Bernabe Navida v. Hon. Teodoro Dizon

7/25/2019 Bernabe Navida v. Hon. Teodoro Dizon

1/35

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P.

ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P.

A B A R Q U E Z ,ORLANDITO A.

ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA,

ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN

M. ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA,

NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA,

FERNANDO C. ALEJADO,

LEOPOLDO N.ALFONSO, FLORO

I. ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B.

ALVARADO, ELEANOR

AMOLATA, RODOLFO P.

ANCORDA, TRIFINO F.

ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE,

RAMON E. ANTECRISTO,

ISAGANI D.ANTINO, DOMINGO

ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M.

APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO

AQUINO, MARCELOS. AQUINO,

JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES

M. ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE,

RUPERTO G.ARINZOL, MIGUEL

G. ARINZOL, EDGARADO P.ARONG, RODRIGO D.R.

ASTRALABIO,RONNIE BACAYO,

SOFRONIO BALINGIT, NELSON

M. BALLENA, EMNIANO

BALMONTE, MAXIMOM. BANGI,

SALVADOR M. BANGI,

HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO,

ARSENIO B. BARBERO,

DIOSDADOBARREDO, VIRGILIO

BASAS, ALEJANDRO G.

BATULAN, DOMINGO A.BAUTISTA, VICTORBAYANI,

BENIGNO BESARES, RUFINO

BETITO, GERARDO A. BONIAO,

CARLO B. BUBUNGAN,

FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA,

ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO,

TOMAS P. BUENO, LEONARDO

M . BURDEOS, VICENTE P.

BURGOS, MARCELINO J.

CABALUNA, DIOSDADO

CABILING, EMETRIOC.CACHUELA, BRAULIO B.

CADIVIDA, JR., SAMSON C.

CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY

A. CALISO, NORBERTO F.

CALUMPAG, CELESTINO

G.R. No. 125078

converted by Web2PDFConvert.com
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2/35

CALUMPAG, LORETO

CAMACHO, VICTORIANO

CANETE, DOMINADOR P.

CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO P.

CARBAJOSA, VICTORINO S.

C A R L O S ,VICTOR CARLOS,

GEORGE M. CASSION, JAIME S.

CASTAARES, FLAVIANO C.

CASTAARES,ELPIDIO CATUBAY,

NATHANIEL B. CAUSANG,

BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R.

CEJAS, CIRILO G. CERERA, SR.,

CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE

V. CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO,

CESAR CORTES, NOEL Y.

CORTEZ, SERNUE CREDO,

CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX

C R UZ, ROGER CRUZ, RANSAM

CRUZ, CANUTO M. DADULA,

ROMEO L. DALDE, ZACARIAS

DAMBAAN,ELISEO DAPROZA,VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO

I. DE TOMAS, GAMALLER P.

DEANG, CARMELINO P. DEANG,

DIOSDADO P. DEANG, DOMINGO

A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG,

JR., JULIETO S. DELA CRUZ,

ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE,

JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL

DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE P.

DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY,

RODRIGO M. DERMIL,ROLANDO B. DIAZ, LORENZO

DIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO,

SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO

DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, FE

DIZON, VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY,

LEO S. DONATO,DOMINADOR L.

DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG,

FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C.

E C H I V E R E ,AQUILLO M.

EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE,

RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS,A N I C E T O ENOPIA, DIOCENE

ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D.

ENTECOSA, AVELINO C.

ENTERO, FORTUNATA

ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY,

RODOLFO M. ESCAMILLA,

SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA,

LAZAROA. ESPAOLA, EULOGIO

M. ETURMA, PRIMO P.

FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO D.

F E R N A N D O ,GREGORIO S.FERNANDO, VICENTE P.

FERRER, MARCELO T. FLOR,

ANTONIO M. FLORES,

REDENTOR T. FLOREZA,

NORBERTO J. FUENTES,



3/35

RICARDO C. GABUTAN, PEDRO

D . V . GALEOS, ARNULFO F.

GALEOS, EDGARDO V.

GARCESA, BERNARDO P.

GENTOBA, EDUARDOP.

GENTOBA, VICTORIO B. GIDO,

ROLANDO V. GIMENA, EARLWIN

L. GINGOYO, ERNESTOGOLEZ,

JUANITO G. GONZAGA, ONOFRE

GONZALES, AMADO J. GUMERE,

LEONARDO M.GUSTO,

ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, NOEL H.

HERCEDA, EMILIO V.

HERMONDO, CLAUDIO

H I P O L I T O ,TORIBIO S

ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G.

IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA,

HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO B.

JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY,

LIBURO C. JAVINAS, ALEJANDO

S . JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T.JUCAR, NAPOLEON T. JUMALON,

OSCAR JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D.

LABANA, CARLOS C. LABAY,

AVELINO L. LAFORTEZA, LOE

LAGUMBAY, NORBETO D.

LAMPERNIS, ROLANDO J. LAS

PEAS, ISMAEL LASDOCE,

RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, CAMILO

G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO

LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO,

CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOSBAEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS,

ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA,

RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN,

P R I M I T I V OLUNTAO, JR.,

EMILIO S. MABASA, JR.,

JUANITO A. MACALISANG,

TEOTIMO L.MADULIN, JOSEPH

D. MAGALLON, PEDRO P.

MAGLASANG, MARIO G.

MALAGAMBA, JAIME B.

MAMARADLO, PANFILO A.MANADA, SR., RICARDO S.

MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI,

ALBERTO T. MANGGA,

ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES,

RUFINO T. MANSANES,

EUTIQUIO P.MANSANES, ALCIO

P. MARATAS, AGAPITO D.

MARQUEZ, RICARDO R.

MASIGLAT, DENDERIA

MATABANG, ARNELO N.

MATILLANO, HERNANI C.MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA,

GREGORIO R. MESA, RENATO N.

MILLADO, ANTONIO L.

MOCORRO, ALBERTO M.

MOLINA, JR., DOMINGO P.



4/35

MONDIA, JUANITO P. MONDIA,

RICARDO MONTAO, RAUL T.

MONTEJO, ROGELIO MUNAR,

RODOLFO E. MUEZ, CRESENCIO

NARCISO, PANFILO C. NARCISO,

BRICS P. NECOR, MOISES P.

NICOLAS, NEMESIO G.NICOLAS,

ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX T.

NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL,

SR., TEODORO B.OCRETO,

BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M.

OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON,

IZRO M. ORACION,ALAN E.

ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS,

ERNESTO M. PABIONA, NARCISO

J. PADILLA,NELSON G. PADIOS,

SR., FRNACISCO G.

PAGUNTALAN, RENE B.

PALENCIA, MICHAEL P.

PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E.

PANILAGAO, NOLITO C.PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS,

NESTOR B.PASTERA, VICENTE

Q. PEDAZO, EDGAR M.

PEARANDA, ILUMINIDO B.

P E R A C U L L O ,ANTONIO C.

