the

Basque Country

versus a consumer

goods

industry

in

Catalonia

were

the

main structural factors

that

shaped

the

political

attitudes

of

the

peasantry, pre-industrial

elites,

and

capitalist

groups

in

both

regions.

The

comparative

focus

of

this

article

contributes to

the

explanation

of

Basque

and Catalan

nationalism.'6

It

builds

upon

Linz's work

by

iso-

lating

those economic

factors which

intensified the

crisis of

the Old

Regime

in

the

Basque Country

compared

with

Catalonia,

by

analyzing

the

major

causes of the different attitudes of

capitalist

elites

in

both

regions

toward

nationalism,

and

by

supporting

these

explanations

with

precise

empirical

information,

something

that

is

lacking

in

previous

work

on

pre-Civil

War

Basque

and Catalan

nationalism.

These are

important

analytical

gaps

in

the

literature

on

Basque

and Catalan

nationalism.

Scholars

writing

on

the

Basque

Country

have

provided

a

plausible

interpretation

of

the

development

of

a

traditionalist form

of

nationalism,

but have

not

explained

why

the

bourgeoisie

did not

spon-

sor more decisively a bourgeois form of nationalism.

Conversely,

those

writing

on

Catalonia

explain

why

the

bourgeoisie

became

nationalist

but

do not

explain

why

a

traditionalist form

of

nationalism

was

all but

absent from

the

Catalan

political

scene.17

I

have

relied here on

secondary

literature,

on

the

writings

of

the

most

influential

nationalist

ideologues

and

political

leaders

in

both

Catalonia

and the

Basque

Country,

and on the

Spanish

Directory

of

Corpora-

tions and Financial Institutions of 1922. The information contained in

this

directory

(company,

sector of

the

economy,

location,

assets,

and

members of

the

board

of

directors)

has been

transferred to a

computer

database,

and to

my

knowledge

this is

the

first

systematic

analysis

of

this

valuable

source of

information.18

It

provides

a

very

useful

tool

to

measure

two

major

elements of

the

explanation

offered

in

this

article:

the

difference

in

the sizes

of

Basque

and

Catalan

capitalism

and the

dif-

ference

in

strength

of

the

economic

ties

that

Basque

and

Catalan

capi-

talist elites established with the rest of Spain in the first third of this

century.

Basque

nationalism:

1876-1936

Basque

nationalism

developed

between

the

end of

the

Second

Carlist

War

(1872-1876)

and the

Spanish

Civil

War

(1936-1939).19

Nation-

alist

leaders were

members

of the

lower

middle

class,

who

sponsored

a



546

traditionalist

form

of

nationalism,

and members of

the local

bourgeoi-

sie,

who

sponsored

a

liberal

form

of

nationalism. As

many

authors have

noted,

the

Basque capitalist

elite

was

not

nationalist

and

supported

the

monarchic

Conservative

and

Liberal

parties.20

Until

1898,

traditionalist

and

liberal

nationalist

leaders

ran

separate

political organizations,

the

Basque

Nationalist

Party

and the Uni6n

Vasco-Navarra

respectively.

They

were

unsuccessful,

however,

because

the

traditionalist

and

liberal

constituencies

favored

political parties

with

a

Spanish

orientation. The

lack

of

political support

for

Basque

nationalism

explains why

the leaders of its two branches

eventually

formed

a

coalition in

1898,

despite

profound

ideological

differences.

This

coalition

kept

the

name of the

Basque

Nationalist

Party (BNP).

Thereafter,

although

the

pro-business

sector

of

the

Basque

Nationalist

Party

provided

many

of the

BNP's

candidates

to

General

Elections and

prevented

extremist

nationalists

from

gaining

complete

control

of

the

Basque

Nationalist

Party, ideological

hegemony

and

legitimacy

belong

to traditionalism. This hegemony was exemplified

by

and reproduced

through

control over

the

main

party

newspapers.

Traditionalism

was

also

the

ideology

of

the

BNP's electoral

base and that

of the

party

mili-

tants

who,

because

of

the

mass

character of the BNP's

party

organiza-

tion,

had

great leverage

over

party

decisions.

In

particular,

traditional-

ists

showed

their

political

and

ideological

superiority

by

winning

a

greater

number of votes

in

the one election

in

which

representatives

of

the traditionalist and liberal

branches

of

the

BNP

competed

electorally

against each other, Bilbao's 1922 Municipal Election.21

I

refer to the

hegemonic type

of

Basque

nationalism

as traditionalist

nationalism.22Its

indisputable ideologue

was the founder

and

highly

charismatic leader

of

the

Basque

Nationalist

Party,

Sabino Arana.

Arana

was the son

of

a

prominent

Carlist

supporter

as

were most of the

early

leaders

of

Basque

nationalism.

His

nationalism,

which

dominated

Basque

nationalist discourse until the

Spanish

Civil

War,23

was

a

defen-

sive reaction against what he saw as the harmful influence of liberalism

in

Basque

society.

His articles

span

the duration

of his

political

life,

from

1890 to

1903,

the

year

in

which

he

died,

and

through

them

one

can

see

clearly

delineated a

political program

essentially

informed

by

religious

concerns.

Arana

presented

his

struggle

for

Basque independence

as a

struggle

for

the

religious

salvation

of the

Basque

race

through

complete

isolation



547

from other

peoples,

especially

Spaniards.24

n his

view,

anguage

was

as

much

a

shield

againstchange

as

political independence.25Similarly,

Arana hated

Spanish

mmigrants

because

they

were

important

agents

of

change

in

the traditions

and culture

of the

Basque

country,

they

represented

more secular

views than the ones

prevailing

among

the

Basque

population,

and

they generally supported

the

Socialist

party,

instead

of

adhering

to a

religiously

ounded

system

of

paternalistic

relations

between

employer

and

worker.

Finally,

Arana's

equally

vicious attacks

on those

groups

of

Basque

ori-

gin

who had facilitated the

penetration

of liberalism nto the

Basque

Country suggest

that

his

attacks

on

immigrants

were

related

to their

secularvalues and

to the

changes they

were

introducing

n the

Basque

Country,

rather

than to other

factors,

such as economic

competition.

The

target

of

his attacks

were the rulers

of

Vizcaya,

the

Basque

eco-

nomic

and

political

elites,

and

the

Basque

intelligentsia.

Not even his

capitalistpoliticalpartners

n

the

BNP

were

spared

his

invectives,

hus

reflecting

the

gulf separating

he two

conceptions

of

nationalism

hat

coexisted n the BNP.26

The

nationalist

deology

described above remained

hegemonic

until

the

Spanish

Civil

War

and

is

exemplified

in

the

doctrinal

principles

agreed

upon

by

the

BNP in

1930.27

Specifically,

hese

principlespro-

claimed

that Catholicismwas the

true

religion

of

the

Basque Country,

that

political independence

was both a

right

and

the

objective

to

be

achieved

by

the

Basque

people,

that

efforts

needed

to be

made

to

pre-

serve and strengthen he Basque race, and that the old practicesand

traditional nstitutions

of the

Basque

provinces

should

be

re-estab-

lished.

The

nationalist

coalition

formed

in

1898 between

anti-centralist

iber-

als and traditionalists

did

not

increase the

appeal

of

Basque

national-

ism

to

the

Basque

electorate.

Despite

a

noticeable increase

in

its level

of

organization

over the

years

and

an

exceptional

and

short-lived

elec-

toral success in the 1918 General election, the Basque Nationalist

Party

did

not

have much

popular

appeal

until

the

Spanish

Second

Republic. Capitalists

ended to

vote

for

the

Spanish

conservativeand

liberal

parties

( dynastic

arties),

rural

areas were

largely

controlled

by

the

Carlist

party,

a

traditionalist

Spanish

party,

which

advocated a

return

to

the

forms

of

social

and

political organization

hat

prevailed

during

the Old

Regime,28

and

the

working

class,

made

up

mostly

of

immigrants,

upported

the

Spanish

Socialist

Party.

Thus,

the

Basque



548

Nationalist

Party

had little

support

outside the industrial

province

of

Vizcaya

and

even in

Vizcaya

it was

relatively strong only

at the

munici-

pal

level.

During

the

Second

Republic (1931-1936)

the

BNP

became

one

of the

leading political

parties

in

two

of

the three

Basque

provinces,

Vizcaya

and

Guipuzcoa. Basque

nationalists

benefited

from a transfer

of votes

from traditionalist

parties

and

dynastic parties

to the

Basque

National-

ist

Party. According

to

Heiberg,29

in

rural areas this

vote came

from

farmers

who,

because

of

growing

employment opportunities

in

indus-

try

in

neighboring

cities,

had

gained increasing

economic

independ-

ence,

which freed them from the

political

hold

of small Carlist

land-

lords.

The rise

in

support

for the BNP in urban areas is

less well under-

stood,

but it has been

suggested

that

segments

of

the

Basque

local

bourgeoisie

used

their

votes

to

punish

the

Basque

economic

elite

for

its

support

of the

failed

economic

policies adopted

during

the

Primo de

Rivera

dictatorship (1923-1930).30

The

paradoxical

consequence

of

these

shifts

in

electoral

behavior was

that while most

of

Spain

sided

with the leftist Popular Front, in the Basque Country, one of the two

leading

industrial

regions

in

Spain,

the left was

a

minority compared

to

conservative

forces.31

During

the

Republican

years, Basque

nationalists,

like

Catalan

nation-

alists,

demanded and

worked for a Statute

of

Autonomy.

