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[PT12.5 (2011) 713-721] Political Theology (print) ISSN 1462-317Xdoi:10.1558/poth.v12i5.713 Political Theology (online) ISSN 1473-1719

Osamabin LadenasamuLti-VOcaL symbOL

Richard Gauvain1

American University in Dubai

Media City

Dubai

28282

[email protected]

AbstrAct

Relying on surveys carried out shortly after his death, this article includes

the opinions of Muslims of varying nationalities, though currently living in

Dubai, towards the gure of Osama bin Laden. In responding to the often

positive opinions elicited, despite the general awareness of his crimes, this

article explores the potential of bin Laden, and implicitly that of all Sala-

jihadis, to function as a multi-vocal symbol capable of uniting historically

distinct, though overlapping, discourses on jihad.

Keywords: bin Laden; Sala; Sala-jihadi; Shiism; Susm; Sunnism; sym-

bols; Victor Turner.

As its title suggests, this article focuses on the perpetrator of the attackson America in September 11th 2001, Osama bin Laden, rather than onthe events themselves. This is not, of course, because these events werenot of the profoundest global importance. It is merely that, for an anthro-

pologist who has lived in the Middle East since they took place, theredoes not of late seem to have been any signicant development in peo-ples attitudes towards these attacks. Instead, the Arab High Street (for

want of a better expression) long ago became saturated with conspiracytheories. Given Americas political and military trajectory under GeorgeBush, such theories are not surprising, but neither are they particularly

1. With a background in anthropology and Islamic law, Richard Gauvain is assistant

professor of Middle East Studies at the American University in Dubai. Over the last ten

years, he has worked in a variety of countries within the Middle East. His recent research

focuses on the spread of Sala ideologies and practices throughout the region; and his


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714 Political Theology

interesting to report. In contrast, however, I would like to pose the ques-tion of what at least some members of the Arab High Streetand particu-larly those living in Dubainow think of bin Laden? The Western media

has reported vast numbers of people across the Muslim World weepingfor his loss.2 This is hyperbole. Yet, in a region so often inconveniencedby his desire to destroy America, seemingly in its entirety, it is interestingthat bin Ladens death was generally not the cause for celebration that onemight have anticipated it to be.

For these reasons, I use the present opportunity to discuss attitudes toOsama bin Laden in Dubai in the wake of his recent assassination. Morespecically, I wish to apply Victor Turners theory of dominant symbolsto the media image of bin Laden as it emerged after September 11th. 3

I argue that certain ideal notions regarding jihadfrom across the widerspectrum of Islamand typically associated with Sunni-legal, Su andShiite conceptualizations of this themeare merged in this picture ofthe modern Sala-jihadi, of whom bin Laden is merely the most iconicexample. Among a sample of non-Emirati Muslim respondents, binLaden was described as an emblematic gure, a model of what it takes tobe a modernjihadi. This understanding of bin Laden gains particular reso-nance when juxtaposed with the often critical perceptions of Dubai itselfamong the same respondents.

To write this article, I spoke to 72 individuals: 57 men and 15 women.4About half of these study at the American University in Dubai (AUD).5The remainder was interviewed at three mosques that I have been attend-ing intermittently over the last two years. All interviewees were between18 and 45 years old. The vast majority of these are afuent; though I alsospoke to a minority of Pakistani workers from a lower socio-economicclass. In terms of nationality, 37 per cent were from a variety of non-Emi-rati, Sunni Muslim backgrounds (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan); justunder 27 per cent (all AUD students) were Sunni Emiratis; 20 per cent

2. See e.g.Daily Mail, May 3, 2011: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1383203/

Osama-Bin-Laden-dead-Mourners-streets-Pakistanis-weep-terrorist.htm l;New York Times,

May 6, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/07/world/africa/07egypt.html

3. For Turners most concise development of his theories on dominant symbols, see

Forest of Symbols (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967).

4. The women were in the American University in Dubai (AUD) classes. Generally

speaking, they were less interested in giving an opinion on bin Laden.

