Boletín Unión Europea - IEEE · Informe sobre Incidentes Cibernéticos en la Unión Europea....

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Boletín Unión Europea Agosto 2012

Gabinete Técnico de la Guardia Civil — Centro de Análisis y Prospectiva

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/�

Boletín UE – Agosto 2012 Gabinete Técnico – Centro de Análisis y Prospectiva

ACTUALIDAD DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

1.- Red Europea de Migración: siguientes pasos.

2.- La mayoría de los incidentes cibernéticos en la UE no son denunciados o incluso no se detectan.

3.- Los miembros del CESE abogan por un sector de la defensa europeo más fuerte e integrado.

4 La Comisión expresa su satisfacción por las medidas para mejorar la situación de los ciudadanos que adquirieron propiedades en el litoral español.

5.- El peligro de incendio sigue siendo muy elevado en Portugal, España y Francia.

6.- Los europeos seguirán sin poder subir más de 100 ml de líquido al avión.

7.- Presentado el Informe Anual de la Comisión 2012 sobre acciones de ayuda al desarrollo.

DOCUMENTACIÓN REMITIDA POR ÓRGANOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA A ESTE CENTRO DE ANÁLISIS Y PROSPECTIVA

1.- EUROSTAT – Solicitantes de asilo y decisiones en primera instancia sobre las solicitudes de asilo: primer trimestre 2012..

2.- Observatorio Europeo de Drogas y Toxicomanías (OEDT). Actualización del apartado “Resumen por países” del OEDT.

3.- Informe de actividad de la Autoridad Común de Control de Eurojust para el año 2011.

4 Informe de actividad anual de 2011 de la Agencia para la gestión operativa de sistemas informáticos de gran magnitud en el espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia.

5.- INFORME del Parlamento Europeo sobre el Informe anual del Consejo al Parlamento Europeo sobre la politica exterior y de seguridad comun.

6.- INFORME sobre la supuesta utilización de países europeos por la CIA para el transporte y la detención ilegal de presos: seguimiento del informe de la Comisión TDIP del Parlamento Europeo.

7.- Informe de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo sobre Posibles ventajas y desventajas de una reducción a dos categorías de armas de fuego (prohibidas o sujetas a autorización), con vistas a un mejor funcionamiento del mercado interior para los productos en cuestión a través de una posible simplificación..

8.- Proyecto de Informe sobre la Estrategia de Libertad Digital en la Política Exterior de la UE .

9.- Plan de desarrollo plurianual de Capacidades Civiles. Líneas de acción 2012-2013.

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NORMATIVA DE INTERÉS


ACTUALIDAD DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

1.- Red Europea de Migración: siguientes pasos.

La Comisión ha publicado su informe sobre el desarrollo de la Red Europea de Migración (REM), una red dirigida por la Comisión con puntos de contacto nacionales en cada Estado miembro, así como de Noruega. El propósito de la Red

Europea de Migración tiene como objetivo proporcionar información actualizada, objetiva, fiable y comparable sobre la migración y el asilo, con el fin de apoyar la formulación de políticas en la Unión Europea en estos ámbitos, así como informar al público en general. Cuatro años después de su creación formal, el informe hace un balance de los progresos realizados y considera cómo debe evolucionar la red, incluso en el contexto del próximo marco financiero plurianual a partir de 2013.

La Red Europea de Migración ha demostrado su eficacia en el apoyo a la formulación de políticas basadas en la evidencia a través de sus múltiples actividades, que van desde contribuir al Informe Anual sobre Inmigración y Asilo, a base de estudios temáticos sobre temas como la inmigración económica y la reagrupación familiar, para reunir rápidamente información específica sobre temas de necesidad a corto plazo, para el

desarrollo de un glosario multilingüe basado en el Derecho de la UE, y la producción de boletines periódicos que resumen últimos acontecimientos políticos y presenta estadísticas.

Para asegurarse de que la REM continúa satisfaciendo las necesidades y expectativas de los políticos en particular y al público en general, el informe también identifica posibles desarrollos futuros. Por ejemplo, las relaciones con las agencias de la UE, como Frontex o la Oficina de Apoyo al Asilo (EASO).

Promover sinergias entre la REM y Frontex podría cerrar la brecha entre las consideraciones de gestión de fronteras y las consideraciones socio-económicas, reuniendo una amplia gama de expertos con especializaciones diferentes pero complementarias.

Del mismo modo, una colaboración más estrecha entre la REM y EASO también podría aumentar la capacidad de los organismos para analizar la situación del asilo en la UE. Por ejemplo, la Red Europea de Migración y EASO conjuntamente podrían realizar un estudio sobre un tema relacionado con el asilo frente a componentes diferentes pero complementarios.

Más información en:

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Informe de la Comisión al Consejo y al Parlamento Europeo sobre el desarrollo de la Red Europea de Migración.

Documento de trabajo de la Comisión Europea que acompaña al Informe sobre el desarrollo de la Red Europea de Migración.

Red Europea de Migración

Antecedentes:

3er Informe Anual sobre Inmigración y Asilo

2.- La mayoría de los incidentes cibernéticos en la UE no son denunciados o incluso no se detectan.

Un informe publicado por la Agencia Europea de Seguridad de las Redes y la Información (ENISA en sus siglas en inglés) muestra que millones de ciudadanos y empresas se han visto

seriamente afectados por los incidentes de seguridad cibernética. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los incidentes no son detectados o incluso, continúan sin ser detectados.

El nuevo “Informe sobre Incidentes Cibernéticos en la Unión Europea", publicado por la Agencia Europea de Seguridad de las Redes y la Información (ENISA en sus siglas en inglés) muestra algunos logros importantes de la legislación sobre seguridad cibernética pero también identifica las lagunas en la aplicación nacional, como que por ejemplo la mayoría de los incidentes no son denunciados. Según el Dr Marnix Dekker y Karsberg Chris, coautores del informe, los incidentes cibernéticos se mantienen en secreto de forma habitual una vez que son descubiertos, dejando a consumidores y responsables políticos sin conocimientos sobre las causas, la frecuencia, y el impacto de estos incidentes. La Comisión Europea recientemente ha puesto en marcha una consulta para una futura iniciativa de la UE para la seguridad de las redes y de la información.

Millones de ciudadanos y empresas se han visto afectados seriamente por los incidentes cibernéticos. Asimismo, la mayoría de los incidentes no son denunciados o incluso detectados. A modo de ejemplo: en 2012, millones de contraseñas de red de negocios se hicieron públicas; en 2011, la tormenta Dagmar destruyó millones de enlaces de comunicación escandinavos; en 2011 también, un fallo de un centro de datos británico interrumpió millones de comunicaciones de negocios en todo el mundo; en 2011, una

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http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/html/index.html


autoridad de certificación se violó exponiendo las comunicaciones de millones de usuarios; en 2010, un proveedor de telecomunicaciones chino “secuestró” el 15% del tráfico de Internet en el mundo durante 20 minutos. Sólo uno de los incidentes mencionados anteriormente estaba dentro del alcance del mandato de los reguladores nacionales, lo que indica una de las lagunas en la regulación. Por lo tanto, según el informe, se debe mejorar la puesta en común en la UE del intercambio de informes sobre incidentes cibernéticos.

El informe también muestra que se ha progresado mucho en este campo. Un grupo de trabajo de ENISA para los reguladores nacionales ha sido desarrollado tanto para llevar a cabo un conjunto común de medidas de seguridad como un formato de denuncia de incidentes. ENISA acaba de recibir informes de los reguladores sobre 51 incidentes importantes, que describen el impacto, las causas, las medidas adoptadas y las posibles lecciones a aprender. Este material se utiliza el desarrollo de la estrategia europea de seguridad cibernética y el ejercicio europeo de seguridad cibernética.


Informe sobre Incidentes Cibernéticos en la Unión Europea.

ENISA: Agencia Europea de Seguridad de las Redes y la Información

3.- Los miembros del CESE abogan por un sector de la defensa europeo más fuerte e integrado.

El dictamen sobre el estado actual de la industria europea de defensa adoptado por el Comité Económico y Social Europeo pide un cambio de mentalidad "radical" en el trato con los gobiernos en lo que respecta a la defensa. También muestra su satisfacción con la creación del Grupo de Trabajo sobre Defensa.

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El Comité Económico y Social Europeo ha aprobado el dictamen titulado "La necesidad de una industria de defensa europea: aspectos industriales, innovadores y sociales", que aboga por un sector más fuerte y más integrado en lo que respecta a la defensa europea. También sugiere que los enfoques obsoletos conducen visiblemente a una fragmentación cada vez mayor, brechas, exceso de capacidad y falta de interoperabilidad en capacidades de defensa europeas. Además, señala que los asuntos exteriores y la capacidad de seguridad, defensa e industrial se encuentran todos interrelacionados y deben integrarse en una estrategia coherente.

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/



El informe acoge con satisfacción la creación del Grupo de Trabajo sobre Defensa y el compromiso personal de muchos altos funcionarios de la UE con la causa de una defensa nacional eficaz. Los autores argumentan que la Agencia Europea de Defensa en particular tiene un papel clave que desempeñar, y que debe actuar como socio de pleno derecho de la Comisión Europea en materia de defensa, con la plena participación también de la industria de defensa y otras partes interesadas. En 2010, el gasto total de la Agencia Europea de Defensa se mantuvo constante en 194 mil millones de euros.

La investigación y el desarrollo es un área en particular destacada en el informe, ya que ha sido testigo de muchos cortes en los últimos años, pero que sigue siendo absolutamente crucial para una defensa eficaz a largo plazo. El informe concluye que el gasto en investigación europea debe buscar oportunidades de inversión de "doble uso" y reducir la dependencia tecnológica de las fuentes fuera de Europa.


DICTAMEN del Comité Económico y Social Europeo sobre el tema “Necesidad de una industria europea de la defensa: aspectos industriales, innovadores y sociales”

4 La Comisión expresa su satisfacción por las medidas para mejorar la situación de los ciudadanos que adquirieron propiedades en el litoral español.

La Vicepresidenta de la Comisión Europea, Viviane Reding, Comisaria de Justicia de la UE, ha expresado su satisfacción ante el anuncio hecho por España de que se propone mejorar la seguridad jurídica de los propietarios de fincas en la costa española que se han visto afectados por la Ley de Costas. La Ley de Costas tiene por objeto proteger los hábitats locales mediante la designación de la zona costera como dominio público. Sin embargo, los titulares de propiedades inmobiliarias en esa zona estiman que la ley, y la forma en que se ha aplicado, violan sus derechos. Muchos de los afectados por la Ley de Costas son ciudadanos europeos que han ejercido su derecho a la libre circulación y han invertido sus ahorros en una propiedad en España.

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La Comisión Europea ha planteado esta cuestión a las autoridades españolas en varias ocasiones después de recibir un gran número de quejas tanto de ciudadanos españoles como de los demás Estados miembros de la UE. La Comisión de Peticiones del Parlamento Europeo organizó una audiencia


específica sobre el asunto e instó a las autoridades españolas a revisar la Ley de Costas.

España se propone reformar la legislación para garantizar una protección eficaz del medio ambiente costero al tiempo que se ofrece una mayor seguridad jurídica a los propietarios y se favorece el desarrollo de actividades económicas y de otro tipo, como el ocio y el turismo.


Borrador de Anteproyecto de Ley de Protección y uso sostenible del litoral y de modificación de la ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio, de Costas.

5.- El peligro de incendio sigue siendo muy elevado en Portugal, España y Francia.

El Sistema europeo de información sobre incendios forestales (EFFIS en sus siglas en inglés), que proporciona información actualizada y veraz sobre los incendios forestales en Europa,

apoyando la prevención de incendios forestales y los servicios de extinción de incendios en los países europeos, ha emitido un comunicado con la situación actual en la UE. Según el mismo, a pesar de una leve mejoría en el pronóstico de la situación a principios de esta semana, las condiciones de peligro de incendios siguen siendo muy altas en la parte occidental de la región mediterránea, en Portugal, España y Francia.

Según un comunicado emitido por el Sistema europeo de información sobre incendios forestales (EFFIS en sus siglas en inglés), la temporada de incendios 2012 se ha caracterizado por un elevado número de incendios en el inicio de temporada. Más de 100.000 hectáreas ya habían sido consumidos por el fuego a finales de marzo. Además, el comunicado confirma que julio conllevó episodios críticos de incendios en España y Portugal, lo que llevó a una serie de pérdidas de vidas humanas. Durante las últimas semanas, el peligro de incendio ha sido muy elevado en el sur de Europa, en particular en Portugal, España, el sur de Francia, el centro y sur de Italia (donde un gran número de incendios siguen activos), la región de los Balcanes, Grecia y Turquía. Recientemente, una investigación europea halla patrones para predecir cambios en la propagación de incendios forestales.

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El sistema EFFIS, que proporciona información actualizada y veraz sobre los incendios forestales en Europa y que ofrece apoyo para la prevención de incendios forestales y los servicios de extinción de incendios en los países europeos, también ofrece una previsión de los posibles de los lugares con mayor riesgo de


incendio con un máximo de seis días de antelación así como una mejora de la preparación de los países en situación de riesgo de incendio. Además, los incendios son supervisados y mapeados por el EFFIS, ofreciendo una previsión cercanas a la realidad en cuento a las estimaciones de tiempo de los daños de incendios en toda Europa.

El sistema está desarrollado y gestionado por el servicio científico interno de la Comisión Europea, el Centro Común de Investigación (CCI), en colaboración con la Dirección General de Medio Ambiente (DG ENV) y la Dirección General de Ayuda Humanitaria y Protección Civil (DG ECHO). Por el momento, cerca de 580.000 hectáreas se han quemado este año en la zona supervisada por el EFFIS, que incluye Europa, Oriente Medio y los países del norte de África.


EFFIS - Sistema europeo de información sobre incendios forestales

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http://effis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/







6.- Los europeos seguirán sin poder subir más de 100 ml de líquido al avión.

Los pasajeros de aviones seguirán sometidos a las restricciones de seguridad que prohíben introducir en la cabina líquidos que superen los 100 mililitros , según la propuesta de la Comisión Europea adoptada este mes, que retrasa hasta como pronto enero de 2014 la retirada de esta prohibición.

El colegio de comisarios del Ejecutivo europeo considera que siguen existiendo riesgos "significativos" para la seguridad de los pasajeros y que los aeropuertos aún no han implementado sistemas de detección de explosivos líquidos efectivos, a pesar de que "los progresos han sido considerables en los últimos años".

"La retirada de estas restricciones para la fecha inicialmente establecida (abril de 2013), puede suponer riesgos considerables debido principalmente a la magnitud del cambio", sostiene la Comisión en una breve nota en la que propone un nuevo sistema de fases.

A partir de enero de 2014 los pasajeros podrían, de acuerdo con esta propuesta que debe ser aprobada por el Parlamento Europeo y los estados miembros, introducir a bordo todos los líquidos comprados en 'duty free', independientemente del tamaño y de la cantidad.

Hasta ahora los productos comprados en zonas de libre imposición de fuera de la UE necesitaban ser revisados manualmente y estaban sujetos a algunas restricciones a la hora de introducirlos en territorio comunitario.


Informe anual 2011 relativo a la aplicación del Reglamento 300/2008, sobre normas comunes para la seguridad de la aviación civil.

7.- Presentado el Informe Anual de la Comisión 2012 sobre acciones de ayuda al desarrollo.

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En su calidad de primer donante mundial en materia de ayuda al desarrollo, la Unión Europea ha llevado a cabo una intensa labor durante el año 2011. Según el Informe Anual EuropeAid 2012 la mayor partida económica se dedicó durante este periodo a los ámbitos de las infraestructuras sociales, educación, agua, desarrollo gubernamental y otras acciones con la sociedad civil.


El Informe Anual EuropeAid 2012 sobre la implementación de las políticas de la Unión Europea en materia de desarrollo y asistencia exterior hace un repaso a las principales acciones llevadas a cabo a lo largo de 2011. El documento recalca que este ha sido un año en el que ha sido necesario dar respuesta a nuevos retos y encontrar nuevas soluciones para algunos ya existentes.

Uno de los fenómenos que marcó de forma más significativa el año 2011 fue sin duda la sucesión de movimientos populares en los países de la cuenca mediterránea y que conformaron el movimiento de la Primavera Árabe. Tras las primeras acciones de ayuda humanitaria y protección civil, la Unión Europea puso en marcha el programa regional SPRING con el objetivo de reforzar su apoyo en el sur del Mediterráneo.

Entre otras acciones, la Unión Europea ha desplegado también una importante partida de ayudas para combatir el hambre en el cuerno de África destinando fondos extraordinarios a acciones en Etiopía, Djibouti y Somalia. Entre las actividades de EuropeAid a lo largo del año destaca también el importanteapoyo prestado a los países vecinos del Este de Europa que se ha consolidado con un socio importante y un foco de atracción de oportunidades. En América Latina la Cumbre de Madrid celebrada en mayo de 2010 subrayó el refuerzo de las relaciones políticas con los países de la zona, relaciones que también han sido reforzadas en el caso de los países pertenecientes a la zona del Caribe. Se han intensificado así mimo las relaciones con la Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste

Asiático (ASEAN), a través de programas como el exitoso programa SWITCH Asia mediante el cual se han financiado una serie de pequeños proyectos en toda la zona.

En lo que se refiere al desarrollo de futuros proyectos de ayuda al desarrollo, la nueva Agenda para el Cambio señala dos bloques de ayuda fundamentales que ahondan en algunas de las prioridades puestas en marcha a lo largo de 2011. Estos dos bloques que centrarán las acciones llevadas a cabo a través de proyectos financiados por EuropeAid son por un lado en la defensa de los derechos humanos, la democracia y la gobernanza, y por otro, en promover un crecimiento inclusivo y sostenible. Se incluye además un nuevo enfoque según el cual algunos de los países, especialmente aquellos que han pasado a ser donantes, no reciban ayuda económica sino otras vías alternativas de apoyo.

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Informe anual de 2012 sobre las políticas de la Unión Europea en materia de desarrollo y ayuda exterior y su aplicación en 2011.

Documento de Grupo de Trabajo de la Comisión que acompaña al Informe anual de 2012 sobre las políticas de la Unión Europea en materia de desarrollo y ayuda exterior y su aplicación en 2011.

EuropeAid

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http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm


DOCUMENTACIÓN REMITIDA POR ÓRGANOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA A ESTE CENTRO DE ANÁLISIS Y PROSPECTIVA

1.- EUROSTAT – Solicitantes de asilo y decisiones en primera instancia sobre las solicitudes de asilo: primer trimestre 2012..

Esta publicación trimestral ofrece una visión de los últimos acontecimientos en materia de protección internacional, incluidos los solicitantes de asilo y las decisiones primera

instancia sobre las solicitudes de asilo.

Estos datos son suministrados a Eurostat por los Ministerios de Interior y organismos oficiales relacionados. La mayor parte de las estadísticas presentadas en este documento se recogen en el marco normativo del Reglamento 862/2007 relativo a las estadísticas sobre la migración y la protección internacional.

PDF 16 pág. 219 Kb.

2.- Observatorio Europeo de Drogas y Toxicomanías (OEDT).

Actualización del apartado “Resumen por países” del OEDT.

Resúmenes por países que proporcionan una sinopsis estructurada de las tendencias y características sobre los problemas de drogas nacionales.

Se componen de un resumen de la situación nacional de drogas, un vistazo de las estadísticas y un barómetro que la posición de cada país según la prevalencia del consumo de drogas.

OEDT - Country overview

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http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/index.cfm�

http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/country-overviews


3.- Informe de actividad de la Autoridad Común de Control de Eurojust para el año 2011.

Este es el noveno informe anual de la Autoridad Común de Control (ACC) de Eurojust, que se estableció por primera vez en mayo de 2003 y describe sus principales actividades durante el año 2011.

La ACC se establece en el artículo 23 de la Decisión Eurojust, como órgano independiente que colectivamente controla las actividades de Eurojust que implican el tratamiento de datos personales para asegurar que se lleven a cabo de conformidad con la Decisión Eurojust y no violan los derechos de las personas interesadas.

Una de las tareas más importantes de la ACC es la de examinar las apelaciones de las personas para verificar que su datos personales sean tratados por Eurojust de manera lícita y correcta.

La ACC también controla la licitud de la transmisión de datos de Eurojust y proporciona su opinión obligatoria relativa a las disposiciones sobre protección de datos en los acuerdos con los organismos de la UE o de cooperación con terceros Estados.


4 Informe de actividad anual de 2011 de la Agencia para la gestión operativa de sistemas informáticos de gran magnitud en el espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia.

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El Reglamento (UE) nº 1077/2011 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, por el que se establece una Agencia Europea para la gestión operativa de sistemas informáticos de gran magnitud en el espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia, fue aprobado el 25 de octubre de 2011 y se pueblicó en el DOUE el 1 de noviembre del mismo año. En él se establece que la Agencia asumirá sus responsabilidades básicas a partir del 1 de diciembre de 2012,


aunque en lo relativo al SIS II no podrá hacerlo hasta que este sistema se encuentre operativo y le sea transferido por la Comisión.

Con arreglo al Reglamento, el Director Ejecutivo deberá presentar al Consejo de Administración el informe anual de actividades correspondiente al año anterior, con el previo asesoramiento de los grupos consultivos, el cual será aprobado por el Consejo más tardar el 31 de cada año.

PDF 15 pág. 3,8 Mb.

5.- INFORME del Parlamento Europeo sobre el Informe anual del Consejo al Parlamento Europeo sobre la politica exterior y de seguridad comun.

El informe de este año constituye un nuevo punto de partida para el Informe anual sobre la PESC, que no ha sido redactado como una revisión del Informe del Consejo sobre la PESC de 2010, sino que pretende ser una aportación a la formulación de un nuevo enfoque estratégico con miras al futuro para la Política Exterior de la Unión Europea.

Asume como punto de partida las ambiciones del Tratado de Lisboa, que establece que «La competencia de la Unión en materia de política exterior y de seguridad común abarcará todos los ámbitos de la política exterior y todas las cuestiones relativas a la seguridad de la Unión, incluida la definición progresiva de una política común de defensa que podrá conducir a una defensa común» (artículo 24, apartado 1,del TUE), lo que representa un importante nivel estratégico de ambición y un marco esencial para desarrollar un enfoque exhaustivo, coherente y sistemático para la política exterior de la Unión.

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Sin embargo, también es importante reconocer el carácter especifico de la formulación y aplicación de los diferentes componentes de la acción exterior de la Unión, como la PESC (y su PCSD), pero también la Política de Vecindad, la Política de Desarrollo y el Comercio Internacional. Este enfoque integral es indispensable para construir un enfoque estratégico y coherente para llevar a cabo la política exterior de la Unión. Para ello es necesaria una mayor coordinación y coordinación en el ámbito de la gestión de crisis civiles y militares con socios importantes como la OTAN, en tanto que para las crisis militares se requiere


resolver las diferencias con Turquía a fin de mejorar la cooperación en el marco de los acuerdos Berlín plus.


6.- INFORME sobre la supuesta utilización de países europeos por la CIA para el transporte y la detención ilegal de presos: seguimiento del informe de la Comisión TDIP del Parlamento Europeo.

Informe elaborado por la Comisión de Libertades civiles, Justicia y Asuntos de Interior en vista a que el Parlamento ha condenado el programa de traslados extraordinarios y detenciones secretas de los Estados Unidos, dirigido por la CIA, que implica numerosas violaciones de los derechos humanos, entre ellas la detención legal y arbitraria, la tortura y otros malos

tratos, violaciones del principio de no devolución y desapariciones forzosas; considerando que su Comisión Temporal sobre la supuesta utilización de países europeos por la CIA para el transporte y la detención ilegal de presos ha documentado el uso del espacio aéreo y el territorio europeo por la CIA, y que desde entonces el Parlamento ha reiterado su exigencia de que se investigue exhaustivamente la colaboración de los gobiernos y organismos nacionales con el programa de la CIA.


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7.- Informe de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo sobre Posibles ventajas y desventajas de una reducción a dos categorías de armas de fuego


(prohibidas o sujetas a autorización), con vistas a un mejor funcionamiento del mercado interior para los productos en cuestión a través de una posible simplificación..

El presente informe responde a uno de los requisitos de la Directiva 91/477/CEE del Consejo, de 18 de junio de 1991, sobre el control de la adquisición y tenencia de armas, modificada por la Directiva 2008/51/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de mayo de 2008.


8.- Proyecto de Informe sobre la Estrategia de Libertad Digital en la Política Exterior de la UE .

Internet y las nuevas tecnologías juegan un papel importante de manera exponencial en las vidas de los europeos y los ciudadanos de todo el mundo. En todo el mundo las tecnologías están cambiando las sociedades, el funcionamiento de nuestras democracias, economías, empresas, medios de comunicación, estrategias de desarrollo, la seguridad y la defensa y en cuestiones de derechos humanos.

Varios Estados miembros de la UE han advertido que el acceso a Internet como un derecho fundamental y la Comisión Europea está de acuerdo en que las libertades digitales son parte de los criterios de Copenhague. En un mundo globalmente conectado, la UE debería tener una estrategia para hacer frente a las nuevas tecnologías en sus acciones exteriores. Hay varias áreas en este mundo digital en que es esencial que la UE actúe como un actor global y aproveche su peso económico y político. Aunque regulación excesiva puede frena una Internet abierta, en algunas zonas las normas deben actualizarse para que coincida con el impacto revolucionario de la evolución tecnológica con la supervisión democrática adecuada.

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Este proyecto de informe apoya el proyecto de la estrategia de Libertad Digital de la UE en sus Acciones exteriores. Un documento de discusión ha sido compartido con los miembros del Parlamento Europeo y puesto en línea para invitar a las


distintas partes interesadas a proporcionar información a través de crowd-sourcing.


9.- Plan de desarrollo plurianual de Capacidades Civiles. Líneas de acción 2012-2013.

Las Misiones civiles han sido instrumentos esenciales en el enfoque integral desde el inicio de la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa (PCSD) hasta ahora. Ha habido numerosos éxitos (por ejemplo, en Aceh, Georgia y Kosovo). A los ojos del mundo, Europa se ha convertido en un productor de seguridad en lugar de un consumidor de la misma. La UE se ha establecido como un actor global en el mantenimiento de la paz y debe seguir desempeñando ese papel. El pleno compromiso de

mantener la participación actual de las misiones de la PCSD y las operaciones en curso así como los acontecimientos recientes en la zona sur de la UE y el desarrollo en África son recordatorios contundentes de que la UE sigue necesitando suficientes capacidades civiles para hacer frente a crisis, y que estas capacidades podría tener que ser desplegados rápidamente.

En respuesta a una tarea del Consejo de diciembre de 2011, el Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior (SEAE) ha establecido un programa de trabajo plurianual, basándose en el trabajo realizado bajo los Objetivos civiles globales. Se compone de un marco estable llamado Plan de desarrollo de capacidades civiles, y líneas de acción para 2012-2013, presentado por separado.

El Plan de Desarrollo de Capacidades Civiles constituye el marco duradero para la PCSD. Cuenta con cuatro pilotos entre sí:

aspiraciones de la UE; Capacidad de Tendencias (término operacional y largo

plazo); Estrategias Nacionales; Lecciones aprendidas con consecuencias en el ámbito de

las capacidades.

17

Esta configuración tiene la ventaja de que puede acomodar modificaciones derivadas de los cambios, el contexto estratégico, el operativo, las variables de retroalimentación y


otros, al tiempo que ofrece un marco estable y un ambiente sostenible para el desarrollo y la planificación de las capacidades civiles de la PCSD. El Plan de desarrollo de capacidades civiles se modela en el desarrollo del Plan de Capacidades Militares (CDP), gestionado por la Agencia Europea de Defensa (EDA), conduce a la identificación entre civiles y militares de sinergias en el desarrollo de capacidades PCSD. Para su realización, se basa en que existen herramientas de apoyo como la base de datos de lecciones compartidas Civil y Militar, el apoyo del entorno de software y el software CDP desarrollado por EDA.


Líneas de Acción 2012 – 2013 del Plan de desarrollo plurianual de Capacidades Civiles


18


NORMATIVA DE INTERÉS

HÉRCULES II Convocatoria de propuestas — OLAF/2012/D5/02 Apoyo técnico a la utilización por las autoridades nacionales de herramientas y métodos de investigación especiales en la lucha contra el fraude y la corrupción y apoyo técnico para reforzar las inspecciones de los contenedores y camiones en las fronteras exteriores de la UE, incluida la lucha contra el contrabando y la falsificación de cigarrillos

El presente anuncio de convocatoria de propuestas se basa en la Decisión no 878/2007/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 23 de julio de 2007, por la que se establece un programa de acción comunitario para la promoción de acciones en el ámbito de la protección de los intereses financieros de la Comunidad (programa Hércules II), DO L 193 de 25 de julio de 2007.

Enlace en el DOUE: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:230:0006:0008:ES:PDF

HÉRCULES II Convocatoria de propuestas — OLAF/2012/D5/03 Formación, seminarios y conferencias — Parte jurídica

El presente anuncio de convocatoria de propuestas se basa en la Decisión no 878/2007/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 23 de julio de 2007, por la que se establece un programa de acción comunitario para la promoción de acciones en el ámbito de la protección de los intereses financieros de la Comunidad (programa Hércules II). La presente convocatoria se refiere a las actividades contempladas en el artículo 1bis, letra b) de la Decisión Hércules II, que consiste en la organización de formación, seminarios y conferencias de apoyo a la lucha contra el fraude, la corrupción y otras actividades ilegales, así como al desarrollo y la aplicación de las políticas de prevención y detección del fraude.

Enlace en el DOUE: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:230:0009:0011:ES:PDF

19

REGLAMENTO DE EJECUCIÓN (UE) No 711/2012 DE LA COMISIÓN de 3 de agosto de 2012 que modifica el Reglamento (UE) no 185/2010, por el que se establecen medidas detalladas para la aplicación de las normas básicas comunes de seguridad aérea,

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:230:0006:0008:ES:PDF







en lo referente a los métodos utilizados para la inspección de personas que no sean pasajeros y de los objetos transportados por esas personas.

Es necesario adoptar disposiciones de aplicación sobre el despliegue de equipos de detección de trazas de explosivos (ETD) y de perros detectores de explosivos para la inspección de personas que no sean pasajeros y de los objetos transportados por esas personas.

Enlace Reglamento en el DOUE: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:209:0001:0003:ES:PDF

Informe semestral de situación sobre la aplicación de la Estrategia de la UE contra la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva (2012/I)

El presente informe de situación abarca las actividades llevadas a cabo en la primera mitad de 2012 en el contexto de la aplicación de la Estrategia de la UE contra la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva (doc. 15708/03) adoptada por el Consejo Europeo en diciembre de 2003, teniendo en cuenta la «Lista actualizada de prioridades» (doc. 10747/08) adoptada por

el Consejo en junio de 2008 y las «Nuevas líneas de actuación» (doc. 17172/97) adoptadas por el Consejo en diciembre de 2008.

Enlace del Informe en el DOUE: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:237:0001:0020:ES:PDF

DECISIÓN DEL CONSEJO de 13 de diciembre de 2011 relativa a la firma, en nombre de la Unión, del Acuerdo entre los Estados Unidos de América y la Unión Europea sobre la utilización y la transferencia de los registros de nombres de los pasajeros al Departamento de Seguridad del Territorio Nacional de los Estados Unidos.

Enlace de la Decisión en el DOUE: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:215:0004:0004:ES:PDF

20

DECISIÓN DEL CONSEJO de 26 de abril de 2012 relativa a la celebración del Acuerdo entre los Estados Unidos de América y la Unión Europea sobre la utilización y la transferencia de los registros de nombres de los pasajeros al Departamento de

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:209:0001:0003:ES:PDF










Seguridad del Territorio Nacional de los Estados Unidos

Se aprueba, en nombre de la Unión, el Acuerdo entre los Estados Unidos de América y la Unión Europea sobre la utilización y la transferencia de los registros de nombres de los pasajeros al Departamento de Seguridad del Territorio Nacional de los Estados Unidos.


ACUERDO entre los Estados Unidos de América y la Unión Europea sobre la utilización y la transferencia de los registros de nombres de los pasajeros al Departamento de Seguridad del Territorio Nacional de los Estados Unidos.

La finalidad del presente Acuerdo es garantizar la seguridad y proteger la vida y la integridad física de las personas.

A tal fin, el presente Acuerdo establece las responsabilidades de las Partes con respecto a las condiciones en que podrán transferirse, tratarse, utilizarse y protegerse los PNR.

Enlace del Acuerdo en el DOUE: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:215:0005:0014:ES:PDF

DECISION 2012/486/PESC DEL CONSEJO de 23 de julio de 2012 relativa a la firma y celebración del Acuerdo entre la Organización Conjunta de Cooperación en Materia de Armamento y la Unión Europea sobre la protección de información clasificada.


ACUERDO entre la Organización Conjunta de Cooperación en Materia de Armamento y la Unión Europea sobre la protección de información clasificada

21

Enlace del Acuerdo en el DOUE: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:229:0002:0005:ES:PDF














22

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13212/12 jw

DG D1B ES

CO�SEJO DE LA U�IÓ� EUROPEA

Bruselas, 28 de agosto de 2012 (29.08) (OR. en)

13212/12

ASIM 102

�OTA DE TRA�SMISIÓ� Emisor: Por el Secretario General de la Comisión Europea,

D. Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU, Director Fecha de recepción: 1 de agosto de 2012 Destinatario: D. Uwe CORSEPIUS,

Secretario General del Consejo de la Unión Europea N.° doc. Ción.: COM(2012) 427 final Asunto: Informe de la Comisión al Consejo y al Parlamento Europeo sobre el

desarrollo de la Red Europea de Migración

Adjunto se remite a las Delegaciones el documento de la Comisión – COM(2012) 427 final.

Adj.: COM(2012) 427 final

ES ES

COMISIÓN EUROPEA

Bruselas, 1.8.2012 COM(2012) 427 final

I�FORME DE LA COMISIÓ� AL CO�SEJO Y AL PARLAME�TO EUROPEO

sobre el desarrollo de la Red Europea de Migración

{SWD(2012) 240 final}

ES 2 ES

I. I�TRODUCCIÓ�

Transcurridos cuatro años desde la adopción de la base jurídica1, corresponde ahora hacer balance de los progresos realizados por la Red Europea de Migración (REM) y estudiar su evolución futura, especialmente en el contexto del próximo Marco Financiero Plurianual para después de 2013.

La Decisión 2008/381/CE del Consejo estableció formalmente la REM2, cuyo objetivo es proporcionar información actualizada, objetiva, fiable y comparable sobre migración y asilo, con el fin de apoyar la elaboración de políticas en estos ámbitos en la Unión Europea. La REM se basa para ello en una red de varios niveles, coordinada por la Comisión Europea, con el apoyo de dos prestadores de servicios, en colaboración con los puntos de contacto nacionales (PCN) establecidos en los Estados miembros3 y Noruega4 que, a su vez, desarrollan redes nacionales con un amplio abanico de agentes interesados. Croacia participa desde hace poco en calidad de observador5. La REM mantiene también a nivel de la UE redes de colaboración con otras organizaciones internacionales o de la UE pertinentes. La orientación política de las actividades de la REM corresponde a un Comité directivo presidido por la Comisión Europea y compuesto por un representante de cada Estado miembro participante y por observadores de Dinamarca, Noruega y del Parlamento Europeo.

II. LAS ACTIVIDADES DE LA REM

La REM lleva a cabo un gran número de actividades para alcanzar sus objetivos, todas encuadradas en un programa de trabajo anual aprobado por su Comité directivo y adoptado por la Comisión6. Actualmente estas actividades engloban:

• Informes políticos anuales, que informan a los responsables políticos de los desarrollos políticos y legislativos (incluidos los de la UE) más significativos, así como de los debates públicos en el ámbito de la migración y el asilo, incluyendo, en la medida de lo posible, las estadísticas pertinentes. Sirven

1 Decisión 2008/381/CE del Consejo, de 14 de mayo de 2008. El presente informe permite también

responder a la obligación establecida en el artículo 13 de dicha Decisión. 2 La REM existe desde 2003, año en que se puso en marcha el proyecto piloto al que sucedió una acción

preparatoria. Información detallada sobre la REM y sus numerosos logros se puede encontrar en la siguiente dirección: http://www.emn.europa.eu.

3 Dinamarca no participó en la adopción de esta Decisión del Consejo, pero está presente de manera informal en las actividades de la REM en calidad de observador.

4 La Decisión de la Comisión C(2010)6171, de 13 de septiembre de 2010, estableció la base de la cooperación administrativa entre la Comisión Europea y el Ministerio de Justicia y la policía del Reino de Noruega en el marco de la participación de Noruega en la Red Europea de las Migraciones. El acuerdo de trabajo entró en vigor el 15 de noviembre de 2010.

5 Desde la firma del Tratado de adhesión con Croacia el 9 de diciembre de 2011, este país participa en la REM con arreglo a la Decisión C(2011)9005 de la Comisión, de 8 de diciembre de 2011, sobre las disposiciones internas de aplicación del procedimiento de información y consulta para la adopción de determinadas decisiones y otras medidas que deban tomarse durante el período que preceda a la adhesión de la República de Croacia.

6 Por ejemplo, el programa de trabajo de la REM para 2012 fue aprobado por la Decisión C(2012)1771 de la Comisión.

http://www.emn.europa.eu./

ES 3 ES

también para el establecimiento de los informes anuales de la Comisión en la materia7.

• Cuestiones ad hoc, que es un instrumento de respuesta que permite recopilar rápidamente información comparativa sobre un tema específico de actualidad. Pueden ser formuladas por la Comisión o por un PCN de la REM y el plazo de respuesta es normalmente de cuatro semanas8.

• Estudios sobre temas políticos pertinentes, que habitualmente incluyen un estudio principal anual, en el que se ofrece una recopilación y un análisis detallado de un tema de interés a medio y largo plazo y se identifican los posibles problemas futuros, y un máximo de tres estudios específicos destinados a responder a las necesidades políticas más inmediatas a corto plazo9.

• Informes de la REM, que presentan sucintamente las principales conclusiones sacadas sobre un tema específico como resultado, por ejemplo, de estudios o de cuestiones ad hoc, en formato destinado a los responsables políticos.

• Boletines de la REM, que proporcionan información actualizada y específica dirigida a los responsables políticos sobre la evolución actual y reciente de la situación a nivel de la UE y de los Estados miembros, incluyendo también las últimas estadísticas disponibles, principalmente de Eurostat10.

• Glosario y tesauro de la REM: el glosario comprende más de 300 palabras y sus traducciones basadas en el acervo de la UE y su finalidad es mejorar la comparabilidad entre los Estados miembros a través de la utilización y la interpretación comunes de los términos y definiciones que contiene; el tesauro permite catalogar y hallar documentos comparables sobre un tema específico de forma coherente y estructurada.

• Informes de situación de la REM, destinados al Parlamento Europeo, al Consejo, a la Comisión, al Comité Económico y Social y al Comité de las

7 Véanse, por ejemplo, los documentos COM (2012) 250 final y SWD (2012) 139 final. 8 Para dar una indicación de la magnitud y el alcance de las cuestiones ad hoc de la REM hay que señalar

que en 2011 se formularon 76 cuestiones individuales y que cada una de ellas recibió, por término medio, más de 17 respuestas al nivel de los Estados miembros, lo que supone más de 1300 cuestiones individuales. Los temas abordados van de las fronteras, la migración económica, el acervo de la UE, la reagrupación familiar, la integración, la protección, la estancia, el retorno, los estudiantes, la trata y visados.

9 En 2012, la REM efectuará un estudio sobre la inmigración de estudiantes internacionales a los Estados miembros de la UE (The Immigration of International Students to the EU ) y estudios específicos sobre abuso del derecho a la reagrupación familiar (Misuse of the Right to Family Reunification), en el marco del Libro Verde [COM (2011) 735], sobre las dificultades encontradas para establecer la identidad de los solicitantes durante el proceso de migración y las prácticas en la materia (Challenges and practices

for establishing applicants’ identity in the migration process), y sobre la movilidad de los nacionales de terceros países en la UE (Intra-EU Mobility of Third-Country ationals).

10 Véase la primera edición anunciada en el sitio Twitter de la DG Asuntos de Interior (@EUHomeAffairs), en la siguiente dirección: http://t.co/FDBAbFuO.

http://t.co/FDBAbFuO


ES 4 ES

Regiones sobre las actividades en curso de la REM y las conclusiones clave de sus diversas contribuciones11.

• Actualizaciones del portal12 de la UE sobre inmigración que garantizan la actualización periódica de la información sobre las políticas y procedimientos13 de inmigración de los Estados miembros. Debido a sus vínculos con los órganos legislativos de los Estados miembros y al conocimiento que tiene de los mismos, la REM está en situación de garantizar las actualizaciones rápidamente, lo que permite asegurar la vigencia del portal de la UE sobre inmigración.

• Cooperación en red que tiene lugar a nivel de la REM, en particular a través de las reuniones periódicas de los PNC; a nivel nacional, con el desarrollo, por los PNC de la REM, de redes nacionales con representantes de todas las partes afectadas, incluidos los responsables políticos nacionales; y a nivel de la UE/internacional, con el fin de desarrollar la coherencia y la coordinación con las estructuras y los instrumentos pertinentes de la UE en el ámbito de las migraciones y el asilo, y mantener relaciones de cooperación estratégica con otras organizaciones, instituciones y redes europeas (de fuera de la UE) que persigan objetivos similares.

• Comunicación y difusión de las realizaciones de la REM, especialmente mediante los informes y boletines de la REM antes citados, así como por medio de sitios web especializados (sitio de la REM14 y sitios nacionales), de una conferencia anual de la REM15 y de presentaciones en acontecimientos (inter)nacionales pertinentes.

La REM elaboraba en el pasado informes estadísticos anuales sobre migración y protección internacional16 que presentaban un análisis de los datos procedentes principalmente de Eurostat, de conformidad con el Reglamento (CE) nº 862/2007. Aunque estos informes eran de gran calidad, adolecían de una cierta obsolescencia debido principalmente a la fecha en la que se facilitaba el acceso a los datos anuales17. Por consiguiente, se decidió poner fin a esta actividad para presentar, principalmente en los boletines de la REM, los últimos datos publicados.

11 El Informe de situación de la REM para 2011 acompaña a este informe con el número SEC(2012) 240.

Para los años anteriores, véanse los documentos SEC(2010)1006 y SEC(2011)1273. 12 http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/ 13 Esta información está disponible en las rúbricas «What do I need before leaving?» y «What do EU

countries do?» 14 http://www.emn.europa.eu 15 La Conferencia de la REM de 2011 se celebró en Varsovia bajo los auspicios de la Presidencia polaca

de la Unión Europea sobre el tema de la migración ilegal. 16 El último informe abarcaba el año 2009 y finalizó en abril de 2012. 17 Mientras que los datos en materia de asilo se presentan mensualmente, los datos sobre inmigración,

emigración, permisos de residencia y ciudadanía se comunican, de conformidad con el Reglamento (CE) nº 862/2007, hasta quince meses después del final del año de referencia (por ejemplo, los datos de 2010 se comunican en la primavera de 2012).

http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/

http://www.emn.europa.eu/

ES 5 ES

El público puede acceder a todos los productos de la REM, principalmente a través de su sitio web y de las publicaciones especializadas de los PCN y de la Comisión. Para los informes o estudios, la metodología seguida se ha basado en la elaboración de especificaciones o modelos comunes que aseguran una mejor comparabilidad y pueden ser utilizados por los PCN de la REM para redactar informes o contribuciones nacionales, normalmente mediante «investigación documental». Estas respuestas nacionales individuales (generalmente 24)18 permiten elaborar un informe de síntesis que reúne y analiza los principales resultados y los sitúa dentro de la perspectiva de la UE, por ejemplo, asociándolos a iniciativas políticas recientes.

III. EVALUACIÓ� EXTER�A

Con el fin de avanzar en el desarrollo de la REM se llevó a cabo una evaluación externa e independiente19 durante la segunda mitad de 2011. Esta evaluación abordó varios aspectos de la REM y de su funcionamiento. En el cuadro siguiente figura un resumen de los resultados.

Cuadro 1: – Resumen general del funcionamiento de la REM

Aspectos positivos Aspectos menos positivos

• Calidad de las contribuciones de la REM (en su mayor parte actualizadas, objetivas, fiables y comparables), a este respecto, merecen mención especial las cuestiones ad

hoc

• Influencia positiva en la elaboración de políticas, especialmente a nivel de la UE, pero también en relación con muchos Estados miembros

• Intensidad de la comunicación en red entre los PCN de la REM y su compromiso con la REM

• Calidad y cantidad de las contribuciones teniendo en cuenta los recursos financieros y humanos disponibles

• Desfases en la producción de la información y comparabilidad limitada, sobre todo en los casos en los que no todos los PCN de la REM hacen una contribución

• Impacto muy limitado en el público en general e incertidumbre en cuanto al papel de la REM

• Visibilidad relativamente baja de la REM (escaso número de consultas del sitio web e inscripciones al boletín) y redes nacionales insuficientemente desarrolladas en algunos países

• Falta de recursos a nivel de la UE en favor del desarrollo de la REM

Los evaluadores consideraron que la REM, en conjunto, funciona adecuadamente y que suministra información pertinente para la elaboración de políticas a nivel de la UE y de los Estados miembros. Entre los aspectos menos positivos señalaron la escasa legibilidad de la información que produce (demasiado extensa) para los responsables políticos, la falta de visibilidad de la REM y el hecho de que la red sea insuficientemente conocida por las demás partes interesadas y los responsables políticos, en particular en las instituciones de la UE.

18 Aunque hay un PCN de la REM en todos los Estados miembros (menos Dinamarca), algunos todavía no

disponen de los recursos de personal necesarios para contribuir a todas las actividades de la REM. 19 Esta evaluación fue realizada por el Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services (CSES) y el informe de

evaluación puede consultarse en: http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/downloads/prepareShowFiles.do? directoryID = 249.

http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/downloads/prepareShowFiles.do?%20directoryID%20=%20249.

ES 6 ES

Se ha formulado una treintena de recomendaciones para mejorar el funcionamiento de la REM. Aun con la evaluación en curso, la REM ya tuvo en cuenta varias recomendaciones para la elaboración del programa de trabajo anual de 2012, en particular la relativa a la necesidad de elaborar una información más pertinente y actualizada y de acompañar dicha información con resúmenes de las conclusiones a la atención, en particular, de los responsables políticos.

IV. LA EVOLUCIÓ� FUTURA DE LA REM

Aunque la REM ya ocupe un lugar prominente en materia de asilo y migración y esté bien considerada, conviene reflexionar sobre el modo de mejorar el logro de sus objetivos. Este apartado recoge la reflexión de la Comisión sobre la evolución futura de la REM en el contexto del Fondo de Asilo y Migración20, aunque algunos de los cambios propuestos puedan aplicarse antes de la entrada en vigor de dicho Reglamento.

La REM ya ha demostrado su capacidad de evolucionar y adaptarse para responder mejor a las expectativas de los responsables políticos. Un factor clave a este respecto es la participación activa de los PCN, designados por sus Estados miembros respectivos, que constituyen los pilares de la REM, y las estrechas relaciones de cooperación que mantienen con la Comisión.

La evolución de la REM, así como la de sus objetivos y funciones, se define en el artículo 23 de la propuesta de Reglamento relativo a la creación del Fondo de Asilo y Migración, por el que se deroga la Decisión 2008/381/CE del Consejo. Los objetivos son:

a) actuar como Consejo Consultivo de la Unión en materia de migración y asilo, mediante la coordinación y cooperación a nivel nacional y de la Unión con los representantes de los Estados miembros, el mundo académico, la sociedad civil, los grupos de reflexión y otras entidades de la Unión/internacionales;

b) satisfacer las necesidades de información en materia de migración y asilo de las instituciones de la Unión y de los Estados miembros, facilitando información objetiva, fiable y comparable sobre migración y asilo, con el fin de apoyar la elaboración de políticas en la Unión Europea en estos ámbitos;

c) facilitar al público en general la información mencionada en la letra b).

El artículo 23 describe también las actividades que deben ser realizadas por la REM para alcanzar dichos objetivos, subraya la necesidad de garantizar la coherencia con la Oficina Europea de Apoyo al Asilo (OEAA)21 y la Agencia FRONTEX22, define la composición de la REM y la asistencia financiera necesaria.

Los apartados siguientes abordarán cada uno de los objetivos descritos más arriba, presentando más detalladamente la visión de la Comisión sobre el futuro de la REM.

20 COM (2011) 751 final. 21 Oficina Europea de Apoyo al Asilo (OEAA), creada por el Reglamento (CE) n° 439/2010. 22 Agencia Europea para la gestión de la cooperación operativa en las fronteras exteriores de los Estados

miembros de la Unión Europea, creada por el Reglamento (CE) n ° 2007/2004 del Consejo.

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IV.1 EL PAPEL DE LA REM

El desarrollo de una política común de la UE en materia de migración hace cada vez más necesaria la recopilación de información objetiva con el fin de establecer y orientar las estrategias políticas sobre la base de datos fiables y de un análisis que incluya una amplia muestra de los distintos puntos de vista. Aunque se dispone de una gran cantidad de información, y no solo procedente de la REM, ésta se presenta a menudo en una forma difícilmente comprensible por los responsables políticos y poco adaptada a sus necesidades inmediatas.

Sería obviamente ventajoso disponer de una fuente europea común a la que los responsables políticos, tanto a nivel nacional como a nivel de las instituciones de la UE, pudieran acceder o que pudieran consultar con objeto de disponer de información fidedigna, incluidas estadísticas, de forma sencilla, factual y objetiva, para poder basar sus decisiones en argumentos sólidos. También es necesario examinar las perspectivas a más largo plazo con el fin de anticipar los problemas potenciales que la UE deberá superar.

La REM se encuentra idealmente situada para satisfacer esta necesidad y dar respuesta a las expectativas de los responsables políticos. Ha demostrado que dispone de una gran experiencia de análisis, tanto a nivel de los Estados miembros como de la UE, y que tiene capacidad para comprender plenamente y poner en contexto la información que procede de los ministerios de los gobiernos, así como de otras fuentes nacionales a través de las grandes redes que ha desarrollado. La fuerza de la comunicación en red entre los PCN de la REM demuestra también que se ha desarrollado una cultura que permite que la situación en un Estado miembro pueda ser comprendida en los demás Estados miembros y en la Comisión.

¿Cuáles son, por lo tanto, los cambios de la REM necesarios? En primer lugar, debe ampliar el alcance de sus fuentes de información en dos frentes: por medio de sus redes nacionales y por medio de sus vínculos con otros organismos de la UE/internacionales pertinentes. Conviene, por consiguiente, reforzar el papel de los PCN de la REM para que cada uno de ellos pueda constituir una plataforma nacional en materia de recopilación y análisis de la información.

Un gran número de PCN de la REM ha realizado esfuerzos considerables por crear una red nacional compuesta por un amplio abanico de partes interesadas y no únicamente por los ministerios nacionales. Se ha dado mayor importancia a las reuniones de las redes nacionales para responder a las cuestiones (de actualidad) pertinentes desde el punto de vista de la política nacional o de la UE y para asociar a los responsables políticos (nacionales). La REM ha facilitado, a través de estas redes nacionales, el suministro de información y el intercambio de impresiones entre, por ejemplo, responsables políticos (nacionales), funcionarios (incluso de distintos ministerios), organizaciones internacionales, investigadores, grupos de reflexión y otros consejeros políticos, ONG y sociedad civil. En algunos Estados miembros nunca se habían reunido antes tantas partes interesadas. Otro elemento a destacar es el desarrollo de diversos sitios web nacionales, que centralizan (a escala nacional), la información en materia

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de asilo y migración, incluidas, en algunos casos, las bases de datos de la legislación y jurisprudencia pertinentes, etc.23.

En consecuencia, las redes nacionales deben ser reconocidas como uno de los elementos constitutivos de la REM y se debería continuar con su desarrollo, por ejemplo, incrementando la participación de sus miembros, incluso puntualmente a título consultivo, cuando se identifique una necesidad de información.

Existe una multitud de organismos distintos que trata de los diversos aspectos del análisis y la investigación en materia de asilo y migración a nivel nacional, de la UE o a nivel internacional24. Cada uno de ellos desempeña un papel especial y se dirige a un público determinado. Para permitir a los responsables políticos aprovechar también la información generada por estos organismos, la REM podrá cooperar más estrechamente con ellos intercambiando información, velando por que sus actividades se complementen y evitando la duplicación de esfuerzos. Si bien esta cooperación se lleva a cabo oficialmente en el seno de la Comisión (en particular, con las DG Eurostat, Investigación e Innovación, Desarrollo y Cooperación, y Empleo y Asuntos Sociales), así como con organismos de la UE tales como la OEAA, FRONTEX o FRA25 (véase la sección IV.4), las relaciones con otros organismos, como el resto de las instituciones de la UE y el Observatorio de África, el Caribe y el Pacífico (ACP) sobre las migraciones, la CDGSI, la CIG, NORFACE, la OIM, la ONU, el Centro de las Políticas Migratorias o la OCDE26, etc., podrían adoptar la forma de estudios o de

23 Véase, por ejemplo, la base de datos de jurisprudencia nacional

(http://194.88.246.195/WD160AWP/WD160Awp.exe/CONNECT/EMN_JURISPRUDENCES) desarrollada por el PCN luxemburgués de la REM, que permite la búsqueda de decisiones recientes de las jurisdicciones administrativas luxemburguesas y cuyo acceso es gratuito para el público en general y los expertos científicos y jurídicos.

24 Una lista de otros organismos pertinentes puede consultarse en http://www.emn.europa.eu en «usefull

links». 25 Agencia de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, creada por el Reglamento (CE) nº

168/2007. 26 GDISC (Conferencia de Directores Generales de los Servicios de Inmigración); CIG (Consultas

intergubernamentales sobre políticas de asilo, refugiados y migración); NORFACE ( ew Opportunities

for Research Funding Agency Co-operation in Europe); OIM (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones); ONU (Organización de las Naciones Unidas, en particular de su división encargada de las estadísticas demográficas); OCDE (Organización de Cooperación y Desarrollo Económico).

http://194.88.246.195/WD160AWP/WD160Awp.exe/CONNECT/EMN_JURISPRUDENCES








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reflexiones sobre asuntos concretos. Esto permitiría también introducir la perspectiva con la que se aborda un tema específico desde el resto del mundo o desde fuera de la UE (a nivel regional) y establecer un vínculo con la dimensión migratoria de las políticas de la UE en materia de desarrollo, a fin de garantizar la coherencia y las sinergias necesarias, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la definición de la cooperación con países prioritarios en el ámbito de la dimensión exterior de la política de la UE en materia de migración.

La REM deberá intensificar sus esfuerzos para mejorar la forma en que se explota la información publicada por estos organismos, aunque para ello serían necesarios recursos adicionales. Ya existe una experiencia positiva en la materia como, por ejemplo, el estudio de la REM sobre la respuesta de la migración a las necesidades de la demanda laboral (Satisfying

Labour Demand through Migration), que recibió las contribuciones y colaboración de Eurocities y la OIM.

En la misma línea, y aunque Dinamarca no participa oficialmente en la REM, se han emprendido algunas iniciativas para asociarla y dicho Estado ha participado en determinadas actividades y reuniones de la REM. Deben adoptarse nuevas medidas que permitan definir las modalidades de una participación más activa de Dinamarca sobre la base de la experiencia adquirida con la integración de Noruega en la REM.

IV.2 SUMI�ISTRO DE I�FORMACIÓ� A FI� DE APOYAR LA ELABORACIÓ� DE POLÍTICAS

Por otra parte, la REM deberá seguir mejorando la pertinencia de la información, así como la forma en que la comunica. La evaluación externa señaló que, si bien la pertinencia, calidad y valor añadido de los productos de la REM son elevados, sigue existiendo un margen de mejora, especialmente en lo que se refiere a sus informes de síntesis. Los informes de síntesis deberían ser menos descriptivos y analíticos y destacar con más claridad los principales mensajes y las repercusiones políticas para los grupos destinatarios. También sería necesaria una cierta flexibilidad que permita seleccionar un tema de estudio en un año determinado en función de la actualidad política.

La REM debe seguir facilitando información actualizada, objetiva, fiable y comparable, pero debe incrementar su flexibilidad y capacidad de adaptación para responder mejor a las necesidades de los responsables políticos. Aunque la REM haya evolucionado positivamente realizando estudios pertinentes y útiles para los responsables políticos, gracias al papel crucial del Comité directivo a este respecto, es preciso seguir mejorando por lo que respecta a la rapidez y la concisión de la información presentada.

La REM ha integrado ya estas recomendaciones en su programa de trabajo de 2012, modificando sensiblemente su funcionamiento, en particular al insistir más en la explotación de la abundante información de que ya dispone, introduciendo estudios específicos27, elaborando informes propios28 destinados a facilitar las principales conclusiones de una actividad dada a los responsables políticos e introduciendo los boletines de información de la REM.

27 Véase la nota a pie de página nº 9. 28 Difundida y publicada en el sitio web de la Red Europea de Migración en la sección «EM Informs».

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IV.3 I�FORMACIÓ� AL PÚBLICO E� GE�ERAL

Otro de los cambios que debería introducir la REM se refiere a la manera en que presenta sus resultados para informar al público en general. La migración constituye hoy un tema controvertido y ampliamente debatido en la UE y a veces informaciones incorrectas o engañosas alimentan la polémica. Existe, a nivel de los Estados miembros, una serie de buenas prácticas relativas a la presentación accesible, objetiva e imparcial de la información29, algunas de las cuales se elaboraron con la participación de los correspondientes PCN. Estas buenas prácticas no existen a nivel de la UE, por lo que la REM debería asumir esta función, por ejemplo utilizando medios de comunicación modernos (tales como los medios de comunicación sociales o un sitio web interactivo) para exponer brevemente los hechos sobre un tema específico a los medios de comunicación y a otros multiplicadores de información. Los miembros nacionales de la red deberían también contribuir a la difusión de la información.

Ello es totalmente compatible con la orientación de la REM hacia la producción de resultados más específicos, en el marco de su función de consejo consultivo, en particular a través del desarrollo y la promoción de su sitio web y de los sitios nacionales como fuentes de información fáciles de usar. Otro aspecto que se puede destacar a este respecto es la necesidad de la REM de proporcionar la actualización de información objetiva en tiempo útil que permita a la Comisión y a los Estados miembros reforzar su base de información.

IV.4 REFUERZO DE LOS VÍ�CULOS CO� LAS AGE�CIAS DE LA UE

El asilo, la inmigración y la integración constituyen elementos de la migración y están, por su propia naturaleza, estrechamente vinculados. La ventaja que ofrece la REM a este respecto es su capacidad de analizar un tema relacionado con la migración haciendo uso del más variado peritaje disponible en los Estados miembros. Por lo tanto puede apoyar de forma útil a otros organismos de la UE, y en particular a las agencias.

Dado que la OEAA también analiza la situación de la UE en materia de asilo, convendría reforzar la colaboración con ella para evitar solapamientos, garantizar la coherencia y la complementariedad y aumentar así la capacidad de ambas entidades. Por ejemplo, sobre la base de la experiencia adquirida con la FRA, la REM y la OEAA podrían realizar un estudio conjunto sobre un tema relacionado con las cuestiones de asilo abordando aspectos distintos pero complementarios30. Otra posibilidad sería que la OEAA facilite una contribución a la REM en el marco del informe político anual, fundamentalmente información para la elaboración del informe anual de la Comisión sobre inmigración y asilo.

29 Véanse, por ejemplo, las páginas Migration Observatory (http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk),

del Reino Unido, y Migración en cifras (http://123.emn.lt/) de Lituania. 30 La REM, por ejemplo, emprendió en 2011 un estudio sobre los estatutos de protección armonizados de

fuera de la UE.

http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/

http://123.emn.lt/

http://123.emn.lt/






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También deben desarrollarse aun más las relaciones con FRONTEX. La promoción de sinergias entre la REM y FRONTEX podría reconciliar las necesidades en materia de gestión de las fronteras y las consideraciones socioeconómicas, reuniendo un gran número de expertos de ámbitos distintos pero complementarios, lo que permitiría cubrir todas las cuestiones de migración y asilo. A título ilustrativo, la red de análisis de riesgos de FRONTEX (FRAN) produce un análisis trimestral de las tendencias migratorias en las fronteras exteriores de la Unión.31 La REM podría sacar aún más provecho de esta información, por ejemplo en el marco de un análisis completo de la migración ilegal o de un análisis más amplio de los flujos migratorios.

La REM tiene ya relaciones estrechas con la FRA que se han ido desarrollando desde hace varios años. Las distintas funciones y responsabilidades de ambos organismos hacen que sus actividades respectivas sean a menudo muy complementarias y la participación regular de un representante de la FRA en las reuniones de la REM permite a ambos organismos estar informados de los trabajos del otro. Se puede citar, para ilustrar esta complementariedad, la realización paralela de estudios sobre los menores no acompañados/niños separados32 y la migración ilegal33.

IV.5 ESTRUCTURA �ECESARIA PARA RESPO�DER A ESTOS �UEVOS RETOS

La REM funciona como una auténtica red europea formada por la Comisión, los Estados miembros de la UE y Noruega, aunque no tiene estatuto jurídico. Si bien es cierto que esta estructura atípica plantea algunas dificultades, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la financiación de los PCN de la REM, ha garantizado un vínculo más estrecho con la agenda política de la Comisión. Funciona también muy bien en la práctica. Por tanto, no es necesario considerar una modificación de la actual estructura de la REM.

Asimismo, una ventaja fundamental de la REM, también destacada por la evaluación externa, es su heterogeneidad. El artículo 5, apartado 1, de la Decisión del Consejo por la que se crea la REM obliga a cada Estado miembro (a excepción de Dinamarca) a designar la entidad que actúe de PCN de la REM. Aunque la mayoría de los PCN de la REM proceden fundamentalmente del ministerio competente para las cuestiones de asilo y migración del Estado miembro correspondiente, algunos proceden de institutos de investigación o de oficinas nacionales de la OIM, aunque en estrecha colaboración con el ministerio competente. La experiencia demuestra que no es necesario cambiar esta configuración. No obstante, debería dotarse de recursos suficientes a los Estados miembros cuyos PCN de la REM no

31 Véase http://frontex.europa.eu/publications?c=risk-analysis 32 Policies on Reception, Return and Integration arrangements for, and numbers of, Unaccompanied

Minors (REM, mayo de 2010) y Separated, asylum-seeking children in European Union Member States (FRA, noviembre de 2010). Ambos informes sirvieron para elaborar el Plan de acción sobre los menores no acompañados [COM (2010) 213].

33 Practical Measures for Reducing Irregular Migration (REM, abril de 2012) y Fundamental rights of

migrants in an irregular situation in the European Union (FRA, noviembre de 2011).

http://frontex.europa.eu/publications?c=risk-analysis




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estén actualmente en condiciones de participar y contribuir plenamente al conjunto de las actividades de la REM.

Es preciso adaptar algunos aspectos del Comité directivo de la REM. Aunque ha demostrado su utilidad en el establecimiento de un vínculo más estrecho entre las actividades de la REM y las necesidades de los responsables políticos, pueden introducirse una serie de mejoras. Convendría sobre todo garantizar que el Comité directivo se centra cada vez más en ofrecer orientaciones estratégicas para asegurar la pertinencia de las actividades de la REM para los responsables políticos. Debe encargarse de que, por ejemplo, las partes implicadas (en particular los tríos de las Presidencias de la UE, los Estados miembros, la Comisión Europea y el Parlamento Europeo) alineen sus prioridades estratégicas y los miembros del Consejo de Administración deben ser de un nivel lo suficientemente alto para proporcionar las orientaciones políticas necesarias. El Parlamento Europeo, así como Dinamarca y Noruega, deben conservar su estatuto de observador en el Comité directivo. La separación entre los miembros del Comité directivo y su respectivo PCN de la REM34 debe ser más clara de manera que se evite cualquier conflicto de intereses y que el Comité directivo pueda pedir de forma más enérgica a los Estados miembros que refuercen las capacidades de los PCN poco o nada eficaces, identificados en función de indicadores comunes de rendimiento35. Además, el Comité directivo debe tratar de promover aún más el vínculo entre la investigación y el proceso de toma de decisiones, por ejemplo, destacando la incidencia de las conclusiones del REM sobre las políticas y prácticas actuales y futuras en materia de migración.

V. CO�CLUSIO�ES

La utilidad de la REM a la hora de prestar apoyo a los responsables políticos ha ido en aumento. En particular en el contexto del próximo Marco Financiero Plurianual, las mejoras definidas en el presente informe deberían permitir a la REM desempeñar más eficazmente su importante función. Trabajando sobre la sólida base de que ya dispone, la Comisión está convencida de que la REM se adaptará una vez más para hacer frente a los nuevos retos.

La Comisión desea poder debatir la futura evolución de la REM, en particular con las demás instituciones de la Unión y con los Estados miembros, sobre la base del presente informe.

34 Actualmente, alrededor de 12 Estados miembros del Comité directivo forman también parte del PCN de

la REM de su Estado miembro. 35 Podría tratarse, en particular, de las contribuciones a estudios e informes, del número de respuestas a

cuestiones ad hoc, el nivel de desarrollo de las redes nacionales y actividades de difusión, la intensidad del trabajo en red a nivel de la UE (tal como se refleja, por ejemplo, en la asistencia a las reuniones o las respuestas a solicitudes específicas) u otros aspectos de los programas de trabajo.

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COMISIÓN EUROPEA


INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN AL CONSEJO Y AL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

Informe anual de 2012 sobre las políticas de la Unión Europea en materia de desarrollo y ayuda exterior y su aplicación en 2011

{SWD(2012) 242 final}

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INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN AL CONSEJO Y AL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

Informe anual de 2012 sobre las políticas de la Unión Europea en materia de desarrollo y ayuda exterior y su aplicación en 2011

ACEPTAR NUEVOS RETOS

En 2011 se dio respuesta a nuevos retos y se encontraron nuevas soluciones para los ya existentes. La Primavera Árabe –como se ha llamado a los movimientos populares que se han registrado en los países vecinos meridionales de la UE– ha impulsado la reivindicación de más democracia y de una mayor justicia social. A medida que evolucionó la situación en el mundo árabe, a la ayuda humanitaria y a las medidas de protección civil iniciales de la UE le sucedieron una ayuda y estrategias específicas adaptadas a estos países y dirigidas a apoyar reformas sostenibles y un desarrollo económico integrador. En el África subsahariana, la UE dio la bienvenida al nacimiento del Estado más joven del mundo, Sudán del Sur con un paquete de ayuda.

En su calidad de mayor donante de ayuda del mundo, con más del 50 % de la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD) mundial, la UE y sus Estados miembros reiteraron su compromiso a largo plazo con la reducción de la pobreza. La Comunicación «Reforzar el impacto de la cooperación al desarrollo de la UE – un Programa para el Cambio» 1 insistió en el apoyo a la lucha contra la pobreza, a la democracia, a la buena gobernanza y al desarrollo sostenible e integrador, así como en la necesidad de ofrecer ayuda allí donde sea más necesaria y tenga mayor impacto. Esta Comunicación tiene una resonancia particular, dada la difícil situación económica en la eurozona. El acontecimiento más importante en materia de desarrollo a escala mundial – el Foro de Alto Nivel de Busan, Corea del Sur, de noviembre de 2011 – también hizo hincapié en la mejora de la eficacia y la coordinación y el uso de los sistemas nacionales de «país» para la entrega de la ayuda. Al Programa para el Cambio vino a sumarse el futuro enfoque del apoyo presupuestario de la UE a terceros países2, que constituye uno de los instrumentos más importantes de la UE para conferir un mayor impacto a la ayuda y obtener mejores resultados de la misma. En diciembre de 2011 se publicaron las nuevas propuestas de financiación de la ayuda exterior y al desarrollo, parte del Marco Financiero Plurianual (2014-2020), en las que se establecen los planes de gasto para las nuevas prioridades.

Programa para el cambio: la modernización de la política de desarrollo de la UE

Los elementos fundamentales del Programa para el Cambio son, por una parte, los derechos humanos, la democracia y la buena gobernanza y, por otra, el crecimiento sostenible e integrador. Este crecimiento sostenible e integrador se estimulará a través de la promoción de la integración social y del desarrollo humano, el trabajo digno, la integración regional y empresarial, la agricultura sostenible, el suministro de energía y el acceso a la misma. Se propone un enfoque diferenciado. Esto significa que, en el contexto del próximo Marco Financiero Plurianual de la UE, algunos países, especialmente los que ya son en la actualidad donantes de pleno derecho, dejarán de de recibir ayuda o recibirán menos. A estos países se les ofrecerán formas alternativas de cooperación. Este nuevo enfoque permitirá a la UE estar

1 COM(2011) 637 final. 2 COM(2011) 638 final.

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mucho mejor situada para promover y defender sus valores fundamentales y respetar sus compromisos internacionales con sus vecinos, especialmente con los que están en vías de adhesión a la UE y con los países en proceso de transición, así como con los más pobres y vulnerables del mundo.

Otras características de la nueva política son la mejora de la coordinación de los donantes, en particular de los Estados miembros de la UE, para evitar la duplicación de esfuerzos y garantizar mayor coherencia e impacto. La UE dará prioridad a los sectores con mayor capacidad para reducir la pobreza, como la gobernanza, la protección social, la salud, la educación, el empleo, la agricultura y la energía. En el futuro, la ayuda bilateral a los países se destinará a un máximo de tres sectores3. Instrumentos innovadores como la combinación de subvenciones y préstamos y la inclusión del sector privado también forman parte de la actualización de la política.

Por lo que se refiere a la revisión del mandato exterior del Banco Europeo de Inversiones, la Comisión está estudiando el posible establecimiento de una plataforma de la UE para la cooperación y el desarrollo con vistas a optimizar los mecanismos para la combinación de subvenciones y préstamos en las regiones situadas fuera de la UE4.

La energía genera reducción de la pobreza

La energía es importante para la reducción de la pobreza al permitir cubrir necesidades básicas como la preparación de alimentos, la sanidad, la vivienda, la comunicación y el empleo digno. También es una fuente de ingresos y crea oportunidades de negocio. Con aproximadamente 2 000 millones EUR de subvenciones asignadas al sector de la energía en los países en desarrollo en los últimos siete años, la UE ocupa una posición de liderazgo en la contribución al desarrollo de la energía en todo el mundo. Instrumentos de la UE, como el Fondo ACP-UE para la Energía, el programa de la UE sobre energías renovables y el Fondo Fiduciario UE-África para Infraestructuras se han utilizado para financiar proyectos individuales en todo el continente africano. La Comisión desea aumentar los niveles de financiación del sector mediante la incorporación del sector privado y de los bancos de desarrollo a futuros proyectos. El Comisario Europeo de Desarrollo es parte del Grupo de Alto nivel de las Naciones Unidas sobre Energía Sostenible para Todos, creado por el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas Ban Ki-Moon con el objetivo de movilizar fondos de todos los sectores de la sociedad para programas relacionados con la energía. La energía es también un sector clave del Programa para el Cambio.

Apoyo presupuestario – un vector de cambio

La Comunicación sobre el nuevo enfoque del apoyo presupuestario de la UE, publicada junto con las propuestas del Programa para el Cambio en octubre de 2011, afinó el uso de esta herramienta de desarrollo como vector de cambio. El apoyo presupuestario comprende un diálogo político, las transferencias financieras a la cuenta del Tesoro nacional del país socio, la evaluación de los resultados y el desarrollo de las capacidades, todo ello sobre la base de la colaboración y la responsabilidad mutua. El nuevo enfoque facilitará una mayor diferenciación de las operaciones de apoyo presupuestario, permitiendo a la UE responder mejor al contexto político, económico y social del país socio. La UE hará mayor hincapié en

3 Con la posible excepción de los países candidatos y candidatos potenciales a la adhesión a la UE

financiados por el Instrumento de Ayuda Preadhesión 4 Decisión 2011/1080/CE

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la responsabilidad mutua y el compromiso conjunto con los derechos humanos, la democracia y el Estado de Derecho, así como con la transparencia y la supervisión del presupuesto.

Un nuevo marco financiero

Las propuestas de la Comisión de junio de 2011 del Marco Financiero Plurianual (MFP) para el período 2014-2020 se basaron en las propuestas de «Un presupuesto para Europa 2020»5 que destacaban las áreas en las que la UE podría desempeñar un papel importante en un mundo cada vez más globalizado. La UE mantiene su compromiso con el logro de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio y la consecución del objetivo de destinar el 0,7 % de la renta nacional bruta (RNB) a Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD) para 2015. Para ello, se ha propuesto el aumento de la dotación presupuestaria de la acción exterior, pasando de 56 800 millones EUR a 70 000 millones EUR, y un mayor despliegue de instrumentos financieros innovadores (como préstamos, garantías, fondos de capital propio e instrumentos de riesgo compartido) destinados a catalizar la inversión privada y reforzar las instituciones de los países beneficiarios. También se ha propuesto que el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo (FED) para 79 Estados de África, el Caribe y el Pacífico (ACP) pase de 23 000 millones EUR por seis años, a 30 300 millones EUR por siete años (a precios de 2011) y siga siendo financiado directamente por los Estados miembros de la UE.

Toma de decisiones conjunta

2011 fue el primer año de funcionamiento del Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior (SEAE) bajo la autoridad de la Alta Representante de la Unión para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad (AR). En 2011, el SEAE trabajó con los servicios de la Comisión en una respuesta común a las crisis de Libia y Túnez y en la elaboración de propuestas sobre el nuevo Marco Financiero Plurianual. La red mundial formada por las 140 Delegaciones de la UE lleva a cabo un trabajo político, diplomático y estratégico para la UE y proporciona apoyo a los Estados miembros mediante actividades como la elaboración de informes conjuntos. A medida que se reducen algunos servicios diplomáticos nacionales para concentrar sus recursos en otras prioridades, el valor añadido de las Delegaciones de la UE radica en garantizar la adecuada representación de la UE en todo el mundo. No se trata de sustituir los servicios diplomáticos nacionales, sino de hacer un uso más rentable y eficaz de los recursos y de aumentar el papel de la UE a escala mundial.

La Primavera Árabe – Una respuesta a los vecinos del Sur

En marzo de 2011, la UE confirmó su ayuda a las poblaciones de los países del Mediterráneo meridional para alcanzar un mayor respeto de los derechos humanos, más democracia y una vida mejor. Ofreció una «Asociación para la Democracia y la Prosperidad Compartida» a los vecinos del Sur en el contexto de la Política Europea de Vecindad (PEV). Se trata de una estrategia basada en incentivos a través de la cual se apoya a los socios que se hayan comprometido a introducir reformas y se establece un vínculo más estrecho entre el enfoque estratégico y el programa de ayuda financiera. Esto condujo a la reorientación de 600 millones EUR en la vecindad meridional hacia los objetivos fijados en la asociación: transformación democrática, participación de la población y la sociedad civil, y un crecimiento sostenible e integrador.

5 COM(2011) 500 final.

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Un importe adicional de 1 000 millones EUR procedentes del presupuesto de la UE se pone a disposición de los países socios de la PEV para apoyar la aplicación de la nueva Comunicación «Una nueva respuesta a una vecindad cambiante», de mayo de 2011. La mayor parte de esos recursos adicionales (670 millones EUR) se canalizará a través de dos programas marco: SPRING (apoyo a las reformas y al crecimiento integrador) en la vecindad meridional (540 millones EUR para el periodo 2011-2013) y EaPIC (Programa de integración y de cooperación de la Asociación Oriental) en los países vecinos del Este (130 millones EUR para el período 2012-2013).

El resto de la financiación adicional se ha asignado en su mayor parte a programas de educación superior (Tempus, Erasmus Mundus, etc.) y a prestar ayuda a organizaciones de la sociedad civil y a agentes no estatales. Se creó un Instrumento para la Sociedad Civil con el fin reforzar la capacidad de la PEV de promover la reforma y la rendición de cuentas en las vecindades meridional y oriental de la UE, con un presupuesto de 26,4 millones EUR para 2011. También se preparó otro programa, «Seguridad de las inversiones en la región mediterránea (ISMED)», para responder a los cruciales acontecimientos de la Primavera Árabe.

En todo el mundo

En 2011, para reforzar sus vínculos en todo el mundo, la UE utilizó y desarrolló toda la gama de acuerdos de cooperación, de comercio y de asociación y los instrumentos especializados de que dispone.

La independencia de Sudán del Sur en julio de 2011 dio lugar a la apertura de una nueva Delegación de la UE en Yuba, su capital. Los Estados miembros de la UE y la Comisión acordaron mejorar la coordinación y la coherencia de la ayuda mediante la programación conjunta de 800 millones EUR de fondos en un único documento estratégico para el periodo 2011-2013, centrado en la salud, la educación, el desarrollo rural, la promoción del Estado de Derecho y la mejora del acceso al agua y al saneamiento. De esta cantidad, 200 millones EUR proceden del FED.

Los acontecimientos en el norte de África han tenido también repercusiones a corto e incluso a largo plazo en los vecinos del sur de esa región, y en particular en el Sahel y países vecinos. A través de su Instrumento de Estabilidad (IE), la UE reaccionó frente a las peticiones de apoyo inmediato a los esfuerzos de estabilización en esta región, incluso abordando las necesidades relacionadas con los medios de subsistencia de los migrantes retornados (en particular, procedentes de Libia) y de otros grupos de población. La Estrategia de la UE para la seguridad y el desarrollo del Sahel abordó los impactos a largo plazo en la seguridad y el desarrollo de la región. Un paquete de ayuda inicial de 150 millones EUR se dividió entre Mali, Mauritania y Níger para actividades de desarrollo y gobernanza que incluían el refuerzo de sus respectivos sistemas judiciales. La región continúa haciendo frente a desafíos múltiples e interrelacionados: pobreza extrema, efectos del cambio climático, frecuentes crisis alimentarias, rápido crecimiento de la población, frágil gobernanza, corrupción, tensiones internas no resueltas, riesgo de extremismo violento y radicalización, tráfico ilícito y amenazas a la seguridad de carácter terrorista.

Las crisis alimentarias en el Cuerno de África se revelaron como uno de los mayores nuevos retos de la región en 2011. La UE proporcionó fondos adicionales para Etiopía (13,75 millones EUR), Yibuti (alrededor de 4,5 millones EUR) y Somalia (25 millones EUR). En noviembre de 2011 se aprobó un nuevo marco estratégico para el Cuerno de África que

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incluyó el nombramiento del primer representante de la Unión Europea en la región, cuyo mandato inicial se centró en Somalia y en la piratería endémica de la región. La UE también reforzó su ayuda a Costa de Marfil mediante la concesión de 125 millones EUR para ayudar a las nuevas autoridades bajo la Presidencia de Alassane Ouattara a restablecer la estabilidad política y económica. También se progresó en la aplicación del segundo plan de acción de la estrategia conjunta África-UE (JAES) y sus ocho asociaciones temáticas. La plataforma para el diálogo África-UE sobre gobernanza y derechos humanos presentó propuestas sobre la gobernanza de los recursos naturales en situaciones de conflicto y de postconflicto, apoyando medidas más recientes de la UE sobre la transparencia de las actividades de las industrias extractivas y forestal en África.

A lo largo de 2011, se prestó gran atención a los países vecinos del Este, que perciben la UE como un socio, un catalizador de la reforma y un imán de oportunidades económicas. La segunda cumbre de la Asociación Oriental, celebrada en Varsovia los días 29 y 30 de septiembre de 2011, sirvió de escenario a la renovación de los compromisos entre la UE y sus vecinos orientales, y la primera comprometió recursos adicionales por un importe de hasta 130 millones EUR para el periodo 2012-2013 para los países socios que emprendan reformas. Una conferencia internacional organizada por Ucrania con motivo del 25º aniversario del accidente nuclear de Chernóbil dio lugar a la asignación de una cantidad adicional de 550 millones EUR para construir una nueva estructura de confinamiento segura y proteger a la población y al medio ambiente de los daños sufridos por el sarcófago de la unidad 4 de Chernóbil. La UE comprometió un importe adicional de 110 millones EUR en virtud de un Instrumento de Cooperación en materia de Seguridad Nuclear.

Para Asia Central, la UE es un aliado político muy cercano y un socio fiable en el que pueden confiar para impulsar el difícil proceso de transición en el que se han embarcado. Es también una fuente de oportunidades económicas. En la reunión de los Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de La UE y Asia Central de Tashkent de 7 de abril de 2011, ambos socios renovaron su compromiso con los objetivos y la aplicación de la Estrategia de la UE y Asia Central y decidieron consagrar los recursos disponibles para el período 2012-2013 a reformas cruciales del ámbito político y socioeconómico.

La Cumbre UE-América Latina/Caribe (ALC) celebrada en Madrid en mayo de 2010 marcó el refuerzo de las relaciones políticas con la región ALC. Se celebró el primer Acuerdo de Asociación interregional con América Central y se puso en marcha un acuerdo comercial multilateral con Colombia y Perú. Las negociaciones de un acuerdo de asociación entre la UE y la Organización del Mercado Común de América del Sur, MERCOSUR, han avanzado considerablemente. En noviembre de 2011 también se inauguró la sede central de la Fundación UE-ALC en Hamburgo, Alemania.

La UE también intensificó sus relaciones con la Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste Asiático (ASEAN) y reforzó los lazos bilaterales con los diez miembros el bloque a través de la negociación y aplicación de acuerdos bilaterales de asociación y cooperación (ACC) y de acuerdos de libre comercio (ALC). Proyecto de gran éxito financiado por la UE para el conjunto de la región asiática, SWITCH Asia es un programa multidisciplinar que fomenta la producción y el consumo sostenibles a través de la financiación de una serie de pequeños proyectos en todo el continente. Al tiempo que promueve la economía verde, contribuye a la reducción de la pobreza y a la mejora de la calidad de vida (Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM) 1 y 7).

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En la región del Caribe se continuó con un gran número de iniciativas lanzadas en 2010. Se elaboró el borrador final de la Estrategia Conjunta UE-Caribe, en fase de debate en la Cumbre UE-Cariforum de 2010, con vistas a su tramitación institucional. Se espera que se dé a conocer en el transcurso de 2012. Siguió adelante la aplicación del Acuerdo Económico y de Asociación UE-Cariforum (AEA). El tan esperado Fondo Fiduciario Caribeño para Infraestructuras fue aprobado por el Comité del FED en la forma de un Mecanismo de Inversión para el Caribe que se pondrá en marcha en 2012.

El cambio climático es la mayor amenaza para la región del Pacífico y está poniendo a prueba su capacidad para alcanzar los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio. Para dar continuidad a la iniciativa UE-Pacífico sobre cambio climático, lanzada en diciembre de 2010, el Comisario de Desarrollo de la UE se reunió con los Ministros del Pacífico en una conferencia regional de alto nivel (Vanuatu, marzo de 2011), que dio lugar a un compromiso reforzado en favor de la cooperación al desarrollo de alto impacto destinado a luchar contra el cambio climático, y a favorecer la reducción de la pobreza, la promoción de los derechos humanos, la democracia y la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres, así como a lograr todos los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio. La Comisión y la Alta Representante tienen previsto presentar en 2012 una Comunicación conjunta titulada «Hacia una asociación renovada para el desarrollo UE-Pacífico».

A lo largo de 2011, la UE continuó asumiendo el liderazgo en la lucha contra el cambio climático a escala mundial y trabajando para avanzar en las negociaciones internacionales en este ámbito. Cumplió sus compromisos de financiación de aplicación rápida e intensificó sus actividades diplomáticas en el área del cambio climático de cara a la celebración de la Conferencia sobre el clima de la ONU celebrada en Durban, Sudáfrica, en noviembre de 2011.

La UE, fuente de proyectos hídricos

Entre 2004 y 2012, la UE cofinanció 272 proyectos en el marco del Fondo para el Agua de la ACP con el fin de mejorar el suministro de agua, la higiene y el saneamiento y la gobernanza del agua en los Estados de África, Caribe y Pacífico (países ACP). El mecanismo fue creado con 700 millones EUR de financiación de la UE y una subvención de 12 millones EUR del Gobierno español.

La Iniciativa para el Agua de la Unión Europea (EUWI, en sus siglas en inglés) de alcance más amplio, lanzada en 2002, sigue intentando movilizar recursos a favor del agua y del saneamiento a partir de diversas fuentes. Desde 2004, la UE ya ha ayudado a más de 32 millones de personas a acceder a un mejor suministro de agua y a más de 9 millones de personas a disponer de instalaciones de saneamiento. Partiendo de los logros de la iniciativa para el Agua de la UE y del Fondo para el Agua UE-ACP, la UE seguirá prestando apoyo a la cooperación internacional y fomentando enfoques innovadores que refuercen el vínculo entre el agua y otros sectores, tales como la agricultura y la energía.

En el Programa para el Cambio, la Comisión destacó que las nuevas políticas deberán hacer frente a las desigualdades y, en particular, mejorar el acceso de los pobres a la tierra, al agua y a la energía sin perjudicar el medio ambiente. Se han comprometido alrededor de 3 000 millones EUR en total para cubrir actividades relacionadas con proyectos de agua y saneamiento entre 2003 y 2010. A lo largo de este periodo, la ayuda al desarrollo de la UE en el sector del agua y el saneamiento se ha triplicado prácticamente.

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Consecución de los ODM

El informe anual de 2011 explica cómo los proyectos y programas de la UE contribuyen a la consecución de los ODM en distintos continentes y regiones. La UE ha puesto en pie programas y ha desarrollado instrumentos específicos para hacer más asequibles los ODM, incluidos aquellos en los que se registran mayores retrasos, como son la mortalidad infantil y materna. A finales de 2011 se adoptó el primer componente de la Iniciativa para los OMD, lanzada en septiembre de 2010 con un presupuesto de 1 000 millones EUR. Se centra en los países más alejados de sus Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio. El Mecanismo Alimentario de la UE también mejora la seguridad alimentaria y la nutrición. A finales de 2011, este mecanismo de la UE, con una dotación de 1 000 millones EUR, había financiado 134 proyectos ejecutados por ONG, Estados miembros de la UE y agencias, 69 proyectos ejecutados por organizaciones internacionales, tres proyectos regionales y diez medidas de apoyo presupuestario.

Entre las prioridades de cooperación de la UE incluidas en el Programa para el Cambio también se encuentran la agricultura sostenible, la seguridad alimentaria y la nutrición. Con vistas a ayudar a los países a alcanzar el ODM3 referido a la igualdad de género, el programa temático de la UE «Invertir en las personas» financió en 2011 dos grandes iniciativas en la materia: una sobre la emancipación social y económica de las mujeres y un nuevo programa de las Naciones Unidas sobre el aumento de la rendición de cuentas de la financiación de la igualdad de género.

El refuerzo de los derechos humanos y la buena gobernanza

En 2011, la UE utilizó sus instrumentos y políticas exteriores para proteger y promover los derechos humanos y la buena gobernanza y para combatir la desigualdad entre mujeres y hombres. En diciembre de 2011, la Comisión y la Alta Representante presentaron la Comunicación conjunta «Derechos humanos y democracia en el centro de la acción exterior de la UE: hacia un enfoque más eficaz»6. Al tiempo que reafirma el enfoque de la UE en materia de derechos humanos, pretende adaptar la promoción de los derechos humanos a las condiciones locales y contempla el modo en que podría explotarse el peso colectivo de la UE. Por otra parte, de conformidad con las propuestas del nuevo Marco Financiero Plurianual, se reforzará el Instrumento Europeo para la Democracia y los Derechos Humanos, que incluirá una propuesta para reforzar el apoyo a la sociedad civil en todo el mundo.

Un planteamiento sensible con respecto a la ablación genital

La cooperación entre la UE y el Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia (UNICEF) ha tenido un éxito considerable en la reducción de la mutilación/ablación genital femenina y los matrimonios infantiles que afectan a muchas niñas. Aplicado por UNICEF, el programa ha recibido un total de 3 991 000 EUR de financiación de la UE durante el período 2008-2012. El programa cubre Egipto, Eritrea, Etiopía, Senegal, Sudán e India y se ha centrado en la transformación de las normas y actitudes sociales a través de la educación y la discusión de temas sensibles en las comunidades rurales recurriendo a la intermediación de líderes respetados en el seno de dichas comunidades. Este planteamiento sensible ha permitido que Senegal esté a punto de convertirse en el primer país en declarar el abandono de esta práctica tradicional.

6 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0886:FIN:ES:PDF

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0886:FIN:ES:PDF

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Perspectivas de futuro

El Programa para el Cambio y las propuestas que lo acompañan sobre apoyo presupuestario actualizan las políticas exteriores y de desarrollo de la UE para hacer frente a los retos de un mundo en rápida transformación. Este programa actualizado trata de centrar la cooperación al desarrollo en el apoyo a los derechos humanos, la democracia, la buena gobernanza y un crecimiento sostenible e integrador. En este contexto constituyen ámbitos importantes la agricultura sostenible, la seguridad alimentaria, la energía sostenible, el refuerzo de los sectores privados como socios de desarrollo y unas normas mínimas por lo que se refiere al trabajo digno y la protección social.

Está admitido que la UE puede mejorar sus herramientas de apoyo al cambio sostenible en las sociedades en transición, adaptándolas a la situación y necesidades específicas de esos países. Los países de renta baja son especialmente vulnerables a las perturbaciones exteriores. Para contribuir a reforzar la resistencia a dichas perturbaciones a medio y largo plazo, las Comunicaciones conjuntas de 2011 se centraron en la movilización de los recursos nacionales, el fortalecimiento de las redes de seguridad social, el aumento de la eficacia del gasto público y las medidas de diversificación de la economía. No obstante, los beneficios de estas políticas tardarán en dejarse sentir. La Comisión también estudiará las posibilidades de aplicar proyectos innovadores como SPRING a otras zonas del mundo.

Son necesarios mecanismos a corto plazo para ayudar a los países en desarrollo a responder a la incidencia económica y financiera de las perturbaciones exteriores. Sobre la base de la experiencia adquirida en la aplicación del mecanismo FLEX, del Mecanismo Alimentario y del Mecanismo FLEX de Vulnerabilidad (V-FLEX), dirigidos a los países con una ralentización económica, la Comisión está desarrollando nuevos mecanismos para hacer frente a las perturbaciones. La consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio y el marco que les sucederá seguirán siendo una cuestión clave en 2012 ante la próxima revisión de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio de las Naciones Unidas prevista en 2013.

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Cuadro 1: Desglose sectorial

1. Infraestructuras sociales: educación,

salud, agua, gobierno y sociedad civil, otros; 4

830 M€; 42,66 %

2. Infraestructuras y servicios económicos:

transporte, comunicaciones, energía,

otros servicios; 1 056 M€; 9,32 %

3. Producción: agricultura, silvicultura y pesca, industria, minería y construcción, comercio

y turismo; 1 268 M€; 11,20 %

4. Cuestiones multisectoriales/transvers

ales: medio ambiente, otras; 1 884 M€; 16,64 %

5. Apoyo presupuestario, ayuda alimentaria,

seguridad alimentaria; 213 M€; 1,88 %

7. Ayuda humanitaria: respuesta de

emergencia, ayuda a la reconstrucción y a la

rehabilitación, prevención y preparación ante las catástrofes; 1 299 M€;

11,47 %

9. Otros/no asig. : costes admin., no

especif: 773M€; 6,8 %

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Cuadro 2: Consenso europeo: áreas relacionadas con la cooperación al desarrollo de la UE

1. Gobernanza y apoyo a las reformas económicas e institucionales; 2 003

M€; 17,7%

2. Comercio e integración regional; 570 M€; 5,0%

3. Infraestructura y transporte; 692 M€;

6,1%

4. Agua y energía; 602 M€; 5,3%

5.Cohesión social y empleo; 730 M€; 6,4%

6. Desarrollo humano y social; 1 020 M€; 9,0%

7. Desarrollo rural, ordenación del territorio, agricultura y seguridad

alimentaria; 877 M€; 7,7%

8. Medio ambiente y gestión sostenible de los recursos naturales; 499

M€; 4,4%

9. Prevención de conflicto y Estados

frágiles; 2 058 M€; 18,2%

10. Otros ámbitos; 2 273 M€; 20,1%

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Gráfico 3a: Prioridad a la lucha contra la pobreza

2000-2011Desembolsos

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

PMA OPRB PRMB PRMA REGION/No ASIG PMA+OPERB

PMA : Países Menos AvanzadosOPRB : Otros Países de Renta BajaPRMB : Países de Renta Media BajaPRMA: Países de Renta Media AltaREGION / NoASIG: Programas regionales y no asignados

Los países más pobres PMA y OPRB se benefician también de los programas regionales/no asignados

En la nueva lista establecida por el CAD de la OCDE, que entró en vigor en 2008, una serie de OPRB pasaron a la categoría de PRMB: Camerún, Cabo Verde, India, República de Moldavia, Mongolia, Nicaragua y República del Congo

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Gráfico 3b: Prioridad a la lucha contra la pobreza

2000-2011Desembolsos

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

200 0 200 1 2 002 200 3 200 4 20 05 2006 200 7 20 08 20 09 201 0 201 1

PMA OPRB PRMB PRMA PMA+OPRB

PMA: Países Menos AvanzadosOPRB: Otros Países de Renta BajaPRMB: Países de Renta Media BajaPRMA: Países de Renta Media Alta

Con el fin de armonizar la presen tación del presente índice con la del índice de otros donantes, el presente índ ice también se ha calculado sin tener en cuenta los proyectos reg ionales y no asignados

En la nueva lis ta es tablecida por el CAD de la OCDE, que entró en vigor en 2008, una serie de OPRB pasaron a la categoría de PRMB: Camerún, Cabo Ver de, India, República de Moldavia, Mongolia, Nicaragua y República del Congo

12111/12 JS/xl

CMPD LIMITE EN

COUNCIL OFTHE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 6 July 2012

12111/12 LIMITE

COPS 238 CIVCOM 259 COSDP 568 PESC 848 RELEX 624 PROCIV 113 JAI 497 COSI 57 CONUN 94

COVER NOTE From: : European External Action Service (EEAS) To: : Political and Security Committee (PSC) Subject : Multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan:

Action Lines for 2012-2013

Delegations will find attached the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan - Action

Lines for 2012-2013, with EEAS (2012) reference number 01187. This document was finalized by

CIVCOM on 2 July 2012.

PSC is invited to agree the Multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan - Action Lines for

2012-2013.

_______________

Encl.: EEAS (2012) document 01187.

EEAS (2012) 01187 JS/xl 1

CMPD LIMITE EN

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)


EEAS (2012) 01187 LIMITE


NOTE From: CMPD To: Political and Security Committee (PSC) Subject: Multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan:

Action Lines for 2012-2013

Delegations will find attached the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan - Action

Lines for 2012-2013. This document was finalized by CIVCOM on 2 July 2012.

PSC is invited to agree the Multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan - Action Lines for

2012-2013.

_________________

EEAS (2012) 01187 JS/xl 2

CMPD LIMITE EN

Table of Content 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 4

1.1. Background ....................................................................................................................... 4

1.2. Aim.................................................................................................................................... 4

2. Action Lines 2012-2013 ............................................................................................................ 5

2.1. Overarching actions .......................................................................................................... 5

2.1.1. Introduction of the Civilian Capability Development Plan ..................................... 5

2.1.1.1. Establishment of a List of generic civilian CSDP tasks 5

2.1.1.2. Introduction of a mechanism allowing the processing of

information 6

2.1.1.3. First reporting round 6

2.1.1.4. Milestones 6

2.1.2. Goalkeeper development ......................................................................................... 6

2.1.2.1. State of play 6


2.2. Actions concerning EU Ambitions ................................................................................... 8

2.2.1. Border Management Concept .................................................................................. 8


2.2.2. Rapid Deployment ................................................................................................... 8

2.2.2.1. Review of the current parameters 8

2.2.2.2. Warehouse 9


2.2.3. Improved ways of force generation ......................................................................... 9

2.2.3.1. Regulatory framework and financing 9


2.2.3.3. European Gendarmerie Force 10

2.2.3.4. Milestones: 11

2.2.3.5. National Expert Teams and other "niche" capabilities 11


2.2.3.7. Establishment through Goalkeeper of Inventory of potentially

deployable personnel 12


EEAS (2012) 01187 JS/xl 3

CMPD LIMITE EN

2.2.4. Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ actors................................................. 12


2.2.5. Synergies ............................................................................................................... 14

2.2.5.1. Civil-military synergies 14

2.2.5.2. Synergies with United Nations 14


2.3. Actions concerning Capability Trends............................................................................ 16

2.3.1. Civilian participation in EDA's Future Global Context workshops ...................... 16

2.3.2. Milestones.............................................................................................................. 16

2.4. Actions concerning national strategies ........................................................................... 17

2.4.1. National strategies ................................................................................................. 17


2.4.2. Training ................................................................................................................. 18


2.5. Actions concerning Lessons Learned.............................................................................. 20

2.5.1. Incorporation of lessons learned and best practices .............................................. 20


ANNEX Calendar for 2012-2013 .......................................................................................... 22

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Multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan: Action Lines for 2012-2013

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

On 1 December 2011 the Council adopted Conclusions in which it stressed "the importance of

strengthening and sustaining the efforts for the civilian capability development, in particular in the

context of current financial constraints, building on the work conducted under the two Civilian

Headline Goals and in synergy with other EU instruments, with a view to responding more rapidly

and effectively to crisis management tasks", and invited the High Representative "to propose a

multi-annual work programme in this regard".1

In response to above Council tasking, the European External Action Service (EEAS) presents the

multi-annual workprogramme for civilian capability development under the Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP) in two separate parts:

A multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan (doc. 12110/12), containing the multi-

annual workprogramme's envisaged methodology and structured conduct;

Action Lines for 2012-2013 (the present document).

The rationale for this set-up is expounded in the Civilian Capability Development Plan mentioned

above and is therefore not replicated here.

1.2. Aim

The present document sets out the concrete action lines on which CSDP civilian capability

development will focus in 2012-2013. They derive from shortfalls identified during our previous

work and the challenges of operations on the horizon.

A calendar overview of milestones in CSDP civilian capability development occurring in this time-

frame is at the Annex.

1 Doc. 17991/11. On the work conducted under the two Civilian Headline Goals, see: Final report on the Civilian

Headline Goal 2008 (doc. 14807/07) and Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (doc. 16817/10).

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2. ACTION LINES 2012-2013

2.1. Overarching actions

2.1.1. Introduction of the Civilian Capability Development Plan

To enable introduction of the Civilian Capability Development Plan as outlined, the following

preliminary steps must be completed.

2.1.1.1. Establishment of a List of generic civilian CSDP tasks

Establishment of lists of civilian key tasks and subordinated tasks under CHG 2008 and CHG 2010

has been a first step towards the eventual establishment of a list of generic civilian CSDP tasks. At

the conclusion of CHG 2008 it was found that the CHG 2008 task list had anticipated the evolving

reality of civilian CSDP missions with a fair amount of accuracy.2

However, the research conducted under the Workplan on promoting synergies between the EU civil

and military capability development has demonstrated that, in order to obtain a generic civilian task

list, it is necessary to abstract tasks from scenarios. The same research furthermore demonstrated

that parallel experiences obtained by EDA in the framework of the military CDP are fit to inform

the development of a such a generic task list at civilian side.3

The next step should therefore be the actual establishment of a list of generic civilian CSDP tasks,

in accordance with above findings and recommendations.

2 A reality check was conducted in October 2007 by comparing tasks set out in Joint Actions, Concepts of

Operations and Operation Plans pertaining to ongoing and planned civilian ESDP missions and calls for contributions for those missions, with the CHG 2008 list of required capabilities. Cf. para. IV.4. and Annex 7 of the Final report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (doc. 14807/07).

3 Cf. Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and Military Capability Development - Final report on the outcomes of Phase 2 of the Workplan (doc. 9850/11+ADD1+ADD2).

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2.1.1.2. Introduction of a mechanism allowing the processing of information

Taking account of the small number of EEAS staff dedicated to CSDP civilian capability

development, an efficient mechanism needs to be established that is able to facilitate reception and

collation of the considerable amount of disparate data obtained through the conduct of the Civilian

Capability Development Plan. The software EDA has developed for the management of the CDP

has been identified as a viable solution to manage the matrix of the three structural parameters

underpinning the Civilian Capability Development Plan. EEAS will introduce this software for that

purpose. Contacts at technical level have been established with EDA to organize the transfer of this

software.

2.1.1.3. First reporting round

At the end of the first semester of 2013, a first comprehensive report on CSDP civilian capability

development will be established in line with the methodology set out in the Civilian Capability

Development Plan.

2.1.1.4. Milestones

May-December 2012: Establishment of a list of generic civilian CSDP tasks (process includes

both the establishment of the draft list and the necessary consultation rounds).

Early 2013: Implementation of software (identical to EDA's CDP software) for the Civilian

Capability Development Plan.

First semester 2013: first comprehensive report on CSDP civilian capability development

established in line with the methodology set out in the Civilian Capability Development Plan.

2.1.2. Goalkeeper development

2.1.2.1. State of play

Finalization and implementation of Goalkeeper requires a joint effort of Member States and the

EEAS. In order to harness this effort, EEAS has set up a Goalkeeper Project Team consisting of a

Goalkeeper Project Manager (seconded by Italy), who under EEAS guidance ensures the daily

management of the project from Brussels, IT experts from the Council General Secretariat and the

EEAS, and Member States' experts who contribute to the Goalkeeper development working from

their respective home bases (in Finland and Germany) under the Project Manager's coordination.

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The Goalkeeper Project Team started its work in mid January 2012. Six team meetings have been

held since then and work is progressing according to plan.4 A presentation of finalized Goalkeeper

system to Member States via CIVCOM/PSC and dissemination campaign is scheduled in the

second semester of 2013.

2.1.2.2. Milestones

Registrar:

First semester 2013: Adaptation of ZIF software in line with Registrar requirements and

start testing phase for Registrar with a pilot group of Member States.

Headhunter:

June 2012: Finalization of the Catalogue of Standard Job Descriptions in the areas of

Police, Rule of Law, Civilian Administration and Head of Mission Office (this last to be

further updated);

Second semester 2012: Finalization of the Catalogue of Standard Job Descriptions in the

areas of Mission Support and Security, to be followed by a testing phase.

Schoolmaster:

Second semester 2012: Outreach campaign to Training Institutions and improvement of

compatibility with other EU training databases (ENTRI, EDA, EUMS…).

Governor:

June 2012: Update of library of conceptual documents contained in Governor EU

Section.

End 2012: Development of Governor National Section (Database of relevant

documentation on civilian international deployment produced by Member States).

4 For the most recent update on Goalkeeper development, see: Goalkeeper: - Second progress report on

development and operationalization; - Assessment of upcoming needs (doc. 10870/12).

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2.2. Actions concerning EU Ambitions

2.2.1. Border Management Concept

The existing concept on border management in the framework of civilian crisis management needs

to be reviewed.5

2.2.1.1. Milestones

March-October 2012: Information-gathering (examination of existing documents and

practices, including Lessons Learned from missions to areas of operations) for initial scoping

of work.

End second semester 2012 (tentative): revised border management concept to be submitted to

Member States.

2.2.2. Rapid Deployment

2.2.2.1. Review of the current parameters

Work on rapid deployment will include a review of the current parameters for civilian rapid

deployment under CSDP to assess their consistency with the overall ambition of the EU in the field

of (civilian) crisis management, and with existing rapid-deployment parameters for specific civilian

CSDP capabilities (such as Civilian Response Teams, Integrated Police Units (IPUs), and Formed

Police Units (FPUs)). Investigations into a possible future civilian rapid-deployment concept will

also be launched, taking into account extreme requirements, such as very tight response time, and

unpredictable and potentially remote places of deployment.

Work on rapid deployment will take account of implications for civilian CSDP capabilities of the

post-Lisbon environment and the changing international strategic context.

5 Draft Concept for ESDP Border missions in the framework of Civilian Crisis Management (doc. 16137/06)

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2.2.2.2. Warehouse

Member States have in Council Conclusions of November 2009 and December 2011 called for the

establishment of a permanent CSDP warehouse. On 24 January 2012, the European Commission

has issued a tender for a Common Security and Defence Policy warehouse, aiming "to secure a

service provider, who will supply warehouse premises, personnel and services related to managing

the warehouse to the Commission. The service provider will be capable of delivering warehoused

assets at short notice to areas where crisis management operations are established".6

2.2.2.3. Milestones

Second semester 2012: Kick-off meeting with key stakeholders aiming i.a. to elaborate a

workplan for the development of a civilian rapid-deployment concept;

Third trimester 2012: Council Decision establishing the warehouse to be finalized and

adopted;

Fourth trimester 2012: Completion of all contractual arrangements necessary to ensure that

the CSDP warehouse is operational.

2.2.3. Improved ways of force generation

2.2.3.1. Regulatory framework and financing

In the Council Conclusions on CSDP adopted on 1 December 2011, the Council "invites the High

Representative and the Commission to examine improved ways of force generation based on a

sound regulatory framework in order to make proposals in the first half of 2012 for consideration by

the Council".7 EEAS is currently consulting with the Commission on this issue.

The Commission has drafted a communication on the financial management of CSDP missions,

which would replace the current "Special Advisors' Communication". This is work in progress, as a

number of issues will need clarification: notably the status of the Head of Mission and of the

contracted staff, as well as the legal status of civilian CSDP missions.

6 The tender was published on the EU's Tender Electronic Daily. See: http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:22618-2012:TEXT:EN:HTML. 7 CSDP - Council Conclusions (doc. 17991/11).

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As regards the financing of the staffing of missions, the costs of the seconded personnel are, to a

large extent, borne directly by Member States. They pay salaries and all social contributions, while

the CFSP budget provides for daily allowances, high risk insurance and the running costs in the

theatre. It therefore remains crucial to continue ongoing work on national strategies to facilitate the

deployment of civilian personnel through secondment. This said, the repartition of costs paid by

Member States and from the CFSP budget could be reconsidered on the basis of clear evidence and

a business case could be made with an eye to providing additional incentives to the personnel and

seconding Member States.

2.2.3.2. Milestones

Ongoing: consultation between EEAS and the Commission to clarify aspects of the regulatory

framework and formulate proposals for possible improvements.

CMPD will present a paper to Member States exploring the financing of civilian CSDP

missions.

2.2.3.3. European Gendarmerie Force

In the document on Lessons and best practices for CSDP from the European Union Police Force

Training 2008-2010, it was stated that "it should […] be established what rapid deployment police

capabilities for a substitution/executive-type mission are available to the EU". Hence it was

recommended "to draw up an inventory for this purpose".8

8 Doc. 18536/11. EU criteria defining this kind of police capabilities are laid down in:

Guidelines for rapid deployment of Integrated Police Units - IPUs - in the initial stage of an EU-led substitution mission and interoperability of IPUs and Police Headquarters (doc. 15956/04);

Concept for rapid deployment of police elements in an EU-led substitution mission (doc. 8508/2/05); Concept for rapid deployment of police elements in an EU-led substitution mission. Draft standard

IPU and FPU Structures (8884/06).

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Gendarmerie-type police elements corresponding to these criteria are already covered by the

European Gendarmerie Force's (EGF) Catalogue of Capabilities, which was drawn up with the

explicit purpose to provide "an updated and realistic overview of the Countries’ available

capabilities, under quantitative and qualitative point of view".9 Because the different police assets

and means the EGF's Full Members indicate in the Catalogue are "first and foremost at disposal of

EU", and the EGF explicitly states that "when deployed for the EU, the PSC (Political and Security

Committee of the EU) assumes the political control and the strategic direction",10 it is self-evident

that all these resources should be considered as potentially available for CSDP as well.

In order to be able usefully to draw on resources registered in the EGF Catalogue (see above),

current arrangements with EGF need to be elaborated into a proper framework arrangement

allowing more ready access to these resources through the EGF mechanism.

2.2.3.4. Milestones:

Second semester 2012: elaboration of framework arrangement with EGF

2.2.3.5. National Expert Teams and other "niche" capabilities

To establish an inventory of Member States' police elements not included in the EGF Catalogue, the

EEAS will issue a dedicated questionnaire. This questionnaire will invite Member States to indicate

the areas where they are developing highly qualified national expert teams with specific

capabilities, in accordance with existing guidelines and concepts for police rapid deployment, to be

used to compose Specialised Elements within a CSDP mission, or other so-called "niche"

capabilities of other dedicated civilian personnel that may be used for crisis management.11

9 The most recent "EGF Catalogue of Capabilities" was issued by the EGF Commander in Vicenza on 7 May

2010. 10 http://www.eurogendfor.eu/ 11 According to the Concept for rapid deployment of police elements in an EU-led substitution mission (doc.

8508/2/05), Specialised Elements are to be composed of highly qualified national expert teams with specific capabilities, or multinational teams where the concerned speciality allows it. Areas of interest for Specialized Elements could be, for example (the list is not exhaustive): Border policing; War crimes; Criminal investigation and forensic police; Antiterrorist/SWAT; Information gathering and analysis; Major and organised crimes; Explosives Ordnance Disposal; Traffic control and surveillances; Environmental police; Illegal immigration; Negotiations experts; Security police and close protection; Dog units; Victim identification units.

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2.2.3.6. Milestones

Third trimester 2012: Questionnaire to be sent to Member States on national expert teams

with specific ("niche") capabilities.

Fourth trimester 2012: Analysis of Member States' replies and report on findings.

2.2.3.7. Establishment through Goalkeeper of Inventory of potentially deployable personnel

In order to update the 2008 inventory of Member States' personnel potentially available for CSDP

civilian crisis management,12 an inventory of individual experts in the areas Police (including

Border Police), Rule of Law, Mission Support, Civilian Administration, and Head-of-Mission-

Office will be established through Goalkeeper, using the Registrar application. A number of

development milestones will have to be met before this survey can be conducted in the second

semester of 2013.

2.2.3.8. Milestones

Second semester 2013: Start of establishment of inventory of potentially deployable personnel

using the Goalkeeper-Registrar application.

2.2.4. Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ actors

CMPD has been tasked, with other relevant stakeholders including the Commission, to take work

forward along the lines contained in "Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ - Draft Road

Map" (doc. 18173/11 of 5 December 2011), so as to elaborate lines of action in view of obtaining

concrete outcomes. This document contains 27 lines of action in five key areas. From among these,

CIVCOM and the COSI Support Group indicated twelve lines of action as prioritary.

The PSC-COSI meeting of 14 December 2011 focused on the methodology for implementing the

Road Map, as well as the need for contributions from Member States to carry this work forward.

For this purpose, a Call for Contributions for Joint Expert Panels to carry forward the development

of each line of action was addressed to Member States, and a workshop was organized on 12/13

March, gathering 80 experts from Member States and the EU, including EU agencies (EUROPOL,

CEPOL, FRONTEX. SATCEN) and ICPO- INTERPOL with a view to establishing the Joint

Expert Panels, a working Method & Process, as well as a Timetable.

12 On the conduct and outcomes of the 2008 capability survey, see: Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal

2010 (doc. 16817/10).

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2.2.4.1. Milestones

July-September 2012:

Identification of potential actions/deliverables (including Establishment of a work plan,

Form Summary of Actions/Deliverables filled in to be communicated to Core Team) by

Joint Expert Panels;

(Possible)* Presentation of State of play on initial actions to CIVCOM & COSI Support

Group;

(Possible)* Agenda item on CSDP civilian capabilities for Ministers' of Justice / Interior

meeting.

Second semester 2012: Presentation to PSC and COSI (incl. orientation /validation of initial

actions (possible* Joint Meeting));

1 September 2012 to first semester 2013: Exploration feasibility of propositions/potential

actions by Joint Expert Panels ( Form Detailed Description of Actions /deliverables filled in

to be communicated to Core Team). Possible intermediate reports before final report.

* Competent FSJ Council bodies to be consulted.