Various

fac-

tors

contributed,

however,

to

a

delay

in

its

approval:

the

clericalism

and

xenophobic

content

of the first

draft

of the

Statute,

which made

it

unpalatable to the Spanish left; popular opposition in the provinces of

Navarre

and Alava

to inclusion

in

the

Basque

autonomous

community;

and

opposition

by

the centralist

Spanish Right

to the

third draft

sub-

mitted

to

the

Spanish parliament.

Eventually,

the

Spanish

Socialists

supervised

the

drafting

of

a

fourth,

more

democratic,

moderate,

and

somewhat

vague

Statute,32

which

was

approved

in

October

of 1936.

By

then,

however,

the

Spanish

Civil War had

already

begun.

Catalan

nationalism

(1876-1936)

The

period

1876-1936

witnessed

the

development

of a

bourgeois

and

a

progressive

type

of nationalism

in

Catalonia,

both

of which

ques-

tioned

the

centralized character

of

the

Spanish

state and

favored

inter-

vention

in

Spanish

affairs.33The

former was

represented

by

the

nation-

alist

ideology

and

programs

of

the

Lliga

and

was

led

by

businessmen



549

and members

of the

intelligentsia.34

n contrast

with

bourgeois

nation-

alism, progressive

nationalism,

which

was

represented by

the

party

EsquerraRepublicana,

was led

almost

exclusivelyby

members of the

intelligentsia.

One

major

difference

between

Basque

and

Catalan

nationalism

s,

therefore,

that

the

capitalist

elite

and

the

intelligentsia

were

more nationalist

n

Catalonia

han

n

the

Basque Country.

Both

bourgeois

and

progressive

nationalist leaders

and

ideologues

agreed

that Catalonia

constituted

a

distinct moral

community,

with

a

common culture

(in

which

languageplayed

a

pivotal

role),

a common

history,

and a common

character,

ll of which

distinguished

t from the

rest of

Spain.

They

differed

rom

Basque

traditionalist ationalists

n

the

non-racistnature

of their

discourse,

in

their

acceptance

of

modernity,

and

in

that

they rarely

advocated

ndependence.Although

their

general

justification

for nationalist

political

mobilization was that

Catalonia

constituted

a

nation,

Catalan nationalistauthors

and

political

leaders

also

pointed

out that

contemporary

onditions

n

Spainweighed

heavi-

ly

in

their

decision

to mobilize

politically.

The

state's ow

prestige

after

the loss of Cubaand the Philippinesand its inability o facilitateeco-

nomic

developmentthroughoutSpain,

its

inability

to

guarantee

order

and

to

promote

industrial

development

n

Catalonia,

and its threatto

Catalanculturaland

juridical

nstitutionswere

the

major

reasons that

nationalist eaders

gave

to

justify

heir

nationalism.

The

emergence

of

Catalan

nationalism

was

preceded

by

a

long process

of

cultural

revival,

common to other

areas of

Europe,

that

lasted

the

entire nineteenthcentury,and was partlyinspired by the rapidsocio-

economic

changes

that Catalonia

experienced

during

his

period.

This

increasing

ethnic

awareness,

however,

did

not lead to the

formation

of

nationalist

parties

until the end of the

century.

The

main nationalist

organization

hat then

developed,

and the vehicle

for

bourgeois

nationalism

during

the

period

before

the

Spanish

Civil

War,

was the

Lliga Regionalista (renamed

Lliga

Catalana

during

the

SpanishSecondRepublic). ts mainpoliticalgoalswere to end political

corruption

and state

de-centralization.While

the

bourgeoisie

attached

foremost

importance

to

obtaining

economic

concessions from the

government,

he

intelligentsia

was more

concerned with

juridical

and

language

matters. The

Lliga

dominated Catalan

politics, along

with

supra-regional epublicanparties,

during

the

1901-1923

period

and,

despite losing

its

hegemony

after

Primo

de

Rivera's

Dictatorship,

remained

a

major

electoral force

during

the

Second

Republic.

Fore-



550

most

among

the

achievements

of

the

Lliga

during

this

period

was

the

creation

of the

Mancomunitat

Catalana.

This

institution,

founded

in

1914,

was a

supraprovincial

organization

with

the

power

to coordinate

the

administration

of

the four

Catalan

provinces.

Although

it

fell short

of

providing

political autonomy,

it

returned

a

sense

of

historical

unity

to

Catalonia.

Through

the

Mancomunitat,

the

Lliga

tried

to

implement

an ambitious

program

of

economic,

educational,

and

cultural

reforms.

Among

these reforms were the creation of a

strong public-service

infra-

structure to facilitate

economic

development,

the

implementation

of

policies

to extend vocational

training among

workers,

and

the

develop-

ment of an ambitious cultural

program,

which focused on the

promo-

tion

of the Catalan

language

and culture.35

Such

policies

reflected

the

goals

of the main

groups

that

supported

the

Lliga:

capitalists

and

mem-

bers

of the

intelligentsia.

During

the 1901-1936

period,

the

Catalan

bourgeoisie

represented

by

the

Lliga repeatedly opposed

government policies,

such

as tariff

pro-

tection

for

grain

imports,

which

only

benefitted

agrarian

interests

from

the rest of

Spain,

and the taxation of industrial

profits

made during the

First World

War,

which was detrimental

to the interests

of the

Catalan

business

community.

However,

partly

out

of

fear

of

the

revolutionary

Catalan

working

class,36

the

leaders

of

the

Lliga

never

sought

inde-

pendence

for

Catalonia

and

even

collaborated

with the

dictatorial

government

of Primo de

Rivera

(1923-1930),

which the

Catalan

bour-

geoisie

saw as the

only

means

to restore order.

In

fact,

the

political

ambivalence

of the leaders

of

the

Lliga

who,

on

the

one

hand,

constant-

ly opposed governmental policies and, on the other hand, sought the

government's

authority

whenever it needed

to

repress

the

working

class,

eventually

undermined

the

Lliga's

social

base

and

played

into the

hands

of

progressive

nationalism.

Progressive

nationalism

did

not become

hegemonic,

however,

until

the

Spanish

Second

Republic.

It

is

only

then

that

Esquerra

Republicana,

in

coalition

with the

major

anarchist

union,

the

CNT,

and

with

the

Uni6

de Rabaissaires, a rural laborers organization, was able to secure

enough

popular

support

to

replace

the

Lliga

as the

major

party

in

Cata-

lonia.

The

origins

of

progressive

nationalism

can

be traced

to

the

nineteenth

century,

to numerous

republican

organizations

with

a

federalist

char-

acter

that

attracted

members

of the Catalan

intelligentsia

interested

in

improving

the economic

and

political

conditions

of

the

emerging



551

working

class.

During

the

period

of

hegemony

of the

Lliga Regiona-

lista, however,

nationalist

republicanism

remained a minor

political

force,

mostly

because of the

stigma

of

conservatism which

was

at-

tached

to nationalism

during

this

period

by

the

international

labor

movement.

Unlike the

leaders

of the

Lliga,

nationalist

republican

leaders

actively

opposed

the

government

during

the

dictatorship

of

Primo

de

Rivera.

This

opposition

increased

the

political

capital

of

progressive

national-

ism

at the same time as it

decreased

that

of

bourgeois

nationalism.

Moreover,

it

predisposed

anarchists and other leftist

political

groups

to

collaborate with

nationalist

republicans

when

democratic rule was re-

stored.

In

the decisive

municipal

elections

of

April

1931,

whose

outcome

brought

about the

Second

Republic,

Esquerra

Republicana

emerged

as

the

undisputable

victor.37 Their

program

in

those

elections

clearly

reflected their

nationalist

and reformist

goals.

They

demanded

the

right

to self-determination (their goal being a confederation of Iberian

states),

political

and economic

rights

for

workers,

welfare

measures for

mothers,

children,

and the

elderly, agrarian

reform,

and the

recognition

of

human

rights.

One

day

after the

elections,

Macia,

the

president

of

Esquerra,

pro-

claimed the

Catalan

Republic,

but

was

soon

convinced

by

Spanish

republican

leaders to

settle for

a less

ambitious

compromise

that

kept

Catalonia a part of Spain. This compromise consisted of the symbolic

re-establishment

of

the

Generalitat,

a

Catalan

medieval

governing

body,

while

negotiations

took

place

for

the

approval

of

a

Statute of

Autonomy

for

Catalonia.

This

Statute was

finally

obtained

in

1932.

A

description

of

the

convoluted

dynamics

that

characterized

Catalan

politics

during

the

years

preceding

the

Spanish

Civil

War is

beyond

the

scope

of

this

article.

Especially

after

1935,

Spain

and

Catalonia

entered a revolutionary spiral that tells us little about the social hege-

mony

of

one

ideology

or

another in

Catalonia,

or

about

the

reasons for

their

hegemonic

or

non-hegemonic

character.

Suffice

it to

say

that,

during

those

dramatic

years,

there

was

a

trend

toward

separatism

and

revolutionary

anti-capitalist

solutions

as

against

more

moderate

alter-

natives.