PEREZ, DOMINGO PEREZ,

OSCAR C. PLEOS, ANTONIETO

POLANCOS, SERAFING. PRIETO,

ZENAIDA PROVIDO, FERNANDO

Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO QUERO,

ELEAZARQUIJARDO, WILLIAMU. QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO,

ROGELIO RABADON,

MARCELINO M.RELIZAN, RAUL

A. REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES,

EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL

R I V A S , RODULFO RIVAS,

BIENVENIDO C. ROMANCA,

JACINTO ROMOC, ROMEO S.

ROMUALDO, ALBERTO

ROSARIO, ROMEO L. SABIDO,

SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEOSALIG, ROMAN G. SALIGONAN,

VICTORINO SALOMON,

GENEROSO J. SALONGKONG,

RODOLFO E. SALVANI, JIMMY A.

SAMELIN, EDUARDO A.

SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN,

GEORGE SAMELIN, ROMEO A.

SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO S.

SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG,

JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO

SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C.SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA,

SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINOS.

SIMTIM, SERAFIN T.

SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A.

SOLA, VICTORINO M. SOLOMON,



5/35

JAIME B. SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON

SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT,

ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT,PEDRO A.

SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE,

NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL

T. SUPAS, WILFREDO A.

TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L.

TACULAD, EUFROCINO A.

TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIOTAHITIT,

PANTALEON T. TAMASE,

ERNESTO TARRE, MAGNO E.

TATOY, AVELINO TAYAPAD,

SAMUEL S. TERRADO,

APOLINARIO B. TICO, ORLANDO

TINACO, ALBERT G. TINAY,

ANTONIO TOLEDO, ANTONIO M.

TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES,

JIMMY C. TORRIBIO, EDUARDO

Y. TUCLAOD, JACINTO UDAL,

RICARDO M. URBANO, ERNESTO

G. VAFLOR, FILOMENO E.VALENZUELA, SALORIANO

VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL,

WALTER VILLAFAE, DANTE

VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P.

VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA,

ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA,JENNY

T. VILLAVA, HENRY C.

VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG,

RODOLFO YAMBAO, EDGARA.

YARE, MANSUETO M. YBERA,

EDUARDO G. YUMANG, HENRYR. YUNGOT, ROMEO P.YUSON,

ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N.

ZABALA and GRACIANO

ZAMORA,Petitioners,

- versus-

HON. TEODOROA. DIZON, JR.,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 37, General Santos City,SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL

CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL

C O R P., STANDARD FRUIT CO.,

STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP

CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC.,DOLE

FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL MONTE

FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL

MONTE TROPICAL FRUITCO.,

CHIQUITA BRANDS

INTERNATIONAL, INC. and

CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC.,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

a n d OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL

CORPORATION,



6/35

Petitioners,

- versus-

BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P.

ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINOP.

ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A.

ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA,

ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN

M. ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA,NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA,

FERNANDO C. ALEJADO,

LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO

I. ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B.

ALVARADO, ELEANOR

A M O L A T A , RODOLFO P.

ANCORDA, TRIFINO F.

ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE,

RAMON E. ANTECRISTO,

ISAGANI D. ANTINO, DOMINGO

ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M.APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO

AQUINO, MARCELO S. AQUINO,

JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES

M. ARAS, ARSENIOARCE,

RUPERTO G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL

G. ARINZOL, EDGARADO P.

ARONG, RODRIGO D.R.

ASTRALABIO, RONNIE BACAYO,

SOFRONIO BALINGIT, NELSON

M. BALLENA, EMNIANO

BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI,SALVADOR M. BANGI,

HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO,

A R S E N I OB. BARBERO,

DIOSDADO BARREDO, VIRGILIO

BASAS, ALEJANDRO G.

BATULAN, DOMINGOA.

BAUTISTA, VICTOR BAYANI,

BENIGNO BESARES, RUFINO

BETITO, GERARDO A.BONIAO,

CARLO B. BUBUNGAN,

FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA,ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO,

TO MAS P. BUENO, LEONARDO

M. BURDEOS, VICENTE P.

BURGOS, MARCELINO J.

C A B A L U N A ,DIOSDADO

CABILING, EMETRIO C.

CACHUELA, BRAULIO B.

CADIVIDA, JR., SAMSON C.

CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY

A. CALISO, NORBERTO F.

CALUMPAG, CELESTINO

CALUMPAG, LORETO

CAMACHO, VICTORIANO

CANETE, DOMINADOR P.

CANTILLO, FRUCTUSOP.

CARBAJOSA, VICTORINO S.

G.R. No. 125598



7/35

CARLOS, VICTOR CARLOS,

GEORGE M. CASSION, JAIME S.

CASTAARES, FLAVIANO C.

CASTAARES, ELPIDIO CATUBAY,

NATHANIEL B. CAUSANG,

BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R.

CEJAS, CIRILO G. CERERA, SR.,

CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE

V. CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO,

CESAR CORTES, NOEL Y.

C O R T E Z , SERNUE CREDO,

CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX

CRUZ, ROGER CRUZ, RANSAM

C R U Z , CANUTO M. DADULA,

ROMEO L. DALDE, ZACARIAS

DAMBAAN, ELISEO DAPROZA,

VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO

I. DE TOMAS, GAMALLER P.

DEANG, CARMELINO P. DEANG,

DIOSDADO P. DEANG, DOMINGO

A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG,JR., JULIETO S. DELACRUZ,

ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE,

JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL

DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPEP.

DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY,

RODRIGO M. DERMIL,

ROLANDO B. DIAZ, LORENZO

DIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO,

SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO

DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, FE

DIZON, VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY,LEO S. DONATO, DOMINADOR L.

DOSADO, NESTORDUMALAG,

FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C.

ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M.

EMBRADORA, MIGUELEMNACE,

RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS,

ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE

E N T E C O S A ,RUBENTITO D.

ENTECOSA, AVELINO C.

ENTERO, FORTUNATA

ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY,RODOLFO M. ESCAMILLA,

SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA,

LAZARO A. ESPAOLA, EULOGIO

M . ETURMA, PRIMO P.

FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO D.

FERNANDO, GREGORIO S.

F E R N A N D O ,VICENTE P.

FERRER, MARCELO T. FLOR,

ANTONIO M. FLORES,

REDENTOR T. FLOREZA,

NORBERTO J. FUENTES,RICARDO C. GABUTAN, PEDRO

D.V. GALEOS, ARNULFO F.

GALEOS, EDGARDO V.

GARCESA, BERNARDO P.

GENTOBA, EDUARDO P.



8/35

GENTOBA, VICTORIOB. GIDO,

ROLANDO V. GIMENA, EARLWIN

L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO GOLEZ,

JUANITO G.GONZAGA, ONOFRE

GONZALES, AMADO J. GUMERE,

LEONARDO M. GUSTO,

ALEJANDRO G.HALILI, NOEL H.

HERCEDA, EMILIO V.

HERMONDO, CLAUDIO

HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S

ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G.

IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA,

HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO B.

JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY,

LIBURO C. JAVINAS, ALEJANDO

S. JIMENEZ, FEDERICOT.

JUCAR, NAPOLEON T. JUMALON,

OSCAR JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D.

LABANA, CARLOS C.LABAY,

AVELINO L. LAFORTEZA, LOE

LAGUMBAY, NORBETO D.LAMPERNIS, ROLANDO J.LAS

PEAS, ISMAEL LASDOCE,

RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, CAMILO

G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO

LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO,

CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS

BAEZ, CONCISO L.LOVITOS,

ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA,

RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN,

PRIMITIVO LUNTAO, JR.,

EMILIO S. MABASA, JR.,JUANITO A. MACALISANG,

TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH

D . MAGALLON, PEDRO P.

MAGLASANG, MARIO G.

MALAGAMBA, JAIME B.

MAMARADLO, PANFILOA.

MANADA, SR., RICARDO S.

MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI,

ALBERTO T. MANGGA,

ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES,

RUFINO T. MANSANES,EUTIQUIO P. MANSANES, ALCIO

P . MARATAS, AGAPITO D.

MARQUEZ, RICARDO R.

MASIGLAT, DENDERIA

MATABANG, ARNELON.

MATILLANO, HERNANI C.

MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA,

GREGORIO R. MESA, RENATON.

MILLADO, ANTONIO L.

M O C O R R O ,ALBERTO M.

MOLINA, JR., DOMINGO P.MONDIA, JUANITO P. MONDIA,

RICARDOMONTAO, RAUL T.

MONTEJO, ROGELIO MUNAR,

RODOLFO E. MUEZ, CRESENCIO

NARCISO,PANFILO C. NARCISO,



9/35

BRICS P. NECOR, MOISES P.

NICOLAS, NEMESIO G. NICOLAS,

ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX T.

NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL,

SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO,

BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M.

OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON,

IZRO M. ORACION, ALAN E.

ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS,

ERNESTO M. PABIONA, NARCISO

J. PADILLA, NELSON G.PADIOS,

SR., FRANCISCO G.

PAGUNTALAN, RENE B.

PALENCIA, MICHAEL P.

P A L O M A R , VIRGILIO E.

PANILAGAO, NOLITO C.

PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS,

NESTOR B. PASTERA,VICENTE

Q. PEDAZO, EDGAR M.

PEARANDA, ILUMINIDO B.

PERACULLO, ANTONIO C.PEREZ, DOMINGO PEREZ,

OSCAR C. PLEOS, ANTONIETO

POLANCOS, SERAFIN G. PRIETO,

ZENAIDA PROVIDO, FERNANDO

Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO QUERO,

ELEAZAR QUIJARDO,WILLIAM

U. QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO,

ROGELIO RABADON,

MARCELINO M. RELIZAN,RAUL

A. REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES,

EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUELRIVAS, RODULFORIVAS,

BIENVENIDO C. ROMANCA,

JACINTO ROMOC, ROMEO S.

ROMUALDO, ALBERTO

ROSARIO, ROMEO L. SABIDO,

SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO

SALIG, ROMAN B. SALIGONAN,

VICTORINO SALOMON,

GENEROSO M. SALONGKONG,

RODOLFO E. SALVANI, JIMMY A.

SAMELIN, EDUARDO A.SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN,

GEORGE SAMELIN, ROMEO A.

SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO S.

SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG,

JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO

SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C.

SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA,

SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINOS.

SIMTIM, SERAFIN T.

SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A.

SOLA, VICTORINO M. SOLOMON,JAIME B. SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON

SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT,

ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT,PEDRO A.

SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE,

NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL



10/35

T. SUPAS, WILFREDO A.

TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L.

TACULAD, EUFROCINO A.

TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIOTAHITIT,

PANTALEON T. TAMASE,

ERNESTO TARRE, MAGNO E.

TATOY, AVELINO TAYAPAD,

SAMUEL S. TERRADO,

APOLINARIO B. TICO, ORLANDO

TINACO, ALBERT G. TINAY,

ANTONIO TOLEDO, ANTONIO M.

TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES,

JIMMY C. TORRIBIO, EDUARDO

Y. TUCLAOD, JACINTO UDAL,

RICARDO M. URBANO, ERNESTO

G. VAFLOR, FILOMENO E.

VALENZUELA, SALORIANO

VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL,

WALTER VILLAFAE, DANTE

VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P.

VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA,ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA,JENNY

T. VILLAVA, HENRY C.

VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG,

RODOLFO YAMBAO, EDGARA.

YARE, MANSUETO M. YBERA,

EDUARDO G. YUMANG, HENRY

R. YUNGOT, ROMEO P.YUSON,

ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N.

ZABALA, and GRACIANO

ZAMORA,

Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO

AGABATU, PRUDENCIO

ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN,

FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO

ALONZO,CORNELIO AMORA,

FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO

AMORADO, MARCELINO

ANDIMAT, JORGEANDOY,

MARGARITO R. ANGELIA,

GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDOA. ARARAO, BONIFACIOL.

ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL,

SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M.

BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA,

REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO

L. BALDAGO, CESAR N.

BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A.

BARING, ANTIPASA. BATINGAL,

MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO

BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN,

M A R G A R I T OBLANCO,

CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR

BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA,

ROBERTO BRINA, LUISBUGHAO,

EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO,

CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO

G.R. No. 126654



11/35

CABAGTE, RICARADO C.

C A B A L L E S ,CARLITO A.

CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR.,

PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO

R. CAPAROSO, DANILO

CARILLO, BONIFACIO M.

CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS,

JOSE F. COLLAMAT, BERNARDO

M . COMPENDIO, CORNELIO

COSTILLAS, ENERIO R.

DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA,

JR., RICADOC. DEIPARIME,

GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE

G. DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A.

DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR.,

CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE

DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA,

ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO

ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG,

JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L.

GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA,RICARDO A. GEROLAGA,

RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO

GONZAGA, ROLANDO

GONZALES, MODESTO M.

GODELOSAO, HECTOR

GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG,

LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E.

IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD,

OLEGARIO IYUMA,DOMINGO B.

JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO

JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON,ROLANDO LACNO,VIRGILIO A.

LADURA, CONSTANCIO M.

LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN,

ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIOB.

LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN,

VIVENCIO LAWANGON,

ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P.

LAYAO, MARDENIO LAYAO,

NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO

LOCION, ENERIO LOOD,

D I O S D A D OMADATE, RAMONMAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE,

MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO

MANACAP, AURELIOA. MARO,

CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES,

CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO

MONCANO, EMILIOMONTAJES,

CESAR B. MONTERO,

CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO

H. NALAS, EMELIANO C.

NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON,

JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILONUNEZ, JORGE M.OLORVIDA,

CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S.

OMBRETE, TEOFILIO

OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO,

SUSANTO C. OTANA,JR.,



12/35

CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO

P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C.

PANA, ERNESTO M.PASCUAL,

BIENVENIDO PAYAG,

RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO

PILAGO, ROMEOPRESBITERO,

OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO

QUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL,

MAGNO QUIZON,DIONISIO

RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES,

NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO

REQUILMEN, ISIDRORETANAL,

CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V.