First semester 2013:

Presentation of actions/deliverables which have been completed to PSC/COSI;

PSC/COSI to agree deliverables and give further guidance;

Implementation of completed actions of 12 priority lines of action & development of

remaining lines of action by Joint Expert Panels.

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2.2.5. Synergies

2.2.5.1. Civil-military synergies

On 5 July 2011 the PSC endorsed a document providing a way ahead beyond Phase 2 of the

Workplan on promoting synergies between the EU civil and military capability development.13 An

implementation period was launched, during which all actions were to be carried forward and

reports were to be made to PSC as required. All outcomes of the 31 identified actions are to be

submitted to PSC for consideration when completed, under packages aimed to rationalise work.

End 2011, PSC agreed a report containing a first package of outcomes of actions finalized during

the second semester of 2011, together with related recommendations. The report also presented a

state of play of actions that could not be finalized as planned before end 2011, including reasons for

this delay.

2.2.5.2. Synergies with United Nations

On 29 November 2011, in order further to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping, the PSC

welcomed a list of actions prepared by the EEAS with the active involvement of the UN

Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Department of Field Support (DFS)

DPKO and other UN departments.14 On that basis, the EEAS has established a Plan of Action to

enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping, in which modalities for implementation are set

out.15 EEAS and UN also agreed to organize a joint seminar on civilian capabilities. This seminar

will be conducive to the implementation of actions from that Plan of Action related to civilian

capabilities.

2.2.5.3. Milestones

Civil-military synergies:

July 2012: Conclusion of initial implementation period (started in July 2011);

assessment of the methodology used so far to produce concrete outcomes to be

submitted to PSC together with proposals for a further way ahead, possibly including an

identification of new concrete actions.

13 Doc. 12035/11 of 29 June 2011 and its COR1 of 6 July 2011. 14 Actions to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping (doc. 17497/11). 15 Plan of Action to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping (doc. 11216/12)

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Synergies with United Nations:

Second semester 2012: EEAS to organize a joint EU-UN seminar on civilian

capabilities, with particular focus on actions related to civilian capabilities from the Plan

of Action to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping.

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2.3. Actions concerning Capability Trends

EU actors such as the European Commission, EDA and the EU Institute for Security Studies, as

well as other supranational actors and actors at national level, develop long-term visions that feed

into planning processes.16 It should therefore be ensured that considerations pertinent to EU civilian

crisis management are taken into consideration in every long-term vision on which the CSDP

capability development is likely to draw. Some actions to that effect have already been identified.

2.3.1. Civilian participation in EDA's Future Global Context workshops

Civilian experts from EEAS will be participating in the upcoming workshops on the Future Global

Context organized by EDA.17

2.3.2. Milestones

July 2012: EDA Workshop on Science, Technology & Innovation

October 2012: EDA Workshop on Conflict & Security

16 An example of a European Commission project is the “European Strategy and Policy Analysis System”, an

initiative of the Commission's Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) aimed at highlighting challenges and scenarios for the Union in 2030 (http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/espas/index_en.htm).

An example of a national actor developing a long-term vision is the German Centre for International Peace Operations (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze - ZIF), which develops strategic foresight as part of an overarching project "Peace Operations – Fit for the Future" (http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/projects/peace-operations-fit-for-the-future.html). In that framework, ZIF i.a. aims to develop scenarios for peace operations in the year 2025.

17 Civilian experts from EEAS already contributed to the EDA Future Global Context workshop held on 22 March 2012, in which topics such as environment, natural resources, energy, economics, governance, demographics and culture & society were addressed.

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2.4. Actions concerning national strategies

2.4.1. National strategies

Exchange of information on best practices and problems encountered at national level with force

generation for CSDP missions, covering issues such as national regulatory measures (e.g.

supporting legislation, career developments/incentives, financial remuneration systems), budget

lines, training and candidate rosters is set to continue. The two main vehicles for this exchange are

the yearly High-level seminars on "Faciliating the deployment of civilian personnel to CSDP" and

the report on Member States' progress in this field.

EEAS has also started to establish contacts with national professional associations of personnel in

areas where there are known shortfalls, notably in Rule of Law as regards judges and prosecutors.

This approach is promising and will be developed further, in full coordination with the authorities

of the Member States concerned. This approach will also form a specific point of attention during

the high-level seminar.

2.4.1.1. Milestones

A fourth High-level seminar has been tentatively scheduled for the second half of September

2012.

During this High-level seminar, EEAS will report on contacts with national professional

associations of personnel in areas where there are known shortfalls, notably in Rule of Law.

Representatives of these associations will be invited to the seminar

The report on Member States' progress is due December 2012.

A fifth High-level seminar has been tentatively scheduled for mid 2013.

In 2012, the launch is envisaged of a new round of bilateral consultations of the EEAS with

Member States' capitals, to discuss and promote with national stakeholders the facilitation of

the deployment of civilian personnel for CSDP.18

18 A first round of such consultations was conducted between November 2009 and November 2010. See the Second

report on Member States' progress in facilitating the deployment of civilian personnel to CSDP missions (doc. 16989/10).

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2.4.2. Training

Efforts continue to improve civilian crisis management pre-deployment training. In 2011 the EEAS

conducted a comprehensive survey of civilian crisis management pre-deployment training

capacities and activities carried out by Member States. In June 2011 the PSC agreed a document on

'Civilian crisis management pre-deployment training – report on survey results and elements for

way ahead' which identified priority areas for further enhancement.

Furthermore, feedback from CSDP civilian missions revealed also some specific training issues that

have to be addressed in close collaboration between Member States as sending authorities and

civilian CSDP Missions as the 'final users'.

2.4.2.1. Milestones

New EU Senior Mission Leaders course (conducted under the aegis of the European Security

and Defence College (ESDC), was conducted (Brussels/Bruges, 15-27 April 2012) with a

view to preparing participants for senior roles within civilian and military CSDP missions and

operations. Lessons will be drawn from the course before end 2012.

Meeting of the Heads of Training serving in CSDP missions and operations and Training

Providers, including ESDC, CEPOL, ENTRi and EUPST)19 took place on 7-8 May 2012

with a view to identifying gaps between training needs and training offers and finding

solutions. Information on two training modules in Mentoring, Monitoring and Advising

(MMA) will be prepared at strategic and operational level by end 2012-early 2013;

Targeted training packages/modules/minimum standard training elements, developed with the

support of Member States' training institutions and EU-level training actors such as ESDC

and CEPOL) to be presented/finalized during 2012 on, i.a., MMA, Security Sector Reform,

Human Rights, Gender and Child protection.

Concept for pre-deployment training of international contracted staff to be presented during

the second semester of 2012.

19 CEPOL = European Police College. ENTRi = Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management. EUPST = European Union Police Services Training.

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Throughout the year 2012:

Systematic support in the area of training will continue to be provided through the

ENTRi project (co-financed through the Instrument for Stability), whose training

activities (both pre-deployment and specialist/thematic courses) aim to strengthen the

capabilities of staff working in civilian crisis management missions, while at the same

time fostering the interoperability and the harmonization of approaches to training.

EEAS will guide ESDC and CEPOL on their training activities relevant to CSDP

civilian capabilities.

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2.5. Actions concerning Lessons Learned

2.5.1. Incorporation of lessons learned and best practices

Lessons and best practices of civilian CSDP missions, lessons provided by Member States and from

other actors should be integrated into civilian capability development at regular intervals.

Experience outside CSDP is relevant, such as the lessons from major international campaigns

involving civilian/state-building efforts, in the same way that non-CSDP lessons are currently

incorporated into EU military capability development through seminars organized by EDA.

Once the new civilian CSDP lessons learned and best practices structure is in place, notably the

Lessons Management Group, the web portal and the database, yearly seminars (comparable to the

lessons-learned seminars organized by EDA in the context of military capability development) will

be held with Member States. The purpose is to transform lessons identified into lessons learned in

the field of capability development by means of considering the lessons identified in relation to, i.a.,

the tasks list, the catalogue of standard job descriptions and any available plans for research and

development.

A similar undertaking will be made in the area of CSDP training to reflect lessons identified to date

in the training planned both at national and EU level, i.a. through agreed curricula.

The annual report on lessons and best practices in CSDP will contain information on progress made

with the implementation of lessons in this regard.

2.5.1.1. Milestones

Second semester 2012: Lessons-learned item in PSC for discussion, and tasking to working

bodies for advice:

CSDP civilian lessons-learned and best-practices concept;

Lessons from CSDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR);

First common civilian-military annual report (covering 2011) on lessons learned and

best practices in CSDP;

Update on implementation of the CSDP Lessons and Best Practices Web Portal and the

shared military (ELMA) and civilian (CiLMA) CSDP database for lessons learned.

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Early September 2012 (tentative): Lessons report on the move of the civilian CSDP mission

EUJUST LEX into Iraq.

July-September 2012: Information-gathering to scope work and request from Member States

input on lessons learned and best practices, with a view to informing the lessons-

implementation seminars and for inclusion on the web portal.

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ANNEX

CALENDAR FOR 2012-2013

2012 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Introduction of the Civilian Capability Development Plan

Establishment of a List of generic

civilian CSDP tasks ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■

GOALKEEPER

Meetings of GK Project Team ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

Development work on GK applications ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■

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Border Management Concept

o Information-gathering ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■

o Revised border management

concept submitted to MS ■

Civilian rapid-deployment concept

o Meeting to elaborate workplan for

development of concept ■

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Inventory of Member States' Capabilities

Elaboration of framework arrangement

with EGF ■

Questionnaire to be sent to MS ■

Analysis of MSs' replies ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■

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Civ-Mil Synergies

o Assessment of methodology used

and proposals for way ahead to be

submitted to PSC (conclusion of

initial implementation period that

started in July 2011)

■

Synergies with United Nations

o Joint EU-UN Seminar (tentative) ■

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Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ actors

o Identification of potential

actions/deliverables

o Presentation to CIVCOM & COSI

SG for validation /orientation

o Agenda item on CSDP civ cap for

Ministers of Justice / Interior mtg

■■■■■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■

Presentation to PSC and COSI ■

Exploration feasibility of propositions/

potential actions ■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■

Civilian participation in EDA's Future Global Context workshop

EDA Workshop on Science,

Technology & Innovation ■

EDA Workshop on Conflict & Security ■

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National strategies

Fourth High-level seminar ■

Report on MSs' progress ■

Bilateral consultations of EEAS with

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EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 6.8.2012 SWD(2012) 242 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Annual Report 2012 on the European Union's Development and external assistance policies

and their implementation in 2011

Accompanying the document

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Annual Report 2012 on the European Union's Development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2011

{COM(2012) 444 final}

2

Chapter 1 - Delivering on commitments .................................................................................... 5

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 5

1. EU response to world developments in 2011 ............................................................... 7

2 Leading the way in development policy ...................................................................... 9

2.1 A more strategic approach: the Agenda for Change & the reform of budget support ......... 9

2.2 Making a difference: an increased budget and new instruments ....................................... 11

3 Keeping long-term promises ...................................................................................... 13

3.1 Progress in achieving the MDGs ........................................................................................ 13

3.2 Focussing on poverty ......................................................................................................... 17

3.3 Strengthening human rights and good governance ............................................................ 18

3.4 Mainstreaming of cross–cutting issues .............................................................................. 20

3.5 Cooperation with non-state actors and local authorities .................................................... 23

4 More, better and more effective aid ........................................................................... 24

4.1 Aid effectiveness and financing for development .............................................................. 24

4.2 Coherence between development and other policies ......................................................... 27

4.3 Cooperation with the international donor community ....................................................... 29

5 Outlook 2012 .............................................................................................................. 30

Chapter 2 - Implementation: geographic overview .................................................................. 31

1 European Neighbourhood and the Middle East ......................................................... 31

1.1 European Neighbourhood & Russia .......................................................................... 31

1.2 Middle East ................................................................................................................ 51

2 Sub-Saharan Africa & Intra-ACP programmes ......................................................... 56

2.1 Sub-Saharan Africa ............................................................................................................ 56

2.2 South Africa ....................................................................................................................... 69

2.3 Intra-ACP programmes ...................................................................................................... 72

3 Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) ............................................................... 74

4 Latin America & the Caribbean ................................................................................. 76

4.1 Latin America ..................................................................................................................... 76

4.2 Caribbean ........................................................................................................................... 86

5 Asia, Central Asia & the Pacific ................................................................................ 92

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5.1 Asia 92

5.2 Central Asia ...................................................................................................................... 101

5.3 Pacific ............................................................................................................................... 108

Chapter 3 - Implementation: thematic overview .................................................................... 119

1- The thematic programmes ........................................................................................ 119

1.1 Investing in People ........................................................................................................... 119

1.2 Non-State actors and local authorities in development .................................................... 121

1.3 Migration and asylum ....................................................................................................... 122

1.4 Environment, climate change and sustainable development ............................................ 124

1.5 Food security .................................................................................................................... 127

2- Democracy and human rights .................................................................................. 131

3- Stability .................................................................................................................... 137

3.1 Crisis response and preparedness ..................................................................................... 137

3.2 Global and regional trans-border challenges .................................................................... 138

4- Nuclear safety........................................................................................................... 142

5- Humanitarian assistance ........................................................................................... 145

6- Macro-financial assistance ....................................................................................... 149

Chapter 4 - Managing aid for results ...................................................................................... 150

1- Monitoring project performance .............................................................................. 150

1.1 Performance measurement: Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) .................................. 150

1.2 Evaluation: Review of the work carried out ..................................................................... 154

1.3 Lessons learned ................................................................................................................ 157

2- Aid delivery modalities ............................................................................................ 158

2.1 Developments in aid delivery modalities and channels ................................................... 158

2.2 Budget support and public finance ................................................................................... 160

2.3 Blending of grants and loans/innovative financing .......................................................... 162

3- Progress in aid management..................................................................................... 163

3.1 Progress on qualitative issues in aid management ........................................................... 163

3.2 Simplification of procedures ............................................................................................ 165

4- Communication & transparency .............................................................................. 166

4.1 Communication and visibility .......................................................................................... 166

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4.2 Transparency .................................................................................................................... 167

Chapter 5 - Financial Annex .................................................................................................. 167

5.1 Introduction to financial tables ......................................................................................... 167

5.2 Financial tables ................................................................................................................. 169

5

Annual Report 2012 on the European Union's Development and

external assistance policies and their implementation in 2011

CHAPTER 1 - DELIVERING ON COMMITMENTS

Introduction 2011 was a particularly challenging year. Political and economic developments, both in European Neighbourhood 1 countries and within the EU, dominated the international agenda. The global economic crisis, which caused widespread market fluctuations and economic instability, continued to send shock waves around the globe, affecting the already poor and vulnerable. Tensions within the Eurozone were a source of deep concern both within Europe and in other countries. During the Arab Spring, people-led movements demanded greater personal freedoms and voiced aspirations for a better future based on fundamental values as well as social, political and economic reform. 2011 also saw the unfolding of a humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa and the birth of a new African state – South Sudan. It was also a year of consolidation of longer-term issues in international politics, such as the continuing rise of the emerging economies and continued concerns about global climate change and regional poverty. There was some progress made towards reaching the poverty reduction targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but key challenges remain, notably tackling severe poverty. Many countries and societies are highly vulnerable to shocks and crises. The rapidly changing global environment, with new global challenges and new donors, requires new approaches both in EU external action and development policy. In 2011, the EU launched several new strategies. They include: a comprehensive strategy for the Arab Spring, a revised European Neighbourhood Policy, a Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel and a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. To respond to the Arab Spring, EU priorities were reviewed to focus on governance, employment, and youth. Up to €1 billion of additional funding was pledged (for the period 2011-13, €3.5 billion had already been allocated to the Southern Mediterranean countries). An updated Human Rights and Democracy strategy envisaged a cohesive approach across EU external policies along with a strengthened focus on human rights and support for democracy. New EU Delegations were opened in Libya and South Sudan. Human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance were also essential elements of the European Commission's Communications of October 2011 on a revised EU development policy – an “Agenda for Change” and on budget support. The Agenda for Change proposes two new pillars for EU development policy: good governance and 1 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/index_en.htm

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sustainable and inclusive growth. It also contains a proposal to bring in differentiation, amounting to resources being targeted to countries most in need of assistance, including situations of fragility, and where they can have the biggest poverty reduction impact. Such differentiation will mean less, or no, development grant aid to more advanced partners, with whom new forms of strategic cooperation will be developed. Providing more than half of the world's total Official Development Assistance (ODA), the EU and its Member States continued in 2011 to be a leader in development policy and action. The main international development event of the year was the Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness. A new Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation was adopted2 building on the former Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action3. In addition to aid effectiveness, it contains commitments for development effectiveness covering South-South cooperation, involvement of the private sector and funding to counter climate change. The document has been endorsed by a wide community of traditional bilateral and multilateral donors, developing countries, emerging economies, civil society, parliaments and private sector. The EU pursued its policy of improving Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) throughout 2011. The European Development Days event (EDD)4 – an annual forum debating global issues and development cooperation – held in Warsaw, Poland in December 2011, focussed this time around on the relationship between development and democracy. Institutional changes and the first year of the EEAS The Lisbon Treaty put the fight against poverty at the core of the EU’s external and development cooperation policies. 2011 was the first year of operation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)/Vice President (VP) of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton. It was an intense and challenging year for building the EU’s role in foreign policy and external relations and promoting more effective development cooperation through more joined-up policy making. Within the Commission, the former Directorate-General for Development and the European Cooperation Office - EuropeAid were merged to form DG Development and Cooperation and a new service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) was created. Under the authority of VP Ashton, the FPI is tasked with implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, the crisis response and prevention measures financed under the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the electoral Observation Missions under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the cooperation with industrialised countries (ICI). It is also responsible for preparing and implementing sanctions proposals. The Arab Spring was both a foreign policy challenge and a political opportunity. EU institutions brought together their services and instruments. Joint crisis platforms brought together the EEAS and the relevant Commission services in coordinating an immediate response to the crises in Libya and Tunisia. 2 http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/en/topics/busan-partnership.html 3 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/eu-high-level-forum-2011_en.htm 4 http://eudevdays.eu/

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During the year, Commission services and the EEAS also worked hand in hand on a number of issues, ranging from proposals for development policy, notably the Commission Communications on the Agenda for Change and on budget support and the Human Rights and Democracy strategy. They also worked together on preparing the Commission proposals for the next Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF), drafting of proposals for the new financial instruments and guidelines for multi-annual programming. The United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution in May on the status of the EU also underlines support for the EU to play its international role. The global network of 140 EU Delegations carry out political, diplomatic, development and policy work for the EU and provide support to Member States through such activities as shared reporting. They also offer the future prospect of better division of labour, including joint programming of development assistance. As some national diplomatic services scale back their resources to concentrate on other priorities, the value added of the Delegations is in ensuring that the EU is properly represented throughout the world.

1. EU response to world developments in 2011 Events across the North Africa and the Middle East regions during 2011 – known as the Arab Spring – resulted in a profound transformation of the EU’s relations with its southern neighbours. The EU was the first to acknowledge that the uprisings and their outcomes must be owned and driven by the people of the countries themselves. It also took immediate steps to respond rapidly and effectively to the challenges of the evolving situation, notably providing substantial humanitarian and civil protection assistance, support to democratic transition and assistance to impoverished areas. In March 2011, a new EU approach to the southern Neighbourhood was set out. It offered “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” to partners committed to wide-ranging and bold reforms. This led to a new approach for the whole European Neighbourhood Policy. The revised incentive-based policy - known as “more for more” - was drawn up to support partners who were delivering reforms, building “deep democracy” and ensuring sustainable and inclusive economic development. Significant support was provided by the EU for the holding of elections in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. There was political condemnation of the respective situations in Bahrain, Yemen, and especially Syria. In Libya (before the fall of former Leader Muammar Gaddafi) and Syria, the EU decided on economic sanctions, trade embargoes, asset freezes, suspension of new EIB loans and visa bans. In parallel, it expanded its support to civil society in the entire Neighbourhood. It also took the initiative to coordinate and strengthen coherence of the international response to the Arab Spring events. There were further initiatives taken in the region to respond to the new situation, notably in the area of trade and mobility. A significant amount of new funding was offered by the EU as well as making adjustments to its on-going support to fit with new policy objectives. The EU also took a pro-active role in international coordination efforts, together with the UN, the Arab League and other major actors like Turkey. During the Libyan crisis, HR/VP Ashton

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brought together the UN and regional organisations (EU, Arab League, African Union and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) in the Cairo Group and actively participated in the Libya contact group. This diplomacy led to a convergence of views in the international community on how to respond to the Libyan crisis. An international Task Force, bringing together the EU, third countries and international financial institutions, was created to enhance the coherence of international support to countries in transition in the Southern Mediterranean. Its September 2011 meeting in Tunis, co-chaired by the Tunisian Prime Minister and the HR/VP, resulted in an overall financial support to Tunisia of about €1 billion in 2011 for supporting economic recovery. Coordination, both within the EU and with international partners, is a key role of the new EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean. Task forces with other countries are in preparation. Events in the southern Mediterranean have also had both short and potentially longer-term impacts on the region’s southern neighbours, particularly in the Sahel and neighbouring countries like Chad. Using the IfS, the EU has responded to requests for immediate support to address migration flows and offset the disruption of remittances. The Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel addresses the longer-term security and development impacts on the region. The Arab Spring has also brought more urgency to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). The voice of the EU in the MEPP became stronger, not least by pushing for a more active role for the Quartet: the UN, United States, EU and Russia. The High Representative pursued international diplomatic attempts to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue based on her United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate. The aim has been to convince Iran that it must demonstrate its readiness to engage in a confidence-building process in order to address all existing concerns on its nuclear programme. This followed a resolution of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) expressing the body’s deep concern at Iranian activities relating to the development of military nuclear technology. Alongside diplomacy, the EU’s approach has been to continuously strengthen existing sanctions. Additional measures affecting the financial, transport and energy sectors were prepared with the aim to have them adopted by the Council in early 2012. At the same time, close attention has been paid to the country’s worrying human rights situation. Turning to Sub-Saharan Africa, 2011 saw the adoption of an EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. In partnership with the region and key bodies such as the United Nations and the African Union, it aims to bring greater peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable government to the region. The EU continues to lead multiple common security and defence policy operations in the region. The European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Somalia ATALANTA operation fights piracy. The EU is also helping to train Somalia’s own security forces. Around 1 800 Somali soldiers have been trained by the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Uganda to join AMISOM, the AU peacekeeping force in Somalia which is largely funded by the EU. The EU is also the largest humanitarian donor in the Horn of Africa, having provided over €700 million in assistance since the beginning of this year. The new EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa will play an important role in addressing the many complex issues of the region. In July 2011, High Representative/Vice President Ashton attended the independence ceremony of the new state of South Sudan, born of the 2005 Sudanese Comprehensive Peace

9

Agreement (CPA). A comprehensive approach to Sudan and South Sudan to underpin the development and peaceful co-existence of two viable, stable and prosperous states has since been followed by the EU. In cooperation with the AU, UN and international partners, the Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan is at the fore in the EU’s efforts to support the resolution of outstanding issues between both states. At the request of the European Council, the EU is engaging in a process to formulate a more effective EU policy towards its main strategic partners. This has contributed to more focused and substantive Summits and other high-level meetings with these countries, as well as more active co-operation in other areas of mutual concern. In Asia, support to the accelerating Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) integration process continued in the form of capacity building for the ASEAN Secretariat and engaging with the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The transition in Myanmar was monitored very closely, with the EU beginning to deliver a response in the country. Throughout 2011, the EU continued to take the lead in combating dangerous climate change and pushing for progress in international climate negotiations. It delivered on its commitments to provide fast start finance and stepped up its climate diplomacy activities ahead of the UN climate conference held in Durban, South Africa in November. The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action reflects European proposals for a detailed roadmap with a global comprehensive climate agreement to be negotiated by 2015 and to come into force by 2020 at the latest. Under the new agreement, to replace the current architecture based on the Kyoto Protocol, all countries would take on legally binding commitments to reduce or limit emissions of greenhouse gases with the effect of collectively containing global warming to a maximum of 2°C. Durban also brought into effect other earlier commitments on a Green Climate Fund and the setting up of new bodies and instruments on adaptation and technology transfer. At Durban, the EU’s call for such ambitious action was joined by more than 100 countries particularly vulnerable to climate impacts.

2 Leading the way in development policy

2.1 A more strategic approach: the Agenda for Change & the reform of budget support Two major political documents which aim to update EU development policy were published on 13 October 2011, following months of intense consultation with stakeholders. They build on the common understanding of EU development policy defined in the European Consensus on Development5. The Communication, "Increasing the impact of EU development policy: an Agenda for Change"6, aims to significantly increase the impact and effectiveness of EU development policy, while the second document, "The future approach to EU budget support to third countries"7 is to strengthen the use of budget support. Why revisit European Union development policy?

5 OJ C46 of 24.02.2006 6 COM(2011) 637 final, 13.10.2011 7 COM (2011) 638 final, 13.10.2011

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The EU has already done a great deal to help reduce poverty, but a lot remains to be done. Recent changes, both within and outside the EU, mean that there is a new development context. The Arab Spring reaffirmed the importance of democracy and good governance for development to occur, and the need for societies to offer a future to their young people. In addition, some former developing countries have become major international players and are now donors in their own right. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has also brought about institutional changes in Europe. Last but not least, the world still has to cope with economic crisis which is putting donors' respective aid budgets under pressure. Agenda for change: What's new? The "Agenda for Change" foresees a two-pillared approach. Through the lessons learnt from recent events in North Africa, human rights, democracy and good governance trends will be given greater weight. The second pillar will stimulate inclusive and sustainable growth to reduce long-term poverty by: promoting decent work, social protection floors, social inclusion and human development; supporting business and regional integration and assisting sustainable agriculture, energy supply and access to energy. EU grant aid will go to countries where it is most needed and can have the most impact. This differentiated approach means that other forms of cooperation will be considered for other countries. The new approach will also favour other issues: • Donor coordination will be improved and duplication reduced, leading to more focussed

EU aid which will be targeted to sectors with a high impact on poverty reduction such as governance, quality employment and social protection, health, energy or agriculture. In future, the EU will allocate resources under individual programmes drawn up with countries to no more than three sectors8.

• EU development aid will use more innovative financial tools, for example, the blending of grants and loans and including private sector involvement.

• Better coordination with Member States is foreseen. The Commission is calling for the introduction of joint EU and Member State responses based on partner countries' own strategies. It also foresees the setting up of a common EU results framework.

• Reaffirmation of the crucial role of policy coherence in the interests of development.

The Communication on budget support

Budget support will continue to be an important EU development cooperation instrument in line with the modernisation of development cooperation policy outlined in the “Agenda for Change”. It will also be considered as an integral part of the toolbox for pre-accession assistance, among other forms of financing. The EU will provide budget support as a vector for change to address the following development challenges and objectives:

• Promoting human rights and democratic values;

8 With the possible exception of candidate countries and potential candidates to EU accession funded by the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, for which strategic focus on a limited number of sectors to secure results and impact may have to be combined with ad-hoc assistance to other sectors covered by the EU acquis, to facilitate implementation of the relevant legislative, institutional and infrastructure measures.

11

• Improving financial management, macroeconomic stability and the fight against corruption and fraud,

• Promoting good governance and inclusive growth for human development; • Promoting sector reforms and improving sector service delivery, with particular focus

on pro-poor, gender and children's issues; • State-building in fragile states and addressing development challenges of SIDS and

OCTs; • Improving domestic revenue mobilisation and reducing dependency on aid.

“Good governance and development contracts” (general budget support) will be provided when there is trust and confidence that aid will be spent on pursuing the fundamental values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. "Sector reform contracts" are also foreseen to promote reforms, support sector policies, and improve service delivery to populations. In post-conflict and fragile situations, the EU will also use, on a case-by-case basis, “state-building contracts” to help partner countries to ensure vital state functions, to deliver basic social services and to promote governance, human rights and democracy.

Existing eligibility criteria and their assessment will be strengthened, as will the EU’s approach to assessing and managing risks. The EU will also put more emphasis on accountability and transparency, with a new eligibility criterion on budget transparency and oversight. The Commission will also look carefully at efforts made to strengthen parliaments and civil society, and will publish relevant information on budget support agreements and performance reviews. There will also be a stronger EU coordinated approach to maximise the impact of support. The way forward All future EU action will have to be compatible with this renewed policy framework. It has already been integrated into the Commission's proposals for post-2013 financial instruments, particularly the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).

2.2 Making a difference: an increased budget and new instruments In June, the Commission proposed a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2014-2020. The Communication, “A Budget for Europe 2020”9, highlighted the areas where the EU could play an important role in an increasingly globalised world. Based on the Europe 2020 strategy and the new institutional architecture of the Lisbon Treaty, it defines broad budgetary orientations, including the future architecture and funding of external action financial instruments. The EU remains committed to pursuing the MDGs and to achieving the target of Official Development Assistance (ODA) of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2015. To help achieve these targets, the Commission suggested stepping up financing for external action within the budget from €56.8 billion to €70 billion and for the European Development Fund (EDF), from currently €23 billion for six years to €30.3 billion for seven years (in 2011 prices).

The objective of the new MFF is to enable the EU to speak with one voice and meet its 9 COM(2011) 500 final

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development and enlargement objectives: promoting democracy, peace, solidarity, stability and prosperity and poverty reduction – both at global level and in its immediate neighbourhood – and also helps safeguard global public goods.

On 7 December, the Commission adopted a package of proposals for Regulations and Decisions covering nine geographic and thematic external action instruments10. These new proposals have been designed to increase both the efficiency and impact of external spending. They aim to reduce overlaps and gaps between the instruments, increase their flexibility and responsiveness, reduce the dispersion of activities and promote aid effectiveness.

The proposals revolve around three main axes.

The first is cooperation with beneficiary and partner countries in line with the Treaty-based policy priorities related to:

• Enlargement, with the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) as the financial pillar of the enlargement strategy;

• the neighbourhood, with the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) used to support deeper political cooperation, closer economic integration and an effective transition to democracy in the EU’s neighbouring countries;

• the promotion of EU and mutual interests worldwide, with a focus on industrialised countries, emerging economies and countries where the EU has significant interests will be supported by the new Partnership Instrument;

• development cooperation with the primary objective of combating poverty, with the Development and Copperation Instrument (DCI) and using the European Development Fund (EDF) for cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.

• the EU-Greenland Partnership, which will be strengthened.

The second axis is the promotion of democracy and human rights globally through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. The proposal would boost it by providing more EU support for the development of thriving civil societies, supporting their specific role as key actors for positive change in support of human rights and democracy.

The third axis is crisis prevention and management through the “Instrument for Stability” where an increase is proposed to respond to current global challenges. The “Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation” will continue to aim to promote high levels of nuclear safety.

Policy changes during 2011 have meant specific improvements in the following ways, among others:

• there will be flexibility in the programming process for faster decision-making in all instruments, particularly in cases of crisis, post-crisis and fragility. For some of the geographic programmes (DCI, ENI), the EU may synchronise its programming cycle to its partners' cycles and replace specific Commission-adopted development strategy papers with other existing strategy documents,

10 COM(2011) 865 final, COM(2011) 836 final, COM(2011) 837 final, COM(2011) 838 final, COM(2011)

839 final, COM(2011) 840 final, COM(2011) 841 final, COM(2011) 842 final, COM(2011) 843 final, COM(2011) 844 final, COM(2011) 845 final and COM(2011) 846 final

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or adopt simplified programming documents based on jointly agreed objectives with partner countries or through joint programming with EU Member States;

• creation of incentive-based approaches, in particular as a performance reward for progress in reforms along the EU accession path, under the IPA II and under the ENI “more for more” policy to better support democratic transition in the EU’s Neighbourhood;

• a more strategic approach based on the priorities of the enlargement agenda for the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance;

• establishment under the DCI of a Pan-African programme enabling the coherent implementation of the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy;

• increased flexibility with a single Global Public Goods programme under the same instrument increasing the EU's capacity to respond to global challenges.

The Commission has also explored ways of making the differentiation of aid between partner countries concrete, allocating a greater proportion of funds where aid can achieve the biggest changes for people. With regard to the DCI, it is proposed that 19 wealthier countries no longer benefit from bilateral development assistance. However, these countries will continue to have access to regional and thematic cooperation.

Innovative tools such as the blending of grants and loans and the inclusion of the private sector are also part of the updated policy. As part of of the revision of EIB's external mandate, the Commission is studying ways to optimise the functioning of mechanisms for blending in the external regions.

With this new setup the EU is much better placed to promote and defend its core values and stand by its international commitments to its neighbours, particularly those undergoing transition and on a path to joining the Union, as well as the poorest and most vulnerable globally.

3 Keeping long-term promises

3.1 Progress in achieving the MDGs Following the 2010 UN MDG Summit, the Commission took a step to reprioritise its activities to increase the impact of its development cooperation on achieving the MDGs. The “Agenda for Change”11 is intended to better assist partner countries in attaining the MDGs. This section gives information on the Commission’s activities in 2011 to help countries achieve MDG targets. More details can be found in Chapter 3. In late 2011, the first component of the EU's €1 billion MDG initiative, launched at the New York Summit in September 2010, was adopted. It focuses on countries that are most off-track in their MDG targets. Eradication of extreme poverty and hunger

11 COM(2011) 637 final

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Progress towards achieving MDG1 on the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger continues to be hampered by the global economic crisis and deterioration of the labour market, the effects of climate change, price volatility, gender inequality, lack of access to land, poor nutrition and situations of protracted crisis, namely the 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa. The “Agenda for Change” places quality employment, social protection, sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition high on the EU's development cooperation agenda. Throughout 2011, the EU continued to work closely on food security and nutrition with a number of actors. For example, on 27 June 2011, a new strategic framework of cooperation was signed in Rome by the Commission, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) and the World Food Programme (WFP). This will increase the capacity of the four partners to deliver effective, coordinated, timely and sustainable support to food security and nutrition. By the end of 2011, the €1 billion EU Food Facility had reached its target. In three years, it has funded 134 projects implemented by NGOs and EU Member State agencies, 69 projects by international organisations, three regional projects and ten budget support measures (see chapter 3). In the light of the global financial and economic crisis, decent employment and social protection are increasingly considered as crucial to the achievement of MDG1. Social protection, employment and decent work are also key themes of the “Agenda for Change” which aims to bring the benefits of growth to more people. Sustainability and inclusiveness in economic development through employment, skills development, social inclusion and social protection, particularly for young people, were chosen as priorities within the support for partnership, reform and inclusive growth programme (SPRING) for Southern Mediterranean countries, approved at the end of 2011. Education In line with its 2010 policy for “More and better education for all in developing countries”, the EU supports the overall balanced development of education systems in partner countries, with particular attention paid to equal access to education and improving the quality of education. In the current programming period, the EU’s support for education in 48 countries amounts to around €4 billion (see chapter 3). Gender equality The EU's thematic programme, “Investing in People”, also funded two major gender equality initiatives during 2011; one on women's social and economic empowerment, and a new UN programme, “Increasing accountability for financing to gender equality", launched with EU support. Both initiatives aim to contribute to the achievement of MDG3 on gender equality by supporting women's leadership in economic and social spheres and by mobilising resources to implement partner countries' commitments on gender equality (see chapter 3). Health

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The Commission’s support to the health sector covers three health-related MDGs and other sectors having an impact on child morbidity and mortality, such as nutrition, water and sanitation. Steady progress is being made in reducing child deaths. Globally, the mortality rate for children under five has declined by 35%, from 88 deaths per 1 000 live births in 1990 to 57 in 2010. All regions, except Sub-Saharan Africa, Caucasus and Central Asia, Southern Asia and Oceania, have seen reductions of at least 50%. Despite population growth, the number of deaths in children under five worldwide dropped from 12 million in 1990 to 7.6 million in 2010, or 12 000 fewer children dying each day. The rate of decline in under-five mortality rates has also accelerated from 1.9% a year, 1990–2000 to 2.5% a year, 2000–2010. The EU has contributed to achievement of the health MDGs by improving the overall functioning of health systems of partner countries, of critical importance for the population to access sustainable services12. It supports projects to eradicate poverty-related diseases and improve health such as the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunisation (MDG4) and the Global Fund to fight against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (MDG6). In addition to its ongoing support to the health sector, 11 country proposals were selected in 2011 for additional aid totalling €280.4 million to accelerate the MDGs for child health and maternal health (see chapter 3). Support to fight HIV/AIDS is mostly channelled through the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria13. The EU has disbursed more than €922 million through this instrument so far. This has been complemented by other specific support - totalling €250 million over the last decade to social organisations at country level to help them run their HIV control activities. Pandemic preparedness and response - emerging diseases The EU is the largest contributor (contributing more than 75% of the total of approximately $125 million) to the multi-donor trust fund Avian and Human Influenza Facility (AHIF), administered by the World Bank. AHIF funds national plans worldwide involving human and animal health services, aiming at preventing and if needed mitigating the effects of serious infectious diseases and pandemics. In 2011, actions financed by AHIF started taking into account the One Health approach, which addresses health risks originating at the interface between humans, animals and their various environments. Environmental sustainability The Commission pursued many policies and projects in 2011 to promote environmental issues for the achievement of MDG 7: the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), the EU forest law enforcement, governance and trade (FLEGT) Action Plan and the ACP-EU Water Facility. The GCCA has provided €210 million for 30 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDs), which are particularly vulnerable to climate change. FLEGT agreements strengthen forest governance in timber producing countries at the same

12 Communication COM(2010)128, 31.03.2010 and Council Conclusions on the EU role in global health 13 http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/

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time as combatting illegal logging and associated trade. FLEGT also supports work on climate change mitigation and reduced emissions from degradation and deforestation (REDD+). Energy-generating income in Malawi The MDGs will not be reached without a steady increase in access to modern energy. The Commission is improving access to modern energy to help achieve the MDGs. Women and children in Msamala, a rural district in Malawi, now collect 30% less firewood thanks to energy-efficient stoves introduced as part of a sustainable energy project. Funded under the ACP-EU Energy Facility, the additional installation of solar photovoltaic systems has increased learning hours for 8860 students. The revenues of 34 business groups have also gone up thanks to the project's spin-off: stove production, bee-keeping and mushroom growing. These activities have in turn increased household investment in livestock and have enabled food to be bought to supplement harvests. Water projects in pipeline Thirty-two projects, totalling €23 million, to improve water governance, resource management and sustainable development of water infrastructure in ACP states were selected for funding in 2011. They are funded out of the 10th EDF ACP-EU Water Facility (€212 million), set up to provide water and basic sanitation to the poor and improve water resource management in ACP countries. Access to sanitation in urban and peri-urban areas – one of the most off-track MDG indicators globally – has been targeted in a new set of calls for proposals. The creation of a pool funding mechanism will also provide private sector and loan financing. The EU supported the newly-founded International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) which promotes the use of all forms of renewable energies in developing countries. IRENA notably emphasises the key role played by renewable energies in supporting sustainable growth and alleviating energy poverty whilst reducing green-house gas emissions and enhancing energy security.

Trailblazing renewable energy in the Southern Mediterranean The three-year EU-funded, “Paving the Way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan” project is promoting the greater use of renewable energy across Southern Mediterranean countries. It has set up a platform for dialogue to explore the possibilities of a harmonised regulatory framework for investments in renewable energy across the nine countries involved. A benchmarking report has been issued for each beneficiary country on the integration of renewable energy into respective electricity systems, along with studies on the infrastructure requirements for the integration of renewable energy in the countries’ electricity systems14. For Commission activities in relation to MDG8 on developing a global partnership for development, see Chapter 1 section 4 more, better and more effective aid.

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3.2 Focussing on poverty The Lisbon Treaty puts fighting poverty at the core of European external and development policies. The EU has already done much to help reduce poverty and in particular to support the achievements of the MDGs. However, the global economic and financial crisis, exacerbated by the food and energy crisis have seriously challenged progress in poverty reduction. According to the UNDP and the World Bank (WB), it is largely Asia’s sustained growth that is putting the world on track to meet the poverty reduction target of halving between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 dollar a day. However, only 49 of 87 countries are on track to achieve MDG poverty alleviation targets. An established positive correlation exists between economic growth, reforms, political stability/good governance, and effective poverty alleviation strategies. Current rapid growth in China, India, Brazil, and other emerging economies has been impressive. Yet, new challenges need to be addressed such as effective social protection for all including the informal sector, ensuring decent working conditions, environmental degradation, climate change, food security and energy efficiency whilst ensuring that economic growth reaches everyone, particularly those most in need.

Looking ahead, the “Agenda for Change” will focus EU support on those partner countries where it can have the greatest poverty reduction impact. Given that the 2015 target for achieving the MDGs is close, developed and developing countries will need to act more quickly to reach the MDGs. The new policy should ensure that the development policy of the EU and its Member States has the greatest possible impact in attaining its objectives. At a time when the credibility of aid is under pressure, demonstrating this increased impact is more important than ever for maintaining political and public support for development assistance.

In 2011, the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LDC IV) took place in Istanbul. The new 10-year Programme of Action reaffirms the global commitment to address the special needs of the LDCs, including the aim of enabling half the number of LDCs to meet the criteria for graduation by 2020. The UN General Assembly decided in December 2011 to establish an ad hoc Working Group to study and strengthen the graduation and smooth transition process. The EU will contribute actively to this follow-up work. Other main achievements and deliverables include a strong commitment from donor countries to review their ODA commitments in 2015; and a high-level mid-term Review in 2015 as a follow-up regarding commitments by donor countries and emerging economies. Progress in reducing poverty All EU partners in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus covered by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) are now classified as Middle–Income Countries (MICs). While poverty in the region has been reduced, social inequality and exclusion are still increasing at country and regional levels. Regional needs are significant. Although the Republic of Moldova15 has been reclassified as a low–middle income country, it remains Europe’s poorest country.

Mediterranean countries covered by the ENPI also have to cope with poverty (all of them, apart from Israel, belong to the MIC category). Due to the existence of informal, as well as formal redistributive channels, more budgetary and fiscal discipline is required. The Arab 15 Hereinafter Moldova

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Spring offers an opportunity for the southern Neighbourhood to carry out reforms needed for better governance and inclusive and sustainable growth for progress on poverty reduction.

EU assistance through the ENPI hence focuses on these issues. The most difficult social situation remains that of the occupied Palestinian territory where, despite humanitarian assistance, more than 30 % of the Palestinian population still live in poverty.

Sub-Saharan Africa has managed to cope with the crisis better than expected and its growth rates are above pre-crisis levels. As a result, many African countries have made progress towards the MDGs. For example, four countries: Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana and Malawi are projected to achieve most of the MDGs, if not by 2015, then soon thereafter. However, serious challenges remain. About half of the population still lives on $1.25 a day, and development progress is neither reaching those most in need nor vulnerable groups. Weak governance is another challenge.

Recovery from the crisis is firmly on track in Asia and the Pacific with real GDP growth registered. There has been an impressive reduction of absolute poverty in Asia, led by China, India and most countries of Southeast Asia. However, poverty is still widespread in India and other countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea and Timor–Leste. Economic growth has led to considerable income and regional disparities, including inequalities between rural and urban populations. There is wide variation in levels of development in Southeast Asian MICs. In these areas, EU cooperation through the DCI focuses on capacity building, social infrastructures, energy efficiency, land management, climate change, food security, environmental protection and trade integration, all of which have spill–over effects on poverty alleviation strategies at regional and country level.

Central Asian transition countries saw growth pick up in 2010 after the crisis caused weaker markets for commodity exports and lost remittances from citizens working abroad. But overall, in the region growth rates fell, poverty levels rose and the urban/rural divide widened. To help meet these challenges, EU support focuses on raising living standards, developing the social sector and providing a social safety net. It also seeks to improve the rule of law and public governance.

Progress in economic and social reform during the 1990s and early 2000s ensured prolonged economic growth for Latin America throughout which poverty levels fell significantly. For example, more than 50 million people were lifted out of moderate poverty between 2002 and 2008. However, an average of 40% of the Latin American population still lives in poverty and income inequality remains. Haiti remains the poorest country in the Caribbean and its reconstruction and poverty challenges are being supported through a revised country strategy which includes joint-programming with EU Member States. For Latin America, EU programmes financed out of the DCI support the fight against poverty by promoting social cohesion and backing regional integration. The EU policy dialogue has also been broadened to include economic competitiveness, trade, migration, environment/energy/climate change, governance, and sustainable development. This is particularly the case for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, among the upper MICs.

3.3 Strengthening human rights and good governance In 2011, the EU used its range of external instruments and policies to promote and protect human rights and good governance and to combat gender inequality. The “Agenda for Change” and budget support communications stress human rights, democracy and good

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governance as a main focus of EU development cooperation with third countries for the period 2014-2020. Further, the proposals presented in December on the EU financial instruments, including the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights strengthen the promotion of democracy and human rights and the stepping up of support to civil society worldwide. The High Representative and the Commission presented a joint communication to the European Parliament and to the Council on “Human rights and democracy at the heart of EU external action – towards a more effective approach”16 in December. While reaffirming the EU's position on human rights, it aims to tailor the EU’s approach to promoting human rights to local conditions. The vision is of a cohesive approach across EU external policies. The communication sets out how to strengthen EU partnerships when implementing the new approach and puts forward ways to harness the EU's collective weight. The EU also started developing human rights strategies for almost 160 countries worldwide. They are shaped to respond to the particular needs of individual countries to achieve stronger positive impacts on the ground. They establish country-specific priorities and objectives, which can be integrated in all relevant EU external policies such as development, trade or security. In 2011, over 130 strategies were finalised, having taken into account the views of civil society. The EU is also active in multilateral fora at the UN, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in setting human rights standards and promoting human rights as universal. In the Human Rights Council (HRC), the EU successfully called for special sessions on Libya and Syria to condemn human rights violations and establish oversight to monitor the situation and ensure accountability. The EU also put Belarus on the HRC’s agenda. It ran initiatives such as the resolutions on Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Burma/Myanmar and resolutions on the protection of freedom of religion or belief and children’s rights in the UN’s General Assembly. Bilaterally, it held over 40 human rights dialogues with third countries which gave the EU many opportunities to address specific human rights concerns. Numerous EU statements also addressed country specific and thematic human rights issues. Further, the EU deployed ten Election Observation Missions (EOM) and seven election expert missions in 2011. Five EU EOMs accompanied and gave additional credibility to major developments, most notably the regime change in Tunisia, the creation of a new country in South Sudan, the transition from a military to a civilian regime in Niger, and the long-awaited shift to the political opposition in Peru and Zambia. Three EOMs accompanied relatively smooth re-elections of incumbent authorities in Nigeria, Chad and Uganda, while two others were led in challenging electoral contexts in Nicaragua and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). During 2011, work continued on the implementation of the Council conclusions of November 2009 and December 2010 on democracy support with the confirmation of pilot countries to explore new ways of working. They involve the following countries: Benin, Ghana, Bolivia, Lebanon, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, Maldives, and Solomon Islands. Commitments in the May 2011 joint communication issued by the High Representative and the Commission on the Neighbourhood, also further strengthened work in the sphere of good governance and democratisation. 16 COM(2011) 886 final, 12.12.2011

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3.4 Mainstreaming of cross–cutting issues The EU supports a number of sectors in developing nations in their own right, such as gender or human rights (see previous section). In having an impact a number of other sectors, such assistance helps to achieve wider development goals, including the MDGs. Gender 2011 was the first year of implementation year of the EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development 2010-201517. This aims to strengthen cohesion and coordination and improve the EU's work on gender in external action for more impact on the ground. The plan contains commitments to be implemented by the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States. It foresees an accountability system where actors must report annually to the Council on progress in implementing the indicators for which they are responsible. In November, the first annual progress report was submitted to the European Council. The report represents the first comprehensive stock-taking exercise of what the EU is doing to mainstream gender equality in development cooperation and in policy/political dialogue in partner countries. It provides a valuable baseline against which to assess future progress, compare trends, and identify good examples and the challenges ahead. The reporting process has also given the opportunity to improve internal communication and strengthen commitments on gender issues between the Commission, EU Delegations, the EEAS and Member States. The replies registered progress and emerging good practices. It was found that EU Delegations play an active part in gender coordination groups/mechanisms aimed at mainstreaming gender equality in development cooperation. Most Delegations also use thematic local calls for proposals to support gender-related projects, including those aimed at fighting violence and discrimination against women and girls. Cooperation with UN Women has been strengthened, including the preparation of a memorandum of understanding for a strategic partnership with the EU, as well as EU support to a number of UN gender equality programmes. The Commission has increased EU budget allocations for gender by €10 million through the thematic programme, Investing in People, and in November 2011 launched a global call for proposals on women's social and economic empowerment. Capacity-building for EU staff on gender equality has continued through online courses, thematic training, and ongoing support to gender focal persons in EU Delegations. Lessons learned include the need to strengthen the capacity of EU staff to mainstream gender equality and empowerment of women in the different sectors and modalities of EU bilateral cooperation (including budget support programmes). This would lead to a more focused and informed gender policy dialogue with its partners in government and civil society. There is also a need to ensure broader impact and the consolidation of institutional memory on gender issues. For this, capacity building on gender should not represent a self-standing activity, but be integrated into core EU training. To accomplish these goals, in December 2011 the

17 SEC(2010)265 final, 08.03.2010 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/227a_en.htm

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Commission launched a new contract with external gender advisory services which will be responsible for capacity building and technical assistance to EU staff on gender issues. Environment and Climate Change In 2011, the Commission and the Member States continued work on a strategy to integrate environment and climate in development cooperation. The aim is to produce an ambitious EU-wide strategy, to be adopted by the European Council in 2012. The Commission revised parts of the guidelines on the integration of environment and climate change in development cooperation, in particular with regard to climate risk assessments of projects. A study on environmental integration indicators and a review of the Commission’s experience with using the strategic environmental assessment tool were completed. The conclusions of these reviews will be incorporated in the Commission's work in 2012. Staff training and information seminars on mainstreaming environment and climate change continued. A one-day course on 'greening development' was introduced, in recognition of the rising importance of the 'green economy' concept. In the context of the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), the Commission has trained over 200 senior officials. The training targeted ministries of finance, planning and environment in GCCA partner countries in an effort to catalyse mainstreaming, with a strong focus on reflecting climate issues in the budgeting process. Utilisation of specific 'climate change windows' in investment facilities continued, allowing more informed investments in projects taking due consideration of climate change, facilitating the tracking of these investments and leveraging loans, particularly for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. Gearing up to green economy In the run-up to the Rio+20 conference and through specific projects, the EU has been promoting the emerging international concept of a green economy. This aims to engender improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. At the same time, it seeks to promote sustainable development and create employment. The EU’s approach also emphasises private sector-led development and growth with a focus on agriculture and energy. In 2011, the EU supported the green economy by promoting activities geared to smart and inclusive growth in the following ways:

- SWITCH Asia targets sustainable production and consumption by introducing life-cycle thinking, eco-design, eco-innovation and product environmental foot print thinking. The project both encourages producers and consumers to switch to greener activities and strengthens environmental policy frameworks and greener governance.

- The Green Economy and Social and Environmental Entrepreneurship Development in Africa programme is working with both the private and public sectors to put in place policies to stimulate greener investments and support private entrepreneurs by means of capacity building, networking and provision of tools.

- The Energy Facility and the Environment and Natural Resources Thematic Programme targets renewable energy and increased energy efficiency.

- Support to climate change mitigation programmes. - Training sessions on mainstreaming environment and climate change policies.

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Anti–corruption As corruption is a sign of failure of broader governance systems, it should be treated as part of the overall support to democratic governance rather than in isolation. To fight corruption effectively, communication and the flow of information to operational staff, as well as close cooperation with other donors and stake-holders, are all necessary. A set of initiatives is being implemented to develop operational tools and support for field work. The Commission is part of a joint initiative with Transparency International, the UNDP and other stakeholders to make more efficient use of existing corruption assessment and measurement tools, through the development of a web-based gateway. The Commission is a party to a memorandum of understanding with other donors and the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions to develop capacities of Supreme Audit Institutions in aid recipient countries. Several working relationships with civil society organisations are also in place for supporting citizens in the daily challenges posed by corruption, notably through legal advice and seeking to achieve systemic changes. The Commission also continues to support anti-corruption efforts in third countries through specific interventions in key governance areas. They include: justice, security, democratisation, non-state actors, public sector reform and decentralisation. It also supports the mainstreaming of governance in other areas of cooperation such as health, water, education, transport and infrastructure, so as to ensure that all projects and programmes – at every stage of their development – analyse and address governance challenges. Culture No effective aid programme is possible without proper consideration of the cultural dimension. Both the international seminar in Gerona, Spain in May 2010 and the UN MDG Summit of September 2010 stressed the cross–cutting contribution of culture to social and economic development. Cooperation with partners in different regions, notably with the European Neighbourhood and ACP countries, provides support to the cultural and creative sector in the framework of geographic (such as ENPI, EDF) and thematic (Investing in people) instruments, whose implementation continued in 2011. In parallel, a roadmap for strengthened cultural cooperation was agreed between the EU and the African Union in May 2011 under the democratic governance and human rights priority. The European Parliament also passed a resolution on 12 May 2011 on the cultural dimensions of the EU’s external actions. 2011 saw further developments in the implementation of the Work Plan for culture 2011-2014 as regards the priority of culture in external relations. As part of a more strategic approach and cooperation in this area, the first informal meetings between senior officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture of EU Member States took place. In light of these meetings, the Commission proposed to set up an expert group on culture and external relations in 2012. This group will have a specific focus on cultural relations with China in the framework of EU-China relations, notably the 2012 Euro-China Year of Intercultural Dialogue and the launch of the Third Pillar of the EU-China strategic partnership on people-to-people contacts.

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In its capacity as a Party to the UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, the Commission set up an expert facility on cultural governance, run by UNESCO for the period 2010-2012 and providing €1 billion, with the aim of strengthening the system of governance for culture in developing countries through technical assistance based on the needs and priorities of the beneficiary countries.

3.5 Cooperation with non-state actors and local authorities 2011 saw the conclusion of the first phase of the Structured Dialogue, a multi-stakeholder consultation lasting almost two years. Designed to improve mutual knowledge, share lessons learnt and enable a climate of confidence and trust among various stakeholders engaged in EU development cooperation, the initiative was finalised in May 2011. The dialogue aimed to improve the effectiveness of the partnership between the EU, civil society and local authorities, in line with the aid and development effectiveness agenda. The Structured Dialogue brought together 700 participants from the EU and partner countries (over 60 nations) including members of civil society (development, relief/humanitarian and human rights NGOs, trade unions, grant making and political foundations, cooperatives, and chambers of commerce, youth organizations, etc.) and decentralised local and regional authorities with representatives of EU institutions: the European Parliament, EU Member States and the European Commission (representing both headquarters and EU Delegations). Debates included the promotion of an enabling environment for civil society and local authorities, multi-stakeholder dialogues, partnerships and complementarities between actors, the territorial approach and its articulation at the local level; finally, how ownership and alignment principles relate to Civil Society and Local Authorities. The Structured Dialogue contributed to building consensus and trust by developing a shared vision of the roles and added value of organised civil society and local authorities. The final conference in Budapest, co-hosted by the Hungarian Presidency of the EU and the EU Commissioner for Development, prompted the ”Joint Declaration of Budapest”, a series of commitments and recommendations addressed to each category of actor (EU, civil society, local authorities and partner countries)18. All actors adhering to the Declaration of Budapest committed to provide follow up. On its side, the Commission will ensure the continuation of the Structured Dialogue at the national level, and at the highest policy level. The Structured Dialogue results contributed substantially to the EU common position ahead of the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan 2011). They were also reflected in the new development agenda of the EU (Agenda for Change). A Communication on EU engagement with civil society organisations, to be tabled in 2012, will consolidate these new aspects and reflections. In parallel, new operational guidelines on "how to engage more strategically with civil Society" are currently elaborated for the benefit of EU Delegations in third countries. Another example of the Commission’s commitment to implementing the recommendations of the Structured Dialogue was also seen in the mapping study on regional, continental and

18 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/aidco/index.php/Structured_dialogue

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global networks of civil society organisations and local authorities. The study will contribute to the achievement of the Commission’s objective to promote and support regular, structured and inclusive multi-stakeholder dialogues. Funding will allow civil society organisations and local authorities, particularly their platforms and representative organisations, to effectively participate in future dialogues. The Commission has also moved forward with its cooperation with local authorities, defined in a 2008 communication. The second “Assises of decentralised cooperation” took place in March 2011. It permitted representatives of EU local authorities and of developing countries, to conduct a political dialogue on development cooperation with European institutions. The Commission has thus strengthened its strategic relation with local authorities at political level in parallel to continuing its co-financing of projects proposed by these authorities. 2011 was also a fruitful year for the Development Education and Awareness Raising in Europe (DEAR) programme. Following the completion of the DEAR study process in 2010, the Commission started implementing its recommendations, and set DEAR’s future priorities. There was stronger emphasis on ensuring complementarity and close cooperation with Member States, particularly on aspects of the programme related to formal education. All Commission-funded development education projects with activities in the formal education sector (inclusion of development education in teacher training, curriculum development, lessons plans, etc.) will complement development education strategies, or orientations in the Member States where the project takes place. The European dimension of the DEAR programme was also strengthened. Priority was given to projects with wide and co-ordinated European coverage. These priorities were reflected in two separate calls for proposals at the end of the year for non-state actors and local authorities. Capacity development and capitalisation of results were also an area of renewed focus this year, with the organisation of an innovative workshop for beneficiaries of new grants. The Commission also set the bases for future work on capitalisation and communication of good practice in the field of development education and awareness-raising. The Commission also stepped up its collaboration with key actors in the field, culminating in the hosting of a GENE (Global Education Network Europe) round table in Brussels – a network of Member States active in global education. The participation of Commissioner Piebalgs in the public hearing on development education, organised by the European Parliament development committee in August, confirmed the Commission's strong involvement in DEAR in Europe.

4 More, better and more effective aid

4.1 Aid effectiveness and financing for development Mobilising more development financing from all available sources is necessary – although not sufficient – to fight poverty and foster development. Founded on the global “Financing for Development” agenda, the EU and its Member States set themselves common quantitative and qualitative targets against which progress can be measured. The Council invited the

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Commission to monitor and report progress annually. Part of the agreement was to collectively provide 0.56% of the combined GNI as Official Development Assistance (ODA) by 2010 with a view to spending 0.7% ODA/GNI in 2015. In 2011, the Commission presented its 9th annual report, 'Enhancing EU Accountability on Financing for Development'19. It showed that, in general, the EU as a whole has kept up progress in delivering on its various financing for development pledges, although the situation varies greatly between issues and between Member States. On ODA, the EU and its Member States spent a historical high of €53.5 billion for aid, corresponding to 0.44% of the combined GNI20, but fell short of the 2010 intermediate target by around €15 billion. The EU collectively accounted for 58% of net ODA to developing countries in 2010 from all members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and for 65% of the global €26 billion ODA increase from 2004-2010. In 2011, the EU continued its work on meeting commitments to implement the internationally-agreed aid effectiveness agenda at several levels. At an international level, the EU continued to support and play a key role in the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness hosted by the OECD’s DAC, focusing mainly on developing its policies for the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November - 1 December 2011) – the key development policy event in 2011. The EU played a leading role in the preparations of the Forum. In Busan, China, India and Brazil signed up for the first time to a document defining common goals and shared principles of a development partnership. The Busan Forum also set up a new inclusive global governance structure – the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. It also marked a conceptual shift from aid effectiveness to aid and development effectiveness, meaning a clearer emphasis on results and strengthening the role of aid as a catalyst to achieve development results. The common EU priorities are largely reflected in the Busan outcome document21: a focus on results and accountability, ownership, transparency and reduced fragmentation and on country level implementation while streamlining the global governance structure. The EU will participate in further supporting the establishment and strengthening of partner country-led frameworks for accountability and results. These frameworks are to be tailored to partner country priorities and local contexts. At the global level, the working arrangements of the Global Partnership, as well as global monitoring and indicators, will be decided upon by June 2012 by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. The EU will actively participate in this process to ensure that the working arrangements of the partnership will be light and that the partnership will focus on providing support for country level implementation.

19 COM(2011) 218 final of 19.04.2011; http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/accountability/eu-annual-accountability-reports/index_en.htm 20 Final ODA outcome figures 2010, published by the OECD DAC in January 2012: http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3746,en_2649_34447_1893129_1_1_1_1,00.html 21 http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories/hlf4/OUTCOME_DOCUMENT_-_FINAL_EN.pdf

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At EU level, the Commission continued working with the EU Member States on implementing the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness. Division of labour among donors remains the main tool to reduce aid fragmentation and is an essential element of the aid effectiveness agenda. In order to promote evidence-based policy-making on aid effectiveness, the Commission finalised several studies, for example, on the costs of non-implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda22. The main message from the study is that the EU and Member States could together save up to €5 billion per year. Measures to reach this would include streamlining project planning and implementation, more division of labour with a focus on fewer countries and sectors, further untying of aid, progress towards more budget support, reducing the volatility of aid, and indirect effects on partner countries' economic growth. Another important study of 2011 on joint multi-annual programming23 outlines the possibilities and constraints for joint programming in a number of partner countries, starting with the countries of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour. The study clearly highlights the need for the EU and Member States to synchronise their programming cycles with the strategy cycles of their partner countries. Fostering joint programming of EU and Member States' aid, a commitment repeated in a series of Council conclusions since 2006, was a priority area of work in 2011. The Commission proposals on the financial instruments for external action in view of the future EU Multi-annual Financial Framework (2014-2020)24 take due account of aid effectiveness principles and will result, if accepted, in considerable changes to the programming of EU aid. In line with the importance the EU attaches to the ownership of partner countries over their own national development, the Commission would synchronise its programming cycles with those of its partner countries. Wherever possible, the Commission would base its programming of aid on a partner country's own national strategy without formulating an EU strategy paper. The Commission would programme its aid jointly with others, foremost with EU Member States, wherever this option emerges from an in-country coordination process. Its ambition is to have all EU Member States, which are active in a given partner country, on board when conducting joint programming. In 2011, the Commission identified 10 partner countries where circumstances are most conducive to commence with joint programming in 2012. Transparency of aid is a priority for the European Commission. In 2011, it started to publish its aid information through the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). Implementing the IATI standard will fulfil the transparency requirements of the EU Transparency Guarantee, adopted by the Council in 2011. Progress in developing the TR-AID (Transparent Aid) tool will further enhance transparency, increase accountability, help reduce fragmentation of EU-managed aid, facilitate division of labour amongst donors as well as reduce the risk of duplication. At Commission level, since mid-2011 a single dedicated unit deals with all issues related to aid effectiveness, increasing effectiveness in this area, including training courses on aid 22 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/impact-inefficiencies_en.htm 23 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/documents/report-joint-multi-annual-programming_en.pdf 24 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/mff/eu-budget_en.htm

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effectiveness the Commission services and the EEAS. With regard to the indicators of progress stated in the Paris Declaration, the 2011 monitoring showed that the Commission has achieved some but not all targets. Its performance was average in comparison with Member States and other donors.

4.2 Coherence between development and other policies The EU is a major global actor and its various policies can have a strong impact on developing countries. The Lisbon Treaty requires the EU to take into account the development objectives in all its policies. The EU work programme on policy coherence for development, 2010–2013, provides guidelines for promoting this policy coherence for development across EU policies. It covers five main areas:

• trade and finance – to enhance the opportunities of developing countries to obtain maximum benefit from their integration into the world economy,

• food security – to help developing countries mobilise their own resources, particularly in sustainable fishing and agriculture,

• climate change – to assist developing countries in adapting to climate change and reduce CO2 emissions while preserving an environmental balance and biodiversity,

• migration – to bring about better coordination between migration and development by reducing the risk of “brain drain”, making migrants’ remittances cheaper and safer, and by facilitating circular migration,

• security – to consider the links between security and socio–economic development when planning and implementing security operations.

In 2011, the European Commission published its third biennial ‘whole-of-the-EU’ report on policy coherence for development. Building on contributions from Commission services and EU Member States it focuses on actions, processes and thematic priorities pursued by the EU and the Member States since 2009. It covers the five focus areas at EU and Member States' levels, looks at lessons learned and the challenges ahead. The three main ones are: to move beyond the ‘do no harm approach’ and seek better integration of the development dimension in the design of other EU and national policies. The second challenge is to strengthen the EU’s cooperation and networking capacity on policy coherence for development with Commission participation in the OECD international platform on policy coherence launched in 2011 seen as an important step in this regard. The third challenge is to enhance and monitor policy coherence and increase data collection capacity in both Member States and the EU. There are several examples of how the EU took development objectives into account in various policy initiatives in 2011. Most progress on policy coherence for development occurred in the sphere of EU climate policy, with the EU moving ahead with its commitment to mobilise fast start finance of €7.2 billion during 2010-2012 to support climate mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. In the area of trade, the EU made substantial progress to introduce comprehensive country-by-country reporting (CBCR) – a key tool to improve transparency, multi-national companies' corporate accountability and to tackle tax avoidance in developing countries. The last

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Commission communication on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)25 renews the EU’s commitment to promote CSR in developing countries, in favour of long term employment perspectives and consumer trust. In the area of food security, the Commission’s 2011 proposals for the reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) gave an opportunity to study and take into account the potential interactions of these policies with development objectives. In particular, the external dimension of the reformed CFP sets the ambition of greater coordination and policy coherence between fisheries and development policies to ensure that the recognition of the aspirations of developing States to build up their fisheries sector is linked to raising awareness of their duties of sustainable fisheries governance26.

Important steps forward are the ambitious EU 2020 Biodiversity Strategy to protect biodiversity as a key factor to achieve food security (focussing on more sustainable agriculture and forestry and better management of fish stocks) as well as the emphasis on biodiversity protection in CAP and CFP reforms. The mobility partnerships proposed in the Commission communication on a ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’27 are a good example for the search of synergies and mutual benefits for the EU and developing countries. They are increasingly recognised as a central instrument to provide important advantages for migrants and the countries involved. The EU pays also more attention to the concept of the 'brain drain', is more open to effective dialogue and cooperation with diaspora groups and migrant communities, promotes more efficient and secure flows of remittances and defends a common EU approach to migrants’ rights. The Renewable Energy Directive requires all EU Member States to apply a common sustainability scheme, ensuring that all biofuels counted towards EU targets – whether of EU origin or imported – have been produced in compliance with EU sustainability criteria. In June 2010, the European Commission adopted guidance for the EU sustainability criteria to encourage industry, governments and NGOs to set up certification schemes for all types of biofuels, including those imported into the EU. Such voluntary schemes may also cover other sustainability issues that are not covered by the EU sustainability criteria. These schemes may also have a wider impact, potentially enhancing sustainable production of agricultural raw materials as a side-effect. The Directive also includes comprehensive monitoring and reporting requirements on the impacts of the EU promotion of biofuels. The first reporting will take place in 2012 and a study setting the 2008 baseline for this has been finalised. Also on energy, the Commission's communication on security of energy supply and international cooperation – “The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Outer Borders"28 – highlights the EU's commitment to improve access to sustainable energy for developing countries by fully incorporating energy in the EU's development activities, while promoting comprehensive energy policies, reform measures, favourable investment conditions, infrastructure development and energy efficiency in countries concerned.

25 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=7010 26 COM (2011) 424 final of 13 July 2011 27 http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/1_EN_ACT_part1_v9.pdf 28 COM(2011 539 final, 07.09.2011

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The EU continues to support cooperation between researchers in Europe and developing countries. Since the start of the seventh framework programme (FP7) in 2007 €378 million has been granted to researchers in developing countries to participate in collaborative projects with European researchers. The forthcoming Horizon 2020 programme will continue to promote international cooperation. Funding will be more focussed on promoting competitiveness and targeting societal challenges such as health, food security, sustainable agriculture, renewable energy and climate change and on support to external European policies.

4.3 Cooperation with the international donor community OECD Close cooperation with the OECD on development issues continued in 2011 at all levels. In 2011, the Commission helped draw up a framework for an OECD Strategy on Development and worked very closely with the OECD to promote the aid effectiveness agenda and improve policy coherence for development.

During 20011, the DAC reviewed EU development cooperation policies and programmes in the framework of the peer review exercise, to be finalised in March 2012. Following the positive peer review of 2007, this exercise will assess the EU’s development policies and aid delivery over the past five years. United States The EU-US Dialogue continued throughout 2011 in all its clusters: food security, climate change, and health (under the MDGs cluster). Overall, progress was mixed: results were visible at the policy level leading, inter alia, to streamlined EU-US positions ahead of the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. In the field, efforts for joint EU-US activities continued in the six pilot countries on food security (Ethiopia, Zambia, Mali, Guatemala, Bangladesh, Nigeria – for the economic community of West African states, ECOWAS), as well as in the three pilots on climate change (Indonesia, Mali, Vietnam). Cooperation on food security in Ethiopia is the most successful pilot so far. In 2012, both sides have agreed to intensify their efforts in the rest of the pilot countries in an attempt to ensure progress on an equal footing with the policy dialogue at headquarters' level. The 2011 EU-US Summit tasked the dialogue "to pursue with vigour our joint efforts in areas such as food security, climate change, health and the MDGs". A new element in 2011 was the “Leaders' agreement "on the importance of close co-operation on security and development in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan". The Commission, in consultation with the Member States, will ensure the Leaders' mandate is followed up during 2012 and aims to shift the centre of gravity of this dialogue from the field to policy work and to further align EU and US development policy priorities. Brazil The EU and Brazil attach high importance to the role of triangular cooperation. During 2011, there was progress in the joint pilot projects on bio-energy in Mozambique and Kenya, as well as on electoral processes in Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP). Work on the electoral processes shows great potential and the Commission is exploring ways to build on

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this. This provides a good opportunity to move ahead with the implementation of triangular cooperation, as mentioned in the Letter of Intent on electoral processes signed by Brazil and the EU in July 2010. China The E continued to play an active part in the China DAC Study Group (CDSG), which brings together DAC, Chinese and African development officials and academics. In 2011, the CDSG completed its first round of four thematic conferences (including one on infrastructure funded by the EU in 2010) and one summary conference, and presented documentation on lessons for African development from Chinese and DAC experience. A side-event was held in Busan and a programme developed for 2012-13, including a move to engage Chinese development policy makers more closely, all of which contributed to Chinese openness to an inclusive result.

5 Outlook 2012 The recently adopted new framework for EU development policy heralds a new start and a promising future. The two communications on development policy (the "Agenda for Change" and budget support) outlined how EU development policy will look in the future with a more modern policy, better equipped to face the challenges of what is a rapidly changing global environment. In particular, the “Agenda for Change” aims to increase the impact of aid by introducing an EU differentiated approach towards partner countries and allocating more funds to countries most in needs, and to focus development cooperation in support of poverty reduction, human rights, democracy, good governance and inclusive and sustainable growth. The Commission will work in 2012 on the preparation of the 2014-2020 programming cycle. The legislative work on the adoption of the EU's external action instruments by the Parliament and the Council will continue during the course of 2012. 2012 will be also a key year for the preparation of the Strategy Papers and programming documents, in order to define funding priorities with partner countries for 2014-2020. The new programming cycle will also see an increased roll-out of innovative financial instruments (such as loans, guarantees, and equity and risk-sharing instruments) aimed at catalysing private investment and strengthening institutions in recipient countries. The objectives of this new policy framework will also have a significant impact on staff allocation. Delivering the new policies rapidly and efficiently will mean allocating resources appropriately, in terms of numbers and profiles alike, both at headquarters and in Delegations. This process shall also start in 2012. Through drawing lessons from the Arab Spring, the Commission will monitor the implementation of initiatives already developed in the southern Neighbourhood region with a view to their possible replication in, or adaptation for other parts of the world. In addition, the Commission will issue a communication on supporting sustainable change in societies in transition in 2012. It will assess the existing policies and implementation methodology in order to identify how the EU can improve its tools to support sustainable change in transition societies, adapted to and taking account of their situations and needs.

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The vulnerability of low-income countries to external shocks remains high. In 2012, the Commission will therefore examine the feasibility of developing a proposal for a shock-absorbing mechanism to be implemented as necessary during 2012-13, prioritising rapid and effective disbursement. Achievement of the MDGs will remain a key issue. Looking ahead, the next UN MDG Review in 2013 – two years ahead of the MDG 2015 target year – will be an important milestone. In 2012, the Commission will therefore start preparing a communication to report on EU action on the MDGs and outline principles for an EU position on a post-2015 framework.

CHAPTER 2 - IMPLEMENTATION: GEOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW This chapter presents the EU's external assistance in the main geographic regions. The geographic instruments covered here are the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The European Development Fund is the main source of financing for EU assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa (except South Africa), the Caribbean and the Pacific regions (ACP). The EDF is separate from the EU budget, which finances external assistance to other geographic areas and the thematic aid programmes. This report does not cover the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)29 or the current Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which is covered by a separate report30. A short section of this report is dedicated to humanitarian assistance31. While some figures and data can be found throughout this chapter, detailed financial information can be found in Chapter 5, Financial Annex.

1 European Neighbourhood and the Middle East

1.1 European Neighbourhood & Russia

1.1.1 Introduction A new European Neighbourhood Policy The EU’s evolving relationship with its partners in the Neighbourhood and the transition in the Southern Mediterranean called for a new policy response, set out following a Strategic review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The 25 May 2011 Joint Communication of the Commission and High Representative on “A new response to a changing Neighbourhood” outlines the new ENP vision and builds on the Joint

29 For more information on CFSP: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm 30 For more information on the IPA: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/instrument-pre-accession_en.htm 31 For more information on humanitarian assistance: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm

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Communication, “A Partnership for Democracy and shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, adopted on 8 March 2011. Mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law are at the core of the renewed ENP. In line with the “more for more” principle, it involves a high level of differentiation and gives each partner country scope to develop its relationship with the EU according to its own aspirations, needs and capacities. Closer economic integration and stronger political co-operation on governance reforms, security, conflict-resolution matters, including joint initiatives in international fora on issues of common interest with the neighbours committed to follow the path of an enhanced partnership, are all part of this. Above all, it seeks to support 'deep democracy' and form partnerships with societies: intensifying political and security cooperation, supporting their sustainable economic and social development, creating growth and jobs; strengthening trade ties, enhancing sector cooperation, promoting further mobility and enhancing regional partnerships. Launched in September 2011, the new civil society facility, with an initial budget of € 26.4 million, aims at strengthening the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in the Neighbourhood. An additional €66 million was allocated to the Erasmus Mundus Programme to boost co-operation in higher education. Preparations of other initiatives, notably the European Endowment for Democracy, are continuing. The new policy approach aims to provide substantial funding earmarked for the Neighbourhood for 2011-2013. It is enshrined in the proposal for the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) adopted by the Commission on 7 December 2011 - part of its overall proposal on the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-2020. The Southern Neighbourhood and the Arab Spring Immediate steps were taken by the EU to respond rapidly and effectively to the challenges arising from the Arab Spring. Initial humanitarian and civil protection support (to date €80.5 million) was approved, as well as of a range of measures for democratic transition and assistance to impoverished areas.

In March 2011, a new approach to the southern Neighbourhood was set out. "A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”32 was offered to those partners committed to wide and bold reforms. A strategic review of the ENP led to a revised approach for the whole European Neighbourhood Policy33. An incentive-based approach was devised (“more for more” principle) to support partners who deliver on reforms, build “deep democracy” and ensure sustainable and inclusive economic development. In 2011, the EU provided significant support for elections in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. There was political condemnation of the political situations in Bahrain, Yemen, and especially Syria. A set of measures: economic sanctions, trade embargoes, asset freezes and visa bans 32 Joint Communication COM (2011) 0200, 08.03.2011 33 Joint Communication COM (2011)0303, 25.05.2011

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were applied in Libya (before the fall of former Leader Muammar Gaddafi) and Syria. In parallel, across the entire Neighbourhood, the EU expanded its support to civil society. In May 2011, HR/VP Ashton visited Benghazi to open the EU’s first office in Libya. An EU office opened in Tripoli in September which two months later was upgraded to a fully-fledged EU Delegation. A range of short-term support has backed the transition in Libya. The EU is currently the lead donor in the country’s post-conflict needs assessment in a number of key sectors. The EU was also one of the first donors to suspend its bilateral co-operation with the Syrian regime. Not all support has stopped however; several projects are still ongoing to support non-state actors, Syrian civil society and refugee populations.

The EU also took the initiative to co-ordinate and strengthen the coherence of international response to events of the Arab Spring, with the establishment of a task force and appointment of a an EU Special Representative (EUSR) to co-ordinate task force activities throughout the Neighbourhood South region. Further initiatives followed. In December 2011 the Council approved mandates for negotiating Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan. A dialogue on migration, mobility and security was officially launched with Tunisia and Morocco in October 2011,with a view to concluding, inter alia, mobility partnerships. The EU also increased its financial support, in addition to adjusting its ongoing support to meet new policy objectives. This included support to the SPRING initiative (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) launched in September 2011. It made available an additional €350 million for 2011 and 2012 for southern partners showing commitment to, and progress in, democratic reforms. An additional budget allocated to the Erasmus Mundus programme allowed the funding of an additional 743 mobility grants for the academic exchange of students and staff for the 2011/12 academic year, thus strengthening academic cooperation between universities from the EU and the South Mediterranean region. The Eastern Neighbourhood In 2011, the EU continued to focus on its eastern partners who view it as a magnet and a catalyst for reform; as an economic opportunity and a close political partner.

At the second Eastern Partnership summit in Warsaw on 29-30 September 2011, the EU and its eastern neighbours renewed their commitment to these objectives and continued implementation of the Eastern Partnership. An allocation of additional resources (of up to €130 million) for 2012-2013 will benefit partners who are committed to reforms.

Repeated calls were made by the EU over the course of the year for all political prisoners in Belarus to be released and rehabilitated and for the opening of political dialogue with the opposition. In response to the violent aftermath of the December 2010 elections in Belarus, the EU pledged more than €17 million in immediate and medium-term assistance to the Belarusian people – mainly for NGOs and non-state actors – to promote freedom of assembly and the monitoring of election processes. It also imposed restrictive measures on the authors of the repression.

The EU-Ukraine Summit in December 2011 noted common understanding on the full text of the association agreement (AA), including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), opening the way for its final consolidation and subsequent initialling. Ukraine’s

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performance, notably in relation to respect for common values and the rule of law, will be of crucial importance for the speed of its political association and economic integration with the EU, including in the context of the conclusion of the Association Agreement and its subsequent implementation.

Negotiations on Association Agreements with the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia made good progress throughout 2011. The launch of negotiations on a DCFTA with the Republic of Moldova and Georgia was announced at the end of 2011. The EU and its eastern partners also worked closely on increased mobility arrangements. A Mobility Partnership between the EU and Armenia was signed in October, with it thus becoming the third country in the region with whom such a Partnership has been concluded (after Moldova and Georgia). Russia In 2011, EU-Russia relations developed further, with significant progress in several areas, notwithstanding protracted conflicts in the Neighbourhood and new differences emerging over the crises in Libya and Syria. The EU-Russia Summit on 14-15 December 2011 in Brussels produced a number of important results, in particular relating to World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession, solutions to aviation issues, visas, and modernisation. Following close dialogue between High Representative/Vice President Ashton and Foreign Minister Lavrov on Syria, Russia finally accepted to discuss a UN Security Council resolution on Syria. The formal re-launch of the 5+2 process on Transnistria on 1 December in Vilnius, after a break of five years, is an encouraging step. Russia’s recent WTO accession is a basis on which to reinvigorate negotiations on the new EU-Russia Agreement. Significant progress has been made on mobility and visa issues.

The partnership for modernisation is now being fully implemented. This is a pragmatic framework which provides additional momentum to EU cooperation with Russia. Twenty-three EU Member States have concluded bilateral modernisation partnerships with Russia, reinforcing and underpinning the EU-Russia partnership.

1.1.2 Aid effectiveness and donor coordination

Throughout 2011, the EU has been playing a key and instrumental role in donor coordination in many partner countries in the eastern and southern Neighbourhood. With the support of Member States and other co-operation partners, the EU Delegation in Azerbaijan has taken a lead in donor coordination since end of 2009. The EU Delegation in Belarus organised regular co-ordination meetings with EU Member States and all major donors active in Belarus (UNDP, WB, Swedish International Development Cooperation agency (SIDA), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) etc.) to synchronise actions and avoid any overlapping. This co-ordination was organised in compliance with the principles of the Paris Declaration and aimed to ensure maximum aid effectiveness. 2011 was a milestone in setting up the donor coordination system in Georgia, including the government of Georgia's signing of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in April 2011.

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A fruitful dialogue is ongoing in key sectors, such as: justice, agriculture, health and trade. The coordination is multi-lateral and the EU is strongly encouraging dialogue between the Government of Georgia, EU Member States, international organisations, non-EU donors and civil society. The overall donor coordination architecture counts 13 working groups at national level, in the framework of which key strategies were drawn up jointly with the government. Sweden and Romania were the two biggest bilateral EU donors in Moldova in the areas of energy, trade, public administration etc. A joint project was also implemented with Austria in the water sector. Due to the absence of operational government/donor co-ordination structures in Ukraine, international donor organisations co-ordinated their activities through the major donor forum and other mechanisms at their own initiative. Few southern neighbourhood countries participated in the 2011 OECD DAC survey of the Paris Declaration. According to this survey, Jordan has fully met four of nine indicators, specifically in the areas of ownership, alignment and mutual accountability. There has also been progress in the use of country systems. In Morocco, there is progress on indicators relating to ownership, alignment, harmonisation and accountability for results and in the use of national Public Finance Management (PFM) systems. Egypt has made progress in meeting many of the Paris Declaration targets including those for ownership and management for results; progress was also made on alignment. Future efforts should be focused on harmonisation and mutual accountability. In the occupied Palestinian territory, results showed that ownership and alignment were very strong. As for the indicators on management for results and harmonisation, further efforts are required by donors to increase coordination and provide data. To further deepen commitments and strengthen development effectiveness, the EU will promote and support specific initiatives. It has been proposed that Tunisia take part in joint programming from 2012 in order to reduce aid fragmentation and promote harmonisation. Further assessments will be carried out to confirm whether this exercise can go ahead. A proposal has also been made to implement joint programming (Commission/Member States) during 2012 both in Ukraine and Moldova, but not yet decided. 1.1.3 Working towards the MDGs In 2011, several ENPI programmes in the social sector were specifically designed to meet MDG objectives. “Empowering young women” and “Entrepreneurship as a tool for raising the role of women in the society” are examples of initiatives in Armenia that contributed to gender equality and empowering women (MDG3). The first programme aimed at helping young women with vulnerable backgrounds by promoting their active involvement in society. The second was targeted at helping women become involved in business. Armenia also actively participated in regional environmental projects aimed at environmental sustainability (MDG7). The Regional Environmental Centre–Caucasus (REC-Caucasus) is currently implementing five projects relevant to Armenia on: climate change, the training of environmental inspectors, waste management, forest policy and sustainable land management.

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In Georgia, more than €25 million were granted to assist internally displaced people and communities affected by conflicts (MDG1). All programmes relating to the Public Finance Management reform and technical assistance to trade (including twinning and comprehensive institutional building) contributed to MDG8 (global partnership for development). The health budget support programme in Moldova contributed towards both MDG-5 (maternal health improvement) and MDG6 (combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases) by providing financial support to the country's health care reforms, strengthening the primary health care system and improving prevention of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, epidemics, etc. Southern neighbours took significant steps to improve the health, education, and standard of living of its people. They face a number of challenges, however, including high youth unemployment, persistent gender and social and economic disparities. Six of the southern Neighbourhood countries are likely to attain universal primary education (MDG2) by 2015. School enrolment and completion rates have reached levels of over 90% in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the occupied Palestinian territory and Tunisia. Morocco has also achieved considerable progress in enrolment terms. The Commission contribution to this process continued in 2011, with the approval of programmes to support the education sector in Jordan (€23 million) and to improve the quality and inclusiveness of education in Libya (€2.4 million). Countries of the Middle East and North Africa have made progress in improving the educational chances of girls, on the path to meeting MDG3 on gender equality and empowering women. The region will remain far from any real gender equality however, if countries do not undertake substantial efforts to improve the economic, political, and legal situation of women. The Commission is supporting countries committed to such goals. In 2011, a programme of €45 million was approved to promote equality between women and men in Morocco. It aims to ensure that women and men are given equal opportunities to participate, influence and steer development policies and development programmes and that both women and men are able to benefit from them equally. The Commission is strongly committed to contributing to developing a global partnership for development (MDG8) in the southern Neighbourhood. Support here varies from good governance-related programmes to justice and rule of law to involvement of youth and civil society. The EU’s commitment was highlighted in 2011 in its response to the Arab Spring. 'A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean' was put forward in a Joint Communication in 8 March 201134, stressing the need for the EU to support wholeheartedly the demand for political participation, dignity, freedom and employment opportunities, and setting out an approach based on the respect of universal values and shared interests. It also proposes that the “more for more” principle be used, under which increased support will be made available to those partner countries most advanced in bringing about democratic reforms.

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A second Joint Communication, “A new response to a changing Neighbourhood” of 25 May35, took this approach further. Several decisions to finance programmes in line with these commitments were taken in 2011: to support youth employment in Algeria (€23.5 million); to support the reform of the judiciary system in Lebanon (€5 million) and support for municipal finance in Lebanon (€20 million). The new Civil Society facility for the whole neighbourhood region which has an overall budget of €26.4 million for 2011 (of which €12 million for the southern Neighbourhood), will promote domestic accountability and contribute to attaining MDG8.

1.1.4 Implementation and results Bilateral cooperation EU assistance to Armenia continued to support reforms in the justice system, public finance management, trade and education. In addition, the comprehensive institution building programme was set up to strengthen the capacities of central government institutions involved in the negotiation process for the AA and to prepare for the DCFTA. An ongoing programme in the area of vocational education and training continued to assist reforms in the education system, making it more relevant to the existing job market. The renovation of 12 multi-disciplinary colleges across the country and the training of numerous directors and teachers upgraded the institutional set up. Improved access to justice and increased transparency through e-services were put in place under a budget support programme. In Azerbaijan, sector budget support operations continued to boost reforms in the energy and justice sectors. Significant progress was made in preparing for a sector budget programme in public finance policy. The twinning instrument continued to be very successful with one of the highest rates of implementation in the region. Nineteen twinning projects are currently in different stages of implementation including six under preparation in the areas of transport, financial services, maritime safety, environment, migration, cartography and tourism. After the post-electoral crisis of December 2010 in Belarus, the EU significantly stepped up its support to civil society, students and the independent media, with a package of around €20 million for the period 2011-2013. The Commission also adopted a €13 million regional development programme which will make a difference to the daily lives of local communities in Belarus. The promotion of sustainable development in Belarus should result in building up competences in regional and local development. In Georgia, EU assistance supported policy reforms in the areas of public finance, criminal justice, education. Institution-building was enhanced and tailored to the specific capacity needs of the core actors involved in preparations for the future EU-Georgia AA. Among them, the public defender office (ombudsman) gained international acknowledgement for its independency and professionalism. In Moldova, the EU continued to encourage anti-poverty policies in the areas of primary health care and rural development. One of the most important assistance projects in 2011 was the EU high-level policy advice mission (EUHLPAM). As part of this initiative, 15 high-level

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international advisors went to Moldova to provide strategic policy guidance to the Moldovan government in key issues related to European integration. The European Border Assistance Mission to Moldova-Ukraine (EUBAM), an advisory and technical body mandated to guarantee security of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, continued to tackle criminality successfully and assisted legitimate trade and travel. A boost to public health in Moldova Major improvements to Moldova’s health system are underway, assisted by a four-year €46.6 million EU-funded programme which started in 2009. It enabled the training of 262 young physicians, 757 young nurses and pharmacists and the renovation of 12 primary health care centres in 2011, as well as programmes for the prevention of HIV/AIDS and viral hepatitis. It is contributing to the implementation of the Moldovan government’s health sector strategy, 2008-2017, designed to improve and public access to health services and increase the efficiency and quality of essential public health services. Part of the strategy, a national programme for emergency care development, 2011-2015, was approved in 2011. 2011 also saw the setting up of the first public/private partnership in health at Chisinau’s Republican Clinical Hospital with the opening of a radiology and medical Imagistics centre.

In the Transnistria region, two sets of confidence building measures were implemented for business development, infrastructure and capacity-building for civil society. In Ukraine, a €70 million sector policy support programme for administrative reform was approved in 2011 as well as programmes for regional development, institutional building and to promote energy efficiency. Technical assistance was provided in a wide range of sectors and further twinning was set up in the areas of energy efficiency, air transport, public order, civil service, statistics and phyto-sanitary legislation. Ukraine making Chernobyl safe The EU is contributing to the Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) including the erection of a new safe confinement structure, a programme developed by the EU, the US and Ukraine to protect the environment and population from the damaged Chernobyl unit 4 shelter. Three hundred separate activities are ongoing to make the site of the 1986 accident environmentally safe. The construction of the new structure will enable the dismantling of the existing damaged reactor 4 and its increasingly unstable sarcophagus, erected just after the accident. Since 1991, the EU has allocated more than €1.3 billion to nuclear safety and security projects in the former USSR – mostly in Russia and Ukraine. The total cost of the shelter implementation plan is currently put at €1.6 billion. A pledging conference marking the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident organised by Ukraine and the G8 presidency, and with EU participation, resulted in a further €550 million being pledged for the programme, including €110 million from the EU pledge.

Designed to be a flexible umbrella to promote reforms, enhance growth and raise competitiveness, the partnership for modernisation has acted as a central platform of cooperation between the EU and Russia since 2010. In 2010-2011, the EU supported the partnership with €7 million. Russia also signed individual bi-lateral modernisation partnerships with 23 EU Member States. Trade related issues with an alignment of technical

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster

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standards, promotion of judicial reforms and dialogue with civil society are among the priority areas of this modernisation process. There was a range of actions concerning further adoption by Russia of EU norms and technical standards. There were also justice-related initiatives in the area of rule of law, the enhancement of the appeals system and ratification of the Hague Conventions. People-to-people links were other key factors in the EU-Russia relationship with the Commission's continuous support for civil society organisations for advocacy and human rights development. During the Arab Spring, bi-lateral cooperation continued with all countries of the southern Neighbourhood – with the exception of Syria – despite the disruptive events. To be able to better respond to the historic events in the region, adjustments to existing arrangements were made in most countries. In Algeria, the EU committed €23.5 million to strengthen the participation of young people in society and support the government's youth policy. This programme puts a particular emphasis on improving youth employment prospects by helping to develop new initiatives at local level and supporting co-ordination of youth policies at national level. EU funds were also committed to a new programme to protect Algeria's cultural heritage (€21.5 million) and for continued support to the transport sector (€13 million). Given the progress in the water and sanitation sector, the Commission released the first tranche of sector budget support to Algeria in December 2011 (€6 million). The Algerian authorities started to improve budget transparency – and public finance management – by submitting to the Parliament final audited accounts for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 after a pause in this practice. In view of the changing circumstances in Egypt, cooperation for 2011-13 was reviewed and adjusted. Five new programmes – amounting to €132 million – were approved during the year, aimed at improving living conditions in deprived areas of Cairo, trade and economic growth (and job creation), agricultural SMEs, as well as the reform of the energy and water sectors. Support to good governance and rule of law was further strengthened through a new €10 million EU programme signed in 2011 to assist Egypt in its judiciary reforms. For 2012, actions amounting to €160 million are already in the pipeline. The EU gave support to the elections in Egypt through two €2 million programmes, financed under the IfS, designed to assist the high electoral commission in its work and provide support to civil society organisations. In Israel, an action plan for 2011 and 2012 was agreed, allocating €2 million per year for institutional twinning projects. €500 000 was awarded by the Civil Society Facility, for human rights projects. The annual action plan for Jordan was reviewed in 2011. A €40 million sum was frontloaded from the 2012/2013 allocation for new programmes for: development of small and medium enterprises; tackling poverty and unemployment in less-favoured areas; research and innovation to engender growth and employment and for further strengthening public finance management. Ongoing programmes (including those from the €71 million for 2011) already support reforms in various sectors, including energy efficiency, education, democratic

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governance and local economic development. Jordan is expected to initiate negotiations for a DCFTA in early 2012. After the collapse of Prime Minister Hariri's government in January 2011 in Lebanon, the country faced a six-month period under a caretaker government and subsequently an institutional slowdown resulting in severe delays in the legislative process. In addition, it suffered from political instability at regional level, in particular due to the increasingly difficult situation which prevails in Syria. In spite of the specific context and the changes that affected the region as a whole during the Arab Spring, the EU was able to continue to support Lebanon's reform agenda in the areas of agriculture, security, policy planning and infrastructure. In total, €33 million were made available in 2011, providing key support to municipal finance reform, independence of the judiciary and to improve the technical capacity of the Ministry of Environment. Aware of the challenges to implement projects in a timely and adequate manner in Lebanon, the EU cooperation is in the process of reviewing its cooperation approach with the aim of strengthening capacity at institutional level. Libya was singled out by the civil unrest which prevailed from early in the year and culminated in NATO intervention. By the end of October, the former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi had been deposed. The EU had previously adopted a series of sanctions against individuals and entities, aimed at preventing arms and money from reaching the Gaddafi regime. In the meeting organised on 2 September 2011 in Paris with the National Transitional Council (NTC), an agreement was reached to cooperate on post-conflict assessments between the EU, the World Bank and the UN. The EU was assigned sectoral leadership for integrated border management, civil society, gender issues and the media, including public messaging. The Commission made €10 million available to support the immediate stabilisation priorities of the new Libyan authorities. This consisted of a package for civil society, public administration capacity building and education. In addition, programmes were re-directed to support the stabilisation of communities at risk and to assist in the management of migration flows inside and from Libya (€10 million) and support for the rehabilitation of the war wounded (€2 million). Additional support was provided under the Instrument for Stability (€1.7 million to establish an "all-inclusive dialogue process") whilst a range of projects implemented by NGOs in the fields of democratisation, women rights and media training was allocated €2 million. A programme targeting the strengthening of civil society institutions received €3 million. In November 2011, the EU opened its official Delegation in Tripoli. In Morocco, legislative elections on 25 November 2011 were conducted in a transparent and fair manner, according to international observers, and brought to power a new political majority. These elections came in the wake of an important constitutional reform adopted on 1 July 2011 which brought significant changes to the equilibrium of power, reinforcing – among other things – the role of Parliament and the Judiciary. The EU has long supported institutional and socio-economic reforms and will pursue its collaboration with Morocco in the framework of the association agreement. Morocco enjoys 'advanced status' (granted in 2008). With regard to financial support, the five priority areas for cooperation stand: development of social policies, economic modernisation, institutional support, good governance and human rights, and environmental protection.

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Three new programmes were adopted in 2011 totalling €155 million: support to the implementation of the ‘advanced status’ (€91 million) which seeks to foster regulatory convergence with the EU by supporting the adoption of a set of key measures in a number of critical sectors; a programme to promote equality between women and men (€45 million), in line with the provisions of the new Constitution and an 'integrated rural development programme in the northern province of Al Hoceima (€19 million) to help improve the development of basic infrastructure and the livelihood of rural populations. Ten sector budget support programmes were implemented in Morocco in 2011 and €88.2 million was disbursed – a reflection of the government’s commitment to to meet the eligibility criteria. This type of support has proved valuable in advancing policy dialogue with Morocco and assisting it in the reform processes it has embarked upon (health sector reform, modernisation of the water sector, public financial management or civil service reforms, etc.). In 2011, for instance, key measures were adopted which will provide more transparency in the field of public procurement, and groundwork completed for universal medical insurance which will benefit the poorest. The EU is committed to increasing its support to Morocco in order to successfully implement the principles and objectives of its ‘advanced status' action plan. Morocco also benefits from other thematic and regional programmes and will receive further support under the new SPRING programme, the Civil Society Facility and Erasmus Mundus. In the area of trade, negotiations for a DCFTA are expected to be launched early 2012. As regards migration, the negotiation of a Mobility Partnership is ongoing and is expected to be finalised before the end of 2012. Support to the occupied Palestinian territory in 2011 was considered as transitional, as it should pave the way for more focused and fewer ad hoc programmes. Funds made available in 2011 amounted to €300 million. A financing decision adopted at the end of 2011 (frontloading 2012 budget) includes €105 million to respond to the priorities of the Palestinian Authority in supporting recurrent expenditure – salaries and pensions – and €55 million to be allocated to the core budget of the United Nations Relief & Works Agency (UNRWA). During 2011, close cooperation between the Delegation and the Ministry of Social Affairs resulted in the alignment of the Gaza Strip with the West Bank in terms of the revised eligibility criteria and payment methodology for social allowances. Given the ongoing split between the two entities, it is a significant achievement. A new Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP) for 2011-2013 was approved in 2011. In light of the ongoing unrest and the systematic violations of human rights, the EU was one of the first donors to suspend its bi-lateral cooperation with Syria on 25 May. Since then, the Commission has suspended the participation of Syrian authorities in its regional programmes and the European Investment Bank (EIB) has suspended all its loan operations and technical assistance to Syria. On 30 November, in reaction to the EU restrictive measures, Syria suspended its membership and its participation in the Union for the Mediterranean. Several projects are still ongoing in the field of support to non-state actors, Syrian civil society, and refugee populations. The Tempus and Erasmus programmes with Syrian students and universities also continue. A

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special measure to support two UNRWA projects targeting both Palestinian refugees and the Syrian population was approved by the Commission in late 2011. UNRWA is currently one of the last executive agencies with a real operational capacity on the ground, and support to Palestinian refugees in Syria remains a priority. The first project will enhance the economic and social prospects of Palestinian refugee youth through vocational training and participation in local development initiatives. The second will provide an integrated package of assistance, supporting immediate service delivery and broader early recovery among vulnerable conflict-affected communities. In the immediate aftermath of the events of the Arab Spring, programmes in the pipeline for Tunisia were immediately reviewed to ensure that they responded to the new challenges. For the period 2011-2013, the EU raised the amount indicatively earmarked for Tunisia by over 60% from €240 million to €400 million (excluding humanitarian assistance). Financial assistance for 2011 was doubled from the €80 million foreseen to just under €160 million. Additional funds targeted economic recovery (increasing the initial budget of the economic recovery programme from €60 million by an additional €40 million), support to the competitiveness of the services sector (€20 million), and support to the most impoverished areas (€20 million). Another €10 million from the 2011 SPRING allocation to Tunisia will provide support to the transition and establishment of the rule of law. Efforts were made in 2011 to co-finance initiatives with EU Member States and other international partners so as to ensure that EU grant support to Tunisia leverages loans from financing institutions and private sector investments. One example is the economic recovery programme, made up of an EU grant of €100 million, a World Bank loan of $500 million, an African Development Bank loan of $500 million, and a €185 million loan from the Agence Française de Développement (AFD). Tunisia is one of the countries expected to initiate negotiations for a DCFTA in early 2012. Tunisia’s economic recovery An EU-Tunisia Task Force – the first in the southern Neighbourhood – was set up to ensure better coordination of European and international support for Tunisia’s political and economic transition. European and international partners took part in its initial meeting, held jointly by the HR/VP and the Tunisian Prime Minister on 28-29 September in Tunis. A joint budget support programme was formulated by the Commission, the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADB) and the ‘Agence Française de Développement’ (AFD) in the wake of the Arab Spring. The meeting secured an unprecedented amount of resources: a €100 million EU grant (including funding under the new SPRING Programme), together with loans amounting €900 million from other partners to improve governance and the financial and social sectors and boost employment. In 2011, 13 new budget support operations totalling €537 million were approved in the ENPI region. A total of €344 million was earmarked for seven new operations in southern partners (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia), while €193 million was committed to six operations in eastern partners (two in Georgia and one in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine, respectively).

In the ENPI region, the new budget support programmes are largely sector-based and aim to support reforms related to, among other sectors: energy, public administration, public finance management, education and gender, while others also target wider economic recovery

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objectives and the implementation of ENP action plans. Close cooperation with other donors is being sought to increase impact, wherever possible. Regional cooperation EU cooperation with partners on a regional level complements bilateral cooperation programmes. It addresses challenges with a regional dimension, and promotes cooperation among neighbouring partner countries on issues of mutual interest. Since issues such as protection of the environment, tackling sea pollution, fighting organised crime and terrorism are cross-cutting, they can be most effectively tackled through cooperation at a regional level.

The launch in 2009 of the Eastern Partnership in 2008 of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and in 2007 of the Black Sea Synergy created new frameworks for regional co-operation, further deepening the Eastern and Southern regional dimension of the ENPI. In the eastern Neighbourhood, new regional programmes were launched in the following areas: energy (the INOGATE secretariat), climate change, environmental protection of international rivers, youth, democracy, good governance and human rights. A series of seminars and meetings took place at regional level, issues corresponding to the work of the Eastern Partnership platforms: democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration (including environment and climate change), energy security and contacts between people. Five Eastern Partnership flagship initiatives are well underway36, touching on issues such as border management, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, energy, civil protection and environmental governance. In the eastern Neighbourhood, several programmes were initiated in 2011 to support the region’s democratic development including the Council of Europe Facility, a €4 million programme promoting democracy, good governance and human rights by enhancing the reform processes in the six partner countries. It aims to bring them closer to Council of Europe and EU standards in the core areas covered by the Eastern partnership, such as improved functioning of the judiciary, public administration reform and fight against corruption, and human rights protection. The €34 million SME Flagship Initiative financed several activities in the spheres of investment and trade facilitation (East-Invest programme), a contribution to the TAM BAS (Turn Around Management and Business Advisory Services) programme and an SME Financing Facilities programme with European Financial Institutions, all to nurture economic development. A SME policy performance study is being conducted by the OECD with the support of the EU in the Eastern partnership countries. In the field of transport, in 2011 the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) programme launched an initiative to support the sustainable development of the logistics infrastructure and multimodal transport along the TRACECA corridor. On environment and climate change, regional programmes contributed to strengthening environmental and climate governance and supported partner countries in converging towards the EU acquis. With a total financial envelope of €50 million, these programmes addressed the main environmental challenges in the region, ranging from waste management to water and quality, including forestry, information management and climate change, covering both adaptation and mitigation. Thanks to the

36 http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/initiatives/index_en.htm

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active involvement of the partner countries, opportunities to move towards a greener economy were identified and will be translated into a new regional programme. In 2011, the implementation of the EaP flagship initiative on prevention, preparedness and response to man-made and natural disasters got underway. It is aimed at developing the partner countries' capacities in the field and bringing them closer to the EU civil protection mechanism. Energy cooperation remained a top priority under the EaP in 2011.The INOGATE programme included approximately €53 million of ongoing projects to support regional energy markets and the Eastern Partnership Energy Flagship in particular (e.g. energy regulation, harmonisation of standards and legislation, but also activities in support of renewable energy and energy efficiency in the building sector). The “Covenant of Mayors” remains a priority under the Eastern Partnership in the energy field. Mayors for sustainable energy More than 3 200 cities in the EU and over 40 cities in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia – including the capitals, Kiev, Chisinau and Tbilisi – have signed up to the ‘Covenant of Mayors’. Launched in 2008, this EU initiative aims to promote sustainable energy development at local or regional levels and secure energy supplies for citizens. Signatories voluntarily commit to increasing energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources to meet and exceed the EU’s objective of a 20% reduction in C02 emissions by 2020. The Commission is encouraging the Eastern Partnership to join the Covenant of Mayors37 and has started to raise awareness and prepare the cities for its Sustainable Energy Action Plan. The October 2010 conference in Tblisi, organised by the Commission, assembled 150 participants from over 45 cities, mainly at mayor and deputy mayor level. Two branch offices of the Secretariat of the Covenant of Mayors were subsequently opened in September in Lviv and Tbilisi under the project, ‘Covenant of Mayors – East’ to provide dedicated support to cites in both Ukraine and Georgia. During 2012-2013, the Commission will expand co-operation in education, youth, research and innovation, culture, the audio-visual sector and information society through the Eastern Partnership. Eastern Partnership countries continued to participate well in the framework programme for research and innovation. Some 254 grant agreements have now been signed, with an EU contribution of just over €23 million. The calls launched in 2011 included a specific action to develop and enhance the science and technology partnership between the EU and Ukraine. Other topics included research into advanced materials for high-temperature power generation. Relations between the EU and Moldova in the sphere of science and technology were strengthened by the signing of a memorandum of understanding. Russia continues to be the most active international cooperation partner country, with Russian participants involved in over 300 grant agreements, having received over €59 million of EU funding to date38.

37 http://www.conventiondesmaires.eu/index_fr.html 38 http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/index.cfm?lg=en&pg=countries

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Regional cooperation with southern neighbours in 2011 was steered towards meeting the challenges of the popular uprisings that have shaken the Arab world and prompted calls for dignity, democracy and social justice. A joint EU-Council of Europe programme aiming to enhance human rights protection, independence and efficiency of judiciary and better compliance with the European legislation and democratic values in partner countries also supported the path to democracy. Completed in 2011, EuroMed Justice II has strengthened cooperation in civil, penal and family law and has helped establish an open legal system in the partner countries. Possibilities for foreign direct investment and inclusive growth in the southern Mediterranean have been developed through the successful ‘Invest in Med’ project. Under the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the elaboration of sustainable urban strategy to stimulate sustainable urban development projects and promote best practices and urban innovations, got underway. Under the EuroMed IV scheme, several youth projects were supported which build bridges with the Mediterranean: promoting mobility, non-formal education and inter-cultural learning among young people, youth leaders and youth workers. To tackle the region’s high unemployment rate, a new Youth-Employment Support Programme was approved by the Commission in 2011, aiming to enhance the employability of young people in partner countries. In addition, the financing of the current phase of the Euromed Youth programme has more than doubled; a Youth in Action window will be opened for the Eastern Partnership, together with a youth regional unit for capacity building and support for youth organisations is planned in South Mediterranean countries. The new regional programme for the development of culture in the Mediterranean region should help cultural operators to become equal partners of European organisations in joint projects. In the east, new projects were selected under the Eastern Partnership culture programme, and a unit to support the capacities of cultural actors in the region was set up. The launch of EuroMed Audivisual III raised the profile of the audiovisual industry in the partner countries through a series of national round tables, data collection and networking events. Around 175 contracts have been signed since 2007 with the Mediterranean partner countries for research and innovation with an EU contribution of €39 million. Calls launched in 2011 included protection of archaeological sites, bio-waste, renewable energy, transport and social change and political transformation. The European neighbourhood policy instrument is funding several initiatives in the area of research and innovation: the research, development and innovation (RDI) programme in Egypt (€20 million, 2010-2012); the ’Projet d'Appui au Système Recherche et Innovation (PASRI)’ in Tunisia (€12 million) and support to research, technological development and innovation (SRTD) in Jordan (€5 million, 2011-2013). An institutional twinning project with Morocco was launched to support its national research system. A high-level Euro-Mediterranean Conference on research and innovation was scheduled for 2012.

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Inter-regional dimension The inter–regional co-operation programmes support both the southern and eastern regions with activities that can be managed more efficiently and flexibly at inter-regional level. It includes two institution-building instruments originally created for the EU enlargement process and also operating in the enlargement countries through the IPA instrument. These are the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) and the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA). TAIEX aims to foster political and economic cooperation in a number of areas, primarily the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation through short-term expertise, workshops and study-visits for the 16 ENP countries and Russia. SIGMA is a joint OECD/EU initiative, assisting partner countries in installing governance and administrative systems. Under the ENPI, SIGMA is active in 11 neighbouring countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine. It works mainly in the following sectors: legal framework, civil service and justice, public procurement, financial control and external audit. SIGMA and TAIEX activities are complementary to the twinning projects in the ENP countries. At an inter-regional level, the Civil Society Facility (total budget of €26.4 million) supports democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It provides funding for non-state actors and complements existing initiatives of support to non-state actors in the eastern and southern Neighbourhood. It also attempts to make NSA-oriented efforts in the ENPI region more visible and structured, and move beyond the simple provision of financial support to NSAs, towards engagement with civil society and increased policy dialogue at the partner country level. A three-year inter-regional project – the European neighbourhood journalism network (ENJN) – to support journalists’ training finished in 2011. Reaching over 1 300 journalists in partner countries, workshops were organised in its final phase to provide specific training following the dramatic events in the southern Mediterranean. The Joint Communication, 'A new response to a changing Neighbourhood' also provided a solid policy framework and additional financial means for academic mobility and youth cooperation between the EU and the neighbouring countries. There are additional financial allocations for higher education under the Erasmus Mundus (mobility of students and academic staff) and Tempus programmes (modernisation of higher education). The increased budget resulted in €66.6 million being made available under Tempus IV in 2011 to modernise and reform higher education systems in the neighbourhood region. Erasmus Mundus received €70.4 million in 2011 to promote student and academic staff mobility. The Commission is extending the internal eTwinning action for schools to Eastern Partnership countries, Egypt and Tunisia. Additional financing has been made available for interventions in vocational education and training in the Southern Mediterranean run by the European Training Foundation. The Commission also plans to launch a policy dialogue on higher education and youth policies in 2012 for the south Mediterranean region. The Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) also combines grants with loans provided by European finance institutions for big inter-regional infrastructure projects as well as for small and medium-sized enterprises. Projects include the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Horizon 2020 initiative for de-polluting the Mediterranean.