During

those

years,

only

the

Catalan

upper

classes were firm

in

their

support

of

autonomy

within

a

united

Spain,

while

large

sectors

within the

intelligentsia

and within

the

non-manual

working-class

sup-



552

ported

a

progressive

form of

nationalism

aiming

at a

Spanish

con-

federation,

and the lower

classes,

less concerned about

the nationalist

issue,

demanded a drastic

transformation of social relations.

Having

outlined the main

defining

traits

of

Basque

and Catalan

natio-

nalism

in

the

pre-Civil

War

period,

I

now focus on those

factors

that

explain

why

nationalism took the form of

traditionalist

nationalism

in

the

Basque Country

while

bourgeois

and

progressive

nationalism

be-

came dominant

in

Catalonia.

Rural

development

and

rural

stagnation

in

the

context

of

industrialization

The

Catalan

road

Catalonia's

industrial transformation

began

in

the

eighteenth

century,

earlier

than

in

most

Spanish regions.

Its

economic

development

was

primarily the product of the combination of two factors: agrarian

development

and the

full

integration

of Catalonia

into the

Spanish

state.

In

1716,

in

the

wake of the War of Succession that

brought

the

Bour-

bon

royal dynasty

to

Spain,

Catalonia was

fully incorporated

into

Spain

by

the

Decreto

de Nueva Planta.38 This

decree

abolished

Catalan

political

and

legal

institutions that had until

then

preserved

Catalan

autonomy.

Full

integration

into

Spain

vastly

increased

the

market

for

Catalan producers, for Catalonia was able to participate more directly

in trade

with the rest

of

Spain

and with the

colonies

of Latin

America.

Catalonia

had the resources

to benefit from

the

new

trading opportuni-

ties.

The

most

important

of these resources

was

agrarian

wealth.

Low

population

density

and the

Sentencia de

Guadalupe,

enacted

by

Ferdi-

nand

of

Aragon

in

the sixteenth

century

to

eliminate

seigniorial

abuses

and

to

grant

freedom

of

movement to the

peasantry,

had

favored

the

development of a prosperous peasantry in Catalonia.

In the

eighteenth

century, demographic pressure

and

new

commercial

opportunities

in Latin America motivated

large

numbers

of

peasants

to

specialize

in

the

production

of

wine

and

eau-de-vie

for

export,

under

increasing capitalist

forms and

relations

of

production.39

These

exports40

encouraged

the

development

of

a

dynamic

commercial

sec-

tor,

a

thriving

naval

construction

industry,

and,

from

the

early

eighteen

hundreds,

a

modern textile

industry.



553

The textile

ndustry,

whose

development

was also

facilitated

by

the

pre-

existence of

a

proto-industrial

urban

sector,41

was

the backbone

of

Catalan ndustrialization.

rom the

1830s to the

1850s

the Catalan

ex-

tile

industry

underwent a

technological

revolution

that

brought

it

to

European

standards.

This

progress

s

indicated

by

Catalonia's

ndex of

industrial

production,

which

trebledbetween

1840 and 1860.

By

1860,

the

Catalan

textile

industry

had

captured

about

eighty percent

of

the

Spanish

market

or

textile

products.

The

growthpotential

of this

dynamic

sector,42

owever,

was

limited

by

the small

size

of the

Spanish

market

and

by

high

production

costs,

which

curtailed he

ability

of Catalan

ndustry

o

compete

abroad.

Con-

sequently,

he Catalan

capitalist

ector

came to

depend

on

protectionist

legislation

enacted

by

the

Spanishgovernment.

This

economic

depend-

ence

on

Spain

and

working-class

unrest

during

this

early period

of

industrialization,43

xplain why

the

Catalan

capitalist

class never

spon-

sored

separatist

olutions.

In

summary,

between 1800 and the

Spanish

Civil

War,

Catalonia

advanced

rapidly

in

the

industrialization

process.

Throughout

the

nineteenth

century,

the

Catalan

countryside

prospered

and farmers

invested

their

profits

in

commerce

and

industry.

The

investment of

small

agrarian

and

industrial

capital

n

industry

was

also

facilitated

by

the

relatively

small

capital

requirements

of

the

modern

textile

indus-

try.44

The Catalan

process

of

industrialization

nsureda

relatively

luid

transition rom

a

rural

to an

urban

society

and the

development

of a

culturalandeconomicaffinitybetweenruraland urbanCatalonia.45

The

making

of

Basque

iron-based

industry

With

almost three

percent

of

the

Spanish

population

in

1800,

the

Basque Country

produced

only

two

percent

of

the

Spanish

GDP

and

was one of

the

poorest regions

in

Spain.46

This

poverty

reflected the

limits of Basque agricultureand the commercialand industrialcrises

created

by

the

Napoleonic

Wars,

the

loss

of

the

Latin

American colo-

nies,

and the loss of

markets or iron

due

to

more

competitive

Northern

European

production.

In

the

following

decades the

Basque

commercial

bourgeoisie

followed

different

strategies

o

adjust

to

these new

conditions.

It

made low-risk

investments

n

public

debt

and real

estate,

lobbied

for

the

privatization



554

of

mining,

took

steps

to

mechanize

iron

production,

and favored

the

transfer

of

customs

houses,

traditionally

ocated

on

the border

between

Castile

and the

Basqueprovinces,

o the coast.

These

transformations

were

so successfulthat between 1800

and

1860

the

Basque

Country's

GDP increased

faster

than that

of

any

other

region

except

for Madrid and

Catalonia.47Unlike

development

in

Catalonia,however,

development

n

the

Basque Country

was

uneven.

In

the

Basque

Country,

development

n

commerce and

industry

took

place

despite

crises

in

the

agricultural

ector and

even at the

expense

of

agriculture.

While Catalan

capitalistdevelopment

was

partly

initiated

by

broad

segments

of the

peasantry,

Basque

capitalist

development

harmed

he

peasantry.

ndeed,

and

speculation

and

the

privatization

f

municipal

and and of

mining,

both

of which

had

traditionally rovided

supplementary

ents to the

peasantry,

nd

rising

consumer

prices

asso-

ciated

with the

transfer

of

customs

houses to the

coast,

created

unrest

among

the

peasantry.

The discovery n 1856 of the Bessemerprocess for the productionof

steel

by

the direct method revolutionized

the

iron

industry.

The

Bessemer

process

allowed

for

the

production

of iron at

very

low

cost

and

in

very arge

quantities,

and

required

he

exclusive

use

of

hematites,

with

very

low

phosphoric

content,

which were

more abundant

and

closer

to the

surface n the

Basque Country

han

almost

anywhere

else

in

Europe.

The dramaticncrease n demand orBasque ronore thatfollowedthe

discovery

of the Bessemer

process

resulted

n

a

spectacular

ise

in

iron

ore

exports.

Although

these

exports

were almost

entirely

controlled

by

foreign

interests

they generated

extensive

economic

activity

in the

Basque

Country

tself.

They

attracted

nvestors

and

workers,

promoted

a formidable

capital

accumulation

which

benefitted

a

numberof

local

capitalists

nvolved

n

the

mining

sector,

and

created

ncentives

or

the

development

of industrial

sectors related to

iron

production.48

This

industry, ike Catalanindustry,needed protectionbecause lack of a

cheap

source

of coal made

Basque

ndustrial

products

oo

expensive

o

compete

in

foreign

markets.

The

negative

side

of this

spectacular

ndustrial

revolution

was

that

it

had

highly

dislocating

effects on

Basque

society

and

benefitted

only

a

very

small

group

within

the

traditional

commercial

and

landowning

elites.49

This

group

comprised

individuals

who had

purchased

the



555

best mines

in the

years

before

the

export

boom,

when

foreign

owner-

ship

of mines was still

forbidden. These

mine owners

then made

their

fortunes

by

charging high

rents to and

becoming

stockholders

in

the

foreign

companies

that

began

to

exploit

these mines in the

eighteen

seventies. Later

on,

they

invested their

capital

in

industrial

and

finan-

cial activities.

Meanwhile,

most commercial

capitalists,

iron

manu-

facturers,

and

big

landowners

were

unable to

compete against foreign

capitalists

and

against

the new

Basque

capitalist

elite.

Patterns

of

development,

ocial

structure,

nd

political

mobilization

Catalan

capitalist

industrial

development

was

endogenous

and driven

in

part by agrarian

capitalist growth.

Basque

industrial

capitalist

devel-

opment,

on the

other

hand,

took

place

without

agrarian

capitalist

growth

and was

greatly

distorted

by

foreign

demand and

investment,

which

fostered

formidable

capital

accumulation

during

the last two

decades of

the nineteenth

century.

The

different

ways

in

which

Catalan and

Basque

rural areas

experi-

enced

capitalism

explain why

the

Basque

peasantry rejected

capitalism

while

the Catalan

peasantry

largely

adapted

to it.

Indeed,

Carlism and

traditionalist nationalism

-

two

different

strategies

to

block the

transi-

tion

to a

capitalist society

-

were

stronger

in

the

Basque country

than

anywhere

else

in

Spain.

For most of the nineteenth century, the Carlist party represented the

aspirations

of

those

sectors

in

Spanish

society

who

opposed

socio-

economic

and

political

change.