ROSETE, TINOY G. SABINO,

M E L C H O RSALIGUMBA,

SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO

SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO

T A J O N , AVELINO TATAPOD,

ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO

TAYCO, CONRADO TECSON,

AGAPITO TECSON,ROMAN. E.TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA,

CARLOS B. TIMA, HERMONEGES

T I R A D O R ,JOSELITO TIRO,

PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO

B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA,

VICENTEVILLA, ANTONIO P.

VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO

VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M.

VILLEGAS,

Petitioners,

- versus-

THE HON. ROMEO D.

MARASIGAN,Presiding Judge of

Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,

Davao City, SHELL OILCO., DOW

CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL

CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD

FRUIT CO.,STANDARD FRUIT &

STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD

CO., INC., DOLE FRESH FRUITCO., DEL MONTE FRESH

PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE

TROPICAL FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA

BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.

and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC.,

Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE

N.A. and DEL MONTE TROPICAL

FRUIT CO.,

Petitioners,

- versus-

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

OF DAVAO CITY, BRANCHES16



13/35

AND 13, CORNELIO ABELLA, JR.,

IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO

ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIOALEMAN,


ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA,

FELIPE G. AMORA,LEOPOLDO

AMORADO, MARCELINO

ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY,

MARGARITO R. ANGELIA,

GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO

A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L.

ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL,



REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO



BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL,

MARCIANONATINGAL, MARINO


MARGARITO BLANCO,CATALINO BONGO,MELCHOR

BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA,

ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO,

EDUARDO L.BURGUINZO,



CABALLES, CARLITO A.



R. CAPAROSO, DANILO

CARILLO, BONIFACIO M.CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS,

JOSE F. COLLAMAT, BERNARDO

M . COMPENDIO, CORNELIO


DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA,

JR., RICADOC. DEIPARIME,


G. DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A.



DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA,ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO



GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA,

RICARDO A. GEROLAGA,


GONZAGA, ROLANDO


GODELOSAO, HECTOR


LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E.IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD,

OLEGARIO IYUMA,DOMINGO B.


JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON,

ROLANDO LACNO,VIRGILIO A.

G.R. No. 127856



14/35


LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN,

ENRIQUE LAQUERO,LUCIO B.


VIVENCIO LAWANGON,

ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDOP.




DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON

MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE,

MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO

MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO,


CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO

MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES,

CESAR B. MONTERO,


H . NALAS, EMELIANO C.


JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILONUN EZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA,

CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S.

OMBRETE, TEOFILIO






BIENVENIDO PAYAG,


PILAGO, ROMEOPRESBITERO,OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO

QUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL,







MELCHOR SALIGUMBA,


SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILOTAJON, AVELINOTATAPOD,

ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO


AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E.

TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA,


TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO,



VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIOP.

VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDOVILLAVITO and SAMUEL M.

VILLEGAS,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., and



15/35

CHIQUITA BRANDS

INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Petitioners,

- versus-

HON. ANITA ALFELOR-

ALAGABAN,in her capacity as

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial

Court, Davao City, Branch 13,CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO

AGABATU, PRUDENCIO

ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN,


ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA,

FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO

AMORADO, MARCELINO

ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY,

M A R G A R I T OR. ANGELIA,

GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO

A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L.ARTIGAS, JERSONASUAL,



REYNALDO BAHAYA,ANTONIO



BARING, ANTIPAS A.BATINGAL,

MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO


M A R G A R I T OBLANCO,

CATALINO BONGO, MELCHORBRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA,

ROBERTO BRINA, LUISBUGHAO,

EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO,



CABALLES, CARLITO A.



R . CAPAROSO, DANILO

CARILLO, BONIFACIO M.

CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS,JOSE F. COLLAMAT, BERNARDO

M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO


DAGAME,FELIMON DEBUMA,

JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME,


G . DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A.



DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA,

ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO



GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA,

RICARDO A. GEROLAGA,


G.R. No. 128398



16/35

GONZAGA, ROLANDO


G O D E L O S A O ,HECTOR


LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E.

IGCALINOS, ALFREDOINTOD,

OLEGARIO IYUMA, DOMINGO B.


JARGUE, ROLANDO A.LABASON,

ROLANDO LACNO, VIRGILIO A.


LAGURA, FRANCISCOLAMBAN,

ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B.


VIVENCIO LAWANGON,

ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P.




DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON

MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE,MARINO G.MALINAO, CARLITO

MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO,


CESAR MONAPCO,SILVANO

MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES,

CESAR B. MONTERO,


H. NALAS, EMELIANO C.


JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO

NUNEZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA,CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S.

OMBRETE, TEOFILIO






BIENVENIDO PAYAG,


PILAGO, ROMEOPRESBITERO,

OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIOQUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL,







MELCHOR SALIGUMBA,


SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO

TAJON, AVELINOTATAPOD,ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO


AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E.

TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA,


Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

PERALTA,*and

PEREZ,JJ.



17/35

TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO,



VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIOP.

VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO

VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M.

VILLEGAS,Respondents.

Promulgated:

May 30, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:

Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which arose out of

two civil cases that were filed in different courts but whose factual background and issues are closely intertwined.

The petitions in G.R. Nos. 125078[1]

and 125598[2]

both assail the Order[3]

dated May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617. The said Order decreed the dismissal of the case in view

of the perceived lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the complaint. The petition in G.R. No. 125598 also

challenges the Orders dated June 4, 1996[4]

and July 9, 1996,[5]

which held that the RTC of General Santos Cityno longer had

jurisdiction to proceed with Civil Case No. 5617.

On the other hand, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 126654,[6]

127856,[7]

and 128398[8]

seek the reversal of the Order[9]

dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, which also dismissed the case on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398 were consolidated in the Resolutions dated February 10,

1997,[10]

April 28, 1997[11]

and March 10, 1999.[12]

The factual antecedents of the petitions are as follows:

Proceedings before the Texas Courts



18/35

Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries,

including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to

dibromochloropropane(DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The

cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston

Division. The cases therein that involved plaintiffs from the Philippines wereJorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et

al.,which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, andJuan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al., which was

docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actionsunder the doctrine offorum non conveniens.

In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants motion to

dismiss. Pertinently, the court ordered that:

Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez and Isae Carcamo will be dismissed 90 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order provided

that defendants and third- and fourth-party defendants have:

(1)participated in expedited discovery in the United States xxx;

(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional defense within 40 days after the entry of this

Memorandum and Order in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which hisinjury occurred. Any plaintiff desiring to bring such an action will do so within 30 days after the entry of this Memorandum and

Order;

(3) waived within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order any limitations-based defense that has matured since the

commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;

(4) stipulated within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order that any discovery conducted during the pendency of these

actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the same extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and

(5) submitted within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order an agreement binding them to satisfy any final judgment

rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.

x x x x

Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result from this Memorandum and Order, in the event that the highest court of any foreign

country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the

country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action

as if the case had never been dismissed for [forum non conveniens].[13]

Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC ofGeneral Santos City and G.R. Nos. 125078

and 125598

In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City (the petitioners in G.R.