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Cross-border co-operation Cross-border co-operation (CBC) programmes are a unique ENPI tool to enhance co-operation between EU Member States and partner countries situated at the EU’s external border. In 2011, the 13 operational programmes focussed on launching calls for proposals and speeding up project implementation. Since the launch of the programmes, 3 000 applications for almost €400 million have been received. 200 projects have been contracted to date: 46% of projects are people-to-people initiatives mainly benefitting civil society; 37% concern social and economic development, and 24% are in other sectors such as environment, health, etc. The division of funds between Member States and partner countries is balanced with 53% and 47% respectively. In addition to standard projects, eight ENPI CBC programmes have decided to implement large-scale projects. To date, 40 large-scale projects have been submitted for approval; eight are already approved and one, to build a border crossing between Poland and Belarus, is in the process of being contracted. Volunteering across borders Young volunteers in the border region between Hungary and Ukraine are helping out citizens in their neighbouring country under a two-year EU project. The €85 000 ‘Volunteering without Borders’ scheme, which started in January 2011, is financed under the ENPI CBC Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine programme. It aims to develop the citizen skills of young people who not only get to know people of a different nationality, but gain invaluable experience for both their professional and social lives. Volunteer activities include: helping vulnerable old people, distributing hot tea and meals to homeless people, collecting waste at a national park, visiting and teaching handicrafts at an orphanage and distributing toys and clothes. The groups regularly assess their work and adapt working methods where they need to. 1.1.5 Monitoring

The quality and flow of information on the management of EU external assistance and cooperation is enhanced by Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM). ROM co-exists with other monitoring and review mechanisms, such as self-monitoring by project management teams, internal monitoring by the EU Delegations and partner countries' own monitoring mechanisms. ROM is hence an intrinsic and important part of the EU’s external cooperation mechanisms. In 2011, ROM missions were implemented in 15 ENPI partner countries (all, with the exception of Syria). The ROM coverage in the European Neighbourhood reached 25% of all ongoing EU operations and represented 22% of the overall budget. In all, 243 ongoing operations (205 national and 38 regional projects and programmes) were reviewed with the ROM-methodology, as well as 33 closed projects (ex-post ROM). The total budget represented by the operations reviewed with ROM was in excess of €900 million. The positive ROM results from the previous years for the ENPI region were confirmed. Over three quarters of the assessed national projects were considered as performing very good or

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good. Close to 9% of the interventions however showed major difficulties. As in previous years, the regional projects/programmes on average tend to score lower than the national/bilateral projects (60% of regional projects scoring very good or good), due to the challenges faced in inducing national ownership and sustainability issues. The majority of monitored operations in the Neighbourhood were in the social infrastructure and services sector, where the good results obtained for the projects related to government and civil society (sub-sector) contributed significantly to the good overall sector performance. The projects in the economic infrastructure and services sector were reviewed as performing particularly well, as opposed to those in the productive sector (industry, agriculture, etc.), which scored lower on average. When further breaking down projects’ performance according to the OECD/DAC-criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability), over 82% of projects assessed in the Neighbourhood region obtained ‘very good’ or ‘good’ ratings for relevance and design. Challenges subsist with reference to other review criteria, as a sizeable portion of monitored projects (about one third for national and over 40% for regional projects) show a clear scope for improved performance both in terms of efficiency (problems in terms of inputs used and implementation of activities) and effectiveness (some issues with inter alia delivery of results). Still, impact or impact perspectives remain very good or good for up to 80% of the national projects monitored in the Neighbourhood region over 2011. The level of ownership of a project/programme by counterparts and stakeholders remains one the main drivers of success in ensuring sustainability, while financial viability beyond the external assistance phase, often resulting from insufficient policy support and ownership, constrains the sustainability of project and programme results in some cases. Table 1:

ROM results according to DAC criteria (national projects)

21.0%14.1% 8.8% 12.2% 7.8%

62.0%

50.7% 59.0%

68.3%62.0%

Relevance andDesign

Efficiency Effectiveness Impact Sustainability

Good

Very good

Table 2:

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ROM results by ODA sector (national projects)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%So

cial

Infra

stru

ctur

ean

d Se

rvic

es

Econ

omic

Infra

stru

ctur

ean

d Se

rvic

es

Prod

uctio

nse

ctor

s

Gov

ernm

ent

and

civi

lso

ciet

y

Very good performance

Good performance

Performing with Problems

Not performing, majordifficulties

1.1.6 Outlook In the eastern Neighbourhood, the EU will continue to support the justice sector in Armenia as well as preparing for DCFTA negotiations, both through budget support and the comprehensive institution building programme. Azerbaijan is expected to benefit from budget support in 2012 for agriculture and rural development, with a view to improving food security, regional competitiveness and job creation. A future budget support programme on public finance reform will create a platform for structured dialogue in important policy areas covered by the ENP Action Plan such as governance, reforms in public finance management and budget transparency. In Belarus, EU assistance for 2012 and beyond will target the green economy, economic development, good governance and people-to-people contacts. EU support for Georgia in 2012 will focus on sustainable agriculture and regional development to address rural poverty in the least advantaged areas of the country (according to the latest Human Development Report, approximately 15% of the Georgian population lives below the poverty line of $1.25 per day). The launch of negotiations on the DCFTA will be accompanied by a targeted technical assistance, in co-ordination with EU Member States to further support a non-discriminatory, rule-based, open trade and financial system. There will be further help for sector reforms, especially for economic governance and justice, as well as for peaceful settlement of conflicts. The main focus of cooperation with Moldova in 2012 will be on energy and justice sector reforms. Assistance to build institutions will accompany negotiations on the AA and the DCFTA. A significant package of confidence-building measures will be implemented in 2012 in the Transnistria region. In Ukraine, there are five actions planned for 2012: in energy, regional development, migration, energy efficiency and comprehensive institutional building.

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All bilateral action plans for the southern Neighbourhood are on schedule for 2012, except for Syria for reasons already outlined elsewhere in the report; allocations of approximately €900 million are expected. In 2012, the SPRING programme will focus on Tunisia and possibly Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. Key events are scheduled in various countries of the region in 2012. Elections are due in Algeria in May 2012, for which an EU Election Observation Mission will be deployed, and the 50th anniversary of Algeria's independence will take place on 5 July 2012. Presidential elections will take place in Egypt over May and June 2012, completing the implementation of the road map for the transfer of power from military to civilian rule, whilst parliamentary elections are expected in Jordan towards the end of 2012. Elections are also due in Libya, probably before the summer. A new programme on the environment will help Algeria develop its national climate change policy ('Plan National Climat'). Other priorities are economic diversification and employment with new initiatives currently being identified. Dedicated instruments (EIDHR and the civil society facility) will support sector programmes for civil society. In Jordan, EU assistance for 2012 will include three programmes targeting justice, security and civil society and the media; additional funds are also expected from the SPRING programme. In Lebanon, six programmes are expected to be approved to: improve infrastructure in Palestinian refugee camps; promote sustainable growth and job opportunities; step up mine action clearance activities and advance reform in the education system and promote social justice. With regard to Libya, as soon as the new Libyan Authorities are ready, the Commission will explore relevant sectors of cooperation for 2012 in line with the results of the Libya co-ordinated needs assessment and the two Joint Communications 'A new response to a changing Neighbourhood' and 'A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean'. In Morocco, the democratic changes brought in by the new constitution adopted on 1 July 2011 will be the focus of EU's attention in the months and years to come and will be the subject of a sustained policy dialogue with the newly-formed government. The important principles laid down in the new constitution are still to be translated into reality. Their prompt and effective implementation will require solid institutional support and financial assistance. The ongoing constructive policy dialogue with the Moroccan authorities will be pursued and in the spirit of the ‘advanced status action plan’, adoption of key policy measures to promote regulatory convergence with the EU, will be encouraged. The government’s efforts to alleviate poverty and bridge the existing social divide will continue to be supported.

Following on from the new Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP) for 2011-2013, new programmes and priorities will be identified.

In Tunisia, the focus is on establishing a functioning democracy through: reform of the judiciary, support to civil society, assistance to impoverished regions and measures to boost employment and bring about economic reforms. A new action plan for 2012-2016, due to be presented to the Tunisian authorities early 2012, will contain a roadmap of the joint measures envisaged to strengthen political, economic, social and cultural relations. Since bilateral cooperation with Syria is currently suspended and violence continues to escalate in the country, the EU does not intend to work with the Syrian authorities for the time being.

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Despite the major operational constraints on the ground, the EU will continue to support Syrian civil society and the refugee populations, and will assess potential new operations in light of the 'do no harm' principle. The EU is closely monitoring the humanitarian situation on the ground, and is ready to intervene should there be any deterioration.

1.2 Middle East

1.2.1 Introduction Middle East peace process The EU stepped up its efforts to advance the Middle East peace process in 2011. It lent full support to the HR/VP in her continuing efforts on behalf of the EU to re-launch direct talks between the parties. The HR/VP visited the region numerous times during the year and stayed in close contact with stakeholders. Against the background of the Palestinian bid to be admitted to the UN as an independent state, deposited by President Abbas in September 2011, the EU renewed its efforts to find a way for the parties to return to negotiations. In its statement of 23 September, the Quartet called for the resumption of direct bilateral negotiations – without delay or preconditions – aimed at reaching an agreement within a timeframe agreed to by the parties and by the end of 2012 at the latest. The HR/VP extended a cautious welcome to the proposals for reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. However, with no substantial progress on reconciliation since the initial signing of the reconciliation agreement on 3 May 2011, the 13th Palestinian Authority government under Prime Minister Fayyad continued to rule in a caretaker function following its resignation on 14 February 2011. The EU has consistently called for Palestinian reconciliation under the authority of President Abbas and commended the efforts of the Egyptian government to bring about and implement the move towards Palestinian reconciliation since the signing of the reconciliation agreement. The EU is ready to continue its support, including direct financial support, to a new Palestinian government composed of independent figures that is committed to the principles set out in President Abbas’ speech on 4 May 2011 after the initial reconciliation agreement was reached. The EU’s expectations of such a government were set out in the foreign affairs council conclusions of 23 May: a new government composed of independent figures should uphold the principle of non-violence and remain committed to achieving a two-state solution and to a negotiated peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, accepting previous agreements and obligations, including Israel’s legitimate right to exist. Direct EU financial support to the Palestinian Authority continued to contribute to ongoing state-building efforts. The Palestinian National Development Plan 2011-2013 (NDP) was presented officially by the PA in April 2011 at the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) meeting in Brussels. Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Iraq and Yemen The DCI covers only three countries in the oil-rich Middle East region – Iraq, Iran and Yemen – where most countries enjoy good standards of living and high income. The work carried out by the EU aims to meet the specific needs of each. Political development, reconciliation and

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reform in Iraq have remained difficult in 2011. The ‘national partnership government’, formed after nine months of difficult negotiations following the 2010 general election, has struggled to function properly since it was set up and the general agreement on governance between the major political forces was not fully implemented in 2011. At the end of the year, the political situation worsened. With the adoption in November 2010 of the first-ever multiannual Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for assistance to Iraq (€58.7 million 2011-13), the EU has shifted its support from emergency reconstruction activities towards regular development cooperation and long-term capacity-building. EU assistance in the medium-term is concentrated on the sustainability of Iraq’s institutions, the improvement of management and civil service capacity along with boosting the provision and quality of basic services (health, education, water and sanitation). The EU also continues to assist the Iraqi government in its efforts to better unlock and invest its own substantial resources, by providing assistance in the areas of good governance and democratisation. EU-Iraq relations have been further strengthened with the implementation of the memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation and the Council's decision to authorise signature of the partnership and cooperation agreement. In parallel, the financial instrument for cooperation with industrialised and other high income countries and territories (called ICI+) was adopted 30 December 2011 and will help the EU expand the nature of its cooperation with the region, and notably with Iraq. The ICI+ is a new avenue for the EU in promoting political and economic interests and engaging in a partnership with Iraq based on mutual interests. Actions will cover public diplomacy and outreach, people-to-people links and especially economic partnership and business cooperation in the energy sector. During 2011, the Yemeni revolution resulted in some ten months of violent unrest. Throughout this period, the EU closely co-operated with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with a view to achieving an agreement on political transition brokered by the GCC. As the political impasse prevailed, clashes between security forces, demonstrators and tribal groups continued, with increased pressure from the international community (threats of sanctions) to find a resolution. In October, the UNSC unanimously adopted a resolution on Yemen and in November, President Saleh finally signed the GCC initiative. Since then, an interim government has been formed and presidential elections were called for February 2012. The EU Delegation in Sana’a remained open throughout the unrest. It was actively and closely involved in efforts to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of power and aid the process of transition. Co-operation was not formally suspended throughout these developments, however the situation itself have the de facto effect of preventing some projects from being executed. The 2011 DCI allocation of €20 million was divided equally between health sector cooperation and economic development focussing on job creation among the youth. The humanitarian situation was already serious prior to the unrest and has subsequently worsened. To tackle this protracted crisis, the Commission released €25 million in 2011. Most of Yemen’s multiple challenges – unparalleled in the region – became more acute during the unrest. Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world with a very small middle

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class, a high level of illiteracy and a youth and population bulge. Greatly contributing to its problems are issues such as the most active Al Qaeda franchise (AQAP), Somali refugees, and strong tribal power. While the EU stands ready to do all it can, it also realises that it only through concerted international efforts that such issues can be tackled effectively and sustainably. EU co-operation activities in Iran are limited to non-sensitive areas such as anti-narcotics and aiding Afghan refugees through support for non-state actors. Efforts to engage with Iran in meaningful negotiations over its nuclear programme continue in line with the EU's dual track approach. 1.2.2 Aid effectiveness and donor coordination Following the outbreak of violence during the 2011 protests, the security situation seriously hampered the effective implementation of development projects in Yemen, and most donors saw themselves obliged to withdraw a significant number of their in-country staff. Even under such difficult conditions, the Commission is one of the very few donors on the ground to have continued to implement projects and disburse funds. Donor co-ordination resumed in December, after the transitional government effectively took over power in Yemen and called on donors to assist the country’s recovery. UN agencies, the World Bank and the Commission have discussed carrying out a joint social and economic needs analysis, while a larger group of the so-called G-10 (Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)/EU/P539) have met regularly to monitor the political implementation of the GCC agreement. At the international conference on Iraq’s reconstruction held in Madrid in December 2003, the international community and the Commission in particular, recognised that the challenging situation in Iraq required urgent and coordinated action. Due to the lack of usable security infrastructure and the absence of a functioning Iraqi government which prevented the development of a meaningful bilateral programme, the Commission was instrumental in setting up and funding multi-donor trust funds for the country. This multi-lateral approach has allowed the priorities of the Iraqi authorities to be taken into account, together with EU priorities. The Commission has also acquired invaluable knowledge for future activities in Iraq through participating in the international reconstruction trust fund facility for Iraq (IRFFI) since 2004. With the departure of US troops, it is relevant for the EU to take an important role with regard to political and policy dialogue with the Iraqi authorities. EU cooperation is therefore moving from joint assistance (with UN agencies) to more direct cooperation targeting development of sector policies and strategies. It is a key factor in developing a culture targeting national interest through national policies and will also be the opportunity to improve donor coordination and division of labour. 1.2.3 Working towards the MDGs

Even prior to the events of 2011, Yemen was the biggest single development challenge in the Middle East. It is a country of deeply-rooted tradition with limited resources: scare water reserves, restricted arable land and fast-declining oil reserves. It is the only poor country in a rich Gulf region, ranked 154 out of 187 countries in the 2011 UNDP human development index. The 2011 crisis has exacerbated a simmering humanitarian situation. More than half of the population faces multiple socio-economic challenges and a third lives in severe poverty. 39 the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China France, Russia, the UK and US)

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Yemen also has the highest gender inequality index in the world. Providing basic services and reducing poverty are the two main aims of the EU budget development programmes in the country, giving support for food security, social welfare, health and good governance. Iraq faces considerable challenges in its efforts to meet the 2015 MDG targets. According to World Bank classification, it is a lower middle income country (its 2010 GNI per capita amounts to $2340; oil and gas contributes 60% of GDP, 99% of exports and 90% of Government revenues). The size of oil revenues inhibits efforts to diversify the Iraqi economy and makes it difficult to transform growth into inclusive growth and access to public services for all. Iraq is classified as a low human development country in the UN human development index (ranked 132 of 187). The country’s primary enrolment rate (85%) compares poorly with neighbouring Iran (94%) and Turkey (92%). The maternal mortality ratio stands at 84 per 100 000 live births. Iraq is struggling to reduce the number of women dying in child birth to meet its target of 29 for every 100 000 live births. The proportion of households using an improved water source has remained at around 80% since 1990. In rural areas, this figure is just 57%. Even if 84% of the population use an improved sanitation facility, just 26% is covered by the public sewage network, dropping to 2% in rural areas. 1.2.4 Implementation and results

The 2011 review of the Yemen country strategy paper largely reconfirmed the previously identified cooperation priorities. These are support for state-building and governance, social development and economic development and livelihoods. The Commission approved the first package of the new three-year strategy for 2011-2013, allocating €20 million to a health support programme and an economic support programme through improved access to finance. The latter aims to develop an environment conducive to private sector development and international trade in Yemen, which would ultimately support the country's overarching objective of job creation and poverty reduction. The focus is in particular, on youth and women entrepreneurs, whose access to finance will be improved. The health programme concentrates on strengthening the primary healthcare delivery capacities of the local health development councils and the oversight and monitoring capacities of the central ministry of public health and population.

EU help to assist Iraq in meeting the MDGs consisted in 2009 and 2010 of: support to emergency medical services and blood banks (€13 million, in cooperation with WHO); putting in place measures for improved water and sanitation services (€7 million, with UNICEF); support to improve the quality of education (€8.5 million, with the British Council) and improving access to quality basic education (€17 million, with UNICEF). In the coming years, the health sector will be supported (with WHO, €10 million), as well as higher legal education (€2 million). A €15.7 million water and integrated ground water management programme which includes the development of a water monitoring system and public awareness-raising measures on water-related issues, is also in the pipeline. The Commission’s support has enabled approximately 15 000 returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to be sheltered with 19 000 returnees, IDPs and community members assisted through water and sanitation projects. Three protection and assistance centres offered counselling to 170 000 persons; 75 000 were provided with assistance through referrals and advocacy with 4 030 legal cases solved.

EU cooperation with Iran is limited due to the ongoing dispute over the country’s nuclear programme. Implementation of projects by local or international NGOs is hampered by

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administrative obstacles such as difficulties in issuing visas and carrying out international financial transfers. The current €2.5 million portfolio of ten projects for includes thematic programmes in the fields of democracy and human rights (EIDHR) and non-state actors (DCI-NSA) aimed at promoting the empowerment of vulnerable people, and community-based initiatives. Yemen - creating jobs during the crisis The EU was able to assist Yemen and respond to the unfolding events set in motion by the Arab Spring, despite a rapid deterioration of the security situation which resulted in many donors withdrawing in-country staff and the stalling of development programmes. Working through the Yemeni social fund for development, an additional 144 projects were mounted with EU funding in three main areas: job creation, local capacity building and girls' education programmes in Yemen in the midst of crisis. The labour intensive works programme alone targeted almost 30 000 people by creating an additional 347 576 working days for the rehabilitation of more than 80 acres of agricultural lands and terraces. Additional activities will aim at constructing rainwater harvesting (cisterns, natural tanks and stone tanks), improving and protecting existing rural roads, protecting drinking water sources (shallow wells and springs), paving public rural markets and protecting irrigation channels. EU funds also helped build 250 classrooms for more than 18 000 girls who would not have been able to attend school otherwise and who would have left their education prematurely. Yemen has the highest gender inequality index in the world.

1.2.5 Outlook

As in some other Arab countries, the Arab Spring movement in Yemen opened a window of opportunity allowing greater political participation from all parts of society and better resource distribution, so as to put the country back on a genuine development track. The road ahead is certainly not smooth: contending groups will have to agree to work out their disputes peacefully and future growth will have to benefit a larger part of society. There needs to be more careful–resource management, notably in the water sector where a crisis looms. One of the first and most important tests for the transitional government lies, however, in dealing with humanitarian crisis and supporting a quick and effective return to "normality".

Iraq's achievements in terms of governance, democracy and rule of law remain fragile and need to be consolidated. The country has significant oil/gas revenues which currently contribute only marginally to inclusive economic growth. There is the need to improve efficiency of public expenditure and the provision of basic services. Institutional capacities need to be strengthened.

EU support for state building, governance (including financial and economic governance) and human rights – a key component of the NIP 2011-2013 – will be crucial in the coming years. Future interventions will continue to target capacity building for state institutions and NSA in key strategic sectors, at both central and decentralised level. In addition to support to the governance sector, the education component of the NIP 2011-2013 will give the opportunity to accompany the process of economic diversification by increasing access to job opportunities and a quality education system which responds to labour market needs.

The signature of the EU-Iraq partnership and cooperation agreement will provide a solid platform on which to build the EU-Iraq relationship in a wide range of areas for the decade ahead.

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In view of the events of the Arab Spring and the forthcoming presidential election in 2013 in Iran, it will be interesting to see whether Iranian civil society is able to steer the authorities towards more political freedom, fewer human right violations and lower the barriers to foreign cooperation.

2 Sub-Saharan Africa & Intra-ACP programmes

2.1 Sub-Saharan Africa

2.1.1 Introduction 2011 saw the birth of a new state in Africa – South Sudan – the consolidation of democracy in a number of countries through credible elections, and an effective African and international response to the post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. Progress however, is uneven and huge challenges remain. The EU has launched several initiatives to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of its multi-faceted engagement with the Sahel region, Sudan and South Sudan, as well as the Horn of Africa. In March 2011, the EU launched a ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’, one of the poorest regions of the world. The Sahel region faces the multiple and intertwined challenges of extreme poverty, the effects of climate change, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, corruption, unresolved internal tensions, the risk of violent extremism and radicalisation, illicit trafficking and terrorist-linked security threats. In few areas is the inter-dependence of security and development more evident. In its initial phase, the primary focus of the strategy is on Mali, Mauritania and Niger around four particular strands of action: development, good governance and internal conflict resolution; political and diplomatic; security and rule of law and countering violent extremism. Building on existing national, bilateral and multi-lateral engagement, the EU is working in close co-operation with the countries of the region, civil society and regional and international bodies to fight the root causes of poverty, support economic development, good governance and improve access to key infrastructures and basic services for the local populations. The independence of South Sudan in July 2011 marked a milestone in the implementation of the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In addition to opening a new EU Delegation in Juba, the EU started to follow a comprehensive approach to both Sudan and South Sudan. However, despite the optimism of the independence day ceremony attended by the HR/VP, the second half of the year saw a worrying deterioration of relations between both states. The EU is still concerned at the lack of progress in resolving outstanding CPA and post-secession issues between Sudan and South Sudan. The security situation and resulting humanitarian crises in Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Abyei remain a particular focus. Underlining the importance attached by the EU to its relations with the Horn of Africa and the breadth of political, security, development and humanitarian engagement, it adopted a Strategic Framework in November 2011. This provides a holistic approach to the EU’s multi-faceted engagement in the region with a view to supporting the people of the Horn in achieving greater peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable government. To assist with implementation of the framework, the EU appointed the first-ever EUSR for the Horn who initially focussed on Somalia and piracy.

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Building on support to governance, the EU deployed five electoral observation missions to Sub-Saharan Africa (Niger, Uganda, Nigeria, Zambia and DRC) and four expert missions (Benin, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Central African Republic). The EU will actively ensure follow-up to the recommendations of the EOMs in dialogue with the governments concerned. Africa-EU Partnership The Africa-EU relationship reached new heights in 2007 with the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon which put in place a framework for enhanced co-operation based on treating Africa as one. The Africa-EU Summit in November 2010 approved the second JAES action plan 2011-2013, which confirmed the commitment to deliver in eight thematic partnerships: peace and security; democratic governance and human rights; trade, regional integration and infrastructure; MDGs; energy; climate change and the environment; migration, mobility and employment; science, information society and space. 2011 saw results of the second action plan in all eight thematic areas, with initiatives financed under multiple instruments. The newly-created Africa-EU platform for dialogue on governance and human rights put forward proposals on natural resources governance in conflict and post-conflict situations, backing recent EU measures on more transparency of the activities of European extractive and forestry industries in Africa. The EU continued to support the Programme for Infrastructure Development (PIDA) and transport, energy and ICT networks via the Infrastructure Trust Fund. The ACP-EU Energy Facility is currently implementing 62 projects in 34 African countries in the fields of power supply and renewable energy. Launched in 2011, the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and Sahel initiative aims to mitigate the region's desertification and land degradation. The two continents have also embarked on scientific and technical cooperation, notably by making African research grants available in agriculture, renewable energy and water and sanitation. Under the African Peace Facility, the EU renewed its support to the African peace and security architecture and peace support operations; the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Economic Community of Central African States Mission for Consolidating Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX). The AU’s peace and security council and the EU political and security committee worked jointly towards crisis resolution, notably in Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire, with EU support for mediation channelled through the early response mechanism, and reinforced dialogue in the areas of maritime safety and transnational security. Through the AU Support Programme (€55 million), the EU contributed to the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the AU Commission and its organs. The Commission's cooperation with the AU’s situation room contributed to technical support for the further development of its Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and technical training of AU and RECs (Regional Economic Communities) staff. In the context of the partnership on science, information technology and space, the Commission notably provided further technical and logistic support to the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) and Africa process which is intended to lead to a GMES and Africa action plan to inter alia optimise the use of satellite observation for environmental management.

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2.1.2 Aid effectiveness and donor coordination In 2011, the Commission continued its efforts to strengthen aid effectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan was the key development policy event of the year and created momentum to further enhance the use of ‘country systems’ (national arrangements and procedures for public financial management, procurement, audit, monitoring and evaluation, social and environmental procedures) – specific priority of African partner countries. In South Sudan, the EU and its Member States endorsed the idea to improve the coordination and coherence of aid by programming funds jointly. The resulting agreement on a single joint Country Strategy Paper (CSP), allocates around €800 million of EU funding to South Sudan over the period 2011-2013, focussing on a number of specific priority sectors: health, education, rural development, rule of law and water, sanitation and hygiene – all part of South Sudan's own development plans. The joint CSP includes an EDF contribution of €200 million, made available by the Council in 2011. In Mali, donor coordination and aid effectiveness are improving through a series of initiatives. A common country strategy for development assistance (SCAP) has been jointly developed by the government and its development partners. Mali has also been selected as a pilot country for the EU’s "joint programming" exercise. In the interest of boosting aid effectiveness, Mali also embarked on a joint evaluation of budget support operations in line with the OECD’s new methodology. An evaluation showed the positive impact of budget support. As a result of the close coordination among donors and in line with the principles of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, the EU has signed agreements with development agencies whereby partners delegate the implementation of their projects to a single agency (delegation agreements). Other donors will also transfer funds to the EU for the delivery of specific projects (transfer agreements). Countries to have signed such agreements include: France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and Denmark. Mali also participates in the ‘fast track initiative’ on the division of labour. Togo – building on budget support Under the EU's budget support programme with the Togolese government, 2009-2011, the government progressed with important reforms to improve budgetary management and oversight of public expenditure. The court of auditors – operational since July 2010 – produced and transmitted its first-ever report to the parliamentary assembly. The general inspectorate for finances substantially increased the number of completed financial audits and several 'commissions' responsible for the launch and oversight of public tenders were established. Financial transparency was further improved by the creation of a website concerning the government's budget expenditure and public tenders – where, for example, a bi-annual report on the government's budget expenditure is now regularly published. A second budget support programme with complementary objectives will build on these encouraging results.

2.1.3 Working towards the MDGs The 10th EDF Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the ACP country strategies and programmes showed that, while the overall picture is diverse, most ACP countries are lagging behind in their schedules to reach the MDGs. The EU thus decided in the context of the 10th EDF MTR

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to devote a share of unallocated funds to support ACP countries’ attainment of the MDGs. At a high level meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2010, the Commission announced the EU’s €1 billion MDG initiative to foster progress towards the 2015 goals. This initiative has two components, the first being a €300 million window to reward ‘good performer’ countries based on their overall good performance indicated in 10th EDF MTR results. The remaining €700 million was open to all ACP countries, including those, on a case-by case-basis, under article 96. The first component is currently in the process of being allocated under the MTR. To access the latter component, ACP states were invited to submit a proposal demonstrating how a top-up could contribute to improving the attainment by 2015 of the most off-track MDGs in their respective countries: eradicating hunger, improving maternal health, curbing child mortality and improving access to water and sanitation. In December 2011, the €700 million sum was allocated to proposals from 36 countries. All proposals selected are results-oriented, with clear and measurable indicators which demonstrate the benefits of additional funding. Progress towards achieving the MDGs varies among countries of Southern and Eastern Africa. While some are making good progress such as Ethiopia, Namibia, and Botswana, most show mixed results including Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. Progress towards MDGs 1c, 4, 5 and/or 7c is often less encouraging. Various forms of EU support are facilitating the achievement of the MDGs: general budget support, including MDG-contracts (Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia); sector budget support and projects and programmes. In Ethiopia, the multi-donor protection of basic services (PBS) programme is enhancing basic government service delivery at decentralised level in health, education, water, agriculture and roads. It has been instrumental in the significant progress made by Ethiopia towards many of the MDGs. The country’s under-five mortality rate dropped from 123 in 2005 to 88 in 2011. The net enrolment rate for primary school children rose from 77.5% in 2005/06 to 85.3% in 2010/2011. The number of health extension workers increased from 2 700 to more than 30 000 in four years, while development agents providing technical advice to farmers increased by 13 000 in just two years. The EU is currently supporting the PBS to with €50 million, with approval given in 2011 for the financing of a €45 million second phase. Safe drinking water in Chad on tap The MDG7 goal of reducing the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by half is on target in Chad due to an €80 million package of assistance from the 10th EDF and other donor support, as well as changes made by the Chadian government. By 2015, 61% of Chad’s population is projected to have access to safe drinking water. Although Chad is still considered to be a fragile state, an improved legal framework and regulations have been put in place by the government to manage the water and sanitation sector. A national training scheme for water management and a new plan for the maintenance and monitoring of water supply points have also been launched. Local populations have especially been involved in the management of water points; frequently financing their installation and upkeep and respecting the requirement of paying for water which has in turn improved sustainability of supply. In 2011, the laboratory of the ministry for water received new equipment and staff skills were improved by a training programme put in place with

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ADB support. Chad also improved its knowledge of groundwater resources through EU-funded drilling programmes. West African countries have seen different levels of progress towards achieving the MDGs. While in some countries, such as Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, goals are achievable with some further change, mixed results have been recorded in most including Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. Progress on MDGs 1, 4, 5 is proving the most challenging. While most governments have aligned their poverty reduction strategies to the MDGs, specific challenges include insufficient health provisions, ensuring sufficient child nutrition, reaching appropriate levels of sanitation and monitoring and collecting data on progress made towards the MDGs. MDG contract improving health and education in Burkina Faso An MDG contract delivered through budget support, is significantly improving both health and education in Burkina Faso, contributing to poverty reduction. Mid-way through its implementation, the programme is showing encouraging results even though this momentum must be kept up if MDG targets are to be met in 2015. As a result of the programme, allocations from the country’s state budget to health rose from 11% to 12.1% and from 14.3% to 16.2% for education over three years. Births attended by skilled health staff increased from 54.6% to 76%. The percentage of people vaccinated against measles went up from 93.9% to 99.3% whereas the percentage of girls' enrolment in school rose from 61.2% to 75%, over the same period and the proportion of students completing primary school increased from 36.4% to 52.1%.

2.1.4 Implementation and results In 2011, the total amount of EDF commitments came to €3.2 billion to slightly exceed the overall target at the beginning of the year. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the EU has exceeded its target by 15%, with €2.1 billion committed against a target of €1.8 billion. The main reasons for the higher than expected commitments are: the stabilisation of the political situation following elections in Côte d’Ivoire allowing for cooperation to be stepped up, the commitment of a record amount of €478 million in Nigeria totalling 70% of the total of the country’s ‘A’ envelope and the commitment of a larger than expected sum to Sudan. As far as EDF payments are concerned, the target for Sub-Saharan Africa was set at €2 394 million with €1 973 million (82.4%) disbursed. The main reason that the target was not reached was the non-disbursement of budget support payments, largely due to issues related to eligibility criteria. In 2012, better results are expected as far as payments are concerned, given the excellent performance with regard to commitments in 2011. In 2011, bilateral cooperation with East and Southern Africa (excluding South Africa) amounted to €456 million and €316 million respectively. Total budget support payments to East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean under the EDF amounted to €457.5 million in 2011, broadly in line with previous years. Commitments under the EDF meanwhile declined further to €85.7 million from their peak of over €2 billion in 2008, reflecting the fact that programmes are already in place for most countries benefiting from budget support under the 10th EDF. A further €271.6 million was committed under the budget. General budget support to Zambia

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€32.8 million of general budget support was disbursed in Zambia following the September 2011 elections, in response to the country’s encouraging commitment in meeting poverty reduction targets in health and education. Despite mixed results on poverty reduction, the previous government succeeded in making improvements in the net enrolment rate, pupil teacher ratio, in transition rates for girls' education, and in immunisation rates in the worst performing districts. Some improvements to public financial management systems, including the rationalisation of the budget calendar and improved procurement regulations, were also recognised. A joint donor evaluation noted that general budget support had increased national budget allocations to exceed budget support inflows. The increased allocations have led to tangible improvements in service delivery, most notably in the social sectors. There were increased challenges in 2011 regarding the implementation of budget support programmes in the region. The combination of macro-economic issues, policy slippages and governance concerns prevented the EU from making planned disbursements in a number of countries including Malawi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Comoros and Tanzania. Food crises in the Horn of Africa proved to be one of the largest emerging challenges in the region and required a strong humanitarian and development response by the EU. Development co-operation activities aimed at improving livelihoods and food security in the Horn were launched in Ethiopia (€13.75 million), Djibouti (about €4.5 million) and Somalia (€25 million). In line with the “Agenda for Change”, food security should feature prominently in 11th EDF co-operation programmes, especially in the Horn of Africa. Seeds improve food security in Somalia Now in its second phase, the improvement and sustainable use of plant genetic resources programme in the country’s southern region – a seed improvement project – has increased the yields of Somalia’s farmlands and has led to an agricultural commercial sector taking root. The use of improved seeds can yield production increases of between 50-100%. Since the establishment of seed growers associations in 2008 and subsequent commercialisation of seeds from 2010, farmers are now self-supporting and seed growers have increased their income. During the recent drought and famine crises in the country, the maize growers’ association, produced 1 800 MT of maize seed, which was distributed at the same time as the ‘agricultural emergency package’ by different donors in various crisis-affected regions during the 2011 humanitarian operation. This seed distribution is expected to increase next season’s maize production in the southern region. Food-security- Support to Livestock in Somalia The livestock emergency interventions to mitigate the food crisis in Somalia is a €4.8 million 24-month project ended in September 2011 and enabled the mass treatment and vaccination of sheep and goats against three major diseases that impact negatively on the productivity of the animals and the export trade in live animals. It sought to reduce the negative impact of soaring food prices on Somali pastoralists and agro-pastoralists and has mitigated the negative impact of the current food crisis. In preventing disease in over 6.7 million livestock which were hence able to stand the recent drought, 72 485 pastoralists’ households have benefited from the project which has also created short-term employment for 600 youths. The creation of an independent South Sudan in July was an opportunity for the EU and its Member States to embark on a joint programming exercise, establishing a coordinated donor

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response to South Sudan's development strategies and priorities. Co-operation with the country is transitioning from humanitarian relief to supporting government-owned sustainable development and state-building. An example of practical work being undertaken is the inclusion of Juba University in a higher education pilot initiative supported under the EU-Africa strategy In the specific case of Zimbabwe, the EU has targeted its interventions in areas such as food security, agriculture, health, education, human rights and rule of law, adding governance-related support to reforms foreseen in the global political agreement, signed back in 2009. This support has proven important in restoring confidence among the population and generating a sense of hope for the future. The principles of Article 96 were maintained and support was channelled through UN organisations and local and international NGOs. Since 2009, the Commission has provided an average of €80 million per year, including humanitarian funding (which is being phased out). These funds were drawn from the reserves of the 10th EDF in the form of ad hoc allocations, as well as from DCI budget lines. Support to livestock smallholders sector in Southern Angola A €10 million programme supports the Angolan veterinary services to develop the livestock sector in Southern Angola. Around 30 000 smallholder farmers were trained in the control of diseases through the use of vaccines and basic veterinary drugs, assisted to construct simple wells and create pastoralist managed organisations that can market cattle, manage pasture and water resources and provide members with training and veterinary supplies. In the drought prone semi-arid regions of south west Angola, the raising of livestock through avian production and agro-pastoralist system are the main source of income and food for over 200 000 families. These farmers, who possess a very strong and distinct cultural identity, produce approximately 23% of the national meat requirement and 78% of meat produced in Angola. The EU is supporting a 4-year program to build capacity in the veterinary services, to support pastoralists systems along transhumance trekking routes and to develop the production of vaccines for domestic poultry. A veterinary laboratory, to produce these vaccines, has been recently rehabilitated and inaugurated by the Ministry of Agriculture. In West Africa, nearly all countries are ranked by the UNDP’s 2011 index as having ‘low human development’. While democratic processes are becoming more fluid – such as in Benin and Liberia – the region remains on the whole fragile and subject to instability. In Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry, EU co-operation is still partly suspended following Council decisions on the basis of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. 2011 was marked by the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and the resumption of aid to help the new authorities restore political and economic stability and to support the country's regional role as a driver of economic growth. The EU immediately allocated the country €125 million when the new government took office. The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, announced during a visit to Brussels by the Côte d’Ivoire’s President Alassane Ouattara that the EU was willing to top-up the country’s aid package by €100 million to support the government post-crisis. The EU also resumed aid, including budget support disbursements, in Niger where a new government was installed in April 2011. Ensuring the stability of Niger, as well as the other

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Sahel countries, is a key challenge for the international community in a context of growing insecurity. Visiting West Africa in November 2011, Commissioner Piebalgs stated: "Instability in the Sahel is threatening the sustainability of development in the region". The Commission has hence worked closely with the EEAS to develop and implement the ‘Sahel Security and Development Strategy’ which includes a new €150 million package of funds divided between Niger, Mali and Mauritania for development and governance activities, including the strengthening of respective justice systems. Mali makes good progress in education Improvements to education in Mali and reform in the sector have been assisted since 2008 by an MDG contract earmarking €150 million of general budget support and €44 million of sector budget support. The funding has resulted in the opening of 13 000 more classrooms and has increased the number of students registered at public schools across the country from 1.3 million to nearly two million. Funds have also been invested to improve education at the local level under the sector budget support programme and resulted in the percentage of girls in school climbing in the regions of Kidal, Mopti, Ségou and Sikasso from 50% in 2003-2004 to 65% in 2011. Other highlights in the region include a €478 million comprehensive aid package for Nigeria, demonstrating the EU’s full commitment to support the country’s development, focusing more particularly on governance and the Niger Delta area. All in all, the EU has committed close to €1 billion in West Africa for bi-lateral co-operation in 2011 with payments totalling some €700 million. Presidential and parliamentary elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in November 2011 saw wide political debate and large popular participation in the second free elections since independence. Despite some security problems, the elections took place without violent incidents getting out of control. However, irregularities, failings and errors in the electoral process led the opposition and a proportion of the population to reject the results. During 2011, the EU has been working continuously to encourage candidates and the public to remain peaceful in respect of democratic principles. The EU will follow closely the remainder of the electoral cycle and is calling for greater transparency and respect for the electoral law in the future. Development cooperation was not affected by the elections since the main cooperation activities took place prior to the electoral period, supported by the government and assisted by a favourable macro-economic situation. DRC – continuing EU support to the national health services development plan EU support (€51 million) is helping to bring quality health services to 2.9 million people, including improved supply of essential medicines. The country faces many health challenges, notably in relation to child mortality and maternal health where the respective MDGs 4 and 5 are unlikely to be met. Building on its previous assistance, the EU’s support is geared to implementing the national plan for the development of health services (PNDS) to which the EU is the largest donor. EU funding is specifically going to the conflict affected eastern districts - under the stabilisation and reconstruction programme in conflict areas (STAREC) - to improve the health care of victims of sexual violence. Additional humanitarian aid and a €40 million sum under the MDG Initiative will further boost health care.

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The stable political and security situation in Rwanda combined with very good public financial management and pro-poor policies, are contributing to a favourable social and macro-economic situation in the country. This good overall performance will lead to a substantial increase in its 10th EDF allocation. European institutions continue to press for greater political and democratic openness and are closely following the implementation of the commitments made by Rwanda in the framework of the Human Rights Council’s last universal periodic review. Sector budget support improves justice in Rwanda A €12 million sector budget support programme for Rwanda, ‘Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order’ has improved the rule of law and respect for people’s basic human rights as well as universal access to justice. Results include: a big rise in the number of cases processed by civil and penal courts; an increased proportion of those responsible for genocide doing community service and a lowering of the percentage of prisoners receiving jail sentence. There is strong commitment to co-ordination and harmonisation with performances in sectors being jointly evaluated under a common performance assessment framework. 2011 was a difficult year in the Central African Republic, marked by widespread insecurity and banditry. Presidential and parliamentary elections – held in line with commitments under the 2008 peace process – took place in a generally peaceful environment but did not enjoy the support of the opposition who largely refrained from participating. The EU also denounced irregularities and widespread fraud. With a lack of progress on security-related sectors reform and an unpaid budget support payment due to inadequate public financial management, development co-operation was sluggish. However, an area-based development programme is underway and will contribute significantly to rehabilitating infrastructure for basic services and increasing state presence in areas where the security situation allows. In Cameroon, elections took place without any major outbreaks of violence but they suffered from low voter participation and widespread delays. The EU supported the electoral process through funding for society activities relating to the elections and the training of local election observers. In Chad, improved stability resulting in part from the 2007 political agreement facilitated the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections without any major security incidents. Implementation of bi-lateral cooperation also benefited from the more stable political environment, particularly with regard to, the MDGs, infrastructure and justice. Educational opportunities for marginalised Somali youth Strengthening access and participation in secondary education (SAPIS) is an ongoing €4.44 million 36-month project (October 2009-October 2012) targeting marginalised youth in Somaliland, Puntland and the Transitional Federal Government areas in Mogadishu. It led to growth in secondary education enrolment of 23% and 17% in 115 target secondary schools in Somaliland and Puntland respectively during the 2009-2010 academic years with an increase in girls’ enrolment of 35 and 18% in Somaliland and Puntland respectively. The educational performance of girls has also improved: in the two regions, 79.7% of the girls graduated from High School in 2011 with a score of Grade C (60% out of 100%) and above in the key subjects, by far exceeding the project’s target of 45%. Dedicated ministry of secondary education units in Somaliland and Puntland have supported the programme through payment

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of monthly incentives to some teachers, policy guidance and quality assurance; key project decisions being made in the six-monthly steering committee meetings attended by key ministry of education officials. Further, an EU-funded teacher training programme implemented by Save the Children is currently training 390 (229 male and 91 female) secondary school teachers to improve the overall quality of secondary education across the three regions of Somalia. Kenya - food security for households The Kenya dairy goats and capacity-building project in the drought-prone districts of Kitui and Mwingi (€1.4 million) aimed to improve the income of poor farmers though increasing livestock productivity, in particular goats, as well as providing training and access to affordable loans. Some1 750 goats were given to farmers as breeding stock and around 2 000 cross-bred goats were born. The project also trained 168 government officers and 36 shallow wells were dug by families. Around 1 000 households benefited from the project. Regional Co-operation EU regional development co-operation is mostly channelled through the regional economic communities and is accompanied by trade relations (e.g. Economic Partnership Agreements - EPAs) as well as political dialogue in the area of peace and security. Given the complex nature of most regional programmes, their implementation is somewhat slower than national ones, meaning that it is yet too early to measure the impact of EU support. Large increases in respective Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) allocations were not matched by similar increases in the capacities of the regional organisations, nor in the staffing of regional Delegations. Delays in concluding EPAs and constraints on execution modalities have also had negative consequences on RIP commitment rates.

The 10th EDF’s regional programme allocated an €645 million envelope to Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (2008-2013). This translates into programmes which are proposed, led or coordinated by any of the four regional organisations (RO), namely: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). The strategy remains highly relevant as it focuses on the fastest-growing region in Africa and relates to regional processes such as the tripartite process, the EU partnerships at the AU level, and the Horn of Africa initiative. However, the future configuration of the Eastern and Southern Africa – Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) region might have to be re-considered in line with emerging political priorities and a better matching of the operational configuration which may be required under the 11th EDF. Alignment of the regional programmes with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), new developments in EPA negotiations and enhancement of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), are all required. Weak institutional capacity and a lack of effective procedures have hampered co-operation with SADC for several years, and have limited the extent to which EU assistance could be used. However, towards the end of 2011, SADC and the EU reaped the benefits of several years of intensive work and co-operation to bring SADC's internal procedures up to international standards. External audits showed that SADC's accounting, procurement and audit procedures have improved remarkably, meaning that direct EU contributions to the SADC budget are hence within reach in the years ahead.

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Efficiency and effectiveness should be improved given the complexity of regional co-operation. The EU’s response should be to reach greater critical mass in its regional integration support. In Central Africa, the commitment rate (75%) is higher than in most other regions. New phases of existing programmes are underway in the areas of biodiversity (ECOFAC V) and peace and security. Over the years, ECOFAC has successfully raised the visibility of environmental issues in the region and has played a role in preserving the Congo basin’s tropical forests. A major regional economic integration (€68 million) programme was also approved in 2011. In West Africa, a transnational environmental programme (Programme d'Appui aux Parcs de l'Entente, €17 million) was signed – the first large project to be implemented under the 10th EDF. Additional support was also provided to a peace and security project as well as to a regional integration project to improve product quality in the private sector. Overall, the regional programme will strengthen regional inter-connectivity both in the energy and transportation sectors, and will also focus on food security. Higher education has been firmly placed on the EU-Africa cooperation agenda and partnership. The African higher education harmonisation and tuning initiative, is a good example of the JAES in action. Sixty universities continent-wide started work in November. Despite strong competition from all over the world, African students and researchers are performing well under the Erasmus Mundus programme and in the context of the FP7 Marie Curie programme. The intra-ACP academic mobility programme was launched and initial partnerships have begun. In the area of research and innovation, some 256 contracts have been signed with Sub-Saharan Africa countries since 2007 with an EU contribution totalling €102 million. The calls launched in 2011 included a study on renewable energy in Sub-Saharan Africa (€1 million) and others on bio-waste and zoonotic diseases. The European Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP) continued to receive support. In the context of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, a new action plan was drawn up for 2011-2013 with a major focus on capacity-building in the area of science and technology. Under the ACP Research for Sustainable Development Programme, the call for proposals for African Research Grants (€15 million from the 10th EDF) was launched by the AU Commission. The first Africa-EU high level science and technology policy dialogue in Addis Ababa in October reinforced scientific and technological cooperation, coordination and political dialogue. Sweet success of Malawian farmers Farming families in Malawi have the opportunity to gain a livelihood selling irrigated sugarcane – a high cash crop – under the Kasinthula Sugarcane Growers Scheme (KSCGS). Continued EU support has enabled accumulated debt to be localised by expanding the scheme to 200 new families from Chikhwawa, one of the poorest districts. KSCGS got underway in 2010 with land preparation and the installation of irrigation equipment. A conservative yield of 100t of cane per hectare is scheduled to bring in gross revenue of €1.3 million per annum from 2012. EU support to the scheme further includes a capacity building programme addressing technical, economic and cross-cutting issues.

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2.1.5 Monitoring

Sub-Saharan Africa (including South Africa) In 2011, 421 on-going national projects, 23 on-going regional programmes and 7 Sector Policy Support Programmes representing a total EU commitment of more than €2.8 billion were reviewed by independent experts in 47 Sub-Saharan African countries (no mission could be organized to Ivory Coast due to the political situation). Additionally, 49 closed projects (ex-post ROM) benefiting of a total EU contribution of €213 million were also assessed. Table 3:

ROM assessment: Grades by evaluation criteria (national projects)

6.7% 3.1% 2.1% 4.0% 1.9%

74.3%56.5% 54.9%

70.8%52.0%

Relevance andDesign


Very good (a) Good (b)

Analysis of the results reveals that 71.5% of national on-going projects perform very good or good, 22.6% of reviewed projects present problems and only 5.9% encounter major difficulties. This represents a major improvement compared to 2010, when only 60% of national on-going projects were performing very good or good and 15% were experimenting major difficulties - although it must be noted that the comparison is not based on the same sample of projects. In terms of assessment of closed operations, 61% of them received good marks. In general, 81% of assessed projects received very good and good ratings in relation to their relevance and design. Some constraints persist in terms of efficiency (as 40.3% of projects reviewed face problems in terms of input used and implementation of activities), in regards to effectiveness (with 43% experimenting some difficulties in delivering results) and sustainability (46% with problems). However, despite this, potential impact remains very good or good for almost 75% of projects. As it had been in 2010, also in 2011 sectors mostly concerned by external monitoring were social infrastructure and services (with 223 ongoing monitoring reports produced covering a budget of € 952 million) and economic infrastructure and services (49 ongoing reports, €988 million). 71.3% of social infrastructure projects assessed received very good and good marks while for economic infrastructure this figure rises to 77.5%. In both sectors, the rate of projects with major difficulties remains under 7%. Table 4:

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ROM assessment: Performance category by ODA sector (national projects)

9.5% 6.3% 1.3% 2.0% 2.2%

85.7% 81.3% 82.9%70.0%

75.5%

60.0% 60.9%

84.2%

4.8%12.5% 17.1%

22.9%16.3%

32.7% 28.3%

13.2%5.8% 6.1% 7.3% 8.7%

2.6%

Health Population Water andSanitation

Other SocialInfrastructureand Services

EconomicInfrastructureand Services

Productionsectors

Multisector -Crosscutting

CommodityAid + GeneralProgrammeAssistance

Very good performance Good performancePerforming with Problems Not performing, major di ffi cul ties

Ongoing national interventions in the areas of health, population and water and sanitation are performing particularly well, with 95.2%, 87.5% and 82.8% of very good and good marks, respectively.

2.1.6 Outlook The Cotonou Agreement foresees a performance review of the 10th EDF by the Council, together with the ACP States, on the basis of a proposal prepared by the Commission in 2010. A special report was published in September 201140. It contains a summary of 10th EDF programming and results with an examination of the added value of main areas of 10th EDF activities and an assessment of its programme funding. The objective of this staff working paper is to provide a basis for discussions on the future of EU-ACP cooperation, with a view to the drafting of the external action package for the next MFF. Over the past ten years, the EU has improved its development cooperation performance; modernising its partnerships and financial instruments, putting in place mechanisms to ensure policy coherence and rallying its Member States around shared policy approaches. The report recalls that the ACP-EU partnership is the focus of this renewed development policy. It highlights the 10th EDF’s added value by virtue of its programming – with funding earmarked at different levels national, regional and intra-ACP – and its ability to respond to ACP needs. The report also shows that all the key issues highlighted in the “Agenda for Change” are features of the 10th EDF and provide the basis on which to increase the concrete impact of EU programmes in pursuit of MDG targets: differentiation, an incentive approach, financial leverage, co-financing and good governance. To overcome the challenge of mainstreaming an innovative continental strategy into existing fragmented financial instruments, and in line with the third Africa-EU Summit commitments, the Commission is proposing that a €1 billion Pan African Programme be set up under the DCI. This will address the JAES in a more structured way and will boost implementation of its successive action plans, with dedicated and significant financing available for initiatives covering the whole African continent. In the meantime, and as agreed by both parties in the last summit, the Commission will set up a flexible, demand-driven technical and

40 SEC(2011) 1055, 08.09.2011

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administrative support mechanism to improve the functioning of the thematic partnerships of the joint strategy and achieve concrete results.

2.2 South Africa

2.2.1 Introduction A strategic partnership was established with South Africa in 2006 in recognition of the country’s key role both in Africa and globally. Under the partnership, the EU and South Africa co-operate on a broad range of political, trade and economic matters, as well as on issues such as science and technology, the environment and energy. During 2011, further steps were taken to build on the partnership’s existing achievements and strengthen ties with the country. The fourth annual South Africa-EU summit was an opportunity to strengthen dialogue and to discuss a number of key issues such as global governance, climate change, trade, development and peace and security in Africa. Given South Africa’s strong engagement in conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, the EU and South Africa continued in 2011 to step up their dialogue on peace and security matters and to jointly review respective assess-ments and commitments. Cooperation was also taken a step further in the fields of mobility and migration, health, higher education, science and technology, ICT and the environment and climate change. In the sphere of space collaboration, the EU and South Africa continued to work towards extending the coverage of the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service which is a platform to enhance global navigation satellite system services in South Africa.

2.2.2 Aid effectiveness and donor cooperation As a contribution to the Busan High-Level Forum, a performance assessment was made in 2011 in South Africa which indicated good progress on development strategies, public financial management and results orientation. It also indicated more could be done on the use of country systems and joint implementation arrangements. Efforts continued in 2011 to improve aid effectiveness. EU+ working groups, cluster workshops of all EU Members assembled under the leadership of the National Treasury provided a forum for sharing experiences and ideas. The EU was a particularly good performer in using country systems with 87% of its aid so far committed being in the form of budget support. In the spirit of an effective division of labour, an agreement was signed with the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) to deliver technical cooperation as part of the EU's support to the primary health care sector. Plans are underway to further enhance coordination through a jointly-prepared multiannual indicative programme and in the areas of analysis of public financial management, improved predictability of aid flows and evaluations. Plans are underway to further enhance coordination through a jointly prepared multi-annual indicative programme, joint analytical work in the area of public financial management, improved predictability of aid flows and joint evaluations.

2.2.3 Working towards the MDGs South Africa is a middle income country but is a young democracy scarred by decades of apartheid and one of the most unequal societies in the world. Overall, South Africa has

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advanced in meeting the MDGs, especially in relation to poverty reduction (MDG 1) and education (MDG2). Progress on health/HIV (MDGs 4, 5 and 6) is still very much lagging behind, mainly due to the spread of the HIV epidemic. There has been satisfactory progress on gender equality (MDG3). During 2011, the MDGs received heightened attention in parliamentary debates. There has also been a focus on addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic, as well as on the quality of education and health services. The rise in unemployment in recent years is likely to have a negative impact on the MDGs in the future. The EU is supporting South Africa to achieve the MDGs in the areas of employment, education and health as well as through a new programme to assist the national development policy in addressing job-related issues and improved service delivery.

2.2.4 Implementation and results Development co-operation with South Africa continues to be marked by the objective of ensuring that support brings value added through innovation, pilot programmes, capacity development and the sharing of skills and knowledge. Several programmes were approved in 2011: a €250 million national development policy support programme to help implement the national development strategy, €5 million contribution to the broadening of the on-going legislative sector policy support programme to regional and international arenas, a €5 million top-up to the Erasmus Mundus Programme and a further €5 million contribution to the EDULINK II higher education programme. At the end of 2011, €720 million or 73% of the total 2007-2013 envelope for South Africa (€980 million) had been committed with programmes supporting employment, capacity development, governance, regional cooperation and dialogue. 2011 was a record year for payments with €139.7million disbursed. There was progress in a number of areas including implementation of a dialogue facility to continue the momentum in South Africa/EU exchanges with a number of activities on green jobs, taxation, health, and ICT. The legislature programme has been implemented smoothly with a second consultative conference focusing on the MDGs, and steps taken to improve parliamentary oversight through local and regional public accounts committees. The innovation for poverty alleviation programme and access to justice programmes are starting to yield results. Budget support programme improves access to justice Improved access to justice for vulnerable and marginalised groups, and enhanced participatory democracy have resulted from a budget support programme for the sector. Eighteen new community advice offices and 382 equality courts have been set up to examine unfair discrimination cases. Training sessions have taken place for over 9 000 officials and five radio talk shows reached 20 million listeners. Over 10 400 refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants benefited from community support services and 183 civil society organisations participated in public policy dialogue. In the social sectors, the primary education programme (PrimEd) was formally launched and results already seen in its foundation phase: the provision of teacher education materials; research in the area of early childhood education; and an expansion in the number of universities offering teacher training at foundation level (up from 13 to 20). The primary health care programme (PrimCare) has been approved and officially launched during a visit of

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Commissioner Piebalgs. Its results include a new aid effectiveness framework for better coordination, exchanges on the proposed national health insurance system, and timely personnel and asset management improvements. Building on the successful implementation of a range of sectoral budget support interventions, and acknowledging the mid- term review conclusions that recommended the consolidation of such programmes, the Commission approved in 2011 a general budget support programme for South Africa – the national development strategy support programme (NDSP). The NDSP envisages a judicious combination of budget support and targeted capacity development and provides a strong platform upon which the EU can continue to pursue meaningful and substantive dialogue around key policies of mutual interest in the areas of service delivery, public financial management in sub-national levels of government and inclusive growth. Under the MIP, the main aid delivery modality in South Africa has been budget support. This approach has shown impressive results in promoting dialogue and enhancing the government's focus on results. It has led to improvements in clean water, capacity of the judiciary, legislative oversight and job creation. Innovation creates jobs The Innovation for poverty alleviation budget support programme is helping to set up pilot activities in the science and technology fields – especially in high risk rural areas – to create jobs and reduce poverty. The provision of seed funding to test new applications for commercialisation has created new jobs. The programme’s results so far include: 730 new jobs, assistance for 1 760 research and vocational trainees, 22 new small and micro businesses and the installation of wireless networks in 182 schools and colleges in rural areas.

2.2.5 Monitoring An independent results-oriented monitoring mission took place in 2011 to assess the quality of 19 projects and programmes covering areas as diverse as governance, justice, rural development, and urban development. Eleven of the projects were considered to be performing well while eight were assessed as performing with problems but without serious deficiencies. While there is not a large difference in the scores for the five criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability), on average the efficiency criterion received the highest assessment and the sustainability one, the lowest.

2.2.6 Outlook The EU will continue to implement existing programmes in the areas of employment, capacity development, governance, regional cooperation, and dialogue. The new national development policy support programme, to be launched in 2012, will address the key themes of job creation, improved service delivery, the environment and public financial management. Future programmes include a possible investment facility which will blend grants and loans with the involvement of South African and European development banks. People-to-people contacts, dialogue, exchange of knowledge and tri-lateral cooperation will continue to be promoted in the context of the SA-EU strategic partnership. A Joint Declaration between the EU and South Africa on enhanced cooperation in education and training is to be signed in May 2012. There are also plans following the Busan outcome document to assess and conclude an agreement at country level.

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One of the most important activities in 2012 will be the preparation of the 2014-2020 multiannual indicative programme which will be concluded jointly with the South African government based on the partnership’s past performance and on the government's current programme. Of particular importance will be the debate in South Africa on the proposed long-term national development plan.

2.3 Intra-ACP programmes The 2011 annual action programme for intra–ACP cooperation under the 10th EDF, benefiting all ACP States, was approved in December 2011. It consists of 14 programmes in the fields of health, climate change, trade and private sector development, agriculture and rural development amounting to €169 million. The package includes a €15 million contribution to the global fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and €10 million for the partnership for strengthening pharmaceutical systems and improving access to quality medicines in African nations. The latter programme aims to develop, implement and monitor national drug policies, increase equitable access to essential medicines. It also seeks to guarantee their quality, safety and effectiveness through drug regulation and a more rational use of medicines by health professionals and consumers. In the area of climate change, €37 million have been allocated for the monitoring for the environment and security in Africa (MESA) programme. MESA addresses the need for improved satellite and land-based earth observation monitoring, analysis and diffusion of information to assist environmental protection, climate and food security policies and programming and decision-making in four regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. In the field of rural development, the EU has allocated €20 million to the intra ACP agriculture policy programme. Its aim is to enhance the ability of regional agricultural development organisations in the developing states of the Caribbean and Pacific regions to address the development needs of smallholder farmers. A new €9 million programme under the 10th EDF is supporting the air transport sector and satellite service applications. Its objective is to contribute to the harmonisation of aviation safety and aviation security regulations at both regional and national levels, mainly through technical assistance, training and equipment. The newly-launched programme with €15 million from the 10th EDF will help ACP countries deal with technical barriers to trade. Its objective is to improve ACP exports and ensure proper protection of their citizens. The Commission approved a €10 million contribution to the 'consolidation of the participatory slum upgrading programme' mounted with UN-HABITAT which aims to address some of the problems created by one of the century’s huge challenges, the transition to urban dwelling. Slums in ACP countries have resulted from rapid and high rates in a context of economic decline and urban impoverishment. Without relevant policies and concrete urban action, the global population of slum dwellers is expected to reach 1.4 billion globally in 2020. For over 20 years, the activities of farmers and farmers’ organisations in ACP countries have also been enhanced by the Technical Centre for Agricultural and rural Cooperation (CTA)

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which has a €16 million budget from the EU for its activities 2011-2015. CTA’s new strategic plan, has the following goals: conducive agricultural policies in ACP regions, the setting up of profitable smallholder value chains and improved information and communication and knowledge management capacity in ACP organisations. CTA-led activities in 2011 include the organisation of an international conference on rural extension in Nairobi in November on current policies, thinking and practice, successes and failures of ongoing and past reforms and advisory services41. In view of the success encountered by the Brussels Development Briefings organised by the CTA, targeting the wider development community in Brussels42, CTA has organised similar briefings in ACP regions since 2010, with more planned for 2012. The annual action plan also includes a decision to finance the 2012 budget of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE). This joint ACP/EU institution remains one of the most important channels through which the Commission supports the private sector at the intra-ACP level. The CDE works at both meso and micro levels to provide non-financial services to small and medium enterprises and intermediary organisations representative of the private sector. CDE’s objectives are: facilitating ACP-EU business partnerships; developing enterprise support services in ACP nations through capacity building with private sector organisations and service providers; assisting investment promotion activities and organisations and improving; technology transfer and management skills. In the science sector, 33 projects are ongoing under the ACP Science and Technology (S&T) programme which aims to strengthen the internal science and technology capacity of all ACP countries. A new €20 million ACP science and technology decision has been signed. To accelerate achievement of the MDGs, EU-supported international research and research capacity building in the developing world has intensified, especially in Africa, where an Africa-EU high level policy dialogue on science, technology and innovation was inaugurated in Addis Ababa in October. At the day-to-day level, the ongoing €20 million ACP research for sustainable development programme generated a call for proposals of €7 million from its African research grants component which targeted MDG-related research in agriculture, renewable and sustainable energy and water and sanitation. There will be a €7 million call in 2012 and the overall programme is expected to evolve into a durable pan-African research framework programme. Another ACP capacity-building initiative, the 10th EDF ACP Science and Technology programme, was expected to lead to a €23 million call for proposals in the first half of 2012, targeting MDG-related agriculture and food security and energy access and efficiency. At the same time, satellite technology, which has a vital role in enhancing crop/fisheries management, controlling the spread of poverty diseases and responding to environmental challenges, was given a boost with the adoption of the €37 million monitoring for environment and security in Africa earth observation programme.

41 http://extensionconference2011.cta.int/ 42 http://brusselsbriefings.net/

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On sustainable fisheries, the ACP FISH II Programme is a 4-year programme financed by the EDF which aims to improve fisheries management in ACP countries so as to ensure that the fisheries resources belonging to these countries are exploited in a sustainable manner. Turning to water, the 10th EDF ACP-EU water facility (€212 million) approved proposals to support water governance, resources management and sustainable development of water infrastructure, with further projects to target increased access to sanitation in urban and peri-urban areas. A pool funding mechanism was also launched. The energy facility concentrates on improved access to energy services, energy management and governance, while focusing on renewable energies and efficiency. The first energy facility (€220 million) funded 71 activities in rural and peri–urban areas of the ACP region. These projects are now either entering their final phase of implementation, or were closed in 2011. A mid-term evaluation was undertaken and confirmed the added value of the energy facility and its positive impact on people. In 2009, a second energy facility was granted €200 million with the aim of combating poverty through provision of energy services. A first call for proposals (€100 million) led to the selection of 66 projects which started up in 2011. An innovative blending instrument – a pooling mechanism – has also been launched by the Commission under the energy facility with a €40 million sum made available. Other donors (development banks, national agencies, IFIs) are expected to pledge resources. This new mechanism was conceived as a flexible tool to enhance private sector participation, maximise the impact of the energy facility grants and to better coordinate at EU level available resources and expertise in the sector. An initial project to foster access to modern energy services in West Nile rural Uganda has been submitted by the KFW bank group. In the area of environment and space applications, within the framework of the African Monitoring of Environment for Sustainable Development programme (AMESD), the Commission has developed a data-processing platform, named 'eStation', to streamline environmental information provision from satellites to support policy formulation and implementation. The system has been installed in all Sub-Saharan countries.

3 Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs)

Introduction In accordance with part four of the EU Treaty, the OCTs are closely associated with the EU. The purpose of this association "shall be to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole". In 2009, the Commission published a communication43

suggesting more focused cooperation, concentrating on issues of mutual interest and narrowing the scope of co-operation accordingly. Three central objectives have been identified: to enhance the competitiveness of the OCTs, to strengthen their resilience and reduce their vulnerability and to promote cooperation between OCTs and their regional, European and international partners. The

43 COM(2009)623 final, 06.11.2009

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communication is guiding further work on replacing the current overseas association decision when it expires in 2013. Issues covered include: regional integration, the principal challenges and the opportunities of each OCT, identification of their potential, their level of competitiveness, and possible adaptation of the rules of origin, and possible financing mechanisms. All of these were examined in the impact assessment exercise the Commission carried out in 2011. An impact assessment was also carried out on the renewal of the Council decision on relations between the EU, Greenland and Denmark.44. In 2011, the Commission adopted its proposals for the 2014-2020 for the OCTs which foresee €217.8 million under the general budget for the partnership with Greenland and €343.4 million under the 11th EDF for the other OCTs45. During 2011, the Commission held several meetings with the OCTs and their related Member States and pursued political dialogue on the modernisation of the association. At the annual OCT-EU forum in March 2011, the OCTs and the four EU Member States concerned addressed a jointly-prepared paper to the Commission on the future of the association of OCTs with the EU. The Commission also undertook a series of technical initiatives in preparing its legislative proposals to revise the overseas association decision. Furthermore, the Commission organised six tri-lateral meetings with OCTs and the Member States and three partnership working parties on trade, environmental issues and on the future of EU-OCT relations.

Implementation and results Atlantic and/or isolated OCTs During 2011, EU cooperation with Greenland continued to support the education sector with disbursement of €27.2 million and a new commitment of €28.4 million. It has helped to increase student intake in post-elementary education and provide vocational training for unskilled workers and support for the government's education sector reforms. For the other Atlantic OCTs – St. Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, and the Falkland Islands – implementation of budget support programmes began in 2011 with the completion and approval of the programming documents and the subsequent financing agreements for St. Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha. In Saint Pierre et Miquelon, the programme aims at enhancing the economic development of the territory and promoting the diversification of its economy through general budget support totalling €20.7 million. The Commission is proposing to continue its support to transport infrastructure in Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha with a total of of €16.6 million. The programming process in the Falkland Islands is expected to be completed during 2012. Pacific & Indian Ocean OCTs

44 COM(2011)846 final, 07.12.2011 45 COM(2011)837 final, 07.12.2011 and COM(2011)846 final, 07.12.2011

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In 2011, the Commission completed the programming process for New Caledonia with the approval and signature of the programming document which foresees sector budget support of €19.8 million for vocational training. In other OCTs of the Pacific, the Commission worked on the completion of its programming document in Wallis and Fortuna where it intends to launch projects to support capacity building and transport infrastructure (€16.5 million). In French Polynesia, the finalisation of the Commission’s programming document is on course with a view to mounting projects in the areas of capacity building and, water and sanitation (€19.8). The Commission pursued discussions with Pitcairn and the EU Delegation in Fiji to finalise the 10th EDF package for the territory (€2.4 million). Concerning Mayotte, the Commission continued discussions with the territorial authorities and the EU Delegation in Mauritius over the foreseen budget support under the 10th EDF (€22.9 million). In 2011, the Commission also approved two financing decisions of €2 million and €1.1 million respectively for French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna for reconstruction of infrastructure following the damages caused by the Cyclones Oli and Tomas, financed out of the ‘B’ envelope. Caribbean OCTs In the former Netherlands Antilles (Curacao, St. Maarten, Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba), the Commission worked on finalising the 10th EDF programming document which foresees support for infrastructure: urban infrastructures for socially deprived areas of Curacao and Saba, improvements to sewerage in St. Maarten and Bonaire and port development in St. Eustatius totalling €24 million. The Commission completed in 2011 its programming document for Aruba which earmarks funds for education (€8.9 million). The 10th EDF’s resources for Turks and Caicos (€11.8 million) will be used for infrastructure and macro-economic reforms, as well as post-disaster rehabilitation. The 10th EDF allocation for Anguilla (€11.7 million) will help implement the government’s medium-term economic strategy 2010-2014 (MTES) via general budget support. The 10th EDF allocation to Montserrat (€15.7 million) will support the territory’s sustainable development plan (SDP) and the sustainability roadmap through general budget support. Regional Programme Approval was given in 2011 for the programming document which sets out the regional cooperation strategy with the OCTs under the 10th EDF (€40 million).

4 Latin America & the Caribbean

4.1 Latin America

4.1.1 Introduction Progress was made throughout 2011 in implementing the outcomes of the EU-LAC Madrid summit, held in May 2010. Work continued on negotiating comprehensive agreements, the first ever region-to-region Association Agreement was concluded with Central America, and a multi-party trade agreement was initiated with two of the Andean American countries, Colombia and Peru.

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In 2011, four rounds of negotiations on the EU-MERCOSUR association agreement took place in Brussels, Asuncion and Montevideo. Considerable progress was achieved during negotiations on all chapters of the normative part of the agreement. A timetable for negotiations in the first six months of 2012 was agreed upon. The EU-LAC Foundation’s headquarters in Hamburg, Germany, were inaugurated in November. Benita Ferrero-Waldner was appointed as its president and former Peruvian Ambassador to the EU, Jorge Valdezas its executive director. It was expected to begin work in 2012. The Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF) continued its successful implementation. Two operational boards were organised in 2011, giving approval to three projects and provisional approval to one. The second LAIF forum was organised in El Salvador to further promote the initiative and draw attention to its opportunities. The implementation of the Madrid Action Plan has also seen considerable progress. Preparations for the forthcoming EU-LAC Summit – due to take place in Santiago de Chile in January 2013 – are underway. The summit’s main theme, “An alliance for sustainable development: promoting investments of social and environmental quality” seems particularly relevant to the EU-LAC Partnership. Three EU-LAC senior officials meetings have taken place in the run up to the summit. A number of specific preparatory events to be co-financed by the EU have been identified, notably on ICT, investment-related issues and civil society. The EU-LAC structured dialogue on migration continued. The Fifth high level meeting on migration took place in May in Brussels and covered issues related to regular migration and integration. The thirteenth High Level meeting of the EU-LAC Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs was held in June in Bogota, Colombia. Several meetings of the subsidiary technical committee took place in Brussels between May and November. The sixth High Level Meeting on migration will take place in 2012 and will be devoted to migration and economic growth. Security continued to be one of the main priorities on the EU agenda with the LAC region. The EU took part in the international conference on Central American security issues, held in Guatemala City in June. A new Central America regional strategy on security was adopted with EU follow-up through the Group of Friends mechanism bringing together all donors active in the sector. The EU will support some pillars of this regional strategy through its regional cooperation with Central America. Dialogues on security have been launched with both Central America (in February) and Mexico (in July). The fifth EU-Brazil Summit took place in Brussels in October, confirming the buoyant state of the relationship and the willingness on both sides to further strengthen the strategic partnership. It was the first EU-Brazil summit co-chaired by President Rousseff. Leaders highlighted the cultural and historical proximity of both parties, but above all, the proximity of values which enable the two sides to work more effectively together both bilaterally and in the multilateral context. Letters of intent were signed on cooperation between the Commission and Brazil in the fields of space, tourism, and science. In the context of existing contractual frameworks with individual Latin American countries, association councils took place with Chile and joint committees with Central America, Brazil

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and Mexico. Political consultations were held with privileged partners including the United States, Canada and Russia. In addition to a discussion on overall policy towards the LAC region, the meetings discussed important issues such as security, trade and investment and regional integration, as well as – where appropriate – specific country-related matters. Bilateral and regional projects and programmes totalling €351 million were financed for Latin America in 2011 out of the DCI.

4.1.2 Aid effectiveness and donor coordination The widely varying levels of dependency on Official Development Aid (ODA) in Latin America reflect the different degrees of development of the continent’s nations. In a few countries (Nicaragua, Honduras, Bolivia), ODA is higher than 4% of GNI and for others (Colombia, Peru, Uruguay), it is less than 0.5%46. However, due to sustained economic development and the reduction of international cooperation flows, the overall trend is towards a reduction. Increased commitment towards aid effectiveness has been observed with an increased number of countries (14) having adhered to the Paris Declaration and its monitoring. Latin American countries are also strongly represented in various international instances of the aid effectiveness agenda. In April 2011, a regional workshop on division of labour was hosted by the ministry of planning and external cooperation of Honduras, in Tegucigalpa, notably in view of the EU’s fast-track initiative on division of labour. During the workshop development partners insisted on the importance of increasing the authority of their respective country offices and recommended that partner countries increase their mid-term planning and strategically manage international cooperation. Some of the emerging economies in the region are not only aid recipients but increasingly becoming aid providers. However, their specific situation – a high level of inequality in the distribution of revenues and social exclusion – should be better taken into account in any decisions to reduce aid. In addition, the potential of South-South and triangular cooperation is highlighted. A number of partners in Latin America, namely Brazil, Mexico and Chile, are specifically interested in triangular cooperation with the EU. EU Delegations continued their pro-active role in promoting overall aid effectiveness agenda and fostering policy dialogue with partner governments through regular participation in donors/governments/civil society platforms and support to partner governments' own coordination initiatives. Aid effectiveness continues to improve across the region. In Ecuador, the EU Delegation was the donor focal point for the 2011 OECD-DAC survey on the implementation of the Paris declaration. In Colombia, a joint mission of the EU heads of cooperation on the very important issue of land restitution was carried out in the Chocó department in June 2011. Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain, Poland and France participated. Since most donors are launching new initiatives in the field, a second joint mission took place in November 2011 to gather at first-hand, experiences of land restitution and formalisation. Social cohesion programme in El Salvador – ‘Comunidades Solidarias’

46 http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/en/countries/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/644.html

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The newly-launched (€47.4 million) social support programme, “Programa de Apoyo a Comunidades Solidarias en El Salvador (PACSES)” follows on from a previous EU-funded budget support programme, “Poverty Alleviation Programme in El Salvador (PAPES)”. The programme was drawn up in close cooperation with international cooperation agencies (AECID and Lux-Development), who agreed a common matrix of objectives and indicators. It is the first programme of its kind both in the country and Central America and could be replicated elsewhere. In addition to the Commission, Spain and Luxembourg, it is also supported by KfW, the WB, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), USAID, Italian Cooperation and JICA.

4.1.3 Working towards the MDGs

Progress on reaching the MDGs over the last year has taken place in the context of a global economic crisis which could jeopardise improvements already made. Previous scenarios have anticipated that if 1990-2008 trends were maintained, poverty would halve in Latin America by 2015. However, in the current situation, it is reasonable to expect that the economic crisis will have a significant impact on poverty levels in the region, known as one of the most inequitable in the world with an imbalance between economic growth and poverty reduction. Most of the region’s countries are experiencing difficulties in maintaining current levels of public spending and in responding to emerging needs either directly or through social protection mechanisms, in order to cushion the negative effects of the financial crisis.

Latin America met the MDG47 related to hunger reduction. However, malnutrition is a significant problem in a number of countries, putting at risk the achievement of MDGs 1 and 4.

Supporting Peru in tackling malnutrition The EU has contributed €60.8 million for the implementation in Peru of the “Programa Articulado Nutricional” (PAN) following a constructive and open dialogue with the government. PAN aims to reduce chronic malnutrition and fight poverty. Since its launch, the programme has brought about positive changes: between 2007 and 2010, chronic malnutrition in children under five years of age has been reduced from 25.4% to 17.9% with a higher rate persisting in rural populations (-5.6%) than in urban areas (-1.7%). While the average rate of malnutrition in Latin America is around 16%, there is a high rate of chronic malnutrition in Peru among the under-fives, varying from 25% at national level to 47% in areas of extreme poverty. Its causes are a shortage of quality food and poor feeding practices, combined with inadequate sanitation and living conditions.

This region is also on track to meet the child survival and gender equality targets. However, progress has not been as outstanding in other areas including environmental sustainability, education, health, and poverty reduction. Paraguay: poverty reduction Poverty rose in Paraguay between 2005 and 2006 by more than five percentage points and then declined steadily in 2009 when 35% of the total population was considered to be living

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in poverty. While the incidence rate of total poverty fell by about three percentage points (from 38% in 2008 to 35% in 2009), extreme poverty remained at 18.8%. One of the reasons for the high levels is the unequal distribution of income among the population. In the framework of the MDGs, the Commission provided €31 million for a social development public policy support programme whose main aim is to contribute to reducing poverty and inequality among the Paraguayan population. The programme has strengthened dialogue and the co-operation between public entities resulting in improved social protection. Furthermore, a social equity fund (FES) has been implemented. Technical assistance was given to develop a solid national social development plan. Unequal access to quality health services is a major obstacle in Latin America to overall health improvements, as well as economic and social development. This is reflected across health indicators, but especially those for maternal and child health, which have been slow to improve among poor, rural, or otherwise marginalised groups. Trends in fertility and contraceptive prevalence rates for the region overall are positive, but large pockets of unmet needs exist for family planning and reproductive health services. 4.1.4 Implementation and results Bilateral co-operation To strengthen social cohesion and promote reconciliation, the EU is financing (€2 million) a “Place of Memory” in Peru, which aims to offer all Peruvians a space for reflection on the causes and consequences of the period of Peru's internal armed conflict (1980-2000) and encourage peace and reconciliation. In Colombia, a crucial law on victims' reparation and land restitution was approved in June 2011. The EU is contributing to this key process through the financing of a project (€3 million) which supports the implementation of the land and rural development policy at local level. In Uruguay, a €5 million project was launched to back the reform of the penal and penitentiary justice systems and improve respect for human rights in national detention centres. In Paraguay, a €31 million programme to improve the economic inclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable in the population was approved. In 2011, a major poverty reduction programme was approved for Honduras. The 'water and quality sectoral budget support programme – PAPSAC' (€42.1 million) seeks to improve provision of basic water and sanitation services which are key to developing and improving the living conditions of the poor, in particular in rural areas. It also aims to enhance the quality of agri-food products, thereby increasing the country's capacity to access external markets and generating more revenue for producers. Support for these two sectors will contribute to the achievement of MDGs 1 (1B: job creation) and 7 (7C: improved water and sanitation coverage). 2011 also saw the approval of another highly relevant programme for Honduras in the area of human rights. Its aim is to put in place a public policy and action plan in the area of justice and human rights in conformity with international standards and strengthen key institutions involved in the promotion and protection of human rights. At the same time, it aims to develop mechanisms for co-ordination and exchange of information between public institutions, civil society and donors and harness synergies between them for appropriate monitoring of human rights in Honduras and the implementation of national and international recommendations. The goal of improvements in respect for human rights, and in the security and justice sector as a whole, remained at the top of the EU agenda in other countries of Central America too. The €13 million "Programade Seguridad Ciudadana”

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(PROSEC) was approved for Costa Rica to support the national security strategy and contribute to the country's public security reform. In Guatemala, the EU confirmed its continuous appreciation of the work of the international commission against impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and approved an additional €4 million for its extended mandate until September 2013. The democratic processes in El Salvador also received EU financial support in 2011: a project aimed at strengthening citizens' participation and the country’s electoral institutions was approved and contributed to 'residential voting'. Another programme, “Comunidades Solidarias”, is improving the social conditions of the poorest (see insert). In Nicaragua, a €32 million project which aims to improve learning conditions in primary and secondary education was launched, while a €5.2 million was committed to enhance Argentina’s participation in the Erasmus Mundus Programme. The first EU-Brazil meeting of political dialogue on education took place in November, and aims to improve international academic mobility, the development of transparency tools and cooperation projects. A high-level seminar is planned for early 2013. Sectoral policy dialogue is underway with Mexico in the field of higher education and culture. A comparative joint study on the internationalisation of higher education was launched in December and will be completed in autumn 2012. A call for proposals focussing on culture was launched in 2011, and specifically on Mexico. EU development funds for Mexico saw some serious cuts in 2011. Two projects have been withdrawn from the programming period 2007-2013, namely support to higher education (€4.95 million) and to the sustainable economy and competitiveness (€8.25 million). The remaining €11 million will focus on enabling cooperation in the key priority area of social cohesion. Promoting human rights in Mexico The EU-Mexico human rights project (EU contribution €350 000) ended in 2011 having supported different initiatives at federal level such as: legislative reform on the use of force in Quintana Roo and Campeche; legislative reform and public policies regarding the indigenous interpreters in Yucatan; the drafting of a proposal of the National Registry of Complaints against torture and the drawing up of protocols with regard to gender violence in Campeche. A €7.5 million programme was approved for the private sector in Argentina to encourage local economic development. Following the conclusion of negotiations leading to the trade agreement between Colombia and the EU in May 2010, in the margins of the EU-LAC summit in Madrid, a joint declaration was signed providing EU support of up to €30 million over seven years for the Colombian dairy sector. In this context, a programme to support the diary sector (€8.6 million) was approved in 2011. In Bolivia, a €35 million programme was adopted for increasing financial inclusion and setting up appropriate fiscal and financial instruments, particularly for small business. In the Central American region (CA), two projects were approved: one to support Central American economic integration and the implementation of the EU-CA Association Agreement (€10 million), and another (€20 million) to contribute to socio-economic development in the Gulf of Fonseca, a region of high socio-economic interest and known for its vulnerable borders shared between Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.

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In line with its commitments in the area of environment and climate change, the Commission adopted a €7 million programme to apply adaptation measures to combat the effects of climate change in the Andean Community, a particularly vulnerable region. In Nicaragua, €8 million were assigned to a project aimed at fostering the sustainable development of the wood value chain. Budget support financed programmes represent almost 75% of bi-lateral co-operation in Latin American. During 2011, seven new budget support financed operations were approved with an overall value of €178.5 million. All budget support operations in Latin-America concern sectoral policies. Budget support financed programmes in Nicaragua are still suspended following a decision by the Commission and other EU donors in January 2009 in the wake of the municipal elections of November 2008 which were deemed to be flawed. ALFA III: "Kick Start - Key Initiatives in the Commercialisation of Knowledge – Ways to teach innovation" The KICKSTART (www.alfa-kickstart.org) project is creating a network of academic entrepreneurship and knowledge transfer to spur innovation. Innovation has become a key to policy-making at all levels, not only within governmental and inter-governmental bodies but also within companies and public institutions such as universities. The new project aims to strengthen and expand the network. With the involvement of local stakeholders, three one-year innovation support programmes are being set up in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, as well as the designing of an international master’s programme in innovation. The consortium running the programme is also producing books and tools, a web portal and a series of conferences under the theme “Innovation Support in Latin America and Europe. What has been achieved?” The programme’s results so far: 90 innovation projects have been generated; a total of 600 researchers participated in related workshops; 75 trainers have been trained in how to teach innovation; three pilot centres have been established in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia with a total of 450 participants; an innovation market place was organised in Scotland with over 150 participants from Europe and Latin America and an innovation awards programme for Latin America has been successfully launched. URBAL III –“Fronteras Turísticas” Located in the Andean border region, “Fronteras Turísticas” (EU contribution – €1.9 million) is a tourism promotion programme between sub-national governments in northern Argentina, Central and Southern Bolivia and southern Peru, co-ordinated by the province of Frosinone, Italy. It is improving regional competitiveness in the tourism sector, by fostering heritage tourism and cultural identity. By integrating Hispanic and colonial routes and creating the Aymara ethno-ecotourism tourist corridor, the destination now has a strong identity. The programme has also built Latin American and European partnerships leading to agreements between travel agencies and the promotion of more than 100 tourist sites. It has further trained 250 young local people as tourist guides and 60 technicians from local government administrations in inter-regional tourism development and has set up eight IT centres to promote the area. A dedicated marketing website and funds to enable participation in at least three tourism fairs in both Latin America and Europe are helping to market the brand.

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AL-Invest IV: ‘The "Jeweller from Lambayeque’ receives presidential prize Assistance from the EU’s AL-Invest programme has helped Peruvian jewellery maker, Ignacio Puicón, to become competitive and go global. Such achievements for his company, ‘MCP Joyería’, seemed out of the question only a few months ago when his sales were limited to the local market. Participation in AL-Invest – along with Ignacio’s creativity and entrepreneurial spirit and – has played a part in his success by enabling training in design business management and export procedures. By participating in an international jewellery business group (nucleo empresarial) and international fairs, Ignacio developed a collection which is now sold in Sweden and Ecuador. In 2011, his company received the Prize of the President of the Republic of Peru for the best SME in the crafts category.

Several regional projects for Latin America continued in 2011. They include: the cooperation programme of high level scholarships for Latin American students and young professionals (Alßan) and ALFA III, a cooperation programme between the EU and Latin America on higher education. AL-INVEST IV continued to promote Latin American SMEs in the global market and @LIS 2 (alliance for information society) pushed ahead with Latin America’s integration into the global information society. EURO-SOLAR is assisting rural communities without electricity in eight countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru) and is providing access to renewable electric energy. Other ongoing programmes are Erasmus Mundus which is promoting exchanges between European and Latin American higher education institutions, COPOLAD, a programme on anti-drugs policies and EUROCLIMA, a successful EU-LA programme on climate change, as well as a €3 million project on migration focused on improving data collection on migration flows, strengthening migration institutional structures and policies and promoting alternatives for the use of remittances.

EUROCLIMA programme: Soil Action

Soil degradation can lead to massive release of greenhouse gases. The new ‘Soil Atlas of Latin America’, developed under the EUROCLIMA programme, helps an understanding of the soil degradation processes, by updating the cartographic information of Latin American soils. It also contributes to assessing the impact and potential of soils in climate change mitigation and consequently improves food security. The network of soil scientists is helping to strengthen scientific cooperation among Latin American and European soil scientists. The overriding aim of EUROCLIMA is to increase knowledge about climate change problems and their consequences in Latin America. Through cooperation with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), EUROCLIMA is playing a crucial role in helping the Latin American scientific community and decision-makers boost and exchange knowledge on climate change with a view to integrating the science in development policies and sectoral strategies.

EUROSOCIAL: Promotion of fiscal education in El Salvador The need to provide the state with necessary resources to ensure a sustainable and inclusive development of the society is a major challenge in Latin America. The regional programme for social cohesion in Latin America, EUROSOCIAL is promoting

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efficient and fair fiscal policy and supports Latin American governments in their efforts to transfer economic prosperity to the whole of society. Under EUROSOCIAL, El Salvador’s ministries of finance and education, in collaboration with the federal administration of public revenue of Argentina, have implemented a programme for fiscal education in El Salvador. It is aimed at increasing fiscal culture within the population through the introduction of fiscal education in the official primary and secondary curricula. In 2011, the programme was awarded the prize of the President of the Republic for best quality in practice. On the basis of the programme, the government has introduced a policy to cultivate fiscal awareness in El Salvadorians and make them responsible citizens, conscious of their rights and obligations. The programme has fast become a reference in the region.

The FLEGT South America project aims to create an enabling environment and increase South America’s capacity to develop initiatives to reduce illegal logging and bring the timber trade in line with EU FLEGT objectives. There is a particular focus on exports to the EU from Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In 2011, new phases of the Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF) and Erasmus Mundus Action 2, strand 1 programmes were also launched for Latin America countries.

In the field of research and innovation, some 244 contracts have been signed with Latin America and 15 with the Caribbean since 2007, with EU contributions of €66 million and €2.7 million respectively. Under the EU-LAC joint initiative for research and innovation, a regular science, technology and innovation dialogue has been established with the first senior officials meeting taking place in March 2011. It adopted a roadmap and set up four thematic working groups to implement the initiative and encourage joint cooperation.

4.1.5 Monitoring In 2011, 21 ROM missions (18 country missions and 3 Regional programmes missions) examined projects in all 18 countries in the Region. A total of 173 ongoing projects were monitored including bilateral, regional, sub-regional projects and sector policy support programmes (SPSP). Two SPSP were monitored: in Honduras and in Paraguay. The total value of ongoing projects monitored amounts to €546 million, which represents 34% of the overall value of ongoing projects in the Region. In addition, a total of 43 completed projects were monitored ex-post with a total value of €262.5 million. As the table shows, 78% of projects in Latin America are performing well or very well (categories I and II), while 17% have some problems and 5% experience major difficulties (categories III and IV). The percentage of projects doing well or very well has increased from 76% in 2008 to 78% in 2011, though lowering from 85% (2010). The number of projects facing difficulties fell from 24% in 2008 to 22% in 2011 though increasing from 15% to 22% with reference to 2010. Table 5: Latin America – performance of ongoing projects (bilateral and Regional)

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Performance of Ongoing Projects (national and regional)

2% 1% 1% 1%

74%

82% 84%77%

17%

5%

21%15% 13%

3% 2% 2%0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2008 2009 2010 2011

Category I

Category II

Category III

Category IV

Table 6: Latin America – 2011 Project performance per ODA sector

12.5%

0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

75.0%

85.2%

70.4%75.0%

66.7%

12.5%

5.6%

25.9%20.0%

30.3%

0.0%

9.3%5.0% 3.0%3.7%

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

110 - Education 150 - Governmentand Civil Society

160 - Other SocialInfrastructure and

Services

Production sectors Multisector -Crosscutting


Good performance


Not performing, major difficulties

Ongoing projects monitored in 2011 in Latin America show that 80% have been positively assessed for relevance, impact and sustainability. However, concerning efficiency and effectiveness, the performance level reached 62%. Amongst the reasons for lower performance levels with regard to efficiency and effectiveness are delays in the formulation and implementation of the programme-estimates, relevance (sometimes obsolete because of changes of Government priorities) and project design not revised, insufficiently focused and occasionally over-ambitious.

4.1.6 Outlook In line with the Commission Communication “Increasing the impact of EU development policy: an agenda for change”48, future EU development aid spending will target countries

48 COM(2011) 637, 13.10.2011

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that are in greater need of external support and where it can really make a difference, including fragile states. Future aid should be allocated to better address different needs, capacities, commitments and performance of partner countries. Differentiation will affect cooperation with some Latin America countries in the next programming period starting 2014. This means that bilateral cooperation will take different paths. Innovative ways of financing development – like blending of grants and loans – will be further explored. Following the mid-term review (2010), 2011-2013 programming for the region will lead to new bilateral cooperation initiatives which will be approved up to the end of 2013 with implementation until 2017/2018. As for regional programmes for Latin America (LA), implementation will progress in line with the regional programming documents. Regional EU-LA programmes continue to enable LA countries to benefit from cooperation between themselves, as well as from the European experience in a wide range of areas, such as higher education, enterprise networks, green energy, social policy, migration and security, and development. EU efforts to improve aid effectiveness will be further enhanced. Closer cooperation with EU Member States and other donors will be pursued as well as promotion of dialogue for policy development and consolidation, and ownership by partner countries. Calls to tackle the region’s growing problems are anticipated: security (including citizen's security), good governance, climate change, energy and social protection.

4.2 Caribbean

4.2.1 Introduction Relations with the Caribbean region during 2011 centred on follow-up to the significant number of initiatives launched in 2010. Pursuing and strengthening political dialogue with the region remains a priority and a political dialogue between the EU and the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific states (CARIFORUM) is expected to take place in 2012. A final draft of the EU-Caribbean joint strategy, under discussion at the EU-CARIFORUM Summit in 2010, was prepared and is expected to be agreed during 2012. In the areas of trade and cooperation, the implementation of the EPA gained pace with the organisation of the trade and development committee, the establishment of EPA implementations units, and a consultation with EU Member States over optimising the EPA’s impact. The kick-off of the regional MTR process confirmed the relevance of maintaining the focal sector of regional integration, and documented that the Caribbean region is in the lead amongst ACP regions in terms of commitment rates under the 10th EDF regional envelope. Finally, the long-awaited Caribbean infrastructure trust fund was approved by the EDF committee in the form of a Caribbean investment facility and will begin in 2012. The sixth EU-Cuba political dialogue took place on 23 February 2011 in Brussels. Human rights issues were raised, as well as issues on the international agenda, notably climate change. The reflection launched by the foreign affairs council of 25 October on the future of EU-Cuba relations continued. In 2011, the EU continued to provide crucial humanitarian aid and cooperation assistance to support Haiti's reconstruction. The appointment of Prime Minister Garry Conille and the establishment of a new cabinet in the third quarter of 2011 allowed renewed bilateral EU-Haiti political dialogue. In the area of human rights, the EU has

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provided a significant contribution to the preparation of Haiti's first universal periodic review under the UN HRC.

4.2.2 Aid effectiveness and donor co-ordination

The Commission remains committed to strengthening donor coordination in the region. Information sharing takes place on a regular basis. Budget support and public finance management continue to be important areas of cooperation. The Commission sits on the steering committee of the Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre (CARTAC) and works closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), DfID and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) on those issues that provide support on macro-economic and public finance management issues. Close working relations with the World Bank and UNDP are maintained on sub-regional social protection reform and with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) on agriculture. Co-ordination is becoming increasingly important in the context of the coordination and cooperation mechanism on drugs between the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean.

In addition, at local level, EU Delegations participate and/or lead donor coordination mechanisms with locally present EU Member States and other donors. At regional level, the Commission continues to stimulate the Caribbean forum of ACP States to enhance donor co-ordination activities. Funds are available for this purpose under the 9th EDF (Caribbean integration support programme). In this context, the secretariat of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) organised comprehensive donor co-ordination meetings in July and in November 2011. The setting up of a number of working groups on donor co-ordination was announced with a view to examining how to further promote donor interaction. The Caribbean–EU EPA trade and development committee meeting of June 2011 discussed development cooperation with Caribbean and EU Member States. The newly-adopted EPA support programme foresees that the Caribbean forum of ACP States will set up a specific donor co-ordination mechanism involving other development partners.

4.2.3 Working towards the MDGs The lack of adequate data and information systems in the region hampers an assessment of MDG achievement, but evidence points to Caribbean countries making fairly good progress on most of the goals. However, this has been unequal and heterogeneous, and on some objectives, there has not been enough progress. The EU supports the Caribbean countries’ efforts to combat poverty through a number of interventions addressing comprehensive strategies to address the challenge of poverty alleviation and income distribution. Information reported in Jamaica’s latest national report on the MDGs (2009) suggests that the country has achieved target 1.A (eradicate extreme poverty), while the latest report on the MDGs produced by the government of the Republic of Suriname shows that between 2000 and 2008 extreme poverty increased. The region may not reach MDG2 addressing universal primary education – even if net enrolment rates of over 90% are reported – due to a marginal increase in the last 10 years. Greater efforts are also needed to improve the quality of education and the completion rates of both girls and boys. The high maternal and neo-natal mortality rates of a number of Caribbean countries reveals the weaknesses and rather deficient performance of national health systems and the urgent need of investing in its main pillars including accessibility and the strengthening of both the quantity and the competence of the human resources working in the health sector.

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General budget support helping the Dominican Republic attain the MDGs Sustained economic growth over the last 30 years has contributed to the welfare of most Dominicans and accelerated poverty reduction. Nevertheless, the Dominican Republic experiences unequal and unjust social distribution of the benefits of growth. The EU supports with €60.7 million the implementation of the government’s sustainable development investment strategy, providing financial and policy incentives to promote poverty eradication and help realise the MDGs. It has meant that the EU has engaged in substantive policy dialogue with the government in building a national development strategy. For the first time, a large consultation process on the main vectors of future growth and social development has taken place. The process culminated in the adoption by the Dominican Republic’s government in 2011, of a long-term national development strategy, with medium-term detailed implementation modalities. The 2012 national budget has been prepared, and approved on this basis. The Dominican Republic now has a shared country vision. In recent years, there has been a slight decline in new HIV infections in the region where about 240 000 individuals are estimated to be infected. Nevertheless, outside Africa, the Caribbean region has the highest HIV prevalence in the world with an average prevalence rate of one per cent for adults aged 15 to 49. The HIV burden varies considerably between and within countries. Cuba, for example, has a very low HIV prevalence of 0.1%, while the Bahamas has the highest HIV adult prevalence in the region, at 3.1%. Progress on MDG 7 is mixed. The region is on track for access to water, but quality should be improved. Although the total area covered by protected areas has grown steadily over the last decade, there are still signs of a loss of biodiversity.

4.2.4 Implementation and results

Bilateral cooperation

In 2011, an amount of €194 million was committed to the Caribbean region from the various cooperation instruments managed by the Commission. Five annual action programmes were approved under the 10th EDF, totalling €29 million. Nine other financial decisions were adopted totalling €106 million. Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago benefited from sugar accompanying measures financed under the EU budget to increase the competitiveness of their sugar industries following the reform of the EU sugar market. In 2011, these countries received €56 million in commitments. In addition, one programme was financed from the thematic programme for the global climate change alliance for an amount of €3 million. Although generally speaking, budget support is a very important implementation modality in the region, in 2011 only 31% of all approved programmes were implemented in this way.

Payments totalled €319.8 million in 2011 for Caribbean countries and the OCTs. With regard to the EDF, disbursements reached €210.3 million. Moreover, the Caribbean received significant support under the special framework of assistance for traditional ACP suppliers of bananas: €17.5 million were paid in 2011. These funds are contributing to the diversification of the local economies and assisting the seven beneficiary countries (Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname) to cope with the effects of changes in the banana market. A €72.8 million sum was disbursed for accompanying measures for sugar protocol countries. Further, a total of €19.2 million was spent under other instruments, such as on the thematic programmes, including food security.

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A new source of income for Dominica – the Waitukubuli National Trail The upgrade of the 184 km long Waitukubuli national hiking trail aims offset the loss of income caused by the banana industry’s collapse. Connecting the south of the island with the north, it has considerable potential to become a worldwide attraction for hikers and nature lovers. Dating back to the 1720s, it is of both historical and cultural interest and passes through a variety of beautiful landscapes with diverse fauna and flora. Opened in 2011, it is expected to attract some 10 000-12 000 visitors per year, generating profitable opportunities both for the private and public sectors whilst laying the path of economic diversification.

In 2011, the budget support modality proved to be a challenging instrument because of difficulties to maintain sound macro-economic policies (Jamaica) or to implement robust national development strategies and sector strategies (Guyana and Barbados). A lack of firm ownership of reform processes have had a negative impact on progress in some sector reform programmes. This has slowed down disbursements and a number of new programmes planned for 2011 had to be postponed until 2012. On the small islands, limited administrative capacities to deal with the complex monitoring mechanisms that should be put in place in order to track performance progress in the supported sectors, is the main constraint. In addition, the requirement to show progress on an annual basis in public finance management systems, remained challenging in MICs where systems are frequently more advanced than in lower income countries. In such situations, the reform requirements in public finance management can be less visible and may need more time to implement.

For the Caribbean region, out of four budget operations approved, two have been financed under the EDF totalling €34 million, and two under the sugar accompanying measures budget line (€56 million). Out of the four operations approved, two supported sectoral policies and there were two general support programmes for Jamaica and Haiti respectively.

Renewed cooperation with Cuba producing results first

Since resuming cooperation with Cuba in October 2008, the first significant batch of monitoring reports became available in 2011. Very good results were reported, with all monitored projects found on the whole to be performing well. Although it is too early to measure any real impact, substantial increases in production and productivity – doubling or tripling in many cases – of participating farmers and cooperatives are expected under the flagship project “PALMA”which is promoting food security (€16.1 million). The programme has provided capacity – building, tools and equipment to co-operatives and individual farmers – as well as asistance to municipalities for the de-centralisation of food security strategies. It has been selected by UNDP as one of two projects (out of 60 regional projects) to win an award under the “‘sharing knowledge for development”, a scheme which singles out initiatives with good, innovative and relevant practices of interest to other countries of the region. The $10 000 prize is given so that others can learn from a project’s good practices. The continuation of the PALMA project is foreseen under a new financing decision with the country’s NIP, 2011-2013.

Regional cooperation

The 10th EDF Caribbean regional programme, signed in November 2008, pays particular attention to deepening regional integration, to achieving maximum benefits from the EPA and to mitigating potential adverse effects of the resulting adjustment process. In 2011, the Commission financed programmes totalling €81 million to support the establishment of the Caribbean single market and economy, the implementation of the Economic Union of the

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Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), as well as to assist CARIFORUM with implementation of the EPA. These instititional programmes complement the regional private sector development support programme decided in 2010. Another €16 million has been committed in 2011 under the regional programme to finance the bi-national programme Dominican Republic/Haiti.

4.2.5 Monitoring In 2011, eight ROM missions examined projects in 14 countries in the Caribbean region. 71 ROM reports were produced. A total of 58 ongoing projects were monitored including national and regional projects. Six sector policy support programme were monitored in Trinidad & Tobago, Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana and Dominican Republic. The total value of ongoing projects monitored amounts to €345.4 million, which represents 40% of the overall value of ongoing projects in the region. In addition, a total of seven completed projects were monitored ex-post with a total value of € 31 million. As the tables below show, in 2011, 65% of ongoing national projects in the Caribbean are performing well or very well, while 12% have some problems and 23% experience major difficulties. The percentage of projects doing well or very well has decreased from 73% in 2010 to 65% in 2011. The number of projects facing difficulties increased from 27% in 2010 to 35% in 2011. If we combine ongoing national and regional projects, overall percentage of projects performing well or very well has decreased from 74.6% in 2009, to 72.9% in 2010 and 61.5% in 2011. The difference between the 2010 and 2011 results are due to the introduction of a sample of new projects which performed less well in average, not to any deterioration of the same projects, since data show that performance of the limited sample of projects re-monitored remained stable. The degradation of the overall results is mainly linked to efficiency and effectiveness. The difference is greater for regional projects, although the sample is too small for a discussion beyond individual cases. Table 7: Caribbean – overall performance of National ongoing projects

0.0% 0.0% 2.3%

73.2% 72.6%

62.8%

23.2%

13.7% 11.6%

3.6%

13.7%

23.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

2009 2010 2011

Very good performance (I)

Good performance (II)

Performing with problems(III)

Not performing, majordifficulties (IV)

Table 8: Caribbean – 2011 National project performance per ODA sector

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Ongoing projects monitored in 2011, show that 82.7 % have scores of "very good" or "good" for relevance and quality of design. Regarding the impact criteria, 67.3 % of projects have been scored as "very good" impact or potential impact (i.e. contribution to improving the livelihood of the people and/or the overall environment in which they operate). However only 44.2 % scored "very good" and "good" for efficiency and respectively 48 % scored "good" for effectiveness. A particular attention will have to be given to the implementation of projects with lower scoring on efficiency and effectiveness.

4.2.6 Outlook

Under the accompanying measures for former sugar protocol countries, an amount of €120 million is scheduled to be committed in 2012. Barbados, Belize, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago are preparing annual action plans to this effect. The available funds will be used for sugar sector reform, macro-economic stability, employment and growth. In Trinidad and Tobago support will be provided for diversifying out of the sugar sector and into other economic sectors.

The main banana-exporting countries in the Caribbean – Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname – are benefitting from allocations under the banana accompanying measures programme. National adaptation strategies and annual action programmes will be prepared to strengthen the competitiveness of the banana sector, promote economic diversification and put in place social and environmental measures.

Implementation of budget support operations remains a challenge in the Caribbean and the policy dialogue with the authorities on macro-economic performance and sector policy results should be further deepened and strengthened. The Commission will continue using the public expenditure and financial accountability methodology (PEFA) tool to encourage weaknesses in public finance management to be addressed. Special attention will be paid to the definition of progress and result indicators that will be used to trigger disbursement, in particular for sector budget support in non-traditional sectors, such as private sector development and the promotion of trade.

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The bulk of the 10th EDF financial envelope for regional integration and EPA support measures has been committed. In 2012, close attention will be paid to the implementation of regional activities decided in previous years.

In 2012, the programming exercise for the period 2014-2020 will start, taking due account of the Commission’s communication “Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change” and in particular placing a stronger focus on human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance and inclusive and sustainable growth for human development as well as taking into account the concentration of EU activities in each country and increased volume and share of EU aid to the countries most in need and where the EU can have a real impact.

5 Asia, Central Asia & the Pacific

5.1 Asia

5.1.1 Introduction The EU has taken forward cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), building upon the EU-ASEAN plan of action to underpin the integration process and intensify political engagement in areas of mutual interest. It has also intensified relations with individual ASEAN countries, notably through the negotiation and implementation of bi-lateral partnership and co-operation agreements (PCAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs). Following up on EU-India security cooperation, a meeting on cyber security was held in Ispra, Italy, in October. The third EU-India forum on effective multilateralism took place, 27-28 September, in New Delhi. 2011 saw progress in human rights legislation in Pakistan. Nevertheless, the overall the situation remains worrisome. There has been further slippage in human rights and governance, against some notable positive developments, including the adoption of the new shelter regulation for women fleeing violent households. EU political dialogue with the country took a major step forward with the conclusion of negotiations for an EU-Pakistan five-year engagement plan in November 2011. The plan raises the level of existing political dialogue and sets out an approach for dialogues in a range of strategic areas for EU-Pakistan cooperation, including governance and human rights, security, trade, energy and migration among other subjects. The EU's Foreign Affaire Council (FAC) concluded in July 2011 that there is a need for EU-Pakistan relations to increasingly balance the interests and concerns of both partners. The council looked forward to the launch of a first EU-Pakistan strategic dialogue at the earliest possible time. This is expected to take place in April 2012. In Afghanistan, the transition process was launched in July, implying increased efforts, also on the civilian side, to implement the provisions of the London and Kabul conferences of 2010. In July 2011, the FAC also endorsed an Afghan-led peace process while emphasising the need for Afghanistan to address governance issues in the context of the transition process. In November, the FAC authorised, ahead of the international conference on Afghanistan, the opening of negotiations for a cooperation agreement on partnership and development with Afghanistan. At the international conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn on 5 December, participants re-affirmed their long-term commitment to Afghanistan beyond the end of the transition period in 2014. The FAC has also extended the EU’s police mission in Afghanistan until at least 2014 and following the 2 November conference on security and cooperation in

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the heart of Asia, encouraged countries of the region to open up trade, transit and investment possibilities for Afghanistan, and through Afghanistan. The EU will continue to provide practical assistance in fostering regional cooperation. 5.1.2 Aid effectiveness and donor coordination At the high level forum in Busan the emerging donors – China and India (together with Brazil) – signed up to a document defining common goals and shared principles of development partnership for the first time.

As part of the agreement, both aid recipient and donor Asian countries helped to set up a more inclusive global governance structure for effective development cooperation, thus marking an important shift from aid effectiveness to aid and development effectiveness. For donor coordination at country level, the EU will continue to support ownership around Asia and all EU Delegations will participate in national coordination mechanisms and working groups put in place by partner governments, for instance in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

There is an improved exchange of information and coordination within EU on both Afghanistan and Pakistan, enabling a common EU view to be expressed in dialogue with both governments and in donor fora. In Afghanistan, joint donor programmes are implemented through two multi-donor trust funds. In Pakistan, the EU is actively seeking structured donor coordination providing synergies and complementarities of activities in education, public finance management and human rights. Vietnam, which became a pilot country of the EU fast-track initiative for division of labour in 2007, is one of the most active countries showing strong ownership and commitment to the implementation of the Paris and Accra agendas. The EU is the lead facilitator, supported by France and Ireland. The government of Vietnam is outlining the country's new national aid architecture and the EU will co-chair with the Vietnamese ministry of planning and investment the 2012 aid effectiveness forum. In Nepal, there is progress in donor co-ordination along with political progress, but the long-awaited country development forum foreseen in 2011 was again postponed.

With regard to division of labour between EU donors, some progress was made in Bangladesh and Laos where prospects for EU joint programming after 2013 were confirmed at the end of 2011. A further joint programming is likely to occur in the future for Afghanistan.

As for collaboration with donors outside the EU, a good example of aid effectiveness is the joint education sector programme in Indonesia, undertaken together with Australia and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The EU has also advanced in applying Asia transfer agreements and delegated co-operation between Member States and the Commission. In Nepal, for instance, since 2010, the UK department for international development, DfID, has transferred funds to the Commission to support the education sector whilst DfID has itself received Commission funds to implement climate change initiatives in the country.

In Asia, EU development assistance is increasingly using country systems in a move from project to sector policy support programmes. Thus, projects and programmes are being gradually replaced by support to sector strategies and reforms (among others through sector budget support). The EU is now providing general budget support to three Asian countries and sector budget support to nine. These programmes are supported by institutional capacity development and technical assistance. 5.1.3 Working towards the MDGs

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Whereas Asia shows economic vitality and global integration, it is also home to the largest population in the world living in absolute poverty, and many countries are still off-track to reach MDG targets on poverty reduction. Even those countries that have experienced rapid economic growth in recent years are lagging behind, most notably India and the Philippines, despite their middle-income country status. The numbers of people living in extreme poverty remain particularly high in Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and India. Therefore, the EU maintains its commitment to help Asian countries eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (MDG1) by deploying food security programmes as well as rural, social and economic development programmes throughout Asia. Asia as a whole has made impressive progress towards other MDGs, especially in education (MDGs2 and 3) with a net enrolment ratio above 90% in 15 Asian countries. EU aid is helping improve primary school completion rates as well as the quality of education, and is promoting gender equality in secondary education, particularly in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Cambodia and Indonesia. The EU supports the implementation of education reform measures in Pakistan with a focus on the enhancement of socio-economic development through investment in human capital, better access and better quality of service delivery through improved sector governance. Water and natural resources in Afghanistan The EU contributed 2004-2011, some €93 million to water and natural resources management in the Panj-Amu River Basin (40% of the water resources in Afghanistan). The programme supports the national regulatory framework and the drafting of the Integrated Water Resources Management strategy. It includes the rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure (more than 65 major irrigation schemes, covering 150 000 ha), promotes a more equitable water management (95 water user associations and training of staff for the river basin agencies) and seeks to protect natural resources in upper catchment areas. The programme has improved water use efficiency and increased the area under double cropping, directly benefitting more than 500 000 people.

Whilst all countries show progress for MDG4 on reducing child mortality, this is too slow to meet the objectives in many countries. This stems from a lack of access to health services for the very poor, but also from cultural and social factors. Therefore, EU-supported programmes in Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar and the Philippines seek to improve poor people’s access to health services, reduce infant mortality and improve maternal health.

Support to health in Afghanistan Since 2001, a total of €216 million has been committed by the EU to support Afghanistan’s health policy management, infectious disease control and basic health care. The EU facilitates access to health for more than five million Afghans in ten provinces, including some of the most insecure and under-served areas of the country. In EU-supported provinces, the assisted delivery of nearly 100 000 babies who were subsequently vaccinated, has significantly decreased mortality of children under five. The EU’s support to health contributes to improved access to primary health care from 9% in 2002 to 65% in 2010.

Development has also been accompanied by environmental challenges, which is a new strategic focus of EU cooperation (MDG7). The EU has widened its support to China’s policies for efficient energy as well as containing CO2 emissions. In India, specific measures for renewable energy, clean technologies and energy efficiency are being implemented in the framework of an EU-India joint plan of action in this area. Climate change mitigation activities are ongoing in the Maldives and support to forest management has been prepared for Malaysia. The EU has implemented a regional FLEGT programme for South-East Asia as

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well as an Asia-wide programme to support sustainable production and consumption (SWITCH).

In the region of the Eastern and Southern Africa-Indian Ocean (ESA-IO), the Smartfish programme will run for two years until 2013, enhancing fishery governance, promoting monitoring, control and surveillance to fight against illegal fishing and developing a regional trade strategy. 5.1.4 Implementation and results

Bilateral co-operation

Almost all cooperation with Asian countries is implemented through EU Delegations in the region and, as of 2011, the EU’s representative office in Kathmandu became a fully-fledged Delegation. In 2011, €748 million were committed to development programmes across the region. The bulk of these funds will be channelled via the beneficiary country's institutions or in partnership with other donors, including Member States.

Significant development packages and programmes were decided for Pakistan during 2011, where the EU is active in the sectors of education - where it continued its support to the National Education Programme to improve access, equity, quality and governance - rural development and support to democratic institutions. There was significant progress in 2011 in human rights legislation in Pakistan, although the implementation of the changes needs to be closely monitored by the EU. In Indonesia, the focal sectors of intervention are education, trade and investment, law enforcement and justice.

In Bangladesh, 65% of the multi-annual indicative plan, 2011-2013, was committed in 2011 to programmes targeting core development issues such as good governance and education (the latter assisted with an initial sector budget support programme). Initiatives were also approved to reinforce local institutions, improve climate change resilience and support the national population and housing census, successfully carried out by the authorities in March 2011. The EU also took steps to support human rights, i.e. the consolidation of an independent electoral framework and the implementation of the Chittagong Hill tracts peace accord.

Food security programmes helping Bangladesh to reach MDG1 €105 million were committed by the EU, 2006-2011 for food security programmes in Bangladesh. These contributed to the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger (MDG1) with a particular focus on poor households in rural disaster-prone areas. The programmes have improved food security and the livelihoods of poor female-headed households, marginal farmers and share-cropper households.

Support to primary education in Bangladesh A €105 sum was committed 2004-2009 to improve primary education in Bangladesh. The EU funding has benefited schools, teachers and pupils, with over 60 million textbooks distributed to pupils every year during the course of the programme. 30 000 new classrooms have been equipped with furniture, tube-wells for safe drinking water, and hygienic toilets. Over 35 000 new teachers have been recruited, and over 90 000 teachers receive enhanced pre-service

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training. The teacher-pupil ratio has declined and the number of contact hours a teacher has with pupils has increased, resulting in better learning.

In the Philippines, the EU supported reforms to increase health insurance coverage and upgrade health facilities. EU cooperation in the trade sector had numerous positive results, for instance enabling continued fish exports to the EU and standardisation of electrical and electronic appliances which represent 50% of the Philippines’ exports. It also contributed to the preparation of the Philippine export development plan, 2011-2016. Particular attention was paid to the situation in Mindanao. The continuous challenges of reconstruction and development in this conflict-affected region are being tackled through support to the national authorities, and specific targeted and thematic interventions.

In Cambodia, 2011 saw the inception of new sector budget support in education and an expanded partnership with UNICEF for technical cooperation. The EU notably assisted governance reforms (public finance management reform and sub-national democratic development) trade development and management of natural resources (land, forestry, fisheries, livestock), along with mitigating the sensitive land concession issue.