5. Only summer classes are now running and, therefore, numbers are down. Never-

theless, I introduced the topic to two groups. I began with admittedly provocative footage


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Gauvain Osama bin Laden as a Multi-Vocal Symbol 715

were Shiite Iranians; and 16 per cent (from a mixture of backgrounds)were Sunni Pakistanis.

This sample is not large and I make no claims regarding the wider

application of this research. Nevertheless, certain patterns in the responsesgathered do seem interesting. For instance, by far the most negative assess-ments of bin Laden were provided by the Emirati students. With onlytwo exceptions, these students replicated the opinions of their countrysreligious leaders and politicians. Accordingly, bin Laden was described asrepresenting the antithesis to Islam and even as no longer being a Muslim.Tellingly, they complained that bin Laden has ruined the picture of Islamfor Westerners. Even among these students, however, there was a generalconsensus that the manner of bin Ladens assassination had been disgrace-

ful. Among the non-Emirati Sunni Arabs, the responses showed a muchwider variation. Only about a quarter of these individuals expressed uni-formly negative views about bin Laden. For the majority, however, binLaden was often described in more ambivalent terms. Indeed, once manyof these interviewees realized that they were not being judged morally ontheir responses, they often opened up to talk about their admiration forbin Ladens dedication to duty and his resilience in the face of the West.

Among the responses of the non-Emirati Sunni Arab Muslims includedthe following: he was the only one who knew how to say No! to the

West; he didnt care about money, the only thing he cared about wasfreedom and religion; he could have lived like a king, but he spent mostof his life in caves ghting for Muslims; if you listen to him speaking,and you understand Arabic, you see that hes not a criminal. I mean whathe did, the Americans did ten times worse!

Not surprisingly, responses among Shiite interviewees on bin Ladenscharacter were less positive. Several individuals claimed that bin Laden

was nothing more than an American stooge, convenient to be rid of whenObamas popularity rating needed a boost. Interestingly, however, other

Shiite respondents were more cautious; they pointed out that,providingthat bin Laden had genuinely been ghting for his beliefs, he should betreated as a martyr. The idea that he died without trial, vastly outnum-bered by his enemies, his body then disgraced, clearly resonated for thesemen. Last, among the Pakistanis with whom I spoke, and particularlythose from the working classes, bin Laden was generally described in verypositive terms, as a great man, generous benefactor and noble warrior.

Three ideas united my respondents regardless of ethnicity. First, every-one emphasized that they fundamentally disagreed with what happenedon September 11th 2001. Second, and in logical tension with the previousclaim, many respondents expressed doubt regarding bin Ladens involve-


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attacks and argued that it was only through fakery that Western govern-ments and media had managed to pin them on him. And, third, on thegrounds that the photos released of bin Ladens corpse are known to have

been forged, many also expressed doubts as to when precisely bin Ladenhad been killed.6 The general explanation was that the deed had probablybeen carried out long ago and news of it had been postponed for reasonsof political expediency.7

While arriving at these results gives us something to discuss, the obser-vation that bin Laden is the source of a considerable degree of ambiva-lence in Muslim settings is hardly groundbreaking. It strikes me, however,that very little has been said about how and why bin Laden manages toprovoke such apparently contradictory feelings among so many people.

That is to say that, while many of my respondents sought to defend binLaden by casting suspicion on his involvement in September 11th, whenI asked directly whether they had any doubts that bin Laden was preparedto kill civilians, no one sought to deny it. Indeed, the general response tothis question, particularly among the non-Emirati Sunni Arabs, was forthe respondent to dissociate him/herself from bin Laden and his move-ment, typically by admitting that, in these matters, both he and Al Qaeda

went much too far. While all of us live with unresolved contradictions,this reception to bin Ladenwhere he is apparently both lauded and

abhorredseems unusually incongruous.As already noted, to explore the reasons behind the lingering loyalty to

bin Laden, in spite of everything that he did, I wish to employ Victor Turnerstheory on dominant symbols. Though Turner was primarily interestedin exploring ritual systems, his concept of dominant symbols has applica-tion in any number of cultural contexts. In Turners reading, a dominantsymbol is one that is most crucial to a ritual systems overall organiza-tion. Any dominant symbol is invariably multi-vocal and is, therefore,capable of signifying a variety of different meanings within the overall

symbolic system.8 Before proceeding, a caveat is due: over the last thirtyyears, scholars have grown increasingly suspicious regarding the general-izing tendencies of Turner and the other Symbolist anthropologists. Myuse of his theories here is, therefore, purely heuristic.