No. 125078, hereinafter referred to as NAVIDA,et al.) filed a Joint Complaint[14]

in the RTC of General Santos City on

August 10, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5617.Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL);

Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Stand

Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquit

Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinaft

collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; an

Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant companies.)

NAVIDA, et al.,prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which

they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical



19/35

during the early 1970s up to the early 1980s when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when

they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries

were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the

stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA,et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said

products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the formers health and well-

being.

Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies respectively filed their Motions for Bill of

Particulars.[15]

During the pendency of the motions, on March 13, 1996, NAVIDA,et al., filed an Amended Joint

Complaint,[16]

excluding Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd., Ameribrom, Inc., Bromine Compounds, Ltd. and Amvac Chemica

Corp. as party defendants.

Again, the remaining defendant companies filed their various Motions for Bill of Particulars.[17]

On May 15, 1996, DOW

filed an Answer with Counterclaim.[18]

On May 20, 1996, without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued anOrder

dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, to wit:

THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

x x x x

The substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites activity on their part which took

place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaintincluded the manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming

part of the stream of commerce.

Accordingly, the subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the present case, consisted of activity or course of

conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including

the present Regional Trial Court.[19]

Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged byNAVIDA, et al., in their complaint is a tort

category that is not recognized in Philippine laws. Said the trial court:

THE TORT ASSERTED IN THE PRESENT COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT FOREIGN

COMPANIES IS NOT WITHIN THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, BECAUSE IT IS NOT A TORT CATEGORY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINELAW

The specific tort asserted against defendant foreign companies in the present complaint is product liability tort. When the averments in the present

complaint are examined in terms of the particular categories of tort recognized in the Philippine Civil Code, it becomes stark clear that such

averments describe and identify the category of specific tort known as product liability tort. This is necessarily so, because it is the product

manufactured by defendant foreign companies, which is asserted to be the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the plaintiff workers, and

the liability of the defendant foreign companies, is premised on being the manufacturer of the pesticides.

It is clear, therefore, that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present case, if and only if the Civil Code of the Philippines, or a

suppletory special law prescribes a product liability tort, inclusive of and comprehending the specific tort described in the complaint of the plaintiff

workers.[20]

Third, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged thatNAVIDA, et al., were coerced into submitting their case to the

Philippine courts, viz:



20/35

FILING OF CASES IN THE PHILIPPINES - COERCED AND ANOMALOUS

The Court views that the plaintiffs did not freely choose to file the instant action, but rather were coerced to do so, merely to comply with the

U.S. District Courts Order dated July 11, 1995, and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District

Court.[21]

Fourth, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant companies therein, thus:

THE DEFENDANTS SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION IS CONDITIONAL AS IT IS ILLUSORY

Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in the Philippines pursuant to the agreement

in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over

persons of the defendants through their voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of the defendants in this case is

conditional. Thus in the Defendants Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens (Annex to the

Complaint) filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that (t)he authority of each designated representative to accept service of

process will become effective upon final dismissal of these actions by the Court. The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is not

yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom (par. 3(h), 3(i), Amended Complaint). Consequently, since the

authority of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the

acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is also conditional. x x x.

The appointment of agents by the defendants, being subject to a suspensive condition, thus produces no legal effect and is ineffective atthe moment.

[22]

Fifth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA,et al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts

violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. The trial court expounded:

THE JURISDICTION FROWNS UPON AND PROHIBITS FORUM SHOPPING

This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of the U.S. District court

dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases in another forum,

violates the rule on forum shopping so abhorred in this jurisdiction. x x x.

x x x x

THE FILING OF THE CASE IN U.S. DIVESTED THIS COURT OF ITS OWN JURISDICTION

Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S. District Court did

not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of

venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction with this court over the subject matter of

this case. It is settled that initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction. x x x.

x x x x

THIS CASE IS BARRED BY THE RULE OFLITIS PENDENCIA

Furthermore, the case filed in the U.S. court involves the same parties, same rights and interests, as in this case. There exists litis pendenciasince

there are two cases involving the same parties and interests. The court would like to emphasize that in accordance with the rule on litis

pendenciax x x; the subsequent case must be dismissed. Applying the foregoing [precept] to the case-at-bar, this court concludes that since the

case between the parties in the U.S. is still pending, then this case is barred by the rule on litis pendencia.[23]

In fine, the trial court held that:

It behooves this Court, then to dismiss this case. For to continue with these proceedings, would be violative of the constitutional provision

on the Bill of Rights guaranteeing speedy disposition of cases (Ref. Sec. 16, Article III, Constitution).The court has no other choice. To insist on

further proceedings with this case, as it is now presented, might accord this court a charming appearance. But the same insistence would actually

thwart the very ends of justice which it seeks to achieve.

This evaluation and action is made not on account of but rather with due consideration to the fact that the dismissal of this case does not

necessarily deprive the parties especially the plaintiffs of their possible remedies. The court is cognizant that the Federal Court may resume

proceedings of that earlier case between the herein parties involving the same acts or omissions as in this case.



21/35

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this case is now considered DISMISSED.[24]

On June 4, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City likewise issued anOrder,[25]

dismissing DOWs Answer with

Counterclaim.

CHIQUITA, DEL MONTE and SHELL each filed a motion for reconsideration[26]

of the RTC Order dated May 20,

1996, while DOW filed a motion for reconsideration[27]

of the RTC Order dated June 4, 1996. Subsequently, DOW and

OCCIDENTAL also filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration[28]

of the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996.

In an Order[29]

dated July 9, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City declared that it had already lost its jurisdiction over

the case as it took into consideration the Manifestation of the counsel of NAVIDA,et al., which stated that the latter had already

filed a petition for review on certioraribefore this Court.

CHIQUITA and SHELL filed their motions for reconsideration[30]of the above order.

On July 11, 1996, NAVIDA,et al., filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to assail the RTC Order dated May

20, 1996, which was docketed as G.R. No. 125078.

The RTC of General Santos City then issued anOrder[31]

dated August 14, 1996, which merely noted the incidents still

pending in Civil Case No. 5617and reiterated that it no longer had any jurisdiction over the case.

On August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed their Petition for Review onCertiorari,[32]challenging the orders of

the RTC of General Santos City dated May 20, 1996, June 4, 1996 and July 9, 1996.Their petition was docketed as G.R. No.

125598.

In their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL aver that the RTC of General Santos City erred in ruling that it has n

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as the persons of the defendant companies.

In a Resolution[33]

dated October 7, 1996, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 125598 with G.R. No. 125078.

CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review onCertiorari,[34]

which sought the reversal of the RTC Orders dated May 20,

1996, July 9, 1996 and August 14, 1996. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 126018. In a Resolution[35]

dated November 13,

1996, the Court dismissed the aforesaid petition for failure of CHIQUITA to show that the RTC committed grave abuse o

discretion. CHIQUITA filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[36]

but the same was denied through a Resolution[37]

dated January

27, 1997.

Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the RTC ofDavao City and G.R. Nos. 126654,

127856, and 128398

Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was fi

before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City.This case was docketed as Civil Case No.

24,251-96. These plaintiffs (the petitioners in G.R. No. 126654, hereinafter referred to as ABELLA,et al.) amended their Joint-



22/35

Complaint on May 21, 1996.[38]

Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA,et al., ABELLA,et al., alleged that, as workers in the banana plantation and/or as

residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical

DBCP. According to ABELLA,et al., such exposure resulted in serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not

limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.[39]

ABELLA, et al., claimed that the defendant companies

manufactured, produced, sold, distributed, used, and/or made available in commerce, DBCP without warning the users of itshazardous effects on health, and without providing instructions on its proper use and application, which the defendant companies

knew or ought to have known, had they exercised ordinary care and prudence.

Except for DOW, the other defendant companies filed their respective motions for bill of particulars to which ABELLA,et al.,

filed their opposition. DOW and DEL MONTE filed their respective Answers dated May 17, 1996 and June 24, 1996.

The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Case No. 24,251-96in its Orderdated October 1, 1996, which, in its entirety,

reads:

Upon a thorough review of the Complaint and Amended Complaint For: Damages filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants Shell Oil

Company, DOW Chemicals Company, Occidental Chemical Corporation, Standard Fruit Company, Standard Fruit and Steamship, DOLE

Food Company, DOLE Fresh Fruit Company, Chiquita Brands, Inc., Chiquita Brands International, Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del

Monte Tropical Fruits Co., all foreign corporations with Philippine Representatives, the Court, as correctly pointed out by one of the defendants,

is convinced that plaintiffs would have this Honorable Court dismiss the case to pave the way for their getting an affirmance by the Supreme

Court (#10 of Defendants Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co., Reply to Opposition dated July 22, 1996).

Consider these:

1) In the original Joint Complaint, plaintiffs state that: defendants have no properties in the Philippines; they have no agents

as well (par. 18); plaintiffs are suing the defendants for tortuous acts committed by these foreign corporations on their respective

countries, as plaintiffs, after having elected to sue in the place of defendants residence, are now compelled by a decision of a

Texas District Court to file cases under torts in this jurisdiction for causes of actions which occurred abroad (par. 19); a petition

was filed by same plaintiffs against same defendants in the Courts of Texas, USA, plaintiffs seeking for payment of damagesbased on negligence, strict liability, conspiracy and international tort theories (par. 27); upon defendants Motion to Dismiss on

Forum non [conveniens], said petition was provisionally dismissed on condition that these cases be filed in the Philippines or

before 11 August 1995 (Philippine date; Should the Philippine Courts refuse or deny jurisdiction, the U. S. Courts will reassume

jurisdiction.)

11.In the Amended Joint Complaint, plaintiffs aver that: on 11 July 1995, the Federal District Courtissued a Memorandum and Order conditionally

dismissing several of the consolidated actions including those filed by the Filipino complainants. One of the conditions imposed was for the

plaintiffs to file actions in their home countries or the countries in which they were injured x x x. Notwithstanding, the Memorandum and [O]rder

further provided that should the highest court of any foreign country affirm the dismissal for lack of jurisdictions over these actions filed by the

plaintiffs in their home countries [or] the countries where they were injured, the said plaintiffs may return to that court and, upon proper motion,

the Court will resume jurisdiction as if the case had never been dismissed for forum non conveniens.

The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above but because it shares the opinion of legalexperts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in its Special report Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility, to wit:

1. Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said:The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file this

kind of damage suit against foreign companies since the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws. There

has been no decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This means there is no available

evidence which will prove and disprove the relation between sterility and DBCP.

2. Retired Supreme Court Justice Abraham Sarmiento opined that while a class suit is allowed in thePhilippines the device has been

employed strictly. Mass sterility will not qualify as a class suit injury within the contemplation of Philippine statute.

3. Retired High Court Justice Rodolfo Nocom stated that there is simply an absence of doctrine here that permits these causes to be heard.

No product liability ever filed or tried here.

Case ordered dismissed.[40]

Docketed as G.R. No. 126654, the petition for review, filed on November 12, 1996 by ABELLA,et al., assails before this Court



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the above-quoted order of the RTC of Davao City.

ABELLA,et al., claim that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction.

According to ABELLA,et al., the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since Articles

2176 and 2187 of the Civil Code are broad enough to cover the acts complained of and to support their claims for damages.

ABELLA,et al., further aver that the dismissal of the case, based on the opinions of legal luminaries reported in a

newspaper, by the RTC of Davao City is bereft of basis. According to them, their cause of action is based on quasi-delict under

Article 2176 of the Civil Code. They also maintain that the absence of jurisprudence regarding the award of damages in favor of

those adversely affected by the DBCP does not preclude them from presenting evidence to prove their allegations that their

exposure to DBCP caused their sterility and/or infertility.

SHELL, DOW, and CHIQUITA each filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Order dated October 1, 199

of the RTC of Davao City. DEL MONTE also filed its motion for reconsideration, which contained an additional motion for the

inhibition of the presiding judge.

The presiding judge of Branch 16 then issued an Order[41]

dated December 2, 1996, voluntarily inhibiting himself from

trying the case. Thus, the case was re-raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of Davao City.

In an Order[42]

dated December 16, 1996, the RTC of Davao City affirmed the Order dated October 1, 1996, and denied

the respective motions for reconsideration filed by defendant companies.

Thereafter, CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review dated March 5, 1997, questioning the Orders dated October 1, 1996 and

December 16, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. This case was docketed as G.R. No. 128398.

In its petition, CHIQUITA argues that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing the casemotu proprioas it acquired

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as over the persons of the defendant companies which voluntarily appeared

before it. CHIQUITA also claims that the RTC of Davao City cannot dismiss the case simply on the basis of opinions of alleged

legal experts appearing in a newspaper article.

Initially, this Court in its Resolution[43]

dated July 28, 1997, dismissed the petition filed by CHIQUITA for submitting a

defective certificate against forum shopping. CHIQUITA, however, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by this

Court in the Resolution[44]

dated October 8, 1997.

On March 7, 1997, DEL MONTE also filed its petition for review oncertiorari before this Court assailing the above-

mentioned orders of the RTC of Davao City. Its petition was docketed as G.R. No. 127856.

DEL MONTE claims that the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction overCivil Case No. 24,251-96, as defined under the law

and that the said court already obtained jurisdiction over its person by its voluntary appearance and the filing of a motion for bill

of particulars and, later, an answer to the complaint. According to DEL MONTE, the RTC of Davao City, therefore, acte

beyond its authority when it dismissed the case motu proprioor without any motion to dismiss from any of the parties to the

case.

In the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, April 28, 1997, and March 10, 1999, this Court consolidated G.R. Nos.