EU-Afghanistan cooperation in 2011 developed according to plan. Health and agriculture are core sectors with technical co-operation provided to the government and grants made via civil society organisations. In the health sector, the Commission successfully promoted a roadmap for a sector-wide approach (SWAp). Despite deteriorating security conditions, implementation of the agricultural services and water management programmes continued throughout 2011. The programme to rehabilitate irrigation schemes was almost completed and 30 000 metric tonnes of certified seeds were produced. In line with the 'Kabul process' commitments, EU funds are mostly implemented through multi-donor trust funds. This modality has increased aid coordination, predictability and ownership. Civilian police, justice and public administration reforms were amongst the areas that received attention in 2011 with a total of €200 million being committed. This portfolio of governance programmes will be implemented via the law and order trust fund for Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan reconstruction trust fund. The EU also provides continuous support to the justice institutions to prepare a national priority programme for justice sector reform, and it pursued the promotion of public administration reform in close cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and the Civil Service Commission.

EU cooperation with India continued in the education sector through specific support to reforms and by providing student exchanges via the Erasmus Mundus programme. A new environmental programme was adopted, and the health sector support programme – after initial difficulties - took off. For Malaysia, support to the trade voluntary partnership agreement has been prepared in anticipation of concluding negotiations. In Nepal, the EU remained an active donor for peace and stability. Two sector budget support programmes - in education and peace and stability - started to show results in 2011. The renewable energy programme ended in December 2011, successfully providing sustainable energy to over 900 remote communities.

In China, EU cooperation has remained focused on strengthening the rule of law and environmental governance as well as policy dialogue, in particular on trade and the environment. Some previously-approved projects were launched in 2011. The EU civilian police training project will support the training and recruitment components of the ongoing

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reform of Chinese police. The “Occupational health and safety in high-risk sectors” project will support China's capacity to design an effective strategy based on prevention and the direct involvement of workers in risk management. The “disaster risk management” project will strengthen China’s management capacities and expertise in disaster prevention, risk mitigation and management, and post-disaster response. Two new projects were adopted – to support access to justice and promote low carbon environmental sustainability.

The EU and China have recently launched the EU-China High-Level People-to-People Dialogue (HPPD), aiming to deepen understanding and mutual trust. This dialogue encompasses past and future joint and bilateral initiatives in education and training, culture, multilingualism and youth. The first HPPD formal meeting will take place in Brussels in April 2012. After the successful EU-China Year of Youth in 2011, the two partners are also currently engaged in the implementation of the 2012 EU-China Year of Intercultural Dialogue. The EU is committed to supporting China in its transition to a low carbon economy, notably through joint work on energy efficiency in the building sector, smart grids, connection of renewable sources of energy to the grids and clean coal technologies. Existing energy projects (such as the Euro-China clean energy centre, the institute for clean and renewable energy and Switch Asia) have delivered in several areas and regions. Equally, the EU-China trade project has been instrumental in supporting the Chinese administration on issues regarding standardisation for grids. Thanks to the strengthened partnership, the EU and China are now willing to move to a higher level of commitment, and agreed to convene the first EU-China high level meeting in 2012 between EU Member States and members of China’s national energy commission.

In Vietnam, the EU funded two new programmes. The first is promoting trade and investment through improved public and private sector capacity for policy making and commitments to international treaties, environmental and labour standards. The second has set up a strategic dialogue facility to promote constructive dialogue with the country and support activities foreseen in the EU-Vietnam partnership and cooperation agreement. In Sri Lanka, intense negotiations with implementing partners and local authorities took place in 2011 which led to the approval of a new integrated reconstruction and rehabilitation programme for the north and east of the country which absorbed €60 million, 2011-2012.

In the interest of a deeper mutual interest-driven cooperation with Asian middle income developing countries, previously adopted initiatives in this direction for China, India, Malaysia and Thailand were implemented, especially in the areas of business and trade as well as joint scientific research. During 2011, EU institutions negotiated the amendment of the ICI regulation – the so-called ICI plus – which was published in December 2011 and will provide a legal basis for co-operation activities with industrialised and other high-income countries in 2012. Regional cooperation The Asia-Europe meeting has been the official platform for dialogue between Asia and Europe since 1996. The Commission underpins the process through the ASEM Dialogue facility, a Commission instrument created in 2007 to support the ASEM dialogue on a number of issues: economic and financial matters, employment and social policy, environment, cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, development cooperation, information technology and maritime affairs. The Singapore-based Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), funded by ASEM partners, promotes understanding and collaboration between the peoples of

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Asia and Europe through cultural, intellectual and people-to-people exchanges. ASEF’s outreach to civil society and the wider public complements the official ASEM dialogues. Some 366 contracts were signed with Asia in the area of research and innovation with an EU contribution of €82 million since 2007. Cambodia held a senior officials meeting between the EU and ASEAN on science and technology in May 2011. The EU and ASEAN jointly decided to make 2012 the year of science, technology and innovation49.

SWITCH-Asia – promoting sustainable production and consumption

In promoting sustainable production and consumption, the EU-funded €150 million seven-year SWITCH-Asia programme, launched in 2007 is contributing to poverty reduction and a better quality of life (MDGs1 and 7). The programme works simultaneously with producers and consumers, and at policy level.

By 2011, SWITCH had funded 47 projects in 15 Asian countries. In Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, for example, the programme funded a project that supports small and medium enterprises in moving to cleaner, more sustainable production in all three countries. In Bangladesh, leather production is a big industry but its waste water and solid waste and gas emissions place high demand on available water resources. A SWITCH project which got underway in 2008 has led to more efficient use of resources, reduced waste emissions, and better standards of occupational health and safety. There is also heightened respect for international standards which has improved the leather producers' access to export markets. SWITCH-Asia has fast gained recognition for good practice in moving towards a green economy which could be replicated elsewhere. Regional response to the threat of infectious diseases in Asia Severe epidemics or pandemics can have a devastating socio-economic impact, in addition to the human suffering they bring. This is particularly the case for the poorest and most vulnerable segments of societies. In Asia, several zoonotic diseases have emerged in the past decade causing serious epidemics among the human population. Most recently, the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 spread in the region, with a significant economic impact and loss of human life. The EU is a leading actor and partner in global endeavours to address the threat of avian influenza and other emerging and re-emerging diseases. It has provided substantial funding of over €70 million to the Avian and Human Influenza Facility (AHIF), a multi-donor trust fund managed by the WB. It has also supported influenza research activities through a €65 million programme as well as through the on-going “Highly pathogenic emerging and re-emerging diseases Asia” (HPED Asia) programme, 2009-2013, for which €20 million have been made available. In implementing the HPED programme, the EU is collaborating with several international and regional bodies. 5.1.5 Monitoring In Asia 72% of the monitored projects recorded good or very good performance in 2011, whereas 29% indicate that projects are encountering difficulties. This compares with 2010 when 79% were in the good/very good project performance category, and 21% indicated that

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projects were encountering difficulties. It should be borne in mind that any straightforward conclusions can be misleading as the type of and portfolio of monitored projects vary considerably from year to year

Breaking down the ROM results data by MDG shows that 104 projects monitored in 2011 related to MDG1 (eradicating poverty) with MDG7 (environmental sustainability) being the second most prevalent programme category.

On the basis of 2011 ROM data, it appears smaller projects perform less well than larger ones, except in terms of efficiency, and that recent projects suffer more problems than older ones (in particular efficiency rates low). Low ratings for efficiency this year are mainly attributable to the high number of newer projects monitored this year as projects tend to suffer from delays earlier in the project cycle. As for regional programs, a total of 26 were monitored. Large programmes, like ERASMUS, TEIN 3, and SWITCH-Asia, are performing very well. Table 9 - Overall performance of ongoing national projects by category in Asia

Sustainability, in particular financial sustainability of projects, was the weakest of all five performance criteria rated by the ROM exercise in 2011. Table 10 - Performance by evaluation criteria –very good and good ratings for ongoing national in Asia

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The ROM criterion receiving the highest rating in 2011 was relevance and quality of design, closely followed by impact. Efficiency and potential sustainability scored lower rates. 5.1.6 Outlook Overall, EU relations with Asia are changing, requiring a re-shaping of EU development cooperation in the years to come. China and India already now play a role also as donors to developing countries, while other upper middle income countries like Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan show increased presence on the donors’ map as well as in trade and global issues.

The EU will continue to focus on strengthening the strategic dialogue and deepening its relations with key countries like China and India. With regard to the most developed countries, the EU will pursue ongoing negotiations, ratifications or implementation of partnership cooperation agreements and free trade agreements in the region as key instruments for advancing political and economic interests and deepening bi-lateral relations. Regional cooperation will be strengthened. The current and potential sources of instability in the whole region will continue to be monitored closely with support for regional and local solutions. Regional security, protection and promotion of human rights, governance and tackling the challenges of climate change will remain high on the EU development agenda in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Philippines/Mindanao and Sri Lanka. In line with the “Agenda for Change”, the EU will apply the principle of differentiation to its development cooperation, including with countries in Asia, with the objective of focusing on those countries and populations who are most in need. As committed by Commissioner Piebalgs, EU commissioner for development, during his mission to Burma/Myanmar, the EU will mobilise additional resources to support the transition process in Burma/Myanmar, provided that the political conditions for lifting EU sanctions are in place. Additional funds will support democratic reforms and inclusive development in the country, including key

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sectors such as health, education, and livelihoods, as well as supporting displaced people and strengthening civil society. For Afghanistan, post-transition funding for the country’s development will be discussed at a conference in Tokyo in July 2012. Its outcome will to a great extent depend on finalisation and firming up of the outstanding national priority programmes, including such important areas as justice. Progress made in the health sector gives grounds to expect it should be possible to switch to the sector approach. In Pakistan, political relations are becoming more prominent and a strategic dialogue is due to start in 2012. In the sphere of development cooperation, there is a rising importance of the governance sector. On a regional dimension, the EU will continue to express direct interest in Asia's regional architecture which is reflected in ASEAN's central role in East Asian regional fora and organisations. Part of the bolstering of EU cooperation with Asia is by being directly involved in East Asia summits as well as having an active dialogue with other multi-lateral fora of the region.

5.2 Central Asia

5.2.1 Introduction The adoption by the European Council of a strategy for a new enhanced partnership with Central Asia in June 2007 around the common goal of achieving stability and prosperity by means of peaceful interaction provided new impetus both to regional and bilateral dialogue. It also allowed for strengthened EU cooperation with the five Central Asia countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) on the major issues facing the region, such as poverty reduction, sustainable development and stability and their integration in the global economy. The strategy is driven by a shared commitment to developing long-term partnerships on the basis of common objectives and undertakings to strengthen peace and stability in Central Asia, respect for human rights and the development of the rule of law and democracy. In 2011, the EU maintained its strong focus on Central Asia with encouraging results. Country partners from the region increasingly view the EU as a close political partner and a trusted supporter for the challenging transition process on which they have embarked, as well as offering economic opportunity.

At the EU/Central Asia foreign ministers’ meeting in Tashkent on 7 April 2011, the EU and its Central Asia partners renewed their commitment to the objectives and continued implementation of the EU/CA Strategy, with mobilisation of resources for the period 2012-2013 aimed at benefiting crucial political and socio-economic reforms. A joint plan of action on implementation of the UN global counter-terrorism strategy in Central Asia was endorsed at a ministerial meeting in Ashgabad on 30 November 2011. In the course of the year, the EU continued to support the path for democratic reforms in Kyrgyzstan. It pledged over €15 million to assist the people affected by the violent events in spring 2010, notably in South Kyrgyzstan, supporting reconstruction activities and confidence-building measures, and providing assistance for the election processes and consolidation of the new democratic framework embedded in the new constitution.

The EU-Kazakhstan co-operation council in December 2011 launched negotiations on a new enhanced partnership and cooperation agreement which opened the way for a substantial and

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comprehensive strengthening of relationships based on common values. The EU side made clear that political reforms were integral part of the agenda, and committed itself to support the process, also in co-operation with the Council of Europe (Kazakhstan notably acceded to the cultural convention, and the Bologna Process). In the energy sector, the EU launched negotiations in October for a tri-lateral agreement between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and the EU on a legal framework for a Trans-Caspian (natural gas) pipeline system. This document is the first of its kind and aims to support the realisation of the southern corridor and the diversification of energy supply routes (as well as sources and counterparties) to Europe; it is a unique document without precedent confirming EU concrete involvement to facilitate energy investments in the region. The EU has strengthened its presence in the region, with the opening of a Delegation in Uzbekistan, following others opened in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2010.

5.2.2 Aid effectiveness and donor coordination The coordination of donor support in the region to avoid any overlapping or duplication is a pre-requisite for targeting resources well and achieving objectives. Donor coordination is improving across the region, in part thanks to the EU-Central Asia strategy and its implementation mechanisms, and in part as a result of country-level efforts. The EU has also increased its cooperation with international financing institutions in the region, enhancing overall coordination and enabling a sharper focus on priority areas to improve the impact of assistance. During 2011, the Commission made further efforts to foster donor coordination and implement the EU code of conduct on division of labour in Central Asia. Results have notably been achieved recently in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where joint cooperation strategies with other donors have been in place since 2008/2009. In Kyrgyzstan, the EU became co-chair of the broader donor group – the development partners' co-ordination council – which meets monthly. In 2011, it assisted the government in drawing up medium and long-term development plans to replace the former country development strategy. The EU cooperates with the UN on elections, human rights, social protection, prison reform, and border management issues. Cooperation between the EU and international organisations in the focal sectors of the EU’s bi-lateral cooperation with Tajikistan has been further increased through joint work in the areas of governance, public finance management, health, social protection, agriculture and private sector development. Donor coordination in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan focused on public finance management issues. For the period 2011-2013, budget support assistance is being consolidated by appropriate policy advice and close monitoring of progress in public finance management, enabling the use of country systems in accountable and transparent ways, thereby increasing ownership and effective impact. 5.2.3 Working towards the MDGs Achievement of the MDGs is supported by the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) with an overall objective of alleviating poverty and promoting sustainable economic and social development.

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Kazakhstan has already achieved the first three MDGs on poverty reduction, access to primary education and gender equality and has consequently adopted more ambitious objectives for those areas (the MDG+ targets). This enhanced version of the MDGs is aimed at strengthening and consolidating these early achievements and setting a new roadmap for the period 2010-2015. The Kyrgyz Republic is also an early achiever of MDG1 and MDG3 targets and is well on track to reach MDG2. But both the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan need to deploy greater efforts in fighting HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases (MDG6) and in enhancing environment sustainability (MDG7) where they are regressing in many indicators. Despite improvements in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan with regard to MDG1 and MDG2, these countries remain among the poorest in Asia according to the Human Development Index (HDI). The challenge still remains for Uzbekistan where the number of extremely poor people remains significant. Progress as regards HIV/AIDS prevalence has been made in all countries except for Tajikistan. All central Asia countries are off track on MDG4 (child mortality). With an under-five children mortality average rate of 44 per 1000 and an infant mortality average rate of 38 per 1000 live births, all central Asia countries are off track on MDG4 (child mortality). Country performances for MDG5 (maternal health) are mixed, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are advancing slowly, or even regressing. Others, such as Uzbekistan, have either already attained both goals, or remain on track to reach them. In Uzbekistan, the “Mother and Child” programme is helping achieving MDGs4 and 5 as shown by the trends in indicators for under-five mortality (down 8% between 2005 and 2009) and the infant mortality rate (10% down over the same period). EU aid under the DCI contributes to the fight against poverty with assistance to human capacity development, agricultural reform and pro-SME, investment and business capacity programmes to raise living standards. EU support also goes to improving health management systems, to enhance social protection/pensions and to improve education systems. Governance and the rule of law are particularly targeted by the EU through assistance for judicial reforms, strengthening public administration and public finance management. Attention is also given to environmental issues and the illegal drugs trade. 5.2.4 Implementation and results In 2011, EU development cooperation commitments to Central Asia totalled €93 million. There was a strong emphasis on education, social protection, and the investment facility for Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, the EU continues to support public sector reform and modernisation. A project to provide access to justice for women and a judiciary reform programme has in particular been successful. Other initiatives focus on developing a solid legal framework, and are promoting a favourable investment environment. The economic diversification programme helps to reduce Kazakhstan's over-dependence on the energy sector by creating new business opportunities and increasing competitiveness. The programme is strongly supported and co-financed by the Kazakh government. In Kyrgyzstan, a €40 million five-year programme which started in 2008 to improve social protection and public finance management, has resulted in more effective social protection

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and social insurance systems and has reduced delays in the payment of pensions and social benefits . Specific actions have been taken to incorporate childcare social protection, improve the targeting of benefits, and to establish effective de-centralised social services to support vulnerable families and children. Progress has also been made towards establishing the legislative and institutional framework for reforms, and in putting in place the institutional and personnel capacity to carry them out. The EU is also providing technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan’s ministry of education to assist with the redesigning of the education system, identified by the government as an urgent priority. Another programme is targeting schools that teach specific professional skills, allowing students to acquire new competences according the needs of the local job market. In Tajikistan, the implementation of a €26 million social protection budget support programme was initiated. Amounting to a continuation of earlier support programmes to the sector, the programme is instrumental to the ministry of labour and social protection’s reform objectives. New targeted social benefits were introduced in two districts of Tajikistan. Over 20 000 requests for benefits have been processed and more than 6500 families have already received benefits. In the area of development of social services, eight new centres providing specialised social services for the population were created. The quality of services in nursing homes run by the ministry of labour and social protection also improved with revised standards for food and medicines provision, revised and increased staffing, and renovation of premises. PFM is a cross-cutting issue for EU commitments to Tajikistan. In 2011, as a result of a technical assistance support project, a new public finance law incorporating the mid-term expenditure framework (MTEF) was adopted and major capacity in MTEF was built up in the three participating line ministries. Internal Audit law and financial management control law have also been adopted by the country’s parliament and a public sector accounting strategy and training strategy for capacity building in PFM have been developed. EU interventions in the field of agriculture contributed to the adoption by the lower chamber of the parliament of the legal amendments related to the VAT issue for agri-leasing – a major step forward. By the end of 2011, around 12 000 loans totalling $39 million had been granted in the context of these interventions. Improving care and social justice for vulnerable people in Khatlon The Khatlon project, supported by the EU, is working with rural communities in the Khatlon region of Tajikistan, where most of the poor live. Since it began in 2008 the districts of Jomi, Khuroson and Kurgan-Tube have witnessed significant improvements to local social services. Thanks to the collaboration with district authorities and the ministry of labour and social protection, the project has contributed to the expansion of alternative non-residential social care and the establishment of three new territorial centres. Home care for lonely elderly people has been organised. Families of those with limited mobility – due to illness or a chronic condition – have received social, medical, psychological and legal assistance. More services for vulnerable groups have been created, including eight new centres which are now financed and managed by the government and local NGOs. In Turkmenistan, an important new programme initiated in 2011 is providing technical assistance to the ministry of education to modernise the education system – with as special focus on general secondary education (see case study). The aim is to introduce innovative learning and teaching methodologies to bring the education system closer to international standards. The EU is also supporting the development and modernisation of the public administration in Turkmenistan. Other new programmes are supporting Turkmenistan's

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reforms in the field of economic policies, strategic planning, parliamentary issues, technical regulation, sustainable development and the rational use of natural resources. A new programme is complementing ongoing EU assistance to the modernisation of the public administration through institutional strengthening and policy support. The legal capacity building project started in 2011 is creating an appropriate training resource facility to boost in-country expertise in the areas of comparative law and international practices. Modernisation of Turkmenistan’s education system An EU-supported programme is helping to modernise Turkmenistan’s education system, involving a review of secondary education, teacher training and re-training, the introduction of innovative teaching methods, and overall improvements to quality. The programme has so far enabled: 218 managers, teachers and trainers to receive courses in curricula development, modern approaches, the methodology of teaching mother tongues and second languages. New curricula of language subjects for grade 4 were developed and implemented in seven pilot schools at the beginning of the school year 2011/2012. At the same time, 178 teachers from the seven pilot schools have so far received training in interactive learning methodology. Further, the review of the content of the education system, pre-service and in-service teacher training systems, the quality assurance system and school management will inform the modernisation strategy of the education system as a whole, and in particular general secondary education from 1st to 10th grade. In Uzbekistan, by the end of 2011, five new projects managed by local associations in partnership with international non-governmental organisations were set up to improve the living standards of vulnerable groups. Focal areas of this programme include women entrepreneurship, local community development, and health and education services. A very innovative EU programme to back reform of the criminal justice sector in Uzbekistan started in 2011. Implemented by the specialised agencies of EU Member States, the programme provides long-term capacity building at strategic and operational levels within the Uzbekistan Supreme Court research centre, the general prosecutor's office, the ministry of justice and the ministry of internal affairs, regarding implementation of new decrees on the rule of law and on the death penalty. Financial education for low-income households in Uzbekistan Basic financial awareness among low-income households in Uzbekistan has been improved through a financial education programme. The programme has successfully provided training to over 800 people in addressing issues of household earnings in rural areas and the use of diverse financial services such as credits, savings, insurance and remittances in local communities. The programme has had a long-term positive impact on households’ savings; among those who saved before, 78% started saving more regularly and 61% added new saving goals. A second phase of the project was initiated in 2011. It is part of the institutional building partnership programme which has been implemented in Uzbekistan since 2002. The 'mother-and-child' programme in Uzbekistan continues to improve health services delivered to mothers and children with a second phase of the programme under preparation. Other projects in Kazakhstan are helping the ministry of health provide health services, especially to the most vulnerable groups: children, mothers or people affected by infectious diseases. In Tajikistan, the EU contributed to the development of the health sector strategy and is developing a health management information system to produce relevant and quality information for health system activities.

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Regional cooperation At the regional level, the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA), launched in 2010 to promote additional investments and key infrastructure with an initial focus on energy, environment, SMEs and social infrastructure, became active in 2011. IFCA now offers the possibility of jointly funding operations with European financial institutions through different mechanisms: investment grants, technical assistance support and risk capital operations (credit enhancement schemes, local currency lending). Pilot infrastructures have been financed through IFCA with EU grants, notably in the energy and water sectors. The EU allocated new funding for quality higher education and vocational training through the Tempus and Erasmus Mundus programmes. The EU-Central Asia education/rule of law platform was initiated in 2011 under the European education initiative for Central Asia. This new project is assisting the modernisation of education systems across the region and is supporting enhanced policy dialogue. On the rule of law, the implementation of the fifth phase of the EU’s flagship CADAP regional programme which gives support to the anti-drug policies of central Asian countries is under way. Unlike previous phases, the present phase of CADAP is implemented by a consortium of EU Member States, bringing together the EU’s best expertise. Phase eight of implementation of another EU flagship regional programme – BOMCA, supporting integrated border management and regional dialogue – started up in 2011. The EU also supports wider dialogue with central Asia in the framework of the EU-Central Asia rule of law Initiative. The launch of the rule of law platform in 2011 will enable the provision of required services for further implementation of the rule of law initiative supported by the EU. In the area of economic and private sector development at regional level, the EU promoted job opportunities provided by a growing business and SME sector. Since 2010, the SME sector is further supported by the Central Asia invest programme, which assists capacity-building through business intermediary organisations. This new tool should become a strategic instrument in providing assistance to key infrastructures in Central Asian countries, where those investments could not otherwise be made. The EU also continued implementation of bilateral projects, supporting private sector development, particularly in Kazakhstan. The new Investment Facility for Central Asia provides regional and bilateral assistance by blending EU grants and loans from European financing institutions. In 2011, the first approved investments have targeted the environment (renewable energies and energy efficiency) and energy (renewable energies and energy efficiency). A possible extension is envisaged to attract SMEs, social infrastructure investments, and transport. The initial 2010 allocation to the facility was €20 million and another €45 million will be added from 2011-2013. The current pipeline of grants and loans has reached €500 million. The EU has also contributed to the improvement of regional water governance within the framework provided by the EU-CA environment and water cooperation platform (EURECA) and the EU water initiative (EUWI). National water policy dialogues under the EUWI were established in five countries. 5.2.5 Monitoring

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40 national projects and nine regional programmes were monitored in Central Asia in 2011. These represented a total budget of over €131 million. In general, the performance of most projects in Central Asia was quite good, with 83% of projects classified as good or very good. Performance was very similar to 2010, but it should be noted that the portfolio of monitored projects was considerably different this year.

Table 11: Overall performance of ongoing national projects by category in Central Asia

In 2011, impact and sustainability were the highest-rated evaluation DAC criteria with 88% and 83% of the projects in Central Asia receiving good and very good rating. The criterion relevance and design received a lower score this year compared to 2010. This seems to reflect the speed at which project environments are changing in Central Asian countries between the design and the implementation stages. Project partners have limited resources, time and staff, with which to engage with contractors leading to lesser involvement in projects. Greater coordination between projects implemented at the same time in the same countries would reduce the demand on partners’ resources, lead to higher levels of cooperation and produce better and more sustainable results.

Table 12: Performance by evaluation criteria – very good and good ratings for ongoing national in Central Asia

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5.2.6 Outlook The EU’s multiannual indicative programme allocation for Central Asia for 2011-13 is €321 million, covering both regional and bilateral cooperation. It highlights education and higher education, health and social protection, good governance, as well as environment, energy, and climate change issues. The EU’s commitment to poverty alleviation in the region will continue to focus on the two poorest countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In Tajikistan, the EU will aim at further strengthening public finance management and will continue its support to private sector development in agriculture. In Kyrgyzstan, the priorities for cooperation, 2011-13, are social protection and public finance management, education and rule of law. In Kazakhstan, the focus of EU cooperation is on local development, public administration reform and judicial reform. New partnership modes such as pilot activities, preparatory activities and twinning with EU Member States institutions are beginning to be used. Relations with the EU have recently intensified in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Cooperation is focused on economic and institutional reforms, good governance and education.

5.3 Pacific

5.3.1 Introduction Climate change is one of the greatest threats to the region and challenges its ability to achieve the MDGs. As a follow-up to the EU-Pacific Initiative on climate change (Strasbourg, December 2010), the European Commissioner for Development met with Pacific ministers in a high level regional conference on climate change (Vanuatu, March 2011). The event confirmed the need for further joint initiatives and a plan of action. Pacific and EU partners were invited to strengthen their commitment to high-impact development cooperation aimed at addressing climate change, reducing poverty, maximising synergies between biodiversity

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conservation, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, and promoting human rights, democracy and gender equality, as well as achieving all MDGs.

The EU has continued to develop a policy framework which combines development and climate change assistance and is responsive to Pacific partners’ needs for adaptation finance combined with support to improve their access to, and management of additional climate change resources. EU approaches are very similar to the recommendations of the forum of economic ministers for climate change financing methods based on aid effectiveness principles and for climate change to be integrated in national budgets and development plans, in order for country systems to be used where possible, particularly through budget support, as the most effective form of delivery.

The EU has both increased additional climate change funds for the Pacific and has continued to support efforts made towards eligibility for budget support across the region, where assistance delivered through projects tends to overstretch small administrations. Budget support is more suited to delivering higher impact development outcomes and responses to climate change, while contributing to improved institutional, policy and regulatory frameworks. So far, the strengthening of public finance management (PFM) and accountability mechanisms has been conducive to budget support in New Caledonia, Pitcairn, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

The EU continues to encourage the region to ratify and implement UN conventions on human rights and the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC). To assist countries in this respect, a contribution agreement was signed in 2011 between the Commission and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Secretariat.

The EU concluded the 10th EDF mid-term review for most Pacific countries in 2011. Decisions granting increased allocations were adopted for six nations that were performing well (Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Tonga) for a total amount of €12 million. These funds will mostly be used to tackle climate change-related initiatives. Papua New Guinea's allocation was reduced due to unsatisfactory progress). Three Pacific countries (Kiribati, Samoa, Timor-Leste) qualified for support totalling €16 million under the EU’s MDG Initiative, to accelerate progress towards reaching the MDGs.

In Fiji, no progress could be noted in the internal political situation, as elections are only expected to be held in 2014 and the state of emergency imposed in April 2009 persists. While development assistance remains suspended, the EU – in response to continued socio-economic deterioration and in particular the critical situation in the sugar belt areas – decided to continue and enhance its activities focussing on social mitigation and build on the €8 million allocated in 2010 to be funded through Fiji's indicative allocation for 2011-2013 of €51 million. Further support to bring about a return to democracy and rule of law, such as support to preparing elections and national dialogue, remains a possibility.

Finally, the Commission President and the European Commissioner for Climate Action attended the Pacific Island Forum’s annual meeting marking the 40th anniversary of the institution, confirming the EU’s long-term partnership and support for the region's sustainable development and climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts.

5.3.2 Aid effectiveness and donor coordination

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The EU supports the 2009 Cairns Compact which seeks to enhance aid effectiveness in the Pacific by encouraging its development partners – both states and regional organisations – to assume leadership for donor co-ordination. The EU supports Pacific partner countries' national development and sector strategies through sector policy support programmes and when eligible, through budget support, channelling aid though the countries' own budgetary systems. To date, six Pacific ACP countries and two European overseas territories in the Pacific are receiving, or will soon receive, assistance through budget support. As of 2011, delegated cooperation and transfer agreements which already take place between the EU and Member States were also made possible with Australia. Thus, where it is possible and if there is a comparative advantage, EU and Australia may use one another's experience in implementing a programme on each other’s behalf. The Commission has also joined the Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility, a platform on which Australia, New Zealand, the ADB, the WB, the Commission and the EIB, can coordinate infrastructure assistance projects. 5.3.3 Working towards the MDGs The Cook Islands, Niue, Palau, Samoa, and Tonga are performing well in progress towards the achievement of the MDGs. There is more of a mixed picture in realising the goals by 2015 in Fiji, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. In Kiribati, Nauru, and Papua New Guinea there is substantial progress to be made. As a whole, the Pacific region is unlikely to achieve the target of halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (MDG1) by 2015. The proportion of underweight children and malnutrition also remains prevalent. According to UNDP estimates, about 27% of the region’s population is undernourished. Progress has been made on the path to achieving the MDGs on access to primary education (MDG2), gender equality in education (MDG3), and reduction of infant and child mortality (MDG4). Although maternal mortality remains a major problem in most island states, many countries are performing well in improving maternal health (MDG5). Progress is slow in stopping the spread of infectious and non-communicable diseases, but with the exception of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Tuvalu, most Pacific island countries are likely to achieve the targets on HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases (MDG6). Access to safe drinking water and sanitation services is supported by EU programmes in several Pacific islands, for instance in the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Samoa and Tuvalu. Sustainable and renewable energy programmes are being assisted in other countries – Nauru, Niue and Tonga. The biodiversity stock of the Pacific region continues to be deteriorated. The prospect of achieving environmental sustainability (MDG7) is unclear since global warming and climate change pose significant threats to the region and most Pacific island nations are vulnerable to rising sea levels. Improving fisheries management Across the world millions of people are employed as fishers, traders and processors, and millions of livelihoods rely directly on oceans and inland water bodies as their primary source of food. In ACP regions, the programme ACP FishII contributes to the sustainable and equitable management of fisheries, aiming to reduce poverty and improve food security. Funded under the 9th EDF (€30 million), it will run for four years until 2013. 5.3.4 Implementation and results

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In 2011, the EU continued to support Samoa's water sector policy and provided €14 million in budget support, reflecting the continued improvements made in strengthening governance in the water and sanitation sector, but also the government's efforts in consolidating the country’s fiscal situation, after two years marked by a tsunami and the global economic crisis. Reducing the risk of natural disasters With rising sea levels, concerns are growing in the Pacific over the negative effects of climate change. The EU is funding projects all over the region to reduce the risks of natural disasters and strengthen integrated management of coastal, territorial and marine environments: from mangrove replanting, reforestation of watershed areas, rainwater harvesting and water conservation to the introduction of drought/salt resistant cultivars, soil retention measures and reduced-impact harvesting. European technical co-operation assisted Tonga, Cook Islands and Kiribati in preparing for budget support. In Tonga, the EU is a key partner in taking forward the government's development strategy with its focus on energy. During 2011, the ‘Vulnerability Flex’ instrument provided €5.5 million to Tonga and Samoa, and €1.5 million for Tuvalu to alleviate the consequences of the global economic crisis. In the Cook Islands, a public expenditure and financial accountability (PEFA) review assessed the country's eligibility for budget support. In Kiribati, a review of the financial legislation was undertaken in 2011 and support was provided for a development of a public financial management reform strategy. The EU’s engagement with the government of Fiji is currently limited. Instead, an allocation of €8 million from the DCI accompanying measures for sugar programme was committed in 2011, with funds channelled through civil society organisations to benefit the population directly. Under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the EU continued in 2011 to support the activities of civil society partners including: the protection of consumer and disabled persons' rights; support to trade unions and to NGOs involved in community civic education. A more sustainable fishing industry The EU is funding a €6.61 million Oceanic fisheries management programme (2007-2013) reaching 14 Pacific countries and three EU overseas territories. It is supplying information on Pacific marine resources and eco-systems to improve the ability to monitor illegal and unregulated fishing and promote sustainable fisheries. A tuna management system now enables comparison of data from several sources, which contributes to the sustainable management of tuna stocks, of great value to the region. Papua New Guinea’s absorption capacity reached a limit; resulting in a 20% decrease in the EU’s funding allocation to the country for 2008-2013. Vanuatu also encountered absorption problems, for instance in respect of a programme addressing climate change. In the Solomon Islands, all programmed funds were spent and the drafting of a new budget support programme targeting the environment got underway. Regional cooperation in the Pacific is supported by several regional organisations such as the Pacific Forum Secretariat, the South Pacific Community, the Forum Fisheries Agency and the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme. Agreements for regional cooperation projects that were signed in 2011 included support to the Oceanic Customs Organisation (€8

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million) and for the Small Island States programme (€11.4 million). Other allocations went to the following sectors: tourism (€5 million), trade (€8 million) and agricultural commodities (€8.5 million). A multi-country disaster risk reduction programme in 2011 provided water storage in several atoll countries. For instance, the drought conditions on Funafuti Island of Tuvalu were attenuated due to the supply of water tanks. In 2011, the €4 million deep sea minerals project effectively got off the ground, providing technical and policy advice to Tonga, Nauru and Kiribati. Nauru and Tonga have now become the first developing countries to be granted exploration permits in the international seabed jurisdiction. Better disaster management The EU has contributed to a €9.76 million disaster risk reduction project to help local communities in eight countries across the Pacific islands. Projects involve institutions and stakeholders such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community Applied Geosciences and technology division (SOPAC). Disaster management is being improved through the setting up of new emergency and early warning centres and communication systems. So far, five operation centres have been opened in Palau, Micronesia and the Solomon Islands. Moreover, ten seismic stations and flood monitoring equipment have been provided to Papua New Guinea. Resilience to drought has been strengthened by ensuring access to drinking water. For example, over 400 rainwater tanks have already been constructed in Tuvalu, Tonga and Nauru under the programme, which runs until 2013.

5.3.5 Monitoring

In 2011, 51 on-going national, six ongoing regional and seven closed programmes representing EU commitments of some €153.5 million in 15 Pacific countries were monitored by independent experts that carry out results oriented monitoring (ROM).

The outcome suggested that 64.7% of national on-going projects perform well, 23.5% present problems and 11.7% encounter major difficulties. Although the programs covered are different from one year to the other, covering different countries and themes, the results of the monitoring exercises are fairly consistent. The following graphs show the assessments made in the sample EU projects and programs in the Pacific from 2009 to 2011 selected for the ROM exercise. Table 13: Overall performance of ongoing national projects by category

0.642

0.561

0.6471

0.2320.293

0.2353

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

2009 2010 2011

Very good performance (I)

Good performance (II)

Performing with problems(III)

Not performing, majordifficulties (IV)

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The monitoring shows that overall performance for ongoing projects is good for some 64% of Pacific EU projects in 2011. Significantly however, virtually no projects demonstrate very good performance and a significant share of the programs have implementation difficulties. As the table below shows, while projects are largely considered relevant, there are strong concerns with regard to efficiency in almost half of the projects. Table 14: Performance by evaluation criteria –very good and good ratings

ROM assessment: Grades by evaluation criteria (national projects)

2.0% 5.9% 5.9% 2.0%

72.5%

45.1% 51.0%

66.7%58.8%

Relevance andDesign



49% of the projects reviewed face efficiency problems in terms of input used and implementation of activities and 49% also experience difficulties in delivering results. 39% have sustainability problems. This confirms relatively high dependence of Small Island Developing States in the Pacific on development and low local institutional capacity (compensated by donors with technical assistance). Another important factor may be significant fragmentation of foreign aid to the region.

In the Pacific, the specific geographic, administrative, technical and political conditions affect implementation of many projects. Typical problems for programmes in the pacific include great distances, absence of reliable statistics and indicators, political reorientation, lack of trained programme management staff and changes of political or administrative projects support. 5.3.6 Outlook The relevance of EU interventions in the Pacific is confirmed – inter alia – by mid-term reviews both at country and regional levels. With the exception of Papua New Guinea, additional funds are provided to sector policies and national development plans in most Pacific countries. The EU interventions will continue to tackle challenges such as climate change and sustainability in a context of high demographic growth with a focus on water, energy, waste management, depletion of natural resources and the need for climate change resilient infrastructures (land and maritime, energy and telecommunications). A Pacific Infrastructure Facility (€10 million) which blends grants with loans is likely to be decided in 2012.

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The EU, together with Pacific countries and organisations, will continue to address the challenges of Pacific regional integration and negotiate EPAs. Strengthening countries' administrative capacity, with a view to continue improving public finance management and ensuring economic stability, will also be at the centre of EU attention. A communication, “Towards a renewed EU Pacific development partnership” is expected to be presented in 2012, outlining the EU partnership with Pacific countries' organisations in the coming years. In conjunction with this, the programming of EU development assistance for the Pacific 2014-2020 (11th EDF) will start in 2012. Tables: Breakdown of external aid by instrument

Table 15 ENPI - Breakdown by sector of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid in 2011

Commitments in € million

Disbursements in € million

Bilateral and multilateral ODA (EuropeAid only).

1 022 M€, 53%

190 M€, 10%

89 M€, 5%

514 M€, 27%

0%94 M€, 5% Social infrastructures: education, health,

water, government and civil society, other

Economic infrastructures and services :transport, communications, energy, otherservices

Production : agriculture, forestry and fishing,industry, mining and construction, trade andtourism

Multisector/Crosscutting : environment, other

Budget support, food aid, food security

Others - including emergency assistance,reconstruction relief

682 M€, 52%

224 M€, 17%

144 M€, 11%

66 M€, 5%

90 M€, 7%

99 M€, 8%Social infrastructures: education, health,water, government and civil society, other

Economic infrastructures and services :transport, communications, energy, otherservicesProduction : agriculture, forestry and fishing,industry, mining and construction, trade andtourismMultisector/Crosscutting : environment, other



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€ million 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Commitments 1 666 1 773 1 637 1 807 2 015

Disbursements 1 412 1 530 1 474 1 513 1 426

Bilateral and multilateral flows (EuropeAid only).

Table 16 ENPI - External aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid

Table 17 ENPI - General and sector budget support per country


Country GBS / SBS Sector Decription Total

Armenia

SBS

Multisector aid Support to the Government of Armenia for the implementation of the ENP Action Plan and preparations for the future Association Agreement – Phase II

24.00

AzerbaijanSBS Rural development Rural development support programme 20.00

Egypt SBSEnergy policy and administrative management

Energy sector policy support programme 30.00

Georgia SBS Legal and judicial development Support to the criminal justice sector in Georgia 18.00

Georgia SBS Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation

Support to conflict affected/displaced population 10.00

Jordan SBS Public finance management Support to the public financial management reform programme

20.00

Jordan SBS Power generation/renewable sources

Renewable energy and energy efficiency programme in Jordan

35.00

Jordan SBS Education policy and administrative management

EU support to second phase of education reform 23.00

Moldavia SBS Energy policy and administrative management

Support to the reform of the energy sector in Moldavia

42.60

Morocco SBS Women’s equality organisations and institutions

Support to the promotion of equality 35.00

Morocco SBS Multisector aid Achievement of advanced status 85.00

Morocco SBS Women’s equality organisations and institutions

Support to the promotion of equality 10.00

Tunisia SBS Multisector aid Support programme for growth 90.00

Ukraine SBS Public sector policy and administrative management

Reform to the Administrative Legal Framework and Civil Service in Ukraine (AAP 2011) 70.00

Grand Total 512.60

GBS : General Budget SupportSBS : Sector Budget Support

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Table 18 EDF - Breakdown by sector of external aid financed on the European Development Fund (EDF) managed by EuropeAid in 2011



Bilateral and multilateral ODA. Excl non-ODA resources (Peace facility,…).

1 166 M€, 40%

559 M€, 19%

397 M€, 14%

394 M€, 14%

74 M€, 3%

297 M€, 10% Social infrastructures: education, health,water, government and civil society, other






832 M€, 31%

719 M€, 26%

263 M€, 10%

172 M€, 6%

520 M€, 19%





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Table 19 EDF - Regional breakdown of external aid financed on the European Development Fund (EDF) managed by EuropeAid in 2011



Africa 2 291 2 328

Caribbean 243 199

Pacific 18 78

Overseas Countries & Territories 18 15

ACP Unallocated 318 118

Total 2 888 2 738

Bilateral and multilateral ODA. Excl non-ODA resources (Peace facility,…). Table 20 EDF - General and sector budget support per country



Benin SBS Decentralisation and support to subn Local development programme 45.00

Jamaica GBS General budget support Tropical Storm Nicole rehabilitation 7.00

Lesotho GBS General budget support Poverty reduction budget support phase II 45.65

Mali GBS General budget support MDG contract Mali - PPAB 2 3.37

Mauritius GBS General budget support Promoting sustainable and equitable development: EDF part 10.00

Mozambique SBSPromoting Sustainable and Equitable Development: EDF part

Health and HIV sector policy support programme 20.00

Samoa SBS Water sector policy and administrative management

Water and sanitation sector policy support programme 2.59

St. Helena SBS Multisector aid Support for infrastructure development in Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha 16.63

Togo GBS General budget support Togo - poverty reduction budget support 7.50

Grand Total 157.73


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Table 21 DCI Geographic - Breakdown by sector of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid in 2011




824 M€, 59%

34 M€, 2%

79 M€, 6%

275 M€, 19%

82 M€, 6%







667 M€, 61%

52 M€, 5%

139 M€, 13%

85 M€, 8%

40 M€, 3%





€ million 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Commitments 1 362 1 371 1 414 1 422 1 414

Disbursements 1 279 1 137 1 192 1 127 1 100


Table 22 DCI Geographic - External aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid

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Table 23 DCI Geographic - General and sector budget support per country



Bangladesh SBSPrimary education Third primary education development programme

(PEDP III)54.00

Bolivia SBS

Employment policy and Support programme for the improvement of the financial and fiscal environment of small business (PAMEFF)

35.00

Colombia SBS Livestock Support to dairy sector 8.60

Costa Rica SBSSecurity system management and reform

PROSEC (PROgrama de SEguridad Ciudadana) 13.00

Ecuador SBSEducation policy and administrative management

Education support programme 34.00

El Salvador SBSSocial/ welfare services Programa de Apoyo a Comunidades Solidarias en

El Salvador (PACSES)47.40

Guatemala SBSFood aid/Food security programmes

Support to the strategic plan for food security and nutrition

6.50

Honduras SBSWater sector policy and administrative management

Programa de Apoyo Presupuestario Sectorial Agua y Calidad (PAPSAC) 25.44

India SBSPrimary education Sector policy support programme for education

in India80.00

Kyrgyz Rep. SBS

Social/ welfare services Sector policy support programme - social protection and public finance management - Kyrgyzstan - AAP2011

13.00

Pakistan SBSEducation policy and administrative management

Sindh Education Sector Support Programme 30.00

Paraguay SBSSocial/ welfare services Social development public policy support

programme in Paraguay 31.00

South Africa SBSLegal and judicial development

Legislative sector policy support programme 5.00

South Africa GBSGeneral budget support National development policy support programme

for South Africa 75.55

Grand Total 458.48


CHAPTER 3 - IMPLEMENTATION: THEMATIC OVERVIEW

1- The thematic programmes

1.1 Investing in People The Commission completed a mid–term review of the thematic programme for human and social development “Investing in People” in 2010. The programme, covering the period 2007–2013, supports thematic activities in health, education, knowledge and skills, gender equality, and other aspects of human and social development (employment and social cohesion, children and youth, and culture). As a result of the mid–term review, it was decided that programming in 2011–2013 should follow the original strategy and continue to focus on all four main pillars of thematic action. The programme has, however, moved away from supporting actions in all areas every year to supporting each area in turn over a longer time

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frame. In line with this approach, in 2011 the programme covered thematic activities in health, education and gender. Health In 2011, the programme provided specific support through relevant UN agencies to improve health systems and tackle health and healthcare problems that pose particular challenges to countries, services and populations. Support was given to the United Nations Population Programme's (UNFPA) global programme to enhance reproductive health commodity security by improving the availability of reproductive health commodities, such as condoms and injectable contraceptives in developing countries (€24.3 million).

The UN Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) – the first international UN treaty in health and ratified by 174 countries – received financial support (€5.2 million) for providing technical assistance to signatory countries to implement treaty obligations. In addition, an agreement was signed with WHO to support policy dialogue on national health policies, strategies and plans in selected developing countries (€5 million). The EU budget also contributed €65 million to the Global Fund against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (with a further €65 million being provided by the EDF).

Education In 2011, the second pillar of the investing in people (IiP) programme continued to support efforts to achieve universal access to quality primary education by contributing with €31.8 million to the global partnership for education fund (GPE). The former education for all fast track initiative (EFA-FTI) changed its name to become GPE and endorsed a series of reforms in its governance structure. The different trust funds were merged into a single education fund. An important pledging conference took place in Copenhagen in November 2011. The Commission also contributed €1 million to the association for the development of education in Africa (ADEA), a forum of African Ministers of education and development agencies supporting policy dialogue on education. This sum will notably fund the ADEA Ouagadougou conference on promoting critical skills for sustainable development in Africa and follow-up activities. Gender The mid-term review of the programme resulted in an increase of the available budget for gender equality and women's empowerment activities by €10 million for the period 2011-2013. The total allocation for the period – €37 million – is being used to support initiatives in the area of protection and promotion of women's rights; strengthen economic and social empowerment of women at national and local levels, develop and test innovative approaches to mainstreaming gender equality and to empower women in policy development, planning and budgeting. In particular, in November 2011 a global call for proposals was launched on women's social and economic empowerment. In October 2011, the new UN programme, “Increasing Accountability for Financing to Gender Equality” was launched with EU support. Both initiatives have the achievement of MDG3 in view by supporting women's leadership in the economic and social sphere, and mobilising resources to implement partner countries' commitments on gender equality.

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1.2 Non-State actors and local authorities in development In 2011, the EU continued to support small-scale development initiatives, either proposed and/or carried out by non-state actors (NSA) and local authorities (LA) from the EU and partner countries. For in-country interventions implemented locally, EU Delegations have adopted a more strategic and focused approach and have launched calls for proposals for NSA and/or LA, ensuring complementarity and consistency with the EU development co-operation programme. For multi-country interventions, as well as development education, awareness–raising and coordination, global calls were successfully launched at Commission headquarters level. Three NSA–targeted projects were also funded: an operating grant to the European Confederation of NGOs (Concord) and two strategic projects implemented in co-operation with the EU presidency. In March 2011, a new multiannual strategy was approved for the period 2011-2013. It was drawn up to ensure a large degree of continuity with the previous programming period, 2007-2010, while introducing improvements proposed by the MTR, the Structured Dialogue (SD) and the development education and awareness raising study (DEAR). In particular, more attention was paid to the strategic positioning of the programme at local level with respect to other EU instruments: Delegations were requested to implement a 'tailor-made' approach taking into account the local environment in which the various actors exercise their right of initiative. The share of the programme devoted to multi-country activities was reduced to favour of actions in a single country. A global multi-country call for proposals was launched in November 2011, jointly with the Neighbourhood civil society facility (under the ENPI). The global objective of this call – in line with the NSA&LA strategy 2011-2013 and the conclusions of the SD – is to support actions aiming at strengthening regional, continental and global civil society representative networks active in development cooperation in partner countries, as well as multi-country actions led by these platforms, tackling issues of global concern. Additionally, for the Neighbourhood region only, the call also addresses civil society organisations which are not part of networks, if their actions have a regional dimension and aim at strengthening and promoting civil society organisations' role in reforms and democratic changes taking place in the Neighbourhood countries. As for country-based interventions, priority was given to local actors and to the strengthening of their capacity. Actions were targeted to local needs, in terms of organisations, themes, sectors, priorities and specific areas. Moreover, the new strategy opened up the possibility to explore new and more effective aid delivery methods, in line with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. A set of 12 technical sheets of aid delivery modalities was produced during the SD process and expected to be effective in 2012 (in particular, direct award of grants, re-granting, financing in full as well as transfer agreements, delegation agreement and/or contribution agreement). The annual action programme for 2011 allocated a total of €231.7 million: €194.5 million for NSAs and €37.2 million for local authorities. For in–country operations, €143.6 million were set aside for NSAs and €27.4 million for LAs. Actions were launched for 79 countries with these funds. 2011 also saw the development of a more strategic approach of the Commission's services concerning the role of local authorities. Following the large response to the call for proposals published at the end of 2009, the Commission launched a new global call for proposals in November 2011 addressed to local authorities. This will give priority to

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initiatives that target strengthened institutional capacity of the associations of local authorities at regional, continental or international level. The call will also support projects that facilitate ongoing de-centralisation processes in partner countries as well as awareness-raising activities by local authorities within the EU and acceding countries. In addition, the online portal of de-centralised co-operation, hosted by the Committee of the Regions, went live at the end of 2011. It is a work tool for European local authorities involved in development co-operation projects. This site will, among other things, enable local authorities from the EU and their partners in developing countries to interact on future projects. This portal will also make the ‘Atlas of decentralised Cooperation’, financed by the Commission and already available online since 2010, more accessible. A positive discussion has continued between the associations who are members of PLATFORMA – a platform for dialogue between European local authorities working in the area of development cooperation and Commission services. PLATFORMA will continue to receive funding from the NSA-LA thematic programme until 2013. During 2011, the Commission strengthened the online portal targeting civil society and local authorities: CiSocH (Civil Society Helpdesk)50. Its objective is to provide a single entry point in order to facilitate access to already existing information on subjects with a particular interest for non-state actors and local authorities, in order to facilitate their understanding of procedures, vocabulary and working methods. The strength of CiSocH is that it concentrates on access to targeted information which is available elsewhere (in other internet sites from the Commission, the Council and other institutions) and organises this information around ‘concepts’ relating to issues of a particular interest for civil society and local authorities. For each concept, a brief description of the subject is provided, as well as links to the relevant web pages and documents.

1.3 Migration and asylum The ‘Stockholm Programme’ confirmed the EU’s global approach to migration, which is built around three pillars: facilitation of labour migration, prevention and curbing of irregular migration and promotion of the links between migration and development, as the strategic framework of the external dimension of EU migration policy. The evaluation of the global approach in early 2011 led to the adoption in November 2011 of the global approach to migration and mobility, aimed at framing the EU’s external migration policy to ensure coherence between EU foreign policy and development co-operation and a better thematic and geographical balance. The thematic programme, “cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum” (TPMA) is the main specific instrument for external cooperation in the field. The 2007-2013 programme has a budget of €384 million. The second half of the TPMA with the 2011-2013 multiannual strategy paper was approved in the first semester of 2011. While recognising the southern Mediterranean and the sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe as EU priority regions for external cooperation, special attention will also

50 [https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/ mwikis/aidco/index.php/Main_Page

https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/

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be paid to thematic priorities. These include: support to unaccompanied minors, the fight against human trafficking, facilitation of circular migration and labour migration, support to the negotiation and implementation of re-admission agreements, international protection of asylum seekers and refugees, support to the mobility partnership and migration research The 2011 TPMA annual action plan encompassed the following measures:

• a call for proposals combining the budgets for 2011-2012 totalling €74 million, the share for 2011 being €36 million. Launched in October 2011, the call for proposals resulted in the submission of more than 470 concept notes.

• €3 million for a targeted project linked to support the action plan adopted in Poznan in November 2011 for the second phase of the Prague process.

• €3 million for a targeted project in the framework of the EU-Armenia mobility partnership.

• €2 million for a targeted project to consolidate the migration management capacities in the Republic of Moldova.

• €4.5 million for the 'Migration EU Expertise II' (MIEUX II): with 40 requests for assistance received covering 50 countries, MIEUX I contributed to building trust and opening channels of cooperation with third countries. The scope of the programme has been broadened, compared to the first phase, to encompass almost all areas covered by the global approach to migration.

• €6.6 million were allocated for special measures for a project to support the Libyan Government's effort to stem irregular migration and assist vulnerable stranded migrants and another to improve protection and provide assistance to refugees and asylum seekers displaced in the Horn of Africa.

In 2011, 18 out of the remaining 19 projects issued from the 2009-2010 call for proposals were contracted. One in Syria could not be contracted due to the political situation in the country. Among the most significant projects financed and carried out in 2011 was a strengthening of Armenia’s migration capacities, with a particular focus on re-integration activities, in the framework of the EU-Armenia mobility partnership. The Special Measure: "Regional Assisted Voluntary Return Programme for Stranded Migrants ex-Libya" aims to support the Libyan Government's effort to stem irregular migration along the Western and Eastern migration routes and assist vulnerable stranded migrants. Due to the 2011 conflict, thousands of regular and irregular migrants rushed to escape across Libya's borders, exacerbating the migration challenges for a country already considered as a transit country. In terms of cooperation frameworks with partner countries, the TPMA has substantially contributed – through both targeted initiatives and projects selected within the call for proposal – to the effective implementation of mobility partnerships between the EU and Moldova, Cape Verde and Georgia. It has also led to the launch of a new partnership with Armenia. Discussions are ongoing to establish new mobility partnerships with other countries, especially North African countries, especially Morocco and Tunisia, in the near future. The Commission also continued to play an active role in the policy dialogue on migration and asylum issues in various international and regional events such as the 5th Global Forum on Migration and Development which took place in Geneva, Switzerland, in December 2011. There, as well as in other fora, the EU has supported the development of migration profiles as an essential tool for the definition of national development policies. In the framework of the EU-Africa dialogue, the migration, mobility and employment partnership – an initiative which aims to facilitate dialogue and exchange of information and good practices – is supported by the TPMA. However, the second action plan endorsed by EU and African

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leaders at the Tripoli summit of 29/30 November 2010, could not be fully implemented due to the political crisis in Libya, at the time co-chair of the MME partnership. Finally, the Commission also played an active role in the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process), especially as regards the Ministerial Conference that took place in Dakar in November and resulted in the adoption of an ambitious action plan. Cooperation with partner countries in Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia has been strengthened, at either a bilateral level or through dialogue and co-operation platforms such as the Black Sea co-operation platform, the Budapest Process, the Eastern partnership and the Soderköping process, or through initiatives such as 'building migration partnerships/Prague process'. The structured dialogue with Latin America, launched in 2009, is also moving forward, supported by a targeted initiative which started its activities at the beginning of 2011. The project is running smoothly. It intends to strengthen political dialogue through the activities carried out in the LAC countries. In its first year, it has focused on data collection and capacity building. On February 2011, the Commission launched an evaluation to assess the extent to which the projects on labour and circular migration, funded by TP MIGRAS and the former AENEAS programme, have reached set policy objectives and how performance can be improved. The results of this overall independent assessment served as guidance for the Commission services and provided practical recommendations for follow-up actions and for improved future planning.

1.4 Environment, climate change and sustainable development Environmental protection, climate change and sustainable development remained key topics in 2011. The Commission seeks to address the issues through the following instruments: geographic support, funds from the thematic programme for the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources including energy (ENRTP) and through the use of innovative initiatives such as the GCCA, FLEGT and the EU water facility. Flow of ideas on water Following the drafting of an issue paper by the EU’s Hungarian Presidency on the ‘role of water in development policy’ and in response to the conclusions of the June 2011 Council, the EU is working towards an updated and strengthened EU policy and implementation framework for sustainable water management in developing countries. The importance of water was further highlighted by the 2011 Bonn Conference on the water, energy, food security nexus in which the Commission actively participated. In total, the Commission committed around €600 million to support these themes. This sum comprises around €500 million from geographical programmes, €80 million from the ENRTP and €50 million from the water facility, including part of the new and additional funds made available by the Commission (€25 million) and EU Member States (€23.8 million) to provide fast start financing for climate change actions. Within the ENRTP, the Commission also committed €20 million to programmes reducing CO2 emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) via its contributions, for example, to the forest carbon partnership facility (FCPF) and the UN-REDD programme.

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In addition, there are the many geographical projects and programmes where these themes are addressed indirectly: environment and climate change issues are increasingly integrated and mainstreamed in project preparation and appraisal. The total amount of the Commission portfolio allocated for sustainable development is thus considerably higher. A specific project aiming at protection of natural resources, including marine resources and biodiversity, is the Honduran Biological Corridor Project which aims to protect natural resources, promote sustainable watershed management and safeguard economic activity, including agriculture and fishing, with EU support of €25 million until 2013. Alongside its important project and programme work, the Commission has also played key roles in negotiations that take place in the context of the UNFCCC and in negotiating voluntary partnership agreements with countries exporting timber to the EU (see box below). Also on protection of forests, through the CEOFAC (Observatory for the Forests of Central Africa) project, the Commission is providing decision-makers of the Congo Basin with reliable information on forest cover change, forest management practices, and biodiversity value and threats, as input for international negotiations on climate and eco-systems. ‘The State of the Forests, 2010’ was produced by the Observatory with over 100 contributors. Turning to energy, under the RENAF (Rural electrification, renewable Energy and communication in Africa) project, the Commission is contributing to building an African-based scientific network focusing on sustainable projects to reduce energy poverty by strengthening collaboration and knowledge exchange in rural electrification and renewable energies. Through a competence/capacity building workshop for energy experts and the publication of joint scientific papers, this initiative contributes to the achievement of the poverty eradication MDGs and on combating climate change. Finally, on water, the Commission, with the support of the EUWI (EU Water Initiative), completed the second edition of the ‘Water Project Toolkit’, to be presented at the March 2012 World Water Forum. A set of important agreements were concluded at the UNFCCC conference in Durban. Firstly, the Durban platform for enhanced action was set up to negotiate a roadmap for a new comprehensive legal instrument to be agreed by 2015 and implemented as of 2020. In the meantime (2012-2020), a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol was also endorsed; the clean development mechanism will thus continue to benefit LDCs. With regard to climate financing, the governance structure of the green climate fund was approved; this will eventually channel the increasing climate finance flows towards developing countries. Finally, several Cancun decisions were implemented including the adoption of detailed rules for monitoring, reporting and verification and the setting up the adaptation committee. Liberia and Central African Republic commit to FLEGT Under FLEGT, two voluntary partnership agreements (VPA) were signed respectively with Liberia and the Central African Republic in 2011. This brings the number of agreements being implemented to six: Ghana, Cameroon, Congo, Liberia, Central African Republic and Indonesia. Negotiations are ongoing with Gabon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malaysia and Vietnam. Laos, Côte d’Ivoire and Honduras have expressed their interest in starting negotiations in 2012. All countries will develop a licensing scheme which will guarantee that

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timber products exported to the EU are legal and that the forest sector contributes to the development of the producer countries. Collaborating on climate change The cycle of Global Campaign for Climate Action (GCCA), regional conferences between the EU, LDCs and SIDS was finalised with the conferences held in Vanuatu and Belize in March 2011. This year, the GCCA also started a series of workshops on mainstreaming climate change into national planning and budgeting which has trained 100 government officials from 49 partner countries. GCCA in Cambodia reached its mid-term in 2011. The programme has already reaped results in the mainstreaming of climate change into overall development strategies. It has supported the creation of an inter-ministerial body for technical advice on climate change and a platform for dialogue on the same topic. GCCA is also enabling Cambodian officials to participate in international negotiations in climate change (through the preparation of position papers, sharing the outcomes of negotiations) and is assisting in-depth analysis to inform policy making. The first call for proposals under GCCA Cambodia produced eight climate change adaptation interventions covering ten provinces and multiple sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, forestry, bio-diversity, urban/coastal infrastructure, disaster risk reduction and community development. EU backs ‘sustainable energy for all’ UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, called for the world to meet the goal of universal access to clean, affordable energy by 2030. To this end, he set up a high level group on sustainable energy for all. This initiative, in which Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs was asked to participate, aims at engaging governments, the private sector, and civil society partners to achieve three major inter-linked targets by 2030: ensuring universal access to modern energy services, improving energy efficiency at all levels and a doubling of the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. EU energy initiative gains momentum The EU is firmly committed to addressing the current and future energy and development challenges jointly with its development partners. The EU Energy Initiative (EUEI) is a key vehicle for the Commission and Member States to jointly deliver on these commitments. The EUEI celebrates its 10th anniversary in 2012 and is currently preparing a renewed mandate. This will focus on improving its impact and visibility and optimising financial resources as well as suggesting innovative approaches for financing. An example of a specific EUEI initiative: the Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP) is a long-term framework for structured political dialogue and co-operation between Africa and the EU on energy issues. Under the AEEP, the Africa-EU renewable energy cooperation programme is currently being developed. It aims to promote development of the renewable energy market, capacity building, application of feed-in tariffs, technology transfer, mobilisation of financing, and the setting up of renewable energy centres. It will serve as an umbrella for and monitor renewable energy investments within EU bilateral programmes in view of the 2020 targets for renewable energy agreed between the EU and Africa. In addition, the ECOWAS renewable energy and energy efficiency centre (ECREEE) in Praia, Cape

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Verde, became operational and 11 energy projects were accepted for financing by the infrastructure trust fund. Disaster risk reduction Following the adoption of an EU strategy on disaster risk reduction (DRR) in developing countries in 2009 which highlighted the need to inter-link DRR and climate change adaptation, a DRR implementation plan with concrete measures was adopted in April 2011. The plan's overarching objective is to harmonise and increase the effectiveness of EU external action in DRR, by focusing on four main priorities: enhancing multi-level and multi-stakeholder dialogue on DRR; supporting regional approaches to DRR planning, implementation and capacity building; greater integration of DRR into the EU's external action policies and co-ordination of EU support to key DRR investments, including the strengthening of information systems and carrying out risk analysis for integrating climate change into DRR. A number of concrete actions have been identified in this framework among which a €60 million contribution from the Commission to the World Bank-managed global facility for disaster risk reduction (GFDRR), to address prevention, mitigation and preparedness to natural hazards in ACP States, focussing on the following priority areas: the mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction; risk identification and assessment; early warning systems and communication on DRR and risk transfer and integration of DRR into recovery initiatives. Funds are drawn from the 10th EDF’s intra-ACP programme.

1.5 Food security Progress towards achieving the MDG on the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger (MDG1) continues to be hampered by various factors: the effects of climate change, price volatility, gender inequality, access to land, poor nutrition and situations of protracted crisis, to name but a few. In 2011, the famine in the Horn of Africa was one example reflecting many of these challenges. According to ‘the state of food insecurity in the world’51, 925 million people were suffering from chronic hunger in 2010. In February 2011, the World Bank estimated that rises in food prices during the second half of 2010 and early 2011 pushed an additional 44 million people into poverty in low- and middle-income countries. After decades of generally declining food prices, the past few years have shown increasing instability. Rising food prices and increased food price volatility can have serious implications for the almost one billion people already suffering from hunger. ‘Garden in a sack’ assists Nairobi’s most vulnerable citizens In Nairobi, Kenya, the EU is helping the urban poor produce some of their own food through the urban agricultural initiative ‘Garden in a sack’. For Nairobi’s shanty towns: Kibera, Mathare, Kiambiu and Mukuru-Lunga it means food security, proper nutrition, employment and a source of income for some of the capital’s most vulnerable people using minimal space. By the end of 2011, 22 374 households had received inputs and training in kitchen garden

51 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP): The State of Food Insecurity in the World (2010)

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techniques; greenhouse vegetable and poultry production. Many of the households are headed by women and are affected by AIDS. Sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition – a top priority in development cooperation The Commission's commitment to tackling global hunger and malnutrition is strong and long-standing. The Commission has never disinvested from these fundamental sectors and it has played a leading role in the areas for many years. In its development cooperation, the Commission attaches high priority to agriculture, food security and nutrition, not least because it is a key area where the EU can best support developing countries' efforts to speed up progress towards the MDGs. In 2011, the new policy framework for development, “An Agenda for Change”52, firmly reflects the EU approach to do more, to do it better and to do it faster in order to support inclusive and sustainable growth in developing countries. In this context, sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition have been placed high on the development cooperation agenda and in the dialogue with partner governments (see Chapter 1). EU cooperation with developing countries is largely delivered through country programmes such as the EDF where support to agriculture, rural development and food security is important in many countries. This is often complemented by other means such as the €1 billion EU food facility (2009-2011) and the almost €1.7 billion food security thematic programme (2007-2013). Small-scale farmers in Zambia increase production In Zambia, the EU is funding a FAO project to support small-scale farmers to restore and increase agricultural productivity and production. As a result, the farmers will make better use of expensive inputs and produce more of their own food, at a time when commodity prices have been rising. The project provided farmers with an inputs package to implement the training they received and serve as a demonstration to others in the community. By the end of 2011, a total of 127 516 farmers had received training via the project. The food facility – on target The food facility is a prime example of the EU's commitment. The EU reacted quickly to the 2008 crisis triggered by volatility of food prices with the €1 billion food facility (2009-2011) to tackle food insecurity in 49 developing countries. Three years later, 90% of the funds have reached more than 50 million direct beneficiaries via more than 230 projects implemented by international organisations, Member State agencies, NGOs and partner countries. The projects were mounted in record time and controls were applied via monitoring, evaluation and audit procedures. The food facility has proven that rapid response is possible, together with enhanced donor coordination and cooperation, and it has contributed to finding innovative ways of project implementation. A full evaluation will be available in 2012. The food security thematic programme 52 'Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change', http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0637:FIN:EN:PDF

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In July 2011, the 2011 annual action plan of the food security thematic programme was adopted with a budget of €230 million. The 2011 annual action plan pays a great deal of attention to agricultural research for development, technology transfer and innovation (€42.5 million), strengthening food security governance at global, regional and national levels (€50 million) and addressing food security for the poor and vulnerable in fragile situations (€137.5 million). A rinderpest-free world Rinderpest has killed hundreds of millions of livestock and wildlife, resulting in colossal economic losses and contributing to famine and social unrest all over the world. Over the past few decades, the fight against rinderpest has moved from control to mass vaccinations and co-ordinated efforts at global level. The EU has been the leading force, contributing €390 million worldwide to rinderpest control and eradication over 50 years, helping partner countries to build sustainable capacity in animal health. In May 2011, rinderpest was officially declared eradicated by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). In accordance with the decision taken by the OIE World Assembly, member countries of the OIE are now exempted from annual reconfirmation for 'rinderpest free' status.

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Table 24 DCI Thematic - Breakdown by sector of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid in 2011



Bilateral and multilateral ODA (EuropeAid only).Including Food Facility.

438 M€, 37%

4 M€, 0%439 M€, 38%

149 M€, 13%

57 M€, 5%







353 M€, 35%

32 M€, 3%

179 M€, 18%111 M€, 11%

243 M€, 24%





€ million 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Commitments 834 956 1 854 1 204 1 173

Disbursements 745 838 1 233 1 210 1 044


Table 25 DCI Thematic - External aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid

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Table 26 DCI Thematic - General and sector budget support per country



Bhutan SBS

Environmental policy and administrative management

Global Climate Change Alliance - climate change adaptation in the renewable natural resources sector

4.40

Bolivia SBSAgricultural policy and Reponse to the food price crisis - reinforcement of

operations in health and food security - Bolivia4.00

Guyana SBSIndustrial crops/export crops Guyana Annual Action Plan 2011 on accompanying

measures on sugar 24.92

Jamaica SBS

Trade-related adjustment Accompanying measures for sugar protocol countries 2011 – Jamaica – Sector Budget Support

30.95

Mauritius GBSGeneral budget support 'Promoting Sustainable and Equitable

Development' 55.41

Mauritius GBSGeneral budget support General budget support - global climate change for

Mauritius 0.10

Samoa SBS

Water sector policy and administrative management

Global Climate Change Alliance:supporting climate change adaption for the Samoan water sector 3.00

Grand Total 122.79


2- Democracy and human rights Support for democracy at the forefront of EU development cooperation The EU has throughout 2011 put a stronger emphasis on offering assistance to democracy and human rights resulting in the adoption of its “Agenda for Change” and has strengthened political conditionality when offering direct budget support to partner countries worldwide. Closer to the EU, the events in the Arab world have confirmed the need to beef up its activities in the field of democracy support. The Joint Communication on the Southern Mediterranean of March 2011 committed the EU to support democratic processes that were sweeping the Arab world by fostering deep and sustainable democracy in the region. The further Joint Communication on the ENP in May 2011 also pledged increased EU financial assistance in return for democratic and socio-economic reforms in the countries of the EU's eastern and southern neighbourhood. As a result, the EU's activities in support of democratic processes, electoral and constitutional reform in the Arab world and further afield have been strengthened. So has the EU’s engagement with all the different democratic political actors and stakeholders, including civil society, media, parliaments and increasingly, political parties. As part of this effort, the EU has for the first time launched a dedicated global call for proposals through the EIDHR in June 2011, with a specific focus on democracy. It aims to support the activities of local civil society in the field of democratisation. The EU is increasingly putting in practice its comprehensive approach to democracy support, including through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and

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has led to results such as, among others, legislative changes (e.g. election laws in Moldova), reinforced political parties (e.g. in Tajikistan), increased participation of under-represented groups in political life (e.g. women in Azerbaijan and Ghana, youth in Kyrgyzstan and indigenous communities in Bolivia), safeguarding freedom of expression and a free press (e.g. in Côte d’Ivoire, enhancing citizens’ trust in electoral processes (e.g. in Bangladesh) and in better information, monitoring, and transparency of political activity (e.g. in the Philippines). The EIDHR works in synergy with the EU's other financial instruments and offers a comprehensive package of local actions to encourage political pluralism, empower disenfranchised groups, defend victims and promote dialogue, fostering mediation, transparency, accountability and consultation. Between 2007 and 2010, approximately €307 million funded over 700 democracy-related projects through the EIDHR.53 These covered various categories of actions: democracy building (€36 million), election related projects (€2.9 million), freedom of expression and association (€39.3 million), education to pro-democracy and civil society building (€37.9 million), operations in difficult situations and countries where human rights and democracy cannot be distinguished (€62.9 million) and EU election observation missions (€128 million). A good example of the comprehensive approach to democracy support is provided by Nigeria where the EU took the decision in 2011 to launch a €20 million (10th EDF) project to support the Nigerian electoral cycle 2012-2015. It specifically aims at the electoral reform process and some of the broader capacity building areas which will emanate from post-election audits, evaluations and reviews. The key beneficiaries include the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the parliament, the judiciary, political parties, CSOs, the media and the security sector. Electoral processes Elections are an essential component of democratic governance. Actions supporting genuine elections can make a relevant contribution to peace and development objectives. EU support for elections is provided in two complementary forms: electoral assistance and EU election observation missions. In 2011, the EU supported electoral processes in a number of countries including Haiti, DRC, Tunisia, Zimbabwe and El Salvador. Without reducing its worldwide effort and focus, the EU has been strengthening its support for the wave of democratisation that is taking place in the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Assistance is being provided, or prepared for the democratic reform processes in Jordan, Libya and Egypt. Knowledge and policy development, as well as collaboration with the main players in the electoral assistance domain, continue to be priorities for the EU. A thematic workshop on elections, violence and conflict prevention took place in June 2011, involving representatives of electoral commissions of many developing countries. The workshop, organised in collaboration with UNDP, produced a comprehensive summary report. General training on electoral assistance programmes implemented by UNDP in the context of the SPA between the UN and the EU was also organised at the beginning of 2011.

53 http://www.eidhr.eu/files/dmfile/EIDHR_DemocracyReport2.pdf

http://www.eidhr.eu/files/dmfile/EIDHR_DemocracyReport2.pdf

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Over the last six years (2005–2010), the EU has spent nearly €600 million – about €100 million a year – on electoral assistance. The money comes from geographic programmes, the Instrument for Stability and the EIDHR. It delivers capacity–building and technical and material support to electoral processes in nearly 60 countries. Almost two-thirds of the support was geared towards Sub–Saharan Africa. A big part went to post–conflict countries such as the DRC, Afghanistan, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and Iraq. Assisting the electoral process in Liberia After over a decade of civil war, Liberia embarked on the path to recovery in 2003 following the Accra peace agreement. The 2011 presidential and legislative elections, the second to be held since the war, were a major step forward in strengthening democratic processes. The EU allocated €7 million to a joint donors’ basket fund for electoral assistance (managed by the UNDP). It aims at deepening the democratisation process by supporting the NEC (National Election Commission) and core electoral stakeholders throughout the electoral process, contributing to electoral reform and enhancing the links between elections and parliamentary development. Overall, the project has improved administration of the elections in a challenging legal and logistical environment. The NEC showed lead and ownership throughout project implementation. This was facilitated by embedding the project's technical experts within the NEC's premises, resulting in an easy transfer of expertise. Coordination among international partners and complementarity of electoral support gave satisfactory results. Important lessons were learned through women's participation in elections and civic education on making improvements to the electoral process. The project continues until the end of 2012 with post-electoral activities, capacity development, an institutional review of the NEC and building on what has been learned. Key findings and recommendations of the EU election expert mission (EEM) will be fed into the exercise. Ensuring domestic accountability by strengthening parliaments The EU puts domestic accountability at the centre of its support for democracy the strengthening of parliaments is crucial in this regard. It is increasingly shifting the focus of its activities from strengthening the executive branch of government to activities that enhance the legislature and establish checks and balances. A comprehensive review was completed in 2011 which looks into how the EU has supported parliaments worldwide over the past decade and provides practical guidance for support to parliamentary institutions. The study showed that since 2000, the EU has spent close to €150 million on strengthening parliaments worldwide (excluding candidate countries and potential candidates to EU accession). Successful projects were those based on careful groundwork, where there was an understanding of the overall governance environment and of the motives of political actors. Such projects tended to take a longer–term approach and occurred where there is a positive environment for democratic development. They demonstrate strong national ownership, clear objectives, strong delegation of ownership, and thorough programme planning. The study further underlined the need to share best practices, to develop parliamentary support programmes in conjunction with other democracy support activities (e.g. support to civil society, political parties and the media), to focus predominantly on partner countries which show a commitment to democratic values and where there is an emphasis on democratic development in the bilateral political dialogue.

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This review process resulted in the publication of the EU reference document, “engaging and supporting parliaments worldwide: EU strategies and methodologies for action to support parliaments” which was extensively disseminated throughout 2011, including through a training module. The publication serves as a practical tool for EU staff and other stakeholders, presenting ways of engaging with and supporting parliaments in partner countries and is being used by EU Delegations. Support to the Parliament and institutionalisation of Kyrgyzstan’s new democratic constitution The popular revolution of 2010 halted the then executive’s attempts to re-impose authoritarian governance, and resulted in a provisional government charged with institutionalising a democratic order. The government and parliament have reached out to the EU for support in designing and implementing a new democratic order constituted as a parliamentary republic. Under the programme, the EU has supported parliament through three projects beginning in 2007 and continuing through to 2012. All three, worth €2 million, were delivered by UNDP and focused on: strengthening parliament’s legislative capacities, on public understanding of parliament’s work, and in enhancing parliament’s use of ICT; helping parliament meet its responsibilities outlined in the revised 2007 constitution, and covering legislation, oversight, and representation functions and supporting the institutionalisation of the legal framework underpinning the country’s new democratic constitution. EU support to the Kyrgyz parliament has enhanced the capacity of parliamentarians and parliamentary administration which in turn has improved the effectiveness and stature of the institution. It has supported critically important revisions to the constitution and is now helping to institutionalise the new democratic order. While Kyrgyzstan continues to face many challenges in its democratic transition, EU support has helped to strengthen parliament as a central democratic institution, enabling the country to preserve and extend democratic freedoms which stand out in a regional neighbourhood often characterised by authoritarian governance. Engaging with political parties EU support to political parties has predominantly been provided within broader electoral assistance projects. Following the Arab Spring, the EU has strengthened its engagement with political parties due to the crucial and multiple roles they play in fostering a democratic system of governance. The EU has only engaged with political parties that share democratic values, on the basis of a non-partisan approach and indirectly, through training programmes and other capacity-development activities (direct funding of political parties is prohibited under EU rules). The EU is increasingly supporting the introduction of legal or constitutional frameworks that empower democratic political parties and allow them to act as all-inclusive vehicles of representation. In particular, through the IfS and the EIDHR, the EU was swift in providing support to political parties in Tunisia and Egypt in the aftermath of the popular uprisings. This has notably been targeted towards domestic election observation and training for political parties. Such support has been granted as part of a broad democratisation package including constitutional and electoral reform, support to civil society watchdogs, the promotion of freedom of expression, support to media, civic education, etc.

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Table 27 EIDHR - Breakdown by sector of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid in 2011



Mains sectors : Government and civil society, Administratives costs related to EIDHRBilateral and multilateral ODA (EuropeAid only).

118 M€, 92%







88 M€, 91%





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Table 28 EIDHR - Breakdown by region of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid in 2011

Commitments ( € million)

Disbursements ( € million)

Beneficiary countries not identified at commitment stage. (multi-regional call for proposal)Bilateral and multilateral ODA (EuropeAid only).

3 M€ 2 M€

123 M€

ENPI East ENPI South

Asia Latin America

ACP Regional

14 M€, 14%

8 M€, 8%

15 M€, 15%

14 M€, 14%23 M€, 24%

24 M€, 25%


Asia Latin America

ACP Regional

€ millions 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Commitments 142 153 162 166 130

Disbursements 130 121 131 160 102


Table 29 EIDHR - External aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid

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3- Stability

3.1 Crisis response and preparedness During the year the EU had to address several major crises, including the Arab Spring upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East. The EU also responded to acute situations in Yemen, Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa as well as protracted crisis situations in Sub-Saharan Africa (notably the Sahel), Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and the West Bank/Gaza all of which required appropriate and sustained responses. As a key policy step, a new approach to crisis and fragility is a feature of the 2011 ‘Agenda for Change’ Communication. It contains a new approach recommending that human rights, democracy and good governance be given greater weight. The Communication also highlights the unique challenges of security, fragility and transition and the importance of state-building. The EU also adopted its Strategy on Security and Development in the Sahel and a comprehensive EU Strategy on the Horn of Africa. In the context of strengthening the EU response to crises, a unit on fragility and crisis management was set up in the newly formed European Commission Directorate General EuropeAid. Its task is to develop the policy framework for cooperation in situations of fragility or crisis, as well as to provide appropriate support, guidance and tools to headquarters and EU Delegations.

In addition, 2011 also signalled the creation of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), a new Commission service managing programmes such as the Instrument for Stability (IfS), with a crisis response and preparedness component with flexible and fast-track procedures to make critical contributions towards responding to crisis. The Instrument for Stability was set up in 2007 with a budget of €2 billion until 2013.

During the course of 2011, another feature associated with the significant upgrade in crisis response organisational capacities was the creation of a Crisis Management Board within the European External Action Service (EEAS). Its role is to co-ordinate measures related to conflict prevention, preparedness and responses to crises of all types. In response to specific crises, the Crisis Management Board establishes Crisis Platforms, as necessary, to bring together the EEAS services and relevant services of the European Commission and the Council Secretariat. In addition, the EEAS has recently created a new Situation Room to provide a 24/7 contact and information service to support services at headquarters, EU Delegations as well as other internal and external stakeholders. The major EU effort in 2011 to rationalise and coordinate the responses to crises has already had an impact on the EU’s aid to fragile and crisis areas: • In response to the Arab Spring, and particularly to the Libyan crisis, the EU reviewed the

aid priorities for the countries of the region to focus more on governance, employment and youth. The EU will allocate up to €1 billion in fresh money (€3.5 billion had already been allocated to the southern Mediterranean countries for 2011-2013);

• A severe humanitarian crisis struck the Horn of Africa in 2011, resulting from the worst drought in 60 years and governance/security problems in the region. In addition to EU humanitarian aid actions, development measures aimed at fostering peace and security,

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improving governance and building resilience were approved. Support was also given to AMISOM, the AU mission in Somalia, through the African Peace Facility (€115 million);

• The Commission allocated €285 million in 2010/2011 to support the new state of South Sudan, while future support for the preparation of a joint programming process is being launched with EU Member States.

• Under the "crisis response component" of the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the Commission committed €202.85 million for some 34 exceptional assistance measures in 21 different countries. These enabled the EU to help prevent, stabilise and respond in the short-term to crisis or emerging crisis situations linked to serious political conflicts as well as man-made and major natural disasters. For example, through the IfS, the Commission provided direct support to newly called elections resulting from the Arab Spring; it put specific emphasis on a strengthened participation of civil society in political transition processes (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya), including through a particular focus on women; measures were also mobilised in Côte d’Ivoire to support the new Ouattara Government and in the Democratic Republic of Congo to support Security Sector Reform. The IfS also supports projects on peace-building and conflict prevention which are implemented by international organisations and non-state actors (for example, in Bolivia, Timor-Leste, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Yemen), focusing inter alia on mediation and dialogue, situations of fragility and conflict, women peace and security, and human security.

The Commission also committed €15 million towards pre-crisis and post-crisis preparedness and related capacity-building in the framework of the so called Peace-building Partnership (PbP) under the IfS. Through this Partnership, the EU works with a wide range of stakeholders, including the United Nations, other international bodies, EU Member State agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other civil society actors. These coordinated approaches are a key step to ensuring more efficient aid as demonstrating solidarity towards populations in fragile and crisis situations requires greater synergies, cooperation and exchanges between aid donors.

3.2 Global and regional trans-border challenges Global and regional trans–border challenges are addressed by actions funded under the long–term component of the IfS. These cover trans–regional security threats, as well as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks. CBRN risk mitigation A total of €21.5 million was earmarked for up to four new regional centres of excellence on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats in cooperation with the UN and other major donors located in the Middle East, the Mediterranean basin, the southern Caucasus and Central Asia. They could also play a role in linking the external and internal dimensions of CBRN risk mitigation. To strengthen the analytical capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the EU is contributing €5 million to support the IAEA safeguards analytical laboratory. Trans–regional threats

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The EU co-operates with the regional centre on small arms and light weapons (RECSA) in southern and eastern Africa. RECSA is engaged in the fight against illicit trade in and excessive accumulation of firearms – including activities to strengthen law enforcement agencies' cooperation, training on marking and tracing techniques, and awareness–raising. The IfS is supporting the establishment of a database managed by Interpol to track illicit trafficking of stolen or lost firearms. The EU supports a counter–terrorism programme for the Sahel region, including Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The first phase of the programme has a budget of €4.5 million. It is timely, given the deteriorating security in the Sahel, and is part of a broader EU effort to support this volatile region. The second phase of the trans–regional cocaine route programme – with a total budget of €19 million – is funding capacity-building measures in Latin America, the Caribbean and, in particular, West Africa. It involves law enforcement authorities from EU Member States. In addition, the IfS critical maritime routes programme (€14 million) is helping to build the capacities of coastal states around the Horn of Africa to counter piracy and other forms of organised crime through improved maritime surveillance and training in maritime law enforcement. Support for investigations into piracy organisers and funders has been initiated with Interpol. Beyond the western Indian Ocean, the IfS supports a €500 000 project of the International Maritime Organisation (IOM) in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to increase the preparedness and response capabilities of coastal states against incidents involving hazardous and noxious substances. The programme is also running in the Gulf of Guinea. Through the IfS expert support facility on trans–regional threats and threat–preparedness, about 100 experts from 17 EU Member States belonging to 60 organisations and institutions have carried out more than 100 fact-finding visits and missions to west Africa, north Africa and the Middle East, the Sahel, Southeast Asia, central and south America and the Caribbean. The EU CBRN-centres of excellence initiative, implemented jointly by the Commission and UNICRI54, helps institutional capacity building to mitigate CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) risk in third partner countries55. In 2011, the initiative established five regional secretariats and approved 23 capacity building projects that will start in 2012.

54 UNICRI United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 55 http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/

http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/

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Table 30 IFS - Breakdown by sector of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid and FPI in 2011



Bilateral and multilateral ODA (EuropeAid + DG FPI)

169.9 M€, 72%

8.9 M€, 4%

58.0 M€, 24%

Social infrastructures: education, health,water, government and civil society, other






91.8 M€, 69%

0.2 M€, 0%

0.1 M€, 0%

41.4 M€, 31%Social infrastructures: education, health,water, government and civil society, other




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Table 31 IFS - Breakdown by region of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid and FPI in 2011




53.9 M€, 28%

25.3 M€, 13%83.7 M€, 44%

27.7 M€, 15%


Asia Latin America

ACP Regional

14.6 M€, 11%

22.1 M€, 17%

51.7 M€, 41%

6.3 M€, 5%

29.2 M€, 23%

3.8 M€, 3%


Asia Latin America

ACP Regional

€ millions 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Commitments 137 181 187 224 291

Disbursements 49 129 144 154 174


Table 32 IFS - External aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid and FPI

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4- Nuclear safety The instrument for nuclear safety co-operation (INSC 2007-2013) came into force in 2007. Its main objectives are the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient safeguards of nuclear material in non-EU countries worldwide. It substantially extended its geographical coverage in 2011. In addition, the EU continued its support for finalising the nuclear safety projects under the TACIS programme (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States i.e. the countries of the former Soviet Union). The principal development on nuclear safety cooperation and assistance under the new instrument in 2011 was a reorientation of nuclear safety cooperation towards third countries' regulatory authorities and radioactive waste management and site remediation. Following the Fukushima-Daiichi accident in March 2011, the EU participated in the discussion aimed at extending a comprehensive safety assessment of operating nuclear power plants including a peer review of national reports to EU neighbourhood countries, the so-called 'stress tests'. Switzerland and Ukraine are following the same schedule for the stress tests as within the EU. Armenia and Ukraine benefit from support to carry them out in the framework of the INSC. In Ukraine, the principal beneficiary of INSC support, the EU has continued to co-operate with the regulator and the operator in improving nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and nuclear safeguards in general. The EU provided €14 million in know-how and equipment to complete the Zaporozhye national training centre for local power plant personnel. Significant financial support was provided to the Chernobyl projects through the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF) and the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), managed by the EBRD on behalf of the donor countries. The pledging conference in Kiev in April 2011, coinciding with the commemorations of the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, was highly successful in raising the required €740 million needed to complete the project. The Commission pledge amounted to €122 million in accordance with the historical burden sharing among the former G7 members. The stabilisation works of the existing shelter of the Chernobyl unit 4 were completed in 2011 and the preparation of the site for the assembly of the new safe confinement is presently approaching completion, foreseen for 2015. In Armenia, important projects have been launched for the operation of the Medzamor nuclear power plant addressing emergency planning, staff training, development of inspection procedures, seismic safety analysis, quality management and a radioactive waste strategy. In Belarus and Georgia, co-operation continued with projects to support the regulatory authorities as well as the safety assessment of a disposal site and a related interim storage facility. In 2011, no mutual agreement was reached to allow new projects to be started under INSC in the Russian Federation, but the ongoing TACIS projects will be completed. The cooperation projects under INSC in 2011 have started to support the capacity building of nuclear regulators in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. The recent political events in the region have increased the need for support but, at the same time, delayed funding. An ongoing capacity building project in Iraq (in the framework of the IfS priority 1) will be followed by a project to design an engineered disposal facility for radioactive waste resulting from the de-commissioning of closed nuclear installations. Projects were launched in Brazil and contacts were established in Mexico.

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Cooperation with the IAEA has been extended to support thematic technical activities at country or regional level, aimed at a further development of the safety culture, capacity building of national nuclear safety regulators and the safety of research reactors. In China, cooperation was initiated with the regulator and technical support organisations. This is aimed at enhancing the nuclear safety regulatory regime as well as strengthening China's preparedness for severe accidents and to help develop a strategy for the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.

Table 33 NSI - Breakdown by sector of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid in 2011



Main sector : Nuclear power plantsBilateral and multilateral ODA (EuropeAid only).

74.6 M€, 98%

1.2 M€, 2% Social infrastructures: education, health,water, government and civil society, other






55.9 M€, 98%

1.1 M€, 2%Social infrastructures: education, health,water, government and civil society, other




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Table 34 NSI - Breakdown by region of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid in 2011




19.9 M€, 26%

11.0 M€, 14%

2.0 M€, 3%

42.9 M€, 57%


Asia Latin America

ACP Regional

48.3 M€, 85%

0.5 M€, 1%

0.8 M€, 1%

7.3 M€, 13%


Asia Latin America

ACP Regional

€ million 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Commitments 78.01 72.49 74.89 70.63 75.87

Disbursements 56.27 76.33 76.94 88.80 69.56


Table 35 NSI - External aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid.

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5- Humanitarian assistance 5.1. Introduction The EU is the world's leading humanitarian donor. In the Commission, the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) is responsible for formulating policy and funding humanitarian aid in non-EU countries. It also helps to facilitate coordination with and among EU Member States. The overall priority is to ensure that aid is managed in the most effective and efficient way possible so that it has the maximum effect, whilst respecting the principles of international law and the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity and independence. Since 2010, the mandate of DG ECHO encompasses humanitarian assistance and civil protection, the two main instruments at the EU's disposal to ensure rapid and effective delivery of relief assistance to people faced with the immediate consequences of disasters. The civil protection instrument covers interventions inside and outside the EU. 5.2. Implementation of humanitarian aid and civil protection In 2011, the global humanitarian context remained challenging with humanitarian needs outstripping available resources. The impact of the famine provoked by the drought and complicated by conflict in the Horn of Africa, the internal conflict in Libya and the triple disaster caused by the 9.0 magnitude earthquake in Japan; coming on top of many protracted humanitarian crises, has stretched the response capacity of international humanitarian community to its limits. The Commission rationalised its decision-making in humanitarian aid in 2011, which resulted in a quicker and streamlined aid delivery. At the same time, it increased its initial budget for humanitarian aid on several occasions in order to respond to urgent needs. At the end of the year, the EU's response to new or protracted crises totalled €1.154 billion and consisted of: providing humanitarian assistance to more than 115 million people in 91 third countries and territories and activating the civil protection mechanism for 27 crises inside and outside the EU.

Natural disasters continued to create severe damage throughout the world. The Commission provided humanitarian assistance to cope with the consequences of disasters, including: floods in Bangladesh, India, Peru and Sri Lanka; cyclones/hurricanes/tropical storms in South East Asia (i.e. Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam), in Central America (i.e. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua) and in the Caribbean (St Lucia); droughts in Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania and Zimbabwe and epidemics in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire. The civil protection mechanism was activated 27 times to respond, for example, to the explosion at a naval base in Cyprus, forest fires in Greece and Albania, floods in Pakistan, an earthquake in Turkey and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, as well as the evacuation of EU citizens and third country nationals during the crisis in Libya. EU civil protection

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assistance is based on resources made available by the 31 states56 participating in the mechanism, following a request from the government of the country struck by disaster. In terms of 'man-made crises', the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire became a major humanitarian crisis and the popular uprising in Libya triggered a humanitarian emergency. These two, among other, major man-made crises in 2011 also affected neighbouring countries. In addition to these crises, the Commission had to respond to several protracted and complex emergencies, for example in Sudan and South Sudan, in the occupied Palestinian territory and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. One of the main challenges continues to be access in situations where the humanitarian space is under threat. The general lack of security and the targeting of humanitarian workers remained major sources of concern. The Commission also pays particular attention to forgotten crises that have been neglected or overlooked by others. In 2011, it identified ten such crises including the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and civilians affected by internal armed conflict in Colombia and the Central African Republic (CAR). Following its needs-based approach, humanitarian and civil protection assistance were provided to the following regions (in € million): Table 36:

56 27 EU Member States, Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Croatia

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Region/country Amount %

Africa 556 48%Sudan & Chad 181

Central Africa 80

Horn of Africa 181

Southern Africa, Indian Ocean 10

West Africa 104Middle East, Mediterranean 156 14%Middle East 86 791

Mediterranean 69 000Asia, Pacific 238 21%Central and South West Asia 127

Central South Asia 54

South East Asia and Pacific 58Latin America, Caribbean 80 7%Latin America 35

Caribbean 45Worldwide disasters 10 1%Civil protection 31 3%Inside EU 17

Outside EU 14Worldwide (capacity building, technical assistance, support, etc) 83 7%

TOTAL 1 154 100% For more information, see DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection's annual report available on its website57. Beyond disaster response, the Commission equally strives to enhance disaster prevention and preparedness – both within the EU and beyond – especially in regions prone to natural disasters. Disaster risk reduction and adaptation to climate change was a clear focus for funding in 2011. The Commission launched new DIPECHO programmes in South Asia, South America, Pacific and the Caribbean. It also mainstreams risk reduction into overall aid operations. 5.3. Humanitarian assistance and civil protection priorities At the policy level, the Commission focused on the following strategic initiatives in 2011:

57 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/annual_reports_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/annual_reports_en.htm

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• Presentation of a legislative proposal on a Union civil protection mechanism with the aim to substantially strengthen the existing instruments. At present, the deployment of EU civil protection assets is based on largely ad hoc voluntary offers from participating states. Though the EU civil protection mechanism plays an important role in supporting, coordinating and complementing the process of mutual assistance, the Commission proposes to move to a system which is pre-planned and immediate.

• In this context, preparations have started to set up an emergency response centre in 2012 to allow for a more pro-active role in planning, preparing, operational co-ordination and logistical support.

• The establishment of a European voluntary humanitarian aid corps, as required by the Lisbon Treaty (article 214.5). In 2011, DG ECHO initiated a public consultation and an impact assessment and launched pilot projects. The results of these activities will feed into a proposal in 2012 for a legislative framework setting up the corps.

The Commission also put particular emphasis on selected horizontal policy priorities, in line with the commitments of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid58 and its action plan. These policy priorities include, for example, the further roll-out of the EU humanitarian food assistance policy. The negotiations for the modernisation of the food aid convention took place against this background. In order to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of joint efforts to meet food security and nutrition needs, the Commission signed a statement of intent on programmatic cooperation on food security and nutrition with three UN agencies: FAO, WFP and IFAD. From humanitarian aid to development cooperation: improving the process In 2011, Commission Directorates-General EuropeAid and Humanitarian aid (ECHO) gave a new impetus to their common work on linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD), aiming to ensure smoother transitions between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, in a process focused on building resilience. In this framework, EuropeAid and ECHO coordinated with the EEAS an approach to LRRD agenda from three angles, to be pursued in 2012. At the conceptual level, the work focused on the need to develop a "policy" understanding and an operational framework, where building resilience, addressing vulnerabilities and creating the capacity in partner countries to respond to emergencies should be an integral part of EU development aid programming, and a shared priority for humanitarian and development actors in countries facing disasters and repeated or protracted crises. In terms of financial instruments and methodology for programming, priority has been given to addressing flexibility in the new financial instruments as well as at programming level, in order to tackle more effectively unforeseen needs or transition challenges. Particular attention has been paid to the development of a common methodology for the design of Humanitarian-Development Joint Frameworks, which are processes that gather humanitarian and development actors to assess and define the backdrop against which each can place its respective actions. The result is a smoother transition, increased impact, and coherence and sustainability of respective actions. Increasingly, the application of the humanitarian-

58 OJ 2008/C/25/01 of 30.01.2008

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development framework is required for country-level assistance, for instance under the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) of the DCI where support to countries in fragile situations is specifically focused on ensuring that food security is addressed in LRRD contexts. In the case of building resilience during chronic food crises, the Commission considers that this is best achieved through a shift to long-term approaches managed through geographic programmes, integrated into indicative country or regional programmes. The pilot on FSTP support to fragile countries serves as an example of focus on LRRD relating to other domains of intervention being, where appropriate, mainstreamed effectively to also cover other sectors and programmes (both geographic and thematic). The joint EuropeAid – ECHO efforts resulted into concrete implementation at country level; in several cases, innovative approaches were initiated in areas such as the Sahel and Horn of Africa, as well as Sri Lanka, where the development and humanitarian responses started being better articulated.

6- Macro-financial assistance Macro-financial assistance (MFA) is an external financial instrument to countries close to the EU, addressing exceptional external financing needs in the form of balance of payment support. MFA therefore strengthens macroeconomic and financial stability in countries neighbouring, or geographically close to the EU, while encouraging the implementation of appropriate structural reforms. It complements and is conditional to the existence of an adjustment and reform programme with the IMF. MFA can take the form of grants, financed by the EU budget, or loans, for which the Commission borrows the necessary funds in capital markets and on-lends them to the beneficiary country. MFA is currently subject to case-by-case legislative decisions, taken jointly by the European Parliament and the Council through the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision). In 2011, the Commission proposed to streamline the decision-taking process by adopting on 4 July a proposal for a framework regulation for MFA. The proposed framework Regulation aims to make MFA faster, more transparent and more effective by speeding up the decision-making process for individual MFA operations and laying down the key rules governing MFA in a formal legal act. In 2011, the Commission submitted two formal proposals for new MFA operations: to extend MFA to Georgia for €23 million in grants and €23 million in loans submitted on 13 January 2011, and to extend an exceptional MFA to the Kyrgyz Republic for €15 million in grants and €15 million in loans submitted on 20 December 2011. These are pending adoption by the European Parliament and the Council. Regarding the implementation of already approved MFA operations in 2011: on the Armenia MFA, the Commission finalised the memorandum of understanding with the Armenian authorities and disbursed the first tranche in July – a €14 million grant and €26 million loan. The disbursement of the second tranche – a €21 million grant and €39 million loan – was agreed in December. The grant part was effectively disbursed on 27 December 2011, while the loan part is scheduled to be paid in January 2012. Regarding the MFA to Serbia, the disbursement of a €100 million loan to the Serbian authorities was made in July 2011, completing this MFA operation, as the second tranche of the same amount was cancelled, due to Serbia's lower external financing needs and its decision not to draw fully on programmed

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IMF disbursements. On the Moldova MFA, the Commission executed the second tranche consisting of a €20 million grant in September 2011. The implementation of the MFA to Ukraine approved in 2010 – together with the funds available from a previous operation approved in 2002, amounting to €610 million in loans – has been delayed due to the lack of agreement with the Ukrainian authorities on certain conditions of the memorandum of understanding. The first tranche of MFA operation for Bosnia and Herzegovina approved in 2009 (amounting to up to €100 million in loans) has not been disbursed so far due to non-compliance with one of the first tranche conditions.

CHAPTER 4 - MANAGING AID FOR RESULTS

1- Monitoring project performance

1.1 Performance measurement: Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) For more than 10 years, the Commission's Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) system has been used to assess the performance of projects funded by the EU. As such, it forms a part of the overall quality assurance cycle, which starts during the design of projects and ends after their implementation. The ROM system is based on onsite visits where experts interview staff involved in projects and programmes, review key project documents, and most importantly, interview relevant stakeholders, including the beneficiaries. The methodology is based on internationally (OECD/DAC) agreed evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. ROM reports are disseminated by the EU to project managers, partner governments and other stakeholders. ROM provides benefits: – At the level of a project or programme: it gives feedback to project managers on the performance of the operations under their responsibility and gives recommendations on how to improve them, if necessary. – It provides a statistical overview of the performance of the EU development aid portfolio with data allowing comparison over time, across regions, between sectors etc. – At the level of programming and learning: quantitative and qualitative studies based on ROM data can contribute lessons learned and best practices to the programming and planning of new projects. ROM performance in 2011 In 2011, a set of new contracts were launched to conduct the ROM exercises in the different regions and for centrally managed thematic programmes. Over 1 000 ongoing projects and 182 regional programmes and 15 sector policy support programmes (SPSP) were assessed in 2011. In addition, 162 closed projects and 22 Regional Programmes were assessed ex-post, i.e. after their closure to focus specifically on impact and sustainability. The ROM system covered in 2011 roughly one-third of development cooperation interventions, representing in financial terms one quarter of the total portfolio.

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Table 37- Overview of ROM activities

Nb of Projects & Programmes monitored ENPI Africa Asia &

Central Asia Latin America CMTP Caribbea

n Pacific Total 2011

Ong

oing

National projects 205 421 223 122 2 43 51 1067

Regional programmes (as a whole) 38 25 19 31 55 9 6 183

Regional programme components 41 24 43 20 89 6 12 235

SPSP - 7 - 2 - 6 - 15

Million € covered Ongoing 808.52 2,882.27 873.99 546.10 162.00 345.37 144.05 5,762.30

Ex-P

ost Closed projects/programmes 33 49 50 4359 4 7 7 193

Million € covered Ex-Post 94.54 213.80 238.51 262.48 6.40 31.03 9.50 856.26

Table 38- Overall performance of ongoing national projects by category

6% 6% 8% 8%

19% 18%19% 19%

71% 73% 70% 70%

3% 3% 3% 3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2008 2009 2010 2011

(I) Very good performance(II) Good performance(II I) Performing with Problems(IV) Not performing or major di ffi cul ties

Of the projects subject to an assessment by ROM, a large majority was considered very good or good. Over the last three years, the percentage of projects rated as very good or good remains constant (between 73% and 76%) while projects facing major difficulties counted for only 6 to 8% of those reviewed. The figures for 2010 and 2011 are virtually the same. For analytical purposes, as well as to identify projects which need specific attention, it is useful to zoom in on the performance category II ("good performance") which contains the large majority of projects/programmes. Among the projects rated as having “good

59 Some of the projects assessed by ROM Ex-Post in Latin America were grouped in one ROM report. 40 reports covered 43 projects.

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performance”, close to a half have not received any grade highlighting problems. Even though room for improvement might exist for these interventions, they appeared fully on track. A quarter of the good projects showed problems in two areas of assessment, which should be addressed to ensure the project's proper implementation. Table 39 - Performance by evaluation criteria - very good and good ratings for ongoing national projects

ROM assessment: Very good and good grades by evaluation criteria (national projects)

9% 6% 5% 8% 4%

72%

54% 55%

70%

58%

Relevance Efficiency Effectiveness Impact Sustainability


81%

64%60%

78%68%

The performance of projects assessed by ROM in 2011 shows best results for the criteria relevance and potential impact. However, it should be stressed that the under the "relevance" criterion, ROM takes into consideration two specific dimensions: “relevance" and "quality of design". If "relevance" scores very highly (96% of good and very good, "design" has lower scores (72% of good and very good). This confirms the importance of the ex-ante quality assessment. In this respect, the Commission has put in place a quality check system, through the oQSG. Its impact on the improvement of the quality of design of projects which since have started to be implemented should be measured and analysed through the ROM system. Table 40- Project performance by for selected ODA (sub-) sectors

Performance category of ongoing (national) projects by sector


Good performance


Not performing or major difficulties

N° reports produced

I II III IV

Education 5% 68% 21% 5% 56 Health 7% 76% 12% 5% 58 Water and Sanitation 2% 75% 20% 3% 59 Government and Civil Society 2% 68% 20% 10% 326

Other Social Infrastructure and 3% 75% 14% 8% 59

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Services

Economic Infrastructure and Services 6% 71% 15% 8% 107 Production sectors 3% 60% 28% 10% 134 Multi-sector – Cross-cutting 3% 68% 19% 10% 120 Commodity Aid + General Programme Assistance 3% 77% 18% 3% 77 New developments in 2011 Internal Monitoring In 2011, a new guidance document on "Strengthening Internal Monitoring" and an associated toolkit have been developed and will be tested, finalised and sent in 2012 to the Delegations. In addition, within the framework of the ‘control pyramid’ system, introduced in 2011, the task-managers in Delegations are assessing twice annually the performance of the projects and programmes they are in charge of, by means of a ‘traffic light’ system. This will serve as an early warning system to identify projects with problems and to enable corrective measures. Delegations also need to produce and regularly update a monitoring work plan. Assessment of ROM and project evaluations During the implementation of projects and programmes the Commission uses two different tools to assess the performance and to identify where there is room for improvement: on the one hand, the ROM system with its brief, highly structured format managed centrally by headquarters; on the other hand, most of the project/programme evaluations are managed by the Delegations and are more in-depth. There has, however, not been a systematic coordination or a clear division of labour between the two tools. Audits by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the Commission's internal audit capability gave recommendations echoing the results of a study on ROM and project evaluations which were concluded in 2010. While accountability requires an objective and independent assessment, support to project management is more effective if an evaluation is participatory, makes use of the experience and expertise of the people involved and assures that the results are agreed upon by all stakeholders. With this in view, the Commission has embarked on a critical reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of ROM and of project evaluations. The Commission is developing an IT application for both project/programme evaluations and ROM, as part of a wider new information management system, called PCM platform, which will serve as the central tool for operational management of Commission interventions throughout their lifecycle. The application aims to facilitate planning and co-ordination, support the management of evaluations, serve as a central storage point for all reports and enable advanced search and analysis functionalities. The IT development is ongoing with a pilot test expected in 2012. Outlook for 2012 Based on the critical reflection being carried out on the strengths and weaknesses of ROM and of project evaluations, a proposal for an improved monitoring and evaluation system will

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be presented in 2012 to Commission management. In October 2011, in its communication on the Agenda for Change, the Commission proposed to work on a common results measurement and reporting framework. In November, it organised an initial meeting of an EU experts group on results. The aim was to reflect on common approaches in this field, including the work which the group could undertake to contribute to the thinking on and development of country results and accountability agreements for which building blocks had been provided in the run-up to and during the Busan High Level Forum. This meeting confirmed the overall impression of the diversity of approaches across donors and the relevance of more convergence in results measuring and reporting.

1.2 Evaluation: Review of the work carried out The overall picture The evaluation unit manages three main kinds of strategic evaluations: geographic (covering activities at country and regional level), thematic and sector, as well as evaluations covering aid delivery mechanisms (issues concerning project-level evaluations are dealt within the section on project results). Since 2010, the Commission has intensified the use of joint evaluations carried out with several other donors. Evaluations are carried out by independent external consultants following a standardised methodology in a transparent way. All evaluation reports are available on the Commission's Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid website60.

The 2011 work programme The evaluation programme for 2011 is the fifth annual programme under the indicative multi-annual evaluation programme for the period 2007-2013. Four geographic evaluations were completed in 2011: Tunisia, Dominican Republic, OCTs and Malawi. At the end of 2011, 13 geographical evaluations were ongoing: Burundi (jointly with six EU Member States), the Caribbean region, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Djibouti, Ecuador, European Neighbourhood policy regions (East and South), Ethiopia, Honduras, Jamaica, Nepal, Philippines and Zambia. Three thematic evaluations were completed: conflict prevention and peace building, justice and security system reform and employment and social inclusion. At the end of 2011, seven thematic evaluations were ongoing: agricultural commodities in ACP countries, health, human rights and fundamental freedoms, integrated border management, private sector, support to the de-centralisation process and trade-related assistance. On the aid modalities Two pilot evaluations on budget support in Mali and Tunisia were completed in 2011. The methodological approach will be refined at the beginning of 2012 to take into account the lessons learned from these pilot studies. This refined approach should be applied from 2012. A joint evaluation of budget support in Tanzania was launched in 2011. To support the preparation of the MFF post-2013, a study on legal instruments and lessons learned from the evaluations managed by the evaluation unit was finalised in 2011. Three

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other evaluations on aid modalities are expected to be completed in 2012: visibility of the EU's external action, technical co-operation and cooperation with the Council of Europe. With regard to dissemination and feedback mechanisms, seven seminars have been organised in countries to discuss the evaluation findings for Congo (Brazzaville), the Dominican Republic Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi, overseas countries and territories and Tunisia. Two seminars were organised in Brussels to share the results of thematic evaluations: conflict prevention and peace building and education. Seven "fiches contradictoires" have been published to ensure follow-up of previous evaluation reports.

Lessons learned from evaluations finalised in 2011 Geographical evaluations Tunisia (1995-2008): The EU's aid has largely contributed to the implementation of institutional, economic and education sector reforms. Continuous support to the development of human resources has contributed to reaching remarkable results. Nevertheless, there is a need to boost the employability of qualified people and reinforce territorial cohesion. Difficult dialogue with the national government hampered the support to governance and democratic processes. Regarding the programmes’ management, there was a good articulation between the different co-operation instruments. Dominican Republic (2001-2009): The EU’s aid contributed to reducing poverty in key sectors, but has not specifically targeted the socio-equity gap. The sustainability of some results remains weak, primarily, but not only, due to the government’s inadequate financial support to most sectors in which the Commission has operated (education, natural resources management and the DR-Haiti border zone development). Therefore, the EU should continue with the current strategy while increasingly focusing on capacity development of the various local stakeholders and investing in robust monitoring and evaluation systems.

Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) (1999-2008): The EU has been consistent with the EU policy objectives of promoting economic and social development in the OCTs and bringing the islands economically closer to the EU. In the area of trade, the EU preference regime did not sufficiently counter-balance economic diversification constraints. The involvement of the OCTs in regional programmes was minimised by isolation from regional networking, high participation costs and sometimes by language barriers. Fewer results than expected were achieved on climate change and disaster crisis management. EU support for management and delivery mechanisms has been less conducive to the achievements of the cooperation's objectives.

Malawi (2003-2010): Although EU cooperation has responded well to the country's long-term needs, certain aid modalities could be improved by adapting to evolving needs. The support has contributed to improved access and availability of food. It has been successful in reducing malnutrition in children less than five years of age. EU aid has positively contributed to the maintenance of the existing road network, yet little has been achieved in terms of wider regional connectivity. Budget support has proved to be a powerful tool which has contributed to macro-economic stabilisation.

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Thematic and sector evaluations and analysis

Evaluation of support for conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB) (2001-2010): The Commission has significantly increased its focus on CPPB (reflected in a total of €7.7bn of funding over the period) and strengthened its policy framework. However, the conceptual orientations at policy level have not always been appropriated at operational level. The support often remained in a developmental perspective. The Commission needs to clarify its role and focus on crisis management and causes of conflict, consolidate and further develop its support for CPPB and ensure that its financial support is sufficiently complemented and leveraged by non-financial support. Justice sector and security reform (JSSR) (2001-2009): The EU substantially increased its funding (amounting to €1 billion), developed a concept to support JSSR and engaged in a wide range of assistance activities. However, the EU's support has generally not been geared towards enhancing the delivery of services in a manner responsive to people's needs. The weaknesses of the EU policy framework and internal capacity limitations hampered the support's impact and prevented the EU from bringing all its potential added value. Employment and social inclusion (ESI) (1999-2009): ESI is a significant priority in development policy and in programmes. Nevertheless, there has been a weak mainstreaming of ESI in EU-supported programmes and a poor sector or thematic approach including a lack of ESI-related indicators. Moreover, the informal economy was often overlooked. EU support to trade development, macro-economic stability and growth contributed to creating new employment opportunities. However, few of these interventions focused explicitly on employment creation. Technical and vocational education and training support policies contributed to improving "employability". The EU has focused positively on the social cohesion of vulnerable groups and on labour market governance.

Aid modalities evaluations Key lessons learned on budget support from three country evaluations

• Budget support is an effective tool in countries where the government has the capacity and the determination to put in place robust development policies.

• It benefits from complementarity with other forms of aid, especially for capacity-building. • It is more beneficial with higher degrees of harmonisation and alignment. • It cannot determine major policy changes but can provide sound support to policy

implementation, not possible with a projects-only approach. • Its effect is strengthened and multiplied when it is linked to wider political and economic

partnerships. • Budget support can increase transparency and accountability of budget processes and

public expenditure management and may therefore be used to support anti-corruption policies.

• The choice between general and sector budget support should be flexible and context-based.