During

the two

Carlist Wars

(1833--

1840,

1872-1876)

which

pitted

Carlists

against

Liberals,

Carlism

was

particularly

strong

in

both

the

Basque

Country

and

in

Catalonia,

but

much

stronger

in

the

former

than

in

the

latter.

Indeed,

support

for

Carlism in

Catalonia,

already

much

weaker

than in

the

Basque

Country

in

the

first

Carlist

War,

decreased

considerably

throughout

the

nine-

teenth century, while it remained very high in the Basque Country until

the

Spanish

Civil War.50

The

loss of two

wars

deeply

divided

Carlists

-

or

Traditionalists as

they

are

also known

-

throughout

Spain.

Some

sectors

within the

Carlist

movement even

began

to

approximate

their

views to

those of

the

Con-

servative

Party

in

power.5

Consequently

some

groups

within

the

Basque

Carlist

community

tried to

find new

ways

to

achieve their

tradi-



556

tionalist

goals.

The

ideology

of

nationalism,

hen so

popular

n

Europe,

offered

the

possibility

of

preserving

raditional

Basque

social

organi-

zation

by isolating

the

Basque

Country

from the rest

of

Spain.

Arana

himself

describes the mental

process

which led

many

Basque

Carlists

toward

nationalism,

when

explaining

how his brother

Luis converted

(sic)

him to nationalism:

...and he made such

an

effort to

demonstrate

to me that

Carlism

was an

unnecessary,

inconvenient,

and

harmful

way

to

prevent Spanish

influence,

to

break-up

ties with

Spain,

and

even to

recover

the

seigniorial

tradition,

that

my mind, understanding that my brother knew history better than me and

that he

was

incapable

of

lying

to

me,

started to

doubt,

and

I resolved

to

study

with

serenity

the

history

of

Biscay

and to

firmly

adhere to

the

truth.52

Arana

rationalizedhis shift

from

Carlism

to

separatist

nationalism

by

saying

that the

Basque

provinces

had

always

been

sovereign,

and

were

therefore

entitled

to

independence

f

membership

n

Spain

threatened

the

survival

of

the

Basque

culture.

The

dislocating

ffectsof

foreign

demandandinvestmentn theBasque

Country

after

the Second CarlistWar

also

explain

why

a

greater

pro-

portion

of the

urban

and

ruralmiddle

classes

supported

a traditionalist

form of nationalism

n

the

Basque

Country

han

n

Catalonia.

Members

of

this

traditional

middle

class,

whose

wealth

still

derived

from

urban

and

rural

property,

lung

the

longest

to the

Basque

dea

of the

Fueros

-

that

is the

Basque

traditional

utonomous

political

nstitutions

after

they

were

banned at the

end of

the Second

Carlist

War.53

ndeed,

these

old institutions, n which rural communitieswere over-represented,

were

their

only

hope

to counter

the economic

power

of

the

new

capital-

ist-elite.

Their

change

roma

pro- Fueros

osition

to

nationalism

was a

semantic

more than an

ideological

one as the

followingpassage

from

a

speech

given

n 1906

by

the

leading

Fuerista

rturo

Campi6n

shows:

We

proudly

called ourselves

Fueristas

in riskier

times

than

today's.

How-

ever,

given

that

there

is

a new

term which

is

more

graphic,

more

intense

and

thoroughly

expressive,

and

that

this term does

not

allow

the

mild-hearted

or

those

who

see themselves

as

sophisticated

(which

is the

same)

to take

refuge

under

it,

I

declare,

without

renouncing

my past,

without

subscribing

to

new

ideas,

without

adopting

new

attitudes,

and,

instead,

in

agreement

with

my

own

modest

history,

that

I renounce

the old

label

and from

now on will

call

myself

a nationalist

(sic).54

In

the

end, however,

regardless

f the relative

proportions

of

traditional

middle-class

groups

excluded

from the

benefits

of

capitalist

develop-



557

ment

in

each

region,

what made

these

groups

more salient in

Basque

nationalism

was that

in

the

Basque Country

the classes above them

were

not nationalist

while

in

Catalonia

they

were. The next

section

explains why

the

Basque upper

capitalist

classes did

not

become

nationalistwhile the Catalandid.

Regional

capitalism

and

the state: The role of

capital-goods

production

versus

consumer-goods

production

The different

political

strategies

followed

by

the

Basque

and Catalan

upper

classes can be attributed

o their relative

ability

directly

o influ-

ence state decisions.

The

previous

section

points

out the

formidable

effect that

foreign

demand and investment

n

iron

extracting

activities

had

on

Basque

industrialization. ecause of

this,

Basque development

achieved levels of

capital

accumulationunheardof

in

Catalonia.This

section focuses on the relative economic

power

of the

Basque

and

Catalan

capitalist

elites and its effects on the

political

power

of these

twogroups.I relyon the 1922 Directoryof Corporationsand Financial

Institutions.Since

in

1922 the

corporation

was

already

a

major

nstitu-

tion

in

both Catalanand

Basque society,

this

directoryprovides

a

good

approximation

f the main differences

n

economic

structurebetween

the two

regions.55

The

information contained

in

the

directory

shows that the

sizes

of

Basque

and Catalan

capitalism

were

very

similar.

Accumulatednomi-

nal assets throughoutCatalanand Basque corporationsand financial

institutionsamounted to

approximately

he

same

figure

(see

Table

1).

Moreover,

n

both communities the

number of

very

large

companies

(with

nominal assets above ten million

pesetas)

was

approximately

he

same:

Forty-nine

n

the

Basque

Country

and

forty-one

in

Catalonia.

Finally,

at the

Spanish

evel,

the

Basque

Country

and

Catalonia,

along

with

Madrid,

were

Spain's

leading capitalist

communities.

Indeed,

among

the two

hundred

largest Spanish

corporations,

fifty-five

were

Basqueandfiftywere Catalan.Exchanging conomicpowerfor politi-

cal

power

and

ennoblement,

many

owners of

the

largest

corporations

were

steadily

incorporated

into the

Spanish

power

bloc, 56which

included the

most

powerful

membersof the

Spanish

anded

aristocra-

cy, forming

what

Moya

has called the

Financial

Aristocracy. s7

Beyond

these

similarities,

he

Basque

and

Catalan

capitalist

structures

differed in

importantways.

For

instance,

the

distributionof

corpora-



558

Table 1.

Distribution

by

Nominal

Assets of

Basque

and

Catalan

Corporations (1922)

Ntile Nominal assets Cumulative % of Nominal assets Cumulative % of

Basque

Country

Basque

capital

Catalonia

Catalan

capital

they

represent

they

represent

10%

100,000

0.109

10,000

0.027

20%

229,000

0.450

25,000

0.110

30%

350,600

1.088

60,000

0.312

40%

524,500

2.170

100,000

0.720

50%

1,000,000

3.876

250,000

1.540

60%

1,500,000

6.383

500,000

3.435

70%

2,500,000

10.707

800,000

6.064

80%

4,363,194

18.457

1,500,000

10.800

90%

10,000,000

32.651

3,500,000

21.062

Total

accumulated

assets

2,342,054,947

2,367,928,087

Source:

Anuario

Financiero

y

de

Sociedades

An6nimas

[Directory

of

Corporations

and

Financial

Institutions]

(1922).

tions

by

size was

very

different in the two

communities,

for

capital

was

far more

concentrated in

the

Basque

Country

than

in

Catalonia

(see

Table

1).

Moreover,

as Table 2

shows,

in

1922 the

average corporation

size

in

Catalonia

was half the

size of

the

average

corporation

size

in

the

Basque Country.

An

analysis

of

variance

included

in

this table demon-

strates

that

only

eleven

percent

of this

difference

in

corporation

size

can be explained by the different sectorial compositions of the Basque

and Catalan

corporations.

The

remaining

variance

depends

on

the

relative

average

size of

Basque

and Catalan

corporations

within sectors

of the

economy.

This

difference

strongly supports

the assertion that

before

the

Spanish

Civil War small-firm

capitalism

characterized Cata-

lan

development

while

large-firm

capitalism

characterized

Basque

development.

Finally, what better describes the contrast between Basque and Catalan

capitalism, simultaneously

revealing

the difference

in

economic

power

of the

two

capitalist

elites,

is the

average

size

of

Basque

and Catalan

financial institutions.

As Table

2

shows,

in 1922

there

were

ninety-nine

financial

institutions

in

Catalonia

compared

with

twenty-three

in

the

Basque Country

but

cumulative nominal assets

in

these financial

insti-

tutions were

twenty-one

percent

greater

in

the

Basque

Country

than

in

Catalonia.



559

Table 2.