125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398.



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The Consolidated Motion to Drop DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL as Party-

Respondents filed by NAVIDA, et al. and ABELLA, et al.

On September 26, 1997, NAVIDA,et al.,and ABELLA,et al., filed before this Court a Consolidated Motion (to Drop

Party-Respondents).[45]

The plaintiff claimants alleged that they had amicably settled their cases with DOW, OCCIDENTAL,

and SHELL sometime in July 1997. This settlement agreement was evidenced by facsimiles of the Compromise Settlement,

Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement, which were attached to the said motion. Pursuant to said agreement, the plaintiff

claimants sought to withdraw their petitions as against DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.

DOLE, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA, however, opposed the motion, as well as the settlement entered into between th

plaintiff claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.

The Memoranda of the Parties

Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced by the parties, this Court, in a Resolution dated June 22,

1998,[46]required all the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

CHIQUITA filed its Memorandum on August 28, 1998;[47]

SHELL asked to be excused from the filing of a memorandum

alleging that it had already executed a compromise agreement with the plaintiff claimants.[48]

DOLE filed its Memorandum on

October 12, 1998[49]

while DEL MONTE filed on October 13, 1998.[50]

NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., filed their

Consolidated Memorandum on February 3, 1999;[51]

and DOW and OCCIDENTAL jointly filed a Memorandum on Decembe

23, 1999.[52]

The Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in G.R. No. 125598

On July 13, 2004, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in G.R. No. 125598,[53]

explaining that the said petition is already moot and academic and no longer presents a justiciable controversy since they have

already entered into an amicable settlement with NAVIDA,et al.DOW and OCCIDENTAL added that they have fully complied

with their obligations set forth in the 1997 Compromise Agreements.

DOLE filed its Manifestation dated September 6, 2004,[54]

interposing no objection to the withdrawal of the petition, and

further stating that they maintain their position that DOW and OCCIDENTAL, as well as other settling defendant companies,

should be retained as defendants for purposes of prosecuting the cross-claims of DOLE, in the event that the complaint below is

reinstated.

NAVIDA, et al., also filed their Comment dated September 14, 2004,[55]

stating that they agree with the view of DOW and

OCCIDENTAL that the petition in G.R. No. 125598 has become moot and academic because Civil Case No. 5617 had alread

been amicably settled by the parties in 1997.

On September 27, 2004, DEL MONTE filed its Comment on Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review Filed by Petitioner

in G.R. No. 125598,[56]

stating that it has no objections to the withdrawal of the petition filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL in

G.R. No. 125598.



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In a Resolution[57]

dated October 11, 2004, this Court granted, among others, the motion to withdraw petition for review

filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL.

THE ISSUES

In their Consolidated Memorandum, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., presented the following issues for our consideration:

IN REFUTATION

I. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.

a) The court did not simply dismiss the case because it was filed in bad faith with petitioners intending to have the same dismissed and

returned to the Texas court.

b) The court dismissed the case because it was convinced that it did not have jurisdiction.

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

II. THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.

a. The acts complained of occurred within Philippine territory.

b. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is broad enough to cover the acts complained of.

c. Assumption of jurisdiction by the U.S. District Court over petitioner[s] claims did not divest Philippine [c]ourts of jurisdiction over the

same.

d. The Compromise Agreement and the subsequent Consolidated Motion to Drop Party Respondents Dow, Occidental and Shell does not

unjustifiably prejudice remaining respondents Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita.[58]

DISCUSSION

On the issue of jurisdiction

Essentially, the crux of the controversy in the petitions at bar is whether the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of

Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction.

Remarkably, none of the parties to this case claims that the courts a quoare bereft of jurisdiction to determine and resolve

the above-stated cases. All parties contend that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction

over the action for damages, specifically for approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants.

NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,et al., argue that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant companies

occurred within Philippine territory. Specifically, the use of and exposure to DBCP that was manufactured, distributed or

otherwise put into the stream of commerce by defendant companies happened in the Philippines. Said fact allegedly constitutes

reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., assert

that the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, as well as Article 2176 thereof, are broad enough to

cover their claim for damages. Thus, NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., pray that the respective rulings of the RTC of

General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 be reversed and that the said cases b

remanded to the courts a quo for further proceedings.

DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article

2176 of the Civil Code. In addition, DOLE states that if there were no actionable wrongs committed under Philippine law, the



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courts a quoshould have dismissed the civil cases on the ground that the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA,et al., and

ABELLA, et al., stated no cause of action against the defendant companies. DOLE also argues that if indeed there is no positive

law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not

refuse to render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying the customs of

the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. DOLE posits that the Philippines is thesitusof the tortious

acts allegedly committed by defendant companies as NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,et al., point to their alleged exposure to

DBCP which occurred in the Philippines, as the cause of the sterility and other reproductive system problems that they allegedly

suffered. Finally, DOLE adds that the RTC of Davao City gravely erred in relying upon newspaper reports in dismissing CivilCase No. 24,251-96 given that newspaper articles are hearsay and without any evidentiary value. Likewise, the alleged legal

opinions cited in the newspaper reports were taken judicial notice of, without any notice to the parties. DOLE, however, opines

that the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 was proper, given that plaintiff claimants merely prosecuted the cases

with the sole intent of securing a dismissal of the actions for the purpose of convincing the U.S. Federal District Court to re-

assume jurisdiction over the cases.

In a similar vein, CHIQUITA argues that the courtsa quohad jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed before

them. The Amended Joint-Complaints sought approximately P2.7 million in damages for each plaintiff claimant, which amount

falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP,not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti

commisitheory in determining thesitusof a tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed

will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC

by making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the proceedings. None of the defendant

companies ever objected to the exercise of jurisdiction by the courtsa quoover their persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the

remand of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively.

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over

Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively

The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations

in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims

asserted therein.[59]

Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the

action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.

At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as

amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:

SEC. 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

x x x x

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or

the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the

demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).[60]

Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:

2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P.

Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of

action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall

be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.



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Here, NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., sought in their similarly-worded Amended Joint-Complaints filed before the

courts a quo, the following prayer:

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs

ordering the defendants:

a) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF moral damages in the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,00.00);

b) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF nominal damages in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 400,000.00) each;

c) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF exemplary damages in the amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00);

d) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF attorneys fees of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and

e) TO PAY THE COSTS of the suit.[61]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in thecomplaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the

cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., fall within the

purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Moreover, the allegations in both Amended Joint-Complaints narrate that:

THE CAUSES OF ACTION

4. The Defendants manufactured, sold, distributed, used, AND/OR MADE AVAILABLE IN COMMERCE nematocides containing the

chemical dibromochloropropane, commonly known as DBCP. THE CHEMICAL WAS USED AGAINST the parasite known as the

nematode, which plagued banana plantations, INCLUDING THOSE in thePhilippines. AS IT TURNED OUT, DBCP not only destroyednematodes. IT ALSO CAUSED ILL-EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH OF PERSONS EXPOSED TO IT AFFECTING the human

reproductive system as well.