Evaluation of budget support operations in Tunisia (1996-2008): Thanks to complementarity of budget support with a long-term economic and political partnership established by the association agreement, Tunisia experienced significant results in terms of economic growth, private sector development and poverty reduction. The EU-funded sectoral

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budget support for education and vocational training has contributed to an initial modernisation of the national school system and to significant improvements in access, including territorial equity. The joint evaluation of budget support operations in Mali 2003-2009 found that the financial contribution of budget support has contributed to an annual economic growth rate of 5% over this period, but that the driving force of the prudent macro-economic policy was not policy dialogue but the authorities' own commitment backed by the political commitment to the WAEMU convergence criteria and to the IMF. The additional financing has also contributed to positive outcomes in the education sector – the overall enrolment rate went up from 64% to 81% while the repetition rate fell from 20% to 14% and the completion rate increased from 40% to 56%. There were good results in the health sector too with prenatal consultations increasing from 54% to 90%.

Study on legal instruments (DCI, ENPI, EIDHR, IfS, INSC and ICI): The logic of the objectives for the instruments could be substantially improved. This would make the measures intended to achieve objectives clearer, and secondly, make the evaluation of progress easier. There is an obvious degree of convergence between what was expected and what occurred, but not all results are positive. The sizeable proportion of mixed results indicates room for improvement in both programming and implementation. There was also a lack of evidence on linkages and inter-relations between the six legal instruments at the operational level.

Outlook for 2012 The evaluation programme for 2012 follows the structure laid out in the multi-annual evaluation programme for 2007-2013, with some adjustments with regard to the future Commission/EU orientations and international commitments (Agenda for change, communication on budget support, MDG/SDG (sustainable development goals), the new draft guidelines on programming and implementation). In partnership with the quality of delivery system unit, the evaluation unit is currently working on a reform of the monitoring and evaluation system.

1.3 Lessons learned The "Fiches Contradictoires", a key tool to ensure the follow-up of evaluation recommendations The "Fiche Contradictoire” is a document which follows up on evaluation recommendations. It is prepared by the services in charge of implementing them. It sets out the main recommendations, actions taken and describes the follow-up to these actions one year later. Every “Fiche Contradictoire” is available on the evaluation unit’s website61. A large majority of the recommendations are accepted and implemented by the services concerned.

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Synthesis of main lessons learned

• In terms of relevance and design, the EU interventions address the needs of the partner's countries and population and are consistent with EU goals.

• The efficiency of EU interventions could be improved by making administrative procedures more flexible and ensuring a better monitoring of interventions. On the other hand, improving the mix of aid modalities (budget support, budget lines, twinning, etc.) has enhanced efficiency at a strategic level.

• Budget support has proven to be an effective tool for the implementation of public

financial management and other reforms where government were committed thereto, but budget support programmes cannot be used to "buy" reforms.

• Being generally effective, the EU interventions generate positive impact, as concluded

in most of the reports, although the spread of EU funds over too many areas may limit it. The EU should work on concentrating its funding in the areas where its added-value is most likely to materialise.

• The impact of interventions could be strengthened by enhancing the consistency of

strategies and programmes: with other donors through joint programming and clear division of labour; with EU Member States through common strategies on sensitive issues such as human rights and governance; internally, at a geographic level, by ensuring a better linkage between regional and national programming and on a sector level by looking for synergies between the different sectors.

• Sustainability of EU projects and programmes needs to be better monitored, as in

many countries the ownership by the partner country is not always demonstrated. Budget support appears to be more successful in this respect.

2- Aid delivery modalities

2.1 Developments in aid delivery modalities and channels The Commission continues to be committed to further improvement and strengthening of its internal quality support tools as well its efforts in relation to accountability and results monitoring. In the recent past, it has engaged in reform of its processes in to order to make them simpler, focused on quality, capacity and results, and in line with internationally-agreed objectives on aid effectiveness. The Commission has also developed more dynamic forms of partnership with beneficiaries and with other donors and has simplified its procedures and clarified the rules for delivery and implementation.

- Programme and project cycle management (PPCM) Improvements to the methods for the design and implementation of actions are in preparation, revising existing guidance on programme and project cycle management (PPCM). The revised guidance will replace and update three sets of guidelines to ensure greater coherence of approaches. Important innovations will include a greater focus on analysing the country

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and sector context of operations in advance of decisions being taken with a better risk management system to include new tools, such as analysis of the political economy. Development of the elements of PPCM and its associated tools takes place through of research and testing involving EU Delegations, Member States and international partners. In 2011, preparations included a number of research seminars on political economy, policy dialogue and risk management as well as case studies and recognition of the substantial work carried out in the PPCM technical annexes.

- Capacity development

Capacity is one of the essential drivers of development, and therefore a key element of aid delivery quality. The Commission has made efforts to improve the quality of its cooperation for enhanced capacity development. In 2011, ongoing work in the area converged:

• Stocktaking of the technical cooperation reform initiated in 2008; • Development of the EU’s own capacity through knowledge exchange and networking; • Preparation of the Busan HLR on aid effectiveness.

Stocktaking of technical cooperation reform for capacity development: 2011 has been an opportunity to look back on technical co-operation reform and to draw lessons which were voiced at the knowledge and innovation space in Busan. The trigger factors for reform were the aid effectiveness agenda and a report from the European Court of Auditors published in 2007. This highlighted that a significant part of EU programmes were not focusing enough on capacity development and that technical assistants were often engaged in substitution activities. The change in strategy has been twofold: changing practices (new guidance based on quality criteria such as ownership) and a change of mind set (dissemination, website, etc.). In 2011, the results of the reform began to emerge. An analysis compiling the statistics of approximately 1000 projects monitored against five quality criteria is ongoing and conclusions should be drawn during 2012. The first preliminary findings revealed that 97% of EU programmes contribute, or have the potential to contribute, to capacity development. Furthermore, it would seem that forms of support with no direct technical co-operation component, such as working through NGOs, may also provide good results in terms of quality of the capacity development support process. Whereas the outcome of the analysis could only provide a snapshot of longer-term CD processes, it allows a look at the nature of capacity development in the Commission’s operations. Knowledge exchange for Capacity Development: Another emerging result of technical co-operation reform is the knowledge management part of the agenda. The Commission's knowledge sharing platform on capacity development – capacity4dev.eu – has been further consolidated. In 2011, 86 articles were edited whose themes included capacity development, change processes, governance, civil society and projects etc. Major efforts were made to share knowledge on subjects likely to improve the quality of aid, such as political economic analysis, or Busan. The platform is an indication that if the EU is to improve the practice of capacity development, it must also invest more intensively in its own capacity to provide capacity development support and secondly it

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signposts that the EU is working in a wider professional system. In the digital age more than ever, it is aware of the importance of knowledge sharing and its link with developing capacities. Other technical co-operation actions included learning events at headquarters level (four sessions) as well as in Guinea Conakry and Mozambique. A study has also been drawn up on the approaches of EU Member States to technical co-operation and capacity development. Finally, 2011 saw several events leading to the Busan HLF on aid effectiveness: LenCD was an important incubator of Busan preparations on capacity development. It is an informal network comprising organisations, partner countries and donors. Workshops on capacity development were held in Kigali, Cairo, Eschborn, Brussels and Bangkok. The Brussels workshop on technical cooperation and capacity development, hosted by EuropeAid in July 2011, provided an opportunity for the Commission, country partners and Member States to reflect on technical cooperation reform, the EU framework on aid effectiveness, innovative approaches to capacity development and to craft key workshop messages, ahead of the Busan HLF. In Busan, capacity appeared to be one of the most addressed cross-cutting issues. For example, the African delegation stated that with such a high density of mineral resources, Africa should not require aid, but it did need capacity to transform itself and develop its own strategies. Furthermore, the specific references to effective institutions and country systems confirm that capacity development is regarded as fundamental to achieving development effectiveness and will need to be a focus of attention post-Busan.

2.2 Budget support and public finance The approval of the budget support communication setting a new policy (for more details see chapter 1) was the culminating point of 2011. Also, the Court of Auditors published a significant special report in 2011 on the Commission's management of general budget support62, recognising the Commission's effort to improve budget support. The first three fully-fledged evaluations on budget support underlined its usefulness and its positive impacts. The approval of the new budget support communication set a new policy in place (for more details see chapter 1). These reflect the growing importance, interest in and scrutiny of budget support as a delivery modality. The Commission is currently reviewing its budget support guidelines to fully reflect the new policy, lessons learned and recommendations by the Court of Auditors. These changes will have significant implications for the selection, design and implementation of new budget support programmes in the future. Budget support commitments From a quantitative point of view, budget support continued to be an important tool to deliver Commission assistance in 2011. Total commitments of general budget support (in support of a national development and reform strategy) amounted to €200 million (down from €494 million in 2010). Total commitments of sector budget support (in support of a specific sector strategy) amounted to €1 billion (down from €1.3 billion in 2010), of which approximately 28% for education, 22% for the sector of government and civil society, including decentralisation and women's equality, 11% for energy and 3.4% for environment. 62 "The Commission’s Management of General Budget Support in ACP, Latin American and Asian Countries" Special report N°11/2010

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Following the success of its V-Flex programme to help countries respond to the financial crisis, the Commission has continued to develop with its key partners – who are notably international financial institutions – ways of ensuring that countries faced by external shocks can be supported, particularly through budget support. Key results achieved

Results of budget support generated by the three dedicated evaluations (Mali, Tunisia, Zambia; for more, see chapter 4.1)

Budget support is a useful and well-established financing modality, with positive effects on macro-economic management and on public investment in priority sectors. It contributes to improved accountability and transparency of budgeting processes and public expenditure. Budget support is a valid support for the implementation of reforms when governments and citizens are actively committed thereto. However, budget support cannot ‘buy’ reform.

Its contribution has helped countries achieve significant outcomes in education and health. Budget support to growth and social policies has contributed to reducing income and non-income poverty, but rural poverty has not been tackled adequately. Expectations of short-term impacts on poverty reduction have been unrealistic. None of the three evaluations found evidence that the risks many associate with budget support – crowding out of domestic revenue and increased corruption – have materialised in practice.

Public finance and public finance management (PFM) Coordination with international organisations was enhanced by a joint workshop with the AU and UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) on governance and taxation in Africa's mineral sector. In addition, following the conclusion of a major study on transfer pricing63, financed by the Commission, a tripartite initiative (OECD/WB/EC) was initiated to carry out joint work to strengthen transfer pricing capacities in developing countries. The Commission continues to support transparency and transfer pricing notably through the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) and the UN. Finally, the Commission continues to promote the use of the public expenditure and financial accountability (PEFA) methodology as the key diagnostic tool for assessing PFM. 245 PEFA assessments have now been completed in 127 countries, including 63 repeat assessments and covering virtually all recipients of EU budget support. The Commission chaired and hosted the December 2011 PEFA steering committee and is working with partners to further improve the framework. Accountability was also reinforced through the proposal to establish a country-by-country reporting regime64, which will require a number of financial disclosures to be made by all major multi-nationals operating in the extractive and 63 Transfer pricing and developing countries , July 2011 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/economic-support/documents/transfer-pricing-study_en.pdf 64 COM (2011) 684 Final

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/studies/transfer_pricing_dev_countries.pdf

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forestry sectors. This measure aims to reduce corruption and increase domestic revenues for developing countries.

2.3 Blending of grants and loans/innovative financing After four years of constant development, the innovative financial instruments that started in the Sub-Saharan Africa and the Neighbourhood region are now maturing and expanding their coverage to cover all regions of external relations. On top of the already existing facilities for the Neighbourhood, Central Asia, Latin America and the trust fund for the Sub-Saharan Africa, in 2011 Asia was also covered by a facility, while significant progress was achieved in setting up such structures for the Caribbean and the Pacific islands to fully cover all regions. A group of experts (GoE) has been established, including the EEAS, the Member States, European financial institutions (EFIs) – namely EIB, EBRD, CEB, NIB, KfW and AFD – and other European bilateral development financial institutions, as well as multilateral IFIs. The group started its work in November 2011, with the objective of advising the Commission on proposals for the establishment of the EU platform for external cooperation and development. Commission services play a crucial role in preparing and co-chairing the meetings. The current financial support provided by the Commission in 2011 through the geographical facilities utilised all resources that were due for programming by the end of 2011. In certain cases, as in the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, approvals are a year in advance of the funding cycle, having utilised all resources already decided, including the 2011 replenishment funds. Following the new European Neighbourhood policy launched in May 2011, the strategic board of the Neighbourhood investment facility (NIF) met in October 2011 and confirmed the 2011-2013 NIF strategic orientations. They foresee that NIF support to the private sector and job creation will remain a priority in the coming years in order to quickly address the respective economic and social contexts at the root of the Arab Spring revolutions. The operational board of the NIF approved in 2011 15 grant operations amounting to €142.3 million. These are expected to leverage €1.7 billion in loans from European finance institutions, to support projects whose total cost is over €3.9 billion, achieving therefore a leverage effect of 1:27. Combined with past approvals, all resources made available by 2009, 2010 and 2011 Commission decisions were fully committed and practically fully (over 90%) contracted. In the same period, the operational board of the Latin American investment facility (LAIF) approved three grant operations amounting to €13.5 million in LAIF grants, with corresponding loans from the European finance institutions of €233.5 million and mobilising total investments of €475 million, amounting to a leverage effect of 1:35. Combined with past approvals, all resources made available by the 2009 and 2010 Commission decisions were fully committed and contracted. The operational board of the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA) approved three grant operations amounting to €22 million in IFCA grants, with an equal sum (€22 million) of corresponding loans from the European finance institutions, mobilising total investments of €46 million, while will be identifying projects that could require up to €300 million of financing. All resources made available by the 2010 Commission decision were fully committed and contracted.

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In Sub-Saharan Africa, the executive committee of the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF) approved 19 grant operations amounting to €86.2 of ITF support. These are expected to leverage €210 million in loans, bringing the total to €295 million of grant support, already leveraging €1.3 billion from the European finance institutions for projects with investment budgets of over €2.8 billion, while funding potential for projects with identified investments could exceed €8 billion. In 2011, the ACP investment facility, managed by the EIB, approved 18 projects financed out of the facility’s resources totalling €400 million. In the framework of the global energy efficiency and renewable energy fund (GEEREF), one project has been approved for a grant amount of €10 million. Following a mid-term review European Parliament and Council Decision N°1080/2011/EU65 granting an EU guarantee to the European Investment Bank against losses under loans and loan guarantees for projects outside the Union and repealing Decision N°633/2009/EC, was adopted on 25 October 2011. In this context, the EIB external mandate for 2007-2013 benefiting from EU budget Guarantee was increased by €3.7 billion (including €2 billion for climate change operations and €1 billion for the Mediterranean region).

3- Progress in aid management

3.1 Progress on qualitative issues in aid management Methodological work and training Developing the skills and capacities of key actors involved in the design and implementation of EU-funded programmes is essential for improving quality, impact and sustainability. The Commission is investing in capacity-building for its staff and other stakeholders through methodological work and training. In the area of methodological work, in 2011 particular attention was paid to the revision of guidance which should take the form of a new, integrated project and programme cycle management (PPCM). Seminars were organised with the EU Delegations and Member States on political economy, policy dialogue and risk management aiming to test concepts and to draw orientations. Case studies were developed and the testing of the political economy analysis tool launched. Substantial work was carried out on the PPCM technical annexes on political economic analysis, policy dialogue, macro-economics, national development planning, public finance management and sector policy analysis. Methodological work was also carried out in the fields of governance and anti-corruption. In the tools and methods series, six new documents were published:

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• Emerging good practice on codes of conduct, partnership principles and memorandums of understanding in the water sector. The purpose of this document is to guide practitioners in implementing the sector approach in the water sector.

• Trade and private sector policy and development – support programmes financed by EU external assistance. This reference document constitutes an in-depth revision of existing guidance in these fields of intervention. It aims, including through its very operational and modular approach, to contribute substantially to a better understanding of Commission services and EU Delegations of the various aspects and dimensions relevant for contributing to the development of the private sector and trade capacities through development cooperation. One of the chapters deals with new types of actions which donors have been increasingly supporting to leverage a more prominent role for the private sector in development through innovative business projects.

• Engaging non-state actors in new aid modalities – for better development outcomes and governance. This document provides Commission staff with guidance on how to engage with civil society in order to promote its participation in dialogue, implementation and monitoring of global and sector aid development modalities such as budget support.

• Support for justice reform in ACP Countries. This reference document provides guidance on how to approach a justice reform - a complex and yet decisive area of development. It is based on experience and provides an overview of the main features of support to the justice sector in ACP countries.

• Addressing under-nutrition in external assistance – an integrated approach through sectors and aid modalities. This document is intended as a resource to guide the practical incorporation of nutrition objectives into relevant sectors and different funding modalities used by the EU - whether in development cooperation or in humanitarian response.

• Supporting anti-corruption reform in partner countries – concepts, tools and areas for action. The main objective of this document is to provide relevant insights on the current thinking on and around anticorruption in developing countries and to enable EU staff to acquire useful tools to analyse corruption in a given local setting, become better equipped to support the implementation of anti-corruption strategies and policies and to identify relevant anti-corruption measures for mainstreaming in EU development assistance.

The Commission also provides training and learning events in various areas related to the design and implementation of EU assistance. The aim is to progressively improve context analysis, dialogue with partners, and to guide the choice of most adapted aid modalities so as to better achieve results. In 2011, 121 sessions of methodological courses were held in Brussels and in various partner countries benefiting over 2 300 participants. Besides standard courses on aid delivery methods, sector approaches, aid effectiveness and macro-economics and financial issues, ad hoc seminars were organised in Brussels and in Delegations on policy dialogue, risk management, taxation, and capacity development, hot topics in agriculture and rural development and also in environment, governance and social protection. Quality of design

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The quality of design of aid interventions is also assured by an internal peer review mechanism – known as the quality support groups (oQSG) – where each new action is scrutinised in the initial phase of identification to ensure that the problem to be addressed is well identified and that the approach and aid modality proposed are the most appropriate to address it; and in a second phase to review the proposed design of the intervention. A revised and simplified procedure for this quality system was introduced in 2010 and has been sustained throughout 2011. In parallel, the Commission will continue the work undertaken on a new IT architecture called the project cycle management platform that should facilitate accessibility to project data and lessons learnt, as well as allow interaction between staff in charge of project/programme design, implementation and evaluation. The Commission aims to build a user-friendly environment to collect, access and use the information currently filed in various ways, which cannot be directly explored. The new on-line tools should also lead to better use of human resources working on development and co-operation.

3.2 Simplification of procedures In 2011, the Commission invested heavily in making its procedures easier to access and understand for all stakeholders. In July, new e-learning modules on the PRAG (Practical Guide to contract procedures for EU external actions, which contains all rules and templates to be applied by the Commission and decentralised contracting authorities as well as tenderers/applicants in contract award procedures for EU external actions) were made available on the Internet. They explain, in a user-friendly way, the procurement and grant-award procedures to anyone who is interested. In December, the PRAG was released in the ePRAG application, specifically designed to help users consult the text. This includes an enhanced navigation menu and features that allow users to visualise and access the annexes, download documents, consult previous versions, find suggested links and keywords, as well as an advanced search-engine in the text of the ePRAG and its annexes66. Six languages are available. These applications can be found at . Wide consultations throughout the year led to major changes in the way experts for technical assistance are selected, to enter in force early 2012. These include increased use of global price contracts, shortening of the evaluation period to bring forward the moment where all tenderers – including unsuccessful ones – are informed of the outcome of the procedure, ensuring the availability of evaluators or replacements, and possibility for the awarded tenderer to propose replacement experts in case of unavailability prior to contract signature. The Commission also reviewed the practical guide to procedures for programme estimates, which sets out how de-centralised contracting authorities should manage the programmes entrusted to them. Among other simplifications, the ex-ante verification by the Commission of the procedures for calls for tenders and calls for proposals will be carried out only at the moment of award of contracts, except if the Head of Delegation, following his/her risk analysis, decides to apply an ex-ante verification at a previous stage.

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The Commission also prepared for the future in proposing new regulations to govern the award of external assistance in the period 2014-2020. In these proposals, all provisions on implementation are placed in one common regulation to ensure the maximum harmonisation of rules across programmes. The proposals are fully in line with, and take full advantage of, the simplification proposals made by the Commission for the revision of the Financial Regulation. In addition, a simplified and more coherent approach to untying of aid is proposed, as well as the acknowledgement that taxes may be eligible for funding if effectively supported by contractors. Delegated acts are also proposed for non essential elements to simplify the legislative process.

4- Communication & transparency

4.1 Communication and visibility Against the backdrop of a fast-changing global political scene, the economic situation in 2011 meant that it remained as important as ever that the public received good quality, timely information on the EU's development assistance that shows the impact and results of external cooperation as well as addressing the challenges. Efforts to engage and inform the public during 2011 included the Kapuscinski lecture series, organised jointly by the Commission and the UNDP67. Aimed at students, NGOs and the general public, the series included topics such as responding to global threats, the MDGs beyond 2015, and climate change and development. A larger selection of case studies was presented on the Commission's website68. While a Eurobarometer survey showed that public support for aid continues to be strong69, efforts continued in demonstrating how aid makes a difference on the ground. An example of this was during the high level summit on aid effectiveness in Busan, where a series of videos were presented70. In press relations, seminars for journalists focused on topics such as aid effectiveness and climate change and press trips enabled journalists to report on the EU's work in the field. An example of this was a press trip to the Chernobyl power plant marking the 25 year anniversary of the accident to report on the continiung work the EU is doing to make the site safe. The Lorenzo Natali prize, which recognises outstanding journalism on development issues, was awarded in December71. Press work around the multi-annual financial framework and the adoption of the Agenda for Change resulted in significant coverage, as did articles to inform the public of the results of the EU's work in different regions of the world, such as in the EU's neighbourhood. Complementing the present report, other publications focussed on specific areas of the EU's development and external assistance include the European Report on Development, whose 2011-12 edition will focus on nature resources especially food, water and energy72. In the

67 http://ec.europa.eu/development/services/events/kapuscinski/index.html 68 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/case-studies/index_en.htm 69 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_375_en.pdf 70 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/videos/index_en.htm 71 http://lorenzonataliprize.eu/ 72 http://www.erd-report.eu/erd/report_2011/index.html

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tools and methods reference series, the latest manuals were on engaging non-state actors in new aid modalities, support for justice reform and addressing under-nutrition73. The EU Development Days (EDD) event again provided an opportunity to advance the debate on development policy and inform stakeholders and communicators on actions taking place and results obtained. Held in Warsaw, Poland, the event focused on development and democracy74. The external cooperation Info Point in Brussels continued to provide information through conferences, film screenings, exhibitions and other events and welcomed more than 8 000 visitors in 2011.

4.2 Transparency Transparency is the cornerstone of effective development cooperation. Better transparency increases predictability and accountability as well as facilitating donor coordination. The Busan HLF reconfirmed the importance of transparency for development results. Transparency was also an EU priority and the EU and its Member States announced an EU transparency guarantee75 during the forum. This will guide future work in transparency as it sets out actions to be taken by the EU to provide more and better aid information. The guarantee also defines objectives to be promoted by the EU at international level. The Commission is determined to be a frontrunner in aid transparency. Since October 2011, it has been publishing its external aid flows through the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) which is a common, open, international standard for publishing aid information. Provision of detailed information on EU aid online helps developing countries and European tax payers to better track what aid is being used for, where it is being spent and what it is achieving. The second phase of IATI, making even more detailed aid information available, will be implemented by the Commission in 2012. To further improve the accessibility to aid information, the EU completed the EU donor atlas in 2011. This contains a detailed mapping of aid by the EU and its Member States in a user-friendly format and is available through easy internet access76.

CHAPTER 5 - FINANCIAL ANNEX

5.1 Introduction to financial tables This Annual Report provides an overview of policies, objectives and achievements in 2011. The tables and graphs which follow present the main data on EU development assistance in

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2011 by country, region, or sector and per source of funding, such as the different instruments of EU external assistance. The geographic cooperation with the ACP countries, is based on the Partnership Agreement with the ACP signatory states and is mainly financed, South Africa excepted, from the European Development Fund which is separate from the EU budget. External assistance for other geographic areas and the thematic programmes with worldwide coverage are financed from the general EU budget. Data for 2011 again show improved overall Official Development Assistance (ODA) levels. Figure 5.1 shows the importance of external assistance in the overall expenditure of the European Commission. Defined as the resources used to foster programmes and projects outside the EU, external assistance accounted for 9% of the total allocation in 2011 (general EU budget and EDF taken together). A global overview of the share of resources is given in Figure 5.2. A detailed breakdown of the budget by policy areas can be found in Table 5.3. A similar breakdown for the EDF is presented in Table 5.4. The concept of ODA used throughout the tables and figures is that defined by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The figures are those reported by the European Commission and Member States. Not all EU external assistance can be reported as ODA. Whether an action, programme or project is classified as ODA or not depends on the recipient country and the purpose and content of the aid. Figure 5.5 shows the share of the EU's external assistance classified as ODA. In all, 92% of EU aid committed in 2011 is considered reportable as ODA, indicating an increased focus on development in external financial allocations. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the evolution from 2003 to 2011 of external assistance and ODA. Figure 5.6 shows the evolution of the main sources of funding: external assistance from the EU Budget and EDF, indicating the share managed by EuropeAid. Figure 5.7 shows the evolution of the sector breakdown of ODA. Figure 5.8 and Table 5.9 present the breakdown per region. For this breakdown, it is necessary to differentiate between bilateral and multilateral aid. Bilateral aid, as defined by the DAC, is direct cooperation by the Commission with a country (or region) where the Commission controls the activities and knows how, when and where the resources are being spent. Multilateral aid comprises direct contributions to the core funding of multilateral agencies, who report back to the Commission at a later stage on how the money was spent. Figure 5.8 provides a breakdown of EU ODA per region. Africa tops the list (35% of ODA) with, Sub-Saharan Africa receiving 29% of total ODA in 2011. A more detailed breakdown, per country and region, in line with the OECD/DAC recipient list, is presented in Table 5.10 (Commitments) and Table 5.11 (Disbursements).

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Leaving aside regional programmes, the top ten ODA recipient countries in 2011 (disbursements) were Turkey, the occupied Palestinian territory, Afghanistan, Kosovo77, Democratic Republic of Congo, Serbia, Pakistan, Morocco, Ethiopia and South Africa. Figure 5.12 focuses on ODA recipients classified under the four UN/OECD categories based on GNI. The table monitors disbursements in 2011 by DAC recipient and by main OECD sectors. One indicator shows ODA disbursement per capita. It is also important to identify the main sectors of activities that receive support. Table 5.13 shows this breakdown of EU ODA per main sector as defined by the DAC. A more detailed sector breakdown of ODA is provided in Table 5.14 for commitments and in Table 5.15 for payments. Tables 5.16 and 5.17 give an overview of the ODA managed by EuropeAid, with a breakdown per sector and region. In these tables, the definition of region reflects the country groupings used in the EU instruments and corresponding budget structure. Tables 5.18 and 5.19 show the sector breakdown of ODA per EU external assistance instrument and sub-component within the instruments, with the associated Figure 5.20 providing a closer look. Finally, Table 5.21 focuses on budget support commitments 2011 by EU instruments. Please note that where references are made in the following tables to 'EU budget', this refers to the budget managed by the European Commission and does not cover EU Member States' national budgets for development assistance.

5.2 Financial tables

77 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

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Commitments in € millionEU budget managed by the Commission w ithout Ex 131 952 M€

External Aid (Budget + EDF) 12 329 M€

EU budget managed by the Commission + EDF 144 281 M€

Table 5.1 Percentage of EU budget managed by the Commission committed on external assistance in 2011

EU budget managed by the

Commission without External

Aid, 131 952 M€, 91%

External Aid (Budget + EDF), 12 329 M€, 9%

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Table 5.2 Sources of external assistance in 2011

Commitments ( € Million )EU budget managed by EuropeAid 5 092 M€EDF managed by EuropeAid 3 279 M€EU budget not managed by EuropeAid 3 958 M€

External Aid (Budget + EDF) 12 329 M€

EU budget managed by EuropeAid, 5 092 M€, 41%

EDF managed by EuropeAid,

3 279 M€, 27%

EU budget not managed by EuropeAid, 3 958 M€, 32%

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Total

Description Commit. Disbursements (1) Commit. Disbursements (1) Commit. Disbursements (1)

Commit. Disbursements (1)

4 01 - ECFIN Macroeconomic assistance + EBRD 139.42 194.12 139.42 194.12 0.54 55.24

4 04 - EMPL Instrument for Preaccession (IPA) — Human resources development

102.40 27.92 102.40 27.92 86.40 19.71

4 05 - AGRI The Sapard pre-accession instrument — Completion of the programme (2000 to 2006)

220.04 106.81 220.04 106.81 188.50 88.34

4 07 - ENV LIFE (European Financial Instrument for the Environment)

3.56 3.16 3.56 3.16 2.08 2.57

4 13 - REGIO Pre-accession IPA and former ISPA 442.13 311.02 442.13 311.02 372.87 93.10

4 14 - TAXUD Customs cooperation and international assistance

2.17 1.47 2.17 1.47 1.00 0.29

4+1 15 - EAC Education, MEDIA 2007 programmes in third countries

76.12 73.54 76.12 73.54 74.72 68.98

4 17 - SANCO International agreements and membership of international organisations

0.24 0.23 0.24 0.23

4 19 - RELEXMultilateral relations, cooperation in the areas of migration and asylum, and general external relations matters

55.64 38.60 55.64 38.60 55.64 37.95

4 Common foreign and security policy 331.64 308.46 331.64 308.46 284.20 262.33

4 European initiative for democracy and human rights (EIDHR)

161.29 123.06 119.89 93.18 41.40 29.88 159.45 118.81

4 Relations and cooperation with industrialised non-member countries

25.11 20.06 25.11 20.06

4 Crisis response and global threats to security 359.14 237.76 153.61 117.03 205.54 120.73 305.14 184.88

4 European Neighbourhood Policy and relations with Russia

1 969.20 1 381.00 1 903.20 1 321.47 66.00 59.52 1 933.08 1 309.45

4 Relations with Latin America 351.51 281.92 346.31 269.79 5.20 12.13 350.47 281.40

4 Relations with Asia, Central Asia and East of Jordan countries (1)

881.21 670.39 867.21 639.90 14.00 30.50 875.01 656.76

4 Policy strategy and coordination for External relations policy area

27.41 27.77 15.50 15.03 11.91 12.74 17.13 16.96

4 20 - TRADE External trade relations 12.74 11.09 12.74 11.09 3.60 2.714 21- DEV Food security 247.51 319.35 247.51 319.35 247.51 319.354 Non-State actors in development 231.80 202.31 231.80 202.31 231.80 201.87

4 Environment and sustainable management of natural resources, including energy

226.85 136.35 226.85 136.35 224.49 134.83

4 Human and social development 172.47 171.99 172.47 171.99 172.47 170.864 Geographical cooperation with ACP Countries 337.67 300.49 337.67 296.59 3.90 337.67 264.30

4 Other cooperation actions and ad-hoc programmes

31.17 29.98 31.17 29.98 2.73 2.73

4Policy strategy and coordination for Development and relations with ACP States policy area

19.48 14.58 19.48 14.58 19.48 14.41

4 22 - ELARG Management of the Instrument for Pre-Accession

1 025.83 828.99 1 025.83 828.99 927.65 701.25

4 23 - ECHO Humanitarian aid including aid to uprooted people, food aid and disaster preparedness

1 073.54 1 007.38 1 073.54 1 007.38 1 063.54 995.98

4 Civil protection interventions in third countries 13.98 11.23 13.98 11.23 13.78 11.03

4 32 - ENER Energy Community 3.31 3.50 3.31 3.50 3.31 3.50

4+5 Administrative expenditure of External assistance (2) 505.10 499.44 363.20 355.87 141.89 143.57 482.12 476.50

TOTAL 9 049.67 7 343.96 5 091.50 4 022.02 3 958.16 3 321.94 8 436.40 6 496.07

(1) Before recoveries(2) Includes administrative cost of EDF management charged to heading 5. Total ODA (Budget + EDF) administrative cost (from headings 4 & 5 and EDF adm. envelope) show n in tables 5.14 & 5.15(3)Breakdow n by budget line of external aid f inanced on the general EU budget in 2011. (Amount in € million)

Table 5.3 General EU budget for external assistance in 2011

Managed by EuropeAid Managed by other DGs of which ODA

Heading / Policy Area

173

Of Which ODA

Instruments (1) Commitments (2)

Disbursements (3)

Commitments (2)

Disbursements (3)

Lomé

NIP / RIP Grants - 44 - 44 Aid for Refugees - 0 - 0 Stabex - 4 - 4 Risk Capital - 19 - 19 SYSMIN - 0 - 0 Heavily indebted poor countries - - - - Use of interest (Lomé) - 0 - 0 Transfer 6th EDF - - - - Transfer 7th EDF - 2 - 2

Total Lomé - 69 - 69

Cotonou

A Envelope - Programmable Aid 2 034 1 702 1 980 1 662 Envelope B - unforeseen 176 292 174 271 Regional projects 218 167 218 164 Intra ACP 602 618 291 466 Co financing A Envelope - - - - Other - 1 - 1 Implementation expenditure + Congo Rep. Dem. 248 93 225 84

Total Cotonou 3 279 2 872 2 887 2 648

Grand total EDF 3 279 2 941 2 887 2 717

(1) Except The Investment Facility (10th EDF) managed by the EIB(2) Commitments 2011 have been calculated follow ing DAC procedures : Total commitments made in 2011 reduced by decommitments made on projects committed in 2011(3) Before recoveries

Table 5.4 European Development Fund (EDF) in 2011

Breakdow n by instrument of development assistance f inanced on the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2011 (amount in € million).

174

Commitments in € millionODA non ODA Total

EU budget managed by EuropeAid 4 953 139 5 092 EDF 2 887 392 3 279 EU budget managed by other DGs 3 484 474 3 958

Total 11 323 1 005 12 329

Table 5.5 Proportion of external assistance used for Official Development Aid (ODA)

- 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 3 000 3 500 4 000 4 500 5 000

EU budget managed by EuropeAid

EDF managed by EuropeAid

EU budget managed by other DGs

ODA non ODA

175



Table 5.6 2003-2011 External assistance

External aid f inanced on the general EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) managed by EuropeAid.

Bilateral and multilateral ODA / other f low s.

0

1 000

2 000

3 000

4 000

5 000

6 000

7 000

8 000

9 000

10 000

11 000

12 000

13 000

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

EU budget managed by EuropeAid EDF managed by EuropeAid EU budget managed by other DGs Grand Total

0

1 000

2 000

3 000

4 000

5 000

6 000

7 000

8 000

9 000

10 000

11 000

12 000

13 000

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

EU budget managed by EuropeAid EDF managed by EuropeAid EU budget managed by other DGs Grand Total

176


Bilateral and multilateral ODA flow s.

Table 5.7 Sectoral breakdown of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2003 - 2011

0

2 000

4 000

6 000

8 000

10 000

12 000

14 000

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Other/Unallocated : admin. costs,unspecified

Humanitarian aid : Emergencyresponse, reconstruction relief andrehabilitation, disaster preventionand preparedness

Action relating to debt

Budget support, food aid, foodsecurity

Multisector/Crosscutting :environment, other

Production : agriculture, forestry andfishing, industry, mining andconstruction, trade and tourism

Economic infrastructures andservices : transport,communications, energy, otherservices

Social infrastructures: education,health, water, government and civilsociety, other

177

Table 5.8 Regional distribution of aid to developing countries (ODA) in 2011


( € Million )

Region (1)Commitment

sDisbursemen

tsCommitment

sDisbursemen

tsCommitment

sDisburseme

ntsEurope 2 269 1 437 495 338 1 774 1 099 Africa, North of Sahara 678 517 588 433 90 84 Africa, South of Sahara 3 297 3 422 2 739 2 895 558 527 Asia : Middle East 663 507 518 383 146 124 Asia : South & Central, Far East 1 337 1 367 991 907 346 459 America 716 721 652 602 64 119 Oceania 19 85 19 82 - 3 Bilateral unallocated 2 134 910 1 629 650 505 259 ODA Multilateral Aid,Total 210 248 208 246 2 2 TOTAL ODA 11 323 9 213 7 840 6 536 3 484 2 677

(1) Following OECD region. Cfr tables "Country breakdown of EU development aid in 2011".

Grand total Managed by EuropeAid Managed by Other DGs

Europe, 2 269 M€, 20%

Africa, North of Sahara, 678 M€, 6%

Africa, South of Sahara, 3 297 M€, 29%

Asia : Middle East, 663 M€, 6%

Asia : South & Central, Far East, 1 337 M€, 12%

America, 716 M€, 6%

Oceania, 19 M€, 0%

Bilateral unallocated, 2 134 M€, 19%

ODA Multilateral Aid,Total, 210 M€, 2%

178

Table 5.9 Regional distribution of aid to developing countries (ODA) 2006-2011

Commitments in € million2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Europe 1 532 1 565 2 093 2 030 2 230 2 269 Africa 3 806 3 687 5 272 4 577 3 230 3 975

North Of Sahara 543 521 546 618 673 678 South Of Sahara 2 867 3 113 4 726 3 929 2 500 3 151 Regional 396 53 - 30 57 146

America 759 820 642 899 934 716 North & Central 505 387 329 621 609 445 South 214 334 312 260 257 246 Regional 40 100 2 19 68 25

Asia 1 852 1 728 1 946 2 043 2 063 2 000 Middle East 587 743 735 669 652 663 South & Central 831 739 886 1 024 948 1 099 Far East 347 164 233 295 363 158 Regional 88 81 91 56 99 79

Oceania 32 141 19 89 116 19 Bilateral unallocated 1 245 1 586 1 586 2 000 1 761 2 134 ODA Multilateral Aid,Total 605 431 366 125 325 210 TOTAL ODA 9 832 9 959 11 923 11 764 10 658 11 323

Disbursements in € Million2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Europe 1 069 1 062 1 242 1 720 1 507 1 437 Africa 3 341 3 779 4 003 4 111 4 161 3 939

North Of Sahara 658 692 570 610 537 517 South Of Sahara 2 683 3 024 3 433 3 478 3 563 3 170 Regional 0 63 1 23 61 252

America 666 776 769 809 973 721 North & Central 365 454 415 441 666 421 South 246 275 314 348 287 270 Regional 56 47 40 20 21 30

Asia 1 596 1 496 1 850 1 854 1 845 1 874 Middle East 494 574 709 617 596 507 South & Central 699 604 858 908 935 996 Far East 295 263 250 266 267 321 Regional 108 55 33 63 47 49

Oceania 64 52 65 59 91 85 Bilateral unallocated 790 856 1 025 955 1 084 910 ODA Multilateral Aid,Total 602 472 239 292 179 248 TOTAL ODA 8 130 8 493 9 194 9 800 9 841 9 213

Bilateral and multilateral ODA flows.(1) Following OECD region. Cfr table "Country breakdown of EU development aid in 2011".

179

Table 5.10 Country breakdown of EU development aid managed by the Commission in 2011

Commitments ( € Million )Budget

managed by EuropeAid

Budget not managed by EuropeAid

EDF Grand Total

Part I : Developing Countries & Territories (ODA)

Europe, Total 494.94 1 774.32 2 269.26Albania 86.01 86.01Belarus 22.08 22.08Bosnia and Herzegovina 117.16 117.16Kosovo (1) 230.27 230.27former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 97.53 97.53Republic of Moldova 80.60 0.06 80.66Montenegro 0.01 31.49 31.50Serbia 192.26 192.26Turkey 779.90 779.90Ukraine 150.46 0.07 150.53States of ex-Yugoslavia unspecif.Europe, Regional 241.78 239.56 481.34

Africa, Total 1 019.40 647.72 2 307.84 3 974.96North Of Sahara, Total 587.85 90.14 677.99

Algeria 58.00 9.00 67.00Egypt 92.00 39.60 131.60Libya 11.63 21.56 33.19Morocco 156.60 156.60Tunisia 142.48 4.98 147.46North Of Sahara, Regional 127.14 15.00 142.14

South Of Sahara, Total 362.42 554.58 2 233.73 3 150.73Angola 25.00 25.00Benin 8.00 63.00 71.00Botswana 8.00 8.00Burkina Faso 5.00 0.00 26.50 31.50Burundi 9.25 66.00 75.25Cameroon 5.40 5.40Cape VerdeCentral African Rep. 6.70 9.00 12.70 28.40Chad 29.80 87.00 116.80Comoros 2.10 2.10Congo, Dem. Rep. 16.50 73.35 189.68 279.53Congo, Rep. 5.00 20.20 25.20Cote d'Ivoire 7.80 66.00 125.00 198.80Djibouti 2.00 12.00 14.00Equatorial GuineaEritrea 0.00 0.00Ethiopia 49.61 63.00 112.61Gabon 12.00 12.00Gambia 3.86 15.00 18.86Ghana 14.35 14.35Guinea 20.60 20.60Guinea-BissauKenya 35.72 23.34 59.06Lesotho 57.65 57.65Liberia 2.00 5.00 2.90 9.90Madagascar 6.00 6.00Malawi 11.59 2.00 13.59Mali 4.00 12.87 16.87Mauritania 0.00 66.00 66.00Mauritius 55.51 11.50 67.01Mozambique 9.92 32.00 41.92

Country/Region

180

Namibia 5.00 5.00Niger 4.50 4.04 102.00 110.54Nigeria 5.80 478.00 483.80RwandaSt.Helena 16.63 16.63Sao Tome & Principe 0.50 0.50Senegal 31.00 31.00SeychellesSierra Leone 9.88 16.50 26.38Somalia 4.00 90.01 98.80 192.81South Africa 140.55 140.55Sudan 158.00 137.00 295.00Swaziland 54.27 26.50 80.77Tanzania 41.82 41.82Togo 17.80 17.80Uganda 11.00 3.00 20.00 34.00Zambia 4.00 4.00Zimbabwe 10.00 34.00 44.00South Of Sahara, Regional 6.35 222.39 228.74

Africa, Regional 69.13 3.00 74.12 146.24America, Total 410.41 63.66 241.87 715.95

North & Central, Total 179.37 45.50 220.03 444.90AnguillaAntigua & BarbudaBelizeCosta Rica 17.00 17.00Cuba 7.00 7.00DominicaDominican Republic 5.50 24.94 30.44El Salvador 48.40 48.40Grenada 2.50 2.50Guatemala 12.50 4.00 16.50Haiti 36.00 77.03 113.03Honduras 30.44 0.00 30.44Jamaica 30.95 22.18 53.13MexicoMontserratNicaragua 23.05 23.05PanamaSt.Kitts-NevisSt.Lucia 10.00 10.00St.Vincent & Grenadines 0.78 0.78West Indies, Regional 82.60 82.60N. & C. America, Regional 10.03 10.03

South, Total 206.46 18.16 21.84 246.47Argentina 7.72 4.16 11.88Bolivia 39.00 39.00BrazilChileColombia 11.60 12.00 23.60Ecuador 34.00 0.00 34.00Guyana 24.92 21.84 46.77Paraguay 31.00 31.00Peru 2.00 2.00 4.00Suriname 0.20 0.00 0.20Uruguay 5.00 5.00VenezuelaSouth America, Regional 51.02 51.02

America, Regional 24.58 24.58

181

Asia, Total 1 498.88 491.14 10.00 2 000.02Middle East, Total 517.60 145.56 663.16

IranIraq 17.70 10.00 27.70Jordan 111.00 111.00Lebanon 33.00 25.92 58.92occupied Palestinian territory 292.65 84.64 377.29Syria 10.00 10.00Yemen 20.00 25.00 45.00Middle East, Regional 33.25 33.25

South & Centr. Asia, Total 780.85 318.59 1 099.44Afghanistan 227.00 120.00 347.00Armenia 48.01 48.01Azerbaijan 31.00 31.00Bangladesh 131.27 21.00 152.27Bhutan 3.60 3.60Georgia 50.73 24.03 74.76India 105.00 6.60 111.60KazakhstanKyrgyz Rep. 18.10 0.32 18.42MaldivesMyanmar (Burma) 15.00 22.25 37.25Nepal 7.00 1.20 8.20Pakistan 30.00 92.50 122.50Sri Lanka 49.00 13.00 62.00Tajikistan 18.96 0.00 18.96Turkmenistan 5.20 5.20Uzbekistan 10.00 10.00Central Asia, Regional 10.68 7.68 18.36South Asia, RegionalSouth & Central Asia, Regional 20.30 10.00 30.30

Far East, Total 125.33 23.00 10.00 158.33Cambodia 5.30 10.00 15.30China 35.01 35.01Indonesia 15.00 15.00Korea, Dem. 10.00 10.00Laos 9.00 9.00MalaysiaMongolia 8.00 0.00 8.00Philippines 21.00 3.00 24.00Thailand 9.00 9.00Timor-Leste 10.00 10.00Viet Nam 18.02 18.02Far East Asia, Regional 5.00 5.00

Asia, Regional 75.10 4.00 79.10Oceania, Total 10.06 9.12 19.18

Cook Islands 0.60 0.60Fiji 7.06 7.06KiribatiMarshall IslandsMicronesia, Fed. Sts.Nauru 0.50 0.50NiuePalauPapua New GuineaSamoa 3.00 2.59 5.59Solomon Islands 2.48 2.48TokelauTongaTuvaluVanuatu 1.88 1.88Wallis & Futuna 1.08 1.08Oceania, Regional

Bilateral unallocated 1 325.62 504.94 303.16 2 133.724 759.31 3 481.79 2 871.99 11 113.09Part I (ODA) Bilateral, Total

182

Public Private PartnershipsUnited Nations 120.30 1.99 122.29

UNRWA 115.30 115.30UNDPWFPWHOFAO

World Bank GroupWorld Trade OrganisationRegional Development Banks 8.00 8.00Other Multilateral Institutions 65.00 15.00 80.00

GFTAM 65.00 15.00 80.00Others

Part I (ODA) Multilateral Aid,Total 193.30 1.99 15.00 210.29

Part I (ODA), Total 4 952.62 3 483.78 2 886.99 11 323.38

Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition (non ODA)

More Advanced Developing Countries 30.44 65.79 52.35 148.58Aruba 8.80 8.80BahamasBahrainBarbadosFrench Polynesia 2.00 2.00GibraltarIsrael 2.00 2.37 4.37Korea 1.21 1.21KuwaitMayotteNetherlands AntillesNew Caledonia 19.81 19.81OmanQatarSaudi Arabia 1.33 1.33Trinidad & Tobago 1.00 1.00Turks & Caicos IslandsUnited Arab Emirates 0.21 0.21Virgin Islands (UK)MADCT Unallocated 28.44 60.67 20.74 109.85

CEECs/NIS 27.69 191.49 219.18BulgariaCroatia 147.87 147.87Cyprus 28.00 28.00Czech Republic 0.11 0.11EstoniaHungary 0.00 0.00Latvia 0.01 0.01Lithuania 0.00 0.00Poland 0.01 0.01RomaniaRussia 4.40 0.00 4.40SloveniaEurope Unallocated 23.29 15.48 38.78

58.13 257.27 52.35 367.76

5 010.75 3 741.05 2 939.34 11 691.14

(1) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence

Bilateral and multilateral ODA / non-ODA flows.

Part II (Non-OA) Bilateral Aid, Total

Grand Total Part I & Part II

Breakdown by country/region of external aid financed on the general EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2011.

183

Table 5.11 Country breakdown of EU development aid managed by the Commission in 2011

Disbursements ( € Million )Budget

managed by EuropeAid

Budget not managed by EuropeAid

EDF Grand Total

Part I : Developing Countries & Territories (ODA)

Europe, Total 337.82 1 099.29 0.02 1 437.12Albania 0.54 61.64 62.17Belarus 9.48 1.65 11.13Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.36 56.06 57.41Kosovo (1) 0.00 219.23 219.23former Yugloslav Republic of Macedonia 0.29 52.24 52.52Republic of Moldova 84.87 22.74 107.62Montenegro 0.21 17.04 17.25Serbia 0.78 188.68 189.46Turkey 0.74 312.33 313.07Ukraine 109.03 109.03States of ex-Yugoslavia unspecif. 1.01 1.01Europe, Regional 130.52 166.66 0.02 297.20

Africa, Total 997.03 611.00 2 331.02 3 939.04North Of Sahara, Total 432.95 84.04 516.99

Algeria 44.21 13.14 57.35Egypt 39.79 8.32 48.11Libya 9.90 25.65 35.56Morocco 152.47 0.06 152.54Tunisia 116.65 13.73 130.38North Of Sahara, Regional 69.93 23.13 93.06

South Of Sahara, Total 473.98 522.27 2 173.39 3 169.65Angola 5.23 14.74 19.97Benin 1.86 0.18 46.88 48.91Botswana 0.14 15.01 15.14Burkina Faso 9.75 9.02 80.49 99.27Burundi 5.76 4.72 52.43 62.92

6.43 0.95 42.29 49.66Cape Verde 2.29 14.11 16.40Central African Rep. 5.96 9.44 31.77 47.17Chad 3.32 39.38 39.86 82.56Comoros 0.02 5.68 5.69Congo, Dem. Rep. 9.77 75.71 130.64 216.12Congo, Rep. 3.85 0.84 9.58 14.28Cote d'Ivoire 4.59 29.59 43.81 77.99Djibouti 0.43 1.43 7.05 8.91Equatorial Guinea 0.01 0.11 0.12Eritrea 3.48 0.37 25.33 29.18Ethiopia 11.17 35.60 100.95 147.71Gabon 0.08 5.40 5.48Gambia 0.28 0.19 27.23 27.69Ghana 3.97 0.78 58.81 63.57Guinea 6.41 1.86 21.81 30.08Guinea-Bissau 4.74 0.02 10.05 14.81Kenya 12.86 32.23 45.53 90.63Lesotho 0.94 41.32 42.26Liberia 4.82 20.59 38.26 63.67Madagascar 6.59 0.87 16.31 23.77Malawi 7.68 0.17 44.16 52.01Mali 6.67 7.94 87.00 101.61Mauritania 4.21 1.88 46.08 52.18Mauritius 38.52 0.55 17.88 56.95Mozambique 9.52 0.42 82.82 92.75

Country/Region

184

Namibia 1.06 0.16 21.53 22.75Niger 5.11 30.32 64.30 99.72Nigeria 4.10 12.98 46.34 63.42Rwanda 2.76 0.04 64.54 67.34St.Helena 3.30 3.30Sao Tome & Principe 0.90 2.86 3.76Senegal 2.30 1.12 77.47 80.89Seychelles 0.20 4.72 4.92Sierra Leone 10.46 0.12 40.89 51.47Somalia 5.88 67.27 38.82 111.96South Africa 139.66 3.12 0.01 142.79Sudan 11.57 101.01 4.55 117.13Swaziland 11.27 12.71 23.97Tanzania 8.05 5.87 93.74 107.66Togo 2.08 0.83 25.75 28.67Uganda 2.39 6.27 113.38 122.04Zambia 17.07 2.60 57.82 77.49Zimbabwe 22.79 15.27 25.57 63.63South Of Sahara, Regional 45.01 0.55 271.74 317.30

Africa, Regional 90.09 4.68 157.63 252.40America, Total 428.20 118.51 173.93 720.63

North & Central, Total 181.41 74.79 164.38 420.59Anguilla 0.02 0.02Antigua & Barbuda 3.22 3.22Belize 5.91 0.21 1.46 7.57Costa Rica 1.34 0.02 1.36Cuba 3.06 0.39 3.45Dominica 5.12 0.40 6.00 11.52Dominican Republic 0.76 6.70 25.41 32.87El Salvador 28.72 1.81 30.53Grenada 0.18 2.38 2.56Guatemala 26.98 2.78 29.75Haiti 6.14 53.45 70.38 129.97Honduras 31.63 1.04 32.67Jamaica 10.42 0.17 8.81 19.39Mexico 7.25 7.25Montserrat 1.60 1.60Nicaragua 24.57 5.27 29.83Panama 0.39 0.19 0.58St.Kitts-Nevis 11.49 0.16 0.81 12.45St.Lucia 3.85 11.32 15.18St.Vincent & Grenadines 2.02 0.16 7.44 9.62West Indies, Regional 0.55 18.49 19.05N. & C. America, Regional 11.04 2.07 7.04 20.14

South, Total 223.49 37.19 9.45 270.13Argentina 10.67 0.75 11.42Bolivia 33.37 4.07 37.43Brazil 11.27 1.57 12.84Chile 10.16 1.11 11.27Colombia 22.27 13.71 35.98Ecuador 18.89 3.18 22.07Guyana 14.80 5.91 20.71Paraguay 17.81 0.96 18.77Peru 10.10 7.14 17.24Suriname 1.81 0.10 3.54 5.44Uruguay 7.64 0.04 7.67Venezuela 3.51 0.83 4.34South America, Regional 61.19 3.76 64.94

America, Regional 23.29 6.52 0.10 29.91

185

Asia, Total 1 275.81 583.58 14.61 1 874.00Middle East, Total 382.87 124.42 0.13 507.42

Iran 0.30 0.40 0.70Iraq 3.71 5.89 9.60Jordan 76.57 4.42 80.99Lebanon 15.74 23.60 39.34occupied Palestinian territory 231.67 55.85 287.52Syria 20.11 6.07 26.18Yemen 23.52 14.60 38.11Middle East, Regional 11.26 13.58 0.13 24.97

South & Centr. Asia, Total 592.10 404.12 996.22Afghanistan 165.22 96.19 261.41Armenia 33.58 35.19 68.77Azerbaijan 17.75 0.06 17.81Bangladesh 86.73 27.98 114.71Bhutan 0.56 0.16 0.72Georgia 70.20 31.72 101.91India 49.52 11.50 61.02Kazakhstan 13.78 0.29 14.08Kyrgyz Rep. 21.28 6.40 27.68Maldives 0.04 0.04Myanmar (Burma) 17.34 17.36 34.70Nepal 18.56 5.25 23.81Pakistan 35.07 149.47 184.54Sri Lanka 22.76 10.98 33.74Tajikistan 13.24 0.41 13.65Turkmenistan 3.10 0.00 3.10Uzbekistan 3.90 0.29 4.19Central Asia, Regional 9.57 10.87 20.44South Asia, Regional 8.25 8.25South & Central Asia, Regional 1.63 1.63

Far East, Total 263.12 43.41 14.45 320.98Cambodia 34.77 3.03 37.79China 32.73 1.30 34.03Indonesia 90.25 4.60 94.85Korea, Dem. 4.17 7.55 6.25 17.97Laos 15.20 1.21 16.41Malaysia 1.08 1.08Mongolia 3.21 0.35 3.56Philippines 26.76 10.19 36.94Thailand 4.58 12.01 16.59Timor-Leste 4.10 0.83 8.20 13.12Viet Nam 45.21 2.35 47.56Far East Asia, Regional 1.07 1.07

Asia, Regional 37.71 11.63 0.04 49.38Oceania, Total 6.48 2.91 75.39 84.78

Cook Islands 0.05 1.12 1.17Fiji 3.38 0.05 1.78 5.21Kiribati 0.05 2.58 2.63Marshall Islands 0.04 0.02 0.06Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0.09 1.11 1.20Nauru 0.04 0.03 0.07Niue 0.04 0.66 0.70Palau 0.04 0.01 0.05Papua New Guinea 1.04 0.27 12.97 14.29Samoa 0.07 0.09 15.61 15.76Solomon Islands 1.26 3.03 4.29Tokelau 0.05 0.05Tonga 0.09 6.43 6.52Tuvalu 0.05 3.38 3.43Vanuatu 0.36 0.69 1.00 2.06Wallis & Futuna 5.44 5.44Oceania, Regional 1.63 20.22 21.85

Bilateral unallocated 578.15 259.45 72.04 909.643 623.48 2 674.73 2 667.00 8 965.21Part I (ODA) Bilateral, Total

186

Public Private PartnershipsUnited Nations 101.44 1.99 103.43

UNRWA 98.17 98.17UNDPWFPWHOFAO

World Bank Group 1.44 1.44World Trade OrganisationRegional Development Banks 28.00 28.00Other Multilateral Institutions 65.00 50.00 115.00

GFTAM 65.00 50.00 115.00Others

Part I (ODA) Multilateral Aid,Total 195.87 1.99 50.00 247.86

Part I (ODA), Total 3 819.35 2 676.72 2 717.00 9 213.08

Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition (non ODA)

More Advanced Developing Countries 79.80 47.13 42.32 169.26Aruba 0.21 0.21Bahamas 0.01 1.02 1.03Bahrain 0.03 0.03Barbados 5.76 0.04 5.80French Polynesia 0.12 0.09 0.21GibraltarIsrael 4.96 3.10 8.06Korea 0.24 0.24Kuwait 0.03 0.03Mayotte 4.37 4.37Netherlands Antilles 0.01 0.01New Caledonia 3.92 3.92Oman 0.03 0.03Qatar 0.03 0.03Saudi Arabia 0.28 0.28Trinidad & Tobago 29.66 0.02 26.71 56.39Turks & Caicos Islands 0.78 0.78United Arab Emirates 0.11 0.11Virgin Islands (UK) 0.28 0.28MADCT Unallocated 39.30 43.26 4.90 87.47

CEEC's/NIS 60.38 367.88 428.26Bulgaria 0.12 31.37 31.50Croatia 0.98 98.51 99.50Cyprus 48.39 48.39Czech Republic 0.37 0.37Estonia 0.70 0.70Hungary 16.33 16.33Latvia 0.03 0.03Lithuania 1.28 1.28Poland 0.01 10.17 10.18Romania 128.55 128.55Russia 37.69 9.39 47.07Slovenia 0.01 0.23 0.24Europe Unallocated 21.56 22.57 44.12

140.18 415.02 42.32 597.52

3 959.53 3 091.74 2 759.33 9 810.60

(1) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence

Bilateral and multilateral ODA / non-ODA flows.

Part II (Non-OA) Bilateral Aid, Total

Grand Total Part I & Part II


187


ODA per Capita (Euro / Capita)

(1)Total Social

Infrastructures

Economic Infrastructures

& ServicesProduction Multisector /

Crosscutting

Budget Support, Food

Aid, Food Security


Humanitarian Aid

Other / Unallocated

Least Developed Countries (LDC)Afghanistan 8.32 261.41 176.01 0.02 12.28 15.03 12.00 45.78 0.29Angola 1.05 19.97 12.52 0.77 2.55 0.08 4.03 0.01Bangladesh 0.77 114.71 46.00 0.05 8.84 3.16 25.18 30.99 0.49Benin 5.53 48.91 13.59 30.93 2.32 0.07 1.10 0.87 0.02Bhutan 1.00 0.72 0.23 0.03 0.24 0.07 0.16 0.01Burkina Faso 6.03 99.27 21.40 4.30 3.76 0.87 57.71 11.22Burundi 7.51 62.92 12.65 20.63 4.32 2.13 17.45 5.55 0.18Cambodia 2.67 37.79 22.00 0.63 6.22 1.54 4.24 3.03 0.12Central African Rep. 10.72 47.17 6.95 26.94 2.19 1.13 0.38 9.55 0.03Chad 7.35 82.56 24.61 4.18 3.65 6.51 1.40 42.18 0.02Comoros 7.75 5.69 4.91 0.41 0.32 0.01 0.02 0.02Congo, Dem. Rep. 3.28 216.12 107.82 16.85 9.22 12.09 16.01 52.85 1.28Djibouti 10.03 8.91 3.33 0.65 0.18 0.01 2.63 2.11Equatorial Guinea 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.01Eritrea 5.55 29.18 22.59 1.40 1.44 0.44 2.84 0.47Ethiopia 1.78 147.71 16.65 76.68 2.15 1.36 5.59 44.96 0.32Gambia 16.02 27.69 2.06 25.36 0.14 0.14Guinea 3.01 30.08 10.42 11.66 2.01 0.56 4.09 0.81 0.54Guinea-Bissau 9.77 14.81 9.59 2.21 1.75 0.18 1.05 0.02 0.01Haiti 13.01 129.97 14.91 26.12 3.07 0.93 27.20 57.38 0.35Kiribati 26.46 2.63 1.46 0.16 1.01Laos 2.65 16.41 3.00 0.00 4.70 0.39 7.06 1.21 0.05Lesotho 19.46 42.26 23.33 10.11 0.06 0.00 8.77Liberia 15.94 63.67 13.32 3.88 3.08 0.58 20.91 21.88 0.03Madagascar 1.15 23.77 13.26 2.78 0.82 0.91 2.93 3.07Malawi 3.49 52.01 14.02 15.03 6.77 9.73 5.69 0.27 0.51Maldives 0.12 0.04 0.04Mali 6.61 101.61 27.01 27.96 7.12 1.44 31.42 5.64 1.01Mauritania 15.08 52.18 6.74 41.29 0.46 0.09 1.64 1.88 0.07Mozambique 3.97 92.75 20.02 14.96 2.30 3.12 52.11 0.24Myanmar (Burma) 0.72 34.70 12.42 1.57 0.35 3.38 16.99Nepal 0.79 23.81 9.71 2.71 2.03 0.93 1.87 6.20 0.36Niger 6.43 99.72 20.11 3.21 1.67 0.84 45.42 28.04 0.42Rwanda 6.34 67.34 14.22 13.20 6.58 0.57 31.71 0.04 1.03Samoa 86.10 15.76 15.61 0.00 0.07 0.09Sao Tome & Principe 22.75 3.76 1.51 1.57 0.07 0.16 0.41 0.04Senegal 6.51 80.89 14.41 26.10 1.80 4.63 32.43 1.06 0.46Sierra Leone 8.77 51.47 13.83 15.45 1.43 1.31 13.58 5.59 0.29Solomon Islands 7.97 4.29 2.97 0.57 0.01 0.75Somalia 12.00 111.96 26.88 5.99 6.74 2.55 0.47 68.67 0.66Sudan 2.69 117.13 6.60 0.25 0.15 8.93 101.20Tanzania 2.40 107.66 11.02 34.82 2.50 1.09 52.31 5.86 0.05Timor-Leste 11.67 13.12 4.54 0.70 0.23 5.58 1.45 0.62 0.01Togo 4.76 28.67 10.65 0.74 0.28 7.89 8.23 0.83 0.04Tuvalu 349.19 3.43 1.73 0.15 1.50 0.05 0.01Uganda 3.65 122.04 11.51 61.75 16.22 0.15 23.35 8.58 0.46Vanuatu 8.58 2.06 0.67 0.38 0.25 0.10 0.65 0.00Yemen 1.58 38.11 21.22 0.03 2.17 1.29 13.41Zambia 5.92 77.49 21.35 6.01 4.51 1.01 43.80 0.23 0.57South Of Sahara, Regional - LDC'sAsia, Regional - LDC'sTotal Least Developed Countries 3.41 2 836.46 871.45 538.27 140.40 90.74 577.00 606.71 11.90

Table 5.12 ODA Recipient by main OECD sector in 2011

188

Other Low Income Countries (OLIC)Cote d'Ivoire 3.95 77.99 28.68 6.87 4.43 0.39 12.14 25.15 0.33Ghana 2.61 63.57 8.27 15.53 3.71 4.12 31.04 0.78 0.10Kenya 2.24 90.63 13.07 22.51 10.19 5.72 2.03 36.77 0.34Korea, Dem. 0.74 17.97 1.28 2.88 7.55 6.25Kyrgyz Rep. 5.19 27.68 23.15 0.01 0.87 0.40 0.75 2.50Nigeria 0.40 63.42 55.74 0.85 0.43 0.22 6.13 0.05Pakistan 1.06 184.54 35.70 0.88 5.77 2.74 139.31 0.15Papua New Guinea 2.08 14.29 9.55 4.19 0.22 0.27 0.05Tajikistan 1.98 13.65 8.48 0.27 2.89 0.69 0.90 0.41Uzbekistan 0.15 4.19 3.41 0.21 0.29 0.27Viet Nam 0.54 47.56 11.60 0.02 3.93 12.47 17.18 2.35 0.01Zimbabwe 5.06 63.63 29.56 0.60 8.58 5.42 5.61 13.87

Total Other Low Income Countries 1.14 669.10 228.49 46.67 40.32 35.43 63.13 12.14 235.38 7.55

Lower Middle Income Countries (LMIC)Albania 19.40 62.17 36.50 14.41 8.20 3.00 0.06Algeria 1.62 57.35 22.13 6.11 13.09 2.77 13.14 0.12Armenia 22.24 68.77 20.58 4.58 0.28 0.30 43.01 0.01Azerbaijan 1.94 17.81 10.24 5.69 0.82 1.01 0.06Bolivia 3.77 37.43 18.45 5.49 3.81 2.86 3.50 3.32Bosnia and Herzegovina 15.27 57.41 36.47 5.67 7.31 3.34 0.38 4.25Cameroon 2.53 49.66 9.20 26.00 7.85 4.93 1.67 0.02Cape Verde 33.06 16.40 7.28 0.09 0.57 3.57 4.89China 0.03 34.03 23.45 2.67 3.63 2.08 0.85 1.36Colombia 0.78 35.98 13.26 0.26 8.14 0.02 14.29 0.01Congo, Rep. 3.53 14.28 5.37 2.18 2.03 2.40 0.48 1.79 0.04Cuba 0.31 3.45 1.39 0.45 1.17 0.05 0.39Dominican Republic 3.31 32.87 8.84 13.16 6.57 0.22 1.24 2.82 0.01Ecuador 1.53 22.07 5.32 0.95 11.41 1.47 2.85 0.06Egypt 0.59 48.11 34.76 2.45 1.03 3.19 6.67 0.00El Salvador 4.93 30.53 24.89 3.73 0.10 1.81Georgia 23.42 101.91 60.55 3.05 3.10 1.16 0.04 33.96 0.06Guatemala 2.07 29.75 8.84 1.53 2.12 4.64 9.97 2.66Guyana 27.45 20.71 1.04 14.53 5.13 0.01Honduras 4.30 32.67 11.40 0.96 6.00 5.35 7.93 1.03India 0.05 61.02 43.88 1.53 1.19 4.30 9.93 0.20Indonesia 0.40 94.85 66.12 2.46 4.20 0.68 21.29 0.11Iran 0.01 0.70 0.08 0.40 0.22Iraq 0.30 9.60 3.56 0.05 0.04 5.95Jamaica 7.08 19.39 4.47 1.04 10.27 2.50 0.10 0.94 0.07Jordan 13.09 80.99 45.39 16.46 12.74 1.76 0.15 4.42 0.06Kosovo (2) 120.09 219.23 178.07 15.27 9.99 7.30 0.30 8.31former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 25.49 52.52 20.29 2.15 10.79 17.90 1.39Marshall Islands 1.17 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.04Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 10.77 1.20 0.27 0.83 0.01 0.09Republic of Moldova 30.12 107.62 34.77 38.57 0.31 11.18 20.00 2.79Mongolia 1.29 3.56 0.76 2.41 0.04 0.35Morocco 4.77 152.54 66.94 55.99 16.57 0.60 12.43Namibia 9.96 22.75 14.49 5.00 0.20 1.86 0.16 1.04Nicaragua 5.15 29.83 9.81 8.52 4.84 2.14 2.22 2.18 0.12Niue 478.62 0.70 0.66 0.04occupied Palestinian territory 71.18 287.52 218.91 1.95 11.75 4.36 2.97 47.53 0.06Paraguay 2.91 18.77 16.41 0.15 0.95 0.25 0.05 0.96Peru 0.59 17.24 9.75 0.94 0.09 0.82 0.27 4.95 0.42Philippines 0.40 36.94 19.27 3.32 1.76 1.87 10.67 0.05Sri Lanka 1.62 33.74 15.72 0.01 0.78 0.60 16.61 0.03Swaziland 20.21 23.97 12.36 1.57 9.84 0.18 0.02Syria 1.28 26.18 10.80 0.05 8.17 0.01 7.14 0.01Thailand 0.24 16.59 3.67 0.03 0.40 0.99 11.48 0.01Tokelau 44.41 0.05 0.05Tonga 62.65 6.52 0.09 0.21 0.45 5.50 0.09 0.18Tunisia 12.44 130.38 34.79 2.40 2.15 9.75 69.47 11.76 0.06Turkmenistan 0.61 3.10 2.60 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.17Ukraine 2.40 109.03 21.75 72.11 8.11 6.92 0.14Wallis & Futuna 400.71 5.44 1.62 3.81 0.01

Total Lower Middle Income Countries 0.66 2 345.43 1 216.62 327.34 224.76 124.12 186.07 245.03 21.49

189

Upper Middle Income Countries (UMIC)Anguilla 1.32 0.02 0.02Antigua & Barbuda 36.32 3.22 2.40 0.82Argentina 0.28 11.42 9.15 1.25 0.34 0.04 0.64Belarus 1.16 11.13 5.90 0.82 1.06 0.13 3.21Belize 24.31 7.57 2.31 2.58 1.68 0.79 0.21 0.00Botswana 7.55 15.14 13.68 0.02 1.30 0.15Brazil 0.07 12.84 4.86 0.82 4.43 2.29 0.34 0.09Chile 0.66 11.27 5.01 0.00 4.45 0.70 1.11 0.01Cook Islands 57.72 1.17 0.16 1.01Costa Rica 0.29 1.36 0.54 0.80 0.02Dominica 170.02 11.52 1.01 2.22 3.89 0.10 3.90 0.40 0.00Fiji 6.05 5.21 3.58 1.30 0.27 0.05 0.01Gabon 3.64 5.48 1.49 2.20 1.76 0.04Grenada 24.51 2.56 0.75 0.18 1.63Kazakhstan 0.88 14.08 12.05 0.10 1.59 0.26 0.06 0.01Lebanon 9.31 39.34 13.98 1.24 2.82 1.07 20.22 0.02Libya 5.59 35.56 11.07 0.33 24.16Malaysia 0.04 1.08 0.33 0.44 0.01 0.30Mauritius 43.83 56.95 1.03 0.20 0.29 54.45 0.97Mexico 0.06 7.25 1.49 3.93 1.80 0.03Montenegro 27.32 17.25 8.48 3.81 2.85 1.33 0.69 0.10Montserrat 269.63 1.60 1.60Nauru 7.07 0.07 0.03 0.04Palau 2.61 0.05 0.01 0.04Panama 0.16 0.58 0.05 0.05 0.28 0.19Serbia 23.59 189.46 102.92 38.67 19.67 24.25 2.46 1.48Seychelles 56.85 4.92 1.85 0.00 0.20 2.85 0.02South Africa 2.85 142.79 116.83 10.33 10.24 4.64 0.75Suriname 10.37 5.44 0.57 2.37 2.13 0.22 0.10 0.07St.Helena 801.36 3.30 3.30St.Kitts-Nevis 237.56 12.45 0.05 0.76 11.48 0.16St.Lucia 87.10 15.18 12.17 0.03 2.04 0.11 0.82St.Vincent & Grenadines 87.96 9.62 3.67 0.69 5.00 0.10 0.16Turkey 4.30 313.07 79.00 12.77 82.27 138.77 0.09 0.17Uruguay 2.28 7.67 3.80 0.08 0.15 3.61 0.04Venezuela 0.15 4.34 3.17 0.09 0.28 0.81

Total Upper Middle Income Countries 1.61 981.98 423.40 84.06 155.47 183.77 74.35 53.80 7.13

Total LDC + OLIC + LMIC + UMIC 1.22 6 832.97 2 739.97 996.33 560.94 434.05 900.55 12.14 1 140.91 48.07

By regionEurope 9.52 1 437.12 636.19 255.65 167.18 292.21 21.47 4.55 59.88Africa 3.86 3 939.04 1 182.40 729.62 401.07 206.77 701.17 13.09 611.87 93.07America 1.24 720.63 255.45 97.37 134.16 52.96 74.07 104.75 1.89Asia 0.49 1 874.00 1 024.85 48.40 124.47 72.86 130.19 462.47 10.76Oceania 9.29 84.78 41.26 6.68 18.73 3.25 7.11 7.50 0.25Bilateral unallocated 0.16 909.64 191.49 35.81 47.80 70.65 14.39 50.26 499.26

Total Region 1.60 8 965.21 3 331.63 1 173.51 893.42 698.70 948.39 13.09 1 241.39 665.10

Bilateral ODA flows.(1) Source : World Population Prospects - United Nations Population Division - 2010 revision(2) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence


190

Commitments in € Million Disbursements in € Million

Table 5.13 Sectoral breakdown of ODA managed by the European Commission in 2011

4 830 M€, 43%

1 056 M€, 9%1 268 M€, 11%

1 884 M€, 17%

213 M€, 2%

0 M€, 0%

1 299 M€, 11%

773 M€, 7%

3 543 M€, 38%

1 203 M€, 13%893 M€, 10%

702 M€, 8%

948 M€, 10%

13 M€, 0%

1 245 M€, 14%

665 M€, 7%

Social infrastructures: education, health, water, government and civil society, other

Economic infrastructures and services : transport, communications, energy, other services

Production : agriculture, forestry and fishing, industry, mining and construction, trade and tourism




Humanitarian aid : Emergency response, reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, disaster preventionand preparednessOther/Unallocated : admin. costs, unspecified

191

Commitments in € Million

Sector of Destination Total Managed by EuropeAid

Managed by Other DGs

SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 4 830.00 3 596.60 1 233.40690.91 512.32 178.59

Education, level unspecified 153.32 145.15 8.17Basic education 177.40 177.40Secondary education 65.23 39.30 25.93Post-secondary education 294.96 150.47 144.49

244.09 241.34 2.75Health, general 99.29 96.54 2.75Basic health 144.80 144.80

123.49 123.49304.17 260.27 43.90

2 659.97 1 779.72 880.25807.37 679.47 127.91

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 1 055.69 862.09 193.60666.08 500.26 165.8211.89 11.89

297.45 275.93 21.523.27 3.27

77.00 74.00 3.00PRODUCTION SECTORS 1 268.28 1 005.11 263.17

779.02 567.53 211.49Agriculture 722.98 511.49 211.49Forestry 51.21 51.21Fishing 4.83 4.83

128.39 125.89 2.50Industry 128.39 125.89 2.50Mineral resources and miningConstruction

265.47 216.29 49.18Trade policy and regulation 351.28 304.69 46.58Tourism 9.60 7.00 2.60

MULTISECTOR / CROSSCUTTING 1 884.15 1 355.49 528.66443.37 287.45 155.92

1 440.78 1 068.04 372.74COMMODITY AID AND GENERAL PROGRAMME ASSISTANCE 212.96 212.96

204.58 204.588.38 8.38

ACTION RELATING TO DEBT

HUMANITARIAN AID 1 298.81 189.84 1 108.971 174.75 131.84 1 042.90

86.35 56.90 29.4537.72 1.10 36.62

OTHER / UNALLOCATED / UNSPECIFIED 773.49 617.51 155.98684.62 555.77 128.85

88.88 61.74 27.13GRAND TOTAL 11 323.38 7 839.61 3 483.78

Bilateral and multilateral ODA flows.

Refugees in donor countriesUnallocated/unspecified

(1) Including € 192 million corresponding to a multianual programme for administrative cost financing. The corresponding share for the year 2011 is € 67.4 million.Breakdown by sector of Official Development Assistance (ODA) financed on the general EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2011.

Other commodity assistance


Emergency ResponseReconstruction relief and rehabilitationDisaster prevention and preparedness

Administrative costs of donors (1)

Trade and Tourism

General environmental protectionOther multisector

General budget supportDevelopment food aid/food security assistance

Banking and financial servicesBusiness and other services

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing

Industry, Mining and Construction

Water supply and sanitationGovernment and civil societyOther Social Infrastructure and services

Transport and storageCommunicationsEnergy generation and supply

Table 5.14 Detailed description of ODA by sector in 2011 - Commitments

Education

Health

Population polices/programs and reproductive health

192

Disbursements in € Million

Sector of Destination Total Managed by EuropeAid

Managed by Other DGs

SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 3 542.94 2 642.56 900.38625.72 421.30 204.42

Education, level unspecified 236.72 221.45 15.27Basic education 108.70 105.47 3.23Secondary education 77.31 54.36 22.95Post-secondary education 202.99 40.02 162.96

490.90 475.43 15.47Health, general 98.85 86.47 12.38Basic health 392.05 388.96 3.10

97.67 85.95 11.72328.78 297.11 31.67

1 483.87 891.53 592.35515.99 471.24 44.75

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 1 203.31 1 083.73 119.58689.40 644.29 45.1237.53 23.76 13.78

348.95 318.54 30.4239.46 36.26 3.2087.97 60.90 27.07

PRODUCTION SECTORS 893.42 744.65 148.77478.70 363.30 115.39

Agriculture 406.62 294.16 112.45Forestry 41.92 40.57 1.35Fishing 30.16 28.56 1.59

240.62 222.19 18.43Industry 223.07 205.02 18.05Mineral resources and mining 16.27 15.88 0.39Construction 1.28 1.28

122.41 107.47 14.94Trade policy and regulation 162.50 149.39 13.11Tourism 11.59 9.76 1.83

MULTISECTOR / CROSSCUTTING 702.15 446.75 255.40185.11 163.32 21.79517.04 283.43 233.61

COMMODITY AID AND GENERAL PROGRAMME ASSISTANCE 948.39 892.87 55.53741.78 686.78 55.00206.61 206.08 0.53

ACTION RELATING TO DEBT 13.09 13.0913.09 13.09

HUMANITARIAN AID 1 244.69 199.42 1 045.271 037.84 56.72 981.13

131.12 99.64 31.4875.73 43.06 32.67

OTHER / UNALLOCATED / UNSPECIFIED 665.10 513.30 151.80555.82 425.46 130.36

109.27 87.84 21.44GRAND TOTAL 9 213.08 6 536.36 2 676.72

Bilateral and multilateral ODA flows.


Breakdown by sector of Official Development Assistance (ODA) financed on the general EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2011.




Administrative costs of donors

Trade and Tourism








Table 5.15 Detailed description of ODA by sector in 2011 - Disbursements

Education

Health


193

Commitments in € Million

Sector of Destination ENPI East

ENPI South ENPI Asia Latin

America ACP Multi Region Total

SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 336 696 559 252 1 196 557 3 59737 57 229 54 103 32 512

Education, level unspecified 23 30 34 26 32 145Basic education 2 134 41 177Secondary education 7 7 25 39Post-secondary education 37 24 58 20 11 150

10 156 76 241Health, general 10 76 11 97Basic health 80 65 145

5 2 9 40 68 1230 22 16 25 194 3 260

294 239 283 51 540 373 1 780376 13 121 164 6 679

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 99 111 45 2 559 46 8627 18 476 500

4 8 1287 70 11 2 61 46 276

5 20 26 23 74PRODUCTION SECTORS 0 89 54 39 639 184 1 005

22 8 15 339 184 568Agriculture 22 8 15 299 168 511Forestry 36 16 51Fishing 0 5 5

35 31 8 52 126Industry 35 31 8 52 126Mineral resources and miningConstruction

0 32 15 17 247 312Trade policy and regulation 0 32 15 10 247 305Tourism 7 7

MULTISECTOR / CROSSCUTTING 101 354 60 184 55 482 121 1 3558 13 74 7 89 97 287

93 341 60 111 48 393 24 1 068COMMODITY AID AND GENERAL PROGRAMME ASSISTANCE 7 206 213

205 2057 2 8

ACTION RELATING TO DEBT

HUMANITARIAN AID 19 18 53 0 100 19018 53 61 132

19 38 570 1 1

OTHER / UNALLOCATED / UNSPECIFIED 39 10 0 203 366 618203 353 556

39 10 0 13 62GRAND TOTAL 592 1 279 60 896 354 3 385 1 273 7 840

Table 5.16 EuropeAid in 2011: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per region

Education

Health

Population polices/programs and reproductive healthWater supply and sanitationGovernment and civil societyOther Social Infrastructure and services

Transport and storageCommunicationsEnergy generation and supplyBanking and financial servicesBusiness and other services



Trade and Tourism


General budget supportDevelopment food aid/food security assistanceOther commodity assistance



Administrative costs of donors (1)Refugees in donor countriesUnallocated/unspecified

(1) Including €192 million corresponding to a multianual programme for administrative cost financing. The corresponding share for the year 2011 is € 67.4 million.Breakdown by sector and region of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid and the European Development Fund (EDF).Bilateral and multilateral ODA flows.

Multi region : covering several regions or unspecified location.

On budget side, region is identified following geographical budget lines and recipient countries for thematic budget lines.ENPI East : Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine. (Russia excluded)ENPI South : Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, occupied Palestinian territory, Syria, Tunisia. (Israel excluded)Asia : Iran, Iraq, Oman, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Maldives, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Korea, Dem., Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam.Latin America : Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, VenezuelaACP : South Of Sahara + Oceania + Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St.Kitts-Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent & Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, West Indies, Regional, Guyana, Suriname. (Turks & Caicos Islands excluded)

194


Sector of Destination ENPI East

ENPI South ENPI Asia Latin

America ACP Multi Region Total

SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 158 555 17 505 181 1 074 152 2 64313 71 145 42 130 20 421

Education, level unspecified 1 49 91 1 61 18 221Basic education 0 8 36 22 39 105Secondary education 11 12 14 3 13 2 54Post-secondary education 1 3 4 16 17 40

15 34 131 5 221 69 475Health, general 1 31 17 2 33 4 86Basic health 14 4 114 4 188 65 389

3 10 10 2 38 22 8613 34 0 19 16 213 1 29798 118 16 154 83 390 31 89216 287 0 45 32 82 9 471

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 168 106 1 12 34 741 22 1 08426 26 0 2 5 584 6442 3 0 7 11 24

135 61 0 7 19 74 22 3191 12 2 0 20 0 363 3 1 3 51 61

PRODUCTION SECTORS 25 122 0 83 75 417 22 7454 20 47 29 242 21 363

Agriculture 4 20 41 18 196 15 294Forestry 1 0 5 10 18 6 41Fishing 0 1 0 28 29

16 86 19 37 64 1 222Industry 13 86 18 37 51 1 205Mineral resources and mining 3 0 1 12 0 16Construction 1 1

5 16 0 17 9 111 0 159Trade policy and regulation 5 16 16 8 105 0 149Tourism 1 0 0 1 0 7 0 10

MULTISECTOR / CROSSCUTTING 26 27 18 57 42 207 69 4476 12 0 10 10 69 57 163

20 16 17 47 32 138 13 283COMMODITY AID AND GENERAL PROGRAMME ASSISTANCE 9 85 84 29 672 15 893

8 82 21 10 565 6871 3 62 18 107 15 206

ACTION RELATING TO DEBT 13 1313 13

HUMANITARIAN AID 30 12 47 3 106 0 1990 7 3 1 45 57

30 4 41 0 24 1001 3 3 36 0 43

OTHER / UNALLOCATED / UNSPECIFIED 33 1 11 4 1 102 361 51380 346 425

33 1 11 4 1 22 15 88GRAND TOTAL 450 909 46 793 365 3 331 642 6 536

ENPI East : Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine. (Russia excluded)ENPI South : Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, occupied Palestinian territory, Syria, Tunisia. (Israel excluded)Asia : Iran, Iraq, Oman, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Maldives, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Korea, Dem., Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam.Latin America : Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, VenezuelaACP : South Of Sahara + Oceania + Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St.Kitts-Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent & Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, West Indies, Regional, Guyana, Suriname. (Turks & Caicos Islands excluded)Multi region : covering several regions or unspecified location.


Breakdown by sector and region of external aid financed on the general EU budget managed by EuropeAid and the European Development Fund (EDF).Bilateral and multilateral ODA flows.On budget side, region is identified following geographical budget lines and recipient countries for thematic budget lines.




Administrative costs of donors

Trade and Tourism








Table 5.17 EuropeAid in 2011: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per region

Education

Health


195


Sector of Destination ENPI EDF DCI - Geo (2)

DCI - Thema

(3)

Food Facility

(4)EIDHR IFS NSI CFSP

(5) IPA Echo Other Total

SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 1 088 1 166 842 438 158 170 284 601 81 4 830.00 160 92 311 33 20 75 690.91

Education, level unspecified 23 25 64 33 8 153.32 Basic education 2 41 134 177.40 Secondary education 7 25 7 4 22 65.23 Post-secondary education 127 1 106 7 53 294.96

153 10 78 3 244.09 Health, general 76 10 11 3 99.29 Basic health 77 68 144.80

35 9 79 123.49 22 187 41 8 44 3 304.17

530 535 336 235 158 170 284 407 4 2 659.97 376 164 134 6 128 807.37

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 190 559 34 4 9 75 185 1 055.69 25 476 9 157 666.08 4 8 11.89

137 61 4 75 22 297.45 3 3.27

25 23 26 3 77.00 PRODUCTION SECTORS 89 397 79 439 260 4 1 268.28

22 148 9 389 211 0 779.02 Agriculture 22 144 9 337 211 0 722.98 Forestry 51 51.21 Fishing 4 1 4.83

35 33 39 19 3 128.39 Industry 35 33 39 19 3 128.39 Mineral resources and mining - Construction -

32 216 32 31 46 4 360.88 Trade policy and regulation 32 216 25 31 43 3 351.28 Tourism 7 2 0 9.60

MULTISECTOR / CROSSCUTTING 514 394 275 149 527 26 1 884.15 21 51 67 149 154 2 443.37

494 343 208 373 24 1 440.78 COMMODITY AID AND GENERAL PROGRAMME ASSISTANCE 74 82 56 2 212.96

74 76 56 204.58 7 2 8.38

- ACTION RELATING TO DEBT -

- HUMANITARIAN AID 37 95 53 5 26 6 1 077 1 298.81

18 56 53 5 1 043 1 174.75 19 38 26 4 86.35

1 0 2 34 37.72 OTHER / UNALLOCATED / UNSPECIFIED 57 202 57 77 0 10 32 1 44 8 284 773.49

43 202 57 44 0 10 7 1 43 8 268 684.62 -

14 0 34 25 1 16 88.88 GRAND TOTAL 1 976 2 887 1 423 1 168 2 169 237 76 284 1 622 1 086 394 11 323.38

(3) DCI - Thema : Migration, Food security, Non-state actors, Environment, Human & social development, ACP sugar programmes(4) Food Facility : facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries, pilot project — Finance for agricultural production(5) CFSP is financed on the general EU budget managed by DG FPI


(1) Including € 192 millions corresponding to a multianual programme for administrative cost financing. The corresponding share for the year 2011 is € 67.4 millions. Column "Other" includes expenditure concerning other instruments.Breakdown by sector and region of external aid financed on the general EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF).Bilateral and multilateral ODA flows.(2) DCI - Geo : Asia, Latin America, South Africa





Trade and Tourism








Table 5.18 External aid in 2011: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per instrument

Education

Health


196


Sector of Destination ENPI EDF DCI - Geo (2)

DCI - Thema

(3)

Food Facility

(4)EIDHR IFS NSI CFSP

(5) IPA ECHO Other Total

SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 729 832 709 352 1 118 92 262 365 84 3 543130 93 244 41 0 1 46 70 626

Education, level unspecified 50 59 91 20 0 1 14 1 237Basic education 7 11 76 10 0 3 0 109Secondary education 22 8 14 11 3 20 77Post-secondary education 51 15 62 0 26 49 203

48 157 145 122 1 1 15 1 491Health, general 31 27 16 12 12 1 99Basic health 17 131 129 111 1 1 2 392

7 18 5 56 0 12 9847 208 29 12 32 1 329

197 316 190 86 117 90 262 217 8 1 484300 40 96 33 0 0 0 43 3 516

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 224 719 52 32 0 0 56 119 1 1 20352 579 7 5 45 1 6895 10 7 1 0 0 14 0 38

146 70 22 24 56 30 0 34913 20 3 1 0 3 0 396 40 13 1 27 88

PRODUCTION SECTORS 144 263 139 162 17 0 0 146 22 89322 125 48 137 17 0 0 115 15 479

Agriculture 22 90 40 111 17 0 0 112 15 407Forestry 0 9 8 24 1 0 42Fishing 0 26 0 2 2 30

101 31 65 24 18 1 241Industry 98 18 64 24 18 1 223Mineral resources and mining 3 12 1 0 0 16Construction 1 1

21 107 26 2 12 6 174Trade policy and regulation 20 104 24 1 10 3 163Tourism 1 3 1 1 2 3 12

MULTISECTOR / CROSSCUTTING 66 172 85 112 0 0 253 15 70214 54 16 79 0 19 2 18551 118 69 32 0 0 234 13 517

COMMODITY AID AND GENERAL PROGRAMME ASSISTANCE 90 520 40 150 93 1 55 94890 510 28 49 9 55 7420 9 12 101 84 1 207

ACTION RELATING TO DEBT 13 1313 13

HUMANITARIAN AID 41 102 48 8 34 4 1 007 1 2456 42 4 5 6 0 975 1 038

34 24 41 0 28 3 1311 36 3 3 0 0 32 76

OTHER / UNALLOCATED / UNSPECIFIED 58 96 62 74 3 9 7 1 0 62 7 286 66543 79 57 39 3 9 6 1 0 43 7 269 556

16 17 4 35 0 1 0 19 17 109GRAND TOTAL 1 352 2 717 1 134 890 115 127 134 57 262 949 1 014 463 9 213

(3) DCI - Thema : Migration, Food security, Non-state actors, Environment, Human & social development, ACP sugar programmes(4) Food Facility : facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries, pilot project — Finance for agricultural production(5) CFSP is financed on the general EU budget managed by DG FPI


(1) Including €192 million corresponding to a multianual programme for administrative cost financing. The corresponding share for the year 2011 is € 67.4 million. Column "Other" includes Breakdown by sector and region of external aid financed on the general EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF).Bilateral and multilateral ODA flows.(2) DCI - Geo : Asia, Latin America, South Africa





Trade and Tourism









Education

Health


197


Commitments %

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

ENPI

EDF

DCI - Geo

DCI - Thema

Food Facility

EIDHR

IFS

NSI

CFSP

IPA

ECHO

Social infrastructures: education, health, water, government and civil society, other

Economic infrastructures and services : transport, communications, energy, other services

Production : agriculture, forestry and fishing, industry, mining and construction, trade and tourism




Humanitarian aid : Emergency response, reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, disaster prevention and preparedness

Other/Unallocated : admin. costs, unspecified

198


General Budget Support

Sector Budget Support

Total Budget Support

Total ODABudget

Support / Total ODA

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) - 513 513 1 976 26%

Development Cooperation Instrument - Geographic (1) 76 383 458 1 423 32%

Development Cooperation Instrument -Thematic (2) 56 67 123 1 168 11%

European Development Fund (EDF) 74 84 158 2 887 5%

Grand Total 205 1 047 1 252 7 454 17%

(1) DCI - Geographic : Asia, Latin America, South Africa

Table 5.21 Budget Support 2011 : breakdown by instrument

(2) DCI - Thematic : Migration, Food security, Non-state actors, Environment, Human & social development, ACP sugar programmes

13274/12 jw

DG D 2B ES


Bruselas, 31 de agosto de 2012 (OR. en)

13274/12

GE�VAL 58 E�FOPOL 249 MI 532 COMIX 475

�OTA DE TRA�SMISIÓ� Emisor: Por el Secretario General de la Comisión Europea,

D. Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU, Director Fecha de recepción: 26 de julio de 2012 Destinatario: D. Uwe CORSEPIUS,

Secretario General del Consejo de la Unión Europea N.° doc. Ción.: COM(2012) 415 final Asunto: I�FORME DE LA COMISIÓ� AL PARLAME�TO EUROPEO Y

AL CO�SEJO Posibles ventajas y desventajas de una reducción a dos categorías de armas de fuego (prohibidas o sujetas a autorización), con vistas a un mejor funcionamiento del mercado interior para los productos en cuestión a través de una posible simplificación.



ES ES

COMISIÓN EUROPEA


I�FORME DE LA COMISIÓ� AL PARLAME�TO EUROPEO Y AL CO�SEJO

Posibles ventajas y desventajas de una reducción a dos categorías de armas de fuego (prohibidas o sujetas a autorización), con vistas a un mejor funcionamiento del mercado

interior para los productos en cuestión a través de una posible simplificación.

ES 2 ES


Posibles ventajas y desventajas de una reducción a dos categorías de armas de fuego (prohibidas o sujetas a autorización), con vistas a un mejor funcionamiento del mercado

interior para los productos en cuestión a través de una posible simplificación.

El presente informe responde a uno de los requisitos de la Directiva 91/477/CEE del Consejo, de 18 de junio de 1991, sobre el control de la adquisición y tenencia de armas, modificada por la Directiva 2008/51/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de mayo de 2008.

1. DIRECTIVA 91/477/CEE Y CUESTIÓ� DE LA CLASIFICACIÓ� DE LAS ARMAS DE

FUEGO E� CATEGORÍAS

1.1. En un principio, la Directiva 91/477/CEE era una medida de acompañamiento en la realización del mercado interior. Con ella, a cambio de algunas facilidades de circulación de las armas a fuego de un Estado miembro a otro, se integraban en el Derecho europeo garantías de seguridad adaptadas a ese tipo de productos.

1.2. Esa misma Directiva contiene dos anexos; en el primero (anexo I) se establece una clasificación —que sigue en vigor— de las armas de fuego, principalmente en función de su peligrosidad. Se establecían cuatro categorías: la categoría A incluye las armas prohibidas – armas de guerra; la categoría B incluye las armas sujetas a autorización —en gran parte utilizadas por tiradores deportivos y cazadores—; en la categoría C figuran las armas sujetas a declaración —fundamentalmente armas utilizadas por los cazadores— y, por último, la categoría D —otras armas de fuego— se aplica fundamentalmente a un tipo de armas1.

1.3. Esta clasificación es una clasificación «de mínimos», al igual que el conjunto del marco normativo de la Directiva. En efecto, en virtud del artículo 3 de la Directiva 91/477/CEE2, los Estados miembros pueden hacer más rígidas esas distinciones, por ejemplo suprimiendo las categorías C o D, o incluyendo puntualmente un arma determinada en una categoría superior, en función de sus políticas o percepciones en materia de seguridad, o de sus tradiciones cinegéticas.

1.4. Ese margen de libertad para los Estados miembros se deriva del carácter mismo de la Directiva, que no tiene como finalidad una armonización completa, pero sí pretende establecer una base mínima de seguridad, sin perjuicio de lo que pudieran realizar los Estados miembros para prevenir el tráfico ilegal de armas3.

1.5. Cabe señalar que la Directiva no se aplica a la adquisición o tenencia de armas por parte de las fuerzas armadas, la policía o los servicios públicos, o los coleccionistas y organismos

1 Armas de fuego largas de un solo tiro, de ánima lisa. 2 Los Estados miembros podrán introducir en su legislación disposiciones más estrictas que las previstas

en la presente Directiva (sin perjuicio de los derechos conferidos a los residentes de los Estados

miembros por el apartado 2 del artículo 12). 3 Por ejemplo, el considerando 8 de la Directiva 91/477/CEE establece: la Directiva no afecta a la

facultad de los Estados miembros de adoptar las medidas necesarias para prevenir el tráfico ilegal de

armas.

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con vocación cultural e histórica en materia de armas reconocidos como tales por el Estado miembro en cuyo territorio estén establecidos. Esa distinción es fundamental, ya que establece una diferencia entre las armas consideradas «civiles» y otro tipo de material utilizado por las fuerzas armadas, o incluso, en ocasiones, por la delincuencia organizada.

1.6. Esta Directiva fue objeto de un informe, el 15 de diciembre de 2000, de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo sobre su aplicación4. Hasta la fecha no se han rebatido sus conclusiones, que, por lo general eran favorables y no cuestionaban la clasificación de las armas de fuego que figura en el anexo I.

2. CLASIFICACIÓ� DE LAS ARMAS DE FUEGO E� EL MARCO LA ADOPCIÓ� DE LA

DIRECTIVA 2008/51/CE, DE 21 DE MAYO DE 2008, POR LA QUE SE MODIFICA LA

DIRECTIVA 91/477/CEE, Y METODOLOGÍA UTILIZADA E� EL PRESE�TE I�FORME

2.1. En el marco de los trabajos del colegislador, un primer enfoque se centraba en dos consideraciones principales: reducir la nomenclatura de las armas de fuego a dos categorías (o bien prohibidas, o bien sujetas a autorización) sería más seguro para el ciudadano europeo y, al mismo tiempo, más sencillo para los operadores económicos.

2.2. Sin embargo, no compartían ese punto de vista quienes consideraban que los Estados miembros debían conservar cierta discrecionalidad en la clasificación interna de las armas de fuego, naturalmente a condición de que respeten los umbrales mínimos establecidos en el anexo I. Al igual que los usuarios habituales de armas de fuego civiles, los operadores económicos tampoco parecían convencidos de las ventajas que podría acarrear una simplificación de ese tipo.

2.3. La síntesis de esas percepciones pudo resumirse en el considerando 18 de la Directiva 2008/51/CE, donde se establece que Algunos Estados miembros han simplificado la

clasificación de las armas de fuego, pasando de cuatro categorías a solamente dos […]. Los

Estados miembros deben adoptar uniformemente esta clasificación simplificada, aunque, en

virtud del principio de subsidiariedad, los Estados miembros que las subdividan a su vez en

varias categorías pueden mantener dicha clasificación.

2.4. El objetivo del presente informe es, pues, revisar la cuestión de la nomenclatura de las armas de fuego teniendo en cuenta expresamente el mejor funcionamiento del mercado interior y desde la perspectiva del informe sobre los resultados de la aplicación de la

Directiva, acompañado, si procede, de propuestas, que la Comisión deberá presentar al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo, a más tardar el 28 de julio de 2015, como también se establece en la Directiva.

2.5. Para ello, los servicios de la Comisión han adoptado un enfoque en el que participan los servicios de los Estados miembros competentes en materia de armas de fuego (principalmente, los ministerios de Interior o de Justicia, dependiendo de los Estados miembros), a los que se envió un cuestionario en noviembre de 2011, así como las principales categorías de usuarios de armas de fuego civiles —en particular, fabricantes, minoristas, cazadores, tiradores deportivos y coleccionistas—, a los que se solicitó, en repetidas ocasiones, que expresaran su punto de vista.

4 COM(2000) 0837 final.

ES 4 ES

2.6. Las preguntas formuladas a las administraciones de los Estados miembros tenían un ámbito amplio, y se centraban en los siguientes aspectos:

1) importancia económica del sector de los fabricantes y minoristas de armas de fuego

2) número de cazadores y de tiradores deportivos registrados

3) número de titulares de la tarjeta europea de armas de fuego

4) indicaciones sobre la evolución de los delitos a lo largo de los últimos años

5) posibles problemas de localización de las armas de fuego

6) compra de una arma de fuego sujeta sistemáticamente al régimen de autorización

7) autorización válida para una sola arma o para varias

8) autorización implícita a partir de otra autorización o licencia

9) posible existencia de un simple régimen de declaración

10) interés por la reducción obligatoria de las categorías en la legislación europea

11) posibles consecuencias de dicha reducción en los sectores económicos afectados

12) posibles mejoras.

Además, se especificaba claramente que las armas contempladas en el cuestionario se limitaban a las que figuran en la Directiva, es decir, las armas de caza y de tiro deportivo, con excepción de las armas de guerra.

3. EVALUACIÓ� DE LA IMPORTA�CIA ECO�ÓMICA DEL SECTOR Y DE LOS PRI�CIPALES

USUARIOS DE ARMAS DE FUEGO, TAL COMO REFLEJA EL CUESTIO�ARIO; DATOS

GE�ERALES

3.1. Se observa que un primer grupo de Estados miembros carece —o casi— de industrias que fabriquen armas de fuego civiles. Este grupo es importante, puesto que agrupa a más de una docena de Estados miembros. No obstante, aunque la producción es baja o insignificante, el comercio minorista puede ser bastante significativo: a título de ejemplo, cabe señalar que Finlandia tiene no menos de seiscientos comerciantes cuya actividad principal es la venta al por menor o la reparación, y en Hungría son aproximadamente quinientos.

3.2. Otro grupo de países tiene una industria manufacturera relativamente sólida, en muchos casos tradicional, aunque los niveles de producción no son muy elevados. Por ejemplo, cabe citar el caso de Eslovaquia, Chequia, Austria o Polonia. Sin embargo, puede ocurrir que estos Estados miembros tengan un número bastante importante de comerciantes, reparadores por

ES 5 ES

revendedores; por ejemplo, solo en Polonia hay unos quinientos operadores, y en Austria setecientos5.

3.3. Los Estados miembros con mayor población tienen asimismo las zonas de producción más importantes, aunque de forma cada vez menos sistemática, ya que las industrias productoras están en retroceso. Si bien Alemania e Italia siguen manteniendo una producción manufacturera significativa, en muchos casos orientada hacia la exportación6, Francia y el Reino Unido han experimentado una gran disminución de su producción de armas civiles, y esa disminución no es tan acentuada en el caso de España. Esto no es obstáculo para que se mantenga una red de agentes comerciales, en ocasiones muy significativa, como ocurre, por ejemplo, en Francia7.

3.4. Sin embargo, los Estados miembros con mayor población son los que tienen un mayor número de cazadores y de tiradores deportivos. Por ejemplo, cabe señalar que hay más de 1 400 000 cazadores en Francia, aproximadamente 850 000 en Italia y más de 1 500 000 en España. Tradicionalmente, el número de tiradores deportivos es bastante menor que el de cazadores, aunque sigue siendo muy significativo: unos 300 000 en Italia, 213 000 en Francia y 14 600 en Polonia.

3.5. Es interesante destacar que algunos Estados miembros con una importancia demográfica relativamente baja (con relación a la media de la Unión) tienen unas proporciones de cazadores o de tiradores deportivos muy significativas. Por ejemplo, Suecia tiene como mínimo 490 000 cazadores y 96 000 tiradores deportivos, mientras que en Finlandia hay más de 300 000 cazadores y 35 000 tiradores deportivos. Dinamarca tiene aproximadamente 169 000 cazadores y 120 000 tiradores deportivos.

3.6. Cabe asimismo hacer referencia al número de titulares de la tarjeta europea de armas de fuego8, que, naturalmente, es un buen índice (aunque dista mucho de ser el único) de la movilidad de los cazadores y tiradores deportivos dentro de la Unión europea. Algunos Estados miembros, como Austria, tienen un número relativamente elevado de titulares de dicho documento (38 000); ese número es proporcionalmente menor en otros países (unos 20 000 titulares en Italia y 39 378 en Francia).

4. DATOS SOBRE LA EVOLUCIÓ� DE LOS DELITOS RELACIO�ADOS CO� LA

UTILIZACIÓ� DE ARMAS DE FUEGO Y TRAZABILIDAD DE LAS ARMAS DE FUEGO

CIVILES

4.1. Por lo general, la respuesta a la pregunta de si en los últimos años la delincuencia con armas de fuego de caza o deportivas ha aumentado significativamente es negativa. Algunos

5 Fuente para Austria: Asociación europea de comercio de armas civiles. 6 Entre el 85 y el 90 % de la producción de armas de fuego civiles alemana se exporta a terceros países o

a países de la Unión (fuente: Association of European Manufacturers of Sporting Firearms). 7 Según las cifras del Instituto europeo de armas de caza y deportivas, aproximadamente entre

ochocientos y mil puntos de venta en Francia viven principalmente de la armería. 8 La tarjeta europea de armas de fuego fue creada por la Directiva 91/477/CEE. Es expedida por las

autoridades de los Estados miembros, previa solicitud, a una persona que se convierte legalmente en

titular y usuario de un arma de fuego (artículo primero, apartado 4). Permite a su titular viajar con su arma en un sistema de autorización simplificado de un Estado miembro a otro para ejercer en él una actividad, por lo general, de caza o de tiro deportivo. Está muy bien vista por sus titulares y no se ha señalado ningún problema de seguridad relacionado con su expedición o utilización.

ES 6 ES

Estados miembros, como Grecia, Polonia, Suecia o Portugal, señalan un incremento ligero —o poco significativo—.

4.2. La mayoría de los Estados miembros, como Austria, Hungría, Bulgaria, el Reino Unido, Finlandia o España, consideran que la tendencia refleja cierta estabilidad en este tipo de delincuencia. Otros Estados miembros, como Bélgica o Irlanda, señalan incluso una ligera tendencia a la baja.

4.3. Estos elementos no son exclusivos de determinados cambios en la delincuencia con armas de fuego y están relacionados, por ejemplo, con la venta de armas —principalmente de guerra— al término de conflictos armados. Sin embargo, ese tipo de armas está excluido del ámbito de aplicación de la Directiva, que ya las considera prohibidas (categoría A del anexo I), a diferencia de las que pueden adquirirse para una actividad de ocio o deportiva.

4.4. De hecho, esas armas autorizadas por la Directiva presentan muchas menos dificultades de «localización», como se desprende de las respuestas al cuestionario, que, por lo general, son tranquilizadoras, al menos en lo que respecta a la circulación legal dentro de la Unión; en efecto, la mayoría de los Estados miembros consideran que hay relativamente pocos problemas de principio, al menos a escala nacional, en la «localización» de las armas de fuego civiles.

4.5. Cabe, sin embargo, señalar algunas dificultades en la recopilación o el tratamiento de información que permita identificar el recorrido de un arma, que ha podido pasar por manos de numerosos propietarios. En particular, la cuestión de que los Estados miembros —y los armeros— lleven correctamente los ficheros y las fuerzas operativas puedan acceder a ellos se considera un requisito fundamental.

5. RÉGIME� DE ADQUISICIÓ� Y POSESIÓ� DE ARMAS DE FUEGO CIVILES

5.1. El principio general que se desprende de las respuestas al cuestionario es que la adquisición y la tenencia de armas de fuego civiles están sujetas al régimen de autorización y, en algunos casos mucho más limitados, al régimen de declaración o de registro administrativo, que, en la práctica, se asemeja a una autorización indirecta. Este principio general no es obstáculo para que algunos tipos de armas, ―o armas que presentan determinadas características― puedan, en un Estado miembro concreto, tener un régimen de adquisición más flexible, como algunas armas históricas, o las armas inutilizadas.

5.2. Sin embargo, el régimen de autorización no lleva consigo necesariamente que deba solicitarse sistemáticamente una autorización antes de la compra de un arma. Por ejemplo, puede expedirse una autorización para la compra de un número concreto de armas cuyas características figuren en la autorización misma (como, por ejemplo, en Austria, Polonia o Luxemburgo).

5.3. La autorización de compra puede añadirse o supeditarse a otro título, por ejemplo ser cazador o tirador deportivo, o, en algunos casos, al reconocimiento ―mediante decisión administrativa― de que el comprador está legitimado para adquirir un arma por razones de defensa personal (por ejemplo, en Finlandia o Polonia).

5.4. El régimen de declaración —categoría C del anexo I de la Directiva 91/477/CEE— aún se aplica a gran número de armas de caza, principalmente en Francia. En ese sistema, el comprador debe entregar al armero una copia de su documento de identidad y del título que

ES 7 ES

justifica la compra (por ejemplo, permiso de caza vigente); además, rellena con el armero9, una declaración, que este último registra y transmite a las autoridades competentes. Si la autoridad se opone a la transacción, conmina al comprador a que restituya el arma o lo obliga a ello recurriendo a la fuerza pública.

5.5. En Francia, algunas armas de caza aún se agrupan en una nueva categoría intermedia, a medio camino entre las categorías C y D de la Directiva: se trata de armas de caza largas de un impacto, de ánima lisa, sujetas al nuevo régimen de «registro», muy próximo del régimen de «declaración» (copia del documento de identidad, del permiso de caza/licencia de tiro, formulario que el interesado debe rellenar y comprobaciones por las autoridades policiales).

5.6. Por consiguiente, de las respuestas facilitadas al cuestionario, no se desprende que haya armas que puedan seguir correspondiendo a la acepción más permisiva de la categoría D de la Directiva, es decir, que puedan adquirirse sin ningún trámite especial, como la Directiva permitía solo para las armas largas de un impacto, de ánima lisa. Todos los Estados miembros que seguían teniendo esa posibilidad han incrementado los requisitos mínimos (como se expone en el apartado anterior).

5.7. Es asimismo importante señalar que la clasificación de un arma en vigor introducida en un Estado miembro (prohibición, autorización, declaración o registro) es necesaria y prevalece sobre la clasificación del arma en el país de adquisición de la misma. Es decir, si, por ejemplo, una arma adquirida en un Estado miembro se adquirió bajo el régimen de la autorización, pero su propietario (aun cuando sea titular de la tarjeta europea de armas de fuego) tiene intención de llevarla consigo a otro Estado miembro en el cual dicha arma está sujeta al régimen de prohibición, naturalmente prevalecerá el régimen de prohibición, y, por consiguiente, el arma no podrá salir de su país de origen.

6. LOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS TIE�E� DIFERE�TES PU�TOS DE VISTA E� LO QUE

RESPECTA A LA CO�VE�IE�CIA DE REDUCIR LAS CATEGORÍAS PERMITIDAS POR LA

DIRECTIVA

6.1. Algunos Estados miembros, como Polonia, el Reino Unido, Irlanda, Dinamarca o Letonia, manifiestan interés por una reducción, a escala de la Unión Europea, a dos categorías, ya que estiman que ello supondría una simplificación.

6.2. En cambio, otros Estados miembros consideran que se podría mantener la libertad que permite la clasificación actual de la Directiva. Por ejemplo, Suecia, Italia, Hungría o Bélgica, no consideran que una modificación de la nomenclatura actual sea una ventaja real, y además estiman que su refundición generaría cargas y costes inútiles.

6.3. Algunos Estados miembros, como Eslovaquia, los Países Bajos, o Rumanía, aun cuando han adoptado a escala nacional un sistema basado en dos o tres categorías, también prefieren dejar a los Estados miembros la facultad de efectuar las clasificaciones que consideren convenientes dentro de la nomenclatura actual.

6.4. A la pregunta de si dicha reducción de las categorías tendría un impacto decisivo sustancial en los sectores económicos, la mayoría de los Estados miembros responden, bien

9 El armero efectúa una primera verificación en los ficheros de «personas que tienen prohibida la tenencia

de armas de fuego».

ES 8 ES

que resultaría difícil apreciar el efecto, o bien que probablemente no habría ninguno, dado que la nomenclatura de dos categorías ya está bastante extendida en dichos países. Sin embargo, es preciso señalar que son sobre todo los Estados miembros no productores de armas de fuego los que, a priori, consideran que una reducción de las categorías tendría consecuencias económicas poco nocivas en su territorio.

6.5. En cambio, algunos Estados miembros que tienen una industria manufacturera de armas de fuego estiman que habría un impacto negativo en el sector económico; es el caso, por ejemplo de Italia o Bélgica. Otros Estados miembros, como Polonia, admiten la posibilidad de que haya consecuencias económicas, aunque no consideran que sea una razón para no proceder a una reducción de las categorías.

6.6. En la mayoría de los Estados miembros, no se observa que la reducción a dos categorías de las armas de fuego del anexo I de la Directiva tenga ventajas claras que puedan favorecer un mejor funcionamiento del mercado interior. Incluso se ha hecho referencia al temor de que se produzca una desviación del tráfico del comercio legal hacia el comercio ilegal en caso de que se endurezcan las restricciones.

7. SE HA� FORMULADO ALGU�AS SUGERE�CIAS DISTI�TAS DE LA REDUCCIÓ� DE LAS

CATEGORÍAS A FI� DE SIMPLIFICAR LA CIRCULACIÓ� DE LAS ARMAS DE FUEGO E�

U� CO�TEXTO DE MÁS SEGURIDAD

7.1. Algunos Estados miembros, como Alemania, o Estonia y Polonia, considerarían una ventaja clara la definición de normas comunes de inutilización de las armas de fuego tomando como base técnicas propuestas en los grupos de trabajo ad hoc de la Comisión Internacional Permanente para la Prueba de las Armas de Fuego Portátiles (CIP10); esto podría dar lugar a una mayor seguridad y facilitar los intercambios en la Unión.