6. On the White Houses policy of releasing photos as and when it suits, see Donald

Windslow, From White House to Pakistan, Photos Play Strange Role in Bin Laden

Drama,News Photographer Magazine, http://www.nppa.org/news_and_events/news/2011/

05/binladen.html

7. A minority of individuals, among them Iranian Shiites and Pakistani Sunnis, sug-

gested that bin Laden is not dead.


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Despite the need for caution, I would nevertheless like to suggest that,in the years before his death, bin Laden became xed in the public imag-ination in such a way as to enable him to act very much like a multi-

vocal symbol in Middle Eastern contexts.9

Let us rst consider this xingprocess. For the overwhelming majority of people, it occurred after theSeptember 11 attacks when the same selection of photographs of binLaden was repeatedly disseminated by the international media. In themost common of these, bin Laden is shown in a spotless white garment(over which a camouage khaki jacket is sometimes worn) and turban,sitting in a tent, a gun propped up to his side; the lighting in these photosis attering, and bin Laden face looks youthful and serene. At other times,he is shown standing in front of a grey mountain face; in these photos, he

seems stern and steadfast, and is often leading a group of equally deter-mined warriors on a trek. In others, he appears, nger raised in warning,

with the testimony of Islam (la ilaha ila allah) inscribed on a black bannerbehind him. Before his (photo-t) death mask replaced them, such werethe images associated with bin Laden.10 Indeed, while the faces of Amer-icas other enemies in the regionfrom Saddam Hussayn to Muammaral-Qadhahave often lent themselves to caricature, the same was appar-ently less true of bin Ladens. Regardless of what he was actually like as aperson, this imagecool, calm and collectedis how bin Laden appeared

to us all. For Arabic speakers, moreover, the voice that accompanied thisimage (in the videos usually sent by Al Qaeda to al-Jazeera) similarlyreected an articulate, coherent and determined individual.11

It has been suggested that this image of bin Laden was not only at-tering, but multi-vocal. Let us be more specic regarding what meanings,in particular, were generated through it. Directly communicated throughthe white clothes of the martyr, the army jacket, and gun, the primarymeaning is clearly resistance (muqawma) or, more properly, jihad. Andthis observation only brings us to the realization that, within the wider

Muslim traditionincluding the voices of normative legal Sunnism,mystical Susm, and Shiismthe theme of jihad itself contains multipletheological and historical signications. Much of bin Ladens popularity,one can argue, rested on his ability to unify these signications. Indeed, inthis respect, bin Laden was merely the best, or most emblematic, exampleof a more general phenomenon. For many modern Sala interpretations

9. Whether bin Laden actually set out to seem like all things to all peoplehe almost

certainly did notis irrelevant to the point being made.

10. For photos, see e.g.: http://www.picsearch.com/index.cgi?start=1&size=1p&widt

h=1008&q=Osama%20bin%20Laden


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of jihad also conceptually unite traditional Sunni, Shiite and Su inter-pretations of the same theme.