Mean

corporation

assets

by region

and sector

(1922)

(in

Pesetas)

Grand mean:

2,932,741.603

Mean Mean

after

N

adjusting

for

composition by

sector

Basque

Country

4,495,307.0 4,337,257.6

521

Catalonia

2,182,422.2

2,258,315.0

1085

Means

Basque Country

Catalonia

Agriculture

556,900.1

(8)

715,255.1

(32)

Mining

2,975,588.1

(109)

2,148,671.5

(67)

Water,

gas, electricity

6,807,635.6

(44)

7,361,386.4

(83)

Food,

beverages,

tobacco

1,665,893.9

(33)

1,580,627.2

(114)

Textiles

2,277,500.0

(9)

1,833,312.0

(83)

Leather, clothes,

shoes

383,750.0

(4)

394,122.3

(47)

Paper,

press, graphic

arts

3,014,685.7

(35)

411,991.3

(46)

Chemical 8,259,749.6 (20) 940,275.0 (100)

Ceramic,

glass,

cement

1,896,666.7

(12)

1,161,625.0

(16)

Steel

31,750,000.0

(6)

2,000,000.0

(3)

Metallurgy

2,136,678.9

(74)

867,122.49(206)

Construction

1,229,354.8

(31)

1,132,916.7

(36)

Transport,

communication

4,924,769.7

(92)

4,831,256.5

(90)

Commerce

(0)

3,367,777.8

(9)

Financial

21,485,000.0

(20)

4,337,500.1

(83)

Hotels and similar

1,950,000.0

(3)

1,248,916.7

(6)

Diverse

services

859,772.7

(11)

437,608.7

(46)

Foreign banks (0) 1,589,597.6 (8)

Foreign

mining

5,843,832.0

(10)

1,260,040.0

(10)

Source:

Anuario

Financiero

y

de

Sociedades

An6nimas

[Directory

of

Corporations

and

Financial

Institutions]

(1922). (

)

Number of

Corporations.

Note:

Branches of

the Bank

of

Spain

have

not been

included.

In

summ,

because one

can

assume

that,

in

early

twentieth-century

Spain,

levels

of

capital

concentration

and

economic

specialization

were

indicators of the strength of involvement in the Spanish market, Basque

capitalism

was

clearly

far

more

oriented

towards

the

rest of

Spain

than

was

Catalan

capitalism.

This

means

that,

while

in

both

communities

there

was a

very

strong

upper

bourgeoisie,

the

relative

weight

of

the

local

bourgeoisie

was much

greater

in

Catalonia than

in

the

Basque

Country.

It also

seems

that the

economic

distance

between

groups

representing

capitalism

and

groups

representing

traditional

society

was

much

greater

in

the

Basque

Country

than in

Catalonia.



560

Further

analysis

of

the

data contained in

the 1922

Directory

of Cor-

porations

and Financial

Institutions,

now

focused

on

members

of the

boards

of

directors

of

these

companies, supports

the

hypothesis

that,

compared

with Catalan

capitalism,

Basque

capitalism

maintained

stronger

ties

with

Spanish capitalism.58

This

analysis

shows

that

out

of

7,581

directors

throughout

Spain,

238

(14

percent

of

all

directors

in

Basque companies) belonged

to the

boards

of both

Basque

and

non-

Basque corporations, compared

to 158 who

belonged

to boards

of

both

Catalan and

non-Catalan

corporations

(8

percent

of all

directors

in Catalan

companies,

see Table

3).

To

gauge

somewhat

better the extent

to

which

Basque

and Catalan

capitalists

tended to be involved

in

economic activities

outside

their

region,

I

have

separately

ranked

directors

in

Catalan and

Basque

com-

panies

according

to the accumulated assets

of

the Catalan

or

Basque

companies

in which

they

were

present,

and selected

the

top

one

hundred

in

each

of the

two

communities.59

Analysis

of the

joint

mem-

bership

in

regional

and

non-regional

corporations

of

the

top

100 direc-

tors in Catalonia and the

Basque

Country

shows that

forty-three

out of

a hundred

were directors

in

both

Basque

and

non-Basque

corpora-

tions,

compared

to

only

sixteen out of a

hundred

who were

members

of

both Catalan

and non-Catalan

corporations.

Similar

findings

were

obtained

by ranking

directors

according

to the

number

of director-

ships

that

they

held and

selecting

the

top

one hundred

in each

region.

Finally,

in

this

review

of

the

linkages

between

Basque

and

Catalan

capi-

talism and the rest of Spain, it is worth considering the strength of the

Table

3. Distribution

of

directors

of

Spanish

corporations

and

financial

institutions

according

to the location

of the

corporations

in which

they

serve

(1922)

N

Basque

1,474

Basque

and

other

238

Catalan 1,881

Catalan

and other

158

Other

in

Spain

3,887

Source:

Anuario

Financiero

y

de Sociedades

An6nimas

[Directory

of

Corporations

and

Financial

Institutions]

(1922).

Note:

The

Total Number

of Directors

is

7,581;

the

sum

presented

above

does

not add

up

to this

number because

twenty

directors

belonged

to

the

board

of

Catalan,

Basque,

and

Other

Spanish

Corporations

simultaneously

and

thirty-five

belonged

to the

board

of

Catalan and

Basque Corporations

simultaneously.



561

economic ties

Basque

and Catalan

capitalists

maintained

with

the

Spanish

state

apparatus,

for this

conditioned the

political

attitudes

of

Basque

and Catalan

capitalists

toward the

Spanish

state. The

literature

on

this

topic

shows that

Basque industry

depended

to a

larger

degree

upon

state

purchases

than did Catalan

industry.60

This is

undoubtedly

related

to the economic sectors

that were

predominant

in

each

com-

munity,

capital-goods production

in

the

Basque

Country

and

consumer-

goods

production

in

Catalonia.

Consumers

of

Basque

products

were

typically

other industries or the

state,

while

private

individuals were

the

main

consumers of

Catalan

products

such

as

textiles

(with

the

excep-

tion of

army

clothing). During

the

dictatorship

of

Miguel

Primo

de

Rivera

(1923-1930)

commercial

relations

between

the

state

and

Basque

industry

intensified because of

a

vast

program

of

public

works

that

was

undertaken.

According

to

Harrison,

when

the

dictatorship

collapsed

in

1930 and the new

Finance

Minister

decided to

halt infra-

structural

reforms,

an

economic crisis in

Vizcaya,

more

severely

hit

by

this

reversal than

any

other

province,

followed

almost

immediately.

Regional capitalist

elites,

the

state,

and

the

character

of

peripheral

nationalism

In

the

period

that

preceded

the

Spanish

Civil

War,

the

Basque

Country

and

Catalonia

established

themselves as

the

leaders of

Spanish

indus-

trialization.

During

the

process

of

industrialization

the

wealthiest

Basque

and

Catalan

capitalist

families

were

incorporated

into

the

Spanish power elite. However, the previous section has demonstrated

that,

beyond

rough

similarities,

the

economic

structure of

the two

regions

differed

quite

substantially.

Basque

capital

was

more

powerful,

more

concentrated,

more

oriented

toward the

rest of

Spain,

and

more

closely dependent

on

the

Spanish

state.

From

a

socio-structural

viewpoint

the

results of

this

situation

were

1)

the

existence of

a

far

more

numerous

local

bourgeoisie

in

Catalonia

than in

the

Basque

Country

and

2)

the

development

in

Spain

of

stronger

economic link-

ages between Basque and non-Basque capitalism than between Catalan

and

non-Catalan

capitalism.

In

Catalonia,

these

two

characteristics

explain

the

exclusion

of the

Catalan

bourgeoisie

from

the

power

sphere

in

which

they

had

participated

quite

vigorously

for

a

short

period

immediately

preceding

the

Restoration

(1868-1874).

After the

loss of

Cuba

in

1898,

which

was a

heavy

blow

to

Catalan

capitalists,

the

main

Catalan

business

association,

the

Foment

del

Treball

Nacional,

withdrew

its

support

from

the

Spanish

Conservative

party

and

began

to



562

act as a

pressure

group.

In

this

respect,

the Catalan

capitalist

elite,

still

playing

the

Spanish

card,

supported

a

political

outsider,

General

Pola-

vieja,

in

his bid for

state

power.

Polavieja,

in

return

for this

political

support,

promised

to

grant

fiscal

autonomy

to

Catalonia,

in

a

similar

arrangement

to the one

Basque

capitalists

had

obtained

in

1882

for

their

region.

In

1899, however,

the

government

headed

by

Polavieja

and Silvela failed to deliver

on

its

promise

and,

instead,

approved

a

budget

which

increased

direct taxation of

capital gains.

After

this

disappointment,

Catalan

capitalists

veered

resolutely

toward

what

they

saw as the

only

strategy effectively

to influence

state

policy,

national-

ism.

They

formed an alliance with

groups belonging

to the intelli-

gentsia,

who for

many years

had

sponsored

anti-centralist

pro-Catalan-

ist

political agendas

but had lacked sufficient economic

resources

to

achieve their

goals.

Political events unfolded

very

differently

for the

Basque capitalist

elite.

Because

of

their economic

power

and their

close economic

ties

with

the

Spanish

state,

Basque capitalists

were

always very

well

represented

among

the

Spanish political

elite. A

good

reflection of the

power

Basques

had over the

Spanish

state was the enactment

of fiscal

autono-

my

for the

Basque Country

in

1882,

after intense

lobbying

by

one of

the

heroes

of

Basque

industrialization,

Victor Chavarri. Unlike

Catalan

capitalists,

Basque capitalists

did not need to

rely

on a form

of

region-

alism

to achieve their

goals;

instead

they

could

rely very

effectively

on

their

main business

association,

the

Liga

Vizcaina de

Productores.61

Conclusion

The

emergence

and

ideological

characteristics

of

Basque

and

Catalan

nationalism

in

late

nineteenth- and

early

twentieth-century Spain

are a

dramatic

expression

of conflict between

modernity

and tradition

in

the

ethnically heterogeneous

Spanish

state.