7.2. Otros Estados miembros, como Suecia, los Países Bajos, Francia, Luxemburgo o Portugal, consideran que podría reforzarse la informatización de los datos dentro de los Estados miembros, a fin de cotejar los movimientos de las armas de fuego con sus propietarios. Por consiguiente, es preciso hacer un esfuerzo en lo que respecta al acceso, en todos los Estados miembros, a los datos que figuran en los registros, lo cual naturalmente facilitaría, en caso necesario, el intercambio de información dentro de la Unión Europea.

7.3. Algunas sugerencias son más específicas, como la de equipar a los transportistas comerciales de armas de fuego con dispositivos de GPS que permitan geolocalizarlos (Chequia) o la de llevar a cabo una mayor supervisión en el caso de las actividades de las empresas de seguridad privada (Bulgaria); otras propuestas son más ambiciosas, por ejemplo una aproximación de las definiciones en materia de armas de fuego que pueda favorecer un enfoque común a escala de la Unión (Países Bajos).

10 La Comisión Internacional Permanente (CIP) para la prueba de armas de fuego portátiles surgió de un

acuerdo intergubernamental en virtud del cual los principales países europeos productores de armas de fuego (once países europeos más Chile, Rusia y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos) se comprometen a reconocer las pruebas de armas de fuego y de municiones ―antes de introducirlas en el mercado― efectuadas en establecimientos denominados «bancos de pruebas» con arreglo criterios técnicos definidos y actualizados en la CIP. Este reconocimiento se materializa en un punzón grabado en el arma de fuego que permite identificar el banco de pruebas en el que se probó. En algunos bancos de pruebas las armas de fuego también se desactivan mediante unas técnicas y unos requisitos que pueden variar, sin que estén necesariamente reconocidos de un Estado miembro a otro.

ES 9 ES

7.4. Algunos Estados miembros considerarían una ventaja la creación un formulario de transferencia normalizado para los intercambios comerciales de armas de fuego (Rumanía). Dicho documento permitiría incluir todos los datos en las solicitudes de autorización o en las notificaciones de transacciones comerciales de un Estado miembro a otro.

7.5. Sin embargo, un número significativo de Estados miembros consideran asimismo que, en general, la situación actual es satisfactoria y/o no proponen medidas especiales. Algunos, como Italia, estiman que cualquier cambio previsto debe evaluarse teniendo en cuenta el principio de proporcionalidad o en función de necesidades reales que justifiquen iniciativas a escala de la UE.

7.6. En general, las observaciones de los Estados miembros se centran principalmente en las cuestiones de la trazabilidad y la inutilización de las armas de fuego. Esos son precisamente dos aspectos en que la Comisión tiene intención de intervenir, ya sea mediante la elaboración de orientaciones comunes en materia de normas y técnicas de inutilización, o garantizando el cumplimiento de la obligación a cargo de los Estados miembros de llevar un fichero informatizado11, ya que la propia Directiva 2008/51/CE prescribe ambas tareas.

8. LAS CATEGORÍAS PRI�CIPALES DE USUARIOS DE LA DIRECTIVA PARECE�

I�TERESADAS POR SIMPLIFICACIO�ES QUE �O �ECESARIAME�TE LLEVARÍA�

CO�SIGO U�A REDUCCIÓ� DE LAS CATEGORÍAS

8.1. Los cazadores (unos siete millones de personas en la Unión Europea12) parecen estar satisfechos con la clasificación actual, modulada en función de las tradiciones cinegéticas y del umbral de seguridad de su Estado miembro. Valoran mucho el reconocimiento y la promoción de la tarjeta europea de armas de fuego, que facilita en cierta medida sus movimientos de un Estado miembro a otro en un marco muy satisfactorio en lo que respecta a la seguridad.

8.2. Los tiradores deportivos también pueden utilizar la tarjeta europea de armas de fuego para desplazarse de un Estado miembro a otro, en la mayoría de los casos para participar en competiciones. En la práctica, sus desplazamientos parecen estar inscritos en un marco bien preciso y sujetos a un estricto régimen de autorizaciones, que además es supervisado por las federaciones de tiro locales o nacionales. Tampoco parece que una reducción obligatoria de las categorías a escala europea pueda dar lugar a simplificaciones claras.

8.3. Si bien sus actividades no se hallan dentro del ámbito de aplicación de la Directiva, los coleccionistas de armas de fuego antiguas, históricas, o de reproducciones de armas históricas, acogerían favorablemente la posibilidad de incluir sus piezas de colección en una tarjeta europea de armas de fuego, lo cual permitiría simplificar la circulación de este tipo de productos de un Estado miembro a otro. Otras medidas que faciliten el reconocimiento de este tipo de armas por los Estados miembros, como su transporte de un Estado miembro a otro, serían bien acogidas por un sector que agrupa a los proveedores, los centros culturales, las salas de venta, los expertos reconocidos, etc.

11 Ese fichero informatizado de datos sobre armas de fuego, que permite vincular el arma a su propietario,

deberá establecerse a más tardar el 31 de diciembre de 2014, a tenor de lo dispuesto en la Directiva 2008/51/CE.

12 Cifras facilitadas por la Federación de las Asociaciones de Cazadores de la Unión Europea (FACE), que agrupa a las asociaciones nacionales de cazadores de los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea y otros países del Consejo de Europa.

ES 10 ES

8.4. Los productores de armas de fuego civiles estarían interesados por posibles medidas de simplificación. A este respecto, cabe destacar el viejo deseo de la industria de poder beneficiarse, efectivamente, de licencias globales para las transferencias de armas de fuego dentro de la Unión. Los Estados miembros no expedirían las autorizaciones para cada transferencia, caso por caso, sino que una autorización sería válida durante un período determinado, para un tipo de productos13, y todo ello en beneficio de operadores que presenten una serie de garantías acordadas.

8.5. Tanto los productores como los minoristas desean asimismo que se haga un esfuerzo de simplificación en la definición de las piezas fundamentales de las armas de fuego. En efecto, cabe la posibilidad de que las definiciones de las piezas fundamentales de las armas de fuego no coincidan exactamente de una legislación a otra, y una mayor precisión podría mejorar aún más la fluidez y la seguridad de las transacciones comerciales.

8.6. En resumen, se observa que la clasificación actual de las armas de fuego en la legislación de la UE no es objeto de críticas específicas por parte de las categorías principales de usuarios establecidos en la Directiva. Sin embargo, es obvio el deseo de determinadas medidas de simplificación con vistas al mejor funcionamiento del mercado interior.

9. LA CUESTIÓ� DE LA CLASIFICACIÓ�, A ESCALA DE LA U�IÓ�, DE LAS ARMAS DE

FUEGO CIVILES PODRÍA, SI� EMBARGO, REEXAMI�ARSE A LA LUZ DE LOS PRÓXIMOS

PLAZOS Y DIRECCIO�ES ESTABLECIDOS POR LA DIRECTIVA MISMA

9.1. La obligación impuesta a los Estados miembros, para el 31 de diciembre de 2014, de establecer y mantener un fichero informatizado de datos sin duda será una respuesta al deseo observado en las respuestas al cuestionario de mejorar la accesibilidad a los datos. Resultará interesante situar en este contexto los posibles problemas de trazabilidad, a escala de la Unión, que podrían deberse a la clasificación actual de la Directiva.

9.2. Por otra parte, mientras que algunas respuestas de los Estados miembros reflejan el deseo de tener métodos comunes de inutilización de las armas de fuego, cabe recordar que la Comisión emprenderá en breve esa tarea, con arreglo a lo dispuesto en la Directiva14. Con ello se espera obtener un mayor nivel de seguridad en la circulación de ese tipo de productos.

9.3. Cabe asimismo señalar que una referencia expresamente sugerida por la Directiva 2008/51/CE también podría corresponder al deseo de una mayor trazabilidad expresado por los Estados miembros: en este caso se trata de la mención, en el considerando 7, del Convenio para el reconocimiento recíproco de punzones de prueba de armas de fuego portátiles, de 1 de julio de 1969, que debe ser, en la mayor medida posible, la referencia para el sistema de

marcado en el conjunto de la Comunidad.

13 Esta facilidad ya existe, en teoría, en la Directiva 91/477/CEE. En efecto, su artículo 11 establece que

los armeros podrán obtener una licencia que, en determinados casos, los exima de tener que solicitar autorizaciones puntuales para todo movimiento intracomunitario de armas de fuego. Sin embargo, esa posibilidad se aplica raramente, ya que supone que los Estados miembros de salida y de llegada la reconozcan, y para ello es necesario un marco regulador comparable.

14 En su anexo I, la Directiva establece que La Comisión publicará, con arreglo al procedimiento

contemplado en el artículo 13 bis, apartado 2, de la Directiva, orientaciones comunes sobre las normas

y técnicas de inutilización de las armas de fuego para garantizar que las armas de fuego inutilizadas lo

sean irreversiblemente.

ES 11 ES

9.4. A tal fin, en breve podría debatirse una aproximación entre la Unión Europea y las estructuras de la Comisión Internacional Permanente para la prueba de armas de fuego portátiles (CIP) con vistas al establecimiento en la Unión de normas reconocidas para la prueba de armas de fuego. En efecto, un control adicional —y certificado— sobre la producción y la circulación de las armas de fuego dentro de la Unión Europea podría tener ventajas en todos los aspectos de la seguridad.

9.5. Por tanto, a partir de los elementos recabados, puede llegarse a la conclusión de que, en sí misma, una limitación obligatoria, a escala de la UE, a dos categorías de armas de fuego no tendría ventajas evidentes; en cualquier caso, esa perspectiva no debería tratarse de forma aislada, ya que se correría el riesgo de simplemente desplazar el debate hacia la cuestión de saber qué tipo de documento constituiría una autorización, para llegar, muy probablemente, a una situación que no sería muy distinta de la diversidad actual dentro de la Unión.

9.6. Por consiguiente, lo que la Comisión presentará al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo el 28 de julio de 2015 es el contexto del informe sobre la situación resultante de la aplicación de la Directiva —acompañado, si procede, de propuestas—, lo cual es conveniente para efectuar un análisis global de los cambios posibles y deseables de la Directiva 2008/51/CE, todo ello con vistas a una simplificación que integre todas las particularidades y exigencias inherentes a este tipo de productos.

9.7. Las conclusiones del presente informe se expondrán en octubre de 2012, en la reunión del grupo de contacto establecido por la Directiva. Dichas conclusiones deberían asimismo debatirse en una conferencia sobre el tráfico ilícito de armas de fuego que la Comisión tiene previsto celebrar a finales de noviembre de 2012, con la participación de las partes implicadas en la lucha contra esta forma de delincuencia. Se tratará, en particular, de hacer balance de las necesidades existentes en este ámbito, así como de identificar orientaciones para futuras iniciativas.

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2009 - 2014

Committee on Foreign Affairs

2012/2094(INI)

24.8.2012

DRAFT REPORT

on a Digital Freedom Strategy in EU Foreign Policy

(2012/2094(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Rapporteur: Marietje Schaake

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PR_INI

CONTENTS

Page

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION............................................ 3

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT............................................................................................ 11

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MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on a Digital Freedom Strategy in EU Foreign Policy

(2012/2094(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the resolution of the UN Human Rights Council of 5 July 2012 entitled

‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet’, which

recognises the importance of human rights protection and the free flow of information

online,1

– having regard to the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue, of 16 May 2011

(A/HRC/17/27) and 10 August 2011 (A/66/290), on the promotion and protection of the

right to freedom of opinion and expression, which underline the applicability of

international human rights norms and standards regarding the right to freedom of opinion

and expression on the internet, seen as a communications medium,

– having regard to the resolution of the UN Human Rights Council of 28 March 2008 (7/36)

establishing the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the

right to freedom of opinion and expression,

– having regard to the UN report of 16 June 2011 entitled ‘Guiding Principles on Business

and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’

Framework’ (reflecting the work of UN Special Representative John Ruggie),

– having regard to the Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, adopted by

the Council on 25 June 2012,2

– having regard to its recommendation to the Council of 13 June 2012 concerning the EU

Special Representative for Human Rights3,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 June 2012 entitled ‘Critical information infrastructure

protection – achievements and next steps: towards global cyber-security’4,

– having regard to its resolution of 20 April 2012 entitled ‘A competitive digital single

market – eGovernment as a spearhead’5,

– having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2012 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in

the World and the European Union’s policy on the matter, including implications for the

EU’s strategic human rights policy6,

– having regard to the 2012 General Budget of 29 February 2012, in particular the call for

1 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session20/Pages/ResDecStat.aspx. 2 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/press_corner/focus/events/2012/20120625_en.htm. 3 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0250. 4 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0237. 5 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0140. 6 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0126.

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creating a ‘Global Internet Freedom Fund’1,

– having regard to the communication of 12 December 2011 by the Commissioner for the

Digital Agenda on the ‘No Disconnect Strategy’,

– having regard to the joint communication of the High Representative of the Union for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2011 entitled ‘Human Rights and Democracy

at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a more effective approach’

(COM(2011)0886)),

– having regard to its resolution of 17 November 2011 on the open Internet and net

neutrality in Europe2,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 25 October 2011 entitled ‘A renewed

EU strategy 2011-2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility’ (COM(2011)0681),

– having regard to its resolution of 25 July 2011 on an effective raw materials strategy for

Europe3,

– having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2011 on EU external policies in favour of

democratisation4,

– having regard to the Joint Communication of the High Representative of the Union for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 25 May 2011 entitled ‘A new

response to a changing Neighbourhood’ (COM(2011)0303),

– having regard to its resolution of 12 May 2011 on the cultural dimensions of the EU’s

external actions5,

– having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2010 on corporate social responsibility in

international trade agreements6,

– having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2010 entitled ‘Internet governance: the next

steps’7,

– having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2010 on the Internet of Things8,

– having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2006 on the human rights and democracy

clause in European Union agreements9,

1 OJ L 56, 29.2.2012, p.1. 2 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0511. 3 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0364. 4 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0334. 5 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0239. 6 OJ C 99E , 3.4.2012, pp. 101–111. 7 OJ C 236E , 12.8.2011, pp. 33-40. 8 OJ C 236E , 12.8.2011, pp. 24–32. 9 OJ C 290E , 29.11.2006, pp. 107–113.

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– having regard to its resolutions on urgent cases of breaches of human rights, democracy

and the rule of law, where they raise concerns regarding digital freedoms,

– having regard to its legislative resolution of 27 September 2011 on the proposal for a

regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No

1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and

technology 1,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in

view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 of 18 January

2012 and introducing export restrictions on ICTs and monitoring tools2,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 264/2012 of 23 March 2012 amending

Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain

persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran and introducing export

restrictions on ICTs and monitoring tools3,

– having regard to Articles 3 and 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European

Union,

– having regard to Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the European Union’s Guidelines on Human Rights,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to all relevant

international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

– having regard to the United Nations Charter,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the ongoing negotiations

on the EU’s accession to the Convention,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinion of the

Committee on International Trade (A7-0000/2012),

A. whereas technological developments enable individuals all over the world to use new

information and communication technologies (ICTs) and to connect to the internet, thus

fostering revolutionary changes in societies, the functioning of democracy, governance,

the economy, business, media, development and trade;

B. whereas internet access is a key enabler of access to information, free expression, press

1 P7_TA(2011)0406. 2 OJ L 16, 19.1.2012, p.1. 3 OJ L 86, 24.3.2012, p. 26.

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freedom, freedom of assembly, and economic, social, political and cultural developments;

C. whereas human rights need to be protected and promoted by the EU, both offline and

online;

D. whereas inclusion, the fostering of e-skills, and bridging digital divides are key in

harnessing the empowering potential of the internet and ICTs;

E. whereas ICTs are also used as tools of repression through (mass) censorship, surveillance,

and tracing and tracking of information and individuals;

F. whereas the context in which technologies are used determines, to a great extent, the

impact they can have as a force for positive developments or for repression instead;

G. whereas the internet has flourished and developed organically as a platform of huge public

value;

H. whereas the global and borderless nature of the internet requires new forms of

international cooperation and governance with multiple stakeholders;

I. whereas net neutrality is an essential principle for the open internet, ensuring competition

and transparency;

J. whereas digital security and digital freedom are both essential and cannot replace one

another;

K. whereas the EU only leads by example on digital freedoms when these are safeguarded in

the EU;

Human rights and development

1. Recognises that uncensored access to the internet, mobile phones and ICTs have impacted

on human rights and fundamental freedoms, exerting an enabling effect, by expanding the

scope of freedom of expression, access to information, the right to privacy and freedom of

assembly across the world;

2. Recognises the vast enabling, creating and catalysing potential of the internet and ICTs for

global economic, social, scientific, cultural and political development, contributing as

such to the progress of humankind as a whole;

3. Stresses that the repression and control of citizens and business involves a growing

technological component, through the blocking of content and the monitoring and

identification of human rights defenders, journalists, activists and dissidents, as well as

through the criminalisation of legitimate expression online and the adoption of restrictive

legislation to justify such measures;

4. Stresses that the promotion and protection of digital freedoms should be mainstreamed

and annually reviewed so as to ensure accountability and continuity, in all the EU’s

external actions, financing and aid policies and instruments;

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5. Reaffirms the Commission’s recognition of unrestricted access to the internet as part of

the Copenhagen criteria;

6. Encourages the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to name digital freedoms

and the ‘No Disconnect Strategy’ among his key priorities;

7. Stresses that effective EU development policies require mainstreaming ICTs and bridging

the digital divide, by providing basic technological infrastructures and facilitating access

to knowledge and information;

8. Considers ICTs to be enablers of transparency and good governance, literacy, education,

sexual and reproductive healthcare, effective election monitoring and disaster relief in

remote areas or rural societies;

9. Stresses that EU development and aid programmes should include digital freedoms, above

all in societies going through post-conflict or political transitions; believes that EU

regulatory experts are essential interlocutors for purposes of training counterparts and

embedding basic rights and principles in new (media) regulation and legislation;

10. Stresses that the digital collection of evidence and dissemination of images of human

rights violations can contribute to the global fight against impunity; considers that

assistance is needed in making materials admissible under international (criminal) law as

evidence in court proceedings;

11. Emphasises the need to ensure that rare earth materials used in the production of ICTs are

obtained in conditions of respect for human, labour and environmental rights;

Trade

12. Deplores the use of EU-made technologies and services in third countries to violate

human rights through censorship of information, mass surveillance, monitoring, and the

tracing and tracking of citizens and their activities on (mobile) telephone networks and the

internet;

13. Welcomes the ban on the export of repression technologies and services to Syria and Iran;

believes this ban should become a precedent for structural restrictive measures, such as an

EU-wide ‘catch-all’ provision or ‘country-specific lists’ in the dual-use regulatory

framework;

14. Underlines the need for more stringent supply-chain controls and corporate responsibility

schemes in respect of trading in products (from equipment to mobile devices) and services

which can be used to curtail human rights and digital freedom;

15. Regards certain targeted jamming, surveillance, monitoring and interception technology

products and services as ‘single-use’ items whose export should be subject to ex ante

approval;

16. Stresses the need to monitor EU sanctions on technologies at Union level so as to ensure

that Member States comply equally and the level playing field is preserved;

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17. Believes companies should perform human rights impact assessments on ICTs, starting at

the R&D phase, and ensure non-complicity in possible human rights violations in third

countries;

18. Calls on the Commission to provide EU businesses with a wide range of information and

guidance, based on the UN’s ‘Ruggie Principles’, so as to ensure that business interests

and corporate social responsibility can be complied with;

19. Stresses the need to consider the effect of technological standard-setting for ICT and

telecom products and services in the EU, where such goods and services are exported to

third countries where concepts such as ‘lawful interception’ have different implications,

for example where the rule of law does not exist;

20. Recognises that the internet has become a public space as well as a marketplace, for which

the free flow of information and access to ICTs are indispensable;

21. Calls for the inclusion of conditionality clauses in EU FTAs, stipulating transparent

safeguards, preserving unrestricted access to the internet, and ensuring the free flow of

information;

22. Calls on the EU to challenge and minimise the extraterritorial impact of third-country

legislation on EU citizens and businesses online;

23. Considers restricted access for EU businesses and online consumers to (digital)

markets through mass censorship in third countries to constitute protectionist measures

and trade barriers;

24. Calls on the EU to strive to ensure that regulation of the internet and ICTs is kept to the

minimum;

25. Calls for the inclusion of targeted repression technologies in the Wassenaar Arrangement;

Internet governance

26. Considers transparent and collaborative decision-making to be essential to ensure respect

for the open and participatory nature of the internet; believes the EU should play a leading

role in the development of digital freedom ground-rules, including dispute settlement

mechanisms, also taking account of conflicting jurisdictions;

27. Considers that the internet is currently relatively unregulated and is governed through a

multi-stakeholder approach; stresses the need for the EU to ensure that the multi-

stakeholder model is inclusive and that small businesses as well as civil society actors and

users are not overruled by a few large business and government players;

28. Stresses the importance of an overall EU strategy for internet governance, as also for

issues related to telecom regulation, which is internationally governed through the

International Telecom Union, in which EU Member States each have one vote;

29. Is concerned at the proposals by coalitions of governments and business seeking to

introduce regulatory oversight and increased governmental and private control over the

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internet and telecom operations;

30. Recalls that the internet, data connection and storage and ICTs are essential parts of the

EU’s critical infrastructure;

31. Calls on the Commission to propose a new regulatory framework for e-commerce, as well

as an update of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive (IPRED), which

would balance the need for copyright reform and protection with the need to protect

fundamental rights online and preserve the open internet and would serve as a basis for

IPR provisions and commitments in future FTAs;

A digital freedom strategy

32. Recognises that human rights must also be protected online, and believes ICTs should be

mainstreamed in all EU programmes to advance this effort;

33. Calls on the Commission and Council to unequivocally recognise digital freedoms as

fundamental rights and as indispensable prerequisites for enjoying universal human rights

such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and access to information and

ensuring transparency and accountability in public life;

34. Calls on the Commission and Council to support, train and empower human rights

defenders, civil society activists and independent journalists and ensure their security and

freedom online, and to assert the fundamental rights of free expression, freedom of

assembly and freedom of association online;

35. Calls on the Commission and Council to upgrade their in-house ICT knowledge base;

36. Calls for political and diplomatic support for digital freedoms in recipient countries of EU

aid, in addition to assistance programmes;

37. Considers that governments which restrict digital freedoms should become ineligible for

EU aid, while those receiving EU aid should be required to use ICTs in order to increase

transparency and accountability;

38. Urges the Council and Commission to include, in accession negotiations, human rights

dialogues, trade negotiations and all forms of contact relating to human rights,

conditionality clauses stipulating the need to respect and preserve unrestricted access to

the internet, digital freedoms and human rights online;

39. Calls on the Commission and Council to promote and preserve high standards of digital

freedom in the EU, in particular by codifying the principle of net neutrality in appropriate

regulation, so as to strengthen its credibility in terms of promoting and defending digital

freedoms around the world;

40. Considers that synergising the EU’s trade, security and foreign policies and aligning its

values and interests are indispensable if the Union is to fully leverage its economic power

and act as a global player in defending digital freedoms;

41. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the

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EEAS.

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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Digital Freedom in the EU’s External Actions

Internet and new technologies play an exponentially important role in the lives of Europeans

and citizens everywhere. Globally technologies are changing societies, the functioning of our

democracies, economies, businesses, media, development strategies, security and defence

concerns and human rights issues. Information and power monopolies that have been

unchallenged for a long time are upset.

Several EU Member States have identified access to internet as a fundamental right, and the

European Commission agrees digital freedoms are part of the Copenhagen criteria. In a

globally connected world the EU should have a strategy to deal with new technologies in its

external actions. There are several areas in this digital world in which it is essential that the

EU acts as a global player and leverages its economic and political weight. Though

overregulation would rather hurt than help the potential of the open internet, in some areas

rules need to be updated to match the revolutionary impact of technological developments

with adequate democratic oversight.

This explanatory statement supports the draft of the first EU’s Digital Freedom Strategy in its

External Actions. A discussion paper has been shared with Members of European Parliament

and was placed online to invite various stakeholders to provide input through crowd-sourcing.

The input provided by many different people, NGOs, governments and businesses have

helped the creation of the first draft to be more comprehensive. The Rapporteur is grateful to

all who spent time and energy on each of these contributions.

Security and freedom

New technologies challenge the way in which governments perform their core tasks. Defence

and security ultimately lie in the hands of government; however, these increasingly rely on

private players. This requires new forms of cooperation and shared responsibilities. Given the

importance of developing detailed cyber and digital security details, the rapport drafted by

Rapporteur Kelam in the SEDE committee focuses on security. This report suggests a strategy

dealing with EU human rights, development, enlargement, internet governance, trade, culture

and diplomacy efforts.

Freedom and security need each other and can not replace one another. The European

Parliament should ensure there is no zero sum game between the two, especially when is

comes to digital and cyber issues. Given the EU’s common security and defence policy as

well as its economic interests, we should lead globally in securing both digital security and

freedom.

Human rights

A quick scan of some events in the world shows that the struggle for human rights has moved

online. Prisons are increasingly populated by dissidents confronted with their own internet

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and mobile communications, compromised by the authorities. Iran continues the building of

an electronic curtain, which eventually will cut off the Iranians from the World Wide Web

through the creation of a ‘Halal internet’. China is similarly cutting its citizens off of the open

internet with the great electronic firewall. Mass censorship violates citizen rights and narrows

business opportunities. Plans are on the table to make anonymous blogging in China illegal.

The Ben Ali government of Tunisia was, and the Al Assad regime in Syria is well known for

their sophisticated use of technologies against citizens. The Syrian Electronic Army is now

subject to ad hoc EU sanctions.

Generally speaking, the fight for control and power by authoritarian regimes involves a

growing ICT component. Promoting and defending human rights then means enabling people

to circumvent mass censorship or to evade cyber attacks by their own governments. While

training human rights defenders, journalists and dissidents should improve their safety online

it also creates a new set of sensitivities and a potentially dangerous dependency on the

accuracy and quality of the guidance. This responsibility should not be underestimated and

has to be reflected in the ways and means we use to assist people in ensuring their freedom

and safety online. Human rights defenders deserve EU support and in any case should not be

targeted with tools and technologies developed and exported from within the EU.

Trade and export

Besides ad hoc export restrictions and trade sanctions regarding intrusive monitoring tools,

the digital and globally connected reality calls for awareness and responsibility in European

corporate boardrooms. It also requires comprehensive and permanent export restrictions to

limit the harmful potential of sophisticated, targeted technology systems. Technologies, tools

or services custom made for targeted human rights violations should not be allowed on

European markets at all. These systems should be categorised as ‘single use’ technologies and

do not differ from traditionally banned torture tools or (parts of) weapons of mass destruction

in their impact.

While the recent EU export bans on certain elements of technologies to Syria and Iran are an

important first step, they risk becoming a paper reality, threatening the EU’s credibility, and

the safety of citizens who think they can rely on the EU’s efforts and promises. Instead of

leaving enforcement up to the different member states, the European Commission should have

the powers and tools to monitor the proper implementation of these restrictions. Transparency

and accountability are needed in this field, much the same as we verify the quality of foods

and medicine, or conventional weapons. This requires new policies such as non-financial

disclosure requirements and updated reporting standards.

Additionally, the European Commission should help companies, in doubt whether to file for

an export license, with real time information about the legality or potential harmful effects of

trade deals. The same goes for EU (based) companies that enter into contractual relations with

third country governments, whether to win operating licenses, negotiate standstill clauses or

by accepting public involvement in business operations or public use of their networks and

services, and which could force these businesses becoming complicit in human rights

violations. Therefore the EU should make the conclusion of new free trade agreements

conditional on the preservation of the open internet, or to provide ad hoc (public) political

backing in emergency situations.

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The changing balance of global powers and the emergence of a global economy means

challenges to EU values when businesses operate abroad will occur more often and require

joint efforts with European policymakers and civil society actors.

Development

The EU should make its development policies more efficient and effective through embracing

ICTs. The EU can help bridge the digital divide; by building and installing basic ICT

infrastructures and by providing access to knowledge and information. The EU can enable

(online) education in remote areas by developing and providing cheap wirelessly connected

tablets, allowing parents to let their children go to school. In the first critical hours after

natural disasters or during humanitarian crisis ad hoc emergency telephone and internet

connections should be set up. ICTs are also essential for effective (citizen) election

monitoring.

Development programmes should therefore include the protection of digital freedoms in a

structural way, in particular by planting seeds in early post-conflict or political transitions. EU

regulators or regulatory experts should engage with their counterparts. Embedding basic

rights principles in new (media) legislation is an essential safeguard and should prevent the

inclusion of provision in laws that for instance make encryption illegal, such as currently

in Egypt. These laws can have unintended effects on human rights that newly or (first time)

elected parliaments or governments are not necessarily aware of.

The internet and particularly social media also enable governments to engage in direct

diplomacy and allow increased people-to-people contact around the world. Open debates

about ideas can refute extremism and improve intercultural engagement and understanding.

The European Parliament should commit itself to including new technologies in the work of

its delegations with other parliaments across the globe, and will keep a close watch on the

progress and concrete measures taken to devise an EU strategy on digital freedom in its

external relations. A proposed assessment in annual reports should ensure accountability and

continuity.

Credibility

The EU can not credibly promote and protect digital freedoms in the world if they are not

safeguarded at home. Although restrictions to freedom online sometimes are formally lawful

there is also an overarching impact on our credibility and moral standing in the world. More

pressingly, the same tools and technologies that our governments and law enforcement

agencies can use to (lawfully) intercept mobile or internet traffic can have a fundamentally

different impact on citizens in societies where the rule of law is absent or no separation of

powers exists.

The European Commission is currently developing a set of human rights (and also broader

corporate social responsibility) guidelines for the ICT sector, based on the UN Guiding

Principles for Business & Human Rights (Ruggie principles). Whilst these guidelines will not

legally bind European companies they might prove to be a useful framework for ICT

companies in mainstreaming human rights concerns and in performing impact assessments,

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even at the R&D phase or when filing for patents. These guidelines will also contribute to a

level playing field in the EU’s internal market.

Internet governance

The internet is governed by a so-called multi-stakeholder approach, which has been developed

organically into a network of public and private actors. This approach has ensured the

openness of the internet, which is the catalyst for many societal benefits. The multi-

stakeholder model can only function properly when it is inclusive so that small businesses,

users and consumers also have a seat at the table.

There are currently two threats to this system of governance. Developed countries are drafting

legislation behind closed doors where only few corporate stakeholders have a say in the

proceedings. Meanwhile the impact of proposed laws touches the very infrastructure of the

internet. Largely below the radar, coalitions of emerging economies are joining forces to

introduce a global regulatory framework for the internet, including increased state control and

establishing an UN regulatory body. A new era of global internet politics has kicked off.

While the EU is the world’s most significant market, most internet companies are US based,

which forces European citizens to accept US user conditions. As most online services are US-

based, internet users world-wide often fall within US jurisdiction when using these services.

This extraterritorial impact of US laws should not restrain the EU’s ability to defend the

fundamental rights of citizens. Policymakers have to understand that in a globally connected

world parameters of lawmaking are constantly changing and traditional concepts of set

jurisdictions often do not match our global digital hemisphere. This however does not

preclude the possibility of efficient dispute settlement mechanisms or addressing conflicting

jurisdiction.

Digital Freedom Strategy

Our digital freedoms are essential rights and are indispensable for traditional human rights

such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, and also for ensuring transparency

and accountability in public life. We all see the impact of human rights violations that can be

documented and shared with the help of mobile phones. The EU should take the lead in

globally promoting and protecting digital freedoms. Besides being the world’s largest trade

block the EU is also a community of values, which should also be the core of all our external

actions.

Only by synergising our trade, security and foreign policies, by aligning our values and

interests the EU can fully leverage its power and act as a global player. As technology is

developing so rapidly it is essential to promote structural collaboration between politicians,

business and civil society. This ongoing equilibrium may best serve the open global internet,

to everyone’s benefit.

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COUNCIL OFTHE EUROPEAN UNION


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COVER NOTE From: : European External Action Service (EEAS) To: : Political and Security Committee (PSC) Subject : Multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan

Delegations will find attached the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan, with

EEAS (2012) reference number 01186. This document was finalized by CIVCOM on 2 July 2012.

PSC is invited to agree the Multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan.

_______________

Encl.: EEAS (2012) document 01186.

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EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)


EEAS (2012) 01186 LIMITE


NOTE From: CMPD To: Political and Security Committee (PSC) Subject: Multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan

Delegations will find attached the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan. This

document was finalized by CIVCOM on 2 July 2012.

PSC is invited to agree the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan.

_________________

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Table of Content

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 4

1.1. Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 4

1.2. Strategic Background........................................................................................................ 6

1.2.1. Civilian crisis management in perspective .............................................................. 6

1.2.2. Evolving structures .................................................................................................. 7

1.2.3. Challenges and expectations.................................................................................... 8

1.2.4. Persisting shortfalls.................................................................................................. 9

1.2.5. Enduring commitment ........................................................................................... 10

1.2.6. The next phase ....................................................................................................... 11

1.3. Presentation..................................................................................................................... 12

2. Civilian Capability Development Plan ................................................................................. 13

2.1. Aim.................................................................................................................................. 13

2.2. Structural parameters ...................................................................................................... 13

2.2.1. Drivers ................................................................................................................... 14

2.2.1.1. EU Ambitions 14

2.2.1.2. Capability Trends 14

2.2.1.3. National strategies 15

2.2.1.4. Lessons Learned 15

2.2.2. Tasks...................................................................................................................... 15

2.2.3. Timelines ............................................................................................................... 15

2.3. Conduct ........................................................................................................................... 15

2.3.1. Summary overview................................................................................................ 15

2.3.2. Analysis of developments with each driver........................................................... 16

2.3.2.1. Analysis of EU Ambitions 16

2.3.2.2. Analysis of Capability Trends 16

2.3.2.3. Analysis of national strategies 17

2.3.2.4. Analysis of Lessons Learned 17

2.3.3. Collation into one coherent vision......................................................................... 18

2.3.4. Information to the competent Council bodies and other EU actors....................... 18

2.3.5. Political guidance .................................................................................................. 18

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2.3.6. Synergies ............................................................................................................... 19

2.3.6.1. EU's Capability Development Plan managed by EDA 19

2.3.6.2. Military Headline Goal 2010 20

2.3.6.3. European Commission 20

2.3.6.4. Non-EU States, International Organisations, non-Governmental

Organizations and Civil Society 20

2.4. Supporting Tools............................................................................................................. 21

2.4.1. General................................................................................................................... 21

2.4.2. EDA CDP software ............................................................................................... 21

2.4.3. Goalkeeper software environment......................................................................... 21

2.4.4. Shared Civilian and Military Lessons Database.................................................... 22

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Multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Executive Summary

Civilian missions have been essential instruments in our comprehensive approach from the start of

the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) until now. There have been numerous successes

(for example in Aceh, Georgia and Kosovo). New challenges lie ahead of us. In the eyes of the

world, Europe has become a producer of security rather than a consumer of it. We have established

ourselves as a global actor in peacekeeping and must continue to play that role. The full

commitment to maintain the current engagement to the ongoing CSDP missions and operations as

well as the recent events in the EU's southern neighbourhood and developments in Africa are

forceful reminders that the EU continues to need sufficient civilian capabilities to address crisis

management challenges, and that these capabilities might need to be deployed rapidly.

In reply to a Council tasking of December 2011, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has

now established a multi-annual work programme, building on the work conducted under the two

Civilian Headline Goals, to harness the many workstrands for development of civilian capabilities

and structure a sequence of reporting and political guidance. It consists of a stable framework called

Civilian Capability Development Plan, and Lines of Action for 2012-2013, presented separately.

The Civilian Capability Development Plan constitutes the lasting framework for CSDP civilian

capability development. It has four interlinked drivers:

EU Ambitions;

Capability Trends (operational & long term);

National Strategies;

Lessons Learned with consequences in the realm of capabilities.

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This set-up has the advantage that it can accommodate modifications deriving from changes in

ambitions, strategic context, operational feed-back and other variables, whilst offering a stable and

sustainable environment for the development and planning of civilian CSDP capabilities. The

Civilian Capability Development Plan, being modelled on the military Capability Development

Plan (CDP) managed by the European Defence Agency (EDA), is conducive to the identification of

civil-military synergies in CSDP capability development. For its conduct, it draws on existing

supporting tools such as the Shared Civilian and Military Lessons Database, the Goalkeeper

software environment and the CDP software developed by EDA.

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1.2. Strategic Background

1.2.1. Civilian crisis management in perspective

Over the last ten years, the trend in international crisis management has been one of increasingly

complex missions deployed ever further afield in often hostile environments. Emphasis is

increasingly placed on post-conflict reconstruction and other forms of crisis management conducted

with civilian instruments. As communities emerge from conflict, they often face a critical shortage

of capacities needed to secure a sustainable peace — the core capacities to run a government, to re-

establish institutions of justice, to reintegrate demobilizing fighters, to revitalize the economy, to

restore basic health and education, and many more. The range of issues addressed is growing, as

does the number of emerging crises. The full commitment to maintain the current engagement to the

ongoing missions and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the

recent events in the European Union's southern neighbourhood and developments in Africa are

forceful reminders that the EU continues to need sufficient civilian capabilities to address crisis

management challenges, and that these capabilities might need to be deployed rapidly.

From the start of CSDP, civilian missions have been essential instruments in the EU's

comprehensive approach to crisis management. During nine years, EU civilian personnel have been

deployed in a variety of theatres, substantially contributing to a range of crisis management

activities in the broad framework of reforming the security sector and rebuilding state structures in

post-conflict situations. There have been numerous successes: for example the Aceh Monitoring

Mission (AMM), where EU monitored and implemented a peace agreement, the European Union

Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, where EU managed to deploy in a short period 200

observers on the Administrative Boundary Lines between Georgia and the breakaway regions of

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo,

where EU is helping to bring police, judiciary and customs up to international standards.

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1.2.2. Evolving structures

The European External Action Service (EEAS) has a real potential of enhancing the coherence and

coordination of EU external action, including CSDP, and thus of enhancing our effectiveness in the

world. It represents a real opportunity to bring together the skills and knowledge of Member States,

the Council and the Commission. However, in doing so we should also take into account the

external aspects of EU internal security. Within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty's

implementation, and with due respect to the respective competences of the EU institutions,

enhanced coherence between the fields of CSDP and the area of Freedom, Security and Justice

(FSJ) is needed to overcome legal and institutional divides both at EU and national level. The

establishment of the EEAS is therefore of great importance, not only to the Member States'

Ministries of Foreign Affairs, but also to all national Ministries with stakes both in the area of FSJ

and in civilian crisis management under CSDP.

It needs to be clearly recognized that the respective realities underpinning the development of civil

and military capabilities are of a radically different nature. The EU military side is able to draw on

long-standing capability development experience whereas on the civilian side such experience is

less deeply engrained. Civilian capability development involves several Ministries/Services at

national level whereas, conversely, military capability development generally involves only the

Ministry of Defence. Consequently, these developments are subject to different political

considerations, and rely on different support structures and budget lines. Especially for the

multifaceted civilian area with its many national stakeholders, political awareness and commitment

by all ministerial and senior stakeholders is essential. An important role for Member States in

civilian crisis management is to improve and streamline, at national level and - in full respect of

national competences - as much as possible also at EU level, mechanisms and procedures to recruit

personnel from among volunteers, provide incentives, facilitate the release of personnel leaving on

mission and offer promising career perspectives to those returning. The EU from its side should

constantly work to raise the awareness of these issues with all the different Authorities in Member

States, and ensure transparent recruitment and good working conditions in missions. Only the

coordinated effort of EU institutions, Member States, national Ministries and also relevant non-

governmental sectors of society working in unison can bring sustainable success to the EU,

especially in an environment where different international actors compete for scarce personnel.

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1.2.3. Challenges and expectations

Increasingly, the provision of qualified civilian personnel to CSDP missions is proving a challenge

and in the current economic recession is likely to continue to do so. However, the EU has

established itself as a global actor in peacekeeping and must continue to play that role. Our means

enable us to spread the values and principles that inspired the creation of our Union. Indeed, the

international community has a firm expectation that we will do so. Europe is regarded as a principal

partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. In

the eyes of the world, Europe has become a producer of security rather than a consumer of it.

The EU's international partners assign particular value to the civilian dimension of its crisis

management activities. The EU has a unique asset here, which it should keep and develop further.

Because the civilian crisis management efforts under CSDP are set to continue, the demand for

deployable civilian experts will remain high, not only for crisis response but also, increasingly, for

crisis prevention. We should therefore recognize the advantages enhanced cooperation can bring us

now, in particular where economies can be made, but we should also look beyond current budgetary

constraints and prepare our systems for when the recovery gets going and resources become

available again.

Our increasingly complex CSDP missions call for greater specialisation and agility and ever more

effective ways of interacting with host countries and partners. Much work has already been done in

assessing the specific needs of civilian crisis management under CSDP. Over the years the

emerging needs of our CSDP missions have required the development of new civilian skills and

capabilities. The development of the Civilian Response Teams and the pool of Security Sector

Reform experts (though this latter not purely civilian) have also allowed a more divergent and at the

same time more targeted response to crisis management. More effective recruitment processes are

needed, including for management positions. The implementation of innovative supporting tools

that are being developed, such as the Goalkeeper software environment, will allow us to expedite

and rationalize training, recruitment and deployment, with an eye to improving further the staffing

of our civilian missions.

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1.2.4. Persisting shortfalls

Civilian capability development conducted in the framework of the Civilian Headline Goals 2008

and 2010 has been productive, but more needs to be done to address persisting shortfalls. An

updated inventory of potentially available experts and niche capabilities in Member States should

enhance our insight in the real capabilities the Union can currently field and help us direct further

action to improve these capabilities where needed. Indeed, maximizing the existing resources is an

important objective for the EU. By exploiting our innovative tools and approaches to the fullest, we

must reinforce the link between training and recruitment, and foster synergies within the CSDP

framework and possibly beyond at all levels. There is scope for the development of dedicated

training modules, for example in the area of mentoring, monitoring and advising - key tasks in the

majority of our civilian CSDP missions. There is room for the enhancement of interoperability,

firstly among Member States but also in reaching out to our partners in the international arena,

especially the United Nations. The new EU senior mission leadership course is modelled on the

leadership courses of the UN with exactly that objective in mind. In order to improve the

performance of CSDP missions and operations, their outcomes should be evaluated through

benchmarking, impact assessment, identifying and implementing lessons learned and developing

best practices for effective and efficient CSDP action. Lessons should also address aspects relating

to human rights, gender and children affected by armed conflict from the early planning of CSDP

missions and operations, during their conduct as well as in the subsequent evaluation processes. The

Shared Civilian-Military Lessons Database that was recently launched is an important instrument to

facilitate such processes and will also help to ensure that findings are not lost but feed back into our

structures, driving further development and improvement. Furthermore, in the overall EU

framework, concepts continue to be particularly important to foster a common understanding of

issues to be addressed, in capability development and training as much as in the planning and

conduct of missions.

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1.2.5. Enduring commitment

The Lisbon Treaty reconfirms the Member States' determination to foster action by the EU on the

international scene that is "guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation,

development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the

rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect

for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the

United Nations Charter and international law." 1 Upon its entry into force, Member States have

repeatedly made important contributions to stimulating the agenda for the development of Common

Security and Defence Policy, including with a view to strengthening military and civilian

capabilities in Europe. All this clearly shows that, notwithstanding the economic recession, Member

States continue to dedicate much energy and many resources to the Common Security and Defence

Policy.

In 2004 and 2007 respectively, the Civilian Headline Goals 2008 and 2010 articulated our ambition

with regard to the necessary civilian capability to respond effectively to civilian crisis management,

providing a framework that allowed Ministers and all competent Council bodies to keep track of the

work conducted and to provide guidance as needed.2 But despite considerable progress, persistent

shortfalls in civilian capabilities still need to be addressed at both national and EU level. Member

States have done much to facilitate the deployment of civilian capabilities to CSDP missions, but

much also remains to be done. Most Member States do not have training institutions specifically

dedicated to the training of civilian crisis management personnel. The need for many Member

States to address issues such as national regulations, rosters and budget lines more structurally still

exists, as does the need for the EU to continue to assist Member States in improving this situation.

At EU side, structures are continuously under development. Also, as the body of our crisis

management experience continues to grow, our capability requirements continue to evolve over

time, both in quality and in quantity.

1 Art. 21, Treaty on European Union 2 See respectively:

Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (doc. 15863/04); New Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (doc. 14823/07).

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1.2.6. The next phase

In consideration of all the above, the Council decided to extend implementation of the Civilian

Headline Goal beyond 2010.3 The Council provided further political impetus to the process on 1

December 2011 by stressing "the importance of strengthening and sustaining the efforts for the

civilian capability development, in particular in the context of current financial constraints, building

on the work conducted under the two Civilian Headline Goals and in synergy with other EU

instruments, with a view to responding more rapidly and effectively to crisis management tasks".

The Council then also invited the High Representative "to propose a multi-annual work programme

in this regard".4

Such a multi-annual work programme for CSDP civilian capability development is only

conceivable if it takes account of the fact that the Council, on the same occasion, has reiterated,

"[in] the context of a growing demand for the European Union to become a more capable, coherent

and strategic global actor, […] the continuing need for a comprehensive approach that increasingly

mobilises the different tools at the EU’s disposal as part of a coherent and effective strategy to

achieve the EU’s objectives." The Council has also stressed "the importance of fully exploiting the

wide variety of existing national and EU resources, maximising synergies and strengthening

cooperation".5

The EEAS in response to above Council tasking issues the current Civilian Capability Development

Plan, combined with action lines for civilian capability development under CSDP in 2012-2013,

which are presented separately. With this Plan, we enter a new phase in civilian capability

development.

3 EU civilian and military capability development beyond 2010 (doc. 17208/1/10 REV 1). 4 CSDP - Council Conclusions (doc. 17991/11). On the work conducted under the two Civilian Headline Goals,

see: Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (doc. 14807/07) and Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (doc. 16817/10).

5 Ibid.

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1.3. Presentation

The Civilian Capability Development Plan (i.e. the present document) constitutes the lasting

framework for CSDP civilian capability development. It is structured in such a way that periodic

modifications deriving from changes in ambitions, political-strategic context, operational feed-back

and other variables can be easily incorporated without upsetting the Civilian Capability

Development Plan and its multi-annual conduct. This should ensure that the Civilian Capability

Development Plan remains a stable and sustainable environment for the development and planning

of civilian CSDP capabilities.

Specific action lines for CSDP civilian capability development in the timeframe 2012-2013 are

issued in parallel in a separate document with an eye to ensuring their natural transition into the

Civilian Capability Development Plan during its set-up and kick-off phase. As set out below (see

paragraph 2.3.5.), action lines for CSDP civilian capability development may be updated

periodically to reflect variables.

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2. CIVILIAN CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN

2.1. Aim

One of the main findings of the work conducted under the two Civilian Headline Goals is that

"sustainable capability development cannot be achieved in a short-term, case-by-case approach.

Long-term structural solutions can only be achieved through an agreed, well-structured process." 6

Accordingly, the aim of the Civilian Capability Development Plan is to establish a lasting

framework for CSDP civilian capability development, taking into account the experiences with the

conduct of CHG 2008 and CHG 2010, with a view to enabling the EU to respond more rapidly and

effectively to crisis management tasks.

A stable Civilian Capability Development Plan improves cooperation between Member States’

authorities and the EEAS in the field of civilian capability development. It also allows better to

exploit possible synergies with the EU military, the capabilities available to the European

Commission, non-EU States, International Organizations and non-State actors, and a more rational

use in civilian capability development of important supporting tools developed over the years, such

as the Goalkeeper software environment and the Shared Civilian and Military Lessons Database, as

well as software built by the European Defence Agency (EDA). It also allows better management of

the cycle of reporting and guidance at political level.

Furthermore, by drawing together existing and future lines of action in a coherent framework, the

Civilian Capability Development Plan aims at maximizing efficient use of resources. This allows a

more coherent, stable and hence cost-effective development of civilian capabilities than could

otherwise be achieved if work streams were to be conducted in isolation - an important

consideration, in particular in the context of current financial constraints.

2.2. Structural parameters

The structural parameters of the Civilian Capability Development Plan are:

Drivers;

Tasks;

Timelines.

6 Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (doc. 16817/10).

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2.2.1. Drivers

The Civilian Capability Development Plan has four interlinked drivers:

(1) EU Ambitions;

(2) Capability Trends;

(3) National strategies;

(4) Lessons Learned.

These four drivers represent the principal forces that drive CSDP civilian capability development.

They replicate, in the civilian realm, the four strands of the EU's Capability Development Plan

(CDP) managed by EDA.7

2.2.1.1. EU Ambitions

These represent generic (i.e. non-mission-specific) ambitions and goals for CSDP civilian crisis

management laid down in dedicated Council or European Council documents. Examples of such

documents are CHG 2008, CHG 2010, the Declaration on Capabilities of December 2008 and the

document on EU civilian and military capability development beyond 2010 of December 2010.8

2.2.1.2. Capability Trends

These represent realities that impact on the future direction of (civilian) crisis management

capability development. Examples are phenomena such as climate change, the Arab Spring and its

aftermath, the current economic crisis etc.

7 The four strands of the CDP are: A) Military Headline Goal 2010; B) Capability Trends; C) Member States'

defence plans and programmes; D) Lessons Identified. For further information on the CDP, see: http://www.eda.europa.eu/Strategies/Capabilities

8 See respectively: Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (doc. 15863/04); New Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (doc. 14823/07); Declaration on strengthening capabilities (doc. 16840/08); EU civilian and military capability development beyond 2010 (doc. 17208/1/10 REV 1). Here, the Council

sets the currently applicable level of ambition by stating that it "extends implementation of the respective existing civilian and military Headline Goals beyond 2010".

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2.2.1.3. National strategies

These represent the enactment and implementation of national measures to facilitate contributions

to the EU's civilian crisis management capability (including national regulatory and budgetary

measures, national rosters of civilian personnel potentially available for CSDP missions, and

training).

2.2.1.4. Lessons Learned

These represent recorded experiences with consequences in the realm of (civilian) capability

development.

2.2.2. Tasks

These represent the operational objectives that can reasonably be expected to occur in CSDP

civilian crisis management, expressed in a generic (i.e. non-mission-specific) way.9

2.2.3. Timelines

These represent the short, medium or long term timeframes in which the EU may expect to be

confronted with identified civilian capability requirements for CSDP.

2.3. Conduct

2.3.1. Summary overview

The Civilian Capability Development Plan is driven by the analysis of developments with each

driver and the resulting changes in the relation between drivers, tasks and timelines. This analysis

yields information that is collated into a coherent vision. This vision is used to inform the

competent Council bodies and other EU actors periodically on the overall state-of-play, i.a. through

the High Representative's reports on CSDP and specific periodical reports on civilian capability

development. The resulting political guidance feeds back into the Civilian Capability Development

Plan, complementing the EU Ambitions.

9 The establishment of a List of generic civilian CSDP tasks forms the object of a specific action and will be

subject to consultation with Member States and all relevant EU actors. See paragraph 2.1.1.1. of the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan - Action Lines for 2012-2013 (doc.12111/12).

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2.3.2. Analysis of developments with each driver

It is established to what extent and in what timeframe developments in each driver affect the overall

civilian CSDP capability to act upon a given generic task. The result of this assessment is expressed

with a 'traffic light' indicating the extent to which the task concerned can be met.

2.3.2.1. Analysis of EU Ambitions

Through the gathering of data, the EU monitors implementation of actions emanating from Council

or European Council documents dedicated to the statement of EU Ambitions in CSDP civilian crisis

management. The methodology for the gathering of data may vary according to the action

concerned, e.g. a questionnaire on Member States’ personnel potentially available for civilian crisis

management,10 or the establishment of targeted expert teams to elaborate specific capability-related

issues.11

In the framework of the Civilian Capability Development Plan, such data are collated and used to

assess the actual effect of the EU civilian capability development actions that emanate from Council

or European Council documents upon the EU's overall capability to act.

2.3.2.2. Analysis of Capability Trends

Capability trends are gleaned from, i.a., long-term vision documents such as, e.g., those published

by the EU's Institute for Security Studies,12 or the comprehensive analysis of potential trends for the

2025+ timeframe conducted by EDA. This process involves all relevant stakeholders.

In the framework of the Civilian Capability Development Plan, capability trends are used to help

predict shortfalls that may occur and the timeframe in which they may occur, taking account of the

state of play with the implementation of action at EU and national level.

10 Such questionnaires were used under CHG 2008 and CHG 2010. On the doctrine and outcomes of the capability

surveys thus conducted, see: Final report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (doc. 14807/07) and Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (doc. 16817/10).

11 For example, data on developing synergies between the EU civil and military capability development are collected through reports on the work of dedicated Action Implementation Teams. On the doctrine of the Action Implementation Teams, see: Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and Military Capability Development - Final report on the outcomes of Phase 2 of the Workplan (doc. 9850/11).

12 E.g. "The New Global Puzzle, What World for the EU in 2025?", Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2008.

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2.3.2.3. Analysis of national strategies

The EU is taking yearly stock of Member States' progress in agreed areas of action, such as national

regulatory and budgetary measures, national rosters of civilian personnel potentially available for

CSDP missions, and training.13

In the framework of the Civilian Capability Development Plan, this information is used to establish

a comprehensive picture of the impact of Member States' initiatives on the EU's overall capability to

act. This comprehensive picture on Member States' initiatives may also stimulate voluntary pooling

and sharing of certain civilian CSDP resources among Member States.

2.3.2.4. Analysis of Lessons Learned

Lessons from all phases of CSDP action are reported upon periodically, both in mission-specific

reports, thematic reports and in horizontal overviews. Lessons are also drawn from exercises.

Recently, the PSC has approved a format for the storage, management and development of lessons

that facilitates the identification of trends and themes that cross-cut civilian and military areas.14

Furthermore EDA, under Strand D of the CDP, gathers lessons identified in an important range of

crisis theatres.15

In the framework of the Civilian Capability Development Plan, lessons from above sources with

potential consequences in the realm of (civilian) capability development are assessed against the

observation of EU Ambitions and national strategies (see above), in order to:

Mitigate or accentuate shortfalls identified through these other Drivers;

Capture possible capability requirements not yet identified outside the operational reality.

It is important therefore that lessons studies are conducted and lessons learned and implemented in

a timely fashion.

13 See:

Facilitating the deployment of civilian personnel - Areas of action and way ahead (doc.12018/09); Report on Member States' progress (doc. 15842/09); Second report on Member States' progress (doc. 16989/10); Report on High-level seminar III "Facilitating the deployment of civilian personnel for CSDP" (doc.

16109/11). 14 Cf.: Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and Military Capability Development - First package of

outcomes of the workplan (doc. 15801/11). Furthermore, a specific note on the establishment of a shared civilian and military lessons database is at doc. 9592/11.

15 Strand D of the CDP concerns Lessons Learned.

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2.3.3. Collation into one coherent vision

Developments with the respective drivers are compared, assessed and collated in a matrix (see

Table 1 below) facilitating the establishment of one coherent vision on the extent to which the EU is

able to address each given generic civilian CSDP task as well as the relative weight of shortfalls

thus identified.

Tasks →

Drivers ↓

A B C D E etc.

EU Ambitions

National strategies

Lessons Learned

Capability Trends

Total

Table 1. Matrix of Tasks and Drivers

2.3.4. Information to the competent Council bodies and other EU actors

This coherent vision is periodically presented to the competent Council bodies and other EU actors

as a dedicated end-of-year report on CSDP civilian capability development, driving a cycle of

reporting and guidance at political level.

2.3.5. Political guidance

On the basis of periodic reporting (see above) the Council is periodically invited to indicate the

concrete elements on which CSDP civilian capability development should focus in the short,

medium or long term. The resulting political guidance feeds back into the Civilian Capability

Development Plan, complementing existing EU Ambitions,16 or replacing them with a new

statement of ambitions.17

16 Similar periodic Ministerial guidance was e.g. given under the CHG 2008 and CHG 2010 on a yearly basis

(except 2009) in the form of dedicated Ministerial Declarations on the strengthening of civilian CSDP capabilities. See, respectively, the docs. 14713/05, 14981/06 and 14729/07 for CHG 2008 and the docs. 16840/08 and 17208/1/10 REV 1 for CHG 2010.

17 Such as, for example, the replacement of the CHG 2008 (doc. 15863/04) with the new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (doc. 14823/07) in November 2007.

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2.3.6. Synergies

The Civilian Capability Development Plan facilitates a closer cooperation between the respective

civilian and military capability development processes, while preserving their different specificities

and objectives and ensuring their integrity. This approach is fully in line with the guiding principle

of the Council paper on promoting synergies between the EU civil and military capability

development.18 It also facilitates the identification and exploitation of synergies with capabilities

available to the European Commission.

Furthermore, it facilitates the identification and exploitation of synergies with non-EU States,

International Organisations, relevant non-Governmental Organisations and Civil Society.

2.3.6.1. EU's Capability Development Plan managed by EDA

The Civilian Capability Development Plan's structural parameters replicate, in the civilian realm,

the main parameters of the military Capability Development Plan (CDP) managed by EDA.19 This

facilitates the identification and exploitation of potential synergies at several levels. For example:

EDA's experience with the conduct of the CDP, including the tools and know-how developed

in that process, may usefully inform the work on the Civilian Capability Development Plan,

e.g. the development of a List of generic civilian CSDP tasks by the Crisis Management and

Planning Directorate (CMPD);

The analysis of capability trends conducted under the Civilian Capability Development Plan

may draw on the comprehensive analysis of potential trends for the 2025+ timeframe

conducted by EDA under Strand B of the CDP;

The analysis of lessons from operational theatres conducted by EDA under Strand D of the

CDP (addressing Lessons Learned) can usefully complement the CSDP lessons identified by

the EEAS.

18 Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and Military Capability Development (doc. 15475/09). 19 See also paragraph 2.2. ("Structural parameters") of the present document.

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2.3.6.2. Military Headline Goal 2010

Similarly, the structure of the Civilian Capability Development Plan will be conducive to

identification and exploitation of further synergies with the Military Headline Goal 2010, 20 i.a.

through:

A common understanding of generic tasks;

The possible establishment of a comprehensive and coherent reporting system to allow a

better coordination and comparison of the progress achieved in capability development at

civilian and military sides.

2.3.6.3. European Commission

A common understanding of generic tasks will also be supportive of the identification of potential

synergies with the European Commission and, more generally, of the EU's comprehensive approach

to crisis management.

2.3.6.4. Non-EU States, International Organisations, non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society

Furthermore, a common understanding of generic tasks will also be supportive of the identification

of potential synergies with non-EU States, International Organisations, relevant non-Governmental

Organizations and Civil Society.

20 The Capability Development Section of the EU Military Staff, responsible for the conduct of the military

Headline Goal 2010, has already been instrumental in helping the civilian side establish the capability planning methodology used in CHG 2008 and the draft common pilot illustrative scenario supportive of both civilian and military CSDP capability development processes that was used in CHG 2010.

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2.4. Supporting Tools

2.4.1. General

Conduct of the Civilian Capability Development Plan is facilitated by supporting tools, such as the

purpose-built software for management of the CDP that EDA is willing to put at the disposal of

EEAS, the Goalkeeper software environment and the civil-military Lessons-Learned database.

2.4.2. EDA CDP software

EDA has developed software for the management of the CDP. This software is equally suited to

manage the matrix of the three structural parameters underpinning the Civilian Capability

Development Plan (i.e. drivers, tasks and timelines - see above). Its use for that purpose will

seriously facilitate reception and collation of the considerable amount of disparate data generated by

the interplay of the Civilian Capability Development Plan's three structural parameters. From a

technical perspective, it will also facilitate the identification of possible civil-military synergies in

capability development.

2.4.3. Goalkeeper software environment

The Goalkeeper software environment has been expressly designed to facilitate civilian capability

development at various levels,21 i.a. by providing:

A digital link between a list of generic civilian CSDP tasks and a standard catalogue of

required (human resources) capabilities identified to address these tasks; this link facilitates

capability planning, including by smoothening identification of possible synergies with

capabilities available to the EU military, actors in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice,

the European Commission, International Organisations, non-EU States and Non-

Governmental Organisations;22

21 For the most recent update on Goalkeeper development, see: Goalkeeper: - Second progress report on

development and operationalization; - Assessment of upcoming needs (doc. 10870/12). For forthcoming milestones in Goalkeeper development, see section 2.1.2. of the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan - Action Lines for 2012-2013 (doc.12111/12).

22 Interlinkage between tasks and capabilities is integral part of the Goalkeeper-Headhunter application (software development achieved). At present, Goalkeeper reflects the CHG 2008 task list. This should be replaced by the generic civilian task list to be developed in line with the results of research conducted under the Workplan on promoting synergies between the EU civil and military capability development (see above). Completion of the Goalkeeper's standard catalogue of required (human resources) capabilities is foreseen for the second semester of 2012.

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A channel for automatic feed-back from the operational level, which will allow constant

improvement of the Standard catalogue of required capabilities;23

A digital device for real-time conduct of capability surveys with EU Member States and,

possibly, with other potential contributors to CSDP action, and for the automatic generation of

related statistics; these statistics help to establish the extent to which the List of generic

civilian CSDP tasks is covered by capabilities potentially available with Member States;24

A digital device facilitating the assessment of training needs and the relative training coverage

per personnel category; the resulting statistics can be automatically generated and may help

Member States orient training efforts and the possible development of national strategies in

this respect.25

2.4.4. Shared Civilian and Military Lessons Database

The Shared Civilian and Military Lessons Database is overseen by the CMPD, the Civilian

Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) jointly

and reached its full operational capability in April 2012.26 In it, lessons observations originated by

the civilian or military community are stored, managed, developed and made accessible to the

community of users in accordance with the agreed processes for the civilian and military lessons-

related procedures and according to an agreed taxonomy.

In the framework of the Civilian Capability Development Plan, the Shared Database could facilitate

the feeding of lessons from the field into the civilian capability development process. The civil-

military character of the Shared Database facilitates consideration of cross-cutting trends and

themes from the civilian and military areas.

23 When operational, the Goalkeeper-Headhunter application automatically imports mission-specific requirements

according to personnel category. This feed-back facilitates updating of the Standard catalogue and helps to import CSDP field requirements into the capability development process. The Headhunter test phase - jointly conducted by CMPD and CPCC - is due to start in the second semester of 2012.

24 Goalkeeper has been tentatively used for the conduct of the capability survey under CHG 2010 (cf. paragraph III.C.1.a. of the Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 - doc. 16817/10). The Goalkeeper-Registrar application is currently being developed. It is designed to allow, i.a., the generation of statistics on the coverage of civilian CSDP tasks by capabilities potentially available with Member States.

25 The linkage between the Goalkeeper-Schoolmaster application (available on-line) and other elements of the Goalkeeper software environment (notably Headhunter) will ensure that all available training opportunities can be targeted to appropriate personnel categories and hence - once the Goalkeeper-Registrar application will be available - to personnel most likely to benefit from such training in view of possible future deployment. Training is one of the main areas of action identified in the context of the work on national strategies (see Facilitating the deployment of civilian personnel - Areas of action and way ahead - doc.12018/09).

26 Promoting synergies between the EU civil and military capability development - Establishment of a shared civilian and military lessons database (doc. 9592/11).

13212/12 ADD 1 AP/pf 1

DG D1B ?? E�

COU�CIL OF

THE EUROPEA� U�IO�

Brussels, 28 August 2012

13212/12

ADD 1

ASIM 102

COVER �OTE

from: Secretary-General of the European Commission,

signed by Mr Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU, Director

date of receipt: 1 August 2012

to: Mr Uwe CORSEPIUS, Secretary-General of the Council of the European

Union

No Cion doc.: SWD(2012) 240 final

Subject: COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

European Migration Network Status Report 2011


Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on

the Development of the European Migration Network

Delegations will find attached the Commission document SWD(2012) 240 final.

________________________

Encl.: SWD(2012) 240 final

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 1.8.2012

SWD(2012) 240 final

COMMISSIO� STAFF WORKI�G DOCUME�T

European Migration �etwork Status Report 2011


Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament

on the Development of the European Migration �etwork

{COM(2012) 427 final}

2

TABLE OF CO�TE�TS

1. I�TRODUCTIO�.................................................................................................................3

2. EM� OUTPUTS I� 2011 .....................................................................................................3

2.1 Annual Policy Reports .....................................................................................................3

2.2 Annual Reports on Migration and International Protection Statistics..............................4

2.3 EMN Studies ....................................................................................................................4

2.3.1 Satisfying Labour Demand through Migration....................................................4

2.3.2 Temporary and Circular Migration: policy, practice and future options in EU

Member States .....................................................................................................5

2.3.3 Visa Policy as a Migration Channel ....................................................................5

2.3.4 Practical measures for reducing irregular migration............................................6

2.3.5 Misuse of the Right to Family Reunification: marriages of convenience and false

declarations of parenthood ..................................................................................6

2.3.6 Immigration of International Students to the EU.................................................6

2.4 EMN Ad-Hoc Queries......................................................................................................7

2.5 EMN Glossary and Thesaurus..........................................................................................8

3. �ETWORKI�G....................................................................................................................8

3.1 Networking amongst EMN NCPs ....................................................................................8

3.2 Networking at National level ...........................................................................................9

3.3. Networking with other relevant entities ..........................................................................9

4. E�HA�CI�G THE EM�’S VISIBILITY .......................................................................10

4.1 EMN Conference 2011...................................................................................................10

4.2 Other conferences and events in 2011............................................................................11

4.3 EMN and National Websites..........................................................................................11

4.4 EMN Wikipedia Page.....................................................................................................11

4.5 EMN Newsletter and EMN Bulletin Report ..................................................................12

5. MA�AGEME�T OF THE EM� ......................................................................................12

6. CO�CLUDI�G REMARKS..............................................................................................13

3

1. I�TRODUCTIO�

This third Status Report,1 accompanying the Report on the Development of the European Migration

Network (EMN),2 reports on progress made by the EMN during 2011, a pivotal year in respect of

evolutions undertaken in order to increase further its relevance and impact in supporting

policymakers.

An overview of the main outputs of the EMN in 2011 is given first, all of which are publicly

available from the EMN's website,3 followed by the extensive networking that occurred and the

activities taken to promote the EMN to policymakers in particular. Information on how the EMN

was managed is then provided, followed by concluding remarks.

2. EM� OUTPUTS I� 2011

This section provides a summary of the EMN's main achievements and impacts in the framework of

its 2011 Work Programme. Its core activity continued to be analysing information to support

policymaking on migration and asylum in EU Member States. Synthesis Reports, highlighting the

main findings within an EU perspective, were produced for each annual report and study on the

basis of National Reports produced by EMN National Contact Points (EMN NCPs) following

common specifications. Whilst every effort was made to have national contributions from all EMN

NCPs, this was not possible for some Member States. Norway4 continued to be a pro-active

contributor to and participant of the EMN.

A significant development during 2011 was the introduction of EM� Informs, providing concise

policy relevant outcomes from a particular EMN activity. Three were produced and widely

disseminated; for the studies on Satisfying Labour Demand through Migration and on Temporary

and Circular Migration, plus for the Migration and International Protection Statistics 2008 report.

2.1 Annual Policy Reports

These reports provide an overall insight across the EU into the most significant political and

legislative (including EU) developments, as well as public debates, in the area of migration and

asylum, along with relevant statistics. They are one basis for the Commission’s Annual Report on

Immigration and Asylum,5 notably the national developments reported in the accompanying

Commission Staff Working Paper. Like for previous years, the contributions from the EMN NCPs,

within the context of the EM� Annual Policy Report 2011, were provided by the end of 2011.

Additionally, the EM� Annual Policy Report 2010, based on 23 National Reports, was finalised in

mid-2011 adding to a series of such reports since 2004.

1 As required by Article 4(5c) of Council Decision 2008/381/EC. Previous versions were also published and

translated into a number of Member State languages as Commission Staff Working Papers in 2010 as

SEC(2010) 1006 and in 2011 as SEC(2011) 1273. 2 COM(2012)427

3 http://www.emn.europa.eu

4 Commission Decision C(2010)6171 of 13th September 2010 established the basis for administrative

cooperation between the European Commission and the Ministry of Justice and the Police of the Kingdom of

Norway for the participation of Norway in the European Migration Network. 5 See, for example, COM(2012) 250 final and SWD(2012) 139 final


4

2.2 Annual Reports on Migration and International Protection Statistics6

These reports provide an analysis of statistical trends in asylum and migration, primarily drawing

on the Commission’s Eurostat statistics. The Synthesis Report for the Annual Report on Migration

and International Protection Statistics 2008, based on 23 National Reports and, for the first time,

analysing data produced in accordance with the Migratory Statistics Regulation 862/2007, was

finalised in October 2011, along with a corresponding EM� Inform. The EMN also developed the

Annual Report on Migration and International Protection Statistics 2009, based on 21 National

Reports, with the Synthesis Report then finalised in May 2012. Whilst both reports might be

considered as ‘historical,’ nevertheless they contribute to a suite of such reports stretching back to

2001 and thus able to provide a longer-term assessment of asylum and migration trends.

Owing to the inherent time lag in producing these reports, however, where elements of the relevant

data are available only some 15 months after the end of a particular reference year, the external

evaluation recommended the discontinuation of further reports, a decision endorsed by the EMN

Steering Board in October 2011. As a result, future EMN analytical work will focus on only the

most relevant and up-to-date statistics, compiled in relation to specific Reports and Studies, and in

relation to the EM� Bulletin.

2.3 EM� Studies7

The EMN finalised and published a number of relevant studies in 2011. These were Satisfying

Labour Demand through Migration (June 2011) and Temporary and Circular Migration: policy,

practice and future options (September 2011). Work was undertaken to progress the following 2011

studies: Visa Policy as a Migration Channel; and Practical measures for reducing irregular

migration. A pilot focussed study on Individual profiles and migration trajectories of third-country

national cross-border workers - the case of Luxembourg led by the LU EMN NCP was also started.

Work also began on developing the specifications for the EMN main study: Immigration of

international students to the EU and the template for the first Focussed Study: Misuse of the Right

to Family Reunification: marriages of convenience and false declarations of parenthood.

Summaries of the progress of the Reports, and, where relevant, examples of impact, are set out

below.

2.3.1 Satisfying Labour Demand through Migration

This study served to inform the debate on the contribution of economic migration to addressing

labour shortages, which are already being experienced by many Member States. The aims were to

identify those sectors experiencing labour shortages in the Member States, to outline the national

strategies for addressing labour market needs with third-country national migrant workers and to

gain an understanding of the perceived effectiveness of these strategies, including examining the

impact of the recent economic downturn and recovery on them. A compilation of available statistics

was also provided, aiming to present the nature and extent of labour market shortages and the extent

to which they are filled by third-country nationals.

One conclusion from the study, based on 23 National Reports, was that whilst economic migration

from third countries may not be considered by the Member States as the main solution to the

6 Reports are available from the EMN website http://www.emn.europa.eu under "EMN Outputs: Migration and

International Protection Statistics" 7 The various reports are available from the EMN website http://www.emn.europa.eu under "EMN Outputs:

EMN Studies"



5

challenges of ageing societies, declining populations and skills shortages in Europe, nevertheless

well-managed immigration can bring positive consequences, particularly by increasing labour

supply and alleviating labour market shortages, both in the short and longer term. To achieve this,

and to compete more effectively worldwide, EU Member States need to be attractive destinations

for third-country nationals with relevant skills and competences.

The study, published in June 2011, proved to be both topical and timely within a number of policy

debates, and was widely disseminated at events and conferences, via the EMN website, and in hard

copy, at both EU and national levels. The European Parliament also translated the Synthesis Report

into DE, IT, ES, FR and IT and circulated it to members of their LIBE and EMPL committees. The

study's findings also contributed to, and were referenced in, the Communication on the Global

Approach to Migration and Mobility.8

2.3.2 Temporary and Circular Migration: policy, practice and future options in EU Member States

Progress has been made with the EU and the international community to promote the developmental

benefits of migration, another main tenet of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.9 This

EMN study provided a detailed analysis of the evidence supporting the benefits of such migration

patterns, and their status across the EU Member States. The aim of the study was to analyse the

characteristics of temporary (broadly understood to refer to a single movement and then limited stay

in the EU) and circular (considered in the context of a back-and-forth movement between the EU

and a country of origin) migration policy and practice across EU Member States.

The main findings, based on 24 National Reports, were that the development and promotion of

policies on temporary and circular migration in the EU Member States is still at a very early stage.

Initial evaluations of existing programmes to support temporary and circular migration have

confirmed positive results for participating migrants in some cases. Overall, however, the study

concluded that evidence for the ‘triple-win,’ bringing benefits for the host society, the migrant and

the country of origin, remained inconclusive. National statistics indicate the scope and scale of

temporary and circular migration in Member States, but tend to be limited and lack comparability.

However, the study does identify a number of indicators used to quantify these types of migration,

including temporary residence permits; certain types of visas; employment databases; population

registers; survey data and data on seasonal workers.

2.3.3 Visa Policy as a Migration Channel

This study, based on 21 National Reports, aims to analyse the possible nexus between visa policy

and migration management and control, including tackling irregular migration. It will also generate

evidence concerning the effectiveness of different strategies to use visa policy to manage migration,

including cooperation with third countries, particularly concerning facilitation and

bilateral/multilateral agreements and highlighting best practice, as well as helping to contextualise

national policies and practices by providing an overview of policy in this area across the EU.

Finally, the Study will explore the effects of EU policy and legislation on national policymaking

and practices. A number of country-based case studies will be presented, including China, Nigeria,

Russian Federation and Turkey, and the study will draw on good practice from other countries too.

It will be published in 2012.

8 COM(2011) 743 final (p.3)

9 SEC(2011) 1353 final (p.5)

6

2.3.4 Practical measures for reducing irregular migration

Reducing irregular migration and actions against trafficking in human beings remain a key priority

at both EU and national level, as exemplified by the Justice and Home Affairs Council approval in

April 2012 of the EU Action on Migratory Pressures - A Strategic Response.10 Development of this

strategy began under the auspices of the Polish Presidency in the latter half of 2011. Against this

background, the overall objective of this study was to provide an overview of existing practical

approaches, mechanisms and measures implemented by Member States to reduce irregular

migration to the EU in relation to pre-entry, entry, stay and regularisation, and return stages. A

number of Ad-Hoc Queries launched in 2011 enabled the EMN to provide up-to-date information in

relation to the issue of irregularity, in advance of the findings of the study. Many National Reports

were published in the latter half of 2011 and the Synthesis Report itself, based on 22 National

Reports, will be finalised in 2012 and aim to inform the implementation of the above-mentioned

strategy. The EMN Conference 2011 (see Section 2.4.1) also served to promote the study to a wide

audience of policymakers and practitioners, with initial findings presented by a number of EMN

NCPs, as well as at the national meeting of the FR EMN NCP in November 2011.11

2.3.5 Misuse of the Right to Family Reunification: marriages of convenience and false declarations

of parenthood

A public consultation on the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC was launched in 201112 in

order to collect opinions on how to have more effective rules on family reunification at EU level

and to provide factual information and data on the application of the Directive. To directly inform

the consultation process, the EMN undertook its first Focussed Study in order to provide up-to-date

information specifically on marriages of convenience and on false declarations of parenthood across

the EU. The aim of the study was to identify the scale and scope of this type of misuse and to

provide clear evidence, to the extent possible (i.e. where the misuse was detected), including

available statistics. The study also summarised Member States’ best practices in the prevention of

these types of misuse and identified any changes in practice or in legislation that can assist in

preventing such misuses. The outcomes of the study were first presented at the public hearing on

the Family Reunification Green Paper in June 2012.13

2.3.6 Immigration of International Students to the EU

Following the Commission’s report on the application of Directive 2004/114/EC14 and its possible

amendment, this study aims to provide an overview of the immigration policies implemented by

(Member) States regarding international students, with a view to assisting policymakers and

practitioners to achieve a balance between actively attracting international students into the EU for

the purposes of study, and preventing the misuse of international student routes to migration. The

results of the study will be published in Autumn 2012 and its outcomes also presented at the EMN

Conference 2012 under the auspices of the Cypriot Presidency.

10 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st08/st08714-re01.en12.pdf

11 http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_det_res&numrubrique=376&numarticle=2617

12 Outcomes of this public consultation are available at http://ec.europa.eu/home-

affairs/news/consulting_public/consulting_0023_en.htm. 13 http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.events-and-activities-european-integretion-forum-7

14 COM(2011) 587 final

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st08/st08714-re01.en12.pdf

http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_det_res&numrubrique=376&numarticle=2617

http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/consulting_public/consulting_0023_en.htm


http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.events-and-activities-european-integretion-forum-7

7

2.4 EM� Ad-Hoc Queries

EMN Ad-Hoc Queries continue to be a highly responsive mechanism for collecting comparative

information from Member States and Norway, on a specific, topical issue, within a short timeframe.

An Ad-Hoc Query can be launched by an EMN NCP, or the Commission, with a typical response

period of four weeks, after which a compilation of all responses is produced and circulated. Some

EMN NCPs made use of a scale of unit costs ("lump sum") to cover the costs of providing a

response.

The responses are publicly available on the EMN's website,15 subject to the agreement of the

contributing EMN NCPs. There are now almost 400 Ad-Hoc Query compilations, responding to an

extensive range of migration and asylum issues which provide a valuable information resource for

the Commission, EMN NCPs, and the wider public. In total, 76 Ad-Hoc Queries were launched

during 2011, with each query having on average 17 individual Member State responses (equivalent

to over 1 300 individual responses from the EMN NCPs). Almost all EMN NCPs and COM

launched at least one Ad-Hoc Query during 2011.

The most frequent topic addressed was international protection, including asylum accounting for

20% of all Ad-Hoc Queries. The main aspects addressed within this topic related to reception

conditions; proof of relationship of applicants for international protection; cash and other benefits

for asylum applicants; documentation issued for asylum seekers; and the evaluation of asylum

systems. A number of Ad-Hoc Queries concentrated on the specific circumstances of nationals from

third countries, including Albania, Somalia and South Ossetia. Return accounted for a further 15%,

with Ad-Hoc Queries addressing issues such as the acceptance of return decisions made by another

Member State; payment of the costs of removal; and use of language analysis during the removal

process. The value of Ad-Hoc Queries as a mutual learning and sharing instrument to tackle

common issues was effectively evidenced by Member States making use of the tool to address

questions related to return policy for Syrian nationals; forced removals for Afghan nationals and

expulsions to Libya, all in response to new circumstances presented by the Arab Spring. Residence

represented some 13% of all Ad-Hoc Queries, and included themes such as security risks when

issuing residence permits; the limitations to acquiring real estate by third-country nationals; and

residence permits issued to citizens of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Ad-Hoc Queries relating to

the direct implementation of EU Acquis accounted for a further 11%. Other themes of note included

economic migration, family reunification, irregular immigration, integration, students,

trafficking and visas.

The Commission has also made effective use of Ad-Hoc Queries in relation to high profile issues,

such as the European Court of Justice’s decision on the Zambrano (C-34/09) case in 2011, where

the Commission used the EMN to rapidly assess the conditions of automatic and unconditional

granting of citizenship to persons born on the territory of a Member State, irrespective of the

immigration status of the parents (unconditional jus soli). Another Ad-Hoc Query initiated by the

Commission, with direct policy implications, concerned the status of national data stored in relation

to harmonised residence permits. The information provided by Member States was used in the

context of negotiations between the co-legislators on the Single Permit proposal.

15 http://www.emn.europa.eu under "EMN Outputs: EMN Ad-Hoc Queries"


8

2.5 EM� Glossary16

and Thesaurus

The development of these tools to facilitate comparability was undertaken by the EMN's Glossary

and Thesaurus Working Group, comprising of EMN members and the Fundamental Rights Agency.

The group met four times in 2011, in conjunction with an EMN NCP meeting, to introduce, discuss,

refine and agree upon the terms and the format for the updated Glossary publication, and to

structure and develop the EMN Thesaurus. An updated version of the multilingual EMN Glossary

was developed and published in 2011, with more than 1 500 copies distributed to national and EU

stakeholders. The Glossary is also available as a web-based tool on the EMN website17 and the

terms are to be incorporated into IATE (Inter-Active Terminology for Europe).18 Translations of the

definitions, as well as the terms, in the updated glossary into DE, ES, FR, IT and PT took place

during the year, and each language version will appear as a separate publication in 2012. Good

progress was also made towards the development of the EMN Thesaurus, which will facilitate

structured searching of the documents available through the EMN’s Information Exchange System.

3. �ETWORKI�G

Extensive networking continued in 2011, amongst the EMN NCPs themselves, and at national level,

as detailed below. This has contributed to strengthening the network and to boost its impacts. A

more strategic approach has been adopted towards other relevant entities.

3.1 �etworking amongst EM� �CPs

Seven EMN NCP Meetings (46th to 52

nd) were organised and hosted by the Commission, bringing

together the EMN NCPs approximately every 6-8 weeks. Meetings were mainly held in Brussels,

although the 51st meeting was held in Warsaw, Poland in conjunction with the EMN Conference

2011. The meetings focused on the delivery of the outputs set out in the EMN Work Programme,

but were also effective in reviewing and discussing the findings and recommendations of the

external evaluation and how these were to be implemented. Meetings were typically attended by

one or two delegates from each EMN NCP, along with other invited representatives, notably from

the Commission's Eurostat and from the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA).

EMN NCP workshops continued during 2011, in conjunction with the formal EMN NCP meetings

and in response to identified needs. As well as the two workshops supporting the External

Evaluation (on 9 February and 23 May 2011), there were also workshops on new formats to

improve the policy-relevance of EMN outputs (13 July 2011); on the development of study

specifications for the 2011 EMN study on Irregular Migration (5 April 2011) and for the 2012 Main

Study and first Focussed Study (16 December 2011); on the further development of the EMN

website and the IES (5 April 2011); and on the management of EMN NCP grants (23 September

2011), in preparation for the submission of the 2011 Final Reports.

Twinning collaborations, cluster meetings and conferences hosted by an individual EMN NCP to

facilitate information exchange amongst EMN NCPs on specific topics of common interest and to

improve access to information continued in 2011, with over 30 events held in total. Many were

additionally attended by a representative from the Commission and/or the EMN Service Provider.

16 ISBN 978-92-79-23336-4 (January 2012), available also from http://www.emn.europa.eu under "EMN

Outputs: EMN Glossary." 17 http://www.emn.europa.eu under "EMN Glossary".

18 http://iate.europa.eu/



http://iate.europa.eu/

9

3.2 �etworking at �ational level

EMN NCPs are required to develop and maintain a national network comprising a wide range of

relevant stakeholders. EMN NCPs and Steering Board members actively enhance the visibility of

the EMN at national level, particularly in relation to policymaking, through a wide range of

activities, including the organisation of national conferences and networking events. Almost all

EMN NCP organised at least one or more national network meetings and other events involving

their network partners, often in conjunction with a twinning/cluster meeting with other EMN NCPs.

It was notable in 2011 how many national networking events were successful in attracting high

level policymakers, including Ministers, and how many acted as a channel for collecting and

feeding a range of perspectives into national policy and legislative debates.

Several EMN NCPs also used their national events to promote recent EMN studies, reports and

other outputs, or to discuss upcoming ones. The EMN study on “Practical responses for reducing

irregular migration,” also the topic for the EMN Conference in 2011, was discussed during events

in BG, FI, FR, LT, MT and NO; other events organised included the themes of Temporary and

Circular Migration (UK) and Visa Policy (BG, IT, MT). The IT EMN NCP promoted a cycle of

national events to publicise the EMN Glossary, which received considerable media attention.

Upcoming EMN studies were also discussed, for example, International Students (DE). Other

events focussed on capacity building of the EMN (DE, LT) in light of the findings and

recommendations of the EMN External Evaluation.

3.3. �etworking with other relevant entities

The EMN again stepped up its collaborative work with other entities19 during 2011, in line with its

mandate to ensure that its activities are consistent and coordinated with relevant EU instruments and

structures, and in direct response to the recommendations of the External Evaluation Report.

Cooperation took the form of contributions to EMN NCP meetings and workshops, and to specific

EMN studies and other outputs.

In relation to EMN NCP meetings:

Ø Representatives of the Commission's Eurostat plus from the FRA regularly attended EMN

NCP meetings throughout the year and a representative from the European Asylum

Support Office (EASO)20 attended the meeting on 16

th December 2011 for the first time;

Ø A regular item was introduced into the meeting agendas to allow relevant entities, and EMN

NCPs, to present recent, relevant policy updates to the network. This has proved to be highly

effective. Representatives from the Commission's Directorate General (DG) for Research

and Innovation attended the EMN NCP meeting on 15 December 2011 and presented their

activities in the field of migration. DG Home Affairs, which co-ordinates the EMN,

presented inter alia an overview of recent developments in relation to Integration on 22

September 2011, and a representative of the EMN subsequently attended the meeting of the

�ational Contact Points on Integration21 on 8 November 2011, where the two networks

sought to improve the mutual sharing of information.

In relation to EMN studies and outputs, specific activities included:

19 An extensive list of relevant entities is available from the EMN website (http://www.emn.europa.eu) under

"Useful Links," as well as, with regard to other databases, under "Activities: Other Databases." 20 http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/asylum/asylum_easo_en.htm

21 http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/about_us.cfm


http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/asylum/asylum_easo_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/about_us.cfm

10

Ø For the EMN study Practical responses for reducing irregular migration, co-operation took

place with FRA, in the context of the FRA study on the Fundamental Rights situation of

Irregular Migrants and from the CLA�DESTI�O22 Project Undocumented Migration:

Counting the Uncountable Data and Trends Across Europe in the form of contributions to

the EMN Workshop on 5 April 2011;

Ø In the context of the development of the Main and first Focussed Studies for 2012, on the

topics of, respectively International Students and the Misuse of the Right to Family

Reunification, co-operation took place with the Commission's Eurostat and DGs for

Education and Culture and for Justice, as well as specifically relevant units of DG Home

Affairs. Representatives attended several EMN NCP meetings plus the EMN workshop

dedicated to these topics on 16 December 2011.

The EMN also started its contributions to the EU Immigration Portal23 by verifying that the content

for their Member State on the portal website was correct, reliable and up-to-date. This involved first

checking and updating the national information prior to the launching of the portal in November

2011.

4. E�HA�CI�G THE EM�’S VISIBILITY

Steps to promote further the EMN to policymakers at national and European level, and to inform

the wider public about its objectives, plus current and future activities, were intensified during the

year, with several new elements included. All EMN outputs are available to the wider public,

principally through the EMN website (and through EMN NCP national websites also), and

publications of certain studies, and also presented at workshops, seminars, meetings and

conferences at EU and national levels. The main activities undertaken, and progress made in 2011,

are highlighted below.

4.1 EM� Conference 201124

This took place under the auspices of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union,

on the topic of Combating irregular migration: practical responses in Warsaw, in October 2011.

The Conference was designed to link into the EMN Study on Practical measures to reduce

irregular migration and involved representatives from the European Commission, 27 EMN

National Contact Points, plus many international and regional organisations, such as the Council of

Europe, International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Migration, Asylum,

Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI); EU Agencies, such as FRA and Frontex; NGOs, such as the

Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), who all gave

presentations; plus from Polish National and Academic Institutions. Overall there were some 160

participants.

The published Conference conclusions recognised that challenges remain in identifying and

studying the issues of irregular migration and irregular migrants, but that effective tools have been

developed that were impacting on the scale of irregular migration of third-country nationals in the

EU Member States, and that practical measures needed to be sensitive to the geopolitical factors

influencing irregular migration. A further important conclusion was the recognition that action

22 http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/

23 http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/

24 http://emn.gov.pl/portal/ese/751/8888/EMN_Conference_2011.html containing also the conference

conclusions.

http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/

http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/

http://emn.gov.pl/portal/ese/751/8888/EMN_Conference_2011.html

11

taken to address irregular migration needed to be balanced whilst respecting migrants’ dignity and

rights.

4.2 Other conferences and events in 2011

In addition to the national conferences and events hosted by EMN NCPs (see Section 3.2), and

consistent with its mandate to reach out to wider audiences, the EMN played a very active role in

the 16th International Metropolis Conference: Migration Futures: Perspectives on Global Changes

(12 – 16 September 2011), which drew together a global audience of policymakers, researchers and

civil society. EMN inputs included organising three workshops,25 a poster Impact of immigration on

ageing in Italy under the theme of Ageing and Migration (IT) and participation in the Roundtable:

On the waterfront: Global migration and port cities, via a presentation on Sea migration and the

EU Southern Borders (PT).

4.3 EM� and �ational Websites

The EMN website serves as the main means by which the EMN's various outputs are made publicly

available. In 2011, further work was undertaken by the Service Provider (iLiCONN) to enhance the

website pages to improve access, and ensure that information remained relevant and up-to-date.

Weekly monitoring of visitors to the website continued in order to better understand the scale and

scope of access and to monitor progress towards increasing the visibility of the EMN. On average,

150 – 200 visits/day were received, and whilst the indications are that the website is primarily used

by EMN members, there has been evidence of wider interest from other users, including from

beyond Europe and particularly following the International Metropolis Conference and the launch

of the EMN Wikipedia page.

The web-based Information Exchange System (IES) was used to share documents with EMN NCPs,

including for meetings, studies and for reference, and to share information and tools developed by

EMN NCPs in their national contexts (e.g. national newsletter, presentation templates). A business

plan to redevelop the EMN website and IES was completed during the course of 2011, but work is

yet to commence on implementing these changes.

At national level, many EMN NCPs have developed their own national websites, with reciprocal

links to the EMN website.26 In many cases they have proven to be an effective tool and focus for

information gathering and sharing at national level, with some NCPs reporting 500-700 visits per

week. Taken across the network, this constitutes a considerable flow of information from the EMN

to the Member States and beyond.

4.4 EM� Wikipedia Page27

In line with its Communications and Dissemination Strategy, and as approved by the EMN Steering

Board, the EMN made an initial step towards enhancing its visibility through social media by

creating an EMN Wikipedia page in 2011. The page presents a succinct summary of the EMN, its

legal basis, constitution, purpose and role, highlights its main outputs and achievements, and makes

links to other relevant entities also described in Wikipedia. Some EMN NCPs have developed their

25 From perceptions to policy: using public perceptions of migration to inform policy development (DE, PL and

UK EMN NCPs); Under-explored aspects of emigration: observations from developed countries (DE, IE, LT

and UK EMN NCPs); and Irregular migration: perspectives from both countries of origin and destination

(AT, FR and UK EMN NCPs); 26 Links to the various national websites are provided at http://www.emn.europa.eu under "EMN NCPs."

27 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Migration_Network


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Migration_Network

12

own language versions of the page, which is now available in EL, FR, HU, IT, LV, NL, SE and SK,

which can be reciprocally accessed from the various translated pages.

4.5 EM� �ewsletter and EM� Bulletin Report

In order to provide regular and up-to-date information on EMN activities and outputs, and related

policy developments, to all EMN stakeholders, and to enhance visibility, the EMN produced four

editions of its quarterly Newsletter (EMNews), distributed by e-mail to some 800 recipients, and via

the EMN website accessible with an RSS feed. Several EMN NCPs also routinely produce their

own Newsletter for their national network members.

The EMN Newsletter has been replaced in 2012 by a new Report, the EM� Bulletin. The Bulletin is

targeted at (senior) policymakers and aims to provide, on a regular basis, latest published EU and

National developments in migration policy, as well as an overview of key statistics on key topics,

including trends and analysis, and the latest EMN outputs and developments. The first edition was

published in June 2012.28

5. MA�AGEME�T OF THE EM�

The Steering Board, which met on 13th May and on 14

th October 2011, strengthened its role in

providing strategic guidance to the EMN during the year. The Director General of DG HOME

attended the May 2011 Steering Board meeting to provide a strategic overview of the future

direction of the EMN, within the framework of future EU policy developments, and the growing

need for more timely and policy-relevant information, drawing also on the draft results of the EMN

External Evaluation.

As well as providing strategic guidance to the EMN and monitoring the implementation of EMN

activities, a number of decisions were taken by the Steering Board, in line with its remit, which

included inter alia the approval of the:

Ø 2012 EM� Work Programme, including the range of new products developed in line with

the recommendations of the EMN External Evaluation and designed to enhance the EMN’s

role in relation to timeliness and policy-relevance;29

Ø 2012 Study Topics; these were, for the EMN Main Study: The Immigration of International

Students to EU Member States and for the three Focussed Studies: Abuse of residence

permits for the purpose of family reunification: Marriage of convenience and false

declaration of paternity; Challenges and practices for establishing applicants’ identity in

the migration process; and Intra-EU Mobility of Third-Country �ationals;

Ø The indicative minimum and maximum budgets for each EMN NCP in 2012;

Ø EMN Status Report 2010;

28 Announced on DG Home Affairs Twitter site (@EUHomeAffairs), see http://t.co/FDBAbFuO.

29 As well as in-depth Annual Reports and Studies, the Work Programme introduced for 2012, a range of shorter,

more focussed products, aimed at improving the timeliness and policy-relevance of EMN information. The

main developments included: plans to produce one, rather than two Main Studies, responding to the longer

term needs of policymakers, and to develop up to three smaller, Focussed Studies, responding to information

needs in the short term; the introduction of succinct EM� Inform policy briefs on specific topics; and the

discontinuation of the EMN Newsletter, in favour of a new Report, the EM� Bulletin, to provide on a regular

basis, latest EU and national policy developments, as well as the most recent statistics, replacing also the

Annual Reports on Migration and International Protection Statistics.


13

Ø Measures to improve the visibility of the EM� through Social Media, enabling the launch of

an EMN Wikipedia page.

Following approval of the Steering Board, the EMN Work Programme 2011 was adopted as

Commission Decision C(2012) 1753 on 22 March 2012, permitting the financing of the EMN

NCPs. This totalled €7.5M in 2011, of which up to €5 971 000 was allocated as grants for financing

up to 80% of the activities of the EMN NCPs, the remaining 20% having to be provided by an EMN

NCP’s national authority. For some EMN NCPs, owing to the difficult financial climate, difficulties

were experienced in obtaining their required national contribution. The remainder of the total

budget (€1 529 000) is principally used for the EMN Service Providers,30 the External Evaluation

31

and for visibility actions (e.g. printed publications).

Particular attention continued to be paid to ensuring that each EMN NCP received financing

commensurate with its activities in order to better match finances with EMN NCP activities. In

addition, the Commission prepared the package for grant applications 2012; evaluated final reports

for grants from previous years; and managed the EMN Service Provider contracts, plus contracts for

producing publications. Monitoring by the Commission of the progress of EMN NCPs, their

impacts, and levels of spend, also took place through their submission of Work Progress Reports in

advance of each EMN NCP meeting.

The Commission and the EMN Service Providers met regularly during 2011 to ensure the continued

smooth functioning of the EMN, including support for the EMN NCPs in managing the change in

the delivery of their work and demands placed on the EMN; preparing EMN NCP meetings;

developing Synthesis Reports, Studies and Statistical Reports; and the on-going development and

functionality of the EMN website and Information Exchange System.

6. CO�CLUDI�G REMARKS

2011 was a pivotal year for the EMN, which has seen the network respond rapidly to the

recommendations set out in its external evaluation and endorsed by its Steering Board, and to step-

up to the challenges of increasing its policy relevance and impact. In 2011, there were again many

examples of how the work of the EMN has directly contributed to informing policymakers at EU

level. New studies in 2012 will feed directly into areas of EU level policy and legislation that are

undergoing review, for example, international students and the issue of misuses of the right to

family reunification. Ad-Hoc Queries have again been used to inform highly topical Commission

Communications and Staff Working papers. At national level there is increasing evidence of EMN

events and outputs shaping and informing national debates, often directly linked to policy

development processes. The changes introduced in 2011 have strengthened the position of the EMN

to improve its efficiency and effectiveness to play an increasingly important role as an advisory

council for migration and asylum policy.

30 Two EMN Service Providers (GHK-COWI and iLiCONN), were appointed by the Commission in 2009,

GHK-COWI’s main priorities are to prepare inter alia draft common study specifications and Synthesis

Reports and other outputs and to support the network; for iLiCONN (Interactive Listening and CONNecting)

their priorities are to develop further the Information Exchange System and the EMN website. 31 Undertaken by the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES) under Specific Contract No.

HOME/2010/EMNS/FW/0005 implementing Framework Service Contract No. JLS/2009/A1/001.

Population and social conditions Author: Alexandros BITOULAS

Data in focus 8/2012

Asylum applicants and first instance decisions on asylum applications: first quarter 2012 Number of asylum applicants only slightly changed in the EU-27 in Q1 2012 compared to the same quarter of 2011 and around 9 000 less compared to Q4 2011

Figure 1: Asylum applicants, EU-27, January 2011 – March 2012

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctzm)

Figure 2: Pending asylum applications on 31st of March 2012 (1)

(1) Countries selected here are those with the highest number of pending applications in the reference period

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asypenctzm)

5 000

10 000

15 000

20 000

25 000

30 000

35 000

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.

2011 2012

10 000 20 000 30 000 40 000 50 000 60 000 70 000

ES

IE

GR

IT

UK

SE

AT

FR

BE

DE

Pending asylum applications

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?mode=view&code=migr_asyappctzm�

2 8/2012 — Data in focus

Italy reported the greatest fall in asylum applications in Q1 2012; nearly 4 000 fewer compared to Q1 2011

Figure 3: Asylum applicants, absolute change between Q1/2011 and Q1/2012


Figure 4: Asylum applicants, relative change between Q1/2011 and Q1/2012


-4 000

-3 000

-2 000

-1 000

1 000

2 000

EU

-27 IT EL

ES IE BE

CY

BG FI

SI

SK

CZ

EE LT

UK

PT

LV

LU MT

FR

HU

DK

NL

RO PL

AT

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Absolute change

- 100

- 50

50

100

150

200

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IE ES

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CY

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CZ

BE

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NL

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RO LV LI

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CH IS

Relative change


http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?mode=view&code=migr_asyappctmz�

Data in focus — 8/2012 3

The number of Tunisian citizens seeking asylum in the EU-27 dropped far more than any other citizenship in Q1 2012 compared to Q1 2011; a decline of around 3 000 asylum applications

Figure 5: Asylum applicants by citizenship, EU-27 (*), absolute change between Q1/2011 and Q1/2012

* Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctzm)

Applications by Syrians and Albanians more than doubled in relative terms in Q1 2012 compared to same quarter of previous year

Figure 6: Asylum applicants by citizenship, EU-27 (*), relative change between Q1/2011 and Q1/2012

* Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctzm)

-4 000

-3 000

-2 000

-1 000

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No

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150

200

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GN

ER

RS

NG LK BD

HT

AM

SD IR AF

AZ

RU IN PK

DZ

SO

CD

GE

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MA

BA AL

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Relative change




1 065 asylum applications per million inhabitants makes Luxembourg the country with the highest number of asylum applicants relative to population in the EU-27 in Q1 2012

Q1

2012

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21 0

6022

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25 1

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28 7

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900

25 4

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26 7

3026

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26 0

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325

24 2

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-11

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95

Bu

lgar

ia11

590

7065

6065

7085

6580

8040

7565

6520

01

-27

2581

5

Cze

ch R

epu

blic

6555

7060

7545

6060

7565

7540

6065

6018

53

-220

745

Den

mar

k36

028

031

528

529

027

026

030

035

543

038

042

039

531

545

51

165

-522

210

4 15

5

Ger

man

y4

430

3 82

54

180

3 44

53

955

3 67

54

020

4 61

54

985

5 18

55

880

5 06

05

365

4 58

04

335

14 2

85-1

115

175

55 1

10

Est

on

ia5

55

510

510

510

55

*10

55

1510

07

1070

Irel

and

135

125

125

8510

011

511

011

595

7011

595

100

8560

245

-15

-37

551

150

Gre

ece

605

920

1 00

545

581

568

599

065

079

074

087

578

555

568

071

01

950

-19

-23

175

8 73

0

Sp

ain

240

335

365

430

365

215

175

280

370

260

205

175

215

215

215

645

0-3

215

3 12

5

Fra

nce

4 55

04

765

5 43

05

255

5 15

54

515

4 64

54

085

4 59

05

020

4 39

04

925

4 67

05

180

4 99

014

845

41

225

57 4

30

Ital

y83

52

425

2 62

02

010

7 01

56

000

3 92

53

220

2 52

51

660

1 05

583

076

061

584

02

210

-38

-62

3530

450

Cyp

rus

185

150

130

125

165

145

130

120

195

180

165

8512

511

514

038

0-1

2-1

844

01

690

Lat

via

520

515

4025

6050

5530

2515

1025

3565

-416

430

380

Lit

hu

ania

3535

3520

3030

3575

5550

5575

4025

4511

0-3

98

3553

5

Lu

xem

bo

urg

115

145

230

145

135

115

155

210

310

225

180

175

225

130

205

560

-414

1 06

52

215

Hu

ng

ary

115

8513

516

512

516

010

513

012

017

023

018

018

510

516

545

5-2

134

451

835

Mal

ta10

1530

1 13

036

510

025

1525

8535

6080

2530

135

-27

146

315

1 97

0

Net

her

lan

ds

1 25

51

090

1 15

51

095

1 29

51

215

1 24

01

345

1 29

51

280

1 26

51

065

1 33

51

260

1 17

53

770

48

225

14 8

70

Au

stri

a88

091

097

097

599

51

080

1 50

01

595

1 46

01

575

1 23

01

255

1 31

01

000

1 22

03

530

-13

2842

015

195

Po

lan

d36

545

052

043

055

055

049

073

566

572

066

078

049

057

074

01

805

-16

3545

7 37

0

Po

rtu

gal

1020

1515

2015

3020

4025

1545

355

2570

-21

585

300

Ro

man

ia50

8512

595

9511

025

519

013

525

521

012

020

018

530

068

016

164

302

145

Slo

ven

ia35

3530

1535

5530

1530

3015

3515

2515

50-3

6-4

825

310

Slo

vaki

a35

4530

2035

4045

4050

7550

3035

2530

90-4

3-1

615

475

Fin

lan

d23

020

524

019

021

021

022

027

032

029

027

026

522

018

521

561

5-2

5-9

115

2 85

5

Sw

eden

1 96

51

960

2 30

52

030

2 37

51

960

2 06

52

570

2 80

03

035

3 11

53

495

2 72

02

370

2 47

57

565

-22

2180

031

000

Un

ited

Kin

gd

om

2 14

01

995

2 22

52

020

2 07

02

235

2 39

52

100

2 24

02

195

2 62

02

200

2 28

01

900

2 20

06

385

-90

100

26 4

55

Icel

and

*5

55

155

510

1010

510

55

515

-41

3040

80

Lie

chte

nst

ein

105

1510

55

*20

*5

5*

10*

515

75-3

385

60

No

rway

810

640

685

665

875

810

715

820

875

765

670

665

780

640

655

2 07

5-1

2541

58

940

Sw

itze

rlan

d2

545

1 25

01

865

1 48

52

235

1 66

51

735

1 72

52

015

2 12

52

545

2 43

52

590

2 22

52

240

7 05

5-1

-48

885

25 0

20(1

) R

elat

ive

to p

opul

atio

n as

of 1

st o

f Jan

uary

201

2 (p

rovi

sion

al d

ata)

, see

met

hodo

logi

cal n

otes

* 2

or fe

wer

asy

lum

app

lican

ts r

ecor

ded

in th

e re

fere

nce

perio

d.

Q4

2011

to

Q1

2012

ch

ang

e in

%

Q1

2011

to

Q1

2012

ch

ang

e in

%

Ap

plic

ants

p

er m

illio

n

inh

abit

ants

(1

) Q

1 20

12

Las

t 12

m

on

ths

Q1

2011

Q2

2011

Q3

2011

Q4

2011

Q1

2012

Tab

le 1

: A

sylu

m a

pp

lican

ts (

incl

ud

ing

new

asy

lum

ap

plic

ants

), Q

1 20

11 -

Q1

2012

(ro

un

ded

fig

ure

s)

Sou

rce:

Eur

osta

t (o

nlin

e da

ta c

ode:

mig

r_as

yapp

ctzm

)



Jan

.Fe

b.

Mar

.A

pr.

May

Jun

.Ju

l.A

ug

.S

ep

.O

ct.

No

v.D

ec.

Jan

.Fe

b.

Mar

.