Before I explore these interpretations in more depth, a brief explanation

of what is here meant by Salasm and why jihad is, at once, both a prob -lematic and yet popular theme within Sala circles is necessary.12 Salasmapplies to a variety of ideological movements spread across the globe. Oneof the unifying characteristics of these movements is that they reject thetraditional tendency for Sunni Muslims to attach themselves to a spe-cic law school. Rather, modern Salas encourage Muslims to return onlyto the most sacred textsQuran and the reports (hadiths) known to betraceable to the Prophetso as to re-envisage Sunni Islamic legal realities.In practice, this has resulted in a truly eclectic (and often chaotic) series

of scholarly developments. The subjects of loyalty to ones secular rulersand jihad have, in particular, proven hugely divisive. On the one hand, themost important and inuential Sala voices in the Middle East (in Saudi

Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and elsewhere) uphold a well-established legal prin-ciple to the effect that, unless it may be conclusively demonstrated that theleadership is no longer Muslim, all believers must remain loyal to theirpresiding ruler and government. In contrast to the Sala elites, however,bin Laden and the other Sala-jihadis protest that, in showing deferenceto the West, Middle Eastern governments are no longer Muslim. Thus,

so the latter train of thought goes, the principle of jihaddictates that it isobligatory to rise up and overthrow them.

Divisions within modern Salasm on these matters are well known.13During the remainder of this brief article, I wish to argue a differentpoint. For, while all Salas would agree that jihad is of vital importance,the subsequent legal wrangling is always presumed to take place withinthe bounds of Sunni tradition.14 In contrast, I shall suggest that, in their

willingness to rie through the vaults of early Islamic tradition so as toarrive at the real picture of jihad, the Sala-jihadis unwittingly incorpo-

rate a fair degree of Su and Shii thought into their approachthese twotraditions being the Salas arch enemiesand that, in the settings underdiscussion, this incorporation pays dividends in terms of their popularity.

Let us consider the contrasting, though overlapping, rationales em-ployed by Sunni-legal, Su and Shiite authorities in their approaches to

jihad. For Sunni Muslim jurists, jihad is primarily a communal obli-gation to compel non-Muslims to convert, or render poll tax (jizya);

12. For a good working denition of Salasm, see Roel Meijers Introduction to Global

Salafsm (London: Hurst & Co, 2009), 132.

13. See e.g. the works of Quintan Wiktorowicz and Muhammad Hafez.


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according to the same tradition, jihad only becomes an individual obliga-tion at times of crisis, when the Muslim community itself is under threat.Plenty of support for the glory of jihad over non-Muslims can be found in

the biographical andhadith material, in which the Prophet and his follow-ers engage in jihad; this is supplemented by the achievements of later his-torical gures, such as Salah al-Din (d. 1193 ce), who drove the Crusadersout of Jerusalem. It is also quite possible to nd examples of Sus ghtingin defense of Islam. Traditionally, however, Susm has interpreted jihadina metaphorical sense: as the greater battle (jihad al-akbar) against a Mus-lims baser instincts. The early Su histories provide manifold examplesof men, such as Hasan al-Basri (d. 728 ce) and Harith al-Muhasibi (d. 857ce), who were born into wealth but, as an act of jihad, chose a life of sim-

plicity and hardship. Finally, in the Shiite tradition, the theme of jihad isinextricably linked to martyrdom. The ill-fated son of Ali ibn Abi Taliband Fatima, Hussayn, who died at Karbala (680 ce) at the hands of Yazidand whose body was subsequently mutilated, remains a denitive gurein the construction of a modern Shiite identity.

As I have said, not only bin Laden, but the motivations of all modernSala-jihadis are approachable from each of these three theological para-digms. Al Qaedas call to jihad is deliberately and convincingly rootedin the theological and legal arguments of the great Hanbali scholar Ibn

Taymiyya, who carries the title shaykh al-Islam within that school to thisday. Whether or not suicide bombing can be proven through traditionalsharia sourcesmost experts agree that it cannotAl Qaeda endeav-ours to justify this act through the channels of classical Sunni Islamic law.