Confirming

Nair's

theory

of

peripheral

nationalism,

uneven

development

in

Spain

during

the

nine-

teenth century overlapped with spatially delimited ethnic communities,

Catalans

and

Basques,

thus

enhancing

their ethnic

identity

and

facili-

tating

the

expression

of

class

conflict

in

nationalist

terms.

However,

the

social

bases and the

ideologies

of

peripheral

nationalism

in

each

region

eventually

came to

reflect the different

patterns

of

development

that

they experienced

and the relative

economic

power

of their

capitalist

elites. These

structural

factors

shaped

the

Basque

and

Catalan

nation-

alist

movements

through

their

influence on class

conflict

and class

alli-



563

ances withinthe

Basque

Country

and

Catalonia,

as well as conflict

and

alliancesbetween these

classes and

the

Spanish

state.

Of

course,

differences

between

Basque

and

Catalannationalism

annot

be

explained

in

purely

structural

erms. The

developmental

actors

I

have

outlined

in this article

helped

to

reproduce onger-term

cultural

and economic

processes,

which

had

progressively

defined the

cultural

identity

of the

upper

classes

in

Catalonia

and the

Basque Country.

De-

scribing

and

explaining

this

process,

however,

exceeds the

objectives

set for

this

article.

This

comparison

of

Basque

and Catalan

nationalism hows that over-

development

does

not

necessarily

lead to

bourgeois

or other

pro-

industrialization ationalist

deologies.

In

particular,

he

Basque

case

illustrates

that,

as

long

as

the

leading

classes

of

overdeveloped

regions

are

able

to influence

state

political

and economic

decisions,

they

will

refrain rom the formulationof

nationalist

programs.

More-

over,

the

Basque

case shows

that

in

the

analysis

of

peripheral

national-

ism, scholars should focus simultaneouslyon the relationshipsestab-

lished

between

the

differentsocial classes in

the

peripheral

community

and the central state and on

those

establishedbetween

classes

within

the

peripheral ommunity.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Le6n Zamosc,CarlosWaisman,GershonShafir,

Akos

R6na-Tas,

Karl

Monsma,

Juan

Linz,

Berit

Dencker,

and the

Theory

and

Society

reviewers or

their

extremely

useful

comments

on

earlier

drafts

of

this article.

Notes

1. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974);

Neil

Smelser,

Mechanisms of

Change

and

Adjustment

to

Change,

in

William

Faunce

and William

Form, editors,

Comparative

Perspectives

on

Industrial

Society

(Boston:

Little

Brown,

1967)

33-54;

Ernest

Gellner,

Nations and

Nationalism

(Oxford:

Blackwell,

1983);

Michael

Hechter,

Internal

Colonialism:

The Celtic

Fringe

of

British

National

Development:

1536-1966

(London:

Routledge

and

Kegan

Paul,

1975);

Michael

Hechter,

Group

Formation

and the

Cultural Division

of

Labor,

American Journal

of

Sociology,

vol. 84

(1978),

293-318;

John

Comaroff,

Humanity,

Ethnicity,

Nationality:

Conceptual

and

Comparative

Perspectives

on



564

the

USSR,

Theory

and

Society,

vol. 20

(1991),

661-688;

Donald

L.

Horowitz,

Ethnic

Groups

in

Conflict (Berkeley: University

of California

Press,

1985).

2. Other

explanations,

such as Charles

Tilly's

in States and Nationalism in

Europe

since

1600,

Working

Paper

128

(New

York: Center

for

Studies

of Social

Change,

New School

for Social

Research,

1991)

1-12,

and

Eric

J.

Hobsbawm's

in Nations

and Nationalism

since

1789.

Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

Press,

1990)

provide

alternative

but

complementary arguments

for the

development

of

popular

nationalism

during

the nineteenth

century.

I

emphasize

Nairn's

argument

because his discussion of nationalism facilitates

the transition

to

my

own

explanation

of

programmatic

differences

between

Basque

and

Catalan

nationalism.

3. The

greater

ethnic

mobilization

potential

that exists

in these situations

of

overlap

has also

been

emphasized by

Hechter,

Internal and

Horowitz, Ethnic,

among

others.

4. Juan

J.

Linz,

Early State-Building

and Late

Peripheral

Nationalism

against

the

State:

The

Case

of

Spain

in

S. N. Eisenstadt

and

S.

Rokkan,

editors,

Building

States

and

Nations,

Vol.

II,

(Beverly

Hills,

Cal.:

Sage,

1973)

32-116;

William

A.

Douglass,

Introduction,

in

William

A.

Douglass,

editor,

Basques

Politics:

A Case

Study

in

Ethnic

Nationalism,

(Reno:

University

of Nevada

Press,

1985),

1-18.

5. Daniel

A.

Segal,

Nationalism,

Comparatively Speaking,

Journal

of

Historical

Sociology

1

(1986)

301-321.

In his

comparison

of France

with

the

Austro-Hun-

garian Empire, he presents a very different view of the effect of

colonial

posses-

sions

on the

development

of a

national

consciousness.

According

to

him,

colonial

possessions

allow for the

development

of a national consciousness

among

the

bour-

geoisie.

However,

in

view

of the

strength

of

peripheral

nationalism

in

ex-Empires

such

as Great

Britain,

Spain,

and

the

Soviet

Union,

his

argument

does

not

hold,

unless

qualifications

are

made

by introducing

the

effect

of uneven

development

into

the

explanation.

6. Tom

Nairn,

The

Break-

Up,

72.

7.

Donald

Horowitz, Ethnic,

provides

a

very

similar

distinction

between

the

type

of

nationalism

that

emerges

in

underdeveloped

areas and

what

emerges

in overdevel-

oped areas.

8.

Jacques

Barbier and

Herbert

Klein,

Revolutionary

Wars and

Public

Finances:

The

Madrid

Treasury,

1784-1807,

Journal

of

Economic

History,

vol.

41

(1981),

315--

339.

9. See

Benedict

Anderson,

Imagined

Communities

(London:

Verso,

1983)

and

Liah

Greenfeld,

Nationalism.

Five Roads

to

Modernity, (Cambridge:

Harvard

University

Press,

1992)

for

discussions

on the

processes

of

piracy

or

borrowing

of the

ideas of

national

identity,

nationalism,

and the

nation.

10.

Seymour

M.

Lipset

and

Stein

Rokkan,

Party

Systems

and

Voter

Alignments

(New

York:

Free

Press,

1967);

Ernest

Gellner,

Nations;

Michael

T.

Hannan,

The

Dynamics of Ethnic Boundaries in Modern States, in Michael Hannan and J.

Meyer,

editors,

National

Development

and the

World

System:

Educational,

Eco-

nomic,

and Political

Change,

1950-1970

(Chicago:

Chicago

University

Press,

1979);

Franqois

Nielsen,

Ethnic

Solidarity

in Modern

Societies,

American

Socio-

logical

Review

50,

133-149;

Charles

Tilly,

Ethnic Conflict

in

the

Soviet

Union,

Theory

and

Society

20,

569-581

(especially

574-575);

Michael

Hechter,

Internal.

11.

Although

the theories

listed

above

acknowledge

that

social

differentiation

is

nega-

tively

related

to

ethnic

group

formation

(Michael

Hechter,

Group

Formation... ;

Michael

Hechter,

The

Dynamics

of

Secession,

Acta

Sociologica

35

(1992),

1-17;



565

Francois

Nielsen,

Ethnic

Solidarity... )

and

positively

related to

ethnic-group

mobilization

(Hudson

Meadwell,

Ethnic Nationalism and Collective

Choice

Theory,

Comparative

Political Studies 22,

139-154),

they

do not take into account

class interests

in their

explanation

of

nationalism.

12.

Indeed,

I

subscribe

to

the view that individuals'

political

behavior is

partly

moti-

vated

by

a desire to

protect

ethnic-group

interests. On this

issue,

Donald

Horowitz,

Ethnic;

Donald

Horowitz,

How to

Begin

Thinking Comparatively

About Soviet

Ethnic

Problems,

in

Alexander

Motyl,

editor,

Thinking Theoretically

About

Soviet

Nationalities.

History

and

Comparison

in the

Study

of

the

USSR

(New

York: Colum-

bia

University

Press,

1992),

9-23.

13. One can include

in

this tradition

the

following

recent

publications:

Miroslav

Hroch,

Social Preconditions

of

National Revival in

Europe

(Cambridge: Cambridge

Uni-

versity

Press,

1985); Kathryn Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers

(Berkeley:

Universi-

ty

of California

Press,

1983);

Segal,

Nationalism;

Eric J.

Hobsbawm, Nations;

John

Comaroff,

Humanity;

Liah

Greenfeld,

Nationalism.

14.