No

n-E

U 2

1 06

0 2

2 40

0 2

5 18

0 2

3 07

5 2

8 77

0 2

5 90

0 2

5 40

5 2

5 71

0 2

6 73

0 2

6 89

0 2

6 02

5 2

5 32

5 2

2 91

0 2

0 89

0 2

1 76

5 6

5 56

5-

22

- 1

0 2

99 4

00

Afg

han

ista

n -

(A

F) 1

945

1 8

60 2

225

1 9

15 2

265

2 4

40 2

550

2 7

60 2

720

2 6

60 2

425

2 2

55 2

130

1 7

90 2

095

6 0

15-2

9-8

28

015

Ru

ss

ia -

(R

U)

1 3

70 1

340

1 4

95 1

230

1 2

90 1

420

1 5

15 1

825

1 6

20 1

665

1 6

15 1

950

1 6

35 1

495

1 6

05 4

730

-14

11 1

8 86

5

Pak

ista

n -

(P

K)

910

1 0

05 1

165

950

1 2

85 1

295

1 4

50 1

475

1 5

40 1

520

1 6

50 1

460

1 3

00 1

220

1 3

30 3

850

-18

24 1

6 47

0

Se

rbia

- (

RS

) 1

245

1 1

80 1

385

855

625

385

425

600

1 0

45 1

780

2 3

55 2

105

1 5

15 1

020

855

3 3

90-4

7-1

2 1

3 56

0

Iraq

- (

IQ)

1 3

65 1

270

1 3

05 1

125

1 2

20 1

205

1 2

55 1

415

1 4

60 1

250

1 2

30 1

070

1 0

15 8

50 8

30 2

700

-40

-51

13

935

Syr

ia -

(S

Y)

435

375

440

460

565

555

690

835

935

910

850

835

880

920

880

2 6

800

115

9 3

15

Iran

- (

IR)

990

830

890

790

830

830

970

1 0

30 1

240

1 1

65 1

180

1 1

20 1

050

800

765

2 6

10-3

8-1

6 1

1 76

5

So

mal

ia -

(S

O)

895

670

785

1 2

20 1

305

930

970

1 0

25 1

025

1 1

10 1

030

1 2

25 9

60 7

20 7

35 2

415

-46

-34

12

255

CD

- (

CD

) (2

) 4

20 4

75 5

90 4

95 5

25 5

25 4

95 4

90 5

85 5

70 5

85 5

30 6

80 7

75 7

05 2

160

2845

6 9

55

Ge

org

ia -

(G

E) 4

30 4

80 5

45 4

30 5

30 5

30 6

40 6

65 7

05 6

95 6

90 7

20 5

85 6

95 7

65 2

045

-638

7 6

45

Ko

so

vo -

(X

K)

(2)

1 0

20 9

95 1

115

1 0

45 9

10 6

20 5

45 6

70 7

30 6

95 7

25 7

95 6

70 5

60 7

40 1

970

-11

-38

8 7

05

Sri

Lan

ka

- (L

K)

605

705

695

635

600

565

635

505

575

595

625

635

620

580

660

1 8

60-3

-10

7 2

30

Ban

gla

de

sh

- (

BD

) 5

00 5

60 6

20 6

40 1

070

1 0

65 8

25 5

95 6

10 5

80 6

00 6

20 5

15 6

35 5

50 1

700

-61

8 3

05

Nig

eri

a -

(NG

) 5

35 5

40 6

10 6

90 1

900

1 8

05 1

140

1 2

05 1

160

815

620

455

545

465

530

1 5

40-2

0-1

1 1

1 33

0

Tu

rke

y -

(TR

) 6

25 6

25 5

75 4

90 5

80 4

85 5

05 4

45 4

25 5

85 5

70 5

45 4

70 5

50 4

95 1

510

-13

-20

6 1

45

Arm

en

ia -

(A

M)

435

490

570

615

675

615

640

600

580

610

580

695

495

530

390

1 4

15-3

6-1

6 7

025

Alg

eri

a -

(DZ

) 3

05 2

85 3

60 2

85 3

45 3

60 4

75 3

50 4

15 4

90 3

60 3

65 5

10 3

70 4

25 1

300

737

4 7

40

Gu

ine

a -

(GN

) 4

75 5

10 5

65 4

50 5

60 5

15 5

50 5

15 5

10 5

35 5

25 5

30 4

45 4

00 4

45 1

290

-24

-22

5 9

85

Ch

ina

- (C

N)

445

450

565

425

450

465

460

440

485

460

420

470

405

370

415

1 1

85-1

9-2

6 5

270

MK

- (

MK

) (2

) 4

15 4

00 7

35 9

75 6

75 1

80 1

70 3

30 4

10 4

20 4

45 3

85 4

40 3

90 2

80 1

110

-12

-30

5 1

05

Erit

rea

- (E

R)

380

370

385

700

675

455

425

520

535

465

390

395

310

285

320

915

-41

-30

5 4

80

Alb

ania

- (

AL

) 1

20 1

40 1

60 2

00 1

55 1

60 1

70 2

20 2

95 7

85 3

65 2

90 2

85 2

45 3

35 8

65-4

010

5 3

505

Ind

ia -

(IN

) 2

25 2

15 2

25 2

30 2

40 2

40 2

70 2

15 2

60 2

15 2

55 1

95 2

60 2

20 2

90 7

6515

14 2

885

Hai

ti -

(H

T)

215

195

205

260

185

180

190

145

180

220

165

140

160

225

235

620

181

2 2

90

Aze

rbai

jan

- (

AZ

) 2

45 2

00 1

65 1

45 1

60 1

95 2

15 2

20 2

20 2

05 2

65 2

50 2

40 2

00 1

75 6

15-2

0-8

2 4

90

Egyp

t -

(EG

) 9

5 1

20 1

60 1

10 1

55 1

60 1

75 2

05 1

95 2

30 2

70 2

25 2

30 1

80 1

90 6

00-2

358

2 3

25

BA

- (

BA

) (2

) 1

00 1

15 1

35 1

10 1

55 1

85 1

15 2

30 3

50 2

50 2

70 5

80 1

85 1

90 2

10 5

85-4

968

2 8

30

Tu

nis

ia -

(T

N)

120

1 7

00 1

610

320

480

275

320

365

420

400

175

160

185

155

225

565

-24

-84

3 4

75

Mo

rocc

o -

(M

A)

90

120

130

110

135

130

245

200

185

215

220

185

185

195

180

560

-12

63 2

185

Su

dan

- (

SD

) 1

65 1

80 2

00 2

00 3

20 4

00 3

40 2

65 3

50 2

65 2

10 2

25 1

95 1

60 1

95 5

50-3

3-7

3 1

30

Oth

er

3 9

35 3

995

4 5

65 4

965

7 9

05 6

725

6 0

30 5

360

4 9

60 4

520

4 3

65 3

925

3 8

15 3

715

3 9

10 1

1 44

082

84 6

0 19

5

(*)

Dat

a fo

r N

L fo

r Q

1 20

12 a

re n

ot a

vaila

ble,

see

met

hodo

logi

cal n

otes

(1

) C

ount

ries

sele

cted

her

e ar

e th

ose

with

the

high

est n

umbe

r of

asy

lum

app

lican

ts r

egis

tere

d du

ring

Q1

2012

(**)

Due

to m

issi

ng d

ata

the

calc

ulat

ions

of

thes

e in

dica

tors

do

not i

nclu

de d

ata

for

NL

for

Q1

2011

and

Q4

2011

(2)

CD

- C

ongo

, the

Dem

ocra

tic R

epub

lic o

f th

e; K

osov

o -

Kos

ovo

/ UN

SC

R 1

244;

MK

- th

e fo

rmer

Yug

osla

v re

publ

ic o

f M

aced

onia

; BA

- B

osni

a an

d H

erze

govi

na

Q3

2011

Q4

2011

Q1

2011

Q2

2011

Q1

2012

Q1

2012

Q4

2011

to

Q1

2012

ch

ang

e

in %

(**

)

Q1

2011

to

Q1

2012

ch

ang

e

in %

(**

)

Las

t 12

m

on

ths

Tab

le 2

: A

sylu

m a

pp

lican

ts in

th

e E

U-2

7 (*

) b

y ci

tize

nsh

ip (

incl

ud

ing

new

asy

lum

ap

plic

ants

), Q

1 20

11-Q

1 20

12 (

rou

nd

ed

fig

ure

s) (

1 )

Sou

rce:

Eur

osta

t (o

nlin

e da

ta c

ode:

mig

ras

yapp

ctzm

)











One out of four asylum applicants in the EU-27 was aged below 18 in Q1 2012

Table 3: Asylum applicants by age group (*), 1st quarter 2012 (%)

(*) Age disaggregation not available for NL, see methodological notes; distribution by age for EU-27 is based on those countries for which data are available : Data are not available in the reference period Source: Eurostat (online data code migr_asyappctzm)

Figure 7: Asylum applicants by gender, 1st quarter 2012 (%)

Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctzm)

0-13 14-17 18-34 35-64 65 and over Unknown

EU-27 69 335 18.1 6.4 49.3 19.7 0.8 0.2

Belgium 7 330 18.7 8.5 53.8 18.5 0.5 0.0

Bulgaria 200 13.4 7.0 58.2 16.9 4.5 0.0

Czech Republic 185 14.5 1.1 42.5 40.9 1.1 0.0

Denmark 1 165 14.2 8.3 56.4 20.1 1.0 0.0

Germany 14 285 25.1 7.6 46.8 19.5 1.0 0.0

Estonia 15 18.8 12.5 31.3 37.5 0.0 0.0

Ireland 245 25.9 3.7 50.6 19.8 0.0 0.0

Greece 1 950 3.7 1.8 79.5 14.9 0.1 0.0

Spain 645 13.1 3.7 63.1 19.9 0.2 0.0

France 14 845 17.8 2.5 52.9 25.8 1.0 0.0

Italy 2 210 7.1 10.8 67.2 14.8 0.0 0.0

Cyprus 380 2.6 2.1 44.4 48.4 0.0 2.4

Latvia 65 10.6 3.0 65.2 21.2 0.0 0.0

Lithuania 110 9.9 1.8 59.5 28.8 0.0 0.0

Luxembourg 560 28.1 6.3 43.6 21.3 0.7 0.0

Hungary 455 19.8 9.7 56.5 13.6 0.4 0.0

Malta 135 4.5 9.0 70.7 15.8 0.0 0.0

Netherlands 3 770 : : : : : :

Austria 3 530 23.1 12.1 48.4 15.9 0.5 0.0

Poland 1 805 35.3 4.6 37.6 22.0 0.4 0.0

Portugal 70 1.5 5.9 72.1 20.6 0.0 0.0

Romania 680 2.1 4.6 82.4 10.9 0.1 0.0

Slovenia 50 9.8 29.4 45.1 15.7 0.0 0.0

Slovakia 90 8.0 0.0 64.8 27.3 0.0 0.0

Finland 615 19.1 6.6 55.6 17.8 0.3 0.5

Sweden 7 565 20.7 10.8 47.6 19.3 1.6 0.0

United Kingdom 6 385 14.7 6.0 53.0 22.8 0.9 2.4

Iceland 15 7.7 0.0 69.2 23.1 0.0 0.0

Liechtenstein 15 15.9 9.4 57.1 16.9 0.7 0.0

Norway 2 075 20.7 4.7 59.2 15.2 0.1 0.0

Switzerland 7 055 7.1 0.0 42.9 42.9 7.1 0.0

Total (absolute

value)

Distribution of age groups as a share of total (in %)

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

EU

-27

PL

LU

FR

DE

SE

UK IE BE

EE

ES

CY

DK FI

AT

CZ

LV

HU EL

BG PT IT SK LT

MT

RO SI

NL IS

NO

CH LI

Women Men Unknown




Only one out of ten Tunisian, Bangladeshi and Indian asylum applicants in the EU-27 in Q1 2012 were women

Table 4: Thirty main citizenships of asylum applicants in the EU-27 (*), by age group, 1st quarter 2012 (in %) (1)

(*) Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes (1) Citizenships selected here are those with the highest number of asylum applicants registered during Q1 2012 in the EU-27 (2) Syria – Syrian Arab Republic; CD – Congo, the Democratic Republic of the; Kosovo – Kosovo / UNSCR 1244; MK – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctzm)

Figure 8: Thirty main citizenships of asylum applicants in the EU-27 (*), by gender, 1st quarter 2012 (in %) (1)

(*) Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes (1) Citizenships selected here are those with the highest number of asylum applicants registered during Q1 2012 in the EU-27 Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctzm)

0-13 14-17 18-34 35-64 65 and over Unknown

Non-EU 65 565 19.2 6.7 52.1 20.8 0.9 0.3Afghanistan - (AF) 6 015 18.6 24.9 44.0 10.8 1.5 0.1Russia - (RU) 4 730 40.8 4.2 32.8 21.5 0.7 0.0

Pakistan - (PK) 3 850 11.7 3.5 63.7 20.0 0.8 0.4Serbia - (RS) 3 390 37.9 6.6 32.1 22.9 0.5 0.0

Iraq - (IQ) 2 700 28.4 7.1 43.5 18.7 2.2 0.1Syria - (SY) (2) 2 680 21.6 4.9 47.4 24.2 1.6 0.3

Iran - (IR) 2 610 11.7 4.5 56.3 26.2 0.7 0.7Somalia - (SO) 2 415 12.2 7.5 65.4 12.8 1.9 0.1CD - (CD) (2) 2 160 19.3 5.3 50.8 23.9 0.5 0.2

Georgia - (GE) 2 045 15.7 2.5 52.3 28.6 0.9 0.0Kosovo - (XK) (2) 1 970 31.5 5.1 41.1 21.6 0.7 0.1

Sri Lanka - (LK) 1 860 10.6 1.3 63.9 22.2 1.2 0.8Bangladesh - (BD) 1 700 4.5 2.7 73.1 18.7 0.1 0.8

Nigeria - (NG) 1 540 17.9 3.8 59.8 17.9 0.1 0.5Turkey - (TR) 1 510 8.6 3.8 69.8 17.1 0.7 0.0

Armenia - (AM) 1 415 20.6 4.1 38.2 34.6 2.5 0.0Algeria - (DZ) 1 300 4.2 4.8 72.8 17.7 0.4 0.0

Guinea - (GN) 1 290 13.3 9.1 68.7 8.8 0.2 0.0China - (CN) 1 185 10.0 1.9 47.9 39.4 0.3 0.5

MK - (MK) (2) 1 110 33.3 8.0 33.0 25.0 0.6 0.0Eritrea - (ER) 915 14.4 3.6 65.2 15.9 0.8 0.1Albania - (AL) 865 22.9 10.0 48.5 17.4 0.9 0.2

India - (IN) 765 2.6 1.7 73.0 20.9 0.1 1.7Haiti - (HT) 620 5.0 0.8 61.5 32.5 0.2 0.0

Azerbaijan - (AZ) 615 26.8 4.1 36.4 28.5 4.2 0.0Egypt - (EG) 600 17.8 5.5 56.1 20.1 0.5 0.0

BA - (BA) (2) 585 40.8 6.8 32.4 19.1 0.9 0.0Tunisia - (TN) 565 1.4 0.9 82.5 15.2 0.0 0.0

Morocco - (MA) 560 2.1 8.2 73.2 16.4 0.0 0.0Sudan - (SD) 550 8.9 2.9 70.3 16.2 0.2 1.5

Other 11 440 16.1 5.5 54.9 22.7 0.5 0.4

Total (absolute

value)

Distribution of age groups as a share of total (in %)

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Non

-EU

CN

RU RS

CD BA AZ AM MK

NG ER XK GE AL IQ IR SY HT

SO GN LK AF EG TR SD PK MA DZ IN BD TN

Women Men Unknown




Table 5: Five main citizenships of asylum applicants, 1st quarter 2012 (rounded figures) (1)

(1) Citizenships selected here are those with the highest number of asylum applicants registered during Q1 2012 in the EU-27 (2) Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes # Absolute number of asylum applications Syria – Syrian Arab Republic; CD – Congo, the Democratic Republic of the; Kosovo – Kosovo / UNSCR 1244; MK – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctzm)

EU-27 (2) # %Afghanistan 6 015 9Russia 4 730 7Pakistan 3 850 6Serbia 3 390 5Iraq 2 700 4Other 44 880 68

BELGIUM # % BULGARIA # (%) CZECH REPUBLIC # (%)Afghanistan 850 12 Iraq 85 41 Ukraine 40 23Russia 650 9 Syria 25 13 Vietnam 15 8Guinea 550 8 Afghanistan 20 9 Syria 15 8CD 470 6 Iran 10 5 Belarus 10 6XK 440 6 Pakistan 10 5 Mongolia 10 6Other 4 370 60 Other 55 27 Other 90 49

DENMARK # (%) GERMANY # (%) ESTONIA # (%)Afghanistan 150 13 Serbia 1 980 14 Vietnam 5 25Iran 100 9 Afghanistan 1 930 14 Belarus 5 19Russia 100 9 Iraq 1 415 10 Georgia 5 19Somalia 85 7 Iran 980 7 Russia * *Iraq 45 4 Pakistan 865 6 Turkey * *Other 680 58 Other 7 110 50 Other 0

IRELAND # (%) GREECE # (%) SPAIN # (%)Nigeria 35 15 Georgia 230 12 Nigeria 65 10Albania 15 5 Bangladesh 135 7 Algeria 40 6Moldova 10 5 Senegal 120 6 Ivory Coast 40 6South Africa 10 5 Dominican Republic 115 6 Cameroon 35 5Mauritius 10 4 Afghanistan 95 5 Cuba 25 4Other 160 66 Other 1 255 64 Other 440 68

FRANCE # (%) ITALY # (%) CYPRUS # (%)Russia 1 465 10 Nigeria 245 11 Syria 75 20CD 1 395 9 Afghanistan 225 10 Pakistan 55 14Armenia 895 6 Tunisia 185 8 Bangladesh 50 14Bangladesh 680 5 Senegal 140 6 Egypt 35 9Turkey 670 4 Egypt 135 6 India 20 6Other 9 740 66 Other 1 285 58 Other 140 37

LATVIA # (%) LITHUANIA # (%) LUXEMBOURG # (%)Georgia 35 53 Russia 15 15 Serbia 170 31CD 20 30 Afghanistan 10 11 Albania 80 14Russia * * Belarus 10 8 XK 65 12Serbia * * Ukraine * * MK 65 12Algeria * * Cameroon * * Montenegro 60 11Other 10 2 Other 70 63 Other 115 21

HUNGARY # (%) MALTA # (%) NETHERLANDS # (%)Afghanistan 230 51 Libya 20 14XK 35 8 Egypt 5 2Pakistan 35 8 Guinea 5 2Somalia 15 3 Chad * *Algeria 10 3 CD * *Other 125 27 Other 105 80

AUSTRIA # (%) POLAND # (%) PORTUGAL # (%)Afghanistan 880 25 Russia 1 070 59 Guinea 20 32Russia 575 16 Georgia 505 28 Somalia 5 10Algeria 165 5 Kazakhstan 50 3 CD 5 6Iran 155 4 Armenia 45 2 Nigeria 5 6Pakistan 140 4 Afghanistan 20 1 Belarus 5 4Other 1 610 46 Other 115 6 Other 30 41

ROMANIA # (%) SLOVENIA # (%) SLOVAKIA # (%)Algeria 255 38 Turkey 10 22 Afghanistan 10 11Morocco 100 15 Somalia 10 18 Moldova 5 8Afghanistan 75 11 Morocco 5 10 CD 5 7Tunisia 25 4 Serbia 5 6 Somalia 5 7China 15 2 Algeria 5 6 Bangladesh 5 7Other 210 31 Other 20 39 Other 55 60

FINLAND # (%) SWEDEN # (%) UNITED KINGDOM # (%)Iraq 130 21 Somalia 1 355 18 Pakistan 1 175 18Russia 50 8 Afghanistan 1 015 13 Iran 725 11Syria 45 8 Serbia 610 8 Nigeria 305 5Somalia 35 6 Syria 470 6 Bangladesh 285 4Afghanistan 35 6 Eritrea 410 5 Afghanistan 275 4Other 310 51 Other 3 710 49 Other 3 620 57

LIECHTENSTEIN # (%) NORWAY # (%) SWITZERLAND # (%)Russia 5 29 Somalia 485 23 Eritrea 1 150 16Ukraine 5 29 Afghanistan 225 11 Nigeria 675 10MK * * Eritrea 170 8 Tunisia 665 9Croatia * * Belarus 95 5 Serbia 660 9Nigeria * * Russia 80 4 MK 290 4Other * * Other 1 020 49 Other 3 615 51

ICELAND # %Iran 5 31Nigeria * *Algeria * *Senegal * *Colombia * *Other 5 31



Table 6: Thirty main citizenships of asylum applicants by destination country in the EU-27 (*), 1st quarter 2012 (rounded figures) (1)

(*) Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes (1) Citizenships selected here are those with the highest number of asylum applicants registered during Q1 2012 in the EU-27 # Absolute number of asylum applications AF – Afghanistan; Syria – Syrian Arab Republic; CD – Congo, the Democratic Republic of the; Kosovo – Kosovo / UNSCR 1244; BD – Bangladesh; MK – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; AZ – Azerbaijan; BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctzm)

NON-EU # (%)France 14 845 23Germany 14 285 22Sweden 7 565 12Belgium 7 330 11United Kingdom 6 385 10Other 15 155 23

AF - (AF) # (%) RUSSIA - (RU) # (%) PAKISTAN - (PK) # (%)Germany 1 930 32 France 1 465 31 United Kingdom 1 175 31Sweden 1 015 17 Poland 1 070 23 Germany 865 22Austria 880 15 Belgium 650 14 France 440 11Belgium 850 14 Austria 575 12 Greece 420 11United Kingdom 275 5 Germany 560 12 Italy 270 7Other 1 065 18 Other 410 9 Other 680 18

SERBIA - (RS) # (%) IRAQ - (IQ) # (%) SYRIA - (SY) # (%)Germany 1 980 58 Germany 1 415 52 Germany 1 025 38Sweden 610 18 Belgium 300 11 Sweden 470 17Belgium 265 8 Sweden 280 10 Denmark 210 8France 210 6 Finland 130 5 United Kingdom 195 7Luxembourg 170 5 Austria 125 5 Austria 160 6Other 155 5 Other 445 17 Other 625 23

IRAN - (IR) # (%) SOMALIA - (SO) # (%) CD - (CD) # (%)Germany 980 38 Sweden 1 355 56 France 1 395 65United Kingdom 725 28 Germany 220 9 Belgium 470 22Sweden 265 10 United Kingdom 165 7 United Kingdom 80 4Austria 155 6 Austria 130 5 Germany 70 3Belgium 120 5 France 125 5 Sweden 25 1Other 360 14 Other 415 17 Other 120 5

GEORGIA - (GE) # (%) KOSOVO - (XK) # (%) SRI LANKA - (LK) # (%)France 665 33 France 570 29 France 1 090 58Poland 505 25 Germany 480 24 United Kingdom 485 26Greece 230 11 Belgium 440 22 Germany 130 7Germany 200 10 Sweden 240 12 Belgium 55 3Sweden 120 6 Luxembourg 65 3 Italy 20 1Other 325 16 Other 170 9 Other 80 4

BD - (BD) # (%) NIGERIA - (NG) # (%) TURKEY - (TR) # (%)France 680 40 United Kingdom 305 20 France 670 44Belgium 295 17 Italy 245 16 Germany 455 30United Kingdom 285 17 Germany 240 16 Belgium 90 6Greece 135 8 France 220 14 Austria 85 6Italy 70 4 Austria 125 8 Italy 70 5Other 235 14 Other 405 26 Other 140 9

ARMENIA - (AM) # (%) ALGERIA - (DZ) # (%) GUINEA - (GN) # (%)France 895 63 France 335 26 Belgium 550 43Belgium 165 12 Romania 255 20 France 515 40Germany 140 10 Austria 165 13 Germany 90 7Austria 65 5 Germany 115 9 Italy 25 2Sweden 60 4 United Kingdom 85 7 Portugal 20 2Other 85 6 Other 340 26 Other 90 7

CHINA - (CN) # (%) MK - (MK) # (%) ERITREA - (ER) # (%)France 615 52 Germany 610 55 Sweden 410 45United Kingdom 215 18 Belgium 200 18 United Kingdom 165 18Germany 100 9 Sweden 105 10 Germany 145 16Belgium 75 6 France 100 9 France 125 13Austria 70 6 Luxembourg 65 6 Greece 20 2Other 110 9 Other 30 3 Other 55 6

ALBANIA - (AL) # (%) INDIA - (IN) # (%) HAITI - (HT) # (%)United Kingdom 175 20 United Kingdom 255 34 France 615 99France 175 20 Germany 220 29 Belgium 0Belgium 150 17 Austria 95 13 Denmark 0Sweden 135 15 Greece 45 6 Germany 0Greece 90 10 Belgium 35 5 Ireland 0Other 145 17 Other 110 14 Other 0

AZ - (AZ) # (%) EGYPT - (EG) # (%) BA - (BA) # (%)France 280 46 Italy 135 22 Sweden 220 37Germany 175 28 France 110 18 Germany 140 24Sweden 75 12 United Kingdom 75 12 France 110 19Belgium 25 4 Greece 70 11 Belgium 50 9Austria 20 3 Germany 55 9 Italy 20 3Other 40 7 Other 160 26 Other 50 9

TUNISIA - (TN) # (%) MOROCCO - (MA) # (%) SUDAN - (SD) # (%)Italy 185 33 Germany 115 21 France 195 35Germany 105 19 Romania 100 18 United Kingdom 185 34Austria 65 11 Austria 85 15 Germany 40 8France 60 11 Sweden 50 9 Sweden 30 6Sweden 40 7 Italy 45 8 Greece 25 5Other 110 20 Other 165 29 Other 70 13



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Figure 9: First instance decisions by outcome, selected Member States (1), 1st quarter 2012

(1) Member States selected here are those reporting the highest number of first instance decisions issued during Q1 2012 UK – United Kingdom Humanitarian reasons not applicable for BE, FR Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asydcfstq)

Figure 10: First instance decisions in the EU-27 (*) by outcome, selected citizenships (1), 1st quarter 2012

(*) Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes (1) Citizenships selected here are those for which the highest number of first instance decisions was issued during Q1 2012 Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asydcfstq)

8%

18%

3%

71%

Sweden (7245 decisions)

7%

2%

91%

France (2) (11330 decisions)

16% 2%

3%

79%

Germany (11690 decisions)

13% 4%

83%

Belgium (2) (6510 decisions)

6%9%

9%

76%

Italy (7090 decisions)

27%

7%

0%

66%

UK (6020 decisions)

1% 0%

99%

Serbia (4825 decisions)

8%

2%

2%

88%

Pakistan (3630 decisions)

14% 3%

2%

81%

Russia (3150 decisions)

2% 2%

5%

91%

Nigeria (2695 decisions)

18%

49%

1%

33%

Somalia (2505 decisions)

14%

26%

7%

58%

Afghanistan (5050 decisions)

Refugee status Subsidiary protection Humanitarian reasons Rejections

Refugee status Subsidiary protection Humanitarian reasons Rejections

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?mode=view&code=migr_asydcfstq�



One out of five first instance decisions in the EU-27 in Q1 2012 was positive

Table 8: First instance decisions by citizenship and outcome, selected Member States, 1st quarter 2012 (rounded figures) (1)

(1) Member States selected here are those reporting the highest number of first instance decisions issued during Q1 2012 Syria – Syrian Arab Republic; CD – Congo, the Democratic Republic of the; XK - Kosovo / UNSCR 1244; MK – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asydcfstq)

Table 9: First instance decisions by outcome, 1st quarter 2012 (rounded figures)

Total decisionsTotal positive

decisionsRefugee status

Subsidiary protection

Humanitarian reasons

Rejected

EU-27 (*) 62 545 13 070 7 255 4 290 1 525 49 475

Belgium 6 510 1 085 855 230 - 5 425

Bulgaria 155 40 5 30 - 115

Czech Republic 225 60 10 50 * 160

Denmark 870 370 155 185 30 500

Germany 11 690 2 475 1 925 225 325 9 215

Estonia 15 10 5 * 5 10

Ireland 260 15 15 * - 245

Greece 2 880 15 10 5 5 2 865

Spain 575 110 65 40 * 470

France 11 330 975 750 230 - 10 355

Italy (1) 7 090 1 725 435 675 620 5 365

Cyprus 425 50 35 * 15 380

Latvia 65 10 * 10 - 50

Lithuania 80 10 * 5 - 70

Luxembourg 535 15 10 5 - 520

Hungary 330 90 20 45 20 240

Malta 250 230 10 105 115 20

Netherlands (**) : : : : : :

Austria 4 005 1 085 625 460 - 2 920

Poland 695 180 45 60 75 515

Portugal 55 25 5 20 - 25

Romania 455 10 10 * * 445

Slovenia 30 5 * 5 - 25

Slovakia 100 45 * 35 10 55

Finland 655 265 65 160 40 390

Sweden 7 245 2 135 605 1 285 245 5 110

United Kingdom 6 020 2 035 1 595 415 20 3 985

Iceland 5 * * * * 5

Liechtenstein 15 5 5 - * 10

Norway 3 150 1 575 1 260 255 65 1 575

Switzerland 4 695 1 670 1 030 210 435 3 020 (*) EU-27 is based on data available (1) See country information notes (**) Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes - represents data are not applicable * represents 2 or fewer first instance decisions recorded in the reference period : represents data are not available in the reference period Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asydcfstq)

Iraq 700 Syria 90 Afghanistan 190 Serbia 3 000 CD 90 Mali 50 Bangladesh 1 130Iran 345 Somalia 45 Iraq 25 Afghanistan 730 Sri Lanka 60 Guinea 30 CD 845Syria 190 Afghanistan 40 XK 10 MK 610 Russia 60 Afghanistan 20 Sri Lanka 760Other 690 Other 50 Other 100 Other 4 870 Other 535 Other 125 Other 7 615

Afghanistan 170 Somalia 515 Afghanistan 130 Serbia 940 Somalia 70 Somalia 195 Nigeria 125 Nigeria 1 385

Somalia 80 Afghanistan 365 Stateless 15 Afghanistan 455 Sudan 65 Afghanistan 120 Ivory Coast 120 Ghana 685Syria 60 Eritrea 225 Iraq 15 Somalia 405 Afghanistan 45 Sudan 45 Pakistan 65 Mali 550Other 295 Other 180 Other 85 Other 3 305 Other 255 Other 315 Other 310 Other 2 740

Russia 95 Afghanistan 195 Albania 715 Iran 205 Afghanistan 55 Somalia 5 Pakistan 905

Afghanistan 95 Somalia 10 Russia 525 Eritrea 145 Zimbabw e 40 Iran 5 Iran 410Guinea 80 XK 5 XK 445 Sudan 145 China 40 Sierra Leone * Sri Lanka 355Other 585 Other 25 Other 3 745 Other 705 Other 280 Other 5 Other 2 315

Russia 225 Somalia 425 Syria 105 Pakistan 1 140 Iran 960 Somalia 1 215 Afghanistan 370 Serbia 4 780

Syria 195 Afghanistan 280 Russia 60 Afghanistan 1 125 Iraq 925 Afghanistan 1 075 Nigeria 135 Pakistan 3 190Afghanistan 120 Iraq 130 Afghanistan 25 Russia 935 Afghanistan 680 Eritrea 265 Ivory Coast 120 Afghanistan 2 925Other 560 Other 395 Other 120 Other 6 820 Other 4 690 Other 1 735 Other 895 Other 38 580

SWEDEN (7 245 decisions) ITALY (7 090 decisions)

Not applicable

OTHER (12 660 decisions) EU-27 (62 545 decisions)

BELGIUM (6 510 decisions) UNITED KINGDOM (6 020 decisions)

Not applicable

GERMANY (11 690 decisions) FRANCE (11 330 decisions)

Refugee statusSubsidiary protection


Rejections Refugee statusSubsidiary protection


Rejections

First instance decisions First instance decisions




15 % of all positive decisions of international protection issued at first instance in the EU-27 in Q1 2012 were granted to Afghans

Table 10: First instance decisions by destination country and outcome in the EU-27 (*), selected citizenships of asylum applicants, 1st quarter 2012 (rounded figures) (1)

(*) Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes (1) Citizenships selected here are those for which the highest number of first instance decisions was issued during Q1 2012 * represents 2 or fewer first instance decisions recorded in the reference period Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asydcfstq)

Table 11: First instance decisions by outcome, 30 main citizenships of asylum applicants in the EU-27 (*), 1st quarter 2012 (1)

(*) Data for NL are not available, see methodological notes (1) Citizenships selected here are those for which the highest number of first instance decisions was issued during Q1 2012 * represents 2 or fewer first instance decisions recorded in the reference period Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asydcfstq)

Germany 180 Sw eden 365 Germany 190 Austria 745 Belgium 15 Belgium * Sw eden 10 Germany 3 000Sw eden 170 Belgium 195 Sw eden 130 Germany 730 Austria 5 Bulgaria 0 Denmark 5 Sw eden 940

Belgium 95 Austria 190 Italy 20 Sw eden 455 France * Czech Republi 0 Germany 5 Belgium 290Other 240 Other 325 Other 30 Other 990 Other * Other * Other 0 Other 545

UK 140 UK 25 Germany 5 UK 905 Austria 160 Poland 55 Poland 55 France 630Germany 110 Italy 25 Czech Republi 0 Greece 825 Belgium 95 Austria 25 Sw eden 5 Belgium 525

Italy 20 Denmark 5 Denmark 0 Germany 415 France 60 Finland 20 Finland 5 Austria 470Other 35 Other * Other 65 Other 1 040 Other 110 Other * Other * Other 925

UK 15 Italy 35 Italy 125 Italy 1 385 UK 95 Sw eden 515 UK 5 Sw eden 405

Italy 10 UK 10 Germany 10 UK 215 Germany 85 Italy 195 Sw eden 5 Belgium 75Germany 5 France 10 Finland * Germany 170 Sw eden 80 Denmark 135 Germany 5 France 70

Other * Other * Other * Other 680 Other 195 Other 370 Other * Other 265

Germany 1 510 Sw eden 405 Italy 405 France 8 915 Germany 1 925 Sw eden 1 285 Italy 620 France 10 355UK 1 290 UK 320 Malta 115 Germany 4 565 UK 1 595 Italy 675 Germany 325 Germany 9 215France 635 Italy 295 Germany 105 Belgium 4 170 Belgium 855 Austria 460 Sw eden 245 Belgium 5 425Other 1 890 Other 745 Other 205 Other 15 115 Other 2 885 Other 1 870 Other 335 Other 24 485

NIGERIA - NG

OTHER

First instance decisions

SOMALIA - SO

NON-EU

AFGHANISTAN - AF SERBIA - RS

Refugee statusSubsidiary protection


Rejections Refugee statusSubsidiary protection


Rejections

PAKISTAN - PK RUSSIA - RU

First instance decisions

Total decisionsTotal positive

decisionsRefugee status

Subsidiary protection


Rejected

Non-EU 62 545 13 070 7 255 4 290 1 525 49 475Afghanistan - (AF) 5 050 2 125 680 1 075 370 2 925Serbia - (RS) 4 825 45 25 * 20 4 780Pakistan - (PK) 3 630 440 305 65 75 3 190

Russia - (RU) 3 150 600 430 105 70 2 550Nigeria - (NG) 2 695 240 40 60 135 2 455Somalia - (SO) 2 505 1 690 455 1 215 20 815Iraq - (IQ) 2 485 1 200 925 225 55 1 285

Bangladesh - (BD) 2 250 45 25 15 10 2 200Iran - (IR) 2 220 1 040 960 65 15 1 185Kosovo - (XK) 1 885 100 45 25 30 1 785Sri Lanka - (LK) 1 455 215 185 25 * 1 245

CD - (CD) 1 430 210 170 30 5 1 225Syria - (SY) 1 385 955 595 255 110 425Albania - (AL) 1 290 115 75 45 * 1 175

Turkey - (TR) 1 255 150 100 25 25 1 105Georgia - (GE) 1 230 25 20 5 5 1 205Algeria - (DZ) 1 170 25 15 10 * 1 145Armenia - (AM) 1 155 50 15 10 20 1 105

Guinea - (GN) 1 145 195 125 55 15 950MK - (MK) 1 090 5 5 * * 1 085China - (CN) 1 050 210 165 40 * 845Ghana - (GH) 990 95 10 20 60 895

Eritrea - (ER) 945 595 315 265 15 350Ivory Coast - (CI) 940 245 50 75 120 695BA - (BA) 865 25 5 * 20 840Mali - (ML) 740 105 10 70 25 635

Sudan - (SD) 640 310 255 60 * 325Tunisia - (TN) 620 30 5 * 25 590India - (IN) 595 15 5 * 5 580Stateless 540 305 210 80 20 240

Other 11 325 1 670 1 035 375 260 9 660




METHODOLOGICAL NOTES DATA SOURCES

The data used for this publication are provided to Eurostat by the Ministries of Interior, Justice or immigration agencies of the Member States. Data are based entirely on relevant administrative sources. Apart from statistics on new asylum applicants, these data are supplied by Member States according to the provisions of Article 4 of the Regulation (EC) 862/2007 of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection.

All data presented in this publication are rounded to the nearest 5. All data presented in this publication are provisional (except as otherwise stated) and may be a subject to change.

DEFINITIONS AND COVERAGE

'Asylum applicant' means a person having submitted an application for international protection or having been included in such application as a family member during the reference period. 'Application for international protection' means an application for international protection as defined in Art.2(g) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC, i.e. including requests for refugee status or for subsidiary protection status, irrespective of whether the application was lodged on arrival at border, or from inside the country, and irrespective of whether the person entered the territory legally (e.g. as a tourist) or illegally. In deciding when to regard an asylum application as having been lodged, the principles expressed in Article 4(1) of Council Regulation 2003/343/EC should be applied, i.e. 'An application for asylum shall be deemed to have been lodged once a form submitted by the applicant for asylum or a report prepared by the authorities has reached the competent authorities of the Member State concerned. Where an application is not made in writing, the time elapsing between the statement of intention and the preparation of a report should be as short as possible'. Applications submitted by persons who are subsequently found to be a subject of a Dublin procedure (Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003) are included in the number of asylum applications. Within the same reference period every person being a subject of asylum application is counted only once, therefore repeat applications are not recorded if the first application has been lodged in the same reference period. However, such a repeat application will be recorded if lodged in a different reference month. It means that the aggregation of the monthly figures may overestimate the number of persons applying for international protection within the aggregated period (quarter or year).

In some Member States (IT, MT and DK) due to restrictions of the asylum procedure (e.g. time limits for lodging repeat application) repeat applications may be very rare. Therefore the number of new asylum applicants may equal or almost equal the number of asylum applicants. The number of asylum applicants and the number of first instance decisions during the same reference period differs. This is due to the time lag between the date of asylum application and the date of the decision on asylum application. The duration of this time lag may vary considerably depending on the national asylum procedure and the administrative workload. Asylum application lodged in one reference period may therefore result in a decision in a later period, while some asylum decisions reported for that period may relate to the applications lodged in previous reference periods.

'New asylum applicant' means a person having submitted an application for international protection for the first time. Applications submitted by persons who are subsequently found to be a subject of a Dublin procedure are included in the statistics on new asylum applicants if such persons are also a subject of first asylum application. All Member States are requested to supply these data but their provision is voluntary. As persons are counted once only, statistics on new asylum applicants may be used for preparation of annual aggregates.

Person being a subject of 'a pending application' means a person who is the subject of application for international protection under consideration by the responsible national authority at the end of the reference period. It includes the number of persons with pending applications at all instances of the administrative and/or judicial procedure.

'Rejected applicant' means a person covered by a first instance decision rejecting an application for international protection, including decisions considering applications as inadmissible or as unfounded and decisions under priority and accelerated procedures, taken by administrative or judicial bodies during the reference period.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:199:0023:0029:EN:PDF�




'Person granted refugee status at first instance' means a person covered by a first instance decision granting refugee status, taken by administrative or judicial bodies during the reference period. Refugee status means status as defined in Art.2 (d) of Directive 2004/83/EC within the meaning of Art.1 of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967. According to the Art.2(c) of that Directive refugee means a third country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it.

'Person granted subsidiary protection status at first instance' means a person covered by a first instance decision granting subsidiary protection status, taken by administrative or judicial bodies during the reference period. Subsidiary protection status means status as defined in Art.2 (f) of Directive 2004/83/EC. According to the Art.2(e) of that Directive a person eligible for subsidiary protection means a third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.

Person granted authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons at first instance' means a person covered by another first instance decision granting authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons under national law concerning international protection, taken by administrative or judicial bodies during the reference period. It includes persons who are not eligible for international protection as currently defined law but are nonetheless protected against removal under the obligations that are imposed on all Member States by international refugee or human rights instruments or on the basis of principles flowing from such instruments. Examples of such categories include persons who are not removable on ill health grounds and unaccompanied minors.

'Dublin procedure' means a procedure according to the Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national.

COUNTRY INFORMATION

Due to the implementation of a new computing system, since January 2012 NL is temporarily unable to provide statistics on asylum applications disaggregated by citizenship, age and sex and on first instance decisions. Only the total number of applicants per month is available.

The number of rejections at first instance in Italy includes a number of recommendations to issue an authorization to stay for humanitarian reasons. These recommendations are issued by the National Asylum Commission to the Police. Therefore the number of first instance rejections can be overestimated. Indeed, some individuals might be counted twice under the same reference period: first as a person rejected and recommended for an authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons and subsequently as a person granted an authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons.

Not all EU-27 population figures are based on the latest census. The following countries transmitted to Eurostat post-census population estimates for 1 January 2012 based on the results of the 2011 Censuses: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovakia

ABBREVIATIONS Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Germany (DE), Estonia (EE), Ireland (IE), Greece (EL), Spain (ES), France (FR), Italy (IT), Cyprus (CY), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Hungary (HU), Malta (MT), the Netherlands (NL), Austria (AT), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), Finland (FI), Sweden (SE), the United Kingdom (UK), Iceland (IS), Lichtenstein (LI), Norway (NO) and Switzerland (CH).

EU ASYLUM POLICY The Directorate-General for Home Affairs (DG HOME) is responsible for developing EU policies on asylum. For more information please see: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/index_en.htm�

Further information

Eurostat Website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat Data on "Population and Social conditions, Asylum": http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database (Select "International Migration and asylum" and "Asylum") More information about "Population and social conditions": http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/introduction

European Statistical Data Support: Contact details for this support network can be found on our Internet site: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/

Manuscript completed on: 30.07.2012 Data extracted on: 16.07.2012 ISSN 1977-0340 Catalogue number: KS-QA-12-008-EN-N © European Union, 2012

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat�

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database�

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/introduction�

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/�

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PARLAMENTO EUROPEO 2009 - 2014

Documento de sesión

A7-0252/2012

29.8.2012

INFORME

sobre el Informe anual del Consejo al Parlamento Europeo sobre la política exterior y de seguridad común (12562/2011 – 2012/2050(INI))

Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores

Ponente: Elmar Brok

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PR_INI_art119-1

ÍNDICE

Página

PROPUESTA DE RESOLUCIÓN DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO.................................... 3

EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS................................................................................................. 33

OPINIÓN MINORITARIA...................................................................................................... 35

OPINIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN DE PRESUPUESTOS........................................................... 36

RESULTADO DE LA VOTACIÓN FINAL EN COMISIÓN................................................ 39

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PROPUESTA DE RESOLUCIÓN DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

sobre el Informe anual del Consejo al Parlamento Europeo sobre la política exterior y de seguridad común (12562/2011 – C7-0000/2012 – 2012/2050(INI))

El Parlamento Europeo,

– Visto el Informe anual del Consejo al Parlamento Europeo sobre la política exterior y de seguridad común (12562/2011),

– Visto el artículo 36 del Tratado de la Unión Europea,

– Vista la parte II, sección G, apartado 43, del Acuerdo Interinstitucional entre el Parlamento Europeo, el Consejo y la Comisión sobre disciplina presupuestaria y buena gestión financiera, de 17 de mayo de 20061,

– Visto el Acuerdo Interinstitucional antes mencionado, de 17 de mayo de 2006, entre el Parlamento Europeo, el Consejo y la Comisión sobre disciplina presupuestaria y buena gestión financiera,

– Vistas sus Resoluciones relativas a los informes anuales 2010 y 2009 sobre la PESC, de 11 de mayo de 20112 y de 10 de marzo de 20103, respectivamente,

– Vista su Resolución, de 8 de julio de 20104 sobre el Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior,

– Vista la Declaración de la Vicepresidenta de la Comisión /Alta Representante de la Unión para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad (VP/AR) sobre responsabilidad política5,

– Vista la Declaración de la Alta Representante ante el pleno del Parlamento Europeo del 8 de julio de 2010 sobre la organización básica de la administración central del SEAE6,

– Vista su Resolución, de 18 de abril de 2012, sobre el Informe anual relativo a los derechos humanos en el mundo y la política de la UE en este ámbito, incluidas las implicaciones para la política estratégica de la UE en materia de derechos humanos7,

– Vista la Comunicación conjunta de la Alta Representante de la Unión para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad y la Comisión al Consejo Europeo, al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo, de 12 de diciembre de 2011, titulada «Derechos humanos y democracia en el centro de la acción exterior de la UE - Hacia un enfoque más eficaz»

1 DO C 139 de 14.6.2006, p. 1. 2 Textos Aprobados, P7_TA(2011)0227. 3 DO C 349 E de 22.12.2010, p.51. 4 Textos Aprobados, P7_TA(2010)0280. 5 Textos Aprobados, P7_TA(2010)0399, anexo II. 6 Textos Aprobados, P7_TA(2010)0280, anexo. 7 Textos Aprobados, P7_TA(2012)0126.

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(COM(2011)0886),

– Vistas las Resoluciones 1325 (2000) y 1820 (2008) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas sobre la mujer y la paz y la seguridad, la Resolución 1888 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas sobre la violencia sexual contra las mujeres y los niños en situaciones de conflicto armado, la Resolución 1889(2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, destinada a reforzar la aplicación y supervisión de la Resolución 1325 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, y la Resolución 1960 (2010) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, por la que se creó un mecanismo para la recopilación de datos sobre la violencia sexual en los conflictos armados y la elaboración de una lista sobre sus autores,

– Visto el artículo 119, apartado 1, de su Reglamento,

– Vistos el informe de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores y la opinión de la Comisión de Presupuestos (A7-0252/2012),

A. Considerando que la Unión Europea debe seguir desarrollando sus objetivos de política exterior y promover sus valores e intereses en todo el mundo con el objetivo de contribuir a la paz, la seguridad humana, la solidaridad, la prevención de conflictos, el Estado de Derecho y la promoción de la democracia, la protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, la igualdad de género, el respeto del Derecho internacional, el apoyo a las instituciones internacionales, el multilateralismo efectivo y el respeto mutuo entre las naciones, el desarrollo sostenible, la gobernanza transparente y responsable, el comercio libre y justo y la erradicación de la pobreza;

B. Considerando que para alcanzar estos objetivos, la UE debe ser capaz de crear sinergias y desarrollar asociaciones estratégicas con aquellos países que comparten los mismos valores y están dispuestos a adoptar políticas comunes y participar en acciones acordadas mutuamente;

C. Considerando que la aplicación del Tratado de Lisboa aporta una nueva dimensión a la acción exterior europea y contribuirá a aumentar la coherencia, y la eficacia de la política exterior de la UE y, más en general, de las acciones exteriores; considerando que es necesario aprender de los fracasos pasados de la Unión Europea y de sus Estados miembros a la hora de reformar su acción exterior consagrando al mismo tiempo los derechos humanos y la democracia en el núcleo de sus políticas y promoviendo la transición en países con regímenes autoritarios, en particular cuando la preocupación por la estabilidad y la seguridad ha puesto en entredicho una política basada en principios para promover la democracia y los derechos humanos;

D. Considerando que el Tratado de Lisboa está dando lugar a un nuevo impulso en la política exterior de la UE, en particular al brindar instrumentos institucionales y operativos que permitirían que la Unión asuma una función compatible con su considerable peso económico y sus ambiciones, y se organice con el fin de ser un actor mundial efectivo, capaz de compartir la responsabilidad de la seguridad mundial y de ejercer el liderazgo para definir respuestas comunes a desafíos comunes;

E. Considerando que la crisis de deuda soberana y financiera actual está afectando

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profundamente a la credibilidad de la Unión Europea en la escena internacional y socavando la eficacia y la sostenibilidad a largo plazo de la política exterior y de seguridad común (PESC);

F. Considerando que este nuevo impulso de la acción exterior europea también obliga a la UE a actuar más estratégicamente con el fin de hacer valer su influencia en el plano internacional; considerando que la capacidad de influencia de la UE en el orden internacional no depende solamente de la coherencia entre sus políticas, actores e instituciones, sino también de la existencia de un concepto estratégico real de política exterior de la UE, que debe unir y coordinar a todos los Estados miembros tras el mismo conjunto de prioridades y metas, de modo que hablen firmemente con una sola voz y muestren solidaridad en la escena internacional; considerando que la política exterior de la UE debe contar con los medios e instrumentos necesarios para que la UE pueda actuar de forma eficaz y coherente en la escena mundial;

G. Considerando que el control de la política exterior de la UE, ejercido por el Parlamento Europeo y los parlamentos nacionales a sus respectivos niveles, es fundamental si se pretende que los ciudadanos comprendan y apoyen la acción exterior europea; considerando que el control parlamentario aumenta la legitimidad de esta acción;

Evaluación del Informe anual del Consejo sobre la PESC de 2010

1. Acoge con satisfacción las medidas adoptadas por el Consejo con el apoyo de la Vicepresidenta de la Comisión Europea/Alta Representante de la Unión para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad (VP/AR), que se recogen en el Informe anual de 2010, para plasmar la política exterior de la UE en un documento político estratégico orientado al futuro;

2. Considera, no obstante, que el Informe anual del Consejo no está a la altura de las ambiciones del Tratado de Lisboa en aspectos importantes, entre ellos: no establece prioridades o directrices estratégicas claras a medio y largo plazo para el SEAE, no clarifica los mecanismos políticos para garantizar la coherencia y homogeneidad entre los diferentes componentes de la política exterior, incluidos aquellos que son de la competencia de la Comisión, no aborda las preguntas importantes sobre el papel del SEAE y las Delegaciones para lograr que los recursos (en materia de personal, financieros y diplomáticos) de la Unión se adapten a sus prioridades en materia de asuntos exteriores y evita un debate, cuya celebración está implícita en las nuevas estrategias para el Cuerno de África y el Sahel, acerca de cómo integrar las misiones y operaciones ad hoc de la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa (su justificación y situación final) en el marco político y estratégico de las prioridades de la política exterior para un país o región;

3. Recuerda la prerrogativa que le reconoce el Tratado de ser consultado en los ámbitos de la PESC y la PESD, de que sus opiniones se tengan debidamente en cuenta y de hacer recomendaciones; reconoce a este respecto la disposición de la VP/AR a comparecer ante el Parlamento; considera, no obstante, que con la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa se podría mejorar la información a la comisión competente sobre el resultado de los Consejos de Asuntos Exteriores, así como la consulta al Parlamento a fin de garantizar que sus opiniones se tengan debidamente en cuenta antes de la adopción de

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los mandatos y las estrategias en el ámbito de la PESC; queda a la espera de la revisión de los instrumentos de asistencia exterior y de un resultado que reconozca el derecho del Parlamento a intervenir en los documentos estratégicos y los planes de acción plurianuales, como se contempla en el artículo 290 del TFUE; pide, asimismo, que se mejore la información facilitada en todas las fases del procedimiento para las decisiones del Consejo PESC sobre acuerdos con terceros países, especialmente antes de decidir dar mandato a la Comisión para que negocie y firme acuerdos en nombre de la Unión y cuando se trate de marcos para la participación de estos países en la operaciones de gestión de crisis de la UE;

4. Pide al Consejo que, al elaborar los futuros Informes anuales sobre la PESC, se ponga en contacto lo antes posible con la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores con el fin de abordar el marco político para el año siguiente y los objetivos estratégicos a largo plazo y establecer una referencia para brindar a los ciudadanos europeos una declaración clara sobre la evolución, prioridades y avances de la política exterior de la Unión Europea;

Un nuevo enfoque integral para la Política Exterior de la UE

5. Señala que en la segunda década del siglo XXI, los ciudadanos europeos y de otras partes del mundo son cada vez más conscientes de que, para hacer frente a las amenazas y retos a nivel mundial, solo resultan adecuados los enfoques amplios que incorporan medios diplomáticos, económicos y, en último recurso y de total conformidad con lo dispuesto en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, militares;

6. Considera que con la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa, la UE cuenta con todos lo medios necesarios para adoptar un enfoque integral como éste, mediante el cual los recursos diplomáticos y financieros de la UE se utilizan para respaldar directrices políticas estratégicas comunes a fin de tener la mayor fuerza posible para promover la seguridad y la prosperidad económica de los ciudadanos europeos y sus vecinos, así como los derechos fundamentales; pide, además, que se siga desarrollando un mecanismo adecuado en el SEAE con la participación de los servicios competentes de la Comisión, en el que se integren conocimientos geográficos y temáticos, y se impulse un enfoque integral para la planificación, formulación y aplicación de políticas;

7. Subraya que una idea integral de la PESC abarca todos los ámbitos de la política exterior, incluida la elaboración progresiva de un marco para la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa (PCSD) que pueda llevar a una defensa común, y que haga hincapié en el mantenimiento de la coherencia y respete al mismo tiempo la especificidad de cada componente de la acción exterior; reitera que dicho enfoque para desarrollar la política exterior de la UE debe basarse en los principios y objetivos consagrados en el artículo 21 del Tratado de la Unión Europea, lo que significa que la acción exterior de la UE debe estar inspirada en la promoción y protección de los valores de la UE, como el respeto de los derechos humanos, la libertad, la democracia y el Estado de Derecho; subraya, al mismo tiempo, la importancia de una coordinación más estrecha entre las dimensiones internas y externas de las políticas de seguridad de la UE, que deben reflejarse también en la acción exterior de la Unión;

8. Observa que 2013 marcará el transcurso de una década desde la adopción de la Estrategia Europea de Seguridad y, por consiguiente, destaca la necesidad de actualizar

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y consolidar este documento marco de conformidad con el actual entorno internacional;

La arquitectura de la política exterior

9. Subraya el papel de liderazgo político que se espera de la VP/AR para garantizar la unidad, coordinación, coherencia y eficacia de la acción de la Unión; pide a la VP/AR que utilice plena y oportunamente sus competencias para poner en marcha, llevar a cabo y garantizar el cumplimiento de la PESC con la plena participación de los órganos competentes del Parlamento; acoge con beneplácito el importante papel de liderazgo que ha desempeñado la VP/AR en condiciones difíciles, en nombre de la comunidad internacional, en las negociaciones con Irán; tiene en cuenta la importante relación histórica entre Europa e Irán y su función como uno de los vecinos de Europa; pide liderazgo para mejorar el papel de la Unión en los países vecinos de Europa, a raíz de los acontecimientos de la Primavera Árabe, particularmente los procesos de transición democrática en los países del sur del Mediterráneo, así como en el estancado proceso de paz en Oriente Próximo;

10. Reconoce el papel fundamental que desempeña el SEAE (incluidas sus Delegaciones y los Representantes especiales de la UE) a fin de prestar asistencia a la VP/AR para lograr un enfoque político más estratégico, coherente y sistemático para la acción exterior de la Unión; manifiesta su intención de continuar supervisando el equilibrio geográfico y de género del personal del SEAE, también en los altos cargos, y de valorar si el nombramiento de diplomáticos de los Estados miembros como Jefes de Delegación y otros cargos claves redunda en beneficio de la Unión y no únicamente en beneficio de sus Estados miembros; recalca la importancia de contar con un SEAE plenamente funcional y eficiente y de fortalecer las relaciones entre el SEAE, la Comisión y los Estados miembros con miras a generar sinergias para llevar a cabo de forma eficaz las acción exterior y que la UE hable con una sola voz en las cuestiones políticas clave;

11. Destaca que el papel de los Representantes especiales de la UE ((REUE) debe complementar y ser coherente con la labor que realizan los Jefes de Delegación de la UE en los distintos países y debe representar y coordinar la política de la UE hacia regiones con estrategias o intereses de seguridad específicos, lo que requiere la presencia y visibilidad constante de la UE; acoge con satisfacción la positiva respuesta de la VP/AR para que los recién nombrados Representantes especiales de la UE y Jefes de Delegación comparezcan ante el Parlamento para celebrar un intercambio de puntos de vista antes de entrar en funciones; pide que se mejore la difusión y el acceso a los informes políticos de las Delegaciones y los Representantes especiales de la UE a fin de que el Parlamento reciba información completa y oportuna sobre la evolución sobre el terreno, en particular en los ámbitos considerados de importancia estratégica o de interés político;

12. Reitera su posición de que las políticas temáticas importantes de las que se ocupaban anteriormente los Representantes personales deben recibir todo el apoyo del SEAE y una representación diplomática adecuada, y pide por ello que se presenten propuestas como la relativa a los derechos humanos;

13. Acoge con satisfacción la decisión del nombramiento de un Representante especial de la UE para los derechos humanos que debe contar con un mandato sustancial para integrar

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los derechos humanos en la PESC, la PSCD y otras políticas de la UE y proporcionar visibilidad y coherencia a la acción de la UE en este ámbito;

14. Considera que unas directrices estratégicas definidas con claridad ayudarán a adaptar los importantes, pero limitados recursos financieros a las ambiciones y prioridades de la acción exterior de la Unión; recalca que un enfoque estratégico de este tipo debe ser objeto de un control democrático, pero que ello no debería inhibir o reducir la flexibilidad para responder a los cambios de las condiciones políticas sobre el terreno;

15. Celebra el compromiso asumido por los Estados miembros en el Tratado de Lisboa de desempeñar plenamente su papel en la formulación y aplicación de la política exterior de la UE y la coordinación y coherencia con otras políticas de la Unión; recalca la importancia de la solidaridad entre los Estados miembros en una época de limitaciones económicas con el fin de mejorar la eficacia de la Unión en tanto que promotora de la cohesión a nivel mundial; señala en particular la importancia de que los Estados miembros faciliten capacidades civiles y militares para aplicar de forma eficaz la PCSD; lamenta, no obstante, que en muchas ocasiones las relaciones bilaterales de algunos Estados miembros con terceros países eclipsan o socavan la consistencia de la acción de la UE y pide, a este respecto, más esfuerzos por parte de los Estados miembros para armonizar sus políticas exteriores con la PESC;

16. Pide a la VP/AR que, a la vez que se fortalece la cooperación sistemática de los Estados miembros en el marco de la PESC, se exploren a fondo las posibilidades que ofrece el Tratado de Lisboa de aumentar la cooperación, incluida la elaboración de directrices para la asignación de tareas y misiones específicas a una coalición de voluntarios, una especie de «núcleo básico» de Estados miembros, y que se ponga en marcha el proceso que conducirá al Consejo Europeo a la elaboración de conclusiones sobre la cooperación estructurada permanente en materia de seguridad y defensa y sobre la aplicación de la cláusula de defensa mutua;

Arquitectura presupuestaria y financiera de la política exterior

17. Recuerda que la revisión del Acuerdo Institucional sobre disciplina financiera y buena gestión financiera de 2006, debe marcar una nueva etapa de mayor transparencia en el ámbito de la PESC y el suministro de información pertinente a la autoridad presupuestaria, de conformidad con la Declaración de la VP/AR sobre responsabilidad política; considera a este respecto que la plena transparencia y el control democrático requieren líneas presupuestarias independientes para cada misión y operación de la PESC y para cada uno de los Representantes especiales de la UE, acompañadas de procedimientos racionalizados pero transparentes para la transferencia de fondos de una partida a otra, si así lo exigen las circunstancias; al mismo tiempo, tiene el convencimiento de que no debe infringirse la flexibilidad y reactividad necesarias para la PESC;

18. Insiste en que los recursos de la UE disponibles para la implementación de la PESC deben utilizarse de la forma más eficiente posible y, por lo tanto, debe lograrse la sinergia entre las acciones exteriores de la UE y sus Estados miembros tanto en términos políticos como presupuestarios;

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19. Considera que el mecanismo Athena para la financiación de los costes comunes de las operaciones militares y de defensa de la UE no proporciona una visión adecuada de todas las implicaciones financieras de las misiones llevadas a cabo en el marco de la PESC y pide, por consiguiente, una relación clara de todos los gastos;

20. Acoge con beneplácito el mayor énfasis concedido a la coherencia entre los instrumentos financieros de la Unión, por ejemplo, en forma de disposiciones transversales sobre el SEAE presentes en los reglamentos propuestos relativos a los nuevos instrumentos financieros para las relaciones exteriores del período 2014-2020; considera que este enfoque demostrará el valor añadido de la Unión para conseguir la seguridad y prosperidad de los ciudadanos de Europa; destaca, a este respecto, que los instrumentos financieros deben utilizarse de forma complementaria en los ámbitos integrales de la política exterior de la Unión sin duplicaciones;

21. Destaca la importancia de que los nuevos instrumentos financieros para las relaciones exteriores que actualmente examinan el Parlamento y el Consejo sirvan adecuadamente a los intereses estratégicos de la Unión y cuenten con los fondos necesarios para ello, y puedan adaptarse a las cambiantes circunstancias políticas; pide por ello que el presupuesto de la Unión (el marco financiero plurianual para 2014-2020) cuente con recursos a la altura de las ambiciones y prioridades de la Unión como agente a nivel mundial con el fin de asegurar un futuro seguro y próspero a los ciudadanos, así como la flexibilidad necesaria para hacer frente a acontecimientos imprevistos;

22. Considera que un enfoque más colectivo e integral para aplicar los instrumentos para las relaciones exteriores de la UE en apoyo de objetivos políticos y estratégicos comunes ofrecerá una respuesta más eficiente y rentable a los retos de la política exterior y de seguridad y, por ende, más seguridad y prosperidad a los ciudadanos de Europa; subraya que para que el Parlamento pueda garantizar a los ciudadanos la coherencia y eficiencia de las políticas exteriores y los instrumentos financieros de la Unión, las competencias que le conceden los Tratados (en particular el artículo 290 del TFUE) deben reflejarse adecuadamente en la revisión de los instrumentos financieros y, en especial, en el uso de actos delegados para adoptar documentos de programación estratégica;

23. Opina que, en aras de la coherencia con los valores propios de la Unión Europea, deben reforzarse los instrumentos financieros que fomentan, inter alia, el establecimiento de la paz, la seguridad, la democracia, el Estado de Derecho, la buena gobernanza y las sociedades justas, ya que se trata de herramientas estratégicas de la política y la acción exteriores de la UE en su respuesta a los retos de alcance mundial.

24. Recalca la importancia de garantizar la coherencia entre la planificación, formulación y aplicación de las políticas por medio de una combinación adecuada de instrumentos financieros en el ámbito de los asuntos exteriores; pide, entre otras cosas, que se mantenga la complementariedad entre la PESC y el Instrumento de Estabilidad en los ámbitos de la mediación, la prevención de crisis, la gestión de crisis y la consolidación de la paz tras conflictos, y que se siga trabajando a favor de la complementariedad con instrumentos geográficos para entablar un diálogo a largo plazo con un país o región; acoge con satisfacción la introducción de un nuevo Instrumento de Asociación, conforme a lo solicitado por el Parlamento, que aporta un importante valor añadido a la

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PESC de la UE al ofrecer un marco financiero para la cooperación de la UE con terceros países en objetivos que se derivan de las relaciones bilaterales, regionales o multilaterales de la Unión pero están fuera del ámbito del Instrumento de Cooperación Internacional;

25. Estima que dicho enfoque podría verse reforzado con el establecimiento de valores de referencia claros, que el Parlamento debe seguir y evaluar a corto, medio y largo plazo; pide que se establezcan valores de referencia para la política exterior europea basados en los actuales documentos estratégicos de programación o marcos políticos estratégicos (como los que están en marcha en el Cuerno de África o el Sahel), que incluyan una definición más sistemática y cuantificable de las prioridades y objetivos políticos, así como de los recursos que deben utilizarse en períodos definidos a corto, medio y largo plazo;

26. Considera que un enfoque integral de la acción exterior de la Unión requiere, entre otros criterios, una mayor alineación y el refuerzo mutuo de la PESC y la Política Europea de Vecindad (PEV); acoge con satisfacción, en este contexto, la respuesta política conjunta de la Comisión y el SEAE a los eventos en los países vecinos meridionales, ejemplificada por la «Comunicación conjunta» del 25 de mayo de 2011; considera, asimismo, que las estructuras multilaterales de la PEV deben consolidarse y desarrollarse de manera más estratégica, con el fin de promover efectivamente las prioridades de política exterior de la Unión; arguye que, dada la centralidad del «multilateralismo efectivo» en la acción externa de la Unión, el SEAE y la Comisión deben explorar la viabilidad de la vía multilateral de la PEV para servir como marco para organizar las relaciones políticas en la Europa ampliada;

Prioridades estratégicas: los círculos concéntricos de la paz, la seguridad y el desarrollo socioeconómico

27. Considera que los intereses, objetivos y directrices generales de carácter estratégico que debe perseguir la PESC se deben basar en la consecución de la paz, la seguridad y la prosperidad para los ciudadanos europeos, en primer lugar en nuestra vecindad inmediata, pero también en otros lugares, y deben guiarse por los principios que inspiraron la creación de la propia UE, como la democracia, el Estado de Derecho, la universalidad e indivisibilidad de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, el respeto de la dignidad humana, la igualdad y la solidaridad, y el respeto del Derecho internacional y de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, incluido el ejercicio de la responsabilidad de proteger;

28. Continúa fomentando la ampliación potencial de la Unión Europea a cualquier estado europeo que respete los valores de la Unión y se comprometa a promoverlos y que esté dispuesto y sea capaz de cumplir con los criterios de adhesión;

29. Señala que la Unión a lo largo del tiempo ha desarrollado relaciones con países y organizaciones regionales que tienen diferentes fundamentos contractuales y jurídicos, algunas de las cuales se han calificado de «estratégicas»; observa que no existe una fórmula clara para determinar la elección de un socio estratégico por parte de la Unión y que, cuando se toma una decisión, no se informa ni se consulta al Parlamento; señala que aprovechar las relaciones bilaterales genuinas y responsables puede servir para

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multiplicar la fuerza de la política exterior de la UE, tanto a nivel regional como en los foros multilaterales, y que por ello la elección de nuestros socios estratégicos debe ser objeto de una atenta reflexión que tenga en cuenta los valores y objetivos estratégicos que la Unión desea proteger;

30. Considera, por consiguiente, que las futuras decisiones sobre socios estratégicos deben enmarcarse cuidadosamente en las prioridades de la política exterior de la Unión tanto respecto a un país o región determinada como en foros internacionales, y que debe examinarse detenidamente la posibilidad de poner fin a asociaciones que se queden obsoletas o resulten contraproducentes; pide por ello la celebración de un debate de seguimiento con el Parlamento sobre las deliberaciones del Consejo Europeo de septiembre de 2010 sobre las asociaciones estratégicas, y que se informe periódicamente al Parlamento antes de que se tomen decisiones sobre futuras asociaciones, sobre todo cuando estas reciban ayuda financiera del presupuesto de la Unión o impliquen una relación contractual más estrecha con la UE;

31. Opina que, a fin de que la Unión pueda ofrecer paz, seguridad y desarrollo socioeconómico a los ciudadanos en un orden político internacional sumamente competitivo, cambiante e impredecible, es importante concentrar los limitados recursos de la Unión en prioridades estratégicas, comenzando con los retos más cercanos, en particular en los países de la ampliación, los países vecinos, y extenderlos hacia afuera en círculos concéntricos, teniendo en cuenta en su caso, el papel y la influencia relativa de las organizaciones regionales;

32. Considera que respetar los compromisos asumidos en el marco de la ampliación y demostrar responsabilidad con los vecinos fortalecerá la credibilidad del alcance global de la Unión; confirma el compromiso de la UE con un multilateralismo efectivo, siendo el sistema de las Naciones Unidas su centro neurálgico, y destaca la importancia de cooperar con otros socios internacionales para responder a las situaciones de crisis, las amenazas y los retos internacionales;

– Balcanes Occidentales

33. Apoya las estrategias de la Unión dirigidas a los Balcanes Occidentales, incluida la perspectiva de una ampliación de la UE, el fomento de la democratización, la estabilización, la resolución pacífica de conflictos y la modernización socio-económica tanto de los propios países como de la región en su conjunto; señala con preocupación que la inestabilidad política, las deficiencias institucionales, la corrupción generalizada, el crimen organizado y los problemas regionales y bilaterales no resueltos impiden que algunos países sigan avanzando en su integración a la UE; pide, por consiguiente, a la UE que aborde estas cuestiones más categóricamente en el proceso de integración, de conformidad con la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, y que refuerce su destacado papel en la región;

34. Reitera su apoyo a la mejora del proceso de adhesión de los países de los Balcanes Occidentales, haciendo que se atenga más a unos parámetros de referencia, transparencia y responsabilidad mutua y con la introducción de indicadores claros; pide a la UE que realice esfuerzos nuevos, convincentes y genuinos para revitalizar el proceso de ampliación y que siga concediendo prioridad a las siguientes condiciones:

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un diálogo político constructivo, buenas relaciones de vecindad, el desarrollo económico, la consolidación del Estado de Derecho, incluida la garantía de la libertad de expresión y el respeto de los derechos de las personas que pertenecen a minorías nacionales, una lucha eficaz contra la corrupción y la delincuencia organizada, la mejora de la eficacia e independencia del poder judicial, el incremento de capacidad administrativa para hacer cumplir la legislación relacionada con el acervo de la UE, la lucha contra las tensiones interétnicas e interreligiosas, y la mejora de la situación de los refugiados y personas desplazadas, así como la resolución de los problemas bilaterales pendientes;

35. Considera asimismo indispensable que la política exterior de la UE para esta región, que ha sufrido recientemente un conflicto armado interétnico, promueva un clima de tolerancia, el respeto de los derechos de las personas que pertenecen a minorías, políticas y legislación contra la discriminación, buena vecindad y cooperación regional, incluso mediante una mayor integración de los sistemas educativos (intercambio de estudiantes dentro de la región) y colaboración científica como requisitos previos para la estabilidad europea y como medio para facilitar la reconciliación;

36. Acoge con beneplácito la reconfiguración de la misión EULEX y su replanteamiento con respecto al Estado de Derecho y al mandato ejecutivo; espera que esté plenamente operativa en todo el territorio de Kosovo, incluido el norte, y se intensifique la lucha contra la corrupción a todos los niveles, así como contra el crimen organizado;

– Turquía

37. Acoge con satisfacción el calendario de la Comisión para las relaciones con Turquía; manifiesta su preocupación por la situación en una serie de ámbitos, especialmente en lo que respecta a la libertad de expresión, el Estado de Derecho, los derechos de las mujeres en Turquía, el lento avance hacia una nueva constitución civil y, además, la polarización de la sociedad turca; señala que Turquía no solo es un país candidato, sino también un importante socio estratégico y aliado de la OTAN; pide, por consiguiente, que se refuerce el actual diálogo político con Turquía sobre opciones y objetivos de política exterior de interés mutuo; recalca la importancia de ofrecer incentivos a Turquía para que continúe su política exterior en un marco de buenas relaciones de vecindad, diálogo y coordinación con la Unión Europea con el fin de generar sinergias útiles y aumentar las posibilidades de que se produzcan repercusiones positivas, en particular con respecto al apoyo al proceso de reformas en el mundo árabe; espera que mejoren las condiciones para la apertura de nuevos capítulos en las negociaciones de adhesión (por ejemplo, la ratificación y aplicación del Protocolo de Ankara);

– Los países vecinos meridionales y Oriente Próximo

38. Pide que se apliquen plenamente los principios en que se sustenta el nuevo enfoque de la Política Europea de Vecindad (PEV), que figuran en la Comunicación conjunta de la VP/AR y de la Comisión de 25 de mayo de 2011, y en particular los principios «más por más», de diferenciación y de responsabilidad mutua y de «asociación con la sociedad», y que la asistencia de la Unión se adapte totalmente a este nuevo enfoque; recuerda que la Comunicación conjunta «Diseño de una nueva Política Europea de Vecindad», de 15 de mayo de 2012, enumera los siguientes retos a los que se enfrentan

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los países de la región: democracia sostenible, desarrollo y crecimiento económico integradores, movilidad, cooperación regional y Estado de Derecho;

39. Recuerda que los países vecinos meridionales revisten una importancia fundamental para la Unión Europea, subraya la necesidad de fortalecer las asociaciones entre la UE y los países y sociedades vecinos a la hora de ayudar en la transición hacia una democracia consolidada y pide que se encuentre un mejor equilibrio entre los enfoques de mercado, por una parte, y los enfoques humanos y sociales, por la otra, en la respuesta de la UE a la Primavera árabe; pide por ello que se preste mayor atención a los derechos humanos, el Estado de Derecho, el empleo (en particular, el desempleo juvenil), la educación, la formación y el desarrollo regional a fin de contribuir a mitigar la actual crisis social y económica en estos países, y que se conceda la asistencia necesaria para apoyar el fortalecimiento de la buena gobernanza, las reformas políticas democráticas y el desarrollo social y económico; subraya, además, la importancia de apoyar el desarrollo de capacidades institucionales y una administración pública eficaz, incluidos los parlamentos de estos países, un sistema judicial independiente, el fortalecimiento de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y de los medios de información independientes, así como la formación de partidos políticos pluralistas con un sistema laico, en el que los derechos de las mujeres sean plenamente respetados, y con notables mejoras con respecto a los derechos fundamentales como el de la libertad de religión, en sus aspectos individuales, colectivos, públicos, privados e institucionales;

40. Reitera que las relaciones económicas, políticas, sociales, culturales o de cualquier otro tipo entre la UE y los países de la PEV deben basarse en la igualdad de trato, la solidaridad, el diálogo y el respeto de las asimetrías específicas y de las características de cada país;

41. Considera que la evaluación de todos los avances realizados por los países socios debe basarse en el grado de compromiso con la reforma y en la transparencia mutua y en valores de referencia definidos claramente y adoptados de mutuo acuerdo, que establezcan plazos para la aplicación de las reformas previstas en los planes de acción; estos valores de referencia deben ser el fundamento de un seguimiento y evaluación periódicos, de ser posible conjuntos, que contemplen un amplio papel para la sociedad civil a fin de garantizar una aplicación eficaz y transparente de las políticas;

42. Destaca la importancia de la Unión para el Mediterráneo como un instrumento para la institucionalización de las relaciones con los vecinos meridionales; subraya la necesidad de superar la fase de parálisis en la que está inmersa dicha organización; acoge con satisfacción los cambios realizados con respecto a la copresidencia europea y espera que el dinamismo del nuevo Secretario General contribuya a impulsar los proyectos seleccionados:

43. Recuerda el compromiso de la UE con el proceso de paz en Oriente Próximo y su respaldo a la solución de dos Estados con el Estado de Israel y un Estado de Palestina contiguo independiente, democrático y viable, que convivan en un entorno de paz y seguridad;

44. Recuerda que solucionar el conflicto de Oriente Próximo constituye un interés fundamental para la Unión Europea, así como para las propias partes y la región en

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general; señala, en consecuencia, que la necesidad de avances en el proceso de paz resulta ahora incluso más urgente debido a los actuales cambios en el mundo árabe;

• Irán

45. Apoya el enfoque de doble vía del Consejo para hallar una solución diplomática, por ser la única opción viable para la cuestión nuclear iraní; recuerda que las sanciones no constituyen un fin en sí mismas; insta al Grupo UE3+3 y a Irán a que continúen en la mesa de negociaciones, y pide a los negociadores que lleguen a un acuerdo; recuerda que, de conformidad con un principio esencial del TNP, Irán tiene derecho a enriquecer uranio con fines pacíficos y a recibir asistencia técnica a tal fin; manifiesta su preocupación por la posibilidad de una acción militar y, por lo tanto, insta a todas las partes a lograr una solución pacífica respetando el Tratado de No Proliferación;

46. Además, pide al Consejo que estudie medidas positivas para Irán a cambio del compromiso de Irán de limitar el enriquecimiento de uranio por debajo del 5 %, exportar todas las reservas de uranio que superen este nivel para su transformación en barras de combustible para fines nucleares civiles y abrir por completo todos los aspectos de su programa nuclear al Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica (OIEA), para que el OIEA pueda verificar que el programa nuclear de Irán es únicamente civil; pide a la VP/AR y al Consejo que reactiven la vía diplomática en otros asuntos de interés mutuo para la Unión Europea e Irán, como la seguridad regional, los derechos humanos y la situación en Siria, Afganistán, Irak y el Golfo Pérsico;

47. Pide un esfuerzo continuo y perseverante por parte de la VP/AR y del Consejo para ejecutar una amplia agenda con Irán que incluya, además del asunto nuclear, los derechos humanos y la seguridad regional; hace hincapié en la necesidad de una política de la UE hacia Irán que exprese solidaridad con todos aquellos que resisten la represión y luchan por las libertades básicas y la democracia; insiste en que la presencia sobre el terreno de la UE podría garantizar que los Estados miembros, además de la UE, evalúen la evolución en todos los ámbitos y se comuniquen con las autoridades iraníes de manera adecuada; pide, por ello, la apertura de una delegación de la UE en Teherán en el momento oportuno;

• Libia

48. Pide a la VP/AR que garantice un rápido despliegue tanto de personal suficiente como de experiencia institucional en Libia para ayudar al país a satisfacer sus necesidades y responder a sus demandas en el ámbito del desarrollo de capacidades, la gobernanza, la sociedad civil y el desarrollo; insta a la UE a que respalde la transición democrática en Libia en todos los ámbitos y pide a la VP/AR que garantice que los Estados miembros actúan de manera coordinada y coherente con los principios y valores de la UE, así como con los intereses estratégicos a la hora de satisfacer las necesidades y peticiones de Libia;

• Siria

49. Insta a la VP/AR, al Consejo y a los Estados miembros a que se comprometan en la

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búsqueda de una solución a la crisis en Siria; pide a la VP/AR que garantice que los Estados miembros actúan de manera unida y coordinada en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, que constituye el foro adecuado para debatir una posible intervención internacional en Siria respaldada por las Naciones Unidas; insta asimismo a la VP/AR a que intensifique los esfuerzos para presionar diplomáticamente a Rusia y a China a fin de desbloquear el estancamiento con respecto a Siria en el Consejo de Seguridad; pide a la VP/AR y a la Comisión que exploren todas las formas posibles de aportar y reforzar la ayuda humanitaria para responder a las necesidades de aquellos países vecinos que se encuentren más afectados por la crisis de Siria, en particular, debido a la afluencia de refugiados;

– La Asociación Oriental

50. Recuerda que la Asociación Oriental tiene una importancia estratégica; pide que se intensifiquen los esfuerzos, y un mayor compromiso político, para lograr los objetivos de la Asociación Oriental, como se indica en la Declaración de Praga y las conclusiones de la Cumbre de Varsovia, y se ratifica en la Comunicación Conjunta «La Asociación Oriental: plan de trabajo para la Cumbre de Otoño de 2013», de 15 de mayo de 2012, que incluyen, en particular, la aceleración de la asociación política y la integración económica y una mejor movilidad de los ciudadanos en un entorno seguro y bien gestionado y una cooperación del sector reforzada; opina que la Unión debería continuar principalmente con las negociaciones y la conclusión de Acuerdos de Asociación con los socios orientales con el fin de promover la movilidad por medio de asociaciones a tal fin y diálogos sobre visados, así como garantizar un avance continuo en la adopción y aplicación de reformas, en estrecha colaboración con la Asamblea Parlamentaria EURONEST; resalta que todas las decisiones deben ir acompañadas de la asignación de recursos financieros adecuados y pide una mejora en el tratamiento de estos temas dentro de la Asociación para la Modernización;

51. Lamenta, no obstante, que no se hayan producido prácticamente avances en la situación global relativa a las normas democráticas y al respeto de los derechos humanos en los países de la Asociación Oriental; hace hincapié, asimismo, en que el pleno desarrollo de la Asociación Oriental solo puede tener lugar una vez resueltos todos los conflictos estancados; pide, a este respecto, una implicación más activa de la UE en los procesos de paz pertinentes con vistas a emprender iniciativas verosímiles destinadas a superar los estancamientos actuales que faciliten la reanudación del diálogo entre las partes y crean las condiciones para lograr acuerdos integrales y duraderos;

52. Pide a la UE un compromiso continuo y firme para la resolución de los conflictos congelados de la región, en colaboración con otros socios regionales importantes, en particular el desbloqueo del conflicto de Nagorno-Karabaj y el desempeño pleno de su papel en apoyo de cualquier acuerdo destinado a garantizar la paz; considera que el conflicto de Transdniéster puede y debe resolverse pacíficamente y pide a la UE que contribuya aún más a dicho proceso, que también puede suponer una buena prueba de la buena voluntad de los socios regionales;

• Moldavia

53. Acoge con satisfacción los esfuerzos multidimensionales de la República de Moldavia

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para acercarse a la UE, en particular, realizando progresos en materia de reforma de las políticas nacionales y dando pasos importantes y positivos en las negociaciones «5+2» sobre el conflicto de Transdniéster;

•••• Ucrania

54. Subraya que, si bien el Acuerdo UE-Ucrania se ha rubricado, solo se procederá a la firma y ratificación si Ucrania cumple los requisitos necesarios, es decir, si garantiza el respeto de los derechos de las minorías, refuerza el Estado de Derecho - mediante el fortalecimiento de la estabilidad, la independencia y la eficacia de las instituciones que lo garantizan - y muestra respeto por los derechos de la oposición, poniendo fin a la persecución, estableciendo así una verdadera democracia pluralista; pide a la VP/AR y a la Comisión que garanticen los medios financieros suficientes para apoyar las misiones adicionales de supervisión de las elecciones para las próximas elecciones parlamentarias en Ucrania; pide al Parlamento ucraniano que enmiende el código penal, que se remonta a los tiempos soviéticos, a fin de eliminar las sanciones penales de actos políticos claros llevados a cabo por funcionarios estatales que actúen en el ejercicio de sus funciones oficiales;

• Belarús

55. Pide a las autoridades de Belarús que liberen a todos los presos políticos; pide que el desarrollo de las relaciones con las autoridades de Belarús quede condicionado a los avances hacia el respeto de los principios de democracia, Estado de Derecho y los derechos humanos; recuerda que no puede haber ningún avance en el diálogo entre la UE y Belarús hasta que se libere y rehabilite a todos los presos políticos; celebra al mismo tiempo los esfuerzos realizados por la UE y su Delegación en Minsk para lograr un acercamiento y establecer un mayor contacto con la sociedad belarusa, entre otras cosas, mediante un «Diálogo europeo para la modernización», la facilitación de los procedimientos para la expedición de visados y una mayor participación de ciudadanos belarusos en programas de la UE;

• Cáucaso meridional

56. Observa los considerables avances registrados en el marco de la Asociación Oriental para reforzar las relaciones de la Unión Europea con Armenia, Azerbaiyán y Georgia. pide nuevas medidas para profundizar las relaciones entre la UE y los tres países del Cáucaso meridional;

• Estrategia para el Mar Negro

57. Subraya la importancia estratégica de la región del Mar Negro para la Unión y recuerda a la Comisión y al SEAE que elabore una estrategia para la región del Mar Negro definiendo así un enfoque de la UE integrado y exhaustivo para abordar los retos y posibilidades de la región;

Rusia 58. Apoya la política de la Unión del compromiso crítico con Rusia; considera que Rusia es

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un importante socio y vecino estratégico, pero mantiene su inquietud en lo que se refiere al compromiso de Rusia con el Estado de Derecho, la democracia pluralista y los derechos humanos; deplora, en concreto, las constantes intimidaciones, acosos y arrestos de los representantes de las fuerzas de la oposición y de las organizaciones no gubernamentales, la reciente aprobación de una ley sobre la financiación de las ONG, así como la creciente presión ejercida sobre los medios de comunicación libres e independientes; pide, en este sentido, a la UE que se mantenga constante en sus demandas para que las autoridades rusas asuman sus responsabilidades como miembro del Consejo de Europa y la OSCE; insiste en que la consolidación del Estado de Derecho en todos los ámbitos de la vida pública rusa, incluida la economía, sería una respuesta constructiva al creciente descontento expresado por muchos ciudadanos rusos, y además es necesaria para la construcción de una colaboración verdadera y constructiva entre la UE y Rusia; pone de manifiesto la voluntad de la UE de contribuir a la Asociación para la Modernización y a todo acuerdo que suceda al actual Acuerdo de Asociación y Cooperación que esté vinculado a los avances de Rusia en materia de derechos humanos, Estado de Derecho y democracia pluralista;

59. Cree que la mejor base para una asociación más estrecha debería consistir en un nuevo Acuerdo de Asociación y Cooperación que incluya capítulos sobre el diálogo político, el comercio y las inversiones, la cooperación energética, el diálogo sobre derechos humanos y los ámbitos de justicia, libertad y seguridad; hace hincapié en la necesidad de crear una auténtica asociación entre la UE y las sociedades rusas y, en este contexto, acoge con satisfacción el progreso logrado en la aplicación de las «medidas comunes para viajar sin visado» acordadas entre la UE y Rusia;

60. Pide a la VP/AR y al Consejo que colaboren con Rusia y China para superar las divergencias, incluso en el seno del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, sobre la evaluación de la situación en Siria, con el objetivo común de poner fin al ciclo de violencia, evitar una guerra civil y encontrar una solución pacífica duradera en Siria; acoge con satisfacción la cooperación con Rusia en las negociaciones E3+3 con Irán para evitar que éste adquiera armas nucleares;

61. Pide a la UE y a Rusia que colaboren para mejorar la estabilidad, la cooperación política y el desarrollo económico en la vecindad compartida, al tiempo que muestran su respeto mutuo del derecho soberano del otro país a elegir sus propias medidas de seguridad;

62. Insiste en que, dado que los Estados miembros abordan la conexión y la integración de sus mercados nacionales a través de la inversión en infraestructuras y la aprobación de normas comunes, también deben realizarse esfuerzos para colaborar con Rusia a fin de elaborar medidas creativas y mutuamente aceptables para reducir las discrepancias entre los dos mercados energéticos;

63. Muestra su preocupación por la reciente militarización de la zona de Kaliningrado, que está creando una inseguridad aún mayor cerca de la UE;

– Asia Central

64. Apoya que la UE promueva un enfoque regional en Asia Central, que es esencial para abordar la dimensión regional de problemas como la delincuencia organizada, el tráfico

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de drogas, materiales radiactivos y seres humanos, el terrorismo, los desastres naturales y provocados por el hombre y la gestión de los recursos hídricos y energéticos; lamenta, no obstante, la falta de avances importantes debida solo en parte a los escasos recursos financieros disponibles; pide, por lo tanto, que este compromiso sea firme y quede supeditado (principio «más por más») a los avances en materia de democratización, los derechos humanos, la buena gobernanza, el desarrollo socioeconómico sostenible, el Estado de Derecho y la lucha contra la corrupción; subraya que un enfoque regional no debería socavar los esfuerzos individuales de los estados más avanzados; señala que la Estrategia de cooperación de la UE para Asia Central identifica siete prioridades, pero ofrece recursos demasiado limitados para tener un impacto en todas las políticas; pide que la UE defina mejor sus prioridades de acuerdo con los recursos disponibles; recuerda la importancia de la región en cuanto a la cooperación económica, la energía y la seguridad, aunque hace hincapié en que es importante garantizar que el desarrollo no quede subordinado a dichos intereses; subraya, no obstante, la importancia del diálogo de la UE con los países de Asia Central sobre asuntos de seguridad regional, especialmente en el contexto de la situación de Afganistán y de una posible escalada en las relaciones entre Uzbekistán y Tayikistán; sugiere que la CE investigue la posibilidades de reunir recursos con los Estados miembros activos en la región;

65. Observa que la situación de los derechos humanos, los derechos laborales, la falta de apoyo a la sociedad civil y el Estado de Derecho sigue siendo motivo de preocupación; pide que se refuercen los diálogos sobre derechos humanos, que sean más eficaces y se basen más en los resultados, con la estrecha cooperación y participación de organizaciones de la sociedad civil en la preparación, seguimiento y realización de dichos diálogos; pide a la UE y a la VP/AR que planteen públicamente los casos de presos políticos y de defensores de los derechos humanos y periodistas encarcelados, y pidan la liberación inmediata de todos los presos políticos y juicios justos y transparentes para los demás; pide que la Iniciativa para el Estado de Derecho mejore su transparencia hacia las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y contemple objetivos claros que permitan una evaluación transparente de su aplicación y resultados;

66. Señala que los países de Asia Central, que son ricos en energía y recursos, podrían ofrecer un medio importante para que la UE diversifique sus fuentes y rutas de suministro; señala que la UE es un consumidor fiable y que los países productores tienen que demostrar su fiabilidad como proveedores a los países consumidores y a los inversores externos por medio de, entre otras cosas, el establecimiento de condiciones de igualdad para las empresas nacionales e internacionales de acuerdo con el Estado de Derecho; pide al SEAE y a la Comisión que mantengan su apoyo a proyectos energéticos y a la promoción de la comunicación sobre objetivos importantes, como el Corredor Meridional y el gasoducto a través del Mar Caspio, sin descuidar los principios de buena gobernanza y transparencia como elementos beneficiosos para la cooperación energética entre la UE y los países socios;

67. Hace hincapié en que la explotación y la gestión de los recursos naturales con respecto, en especial, al agua, siguen siendo motivo de controversia en la región y una fuente de inestabilidad, tensión y posible conflicto; acoge con satisfacción, a este respecto, la Iniciativa para el Agua puesta en marcha por la UE en Asia Central, pero pide un diálogo más eficaz y constructivo entre los países montañosos y los países llanos con

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vistas a lograr formas sólidas y sostenibles de tratar los problemas en materia de agua y adoptar acuerdos amplios y duraderos para compartir el agua;

• Afganistán

68. Expresa su preocupación por el resurgimiento de la violencia tras la suspensión de las negociaciones de paz; destaca la importancia de un enfoque subregional de Asia Central para hacer frente al tráfico transfronterizo de personas y mercancías y luchar contra la producción ilegal y el tráfico de drogas, fuente básica de financiación para la delincuencia organizada y el terrorismo; pide una mayor cooperación entre los Estados miembros que participan en la misión ISAF de la OTAN a fin de garantizar la eficacia de la intervención; pide esfuerzos para apoyar el desarrollo de las capacidades del Gobierno de la República Islámica de Afganistán y de las Fuerzas de Seguridad Nacionales, e intensificar las ayudas a la población en general para el desarrollo agrícola y socioeconómico a fin de que el país asuma plenamente la responsabilidad de su propia seguridad, una vez que finalice la transferencia de la seguridad interior a las fuerzas afganas a finales de 2014;

69. Toma nota, con gran preocupación por la población afectada, de que la intervención militar en Afganistán no ha logrado crear un estado viable con estructuras democráticas, la mejora de las condiciones de vida de la mayoría, en especial de las mujeres y las niñas, ni la sustitución de la producción de narcóticos por otras formas de agricultura, sino que ha dejado al país inmerso en un nivel de corrupción sin precedentes; pide a la UE y a los Estados miembros que, a la vista de la acelerada retirada de las tropas europeas elaboren, con carácter prioritario, un plan de seguridad para aquellos afganos que hayan apoyado estrechamente los esfuerzos europeos para la creación de un estado y cuyas vidas pudieran estar amenazadas tras la salida europea, y especialmente la vida de las mujeres activistas; pide al SEAE que lleve a cabo una evaluación honesta de la política de la UE y de los Estados miembros en Afganistán desde 2001 y que presente a finales del presente año un plan realista para las actividades futuras de la UE en la región;

70. Hace hincapié en la necesidad de reforzar la cooperación con países como Rusia, Pakistán, India e Irán al abordar los problemas de Afganistán, especialmente aquellos relacionados con el tráfico de drogas, el terrorismo y el riesgo de contagio a países vecinos y a la región;

– América

• Estados Unidos

71. Cree firmemente que los Estados Unidos son el socio estratégico más importante para la UE; por ello, insta a la UE a que otorgue prioridad política clara a la profundización de las relaciones transatlánticas a todos los niveles;

72. Subraya la suma importancia de las relaciones transatlánticas; estima que la celebración de cumbres periódicas entre la UE y los Estados Unidos ofrecería una oportunidad para identificar objetivos comunes y coordinar estrategias sobre amenazas y problemas de importancia mundial, como la gobernanza económica y la elaboración de un enfoque

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común hacia las potencias emergentes; acoge con satisfacción el informe del Grupo de Trabajo de Alto Nivel sobre Empleo y Crecimiento; considera que el Consejo Económico Transatlántico (CET) y el Diálogo Transatlántico de Legisladores (DTL) deben incluir una reflexión sobre el compromiso estratégico de la UE y los Estados Unidos con los países BRICS y otros países emergentes importantes, así como con la ASEAN, la Unión Africana, Mercosur, la Comunidad Andina y la CELAC, sobre la forma de fomentar la convergencia normativa con esos países; subraya la importancia del CET, como órgano responsable de la mejora de la integración económica y de la cooperación en materia legislativa, y del DTL, como foro para el diálogo parlamentario y la coordinación del trabajo parlamentario de ambas partes en cuestiones de interés común y, en particular, la legislación pertinente para el mercado transatlántico; recuerda la necesidad de establecer cuanto antes un Consejo Político Transatlántico como órgano ad hoc de consulta y coordinación sistemática de alto nivel en materia de política exterior y de seguridad entre la UE y los EE.UU. simultáneamente con la OTAN;

73. Señala que los Estados Unidos están trasladando progresivamente su principal atención, inversión política y recursos militares al Pacífico, reflejando así la creciente importancia a nivel mundial y regional de China, India y otros países emergentes de Asia; señala asimismo que Asia debe ocupar un papel cada vez más importante en la agenda exterior de la UE y de sus Estados miembros; pide por ello que se coordinen mejor las políticas de los EE.UU. y de la UE respecto de China, India y otros países emergentes de Asia con el fin de evitar una disociación de sus respectivos enfoques de las políticas clave;

74. Considera que los Estados Unidos seguirán haciendo una contribución vital a la seguridad colectiva de la zona euro-atlántica y reafirma la importancia inmutable y vital de los lazos de seguridad transatlánticos; señala que, en la cambiante situación geoestratégica y económica, crear unas capacidades de seguridad y defensa europeas más sólidas supone una importante forma de reforzar los lazos transatlánticos;

• América Latina

75. Pide que se amplíe a todos los niveles el diálogo entre la UE y América Latina, incluidas las Cumbres de Jefes de Estado y la Asamblea Parlamentaria EUROLAT, por ser una importante herramienta para el desarrollo de consenso político; pide que los compromisos políticos adoptados en las Cumbres UE-América Latina vayan acompañados de la asignación de recursos financieros adecuados; expresa su enorme inquietud ante la reciente nacionalización por parte de Argentina de YPF, importante empresa petrolífera de propiedad española, y ante las acciones sumamente inoportunas que ha realizado el país en cuanto a las Islas Malvinas, pertenecientes al Reino Unido;

76. Propone que se examine la posibilidad de intensificar la cooperación, en especial en el ámbito económico, entre América y la UE, con objeto de lograr un acuerdo común de libre comercio;

77. Pide que se intensifiquen los actuales diálogos sobre derechos humanos con una mayor participación del Parlamento, así como el diálogo sobre la mejora de la cooperación ante los retos importantes en el ámbito de la seguridad, sobre todo en lo relativo a las nefastas repercusiones del narcotráfico y la delincuencia organizada en las instituciones estatales y para la seguridad humana; señala que la Séptima Cumbre de Jefes de Estado

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y de Gobierno de la UE y América Latina y el Caribe, que se celebrará en Chile en enero de 2013, podría ser una buena oportunidad para avanzar nuevos puntos de vista para la cooperación birregional en una amplia gama de ámbitos políticos y socioeconómicos;

78. Subraya que la cohesión social debe seguir siendo un principio clave de la estrategia de cooperación para el desarrollo con respecto a América Latina, no solo por sus repercusiones socioeconómicas, sino también por su importancia en cuanto a la consolidación de las instituciones democráticas en la región y el Estado de Derecho; destaca también que una nueva cooperación al desarrollo entre la UE y los países de renta media de América Latina es necesaria para abordar las grandes desigualdades que aún persisten en la región; pide el refuerzo de la cooperación triangular y la cooperación Sur-Sur con los países de América del Sur;

79. Destaca las repercusiones significativas de la emergencia de Brasil en la región y en el ámbito global, combinando los programas económicos y sociales con la democracia, el Estado de de derecho y las libertades fundamentales; solicita el refuerzo de la Asociación Estratégica UE-Brasil y del diálogo político;

80. Acoge con satisfacción el hecho de que el Acuerdo de Asociación con América Central se vaya a firmar pronto y esté sujeto al procedimiento de aprobación en el Parlamento Europeo; subraya que este acuerdo, al ser el primer tratado interregional integral para la UE, eleva la relación y fomenta un enfoque regional, así como la integración regional latinoamericana; declara su intención de seguir muy de cerca la aplicación de este acuerdo y, en particular, sus repercusiones en la situación de los derechos humanos y el Estado de Derecho en América Central;

81. Celebra, asimismo, que el Acuerdo de Libre Comercio entre la Unión Europea y Colombia y Perú vaya a firmarse en breve y esté sujeto al procedimiento de aprobación en el Parlamento Europeo; recuerda que dicho Acuerdo no puede concebirse como un marco definitivo para las relaciones entra la UE y esos países, sino como un paso más hacia un acuerdo de asociación global, que deja la puerta abierta a la adhesión de otros países de la Comunidad Andina;

82. Señala que el objetivo de la UE es la firma de un Acuerdo de Asociación con todos los miembros de la Comunidad Andina; considera que el Acuerdo de Asociación con MERCOSUR representaría un avance determinante en las relaciones estratégicas con América Latina, siempre que se base en los principios de un comercio libre y justo y seguridad jurídica de las inversiones, el respeto de las normas internacionales, laborales y medioambientales y el comportamiento fiable de los socios;

83. Deplora que las propuestas de la Comisión sobre el reglamento relativo a un sistema de preferencias arancelarias generalizadas y el Instrumento de Cooperación al Desarrollo ignoren el carácter estratégico de las relaciones con América Latina, ya que excluyen a un buen número de países vulnerables de la región; recuerda que algunos países de América Latina se encuentran entre los más desiguales del mundo en ingresos per cápita y que la desigualdad persistente se produce en un contexto de baja movilidad socioeconómica; considera que el mensaje que transmite la UE hacia la región es muy preocupante ya que, en la práctica, es una declaración de que no le concede la

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importancia que merece, a pesar de los múltiples compromisos políticos y comerciales adquiridos, así como de los intereses globales comunes;

– África

84. Señala que la Estrategia conjunta África-UE se centraba en un principio en la Unión Africana (UA) y en la asistencia técnica para el desarrollo de capacidades institucionales y políticas en los ámbitos de la paz y la seguridad, los derechos humanos, la promoción de la democracia, el Estado de Derecho y el logro de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM); recuerda que, aunque este enfoque integral sigue siendo válido, resulta urgente ir más allá del desarrollo de capacidades institucionales a nivel continental para desarrollar una asociación política a favor de la paz, la seguridad y el desarrollo socioeconómico a nivel regional y subregional; pide que se extiendan estas asociaciones políticas para incluir a las Comunidades Económicas Regionales, no solo como una estrategia para reforzar la Unión Europea, sino también como medio para intensificar la asociación UE-África a nivel regional y subregional a fin de tener en cuenta los intereses políticos, económicos y de seguridad de los ciudadanos africanos y europeos; lamenta el atraso que han supuesto los golpes de Estado, como los acontecidos en Malí y Guinea-Bissau, para los objetivos y principios democráticos de la UA, la UE y las Naciones Unidas; solicita el urgente restablecimiento del orden constitucional en dichos países;

85. Toma nota de las estrategias de la UE para la región del Cuerno de África y el Sahel; considera que se deben abordar las causas estructurales del conflicto en esas regiones a fin de allanar el camino hacia una solución pacífica viable de los problemas y ofrecer una perspectiva más adecuada para la población, lo cual implica garantizar el acceso justo a los recursos, el desarrollo sostenible de la región y la redistribución de la riqueza; pide que se evalúen las políticas de la Unión a las que se dedican recursos diplomáticos considerables y un volumen destacable de ayuda al desarrollo con vistas a analizar los efectos en la población; pide también una mayor colaboración entre el Parlamento Europeo, el Parlamento Panafricano y los órganos parlamentarios regionales a fin de garantizar una mayor rendición de cuentas por las decisiones políticas y presupuestarias ante los ciudadanos de ambos continentes y como fundamento para medir y evaluar los avances en la aplicación de las distintas políticas;

86. Alberga una enorme preocupación en cuanto a las tensiones existentes entre Sudán y Sudán del Sur; insta a ambas partes a demostrar su voluntad política de resolver las cuestiones pendientes tras la secesión de conformidad con la hoja de ruta aprobada en la Resolución 2046 (2012) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, de 2 de mayo de 2012; hace hincapié en que la estabilidad de la región a largo plazo requiere una nueva estrategia internacional, unificada y general, en la que la UE podría desempeñar un papel junto con otros actores mundiales y regionales, y que se centraría no solamente en cuestiones Norte-Sur y en la situación en Kordofán Meridional y el Nilo Azul, sino también en el proceso de reformas en Sudán, pendiente desde hace largo tiempo, y en la profundización de las reformas democráticas en Sudán del Sur;

87. Recuerda su Resolución de 25 de noviembre de 2010 sobre la situación en el Sáhara Occidental; pide a Marruecos y al Frente Polisario que prosigan con las negociaciones

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para una solución pacífica y duradera en el Sáhara Occidental y reitera el derecho del pueblo saharaui a la autodeterminación y a decidir sobre el estatuto del Sáhara Occidental mediante un referendo democrático, con arreglo a las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas pertinentes;

– Asia

88. Pide que la UE aumente su presencia en la región de Asia y el Pacífico, en particular destacando los logros de la transición democrática en Indonesia, el país musulmán de mayores dimensiones, y mediante la contribución de su experiencia y conocimientos técnicos a las iniciativas multilaterales en el seno de la ASEAN y en torno a esta, y a la progresiva aparición de nuevas iniciativas transpacíficas; considera que el SEAE debería aprovechar al máximo el potencial disponible para impulsar la cooperación entre la UE y Asia; sostiene que el Plan de Acción de Bandar Seri Begawan robustece la colaboración reforzada ASEAN-UE como primer paso pertinente en ese sentido; elogia también el reciente respaldo al Tratado de Amistad como oportunidad para profundizar en la cooperación, con vistas a ir más allá de la perspectiva de los acuerdos comerciales entre la UE y los países asiáticos; subraya que debería darse una mayor prioridad al desarrollo económico y cultural mutuo, en particular a través del fomento de las oportunidades de inversión directa y haciendo más atractivo y fácil el acceso a estudiantes e investigadores; señala que ello implica una coordinación estratégica de los esfuerzos de los Estados miembros y de la UE, por oposición a políticas nacionales paralelas que compitan entre sí; señala que en el contexto de seguridad regional del Pacífico Asiático, en el que se incluyen litigios territoriales en torno al Mar del Sur de China, así como la preocupación relativa a Corea del Norte, la UE debería proponer activamente, en su calidad de socio neutral, una solución estable y pacífica basada en las instituciones multilaterales;

89. Solicita la rápida puesta en marcha de las negociaciones sobre el Acuerdo de Colaboración y Cooperación UE-Japón;

• China

90. Acoge con satisfacción los avances en el desarrollo de la Asociación Estratégica UE-China, incluido el desarrollo del tercer pilar «diálogo entre los pueblos», además de los diálogos en materia económica y de seguridad; hace hincapié en la creciente interdependencia entre las economías de China y la UE y recuerda la importancia del rápido crecimiento de la economía china y su influencia en el sistema internacional;

91. Señala que el cambio de liderazgo en China será una importante prueba de la evolución de este país; confirma su objetivo de desarrollar una asociación estratégica integral con China; pide a la UE y a sus Estados miembros que adopten una posición más coherente y estratégica en sus mensajes y políticas con el fin de contribuir a apoyar una evolución en la dirección correcta; destaca que ello implica eliminar las diferencias entre las prioridades de los Estados miembros y de la UE en relación con los derechos humanos en China, el diálogo sobre derechos humanos y el apoyo a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil;

• Japón

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92. Destaca la necesidad de consolidar las relaciones de la UE con Japón como agente internacional de primer orden que comparte con la UE unos valores democráticos comunes y es un socio natural para la cooperación en los foros multilaterales y en cuestiones de interés mutuo; aguarda con interés la realización del acuerdo sobre un marco general y del acuerdo de libre comercio;

Asia meridional y oriental

93. Pide que la UE se muestre más activa en Asia Meridional y en Asia Sudoriental para apoyar la evolución democrática y las mejoras en el ámbito de la gobernanza y el Estado de Derecho; celebra por ello el compromiso a favor de un Pakistán democrático, laico, estable y socialmente incluyente; acoge con satisfacción el primer diálogo estratégico UE-Pakistán de junio de 2012 y el compromiso para la celebración de debates constructivos sobre el refuerzo de la cooperación bilateral y las opiniones compartidas en asuntos regionales e internacionales de interés mutuo, incluida una participación más activa en la lucha contra el terrorismo; pide a la UE y a sus Estados miembros que refuercen unas relaciones con la India basadas en la promoción de la democracia, la inclusión social, el Estado de Derecho y los derechos humanos; pide asimismo a la UE y a la India que concluyan rápidamente las negociaciones actuales para un acuerdo de libre comercio UE-India integral, que estimularía el comercio y el crecimiento económico de Europa y la India; insta a la UE y a sus Estados miembros a respaldar plenamente el desarrollo económico y la reconstrucción de Sri Lanka tras la guerra y, en ese sentido, pide al Consejo que estudie detenidamente la posibilidad de restablecer condiciones favorables para Sri Lanka en materia de comercio con la UE, sobre todo su estatus del SPG+; acoge con satisfacción el respaldo activo de la UE a favor del proceso de democratización en Birmania/Myanmar;

94. Se congratula de que las elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias celebradas en Taiwán el 14 de enero de 2012 concluyeran satisfactoriamente; insta a Taiwán a continuar los esfuerzos para mantener la paz y la estabilidad en la zona de Asia-Pacífico; reconoce el progreso experimentado en las relaciones entre China y Taiwán, en particular en lo relativo a la mejora de los vínculos económicos, así como que unos nexos económicos más intensos con Taiwán podrían mejorar el acceso del mercado de la UE a China; insta a la Comisión y al Consejo, de conformidad con la Resolución del Parlamento, de 11 mayo de 2011, sobre la PESC, a adoptar medidas concretas para mejorar las relaciones económicas entre la UE y Taiwán y facilitar la negociación de un acuerdo de cooperación económica UE-Taiwán; reitera su firme apoyo a la significativa participación de Taiwán en organizaciones y actividades internacionales de importancia, entre ellas la Organización Mundial de la Salud; reconoce que el Programa de Exención de Visado de la UE vigente para los ciudadanos taiwaneses, que entró en vigor en enero de 2011, ha demostrado ser mutuamente beneficioso; apuesta por una cooperación bilateral más estrecha entre la UE y Taiwán en ámbitos como el comercio, la investigación, la cultura, la educación y la protección del medio ambiente;

95. Insta a la UE a sensibilizar a la ciudadanía sobre las graves violaciones de los derechos humanos, los asesinatos masivos y el trato inhumano en los campos de trabajo y de presos políticos en Corea del Norte y a respaldar a las víctimas de dichas violaciones;

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– Socios multilaterales

• G-7, G-8 y G-20

96. Considera que, ante la creciente importancia de los BRICS y otras potencias emergentes y del sistema multipolar de gobernanza global que se está configurando, el G-20 podría ser un foro útil y especialmente apropiado para el logro de consenso que sea incluyente, esté basado en la colaboración y sea capaz de fomentar la convergencia, incluida la convergencia reglamentaria; considera, no obstante, que el G-20 debe aún demostrar su utilidad para convertir las conclusiones de las cumbres en políticas sostenibles que aborden los retos fundamentales y, sobre todo, el control de los paraísos fiscales y otros desafíos y amenazas que pone de manifiesto la crisis financiera y económica global; señala en este sentido el potencial del G-8 para desempeñar un papel clave para el logro de consenso antes de las reuniones del G-20; considera que la existencia del G-8 también debe aprovecharse para intentar acercar posiciones con Rusia con el fin de afrontar los retos comunes de manera coordinada y eficaz;

• Naciones Unidas

97. Pide que la UE que, mostrando que el multilateralismo eficaz es una de las piedras angulares de la política exterior de la UE, asuma un papel de liderazgo en la cooperación internacional y promueva la acción global de la comunidad internacional; pide a la UE que siga promoviendo sinergias dentro del sistema de las Naciones Unidas, que sirva de puente en ellas y que entable un diálogo a nivel mundial con organizaciones regionales y socios estratégicos; manifiesta su apoyo para la continuación de la reforma de las Naciones Unidas; pide a la UE que contribuya a la buena gestión financiera y a la disciplina presupuestaria en relación con los recursos de las Naciones Unidas;

98. Pide, por ello, a la UE que insista en una amplia reforma del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas a fin de reforzar su legitimidad, representación regional y eficacia; subraya que dicho proceso de reforma puede ser impulsado irreversiblemente por los Estados miembros de la UE si, de forma coherente con los propósitos del Tratado de Lisboa para mejorar la política exterior de la UE y el papel de la UE en la paz global y la seguridad, solicitan un puesto permanente para la UE en un CSNU ampliado y reformado; pide a la VP/AR que tome urgentemente la iniciativa para que los Estados miembros elaboren una posición común a tal efecto; insta a los Estados miembros a que, a la espera de la adopción de dicha posición común, acuerden y apliquen, sin demora, un sistema de rotación en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas con el fin de asegurarse con carácter permanente un puesto de la UE en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas;

99. Considera importante que la Resolución de la Asamblea General sobre la participación de la UE en los trabajos de dicha asamblea se aplique plenamente y que la UE actúe y obtenga resultados de forma oportuna y coordinada sobre temas sustanciales; pide a la UE que mejore la coordinación de las posiciones e intereses de sus Estados miembros en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas; acoge con satisfacción el establecimiento de prioridades a medio plazo de la UE en las Naciones Unidas, y pide

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que se consulte periódicamente a la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Parlamento Europeo sobre su revisión anual y sobre su aplicación; subraya la necesidad de una diplomacia pública más vigorosa en lo relativo a los asuntos de las Naciones Unidas y de que el papel de la UE a nivel mundial se comunique de forma más eficaz al público europeo;

100. Tiene la firme convicción de que es necesario desarrollar la colaboración en el ámbito de la prevención de conflictos, la gestión de crisis civiles y militares, y la consolidación de la paz y, en consecuencia, que el Comité Director UE-ONU actúe de forma más eficaz en el contexto de la gestión de crisis; pide a la UE y a sus Estados miembros que sigan avanzado en la aplicación efectiva del principio de «responsabilidad de proteger» y que colaboren con los socios de las Naciones Unidas para que este concepto pase a ser parte de la prevención de conflictos y la reconstrucción después de estos; solicita la elaboración de un «Consenso interinstitucional sobre la responsabilidad de proteger y una Política común de prevención de conflictos», en paralelo a los ya existentes «Consenso Europeo sobre la Ayuda Humanitaria» y «Consenso Europeo sobre Desarrollo», que podrían asegurar una mayor uniformidad de la UE en los foros de las Naciones Unidas sobre dichas cuestiones;

101. Recuerda que el Planteamiento global para la aplicación por parte de la UE de las Resoluciones 1325 y 1820 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas relativas a la mujer, la paz y la seguridad, aprobadas por el Consejo de la Unión Europea el 1 de diciembre de 2008, reconoce los estrechos lazos existentes entre las cuestiones de la paz, la seguridad, el desarrollo y la igualdad de género y debería ser una pieza fundamental de la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común; hace hincapié en que la UE ha pedido firmemente la aplicación global del programa para la mujer, la paz y la seguridad establecido en las Resoluciones 1325 (2000) y 1820 (2008) de las Naciones Unidas y posteriormente reforzado por la aprobación de las Resoluciones 1888 y 1889 (2009), así como de la 1960 (2010), especialmente la necesidad de combatir la violencia contra las mujeres en las situaciones de conflicto y el fomento de la participación femenina en la consolidación de la paz; insta a aquellos Estados miembros que aún no lo hayan hecho a aprobar Planes de acción nacionales sobre la mujer, la paz y la seguridad y destaca que deberían basarse en unos criterios europeos mínimos e uniformes en lo que se refiere a sus metas, aplicación y supervisión en todo el territorio de la UE;

102. Subraya la necesidad de elaborar directrices y capacidades de mediación más eficaces a través de la colaboración entre la UE y las Naciones Unidas en cuanto a capacidades de mediación, con el fin de conceder recursos más adecuados para la mediación de forma oportuna y coordinada y garantizar la participación de las mujeres en estos procesos; considera que para aplicar la política de derechos humanos de la UE es esencial desarrollar la capacidad del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas para abordar las situaciones graves y urgentes de los derechos humanos, para reforzar el proceso de seguimiento de la aplicación de las recomendaciones de los procedimientos especiales y para reforzar el proceso del Examen Periódico Universal; insiste en la necesidad de que la UE continúe apoyando al Tribunal Penal Internacional, con el objetivo de contribuir a la efectiva protección de los derechos humanos y a la lucha contra la impunidad;

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103. Pide a la VP/AR y al Consejo que, en lo que respecta a las negociaciones de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas (TCA), trabajen en pos de alcanzar los estándares más elevados posibles de protección de la legislación internacional en materia de derechos humanos y de derecho humanitario internacional, estableciendo unos criterios que vayan más allá de los ya acordados a escala de la UE y consagrados en la Posición común de la UE relativa a la exportación de armas; subraya que los Estados Partes de la UE no deben aceptar normas menos exigentes, que sin duda redundarán en detrimento del éxito y la eficacia del TCA;

• UE-OTAN

104. Acoge con satisfacción los compromisos contraídos por la UE y la OTAN de fortalecer su asociación estratégica, reafirmados por la Alianza en el nuevo Concepto Estratégico y en la Cumbre de Chicago, y hace hincapié en los avances realizados en la cooperación práctica en las operaciones; señala que la actual crisis económica europea y mundial ha estimulado los esfuerzos por dotar a la UE y la OTAN de las capacidades operativas eficientes que tanto necesitan; pide por ello a la VP/AR que tome la iniciativa para promover nuevas propuestas concretas para la mejora de la cooperación entre las organizaciones, incluso a través de la Agencia Europea de Defensa (defensa inteligente, puesta en común de las capacidades militares y un enfoque integral como principios rectores, sobre la base de la complementariedad de las iniciativas); pide una solución política urgente al bloqueo de la cooperación en el marco de los acuerdos «Berlín plus», que retrasa las perspectivas para que las dos organizaciones cooperen de modo más eficaz;

• Consejo de Europa

105. Pide a los Estados miembros que cumplan con su deber de concluir con celeridad las negociaciones sobre la adhesión de la UE al Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales (CEDH); subraya la importancia de los criterios, procedimientos de seguimiento y conclusiones del Consejo de Europa, por ser una importante aportación para evaluar los avances de los países vecinos para llevar a cabo reformas democráticas;

106. Insiste en el hecho de que la adhesión de la UE al CEDH constituye una oportunidad histórica de declarar los derechos humanos como valor fundamental de la Unión y terreno común para sus relaciones con países terceros, y espera que se materialice sin demoras innecesarias; reitera que la adhesión de la UE al CEDH constituye un logro destacable para reforzar en mayor medida la protección de los derechos humanos en Europa;

• OSCE

107. Apoya el diálogo sobre la reforma de la Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (OSCE), siempre que no implique el debilitamiento de las instituciones y mecanismos ya existentes o afecte a su independencia; subraya la necesidad de mantener el equilibrio entre las tres dimensiones de la OSCE, desarrollándolas de forma coherente y global a partir de los resultados conseguidos hasta la fecha; subraya igualmente que habría que hacer frente a las amenazas y retos a

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la seguridad en sus tres dimensiones para que las medidas resulten realmente eficaces; pide a la OSCE que siga reforzando su capacidad de garantizar el respeto y la aplicación de los principios y compromisos asumidos por los Estados participantes en las tres dimensiones, mejorando, por ejemplo, los mecanismos de seguimiento;

• CCG

108. Espera que la UE desarrolle una verdadera asociación estratégica con el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo (CCG), que incluya un diálogo abierto, periódico y constructivo, y una cooperación estructurada sobre los derechos humanos y la democracia, así como sobre el proceso de transición y la gestión de crisis en los países vecinos meridionales; reitera que, para apoyar este objetivo, el SEAE debería dedicar más recursos humanos a esta región y abrir delegaciones en los principales países del CCG; subraya que los derechos humanos, los derechos de las mujeres, el Estado de derecho y las aspiraciones democráticas de los ciudadanos de los países del CCG, desde Baréin hasta Arabia Saudí, no pueden seguir pasándose por alto en las políticas de la UE para la región;

• Liga Árabe

109. Reconoce el papel cada vez más importante que desempeñan las organizaciones regionales, especialmente la Liga Árabe, pero también la Organización de Cooperación Islámica y la Organización de Cooperación Económica, y pide a la UE que refuerce la cooperación, en particular en temas relacionados con los procesos de transición y la gestión de crisis en los países vecinos meridionales; acoge con satisfacción los esfuerzos que realiza la UE para ayudar a la Liga Árabe en su proceso de integración;

– Prioridades temáticas de la PESC

• Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa

110. Insiste en que las acciones de la PCSD deben insertarse en una política general dirigida a países y regiones en crisis en los que estén en juego los valores e intereses estratégicos de la UE y en los que las operaciones de la PCSD aporten un valor añadido real promoviendo la paz, la estabilidad y el Estado de Derecho; destaca, asimismo, la necesidad de un proceso de aprendizaje de experiencias que evalúe con más precisión el éxito de cada una de las operaciones y su repercusión duradera sobre el terreno;

111. Reitera su llamamiento a la VP/AR, al Consejo y a los Estados miembros para que aborden los numerosos problemas que afectan a la cooperación civil y militar, desde las carencias de personal cualificado hasta las carencias y desequilibrios en los equipamientos; pide, en particular, personal en los ámbitos de la justicia, la administración civil, las aduanas y la mediación, a fin de que las misiones de la PCSD cuenten con conocimientos técnicos adecuados y suficientes; pide a la VP/AR que presente propuestas concretas para colmar esta escasez de personal, en particular en el ámbito de la gestión de crisis civiles y en los sectores antes mencionados;

112. Acoge con satisfacción las peticiones para poner en común y compartir en mayor medida las capacidades militares clave, mejorar las capacidades de planificación y realización de misiones y operaciones e integrar las misiones y operaciones civiles y

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militares; destaca la necesidad de mejorar sistemáticamente las misiones y operaciones PCSD, también mediante la evaluación de resultados, la determinación de criterios de referencia, las evaluaciones de impacto, la determinación y aplicación de las lecciones aprendidas y el desarrollo de prácticas adecuadas para que la acción en el marco de la PCSD discurra de forma eficaz y eficiente; lamenta, no obstante, los condicionantes políticos que dificultan la cooperación, que en ocasiones impiden que las mejores prácticas puedan crear sinergias;

•••• Comercio de armas

113. Recuerda que los Estados miembros son responsables de más de un tercio de las exportaciones de armas en todo el planeta; pide a los Estados miembros que respeten no solo los ocho criterios de la Posición Común 2008/944/PESC (el Código de Conducta de la Unión Europea en materia de exportación de armas), sino también los principios de la política de desarrollo de la UE; pide que se transfieran a la UE las competencias sobre la regulación de las exportaciones de armas; recuerda a los Estados miembros que los países en desarrollo deberían invertir sus recursos financieros ante todo en el desarrollo social y económico sostenible, la democracia y el Estado de derecho; insta a la VP/AR y a los Estados miembros a aprovechar la actual revisión de la Posición Común 2008/944/PESC de la UE para reforzar la aplicación y la supervisión de los criterios de la UE sobre las exportaciones de armas; pide a la VP/AR y a los Estados miembros que hablen con una sola voz en el contexto de las negociaciones de las Naciones Unidas sobre un Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas (TCA) global y que impulsen un TCA sólido y firme que exija a los Estados Parte que se nieguen a toda exportación de armas en caso de que exista un grave peligro de que éstas se empleen para cometer o facilitar violaciones graves de la legislación internacional en materia de derechos humanos y derecho humanitario internacional, incluyendo el genocidio, los crímenes contra la humanidad y los crímenes de guerra;

• Prevención de conflictos y consolidación de la paz

114. Pide a la VP/AR que presente propuestas para mejorar las capacidades de la SEAE en materia de prevención de conflictos y consolidación de la paz, en particular en referencia al Programa de Gotemburgo, que amplíe aún más la capacidad de la UE para evitar conflictos y ofrecer capacidades de mediación, junto con el aumento de los recursos de sus capacidades de gestión de crisis; pide con carácter prioritario que se haga un inventario de las políticas de la UE en el ámbito de la prevención de conflictos y la consolidación de la paz a fin de que la VP/AR presente al Parlamento propuestas para reforzar la capacidad de la acción exterior y de respuesta de la UE en dichos ámbitos; celebra la propuesta de la Comisión y del SEAE de introducir una línea presupuestaria con una dotación de 500 000 euros para los servicios de prevención de conflictos y de apoyo a la consolidación de la paz en el presupuesto del SEAE para 2013, tras la conclusión positiva a finales de este año de una acción preparatoria propuesta por el Parlamento; pide a la VP/AR que refuerce la participación de las mujeres en los mecanismos de prevención de conflictos, mediación y consolidación de la paz;

115. Considera que la propuesta relativa a la creación de un Instituto Europeo para la Paz

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autónomo o semiautónomo estrechamente vinculado a la UE es una idea muy prometedora que podría contribuir a reforzar la prevención de conflictos y las capacidades mediadoras en Europa; solicita que dicho organismo se base en un mandato claramente definido que evite la duplicación de organizaciones gubernamentales y no gubernamentales existentes y se centre en la diplomacia mediadora informal y en la transferencia de conocimientos dentro de la UE y entre ésta y los agentes mediadores independientes; aguarda con interés los resultados del proyecto piloto para un Instituto Europeo para la Paz lanzado este año; espera participar plenamente en las negociaciones para la posible creación de dicho ente;

• Sanciones y medidas restrictivas

116. Cree que, en el tratamiento que dispensa a los regímenes autoritarios, la UE debería desarrollar una política más coherente en cuanto a la imposición y al levantamiento de sanciones y medidas restrictivas;

• No proliferación y desarme

117. Insta a la VP/AR a analizar la efectividad de la Unión Europea al abordar la amenaza que plantean las armas químicas, biológicas, radiológicas y nucleares una década después de la aprobación en 2003 de la Estrategia contra la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva y una vez expirado el plazo prorrogado para la aplicación de las Nuevas líneas de actuación de 2008, con vistas a que la VP/AR informe al Parlamento de las propuestas para el refuerzo de las capacidades de la UE en ese ámbito político;

118. Insta a la VP/AR a analizar la efectividad de la Unión Europea al abordar la amenaza que plantea la proliferación de las Armas ligeras y de pequeño calibre (ALPC) y otras armas convencionales, así como cuestiones más amplias relacionadas con el desarme, tras la aprobación de la Estrategia de la UE contra la acumulación y el tráfico ilícitos de armas pequeñas y ligeras y de sus municiones en 2005 y de otros marcos políticos importantes (incluyendo la Posición Común de la UE sobre el corretaje de armas y los embargos de armas de la UE), con vistas a que la VP/AR informe al Parlamento de las propuestas para el refuerzo de las capacidades de la UE en este ámbito político;

• Agencia Europea de Defensa

119. Reitera su llamamiento a los Estados miembros para que intensifiquen la cooperación europea en materia de defensa, que es la única forma viable de garantizar que las fuerzas militares europeas sean creíbles y operativas, en vista de la reducción de los presupuestos de defensa; señala los avances logrados mediante la puesta en común participativa de recursos de la UE y la defensa inteligente de la OTAN, y considera que es esencial lograr nuevas sinergias entre las dos organizaciones; subraya la necesidad de seguir avanzando en la puesta en común participativa de recursos, y en las posibles sinergias en el ámbito de la investigación, desarrollo y cooperación industrial en materia de defensa a nivel de la Unión; acoge con satisfacción las iniciativas de cooperación reforzada en esta materia, y entre ellas la Iniciativa Weimar plus;

120. Recuerda, en este contexto, el papel esencial que desempeña la Agencia Europea de Defensa (AED) en la formulación y aplicación de una política de la UE de capacidades

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y armamentos; pide por ello al Consejo que refuerce el carácter institucional de la AED y desarrolle todo su potencial, como se establece en el artículo 42, apartado 3, y el artículo 45 del TFUE;

121. Insta al Consejo y a los Estados miembros a que doten a la AED de fondos adecuados para todas sus misiones y tareas; estima que la mejor manera de hacerlo es financiar los costes de personal y funcionamiento de la Agencia con cargo al presupuesto de la Unión a partir del próximo marco financiero plurianual; pide a tal fin a la VP/AR que presente las propuestas necesarias;

• Seguridad energética

122. Señala que el artículo 194 del Tratado de Lisboa establece que la UE tiene derecho a adoptar medidas a escala europea para garantizar la seguridad del abastecimiento de energía; señala a este respecto que, para mejorar la seguridad energética y reforzar a la vez la credibilidad y la efectividad de la PESC, es de suma importancia reducir la dependencia energética respecto de países terceros, sobre todo de aquellos que no comparten o que vulneran valores de la UE; considera que la diversificación de las fuentes de suministro y las rutas de tránsito, así como el aumento del recurso a las fuentes de energía renovable y limpia y las rutas de tránsito son cuestiones urgentes y esenciales para la UE, que depende en gran medida de fuentes externas de energía; señala que las principales direcciones para esta diversificación son el Ártico, la cuenca mediterránea y el corredor meridional que va desde Irak hasta Asia Central y Oriente Próximo, e insta a la Comisión a priorizar dichos proyectos; manifiesta su preocupación por los retrasos que sufre la conclusión del corredor meridional; destaca la necesidad de lograr la seguridad energética mediante la diversificación de la energía y hace hincapié en el potencial de un corredor de GNL complementario en el este del Mediterráneo como fuente flexible de energía e incentivo para una mayor competitividad en el mercado interior de la UE; estima que la UE debe velar por que una de las principales fuentes de importaciones en la actualidad —Rusia— cumpla las normas del mercado interior, la normativa del Tercer Paquete Energético y el Tratado sobre la Carta de la Energía; destaca el gran potencial en el desarrollo y la interdependencia que podría derivar de unas redes transcontinentales inteligentes para las energías renovables que unieran Europa y África;

123. Señala que la Comisión propuso en 2011 la creación de un mecanismo de intercambio de información sobre acuerdos intergubernamentales en materia de energía entre los Estados miembros y países terceros; considera que el intercambio de mejores prácticas y el apoyo político de la Comisión reforzarían igualmente el poder de negociación de los Estados miembros; pide a la VP/AR y a la Comisión que informen periódicamente al Parlamento sobre la creación y aplicación de este mecanismo; pide a la Comisión que incluya una «cláusula sobre seguridad energética» en los acuerdos comerciales, de asociación y de cooperación con los países productores y de tránsito, es decir, un código de conducta en caso de que se interrumpa el suministro o se modifiquen unilateralmente las condiciones de éste;

• Nuevas amenazas y desafíos

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124. Destaca que la PESC debe reservar un lugar destacado a las medidas contra la nueva generación de retos para la estabilidad y la seguridad internacional, como el cambio climático la delincuencia y el terrorismo internacionales, los ataques cibernéticos, la proliferación de armas nucleares y de destrucción masiva, los Estados fallidos, la piratería y las pandemias;

• La dimensión exterior del Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia

125. Recuerda que la dimensión exterior del Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia debe desempeñar un papel destacado en la PESC; subraya la necesidad de una gestión organizada de los flujos migratorios que garantice la cooperación con los países de origen y de tránsito;

• Diálogo cultural y religioso

126. Considera que la promoción del diálogo y el entendimiento entre las diferentes culturas y religiones debería ser una parte fundamental de nuestro compromiso externo con terceros países y sociedades y, en especial, de nuestro apoyo para la resolución de conflictos y el fomento de sociedades tolerantes, integradoras y democráticas;

°

° °

127. Encarga a su Presidente que transmita la presente Resolución a la Vicepresidenta de la Comisión /Alta Representante de la Unión para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad, al Consejo, a la Comisión, a los Gobiernos y Parlamentos de los Estados miembros de la UE, al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, al Secretario General de la OTAN, al Presidente de la Asamblea Parlamentaria de la OTAN, al Presidente en ejercicio de la OSCE, al Presidente de la Asamblea Parlamentaria de la OSCE, al Presidente del Comité de Ministros del Consejo de Europa y al Presidente de la Asamblea Parlamentaria del Consejo de Europa.