Equally, though Salas vigorously disagree, there is no disputing the factthat Ibn Taymiyya was also a Su. Hence, despite their vigorous attacks onall things Su, modern Sala-jihadis nevertheless draw from a rich historyof Su writings in which the theme of jihad against earthly temptation isof central importance in the Muslims journey towards God. Embedded

within the Su attitude there is, moreover, a bent for political revolution:an often-citedhadith in Su circles recalls the Prophet being asked aboutthe best kind of jihad to which he replies it is a just word to a tyranni-cal ruler. Until very recently, bin Laden was one of the few gures in theregion who could claim to have stood up against the dominant politicalregimes (in his case, the house of Saud). Finally, and most importantly, inits emphasis on martyrdom as the desired end, rather than merely a poten-tial (albeit glorious) possibility, of the act of jihad, the Sala-jihadi interpre-tation of this theme incorporates a great deal of Shiite sentiment. Onceagain, this may only prove surprising to the Salas themselves: the Iranianrevolution (1979) paved the way for a specically Shiite discourse on jihad


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the wider Muslim discourse on resistance against oppression. There isalso every chance that the apparent illegality of the Americans eventualassassination (without trial) and burial (at sea) of bin Laden might rever-

berate in the collective memory of the Shiite community.Thus stated, the Sala-jihadis undeniably modern interpretation ofjihad incorporates dominant themes from quite distinct spheres of Islamichistorical tradition. To return to the responses of my interviewees, thisfact may help explain something of (the grudging) appreciation expressedfor bin Laden. For, in Dubai, there are Sunnis, Sus and Shiis, and, forthat matter, Salas. Perhaps given the above, we can better understandhow the image of bin Laden, those photos that we all saw, could be (mis)taken for somebody iconically Muslim: a paradigm or, to use Turners

terminology, a multi-vocal symbol of resistance against Western culturalinvasion, in which the historically (and geographically) disparate voicesof Islam are united. I am not, of course, suggesting that the Sunni ArabsI spoke to were fond of bin Laden simply because he used the languageof Sunni law, or even that Sus and Shiis would relate to him specicallybecause of his abstemiousness and/or eventual martyrdom. What I amsuggesting, however, is that the modern medias projection of bin Ladenallows for the fulllment of certain culturally embedded notions of whata jihadi warrior should be like. Within the greater historical tradition of

Islam, separate, though overlapping, discourses evolved to meet the needsof Sunni legal, Su, and Shii domains. Each of these discourses, it shouldbe noted, has its roots in the Quran. In todays peculiar, post-colonialMiddle East, where Sunni and Shiite often share the same enemycon-sider the political experiences of Hamas and Hizbullah15these domainscan, and indeed often do, converge once again. As a result, the conve-niently attering image of bin Laden is necessarily multi-vocal: he was

warrior-scholar, revolutionary hermit, and, ultimately, wronged martyr.It is interesting that it was only my Emirati students who found nothing

good at all to say about bin Laden. But their response also makes a kindof sense. For the (image of) Dubai in which they grew up is, similarly,a form of dominant and multi-vocal symbol. Given the regularity with

which non-Emiratis complain about the identity crisis facing the city,it may be, however, that Dubais voices are not yet in harmony. After all,

while on the one hand, it promises things that are certainly in keepingwith traditional Muslim expectations, such as technical progress, nan-cial reward, and cultural glory, on the other hand, Dubai also homes allsorts of demonstrably un-Muslim pursuits, including bars and casinos.

15. Hamas is a Sunni Muslim organization, with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood;


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In short, while Dubais rulers and their obedient media are on a remark-able quest to bring prosperity to their city, they have not been able to doso without compromises. For all their viciousness and egoism bin Laden

and the Sala-jihadis have never compromised. In this clash of symbol-isms, their approach has undeniable appeal. A Syrian man summed upthe differences more succinctly: Dubai cares about business investmentand tourism; it doesnt want to return to the sands. Bin Laden came fromthe sands; what he invested in, the Emiratis dont want to touch. And he

wasnt great for tourism either!

bibliogrAphy

Lincoln, B. The Rhetoric of Bush and Bin Laden. http://fathom.lib.uchicago.edu/1/77777

7190152/

Meijer, R. Introduction. In Global Salafsm, 132. London: Hurst & Co, 2009.

Turner, V.Forest of Symbols. New York: Cornell University Press, 1967.

Windslow, D. From White House to Pakistan, Photos Play Strange Role in Bin Laden

Drama.News Photographer Magazine. http://www.nppa.org/news_and_events/news/

2011/05/binladen.html


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