Hechter's recent

work,

under the influence

of rational-choice

theory,

has the virtue

of

taking

the individual as the

starting point

and of

viewing

nationalist

political

mobilization as a social movement that needs

to be

studied

using

the theoretical

tools

developed by

the social movements

literature. See Michael

Hechter,

Prin-

ciples

of

Group Solidarity

(Berkeley: University

of

California

Press,

1987);

Michael

Hechter,

Nationalism as

Group Solidarity,

Ethnic

and Racial Studies

10,

415--

426;

Michael

Hechter,

The

Dynamics. Although

his

focus thus far has been on

the external rewards and

penalties

that

determine an

individual's

participation

in

ethnic

collective

action,

a

strategy

focused on

individuals and on

their

utility

schedules could also be

used to

develop hypotheses

about other

types

of nationalist

behavior,

such as

voting

behavior

and the

decision

to

create a

nationalist

organiza-

tion,

that are less sensitive to selective

rewards and

penalties

imposed by

nationalist

organizations.

15. Marianne

Heiberg,

Urban Politics

and

Rural

Culture:

Basque

Nationalism,

in

Stein Rokkan and Derek W.

Urwin,

editors,

The

Politics

of

Territorial

Identity

(London:

Sage

Publications,

1982)

355-387.

She

points

out that

Basque

national-

ism is particularly interesting because of the important role intra-ethnic group con-

flict

played

in

its

development,

358.

16. Pierre

Vilar,

La

Catalogne

dans

L'Espagne

Moderne:

Recherche

sur les

fondements

des Structures

Nationales.

(Paris:

S.E.V.P.E.N,

1962);

Juan J.

Linz,

Early

State;

Stanley Payne,

El Nacionalismo

Vasco

(Barcelona:

Dopesa, 1974);

Javier Cor-

cuera,

Origenes, Ideologia,

y Organizaci6n

del

Nacionalismo

Vasco

(1876-1904)

(Madrid:

Siglo

XXI,

1979);

Antonio

Elorza,

Ideologias

del

Nacionalismo

Vasco

(San

Sebastian:

Haranburu,

1978);

Juan

Pablo

Fusi,

Pluralismo

y

Nacionalidad

(Madrid:

Alianza,

1984);

Faustino

Migu6lez

and

Carlota

Sole,

Classes

Socials

i

Poder Politic en

Catalunya (Barcelona:

PPU,

1987),

among

others.

17. These explanatory gaps are also present in Eric J. Hobsbawm's own analysis of

Basque

and

Catalan

nationalism;

see

Nations,

119-120.

18. The

Anuario

Financiero

y

de Sociedades

An6nimas

was

published

annually

from

1914 to at

least the late

1950s

by

a

private

publishing company,

based

in

the

Basque

industrial

city

of Bilbao.

For

many years,

the two

persons

responsible

for its

publication

were

Ibafiez and

Marco-Gardoqui.

The

year

of 1922 was the first

year

for

which

extensive information

was

provided

for

both

financial and non-financial

corporations,

which

explains why

I

did not

choose

an

earlier date. The stated

goal

of this

publication

was to

inform

businessmen.

Although

the

information for this



566

publication

was

voluntarily

provided

by

the

companies

themselves,

the authors

of

this

publication

provide

comparative

figures

to

demonstrate the

completeness

of its

coverage.

Copies

of this

directory

can be found in

many Spanish

libraries. The

library

of

the Banco

de

Espafia,

in

particular,

owns the

entire

collection. Manuel

Gonzalez

Portilla

(La

Formaci6n

de la

Sociedad

Capitalista

en el Pais

Vasco,

1876--

1913

[San

Sebastian:

Haranburu,

1981])

and other

researchers often

use

the

infor-

mation contained

in

this

directory,

but

so far

nobody

had transferred its

informa-

tion to a

computer

database.

Gonzalez Portilla

suggested

the idea of

using

it

for

my

research,

and

I

would like to

thank

Santiago

de

la

Hoz,

Maria

Teresa

Delgado,

and

Sarolta

Petro for their

assistance in

creating

this

dataset.

19.

Stanley Payne,

El

Nacionalismo;

Juan

J.

Solozabal,

El

Primer Nacionalismo

Vasco

(Madrid:

Tucar,

1975);

Antonio

Elorza,

Ideologias;

Javier

Corcuera,

Origenes;

Jose Luis De La

Granja,

El

Nacionalismo Vasco

durante la

II

Republica

(Madrid:

CIS,

1986).

20. Javier

Corcuera,

Origenes;

Javier

Cuesta,

El

Carlismo

Vasco:

1876-1900

(Madrid:

Siglo

XXI,

1985);

Stanley Payne,

El

Nacionalismo;

Antonio

Elorza,

Ideologias.

In

my

own

empirical

research,

by

contrasting

the names of

leading

members

of

the

major

political parties

in

the

Basque

Country

with the names

of members

of the

Board

of

Directors

in

Spanish corporations

and financial

institutions,

I

have

been

able to confirm

that indeed the

Basque capitalist

elite

was not nationalist.

21.

The

BNP

had

previously split

along

the

Traditionalist/Liberal

cleavage;

while the

Traditionalist sector retained the name of the party, the more Liberal branch com-

peted

under the name

Comunidad Nacionalista Vasca

(Basque

Nationalist Com-

munity).

22.

There

is

little

agreement

on how

to

classify

forms of nationalism

(Ernest

Gellner,

Nations;

Ernst

Haas,

What is

Nationalism and

Why

should

we

Study

It Inter-

national

Organization

40, 707-744;

Liah

Greenfeld,

Nationalism).

In this

article,

I

have chosen the terms

traditionailst,

bourgeois,

and

progressive,

because

they

fit

better into

my

characterization of the two nationalist movements

throughout

the

twentieth-century,

which

I

elaborate

in

a

forthcoming

book

comparing

the

two

movements.

However,

using

Haas's

definitions,

one

can

say

that

Basque

national-

ism is a mixture of the traditional and restorative types of synchretist nationalist

ideology.

Catalan

nationalism,

on

the other

hand,

presents

elements

of two

types

of

nationalism;

the

bourgeois

form of

nationalism

is

a

mixture of the

liberal

Whig

and

the

syncretist synthetic types

defined

by

Haas,

while the

progressive

form

of na-

tionalism falls into what Haas calls the Liberal Jabobin

nationalist

ideology.

23.

Engracio

de

Arantzadi,

who

succeeded Arana as one

of the main

ideologues

of the

BNP,

provides

a

telling

illustration of this

ideological

continuity

in his book

Ereintza,

Siembra de Nacionalismo

Vasco,

1894-1914,

which

was

published

in

1935

(San

Sebastian:

Aunamendi,

1980).

24. Sabino de

Arana,

Obras

Escogidas

(San

Sebastian:

Haranburu,

1965

[1897]);

73-75.

25.

Ibid,

207.

26.

Javier

Corcuera,

Origenes,

158.

27. Antonio

Elorza,

Ideologias;

Jose

Luis De la

Granja,

El

Nacionalismo.

28. Jose

Extramiana,

Historia de las Guerras Carlistas

(San

Sebastian:

Haranburu,

1980);

John

F.

Coverdale,

The

Basque

Phase

of

Spain's

First Carlist

War

(New

Jersey:

Princeton

University

Press,

1984);

Vicente

Garmendia,

La

Ideologia

Car-

lista

(1968-1876) (Zarauz:

Diputaci6n

Foral de

Guipiizcoa,

1984).

29.

Marianne

Heiberg,

Inside the Moral

Community:

Politics

in

a

Basque Village

in

William

Douglas,

editor,

Basque

Politics,

295.



567

30.

Juan Pablo

Fusi,

Pluralismo;

Jose Luis

De la

Granja,

El

Nacionalismo.

31.

Ibid,

566.

32. Juan Pablo

Fusi,

Pluralismo.

33.

Isidre

Molas,

Lliga

Catalana II

Vols

(Barcelona:

Edicions

62,

1971);

Santiago

Alberti,

El

Republicanisme

Catald

i la

Restauraci6

Mondrquica

(Barcelona:

Alberti,

1972);

Xavier

Cuadrat,

Socialismo

y Anarquismo

en

Catalura

(1899-1911)

(Madrid:

Ediciones

de la Revista

del

Trabajo, 1976); Borja

De

Riquer

and

Miquel

Izard,

Coneixer

la

Historia

de

Catalunya,

Vol.

4

(Barcelona:

Vicens

Vives,

1983);

Gabriel

Sirvent,

Algunes

Notes

sobre

la

Implantaci6

Sindical

de

Socialistes i

Anarquistes

a

Catalunya,

abans

dels

Anys

de

la Primera

Guerra

Mundial,

in

Manuel

Gonzalez

Portilla,

Jordi

Maluquer

de

Motes,

and

Borja

de

Riquer

Permanyer,

editors,

Industrializaci6n

y

Nacionalismo,

(Bellaterra:

Universitat

Aut6noma de

Barcelona,

1985),

555-568;

S.

Tavera

Garcia

Notes sobre

L'Anar-

co-Sindicalisme Basc

i

Catala, 1917-1920,

in

Manuel

Gonzalez

Portilla et

al.,

Industrializaci6n

y

Nacionalismo, 569-578;

Joan

Culla

i

Clara,

El

Republicanisme

Lerrouxista

a

Catalunya

(1901-1923)

(Barcelona:

Curial,

1986);

Manuel Lladonosa

i

Vall-Llebrera,

Catalanisme

i

Moviment Obrer:El

CADCI entre 1903 i

1923

(Mont-

serrat: Publications de

l'Abadia

de

Montserrat,

1988);

M. Dolors Ivern i

Salva,

Esquerra Republicana

de

Catalunya

(1931-1936) (Montserrat:

Publicacions

de

l'Abadia

de

Montserrat,

1989).