5. The plaintiffs were exposed to DBCP in the 1970s up to the early 1980s WHILE (a) they used this product in the banana

plantations WHERE they were employed, and/or (b) they resided within the agricultural area WHERE IT WAS USED. As a result of

such exposure, the plaintiffs suffered serious and permanent injuries TO THEIR HEALTH, including, but not limited to, STERILITY and severe

injuries to their reproductive capacities.

6. THE DEFENDANTS WERE AT FAULT OR WERE NEGLIGENT IN THAT THEY MANUFACTURED, produced,

sold, and/or USED DBCP and/or otherwise, PUT THE SAME into the stream of commerce, WITHOUT INFORMING THE

USERS OF ITS HAZARDOUS EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND/OR WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON ITS PROPER USE AN

APPLICATION.THEY allowed Plaintiffs to be exposed to, DBCP-containing materials which THEY knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care

and prudence ought to have known, were highly harmful and injurious to the Plaintiffs health and well-being.

7. The Defendants WHO MANUFACTURED, PRODUCED, SOLD, DISTRIBUTED, MADE AVAILABLE OR PUT DBCP INTO

THE STREAM OF COMMERCE were negligent OR AT FAULT in that they, AMONG OTHERS:

a. Failed to adequately warn Plaintiffs of the dangerous characteristics of DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to so

warn plaintiffs;

b. Failed to provide plaintiffs with information as to what should be reasonably safe and sufficient clothing and proper protective

equipment and appliances, if any, to protect plaintiffs from the harmful effects of exposure to DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries

or affiliates to do so;

c. Failed to place adequate warnings, in a language understandable to the worker, on containers of DBCP-containing materials to

warn of the dangers to health of coming into contact with DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;

d. Failed to take reasonable precaution or to exercise reasonable care to publish, adopt and enforce a safety plan and a safe

method of handling and applying DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;

e. Failed to test DBCP prior to releasing these products for sale, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so; and



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f. Failed to reveal the results of tests conducted on DBCP to each plaintiff, governmental agencies and the public, or to cause their

subsidiaries or affiliate to do so.

8. The illnesses and injuries of each plaintiff are also due to the FAULT or negligence of defendants Standard Fruit Company, Dole Fresh

Fruit Company, Dole Food Company, Inc., Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. in that they failed to exercise

reasonable care to prevent each plaintiffs harmful exposure to DBCP-containing products which defendants knew or should have known were

hazardous to each plaintiff in that they, AMONG OTHERS:

a. Failed to adequately supervise and instruct Plaintiffs in the safe and proper application of DBCP-containing products;

b. Failed to implement proper methods and techniques of application of said products, or to cause such to be implemented;

c. Failed to warn Plaintiffs of the hazards of exposure to said products or to cause them to be so warned;

d. Failed to test said products for adverse health effects, or to cause said products to be tested;

e. Concealed from Plaintiffs information concerning the observed effects of said products on Plaintiffs;

f. Failed to monitor the health of plaintiffs exposed to said products;

g. Failed to place adequate labels on containers of said products to warn them of the damages of said products; and

h. Failed to use substitute nematocides for said products or to cause such substitutes to [be] used.

[62]

(Emphasis supplied andwords in brackets ours.)

Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., attribute to

defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides containing the chemical DBCP.

According to NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., such exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses,

specifically to their reproductive system.

Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants a quasi-delict, which under the

Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence. To be precise,

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage

done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the

provisions of this Chapter.

As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., point to the acts and/or

omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using, and/or otherwise putting into the stream of

commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without

instructions on its proper use and application.[63]

Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals,[64]

this Court has always reminded that jurisdiction of the court over the

subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are

entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon

the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely

depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from

the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for

the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for

each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.



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Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their

exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while they were residing

within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to

their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao

City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.

It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quowhen they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on

the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,et al., took place abroad and had

occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in

containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce,[65]

and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.

Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be

determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. Inpersonal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the

Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants

resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

[66]

In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,et al., are

available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in

Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial

jurisdiction of the courts a quowherein NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the

testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and other

members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines. Considering the great number of plaintiff claimants

involved in this case, it is not far-fetched to assume that voluminous records are involved in the presentation of evidence to

support the claim of plaintiff claimants. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of action ofNAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,et al., against the defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate

that, apart from the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter in the

instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases.[67]

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired

jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies

It is well to stress again that none of the parties claims that the courts a quolack jurisdiction over the cases filed before them. All

parties are one in asserting that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired jurisdiction

over the persons of the defendant companies in the action below. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared

and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo.

Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [t]he defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall

be equivalent to service of summons. In this connection, all the defendant companies designated and authorized representatives to

receive summons and to represent them in the proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted

themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative

reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings below.

In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,[68]

held that jurisdiction

over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its

authority or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an



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invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on

impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction.[69]

Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons o

the defendant companies, as well as over the subject matter of the instant case. What is more, this jurisdiction, which has been

acquired and has been vested on the courts a quo,continues until the termination of the proceedings.

It may also be pertinently stressed that jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority

to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of

the defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an

exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment,

which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.[70]

Plaintiffs purported bad faith in filing the subject civil cases in Philippine courts

Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad faith merely to procure a dismissal of the

same and to allow them to return to the forum of their choice, this Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any

merit.

It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported by evidence on record. This Court

does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies;

on realities, not appearances. When this Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-lived.[71]

This

is especially true with respect to allegations of bad faith, in line with the basic rule that good faith is always presumed and bad faith

must be proved.

[72]

In sum, considering the fact that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over th

subject matter of the amended complaints filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,et al., and that the courts a quohave also

acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies, it therefore, behooves this Court to order the remand of

Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively.

On the issue of the dropping of DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL as respondents in

view of their amicable settlement with NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.

NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,et al., are further praying that DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL be dropped as respondents i

G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. The non-settling defendants allegedly

manifested that they intended to file their cross-claims against their co-defendants who entered into compromise agreements.

NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,et al., argue that the non-settling defendants did not aver any cross-claim in their answers to the

complaint and that they subsequently sought to amend their answers to plead their cross-claims only after the settlement between

the plaintiff claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL were executed.NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., therefore,

assert that the cross-claims are already barred.

In their Memoranda, CHIQUITA and DOLE are opposing the above motion of NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al.,

since the latters Amended Complaints cited several instances of tortious conduct that were allegedly committed jointly andseverally by the defendant companies. This solidary obligation on the part of all the defendants allegedly gives any co-defendant

the statutory right to proceed against the other co-defendants for the payment of their respective shares. Should the subject

motion of NAVIDA,et al., and ABELLA,et al., be granted, and the Court subsequently orders the remand of the action to the

trial court for continuance, CHIQUITA and DOLE would allegedly be deprived of their right to prosecute their cross-claims

Bernabe Navida v. Hon. Teodoro Dizon

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Transcript of Bernabe Navida v. Hon. Teodoro Dizon