My

own

empirical

research,

in

which I

contrast the

names of

nationalist and

non-nationalist leaders

with the

names

of

members

in

the

Board of Directors of Spanish corporations and financial institutions confirms

these studies'

findings.

34.

See works

in

note 33.

35.

De

Riquer

and

Izard, Coneixer,

170.

36. Juan J.

Linz,

Early.

37.

One

important

factor that has also been

mentioned to

explain

the sudden

appeal

of

Esquerra

Republicana among

the Catalan

working

class was the shift

to the

right

by

the

supra-regional Republican

party,

which until

then

had attracted most of

the

popular

vote.

38.

I use the

word

fully

because there is

growing

evidence

that

integration

was

pro-

ceeding quite fast in the years preceding the War of Succession, both at the eco-

nomic

and cultural

levels;

see Carlos

Martinez

Shaw,

Cataluna

en

la

Carrera

de

Indias

(Barcelona:

Critica,

1981);

David

Laitin,

Language

and the

Construction

of

States:

The Case

of

Catalonia

in

Spain,

Wilder

House

Working Papers

10

(1991),

1-33.

39.

Pere

Pascual,

Agricultura

i

Industrialitzaci6

a

la

Catalunya

del

Segle

XIX,

(Barce-

lona:

Critica,

1990);

Pierre

Vilar,

La

Catalogne.

40.

Research

on the

type

of

merchandises

that were

exported

has been

hampered

by

the lack

of official

statistics on

the

composition

by product

of

exports

to

foreign

countries.

Although

authors

agree

that

Catalans

also

exported

textile

products

to

Latin America, the dominant view is that these industrial products represented a

tiny

percentage

of

total

exports

and

that

only

a

very

small

proportion

of

the indus-

trial

goods

that

were

produced

in

Catalonia were

exported.

See J. K.

J.

Thomson,

A

Distinctive

Industrialization.

Cotton

in

Barcelona,

1728-1832

(Cambridge:

Cam-

bridge

University

Press,

1992),

Albert

Carreras,

Cataluna,

Primera

Regi6n

Indus-

trial de

Espana,

in

Jordi

Nadal and

Albert

Carreras,

editors,

Pautas

Regionales

de

la

Industrializaci6n

Espanola

(siglos

XIX

y

XX),

(Barcelona:

Ariel,

1990),

3-22;

Pere

Pascual,

Agricultura.

41.

J. K. J.

Thomson,

A

Distinctive,

12-13.



568

42. Jordi

Nadal,

El Fracaso de la

Industrializaci6n

en

Espana, (Barcelona:

Ariel,

1975).

43. JuanJ.

Linz,

Early,

7-59.

44. PedroTedde, BancaPrivaday CrecimientoEcon6micoen Espafia,1874-1913,

in

Papeles

de Economia

Espanola

20

(1984),

169-184.

45. Pierre

Vilar,

La

Catalogne;

Jaume Vicens

Vives,

Industrials

i Politics al

Segle

XIX

(Barcelona:

Vicens

Vives,

1958);

Jordi

Maluquer

de

Motes,

La Historia

Eco-

n6mica de

Catalufia,

in

Papeles

de Economia

Espafiola

20

(1984),

268-280;

Albert

Carreras,

Fuentes

y

Datos

para

el Analisis

Regional

de la

Industrializaci6n

Espafiola,

n

Jordi Nadal

and Albert

Carreras, ditors,

Pautas

Regionales,

3-22;

Pere

Pascual,

Agricultura.

46.

Albert

Carreras,

Fuentes.

47. Albert

Carreras,

Fuentes.

48.

Ibid;

Antonio

Escudero,

Capital

Minero

y

Formaci6n

de

Capital

en

Vizcaya

(1876-1913),

in

Jordi

Nadal

and

Albert

Carreras,

Pautas

Regionales,

106-123;

Emiliano Fernandez

de

Pinedo,

La

industrializaci6n

en el Norte

de

Espana, (Barce-

lona:

Critica,

1988).

49.

Manuel

Gonzalez

Portilla,

La

Formaci6n;

Emiliano Fernandez

de

Pinedo,

La

Industrializaci6n;

Albert

Carreras,

Fuentes.

50.

The

clergy,

small

andowners,

and

peasants

were the main

social actors

supporting

Carlism

n the two

communities.

A

detailed

comparative

tudy

of

the causes

for

the

war,

for its

greater

ntensity

n the

Basque

Country

and

in

Catalonia,

and

for

the

reasonswhy it was strongest n the BasqueCountry,has not yet been conducted

and

is

beyond

the

scope

of this

article

(Juan

Diez

Medrano,

Divided

Nations,

forthcoming).

However,

a

comparative

analysis

based

on the

literature

hat has

been

published

on the CarlistWars

suggests

hat the

relative

evel

of

development

of

agriculture

n

the two

regionsultimately xplains

he different

ntensity

of

popu-

lar

support

to Carlism

n the two

regions, by

determining

he

intensity

of

rural-

urbanconflict

(Pere

Pascual,

Industrializaci6;

osep

M.

Mundet

Gifre,

La Primera

GuerraCarlina

a

Catalunya

Barcelona:

Publicacions

de l'Abadia

de

Montserrat,

1990];

Miquel

Izard,

El Rechazo a

la Modernizaci6n

Capitalista,

Cataluiia

y

Euskadi,

Similitudes

y

Diferencias,

n Manuel Gonzalez

Portilla

et

al.,

Industria-

lizaci6n, 375-387; John F. Coverdale, The Basque Phase of Spain's First Carlist

War,

New

Jersey:

Princeton

University

Press,

19841;

Vicente

Garmendia,

La Ideo-

logia;

Jose

Extramiana,

Historia;

Stanley

Payne,

El

Nacionalismo;

Emiliano

Fer-

nandez

de

Pinedo,

Crecimiento;

Pablo

Fernandez

Albadalejo,

La

Crisis

delAntiguo

Regimen

en

Guipuzcoa

Madrid:

Akal,

1975];

Jaume

Torres

Elias,

Liberalismo

Rebeldia

Campesina,

Barcelona:

Ariel,

19731).

51. Javier

Cuesta,

El Carlismo.

52. Cited

in

Javier

Corcuera,

Origenes.

53.

As is well

known

now,

the

preservation

or

suppression

of

the

Fueros

was

not the

origin

of the

war,

nor one of its

major

themes

(Javier

Corcuera,

Origenes).

The

Spanishcentralgovernment,however,used itsmilitary ictory o eliminate hem,as

part

of

its

centralizing

fforts.

For several

years

after

the

revocation

of the

Fueros,

the

restoration

f these

traditional

ights

and

institutions

was

in

the

political

agenda

of

all

majorpolitical

groups

n

the

Basque

Country,

ncluding

ndustrial

apitalists.

However,

in

1882,

an economic

agreement

-

the Conciertos

Econ6micos

-

was

signed

between

Basque

authorities

and the

central

government

which

gave

Basque

authorities

iscal

autonomy.

This

measure

was

greeted

with

enthusiasm

by

the

wealthiest

Basque

capitalists,

who

then decided

to

abandon

the

pro-Fueros

cause.



569

54. J.

Corcuera,

Origenes,

29.

55.

Actually,

he

corporation

was more extended

n

the

Basque Country

han

in

Cata-

lonia,

wheresmall

amily

irmswere

relatively

more common.

56. Manuel

Tuii6n

de

Lara,

Estudios

sobre el

Siglo

XIX

Espahol,

(Madrid:

Siglo

XXI,

1972).

57.

Carlos

Moya,

El Poder Economico

en

Espaia,

(Madrid:

Tucar,

1975).

58. The fact that

major

capital

owners

still tended to be

membersof the

Boards

of their

companies

in

this

historical

period (they

also

participated

n

political

contests),

justifies

he use of this

Directory.

n the

absence of information n the

place

of ori-

gin

of all

directors,

his

analysis

has used

informationon the

province

where cor-

porations

were

located,

to

compare

the

numberof

directors

belonging

both to the

Board of

Basque

and of

non-Basque outside

of the

BasqueCountry)corporations

with

the number

of

Directors that

belonged

both

to the Board of Catalanand of

non-Catalan

orporations.

59. Because of their intense involvement

n

Basque

or Catalan

economic activitiesone

can

define these

top

100 directors as

Basque

or

Catalan,

regardless

of

place

of

birth.

Moreover,

inking

the names included

in

these lists with

biographical

nfor-

mation available

on

these

persons

and

personal

knowledge

of

typical

Catalanand

Basque

names

suggests

that these

people

were indeed

Basque

or

Catalan

by

eth-

nicity

as well as

by

intensity

of

economic

nvolvement

n

the

region.

60.

Joseph

Harrison,

La

Industria

Pesada;

Manuel

Gonzalez

Portilla,

La

Formacion;

ManuMontero,Mineros.

6

1.

Ignacio

Arana

Perez,

La

Ligna

Vizcaina

de

Productores

y

la

Politica Econ6mica de

la Restauraci6n.

1894-1914,

(Bilbao,

Caja

de

Ahorros

Vizcaina,

1988).

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