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EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS

El informe de este año constituye un nuevo punto de partida para nuestro Informe anual sobre la PESC, que no ha sido redactado como una revisión del Informe del Consejo sobre la PESC de 2010, sino que pretende ser nuestra aportación a la formulación de un nuevo enfoque estratégico con miras al futuro para la Política Exterior de la Unión Europea.

¿Qué implica este nuevo enfoque? Asumimos como punto de partida las ambiciones del Tratado de Lisboa, que establece que «La competencia de la Unión en materia de política exterior y de seguridad común abarcará todos los ámbitos de la política exterior y todas las

cuestiones relativas a la seguridad de la Unión, incluida la definición progresiva de una

política común de defensa que podrá conducir a una defensa común» (artículo 24, apartado

1,del TUE), lo que representa un importante nivel estratégico de ambición y un marco esencial para desarrollar un enfoque exhaustivo, coherente y sistemático para la política exterior de la Unión.

Sin embargo, también es importante reconocer el carácter específico de la formulación y aplicación de los diferentes componentes de la acción exterior de la Unión, como la PESC (y su PCSD), pero también la Política de Vecindad, la Política de Desarrollo y el Comercio Internacional. Este enfoque integral es indispensable para construir un enfoque estratégico y coherente para llevar a cabo la política exterior de la Unión. Para ello es necesaria una mayor coordinación y coordinación en el ámbito de la gestión de crisis civiles y militares con socios importantes como la OTAN, en tanto que para las crisis militares se requiere resolver las diferencias con Turquía a fin de mejorar la cooperación en el marco de los acuerdos Berlín plus.

El Informe del Consejo de 2010 contempla pasos importantes en esta dirección para levantar un inventario de las prioridades de la política exterior de la Unión en un marco estratégico orientado al futuro. No obstante, este informe no alcanza las ambiciones del Tratado de Lisboa en varios aspectos importantes, entre otros, al no establecer prioridades o directrices estratégicas para la PESC, al no clarificar los mecanismos políticos para garantizar la coherencia y homogeneidad entre los diferentes componentes de la política exterior, incluidos aquellos que son competencia de la Comisión, al eludir preguntas importantes sobre el papel del SEAE y las Delegaciones para lograr que los recursos (de personal, financieros y diplomáticos) de la Unión se adapten a sus prioridades en materia de asuntos exteriores, o al evitar un debate sobre cómo integrar las misiones y operaciones ad hoc de la PESC (su justificación y situación final) en el marco político y estratégico de las prioridades de la política exterior para un país o región.

Aunque este informe pretende ser ambicioso y estratégico desde un punto de vista político, también debe ser realista y pragmático a la hora de establecer los valores de referencia que deben ser objeto de seguimiento, evaluación y desarrollo en posteriores informes anuales. Por consiguiente, no debemos obsesionarnos con pedir más estrategias y subestrategias sin reflexionar detenidamente sobre las prioridades y recursos de que dispone la Unión para alcanzar objetivos claros y ofrecer un verdadero valor añadido en un período de austeridad económica. De hecho, en lugar de pedir simplemente una nueva revisión de la política exterior o una nueva estrategia europea de seguridad, este informe debería ser una aportación para la formulación de un marco para la política exterior de la UE y para establecer valores de

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referencia para el seguimiento y evaluación de los avances que se realicen en los próximos años. Sobre esta base, los futuros informes de la Comisión AFET podrán desarrollar este marco y evaluar los avances de la política exterior de la Unión.

Este informe debería hacer un llamamiento a la UE para que genere, con el apoyo del SEAE, mayores sinergias basadas en el triple mandato de Catherine Ashton en su calidad de Alta Representante para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad, Vicepresidenta de la Comisión y Presidenta del Consejo de Asuntos Exteriores. Si bien se han producido dificultades comprensibles en la transición a un nuevo enfoque para la PESC tras la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa, este informe pide ahora a la VP/AR y al SEAE que hagan gala de liderazgo por medio de la calidad, la audacia y acciones decisivas y oportunas. La falta de dicho liderazgo y de un enfoque estratégico hace necesario priorizar la Política Europea de Vecindad como principio rector incluido en el desarrollo de la PESC.

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OPINIÓN MINORITARIA

Opinión minoritaria sobre el informe anual del Consejo al Parlamento Europeo sobre los principales aspectos y las opciones fundamentales de la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común (PESC) Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores, Ponente: Elmar Brok Opinión minoritaria presentada en nombre del Grupo GUE-NGL por Willy Meyer, Sabine Lösing, Nikos Chountis y Takis Hadjigeorgiou Nos oponemos firmemente al informe por las siguientes razones: - defiende y promueve aún más la militarización como elemento central de la PESC; - promueve la sinergia de las capacidades civiles y militares; - defiende que la PESC abarque todos los ámbitos de la política exterior y todas las cuestiones relativas a la seguridad de la Unión, incluida la definición progresiva de una política de defensa común; Pedimos lo siguiente: - una UE civil, estrictamente separada de la OTAN; - la disolución de la OTAN; - una PESC basada en principios pacíficos; - el respeto del Derecho internacional y de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas; - que los gastos militares se utilicen para fines civiles; - el cierre de todas las bases militares en Europa; - el desarme de Europa, incluido el desarme nuclear total; - que la UE se abstenga de aplicar políticas intervencionistas, respetando la soberanía de los estados. Bruselas, 9 de julio de 2012

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4.6.2012

OPINIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN DE PRESUPUESTOS

para la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores

sobre el Informe anual del Consejo al Parlamento Europeo sobre la política exterior y de seguridad común (12562/2011 – C7-0000/2012 – 2012/2050(INI))

Ponente de opinión: Nadezhda Neynsky

SUGERENCIAS

La Comisión de Presupuestos pide a la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores, competente para el fondo, que incorpore las siguientes sugerencias en la propuesta de resolución que apruebe:

1. Señala que, pese a las cada vez mayores ambiciones de la PESC, su nivel de ejecución presupuestaria en 2010 fue de solo 282 millones de euros, lo que equivale al 3,5 % de los créditos totales de la rúbrica 4; toma nota del aumento gradual del presupuesto asignado a la PESC para 2011 y 2012 y reitera que los créditos de compromiso deben ser objeto de una atenta planificación respecto de cada línea presupuestaria correspondiente a la PESC con vistas a garantizar la atribución de los fondos de la UE a las medidas para las que son más necesarios, criterio que parece no haberse aplicado en los presupuestos de 2011 y 2012; constata el aumento del 20 % de los créditos de la PESC propuesto para el Marco Financiero Plurianual 2014-2020, al pasar de 2 089 a 2 510 millones de euros a precios constantes de 20111;

2. Acoge con satisfacción las peticiones para poner en común y compartir en mayor medida las capacidades militares clave, mejorar las capacidades de planificación y realización de misiones y operaciones e integrar las misiones y operaciones civiles y militares; destaca la necesidad de mejorar sistemáticamente las misiones y operaciones PCSD, también mediante la evaluación de resultados, la determinación de criterios de referencia, las evaluaciones de impacto, la determinación y aplicación de las lecciones aprendidas y el desarrollo de prácticas adecuadas para que la acción en el marco de la PCSD discurra de forma eficaz y eficiente; lamenta, sin embargo, los condicionantes políticos que dificultan la cooperación, que en ocasiones impiden que las mejores prácticas puedan crear sinergias;

1 Cifras transmitidas por la Dirección General de Presupuestos de la Comisión Europea.

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3. Se congratula de los esfuerzos desplegados para asignar una línea presupuestaria a todas las misiones, tal como se propone en la reforma del Reglamento financiero, lo que proporcionará un balance más completo y transparente de las misiones realizadas en el marco de la PESC;

4. Considera que el mecanismo Athena para la financiación de los costes comunes de las operaciones militares y de defensa de la UE no proporciona una visión adecuada de todas las implicaciones financieras de las misiones llevadas a cabo en el marco de la PESC y pide, por consiguiente, una relación clara de todos los gastos;

5. Opina que, en aras de la coherencia con los valores propios de la Unión Europea, deben reforzarse los instrumentos financieros que fomentan, inter alia, el establecimiento de la paz, la seguridad, la democracia, el Estado de Derecho, la buena gobernanza y las sociedades justas, ya que se trata de herramientas estratégicas de la política y la acción exteriores de la UE en su respuesta a los retos de alcance mundial.

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RESULTADO DE LA VOTACIÓN FINAL EN COMISIÓN

Fecha de aprobación 31.5.2012

Resultado de la votación final +: –: 0:

33 3 2

Miembros presentes en la votación final Marta Andreasen, Richard Ashworth, Francesca Balzani, Zuzana Brzobohatá, Jean-Luc Dehaene, James Elles, Göran Färm, José Manuel Fernandes, Eider Gardiazábal Rubial, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Jens Geier, Ivars Godmanis, Lucas Hartong, Jutta Haug, Monika Hohlmeier, Sidonia ElŜbieta Jędrzejewska, Anne E. Jensen, Ivailo Kalfin, Sergej Kozlík, Jan Kozłowski, Alain Lamassoure, Claudio Morganti, Juan Andrés Naranjo Escobar, Nadezhda Neynsky, Dominique Riquet, Alda Sousa, László Surján, Jacek Włosowicz

Suplente(s) presente(s) en la votación final

François Alfonsi, Frédéric Daerden, Charles Goerens, Edit Herczog, Jürgen Klute, María Muñiz De Urquiza, Jan Olbrycht, Paul Rübig, Peter Šťastný, Gianluca Susta

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34 1 6

Miembros presentes en la votación final Pino Arlacchi, Bastiaan Belder, Franziska Katharina Brantner, Elmar Brok, Tarja Cronberg, Arnaud Danjean, Michael Gahler, Marietta Giannakou, Richard Howitt, Liisa Jaakonsaari, Tunne Kelam, Evgeni Kirilov, Maria Eleni Koppa, Andrey Kovatchev, Eduard Kukan, Vytautas Landsbergis, Sabine Lösing, Ulrike Lunacek, Mario Mauro, Francisco José Millán Mon, María Muñiz De Urquiza, Raimon Obiols, Kristiina Ojuland, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Alojz Peterle, Hans-Gert Pöttering, Nikolaos Salavrakos, György Schöpflin, Charles Tannock, Sir Graham Watson

Suplente(s) presente(s) en la votación final

Laima Liucija Andrikien÷, Reinhard Bütikofer, Andrew Duff, Barbara Lochbihler, Teresa Riera Madurell, Ivo Vajgl, Janusz Władysław Zemke

Suplente(s) (art. 187, apdo. 2) presente(s) en la votación final

Arkadiusz Tomasz Bratkowski, Claudiu Ciprian Tănăsescu, Artur Zasada

Cyber Incident Reporting in the EU An overview of security articles in EU legislation

August 2012

About ENISA

The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) is a centre of network and information security expertise for the EU, its member states, the private sector and Europe’s citizens. ENISA works with these groups to develop advice and recommendations on good practice in information security. It assists EU member states in implementing relevant EU legislation and works to improve the resilience of Europe’s critical information infrastructure and networks. ENISA seeks to enhance existing expertise in EU member states by supporting the development of cross-border communities committed to improving network and information security throughout the EU. More information about ENISA and its work can be found at www.enisa.europa.eu.

Authors

Dr. Marnix Dekker, Christoffer Karsberg, Barbara Daskala

Contact

For contacting the authors please use [email protected]. For media enquires about this

paper, please use [email protected].

Legal notice

Notice must be taken that this publication represents the views and interpretations of the authors and editors, unless stated otherwise. This publication should not be construed to be a legal action of ENISA or the ENISA bodies unless adopted pursuant to the ENISA Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 as lastly amended by Regulation (EU) No 580/2011. This publication does not necessarily represent state-of the-art and ENISA may update it from time to time.

Third-party sources are quoted as appropriate. ENISA is not responsible for the content of the external sources including external websites referenced in this publication.

This publication is intended for information purposes only. It must be accessible free of charge. Neither ENISA nor any person acting on its behalf is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained in this publication.

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

© European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 2012




1 Cyber Incident Reporting in the EU

An overview of security articles in EU legislation

1 Introduction

Reliable and secure internet and electronic communications are now central to the whole economy and society in general. Cyber security incidents can have a large impact on individual users, on the economy and society in general. We give five examples:

1. In June 2012 6.5 million (SHA-1) hashed passwords of a large business-focussed social network appeared on public hacker forums. The impact of the breach is not fully known, but millions of users were urged to change their passwords and their personal data could be at risk.

2. In December 2011, the storm Dagmar affected power supplies to electronic communication networks in Norway, Sweden and Finland. As a result millions of users were without telephony or internet for up to two weeks.

3. In October 2011 there was a failure in the UK datacentre of a large smartphone vendor. As a result millions of users across the EU and globally could not send or receive emails, which severely affected the financial sector.

4. Over the summer 2011, a Dutch certificate authority experienced a security breach, allowing attackers to generate fake PKI certificates. The fake certificates, the result of the breach, were used to wiretap the online communications of around half a million Iranian citizens. Following the breach many Dutch e-government websites were offline or declared unsafe to visit.

5. In April 2010 a Chinese telecom provider hijacked 15% of the world’s internet traffic through Chinese servers for 20 minutes, routing traffic to some large e-commerce sites, such as

www.amazon.de and www.dell.com as well as the .mil and .gov domains, et cetera. As a result, the internet communications of millions of users were exposed (to eavesdropping).

The large outages and large data breaches receive extensive media coverage, showing the importance of cyber security in society. Many breaches, however, remain undetected and if detected, are not reported to authorities and not known to the public. There is no overall view across the digital society of the incidents, the root causes or the impact for users.

Lack of transparency and lack of information about incidents makes it difficult for policy makers to understand the overall impact, the root causes and possible interdependencies. It also complicates the efforts in the industry to understand and address cyber security incidents. And finally, it leaves customers in the dark about the frequency and impact of cyber incidents.

Legislation can play an important role here. For some types of incidents1, there is now an EU directive, which has been transposed in national laws obliging providers to report incidents to a national authority. In this paper we give an overview of different articles of EU legislation on cyber security incident reporting and prevention and we show how they are related. We conclude with some general remarks about incident reporting across the European digital society.

1 These are currently the security breaches and personal data breaches which occur related to the provision of public electronic

communications networks and services. Public electronic communication networks and services are networks and services which offer or facilitate electronic communications to the public. Examples are fixed telephony, mobile telephony and internet access to the general public. Internal company networks, for example, are not in the scope of this legislation.

http://www.pcworld.com/article/257045/update_linkedin_confirms_account_passwords_hacked.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclone_Dagmar

http://arstechnica.com/business/2011/10/blackberry-outages-spread-throughout-the-world/

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/news-items/operation-black-tulip

http://arstechnica.com/security/2010/11/how-china-swallowed-15-of-net-traffic-for-18-minutes/



2 Security articles in EU legislation

In recent years a number of EU Member States recognized the need for preventing cyber security incidents and they had started up, for example, voluntary or mandatory incident reporting schemes to create more transparency about cyber security incidents. In these countries often the focus was on the vital infrastructure for the digital society; the electronic communication networks and services.

Not all EU countries adopted legislation on security measures and incident reporting and there were big differences between the different national approaches. This had two main disadvantages:

● Cyber security incidents in one country may well have an impact across national borders. The Diginotar incident shows how national incidents can have a cross-border impact. This means that to improve security across the EU, all countries should agree on common principles.

● Furthermore, service providers often operate across EU countries, especially telecom companies and internet service providers. It is cumbersome for these providers to have to adapt their systems to different national requirements. A harmonized legislation across the EU avoids digital borders and allows for a level-playing field for providers across the EU market.

To address these issues, the EU countries, through the European commission (EC), have been working together on common EU wide legislation with the objective to have consistency and harmonization across the EU. In the following paragraphs we go over existing and proposed EU legislation on security measures, breach notification and incident reporting.

2.1 Article 13a of the Framework directive: “Security and Integrity”

The Telecoms reform passed into law in 2009, adds Article 13a to the Framework directive, regarding security and integrity of public electronic communication networks and services. Article 13a states:

● Providers of public communication networks and services should take measures to guarantee security and integrity (i.e. availability) of their networks.

● Providers must report to competent national authorities about significant security breaches.

● National authorities should inform ENISA and authorities abroad when necessary, for example in case of incidents with impact across borders.

● National authorities should report to ENISA and the EC about the incident reports annually.

Article 13a also says that the EC may issue more detailed implementation requirements if needed, taking into account ENISA’s opinion.

The EC, ENISA, and the national regulators have been collaborating for the past 2 years to implement

Article 13a and to agree on a single set of security measures for the European electronic communications sector and a modality for reporting about security breaches in the electronic communications sector to authorities abroad, to ENISA and the EC.

In May 2012 ENISA received the first set of annual reports from Member States, concerning incident that occurred in 2011. ENISA received 51 incident reports about large incidents, which exceeded an agreed impact threshold. The reports describe services affected, number of users affected, duration, root causes, actions taken and lessons learnt. While nationally incident reporting is implemented differently, with different procedures, thresholds, et cetera, nearly all national regulators use a common procedure, a common template and common thresholds for reporting to the EC and ENISA.

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/140framework.pdf

https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/article-13/




Despite the fact that this first set of incident reports is incomplete, as some countries had not yet fully implemented national incident reporting schemes, these reports already provide valuable insights into the types of threats facing the European electronic communications sector. The information from the incident reports is used, for example, as input to the European Cyber Security Strategy and the pan-European Cyber Security exercises. ENISA will publish a summary of the received annual incident reports in September 2012, and from spring 2013 annually.

2.2 Article 4 of the e-Privacy directive: “Security of processing”

The Telecoms reform also changed the e-Privacy Directive, which addresses data protection and

privacy related to the provision of public electronic communication networks or services. Article 4 of the e-Privacy directive requires providers to notify personal data breaches to the competent authority3 and subscribers concerned, without undue delay. The obligations for providers are:

● to take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure security of services,

● to notify personal data breaches to the competent national authority,

● to notify data breaches to the subscribers or individuals concerned, when the personal data breach is likely to adversely affect their privacy, and

● to keep an inventory of personal data breaches, including the facts surrounding the breaches, the impact and the remedial actions taken.

Article 4 also says that the EC may issue technical implementing measures regarding the notification formats and procedures, in consultation with the Article 29 Working Party, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and ENISA.

In 2011, ENISA started an expert group, including experts from national data protection authorities, industry, and EDPS, to draft recommendations for the technical implementation of Article 4.

2.3 Articles 30, 31 and 32 of the Data Protection regulation

The EC has proposed to reform the current European data protection framework (Directive 95/46/EC), and has proposed an EU regulation on data protection. The regulation regards organisations that are processing personal data, regardless of the business sector the organisation is in. Security measures and personal data breach notifications are addressed in Articles 30, 31 and 32:

● Organisations processing personal data must take appropriate technical and organisational security measures to ensure security appropriate to the risks presented by the processing.

● For all business sectors the obligation to notify personal data breaches becomes mandatory4.

● Personal data breaches must be notified to a competent national authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 24 hours, or else a justification should be provided.

3 In a number of countries, the competent body for notification about personal data breaches related to electronic

communications networks and services is not the telecom regulator, but a data protection authority or other agency.

4 This provision extends personal data breach notifications beyond the electronic communications sector.


http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/24eprivacy.pdf

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/risks-and-data-breaches/dbn/art4_tech

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf



● Personal data breaches must be notified to individuals if it is likely there will be an impact on

their privacy. If the breached data was unintelligible5, notification is not required.

2.4 Article 15 of the e-Sig and e-ID regulation: “Security requirements” The EC recently released a proposal for a regulation on electronic identification and trust services6 for electronic transactions in the internal market.. Article 15 in this proposal introduces obligations concerning security measures and incident reporting:

● Trust service providers must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for the security of their activities.

● Trust service providers must notify competent supervisory bodies and other relevant authorities of any security breaches and where appropriate, national supervisory bodies must inform supervisory bodies in other EU countries and ENISA about security breaches.

● The supervisory body may, directly or via the service provider concerned, inform the public.

● The supervisory body sends a summary of breaches to ENISA and the EC.

Article 15 is similar to Article 13a of the Framework directive (see References).

2.5 EU Cyber Security Strategy

The European Commission is developing a European Cyber Security Strategy. The roadmap for the strategy refers to Article 13a and mentions extending Article 13a to other business sectors. The Commission has indicated that there will be five main strands:

● Capabilities and response networks, for sharing information with public and private sector

● Governance structure including the national competent authorities, to address incidents and develop an EU contingency plan.

● Incident reporting for critical sectors like energy, water, finance and transport.

● Pre-commercial procurement of security technology and public-private partnerships to improve security across the single market

● Global cooperation, to address global interdependencies and the global supply chain.

A European Cyber Security Strategy is an important step to increase transparency about incidents, and ultimately to prevent them or limit their impact.

5 In the recommendation for the technical implementation of Article 4, unintelligible data is described as data that has either

been encrypted (asymmetric or symmetric), or hashed. 6 Trust service means any electronic service consisting in the creation, verification, validation, handling and preservation of

electronic signatures, electronic seals, electronic time stamps, electronic documents, electronic delivery services, website authentication, and electronic certificates, including certificates for electronic signature and for electronic seals.

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/esignature/eu_legislation/regulation/index_en.htm


http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2012_infso_003_european_internet_security_strategy_en.pdf


http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/204&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en



3 A model of security articles

In this section we show the overall picture of the different security articles discussed in Section 2.

3.1 General model The diagram in Figure 1 shows the actions of the actors as described in the different security articles. In particular it shows the issuing of security measures to prevent breaches, as well as the reports about breaches.

We stress that this overall picture is not an exact description of the individual security articles, but intended as an overall view. We refer the reader to Section 3.2 for details about what is different across the different articles.

Network or service

provider

Competent national authority

EC and ENISANational

authorities abroad and ENISA

3

6

Victims

Public

2

4

1

1

Security measures

Notification

Informing

Summary reporting

4

5

Figure 1: Overall view of actions and information flows

A simplification in this diagram is that we describe only one single national authority collecting breach notifications and incident reports. In practice multiple national authorities may be involved when dealing with security and privacy breaches. It is at the discretion of national governments to assign tasks to competent government bodies, depending on national circumstances. For example, in some countries security and privacy breaches regarding electronic communication services are all dealt with by the national telecom regulator acting as a single point of contact for the electronic communications sector. In other countries, the privacy breaches are reported separately to the data protection authorities, or to a national cyber security centre. We go over the numbered arrows in the diagram, step by step:



1. (blue dotted arrows) National authorities require providers to take appropriate technical and organisational security measures, taking into account the state of the art in security technology. To ensure that these security measures are taken, national authorities may audit providers, or ask them to do a self-assessment or undergo an audit. This step can be seen as one of the main objectives of this legislation, to ensure that appropriate measures are being

taken, across the EU7. At some point in time an incident is detected at a network or service provider. The incident may be a security breach, a personal data breach or both (e.g. a security breach resulting in a personal data breach). The provider starts to respond to the incident and if needed, the provider should contact

technical experts or national computer emergency response teams (CERTs) to address the incident8.

2. (red arrow) The provider notifies users affected by the breach (victims)

3. (red arrow) The provider notifies competent national authorities about the breach. An initial quick notification is followed by more detailed incident reports at a later stage, containing impact analysis, root causes, actions taken, lessons learnt, et cetera.

4. (black dash-dotted arrow) When necessary the national authority informs the public. Alternatively, depending on the situation, the national authority may require the provider to inform the public.

5. (black dash-dotted arrow) Additionally, when relevant, the national authority informs authorities abroad and ENISA. For example, in case a breach has a cross-border impact.

6. (black dashed arrow) Later, on an annual basis, the national authority sends a summary report of the significant incidents to ENISA and the EC. The annual reporting gives feedback at an EU level about the effectiveness of EU legislation, to understand EU wide trends, and to provide a platform for discussing lessons learnt and agreement about a harmonized and consistent approach to improving cyber security across the EU.

Finally, returning to the blue dotted arrows (1), past incidents, root causes, lessons learnt ex-post, are being discussed nationally and at an EU level, and the security measures are being adapted to improve the security of the networks and services.

7 Technical and organisational security measures are an important aspect in all the legislation discussed in Section 2

8 Although out of scope of this paper, CERTs are crucial capabilities to be able to limit the impact of cyber security incidents

and a key activity of ENISA is to support EU countries in setting up well-functioning CERTs and to foster collaboration and information sharing between the different CERTs.

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/cert



3.2 Commonalities and differences

The overall picture provided in Section 3.1 ignores some differences between the security articles. In the diagram below (Figure 2) we illustrate the commonalities and differences between the different security articles, by annotating the information flows with references to individual articles.

Network or service

provider

Competent national authority

EC and ENISANational

authorities abroad and ENISA

Art 13a, Art 4, Art 15, Art 31

Art 13a, Art 15

Victims

Public

Art 4Art 32

Art 13a, Art 15



- Art 13a of the Framework directive.

- Art 4 of the e-Privacy directive.

- Art 30, 31, 32 of the proposed Data protection regulation.

- Art 15 of the proposed regulation on e-signatures and e-identities

Art 13a, Art 4Art 15

Art 13a, Art 15

Figure 2: Commonalities and differences between the security articles



4 Conclusions

Security measures and incident reporting, implemented across the EU’s digital society, are important to improve overall security. EU legislation plays an important role here as it allows harmonization across the EU member states. This in turn prevents weak links and unnecessary costs for providers operating cross-border. The European Commission, in collaboration with the EU Member States, has undertaken a number of legislative initiatives aiming to further improve transparency about incidents. Another important step is the proposed Cyber Security Strategy, which emphasizes incident reporting and the importance of exchange across the EU about incidents and how to address them. We conclude with some general remarks.

● Regulatory gaps: In the introduction we gave five examples of cyber incidents with a severe

impact on the security or privacy of electronic communications. The 2nd incident, caused by the

Dagmar storm, is in scope of existing incident reporting legislation and as such reported to

authorities9. The proposed regulation on electronic trust providers would also cover the 4th

incident10. But the remaining incidents (the 1st, 3rd, and 5th) are not clearly in scope or subject

of debate between providers and the national regulator. It is important that national

authorities and the EC discuss, agree, and clarify the scope of legislation on electronic

communications and address these and other gaps. This can be done without necessarily

changing the text of existing legislation, such as the telecom regulatory framework, but rather

the interpretation of what the services are, because the landscape of electronic

communications is continuously changing (from landline telephones and minitel in the past, to

mobile phones, internet and VoIP).

● Model security articles: There is a lot of similarity between Article 13a of the Framework

directive and Article 15 of the e-Signatures and e-Identities regulation. The former has

been taken as a model for drafting the latter. Both articles combine security measures and

incident reporting, at a national level and at an EU level. Consistency and standardization in

the legislative texts allows for more easy governance by the member states, and more easy

implementation by the providers. Furthermore, the combination of national reporting and EU

reporting (present in both Article 13a and Article 15) allows national authorities room to adjust

to national circumstances, while at the same time providing overview and feedback at an EU

level, which allows Member States to optimize implementation and to ensure a harmonized

approach across EU member states.

● Governing security measures: Mandatory breach reporting receives a lot of media attention

and it is arguably the most visible part of the security articles discussed in Section 2. But the

9 The Dagmar storm caused power cuts which led to large outages which fall under Article 13a: To be precise in the article this

would be called a breach of integrity of the networks affecting the continuity of supply of electronic communication services over these networks. The EC and ENISA received summary incident reports from three countries as part of Article 13a’s annual incident reporting to ENISA and the EC.

10 The Diginotar incident was a security breach at a Certificate Authority which would fall under the proposed Article 15.



ultimate goal is to limit the impact of security and personal data breaches or prevent them

altogether by making sure appropriate security measures are taken. This type of governance is

crucial and not easy. In security much depends on the technical details of the implementation

and these details are hard to capture in (high-level) legislation and subject to change. National

authorities should exchange knowledge about an effective and efficient combination of high-

level legal obligations and technical implementation requirements. For the latter it is

important to adopt a bottom up approach (i.e. commonly agreed recommendations), taking

into account the (changing) state of the art and the practical experiences of regulators and

experts from the private sector.

As a second, but related point, the need to take “appropriate technical and organisational

security measures” is mentioned in all the security articles discussed in Section 2. Although

these articles are aimed at different providers and different types of breaches, there is still a

large overlap11 between the security measures that have to be taken. The competent national

authorities should collaborate (nationally and at an EU level) to ensure that these security

measures are implemented consistently and where there is an overlap, similarly, to allow

providers to comply more easily, and to allow equipment vendors to adapt their products

accordingly12

.

● Optimizing incident reporting procedures:

○ Incident response versus incident reporting: To prevent incidents from escalating

Member states should encourage providers to quickly contact technical experts,

incident response teams (like national CERTs), crisis coordination groups, and other

organizations relevant in the response phase, should this be necessary. Member states

should underline that incident response receives priority. The purpose of mandatory

incident reporting to national authorities is supervision over whether or not providers

comply with legal requirements, while the purpose of information exchange in the

response phase, for example with a national CERT, is to tackle the incident. Member

states should encourage transparency and trusted information sharing in the response

phase and ensure that response processes are independent and not slowed down by

legal reporting requirements. Member states should for instance ensure that incident

reporting procedures are easy and quick to apply. 13.

○ Exchange and sharing: Over the past years CERTs have developed effective platforms

for collaboration and information exchange. Beyond the response phase, however,

11

To give a simple example, access control to databases is an important measure under both Article 13a and 4.

12 ENISA will address synchronization of Article 13a and Article 4 security measures, in collaboration with the national

authorities, as part of ENISA’s 2013 work program.

13 For example by adopting a two-staged approach, where brief reports with impact estimates are sent within hours, while

longer reports with exact figures are sent days after the incidents have been resolved.



there is still little exchange of information about breaches between different national

authorities. The EC should continue to support the working groups and platforms for

exchanging information between national authorities, about breaches, about lessons

learnt and best practices.

○ Granularity and tools: An important aspect of the evaluation of existing legislation on

incident reporting should be an analysis of costs and benefits. Both for national and EU

level reporting it is important to review over time the thresholds for reporting, the

type of information that is reported, the level of detail, and so on. If too few incidents

are reported, then it will be difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about common

root causes or trends. This would defeat the purpose of the legislation altogether and

make the legislation cost ineffective. National authorities should analyse what is a

good balance, taking into account the costs and benefits for providers as well as the

national authorities. Providers and national authorities should investigate automated

tools and computer interfaces to allow for cost-effective incident reporting at a

sufficient level of detail, while avoiding the burden of manual and ad-hoc reporting

procedures14. For example, one could distinguish between small and large incidents

and use less reporting detail for the (many) smaller incidents.

For the sake of brevity we refrain from discussing a number of other related issues (including for example, common data models for incident reports, common impact assessment methods, severity classification of breaches, common risk assessment methods, et cetera), which are already being addressed in the different working groups for Article 13a and Article 4.

Concluding we would like to remark that in recent years a lot of progress has been made, in terms of addressing incidents and increasing transparency about incidents. The national authorities, for example, recently submitted to ENISA and the EC, the first Article 13a incident reports regarding severe incidents that occurred in 2011. The vast majority of national authorities use a single set of security measures and a common reporting template allowing for efficient collection and analysis. ENISA will publish an analysis of the 51 severe incidents in September 2012. From next year, every spring ENISA will collect annual incident reports and publish an analysis of the incidents of the previous year. For example, next spring 2013 ENISA will publish an analysis of the 2012 incidents.

We look forward to continuing our work with national authorities and the European Commission to support an efficient and effective implementation of Article 13a, Article 4, and the other security articles across the single digital market, and to support collaboration and information exchange between national authorities across the EU, to improve security across the EU’s digital society.

14

In the context of Article 13a a number of countries are developing online reporting tools with interfaces to incident response systems of providers, and also ENISA is developing an automated tool for EU-level reporting which provides important functionality for national regulators.



5 References

5.1 EU legislation and proposals

● Article 13a of the Framework directive of the EU legislative framework on electronic communications: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/140framework.pdf

● Article 4 of the e-Privacy directive, part of the EU legislative framework on electronic communications: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/24eprivacy.pdf

● The electronic communications regulatory framework (incorporating the telecom reform): http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/regframeforec_dec2009.pdf

● Article 15 of the Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/esignature/eu_legislation/regulation/index_en.htm

● Article 30, 31 and 32 of the proposed Data Protection regulation: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf The regulation is part of a wider reform of the data protection framework: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_en.htm

● Roadmap for a proposal on a European strategy for internet security: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2012_infso_003_european_internet_security_strategy_en.pdf

● The speech of EU Commissioner Neelie Kroes on the EU strategy for internet security: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/204&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

● The speech of EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström on the EU Cyber security strategy: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/315

5.2 Related ENISA publications ● ENISA’s Article 13a Guidelines on Incident reporting and Minimum security measures ● ENISA’s Recommendations for the technical implementation of Article 4 ● ENISA’s 2009 paper on incident reporting shows an overview of the situation 3 years ago ● ENISA’s 2011 paper on data breach reporting across the EU shows an overview of the different

national approaches to personal data breach notifications. ● ENISA’s paper on National Cyber Security Strategies shows commonalities and differences

between national cyber security strategies across the EU.

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/140framework.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/24eprivacy.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/regframeforec_dec2009.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/regframeforec_dec2009.pdf



http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_en.htm





http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/315


http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/risks-and-data-breaches/dbn/art4_tech

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents%20reporting/good-practice-guide-on-incident-reporting/good-practice-guide-on-incident-reporting-1

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/risks-and-data-breaches/library/deliverables/dbn

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/cyber-security-strategies-paper



P.O. Box 1309, 71001 Heraklion, Greece www.enisa.europa.eu

13032/12 ana/JV/pl 1

DG D 2B ES

CO�SEJO DELA U�IÓ� EUROPEA


13032/12

EUROJUST 74

�OTA PU�TO "I/A" De: Autoridad Común de Control de Eurojust

A: Coreper y Consejo

Asunto: Informe de actividad de la Autoridad Común de Control de Eurojust para el año

2011

1. El artículo 23, apartado 12 de la Decisión del Consejo de 28 de febrero de 2002 por la que se

crea Eurojust estipula: "La Autoridad Común de Control informará una vez al año al

Consejo".

2. Se adjunta en el anexo el informe de actividad de la Autoridad Común de Control de Eurojust

para el año 2011.

3. Se solicita al Coreper que invite al Consejo a tomar nota del informe que se adjunta en el

anexo y lo remita al Parlamento Europeo para su información, de conformidad con el

artículo 32, apartado 2, de la Decisión del Consejo por la que se crea Eurojust.

________________________

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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

A�EXO

Activity Report of the

Joint Supervisory Body of

Eurojust for 2011

13032/12 ana/JV/pl 3

ANEXO DG D 2B ES

Foreword............................................................................................................................................. 4

Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 5

1. Administration and management of the JSB......................................................................... 5

1.1 Composition of JSB .................................................................................................... 5

1.2 Meetings...................................................................................................................... 6

1.3 Participation and representation at the international data protection fora................... 7

1.4 Budget and costs ......................................................................................................... 7

2. �ew developments .................................................................................................................... 8

2.1 Implementation of the revised Eurojust Decision....................................................... 8

2.2 Data Protection after Lisbon ....................................................................................... 8

2.3 European Terrorist Finance Tracking System (TFTS)................................................ 9

3. Supervisory work...................................................................................................................... 9

3.1 Eurojust inspection 2010............................................................................................. 9

3.2 Cooperation with Data Protection Officer of Eurojust ............................................. 10

4. Opinions of the JSB ................................................................................................................ 11

4.1 Secure connection with OLAF.................................................................................. 11

4.2 Case Management System ........................................................................................ 12

5. Cooperation agreements between Eurojust and third States .................................................. 13

6. Rights of the data subject....................................................................................................... 13

6.1 Case-related appeals.................................................................................................. 14

6.2 Non-case-related appeals .......................................................................................... 15

7. Transparency .......................................................................................................................... 15

7.1 JSB webpage.......................................................................................................... 15

8. Self-assessment........................................................................................................................ 17

9. Future outlook......................................................................................................................... 17

1.1. ......................................................................................................................................... 17

Annex I APPOI�TEES TO THE JOI�T SUPERVISORY BODY 2011................................. 19

Annex II Publications ................................................................................................................... 21

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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

FOREWORD

As Chair of the Joint Supervisory Body of Eurojust (JSB) at the moment of

adoption of this report, it is my pleasure to present the 9th Activity Report of the

JSB, which provides an overview of the main activities carried out by the JSB in

2011.

Throughout this year, the JSB has closely followed the developments related to

the European Union’s future data protection framework and its possible

implications for the activities of Eurojust, and has actively contributed to the

discussions on the future supervision model in the area of police and judicial cooperation.

Another important area of work has been the enhancement of transparency and visibility regarding

the work of the JSB. During 2011, the JSB has endeavoured to increase public awareness of its

activities and, for this purpose, the JSB launched its website, making the work of the JSB of

Eurojust more accessible, visible and transparent for all EU citizens. In addition, a number of

publications and information folders have been issued and translated into official EU languages;

they are available online and are provided free of charge by the JSB Secretariat to any interested

person.

The year 2012 promises to be challenging and interesting in terms of data protection, especially in

view of the fundamental reform of the European Union’s data protection framework launched by

the European Commission in January 2012. The JSB is ready and eager to face all new challenges

that the future might bring and hopes that, whatever legislative steps and political decisions are

taken, the expertise and substantial experience inherent in the present system of specialised

supervision will be maintained.

I would like to take this opportunity to warmly thank my fellow members of the JSB troika, Ms

Lotty Prussen and Mr Hans Frennered, with whom it has been a pleasure to work and to share our

knowledge and expertise. I would also like to thank the College and staff of Eurojust for their

contribution to the JSB’s activities. Finally, I thank in particular Diana Alonso Blas, Eurojust’s Data

Protection Officer, and her staff for their invaluable support and input to the JSB’s work.

Yours sincerely,

Carlos Campos Lobo

Chair

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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

I�TRODUCTIO�

This is the 9th annual report of the Joint Supervisory Body of Eurojust (hereinafter “JSB”) since it

was first established in May 2003 and outlines its main activities during the year 2011.

The JSB is established by Article 23 of the Eurojust Decision1, as an independent body, to

collectively monitor the activities of Eurojust involving the processing of personal data and to

ensure that they are carried out in accordance with the Eurojust Decision and do not violate the

rights of concerned individuals.

One of the most important tasks of the JSB is to examine appeals of individuals to verify that their

personal data are processed by Eurojust in a lawful and accurate manner.

The JSB also monitors the permissibility of the transmission of data from Eurojust and provides its

obligatory opinion concerning the provisions on data protection in agreements or working

arrangements with EU bodies or cooperation agreements with third States.

1. ADMI�ISTRATIO� A�D MA�AGEME�T OF THE JSB

1.1 Composition of JSB

The JSB is an independent external supervisor in the field of data protection, established by Article

23 of the Eurojust Decision.

This body, composed of judges or members with an equal level of independence, has a very

important task: ensuring that the processing of personal data is carried out in accordance with the

Eurojust Decision.

Given the very sensitive nature of the information processed by Eurojust (data on persons who are

subject to an investigation or prosecution, victims, witnesses and those convicted of crimes),

ensuring that the rights of data subjects are properly protected is crucial. The JSB is composed of

twenty-seven appointees, nominated by each Member State, three of whom are permanent members

(see Annex I). Ms Lotty Prussen (Luxembourg), Mr Hans Frennered (Sweden, Chair from June

2010 to June 2011) and Mr Carlos Campos Lobo (Portugal, current Chair) were the three permanent

members during 2011.

1 Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending

Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime,

hereinafter referred to as the “ Eurojust Decision”.

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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

In accordance with Article 3(2) of the Act of the Joint

Supervisory Body 2010/C 182/03 of 23 June 20092,

elections were held at the plenary meeting in June. Mr

Frennered was re-elected as a permanent member for a

further term of three years. Mr Campos Lobo took over

as Chair for the following year. Ms Prussen remained as a

member for another two years.

The Secretariat of the JSB is contained within Eurojust, permitting it to ensure full communication

and cooperation with all Eurojust post-holders. Where necessary, the Secretariat of the JSB may

rely upon the expertise of the secretariat established by Decision 2000/641/JHA3.

1.2 Meetings

The JSB meets regularly, usually four times a year, and its

meetings take place at Eurojust. During those meetings, the

members of the JSB have an opportunity to exchange views

with the Eurojust College and administration regarding the

developments in the organisation. In such a way, the JSB is

always fully informed of all ongoing matters with any data

protection relevance and can advise with timely effect and

with full information about the organisation.

The permanent members met on 8 February, 7 April, 20 June and 10 November 2011 at Eurojust’s

headquarters in The Hague; a plenary meeting of the appointees took place on 21 June. To improve

efficiency and transparency of its work and activities, the JSB circulated highlights of each meeting

to the JSB appointees, the College of Eurojust and selected members of the administration of

Eurojust. These highlights may also be found on the JSB webpage: www.eurojust.europa.eu/jsb-

news.htm.

2 Act of the Joint Supervisory Body of Eurojust of 23 June 2009 laying down its rules of procedure of

23 June 2009 (2010/C 182/03), hereinafter referred to as the “Act of the JSB”. 3 Council Decision 2000/641/JHA of 17 October 2000 establishing a secretariat for the joint supervisory

data protection bodies set up by the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office

(Europol Convention), the Convention on the Use of Information Technology for Customs Purposes

and the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at the

common borders (Schengen Convention), OJ L 271, 24.10.2000, p.1.

Meeting of JSB permanent members, 10 November 2011

JSB permanent members Hans Frennered, Lotty Prussen and Carlos Campos Lobo (left to

right)

http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/jsb-news.htm

http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/jsb-news.htm

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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

1.3 Participation and representation at the international data protection fora

Since 2010, the JSB of Eurojust is an accredited member of the International Conference of Data

Protection and Privacy Commissioners. In 2011, the JSB was accredited as a member of the

European Data Protection Commissioners’ Conference4; at the same time, the JSB became a

member of the Working Party on Police and Justice (hereinafter “WPPJ”) concerning supervision in

the area of freedom, security and justice. Both conferences provide an excellent forum to exchange

views, experiences and ideas on present and future challenges for the supervisory authorities.

The JSB liaises frequently with the other existing joint supervisory authorities dealing with data

protection in the area of law enforcement, attends the joint meetings organised with those parties

and consults them when dealing with matters of common interest. Such mutual cooperation between

the supervisory authorities ensures a unified and consistent approach when dealing with similar

issues related to data protection in the field of the law enforcement and judicial cooperation.

As a member of the WPPJ, the JSB contributed to its work on the future of data protection,

especially the future supervisory mechanism model. On behalf of the JSB, Mr Campos Lobo

attended regular meetings of the Working Party on Police and Justice5. He also attended a meeting

of the Joint Supervisory Authorities in Ljubljana from 31 January to 1 February 2011. At this

meeting, he took the opportunity to highlight the need for tailor-made rules and for specific and

effective supervision in the area of justice and home affairs. He confirmed that the JSB of Eurojust

strongly supported the proposals made by the other participants to increase cooperation and

communication between joint supervisory bodies and authorities.

1.4 Budget and costs

The JSB has its own budget, which is part of the Eurojust budget. According to Article 23(10) of

the Eurojust Decision, the costs of the Secretariat of the JSB shall be borne by the Eurojust budget.

The Secretariat of the JSB shall enjoy independence in the discharge of its function within the

Eurojust secretariat.

Due to its small size and efficient approach to work, the JSB operates with a very limited budget.

The actual amounts allocated for the JSB from 2008 to 2011 were as follows:

Year Amount (Euros)

2008 49,000

2009 46,000

2010 51,500

2011 52,600

4 Conclusions of European Data Protection Commissioners' Conference, Brussels, 5 April 2011.

5 The meetings took place on 8 June, 30 September and 2 December 2011 in Brussels.

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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

As seen from the table above, in 2011, the JSB was granted a budget of €52,400 to cover the costs

of its meetings, participation in external meetings of data protection authorities and EU working

groups, and any other additional expenses, including possible appeal cases. Some of this budget

(€1,300) was used for the translation of the JSB’s 2010 Activity Report into French, German,

Spanish and Italian. Additionally, €12,600 was spent on the translation into French, German and

Spanish of a useful reference booklet, entitled “Data Protection at Eurojust”, drafted by the Eurojust

Data Protection Officer6.

2. �EW DEVELOPME�TS

2.1 Implementation of the revised Eurojust Decision

Through 2011, the JSB followed closely the discussions and work done by Eurojust in relation to

the implementation of Council Decision 2009/426/JHA on the strengthening of Eurojust, especially

in relation to information exchange and personal data processing. The JSB regularly received

information updates on the progress in the implementation of the revised Eurojust Decision and its

implications for data processing at Eurojust, with special focus on the new Article 13 of the revised

Eurojust Decision.

In the context of the continued development of Eurojust’s core operation tool, the Case

Management System (CMS), the JSB has shown great interest from the beginning in the work on

implementation of new data protection requirements, focusing on the changes brought by the

revised Eurojust Decision.

2.2 Data Protection after Lisbon

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty7 in December 2009 brought with it a number of

substantial changes regarding data protection in Europe. The most significant improvement was the

introduction of its Article 168, which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.

2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative

procedure, shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the

processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member

States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Union law, and the rules relating

to the free movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of

independent authorities. The rules adopted on the basis of this Article shall be without prejudice to

the specific rules laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty on the European Union.”

6 This booklet can be requested free of charge by writing to [email protected].

7 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European

Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 (2007/C 306/01), OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p.1. 8 Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.


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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

Article 16 of the Lisbon Treaty provides for a single legal basis for data protection, abolishing the

previous pillar structure. Nevertheless, Declaration 21 attached to the Lisbon Treaty9 acknowledged

that “specific rules on the protection of personal data and the free movement of such data in the

fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation based on Article 16 of the

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union may prove necessary because of the specific

nature of these fields”. In the context of the review of the existing legal framework on data

protection, the JSB also actively contributed to the Commission consultations and discussions,

drawing attention to the robustness and suitability of the existing data protection rules at Eurojust

and actively promoting the maintenance of the specialised supervision system currently in place at

Eurojust.10

2.3 European Terrorist Finance Tracking System (TFTS)

The JSB followed closely the developments related to the proposal to establish an EU Terrorist

Finance Tracking System, which is being discussed at the level of the European Union. The two

main objectives of such a system would be: to contribute to limiting the amount of personal data

transferred to the USA; and to contribute to efforts to cut off terrorists’ access to funding and

materials and follow their transactions. When discussing any possible role that Eurojust could play

in this context, the JSB repeatedly remarked on the importance of thoroughly considering the very

serious data protection implications of such a scheme. The JSB expressed a strong wish to be

informed and involved in these discussions, especially with regard to Eurojust’s possible role in this

matter.

3. SUPERVISORY WORK

The JSB holds frequent and regular inspections, covering both case-related and non-case-related

(administrative) processing operations of Eurojust and delivers extensive and detailed reports of

such inspections, including findings and recommendations. Follow-up by the organisation is

monitored in successive meetings. When necessary, additional inspections dedicated to single

matters or issues are held.

3.1 Eurojust inspection 2010

Since its establishment in 2003, the JSB has been entrusted with the task of supervising Eurojust's

activities when processing personal data. This task is even more important from the perspective of

the types of information Eurojust processes and the possible negative consequences to those

individuals concerned if this information is processed without proper and strict safeguards. The JSB

plans at least one inspection every two years. When necessary, additional inspections dedicated to

single matters or issues are held.

9 Declaration number 21: Declaration on the protection of personal data in the fields of judicial

cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. 10 Letter of the Chair of the JSB to Ms Reding of 31 May 2010; letter of the Chair of the JSB to Ms

Reding of 15 December 2010. See for more information the article by ALONSO BLAS, D., Ensuring

effective data protection in the field of police and judicial activities: some considerations to achieve

security, justice and freedom at ERA Forum (2010) 11: 233-250.

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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

At its meeting on 19 November 2009, the JSB gave the inspection team a mandate to inspect:

1. the content of the CMS;

2. compliance with all procedures for processing data by Eurojust related to the cases processed by

it;

3. the follow-up of the recommendations made in the previous inspection reports (2007);

4. access to the Schengen Information System (SIS); and

5. data processing by the administration.

In accordance with the mandate conferred upon it by the JSB, the inspection team visited Eurojust

on 18 November 2009 to familiarise itself with Eurojust’s systems and procedures and then, from

19-21 January 2010, conducted the inspection. The JSB’s inspection concentrated on the following

issues: the content of the CMS; the input of information into the CMS via the secure line; the data

guard (data entry and output from CMS); logging into the CMS; access to the SIS; compliance with

data protection rules; the follow-up of the recommendations of the previous inspection; and the

processing of staff data by Eurojust’s Human Resources Unit. As a result of the 2010 inspection, the

final inspection report was presented to the JSB plenary meeting in 2011. The JSB concluded that

Eurojust had further improved its compliance with the data protection rules in place. The

introduction of a more user-friendly CMS contributed to this improvement. However, the JSB

identified some areas for further improvement. The JSB formulated specific recommendations to

Eurojust to improve and harmonise the processing of data.

The JSB decided to hold a further inspection of the Human Resources Unit at the beginning of

2012.

3.2 Cooperation with Data Protection Officer of Eurojust

The JSB benefits from close cooperation with the Data Protection Officer of Eurojust, appointed in

November 2003, who plays a fundamental role regarding the internal control of data protection

compliance within the organisation.

One of the significant components of the work of the DPO is to act as a link between Eurojust and

the JSB to ensure that the JSB members are sufficiently informed about the activities of Eurojust

regarding data protection matters and the implementation of rules. At every meeting, the JSB has

the occasion to exchange views with the DPO, who informs the members of all ongoing matters and

of the issues that might require their attention in the future. The strong collaboration between the

DPO and the JSB provides mutual benefits in meeting their responsibilities to ensure the application

of data protection requirements. In case of non-compliance, Article 17 of the Eurojust Decision

establishes that the DPO may directly inform the College and the Administrative Director and,

should a solution to the issue not be found internally, the JSB. The JSB can rectify a situation or

impose general measures to improve data protection at Eurojust.

In accordance with Article 6(6) of the Act of the JSB, the JSB liaised regularly with the DPO, who,

throughout the course of 2011, continuously informed the JSB about ongoing data protection issues

and matters at Eurojust.

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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

A new Technical Advisor to the Data Protection Service was appointed at the end of 2011, whose

term of office is due to start in spring 2012, thus completing the DPO team at Eurojust, which is

now composed of four members.

At the plenary meeting in June 2011, the DPO presented the findings of her 5th annual survey,

carried out in compliance with the requirements of Article 27(1) of the Rules of Procedure on the

Processing and Protection of Personal Data at Eurojust. The Annual Survey 2010 included

interviews with selected National Desks: Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, and also

the Human Resources Unit. The report of the Annual Survey 2010 was presented to the College of

Eurojust on 21 June 2011.

JSB members with Ms Diana Alonso Blas (DPO)

4. OPI�IO�S OF THE JSB

4.1 Secure connection with OLAF

On the request of the DPO, the JSB discussed the data protection issues related to the logging

mechanism of users’ actions accessing the Customs Information System (hereinafter “CIS”). The

logs are essential for the successful monitoring done by the DPO and the JSB in carrying out

controls and audits in accordance with Article 23(1) of the Eurojust Decision and Article 27(2) of

Eurojust Data Protection Rules11

. The information stored in the logs must be sufficient and adequate

for proper monitoring of system access and to ensure that this access remains appropriate.

Article 28 of the Council Decision 2009/917/JHA of 30 November 2009 on the use of information

technology for customs purposes12

stipulates that all necessary administrative measures to

maintain security shall be taken by Eurojust (as well as by the competent authorities of the

Member States and Europol). In particular, Eurojust shall take measures to guarantee that it is

possible to check and establish a posteriori what data have been entered in the CIS, when and

by whom, and to monitor searches.

11 Rules of Procedure on the Processing and Protection of Personal Data at Eurojust (2005/C 68/01) of

21 October 2004, OJ C 68, 19.3.2005, p.1, hereinafter referred to as the “Eurojust Data Protection

Rules”. 12 Council Decision 2009/917/JHA of 30 November 2009 on the use of information technology for

customs purposes, OJ L 323, 10.12.2009, p.20, hereinafter referred to as the “Council Decision on

CIS”.

13032/12 ana/JV/pl 12

ANEXO DG D 2B ES

Article 22(2) of Eurojust Decision requires Eurojust to implement measures designed to ensure that:

verification and establishment of the bodies to which personal data are transmitted when data are

communicated is possible; verification and establishment of which personal data have been input

into automated data processing systems is possible and when and by whom the data were input.

Article 25 of the Eurojust Data Protection Rules stipulates that Eurojust shall put in place

appropriate technical measures to ensure that a record is kept of all processing operations carried

out upon personal data.

Eurojust is responsible for the information that it processes in its information systems. Article 14 of

Eurojust Decision states that personal data processed by Eurojust shall be adequate, relevant and not

excessive in relation to the purpose of the processing. Personal data processed by Eurojust shall be

processed fairly and lawfully. More importantly, according to Article 24 of Eurojust Decision

Eurojust shall be liable for any damage caused to an individual which results from unauthorised or

incorrect processing of data carried out by it.

The practical implementation of Article 28 of the Council Decision on CIS was discussed with the

JSB. According to Article 36(2) of the Council Decision on CIS, the Decision should apply to

Eurojust from 27 May 2011. During the discussions, possible solutions and the way forward were

agreed by the JSB.

4.2 Case Management System

The JSB followed thoroughly all the developments related to the implementation of the revised

Eurojust Decision, especially those dealing with the implementation of Articles 12 and 13 of the

Eurojust Decision. In the context of the continued development of Eurojust’s core operation tool,

the CMS, the JSB was regularly informed by Eurojust on the implementation of new data protection

requirements focusing on the changes brought by the revised Eurojust Decision (the three-year

storage limit of the log files; the improvement of interactive statistics and improved reporting on

case links; logging mechanism). The JSB was interested in how the adjustments and new

functionalities of the CMS would accommodate connection and facilitate the structured and

enhanced information exchange with the Member States, increase the use of the system and

implement the JSB recommendations provided in its inspection reports.

The JSB underlined the importance of the CMS remaining as one system and viewed with interest

the possibilities to increase its analytical capacity, especially in light of Article 13 of the revised

Eurojust Decision.

13032/12 ana/JV/pl 13

ANEXO DG D 2B ES

1. 5. COOPERATIO� AGREEME�TS BETWEE� EUROJUST A�D THIRD STATES

The JSB monitors the permissibility of the transmission of data from Eurojust and provides its

obligatory opinion concerning the provisions on data protection in agreements or working

arrangements with EU bodies and cooperation agreements with third States.

Article 26(2) of Eurojust Decision explicitly recognises that in order to conclude agreements or

working arrangements with the institutions, bodies and agencies set up by, or on the basis of, the

Treaties establishing the European Communities or the Treaty on European Union, Eurojust is

obliged to consult the JSB on the provisions of the draft agreement or working arrangements

concerning data protection. The same obligation, laid down in Article 26a(2) of the Eurojust

Decision, applies when a draft cooperation agreement is to be concluded with a third State or

international organisation.

In accordance with Articles 26(2) and 26a(2) of the Eurojust Decision, Eurojust’s External

Relations Team regularly updated the JSB on relations with third States and the state of play of

ongoing negotiations between Eurojust and third States/international organisations. The JSB

considered thoroughly all the information provided by the DPO to the JSB when discussing the

level of data protection of various third States and organisations with whom Eurojust wishes to have

a cooperation agreement. In this way, the JSB was fully informed and involved in the matters

related to the ongoing negotiations as well as in the follow-up to the implementation of existing

agreements.

6. RIGHTS OF THE DATA SUBJECT

One of the most important elements of the robust data protection regime established by the Eurojust

Decision is the enforceable right of the data subjects to access, correct, delete or block the personal

data related to them. Article 19(1) of the Eurojust Decision guarantees that every individual is

entitled to have access to personal data concerning him or her that are processed by Eurojust.

Article 20(1) of the Eurojust Decision entitles every individual to ask Eurojust to correct, block or

delete data concerning him or her if they are incorrect or incomplete or if their input or storage

contravenes this Decision.

If an individual is not satisfied with Eurojust’s response to his/her request, he/she may appeal that

decision before the JSB. The JSB examines any appeals submitted to it in accordance with Articles

19(8) and 20(2) of the Eurojust Decision and carries out controls. The JSB is also competent to

handle appeals concerning the processing of non-case-related data. If the JSB considers that a

decision taken by Eurojust or the processing of data by it is not compatible with the Eurojust

Decision, the matter is referred to Eurojust. Decisions of the JSB are final and binding on Eurojust.

13032/12 ana/JV/pl 14

ANEXO DG D 2B ES

6.1 Case-related appeals

A case-related appeal was submitted to the JSB on 18 March 2011, involving a request for access to

personal data potentially processed by Eurojust. The JSB issued its decision on 7 April 201113

.

In this case, the JSB received an appeal from Mr T against the decision of Eurojust communicated

to him by the Eurojust Data Protection Officer (DPO) on 22 February 2011.

The decision of Eurojust related to the request of Mr T of 11 January 2011 concerning access to any

personal data on him processed by Eurojust, deletion of such data, undertaking not to further

process any data on him and notification on the same subject to any relevant third party.

The decision of Eurojust, as communicated to the applicant by the DPO of Eurojust, was worded as

follows: “In accordance with Article 19.7 of the Eurojust Decision, I hereby notify you that checks

have been carried out, but I am unable to give any information which could reveal whether or not

your client is known.”

In accordance with the procedure stated in Article 16(2) of Act of the JSB, the JSB informed the

College of Eurojust of the appeal on 21 March 2011 and invited the College of Eurojust to submit

any observations regarding the subject of appeal to the JSB. The College of Eurojust, after thorough

consideration of the case, was of the opinion that the answer given to the applicant was correct and

did not have any additional considerations at that stage of the proceedings.

At its meeting of 7 April 2011, the JSB discussed the case, taking note of all documents related to it.

After deliberations, the JSB reached a unanimous decision, concluding that:

“In the light of the specific circumstances and complexity of the case as well as of the big

interest at stake for the data subject, who has been de facto denied the possibility to exercise

his rights, as guaranteed by Article 19 and 20 of the Eurojust Decision, by the provision of

the standard answer by Eurojust, and, in the absence of any evidence that Eurojust could

suffer any harm by providing the individual a clear and unambiguous answer, the JSB

decides, in accordance with Article 23.7 of the Eurojust Decision to refer the matter to

Eurojust for reconsideration. Eurojust is required, in line with Article 23.8 of the Eurojust

Decision, to provide Mr T a clear and unambiguous answer as to the fact that no personal

data on him are processed by Eurojust and to clarify that, therefore, there is no object for

the exercise of any other of the rights invoked by the individual”.

13 The Decision is available: http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/Eurojust-

framework/jsb/appealdecisions/Appeal%20Decision%202011-04-07/JSB-Appeal-Decision-CaseMrT-

2011-04-07-EN.pdf

http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/Eurojust-framework/jsb/appealdecisions/Appeal%20Decision%202011-04-07/JSB-Appeal-Decision-CaseMrT-2011-04-07-EN.pdf



13032/12 ana/JV/pl 15

ANEXO DG D 2B ES

6.2 1on-case-related appeals

A non-case-related appeal, relating to a request for access to the minutes of a selection procedure at

Eurojust, was lodged with the JSB on 29 July 2011. After consultation with the College of Eurojust,

which informed the JSB of its decision to reconsider the matter and provide the applicant with all

requested information, the JSB welcomed this revised decision and requested the College by letter

of 11 October 2011 to implement its own decision and to accordingly provide full information to

the applicant. The College consequently provided the full text of the conclusions of the minutes of

the Selection Board to the applicant on 13 October 2011.

7. TRA�SPARE�CY

7.1 JSB webpage

The new JSB webpage14

was officially launched at the plenary meeting on 21 June 2011. This page

provides up-to-date information about the JSB, including highlights of each meeting, appeal

decisions, news on the latest developments concerning data protection reform, and the Annual

Activity Reports (the report of 2010 is currently available in German, French, Spanish and Italian).

Additionally, two leaflets about data subjects’ rights and the JSB’s role, entitled “Know your

Rights” and “The Role of the JSB”, were made available in the 23 official EU languages and made

available on the JSB’s webpage.

To facilitate the exercise of the rights to data subjects, a list of authorities in each Member State,

whom citizens can contact concerning their data subject rights, was created. This list was made

public and available on the JSB’s webpage.

All this work has been done to publicise the efforts of the JSB and to raise public awareness of data

protection at Eurojust.

14

www.eurojust.europa.eu/jsb.htm

http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/jsb.htm

13032/12 ana/JV/pl 16

ANEXO DG D 2B ES

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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

8. SELF-ASSESSME�T

Through self-assessment via the evaluation and analysis of its own activities, the JSB is able to spot

any possible problems, and foresee ways of resolving them, thus increasing performance,

efficiency, and quality of work, working methods and results achieved.

Since its inception in 2003, the JSB has been not only an external supervisor, but also an advisor to

Eurojust in matters related to data protection. The JSB’s knowledge of data protection matters in the

context of judicial activities provided added value. Through regular contacts with Eurojust’s

administrative staff, the JSB had gained complete insight and understanding into the way Eurojust

operates. Such in-depth analysis of the issues contributed to the delivery of constructive results. The

JSB has always been keen to increase public awareness about its activities and its achievements.

According to Article 23(12) of Eurojust Decision, the JSB submits an annual report to the Council.

The highlights of the meetings are placed on JSB’s webpage. This helps to promote the profile of

the JSB and also serves to increase its accountability to the broader public.

The frequent and regular JSB inspections, covering both the case-related and non-case-related

(administrative) processing operations of Eurojust, have strongly contributed to a continuous

growth of experience and knowledge necessary for the supervisory work, especially in the field of

judicial cooperation.

In the overall context of a fundamental reform of the EU’s data protection framework, the new data

protection challenges call for more effort, commitment, input and participation from the JSB.

Therefore, the JSB will not rest on its achieved results, but will actively continue its work and

maintain the same quality of work as has been achieved so far.

9. FUTURE OUTLOOK

1.1.

Today, in a world of rapid technological changes and globalisation, we face ever more growing

demand for the use of personal data in the area of police and judicial cooperation, especially the

demand for cross-border exchange of information, making it inevitable in order to build Europe as a

safe place for our citizens. However, one should never forget that the measures to combat crime

must be accompanied and carefully balanced by the protection of individual rights and freedoms.

Data protection is a fundamental right; therefore, the right balance between the needs of operational

work and the requirements of data protection must be maintained.

The year 2012 promises to be challenging and interesting in terms of data protection, as the

European Commission will make a proposal for fundamental reform of the EU’s data protection

framework, including a proposal for a Directive on the protection of personal data in police and

criminal justice matters. The Eurojust JSB is looking forward to the challenges awaiting it in 2012,

especially in terms of the future supervision model to be defined by the new data protection acquis;

however, the priorities for the JSB will stay the same – to protect the rights of individuals. The

Eurojust JSB will continue its follow-up work on the last inspection at Eurojust in 2010, monitoring

closely the implementation of the recommendations given in its inspection report.

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ANEXO DG D 2B ES

The JSB will meet on the following dates in 2012: 10 February, 19 April, 14 and 15 June, and 15

November.

JSB appointees at plenary meeting on 15 June 2012

13032/12 ana/JV/pl 19

ANEXO I DG D 2B ES

A��EX I APPOI�TEES TO THE JOI�T SUPERVISORY BODY 2011

Member State Appointee

Date of appointment

Belgium Ms Nicole LEPOIVRE 09/01/2007

Bulgaria Ms Pavlina PANOVA 04/07/2007

Czech Republic Mr Josef RAKOVSKÝ 14/04/2004

Denmark Mr Jakob LUNDSAGER 05/04/2009

Germany Mr Bertram SCHMITT 23/06/2009

Estonia Mr Pavel GONTŠAROV 25/10/2004

Ireland Mr Billy HAWKES 06/06/2005

Greece Ms Anastasia PERISTERAKI 04/02/2010

Spain Mr Artemi RALLO LOMBARTE 27/02/2007

France Mr Frédèric BAAB 11/06/2009

Italy Mr Luigi FRUNZIO 14/06/2010

Cyprus Ms Goulla FRANGOU 23/07/2008

Latvia Ms Zane PĒTERSONE 27/09/2004

Lithuania Mr Egidijus BIELIŪNAS 08/12/2004

Luxembourg Ms Lotty PRUSSEN 06/05/2002

Hungary Mr Tibor KATONA 23/06/2008

Malta Mr Joseph EBEJER 30/03/2009

Netherlands Ms Jannette BEUVING 01/01/2007

Austria Mr Gerhard KURAS 06/02/2010

Poland Mr Dariusz ŁUBOWSKI 26/05/2004

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ANEXO I DG D 2B ES

Appointees who terminated office during 2011

Member State Member Date of office

Cyprus Ms Goulla FRANGOU 23/07/2008-November 2011

Portugal Mr Carlos CAMPOS LOBO 01/04/2006

Romania Ms Laura-Marina ANDREI 01/10/2007

Slovenia Mr Rajko PIRNAT 23/03/2005

Slovak Republic Ms Renáta JANÁKOVÁ 31/07/2008

Finland Ms Anne HEIMOLA 01/01/2008

Sweden Mr Hans FRENNERED 01/07/2002

United Kingdom Mr Christopher GRAHAM 12/08/2009

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ANEXO II DG D 2B ES

A��EX II PUBLICATIO�S

The following publications can be requested from the JSB Secretariat, Po Box 16183, 2500 BD The

Hague, Netherlands, e-mail: [email protected]

2.

Booklet “Data Protection at Eurojust”, available in English, French,

German and Spanish

3.


13032/12 ana/JV/pl 22

ANEXO II DG D 2B ES

Leaflet 1: “Know your rights”, printed version available in English,

French, German and Spanish

Leaflet 2: “The Role of the Joint Supervisory Body of Eurojust”,

printed version available in English, French, German and Spanish

Leaflet 1

Leaflet 2

_______________

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 30.5.2012 COM(2012) 250 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

3rd Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2011)_

{SWD(2012) 139 final}

EN 2 EN

I. INTRODUCTION

This Report presents a forward-looking analysis of EU policy on immigration and international protection based on developments in 2011, an important year for the EU in many respects, with consequent impact also on migration policy. Not only did the economic crisis continue to burden the EU's economy and growth, there were also the dramatic events of the Arab Spring and increasing migratory pressure on the EU's external borders, notably those bordering the Mediterranean and in the South East, plus the consequences arising from the misuse of visa liberalisation. These events served to further emphasise the need for a coherent, balanced EU migration policy which is both dynamic, to respond to short-term needs, and strategic, providing a longer-term vision.

In this context, there were several key initiatives, such as the new strategic framework set out in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), bringing added value to the EU's and its Member States' actions notably in relation to its external migration policy, as well as the Visa Information System going live, the launch of the EU Immigration Portal, proposals to strengthen the governance of the Schengen area and the presentation of the EUROSUR proposal. Other notable achievements were the political agreement on extending the mandate of Frontex and on the amended Asylum Qualification Directive; the conclusion of a mobility partnership with Armenia; inauguration of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO); and the establishment of a new European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice. Along with the co-legislators, some progress was made towards achieving the goal of a Common European Asylum System in 2012.

Progress in EU acquis was also made with the adoption of Directives on the single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the EU and on a common set of rights for legally residing third-country national workers;1 on extending the scope of long-term resident status to beneficiaries of international protection;2 and on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims.3 Member States also took further steps to transpose the Return and the Employer Sanctions Directives.

Last year's Annual Report4 followed the May 2011 Communication on Migration,5 which gave a perspective on policy development in light of events at that time. Both of these then served to inform the subsequent Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)6 and European Council7 conclusions in June 2011 which set orientations for the development of the EU's migration policy, specifically in regard to the governance of the Schengen area, the control of external borders, the development of partnerships with the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood and the completion of the Common European Asylum System by 2012.

1 Directive 2011/98/EU of 13 December 2011 2 Directive 2011/51/EU of 11 May 2011 3 Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011 4 COM(2011) 291 final and SEC(2011) 620 5 COM(2011) 248/3 6 Council conclusions on Borders, Migration and Asylum Stocktaking and the way forward, 3096th

JUSTICE and HOME AFFAIRS Council meeting, Luxembourg, 9 and 10 June 2011 7 Conclusions of the European Council, Brussels, 23/24 June 2011

EN 3 EN

This year's report first gives an overview portraying the migration picture in the EU from a statistical perspective. The EU's response to the aforementioned key events which impacted on migration policy is then addressed, along with the Commission's contribution to the roadmap addressing increased migratory pressures. The report is again based principally on the Commission's and Member States' political assessments and complemented by a factual paper with statistical annex8 detailing developments that have occurred at both EU and, via the European Migration Network,9 Member State level.

II. A SNAPSHOT OF EU MIGRATION10

It is instructive to first place the EU's migratory situation in the wider global context. In a year in which the world's population surpassed seven billion, there are estimated to be some 214 million migrants worldwide (approximately 3.1% of the total world population),11 meaning that 9.4% (around 20.2 million) of the world's migrants are third-country nationals residing in the EU. By comparison, Canada has around 3.4% of the world's total (7.2 million representing 21.3% of its national population), whilst the USA has around 20% of the world's total (42.8 million representing 13.5% of its national population).12

On 1st January 2011, the EU's total population was 502.5 million, with an increase of 1.4 million from 2010 which is equivalent to an annual rate of +2.7 per 1000 inhabitants made up of a natural increase of 0.5 million (+1.0‰) and net migration of 0.9 million (+1.7‰). The 20.2 million third-country nationals in the EU amounts to some 4% of the total EU population, which is more than the number of EU citizens (12.3 million or 2.5% of the total EU population) who have moved to another Member State.13 The largest resident third-country nationality groups in 2009 were from Turkey (approx. 2.4million), Morocco (approx. 1.8million) and Albania (approx. 1million).14 Using the UN Human Development Index (HDI), around 47% of non-EU born migrants are from high HDI, around 46% from medium HDI and around 7% from low HDI countries.15

In terms of first residence permits issued to third-country nationals, this amounted to almost 2.5 million in 2010; the number of permits issued for remunerated activities representing 32.5% of the total, against 30.2% for family reasons, 20.6% for study and 17% for various other reasons (protection-related, residence without the right to work, etc). Broken down by nationality, most residence permits were issued to nationals of the USA (around 212 000), India (around 200 000), China (around 172 000), Ukraine (around 167 000) and Morocco (around 157 000).

The 60th anniversary year of the Geneva Convention saw a significant increase of 16.8% compared to 2010 in the total number of asylum applicants, amounting to just over 302 000

8 SWD(2012) 139 9 EMN, http://www.emn.europa.eu 10 More detailed statistics, including a breakdown by Member State, are given in the Statistical annex of

the accompanying Commission Staff Working Paper (SWD(2012) 139). 11 Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division International

Migration 2009 12 Figures from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division

International Migration 2009 13 Figures based on Eurostat 2010 data, see News Release 105/2011 14 Figures from Eurostat Statistics in Focus 24/2010. 15 Migrants in Europe: a statistical portrait of the 1st and 2nd generation, Eurostat, December 2011. Note

that these percentages relate to 2008.


EN 4 EN

and further affecting the asylum systems of several Member States. The most important countries of citizenship of asylum seekers were Afghanistan (28 000), Russian Federation (18 200), Pakistan (15 700), Iraq (15 200) and Serbia (13 900). In terms of protection granted in 2011, a total of 59 465 received protection at first instance (refugee (28 995), subsidiary protection (21 400) or humanitarian (9 065)), around 25% of all decisions taken.16

As addressed in Section IV, irregular migration continues to be a major component of migration to the EU. By its very nature, no reliable figures on the number of irregular migrants in the EU exist, with estimates of fewer than 2 million up to 4.5 million most often cited.17 More reliable indicators such as refusals, apprehensions and returns may be used, though they are subject to many caveats. In 2011,18 some 343 000 persons were refused entry to the EU, a decrease of 13% from 2010, with the vast majority (nearly 70%) being refused in Spain, notably at their external land borders. Also in 2011, some 468 500 persons were apprehended (a decrease from 2010 when it was about 505 000) and Member States returned around 190 000 third-country nationals (almost 15% less than in 2010).

III. CONTRIBUTION OF MIGRATION TO THE EU'S GROWTH AGENDA19

At first sight, the EU's current economic challenges might make it difficult to understand the necessity for legal migration and mobility channels. But it is necessary to bear in mind that, even with an overall EU unemployment rate of around 10%, equating to 23.8 million citizens, and increasing to 22.1% for youths (under 25),20 many Member States are already experiencing labour and skills shortages21 in different sectors and for varying reasons.22 Most Member States are concentrating their efforts on addressing unemployment and increasing the employability of their own resident population and then using Union preference to address labour shortages. Currently, Member States tend to focus their approach to economic migration of third-country nationals more on (highly-) skilled workers, although several also require low skilled workers, albeit, in most cases, for a temporary period.

Economic migration thus remains an important component part of efforts to address the challenge of labour shortages, notably in the context of the EU's ageing population23 and an increasingly competitive international market for talent, with other countries outside Europe also experiencing skills shortages. The lack of recognition of expertise and formal qualifications of those third-country nationals already residing in the EU, as well as of the portability of social security rights, represent additional barriers to benefit fully from this source of labour.

16 Figures based on Eurostat data, see News Release 46/2012 17 Figures are from the EU funded CLANDESTINO project for 2008. 18 Figures based on Eurostat data and exclude Luxembourg for whom data were not available. 19 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020. See also 'Towards a job rich recovery' (COM(2012) 173 final). 20 Eurostat News Release 16/2012 21 The European Vacancy Monitor provides a quarterly review of available vacancies,

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=955&langId=en. In January 2012, for example, it noted that the number of job-finders in the ‘professionals’ group has grown by +34% in the second quarter of 2011. Longer-term projections are produced by the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), including its EU Skills Panorama (http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/EN/Files/5191_en.pdf).

22 Further details in Satisfying Labour Demand though Migration, EMN, June 2011 and by the IOM's Independent Network of Labour Migration and Integration Experts, http://www.labourmigration.eu/.

23 2012 is the European Year of Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations. One of the findings of a Eurobarometer survey on Active Ageing found that majority of Europeans (71%) are aware that the population is getting older, but this is a concern for only 42 %.

http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=955&langId=en

http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/EN/Files/5191_en.pdf

http://www.labourmigration.eu/

EN 5 EN

In addition to the potential of migrants to contribute to economic growth,24 they also bring to our societies a social and cultural contribution.

Given all this, the Commission proposes to launch, before the end of 2012, a consultation inviting broad debate with Member States, social partners and stakeholders on what the role of EU policies should be regarding the opportunities of economic migration.

In fact, the EU has already undertaken several forward-looking measures and future developments, in the framework of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility,25 will look into facilitating better the match between employers and employees within a global labour market, with a view also to enhance and mutually benefit from "brain circulation" rather than increasing "brain drain." Mobility partnerships form part of this approach and, following those already in place with the Republic of Moldova (henceforth Moldova), Georgia and Cape Verde, an agreement with Armenia was concluded in October 2011.26 The Commission has also launched negotiations with some Southern Mediterranean countries with the aim to conclude Mobility Partnerships or other cooperation frameworks, such as Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility (see also Section IV.1).

In order to better inform migrants of the possibilities and conditions for legal migration, the EU Immigration Portal27 was launched. It provides a first point of entry for up-to-date, targeted and practical information on EU and national immigration procedures and policies. It also explains the rights and the risks related to irregular migration in order to dissuade migrants from entering the EU via often dangerous routes.

The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, along with an accompanying paper on Migration and Development,28 also proposed a number of measures to maximise the development impact of migration and mobility. These included promoting the WHO Code of practice on the international recruitment of health personnel29 and monitoring application of the 'EU Blue Card' Directive, which allows Member States to reject applications in order to ensure ethical recruitment, to mitigate brain drain. Another facet was to explore the setting up of diaspora investment vehicles that could channel the voluntary contributions of the diaspora, supplemented by EU resources to boost the development-oriented initiatives and investments in priority countries, such as in the Southern Mediterranean. Further measures aim to develop private-public partnerships to engage migrant entrepreneurs and SMEs in trade, investment and skills transfers between EU Member States and partner countries; to explore the usefulness of an annual remittances forum; and consider the added value of a common EU portal on remittances.30 Providing assistance to partner countries to identify and monitor bona

24 See, for example, The Causes and Effects of International Migrations: Evidence from OECD Countries,

Francesc Ortega, Giovanni Peri, NBER Working Paper No. 14833 (April 2009) whose results imply that immigration increases the total GDP of the receiving country in the short-run one-for-one, without affecting average wages and average income per person.

25 COM(2011) 743 final 26 Commission Press Release IP/11/1257 of 27 October 2011. Mobility partnerships with Armenia,

Moldova and Georgia are part of the EU's Eastern Partnership strategy (COM(2011) 564 final). Negotiations with Ghana are ongoing and it is planned to open discussions with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.

27 http://ec.europa.eu/immigration 28 SEC(2011) 1353 final. 29 http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/code/practice/en/ 30 Outflows of workers' remittances was €31.2 bn in 2010, a 3% increase compared to 2009. Eurostat

Statistics in Focus 4/2012

http://ec.europa.eu/immigration

http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/code/practice/en/

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fide recruiters in order to empower migrants, notably with a view to facilitating circular migration31 is a further aspect. Finally, proposals were included to broaden the traditional migration and development agenda to better address issues such as the social consequences of migration on countries of origin and the protection of the rights of migrants in transit. The Commission stands ready to address these various measures through dialogue and cooperation with non-EU countries. Indeed, this is already an integral part of all the political dialogues and cooperation frameworks the EU has developed with third countries and regions, currently amounting to seven regional processes, covering more than a hundred countries and over twenty bilateral processes.

Another significant achievement has been the adoption of the 'Single Permit' Directive,32 with transposition into national legislation required by December 2013. This serves to simplify migration procedures and ensure that legally residing third-country nationals enjoy a common set of rights on an equal footing with nationals. Elsewhere, some Member States have transposed the 'EU Blue Card' Directive.33 However, overall progress has been limited, leading the Commission to launch infringement procedures for non-communication of national measures. For students34 and for researchers,35 who also contribute to and are an investment for the EU's economy, a number of shortcomings have been identified. For example, for students there was an identified need to strengthen mobility clauses in the Directive, to stimulate synergies with EU programmes that facilitate third-country nationals' mobility into the EU and reinforce procedural guarantees; whilst for researchers there was an identified need to provide clear and unambiguous definitions of researchers' rights, to make clear distinctions between permits for researchers and other types of permits and to provide better guidance and information on the possibilities provided by the Directive. Consequently, in order to make better use of these instruments and to promote further the attractiveness of the EU, a proposal to amend and merge these two Directives is planned to be tabled in December 2012 with the aim also to promote greater mobility of students and researchers.

There was some progress in negotiations on the proposed Directives for seasonal workers36 and for intra-corporate transferees.37 The former will provide legal means by which seasonal workers may enter and work in the EU, as well as preventing exploitation and protecting their health and safety, ensuring also that EU employers have the necessary workforce. The latter serves to address an identified need of multinational companies to more easily transfer their highly-skilled staff to their premises and related enterprises in the EU by overcoming the plethora of different rules and red tape in the Member States. It thus has the potential to enhance growth, to reinforce EU competitiveness, improve the ability to deliver on the goals of the EU 2020 Strategy and ensure equal access and opportunity to all relevant stakeholders. Whilst there are a number of issues still to be resolved during the negotiations, Member States

31 The EMN study on EMN Study on Temporary and Circular Migration looked at empirical evidence,

current policy practice and future options for these types of migration. 32 Directive 2011/98/EU of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for

third country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for legally residing third-country workers.

33 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009. See also Commission Press Release IP/11/1247 of 27.10.2011. 34 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 and including also pupils, unremunerated trainees and volunteers.

See also report on implementation of this directive, COM(2011) 587. 35 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005. See also report on implementation of this directive, COM(2011) 901. 36 Proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the

purposes of seasonal employment (COM(2010) 379) 37 Proposal for a Directive on conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the

framework of an intra-corporate transfer (COM(2010) 378)

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are urged to reach political agreement as soon as possible so that these EU instruments may also become part of the tools needed to tackle the current economic crisis and the challenges ahead.

Also, the report on the Long-Term Residents' Directive38 concluded that, for a variety of identified reasons, the potential of this EU instrument is far from being fully exploited. The Commission will step up its efforts to ensure that the Directive is correctly transposed, primarily through technical meetings with Member States and, if necessary, also via infringement proceedings.

The corollary of legal migration is the need to have effective integration policies. Whilst developing and implementing integration policies falls within the competence and responsibility of the Member States, the Commission continues to play a supportive role, as most recently recognised by the JHA Council.39 However, while there are many examples of ambitious integration policies,40 not all measures have met their objectives. Much still needs to be done to fully benefit from the potential offered by the 20.2 million third-country nationals in the EU. With reference also to the Europe 2020 headline targets,41 in 2010 the average employment rate of third-country nationals aged 20-64 was 58.5%, compared to 68.6% of the total population aged 20-64. Some 19.4% of third-country nationals in the same age group were unemployed, compared to 9.3% of the total population and 46.4% of third-country nationals were overqualified for their jobs, compared to 21.2% of the total population. For those third-country nationals who become unemployed, there is the additional risk that they might then lose their legal residence status too. In 2010, 32.4% of third-country nationals aged 20-64 were at risk of poverty, compared to 15.0% of the total population in the same age group. Also in 2010, the rate of early school leaving among third-country nationals aged 18-24 was 33.0%, compared to 14.1% of the total population in the same age group.42

The European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals43 sets out the next steps in order for migrants, and thus the EU, to make full use of their capacities and skills, underpinned by the respect for and promotion of fundamental rights. Measures proposed in order to fully benefit from the potential of migration include stronger economic, social, cultural and political participation of legally resident third-country nationals in their receiving societies, as well as knowledge of their rights and obligations and a positive approach to

38 COM(2011) 585 final 39 3135th JUSTICE and HOME AFFAIRS Council meeting, Brussels, 13 and 14 December 2011 40 The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which serves to assess, compare and improve

integration policy, is a useful reference. Work has also begun to develop and evaluate common European "Indicators" to comparatively monitor results of integration policies. A pilot study on Indicators of Immigrant Integration was published by Eurostat in June 2011 and a dedicated webpage created, see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_social_policy_equality/migrant_integration/indicators.

41 Specifically, raise to 75% the employment rate for women and men aged 20-64, […..] and the better integration of legal migrants; and improving education levels, in particular by aiming to reduce school drop-out rates to less than 10% and by increasing the share of 30-34 years old having completed tertiary or equivalent education to at least 40%. [European Council, 17th June 2010]

42 These data come from Eurostat's Labour Force Survey and their EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions.

43 COM(2011) 455 final and subsequent 3135th JHA Council conclusions of 13 and 14 December 2011. A Eurobarometer on Migrant Integration (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/quali/ql_5969_migrant_en.pdf) was also published.

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_social_policy_equality/migrant_integration/indicators

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_social_policy_equality/migrant_integration/indicators

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/quali/ql_5969_migrant_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/quali/ql_5969_migrant_en.pdf

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diversity. The Commission is also strengthening cooperation with local and regional authorities and developing a role for countries of origin.

Another related component concerns family reunification with certain Member States explicitly stating their desire to limit this form of legal migration. Within such a context, a public debate44 on family reunification was launched in November 2011 on how this type of migration might be developed further without losing sight of the objective in Directive 2003/86/EC, including preserving the fundamental right to family life. On the basis of the feedback received, the Commission shall then decide on the next steps.

IV. EU'S POLICY RESPONSE TO MIGRATORY PRESSURES

Whilst only 4% (or 27 465 out of 706 000)45 of those fleeing the civil strife in Libya travelled North to the EU, the resulting impact, combined with the increase in irregular migration flows from Tunisia46 and at the Turkey-Greece border47 along with a significant increase of asylum applicants arriving at the EU's southern external borders,48 served to demonstrate that the EU is still under increased migratory pressure49 with no expectation of this declining in the future.50 Indeed, the consequences of the Arab Spring,51 principally in Italy but also in Malta, plus the migration flows at the Greece-Turkey border during 2011, led to serious reflections on how the EU should best respond to these migratory pressures, whilst at the same time having efficient entry mechanisms to permit orderly and managed migration.

Irregular migration to the EU is often a risky endeavour and, for those trafficked or smuggled, an abhorrent exploitation of human beings. Even within the EU, migrants may be in an irregular situation as a result of, for example, overstaying their visa limit or not returning to their country of origin upon receiving a negative asylum decision. The EU has always placed particular emphasis on identifying measures aimed at reducing irregular migration and in

44 COM (2011)735 final. Contributions received in response to this Green Paper are available at

http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/consulting_public/consulting_0023_en.htm. The European Migration Network also undertook a study on abuses though marriages and convenience and declarations of parenthood to inform this debate.

45 Humanitarian Emergency Response to the Libyan Crisis, IOM, December 2011. 46 Some 26 354 primarily Tunisian nationals fleeing from Tunisia arrived in Lampedusa (Source:

Humanitarian Emergency Response to the Libyan Crisis, IOM, December 2011). 47 According to Frontex, throughout 2011 there were over 55 000 detections at the Greek-Turkish land

border in the Evros region, an increase of approximately 17% compared to 2010. 48 For example, and according to Eurostat, the number of asylum applications in Italy in 2011 was 34 115,

a 239% increase from 2010, and for Malta it was 1 890, a 980% increase from 2010. The number of applications from Tunisia increased 12-fold to 6 335 in 2011 with the vast majority lodged in Italy.

49 According to Frontex, the majority of irregular border crossings are limited to 'hotspots' such as the Eastern, notably at the Greek land border with Turkey, and Central Mediterranean routes (50% and 33% of the EU total respectively), plus increasingly the Western Mediterranean route (almost 10% of total). The most commonly detected migrants were from Afghanistan. These increased flows have also been matched by an increase in the number of applications for international protection. Frontex Quarterly Report, Issue 3, July-September 2011

50 For example, the ACP Observatory on Migration's Human Mobility Report 2011 estimates that the population in sub-Saharan Africa was 802 million, increasing on average by 2.7% per year. The report also states that more than two-thirds of the population in Africa are under 25 years of age implying "a large increase in the share of working-age persons likely to seek greener pastures abroad." See also population projections for Africa in Eurostat Statistics in Focus 19/2012 of 27 March 2012.

51 See MEMO/11/918 of 16 December 2011 for an overview of the EU's overall response to the Arab Spring.


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2011 several Council Conclusions52 addressing irregular migration were adopted. The Commission Communications of 4 May53 and 24 May 201154 included priorities for reducing irregular migration. They also extensively examined the situation of irregular migration, including composition of flows, nature and scale of the impact, as well as measures and best practices undertaken by the EU and its Member States. Whilst it is clear that the situation across the EU differs, given the geographical and political specificities, there is now a need for more effective implementation of the already existing processes and measures agreed at EU level. The EU's response should be tailor-made to the different challenges, but the objectives to be achieved and the means at the disposal of the EU and the Member States remain the same.

This is a common challenge for the EU and its Member States. No Member State is able to respond to these challenges on its own, yet each has a responsibility to ensure their effective implementation of agreed measures. The added value of action at EU level, and between the EU and our partners, and in particular our neighbours, is therefore essential. It is also important to identify and jointly support a strategic and comprehensive approach to addressing irregular migration, including ensuring that the external borders of the EU are effectively managed with appropriate legal channels for entry.

Migration and mobility should therefore be placed in the context of the need to maintain orderly movements and in full respect of fundamental rights. This implies dialogue and cooperation with non-EU countries with a view to facilitating legitimate migration and mobility, while at the same time efficiently tackling irregular migration and having an effective return policy. It also implies properly functioning external border controls and solidarity with those Member States most affected. Without this, it will not be possible for the EU to offer more opportunities for legal migration and mobility. It is also an essential element to preserve freedom of movement and internal security inside of the EU. The legitimacy of any policy framework relies on this. As the following will demonstrate, existing acquis and the initiatives tabled in 2011 would, if effectively implemented, provide the EU with the necessary tools to address these challenges.

Under the guidance of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU, the latest trends in irregular migration were addressed on several occasions with a view to preparing a set of proposals for possible common actions.55 Working with the Commission and the Member States, the Danish Presidency then took forward the work and developed a coherent response which resulted in the adoption by the JHA Council in April 2012 of the roadmap EU Action on Migratory Pressures – a Strategic Response.56 The Commission's contribution to the development of this roadmap is outlined in Section IV.6.

IV.1. Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and Security57

As part of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, dialogues on migration, mobility and security leading to the conclusion of Mobility Partnerships were launched on 6 and 13

52 On 25/26 February 2010, 3rd June 2010, 11-12 April 2011 and 9-10 June 2011 and most recently on the

basis of a Note (Council Doc 18302/11) from the Polish Presidency in December 2011. 53 COM(2011) 248/3 54 COM(2011) 291 final 55 Council Doc 18302/11 56 Council Doc 8714/1/12 57 See also COM(2011) 292/3

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October 2011 with Tunisia and Morocco respectively, and the necessary preparations to start the dialogue with Egypt have been made. Similar dialogues will follow with other countries in the Southern Mediterranean region, notably with Libya, as soon as the political situation permits. These dialogues allow the EU and the partner countries to discuss in a comprehensive manner all aspects of their possible cooperation in managing migration flows and circulation of persons with a view to inter alia establishing Mobility Partnerships. The principle of conditionality is applied in these dialogues in order to encourage effective commitment in preventing irregular migration flows, in managing borders and in cooperating on the return and readmission of irregular migrants.

It is also time to re-consider the proposal made by the Commission at the beginning of 2011 – as noted by the conclusions of the JHA Council of 25 February 2011- to launch a dialogue with Turkey.

Dialogues of a similar format, aimed at jointly addressing mobility and related security elements, have been in place with the Western Balkan countries since 2008. The process is based on country-tailored roadmaps with benchmarks including inter alia document security; strengthening capacities in migration, border management and readmission; and the fight against transnational organised crime, terrorism and corruption. Following the lifting of visa-requirements, the Commission has been working intensively with Western Balkans countries to prevent and remedy the situation of misuse of the visa free regime. The countries concerned have adopted a series of targeted measure to address this phenomenon.

Likewise, concrete proposals were made to enhance further the level of political and operational cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs between the EU and its Eastern Partners.58 Particular priorities were to consolidate the existing frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, including by identifying the principles for such cooperation; and to analyse the progress made to then propose orientations for further strengthening of cooperation, including its thematic priorities.59

IV.2. Support to Greece

The land border between Greece and Turkey is particularly vulnerable to irregular migratory movements and particular attention has been devoted to reinforcing controls at this border, with political and material support provided mainly under Frontex coordination. Frontex also assisted Greece via the Attica Project, which supported the Hellenic Police in return capacity building. The Commission was actively engaged with the Greek authorities and regularly undertook missions to Greece to review progress in the implementation of the Action Plan, then reporting back to the JHA Council.

In view of the need for Greece to make rapid progress in implementing the Action Plan on Asylum Reform and Migration Management, adopted in September 2010,60 the External Borders Fund has provided and will continue to provide substantial financial support61 towards improving border management, in particular, by supporting the establishment of modern screening and detention facilities in the Evros region at the Greece-Turkey land

58 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. See COM(2011) 564 final. 59 Conclusions were adopted by the JHA Council meeting in December 2011. 60 MEMO/10/450 of 27 September 2010. The quarterly reports of the Task Force for Greece places this

Action Plan in the wider context of other technical assistance to Greece. 61 In the period 2007-2011, Greece received €119 million and a further €44.7 million is foreseen for 2012.

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border. High priority was also given to enhancing Greece's capacity to ensure that irregular migrants are returned to their countries of origin, in accordance with the standards set out in the Return Directive (2008/115/EC), again with substantial financial support62 available from the Return Fund to support forced return operations and the introduction and implementation of voluntary return programmes. The Fund also financed measures reinforcing Greece's operational capacity for return management and the effective transposition of the Return Directive. The Commission has made, and continues to make suggestions to Greece on how to maximise the effectiveness of the support available, including through working with organisations such as the IOM.

However, these actions in themselves would not be sufficient without parallel, enhanced cooperation with the immediate neighbours, and in particular Turkey. In this respect, and referring also to Section IV.1, the conclusion of the readmission agreement with the Turkish authorities and ensuring their commitment to combat irregular migration remain a high priority.

The Commission, Member States, EASO and UNHCR supported Greece also in the reform of its asylum system, including financially,63 and a number of positive developments occurred, such as the adoption of new asylum laws, the creation of a new independent Asylum Service, Initial Reception Service and Appeals Authority, a reduction in the backlog of applications, and EASO developing an Operating Plan to deploy Asylum Support Teams from May 2011. However, significant concerns still remain over inter alia the inappropriate reception conditions, in particular in the Evros region. The Greek authorities are requested to address these concerns swiftly, whilst ensuring the respect of the fundamental rights of the persons concerned.

IV.3. Safeguarding the EU's External Borders

The added value of Frontex in facilitating operational cooperation between Member States on border security and return was once again demonstrated, notably in respect to assisting the Greek authorities, including via a RABIT,64 at its border with Turkey and in Mediterranean Sea operations. Its budget was reinforced by €30 million to enable the Agency to further expand its operational capacity.

Amongst the notable evolutions, following the agreement on amending its founding Regulation,65 is for the Agency to be able to strengthen its cooperation with third countries, including providing technical assistance;66 the deployment of European Border Guard Teams; and the establishment of a Fundamental Rights Officer plus a Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, which should serve to mainstream fundamental rights in all of its activities. Member States are requested to continue to share operational information and

62 In the period 2008-2011, Greece received €52.2 million and a further €37.3 million is foreseen for

2012. 63 In the period 2008-2011, Greece received €35.5 million (including emergency support for 2008-2011)

and a further €4 million is foreseen for 2012. 64 Rapid Border Intervention Teams, as established by Council Regulation (EC) 863/2007. See also

Frontex's RABIT Operation 2010 Evaluation Report, August 2011. 65 Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 of 25 October 2011 66 This shall be done, for example, via the Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) network which, following

adoption of Regulation (EU) 493/2011 of 5 April 2011, is now integrated into Frontex operations.

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cooperate with each other and Frontex in order to reduce the loss of lives at sea and the number of irregular immigrants entering the EU undetected.

Elsewhere, the adoption of the legal basis for the establishment of a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice67 will ensure, once it becomes fully operational at the end of 2012, the continuous, uninterrupted exchange of data between national authorities using EURODAC, the Visa Information System (VIS) and the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). Apart from managing these systems, the Agency will also be responsible for the development and operational management of these systems, as well as for other large-scale IT systems based on Title V of the TFEU.

Looking to the future, the Commission tabled its proposal to establish the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR),68 aiming to reinforce the surveillance of the Schengen external border, especially the southern maritime and eastern land borders, from 2013 onwards. It also launched its vision69 on the next generation of border management, using new technologies to simplify life for those travelling frequently to the EU and to better monitor border crossings. This "Smart Borders" initiative consists principally of an Entry/Exit System (EES) and a Registered Travellers Programme (RTP). Following consultations with the European Parliament, the Council and the European Data Protection Supervisor, the Commission intends to table legislative proposals for an EES and RTP in 2012 on the basis of an extensive impact assessment.

IV.4. A Common EU Visa Policy

Some 12.7 million Schengen visas were issued in 2011,70 a number likely to increase in the coming years. With the launching of the Visa Information System (VIS) on 11th October 2011 in North Africa, and to be progressively deployed worldwide, applications are processed much faster and identity theft tackled more effectively. Since its launch and up to the end of 2011, the system had stored almost 300 000 visa applications, with some 243 000 decisions made to issue a visa and 38 000 not to. Most of the applications came from Morocco (around 74 000), Algeria (around 71 000), Tunisia (around 29 000) and Egypt (around 23 000). More than 50% of all applications were processed by France (some 116 000 applications) and Spain (some 44 000 applications). About 500 persons were registered with multiple applications, all of which were rejected.71

In part also as a result of the sudden and substantial increase of unfounded asylum applications following the introduction in November 2009 of visa liberalisation with the

67 Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of 25 October 2011 68 COM(2011) 873 final 69 COM(2011) 680 final 70 Such visas entitle the holder to stay in the EU for up to three months in any six-month period. In 2011,

the highest number, around 41% of the total, of Schengen visas were issued in the Russian Federation. 71 Corresponding figures in 2012, up to the end of April 2012, are around 453 900 visa applications, with

about 368 400 decisions made to issue a visa and 63 000 not to. Most of the applications came from Algeria (around 122 000), Morocco (around 119 000), Egypt (around 41 000) and Tunisia (around 39 000). More than 50% of all applications were processed by France (some 185 000 applications) and Spain (some 78 000 applications). About 3 000 persons were registered with multiple applications, all of which were rejected.

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Balkan States, the amendments to Regulation 539/200172 proposed in May 2011 included a visa safeguard mechanism that could be used as a last resort measure.

Substantial progress was made on negotiating visa facilitation agreements with Cape Verde and on upgrading the existing visa facilitation agreements with Moldova, Russian Federation and Ukraine.73 Negotiations with Ukraine were finalised in December 2011.74 The Commission will continue to make use of visa facilitation agreements in order to promote people-to-people contacts, including in the framework of the Eastern Partnership75 and, in the future, in the Southern Mediterranean. The dialogue on visa liberalisation has started with Kosovo76 and is continuing with Moldova, Russian Federation and Ukraine.

IV.5. Schengen governance

Schengen, as an area without internal border controls, is one of the principal pillars of the EU and has facilitated travel for over 400 million Europeans in 26 countries. However, the influx to other Member States, notably France, of Tunisian nationals granted temporary permits in Italy77 and the plan to introduce border measures by Denmark, put Schengen under strain and brought into focus the need to enhance Schengen governance. In order to improve the functioning of Schengen, the Commission tabled proposals78 to enhance the evaluation and monitoring of the application of the Schengen rules, in order to transform the current mechanism into an effective and preventive tool. The proposals also included a mechanism for the reintroduction of internal border controls as a last resort,79 which should occur only in exceptional circumstances, and ensuring that a coordinated EU response is available to protect the functioning and the integrity of the Schengen Area as a common good.

Several amendments80 to the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) were proposed as well. The Commission believes they improve clarity and narrow the scope for divergent interpretations, while responding to practical problems that have arisen plus serve to strengthen further the protection of fundamental rights. Negotiations have advanced in Autumn 2011 and adoption can be expected in the course of 2012.

In order to ensure a coherent implementation and interpretation of the rules governing Schengen, the Commission also developed guidelines, in consultation with Member State experts, on the issuing of temporary residence permits and travel documents to non-EU

72 COM(2011) 290 final proposing a Regulation to amend Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing

the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement.

73 The Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation was presented to Moldova on 24 January 2011 and to Ukraine on 22 November 2010. Both contain benchmarks in the area of migration and asylum.

74 Ukraine-EU Summit Joint Statement, 19 December 2011 75 COM(2011) 564 final 76 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the

ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. All subsequent mentions of Kosovo are also to be understood within the context of this statement.

77 It is estimated that up to 12 000 permits had been issued and subsequently renewed by the Italian authorities. Whilst it is known that many Tunisian nationals then travelled to other Member States, notably France, the actual numbers are unknown.

78 COM (2011)559 final 79 COM (2011)560 final 80 COM(2011) 118 final

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citizens and police measures in the internal border zones. These guidelines are expected to be presented in 2012.

In addition, and following the endorsement of the JHA Council in December 2011, the Commission plans to present regular reports on the functioning of the Schengen cooperation, serving as a basis for a political discussion in the Council and in the European Parliament. The first report was published in May 2012.81

Positive to note was the formal accession of Liechtenstein82 to Schengen; the inclusion of the Kaliningrad oblast as an eligible area for local border traffic;83 and the progress made by Bulgaria and Romania towards joining Schengen.84

IV.6. Next Steps – a verifiable roadmap

As the previous sections have demonstrated, the EU already has a number of instruments in place to reduce irregular migration, with not only Frontex but also Europol and EASO expected to play key roles. There is thus no need to create new structures or mechanisms, but rather to concentrate on a more effective implementation of the already existing processes and measures agreed at EU level. These should be used to their full potential and Member States are urged to work closely with the Commission to ensure that this happens.

Indeed, following on from the aforementioned extensive discussions in Council during 2011, in particular during the Polish Presidency, the way forward is now set out within the coherent framework of the roadmap EU Action on Migratory Pressures - A Strategic Response, developed under the Danish Presidency, which gives clear goals and measurable priorities. On the basis also of priorities identified by the Member States and the recognition that only a strategic and holistic response at EU level would be successful in addressing them, the Commission contributed to the development of this roadmap on the basis of the following five priorities:

(1) concrete solidarity between Member States, most notably for those most affected, while ensuring that Member States makes all necessary efforts to effectively manage their external borders;

(2) an enhanced role at operational level of EU Agencies (in particular Frontex, EUROPOL and EASO);

(3) a stronger capacity to persuade third countries to act more effectively and to cooperate with the EU in preventing irregular migration and in readmitting85 irregular migrants in full respect of their fundamental rights, to be obtained by offering more substantial incentives and rewards for their cooperation, as well as through dialogue and partnership to address all aspects of migration management;

81 COM(2012) 230 final 82 Council Decision 2011/842/EU of 13 December 2011 83 Regulation (EU) 1342/2011 of 13 December 2011. Certain administrative districts of Poland in the

eligible border area are also included. 84 3135th JUSTICE and HOME AFFAIRS Council meeting, Brussels, 13 and 14 December 2011 85 See COM(2011) 76 final for a review of EU readmission agreements.

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(4) mobilisation of appropriate financial resources, including via the future Asylum and Migration Fund;86 and

(5) full transposition and use of existing acquis, notably the Return Directive,87 with continued emphasis on voluntary departure, reintegration and monitoring of the fundamental rights safeguards; and the Employer Sanctions Directive,88 plus progress on already tabled relevant proposals, notably on seasonal workers and EUROSUR.

The roadmap adopted by the JHA Council in April 2012 has, to a large extent, incorporated the approach proposed by the Commission.

V. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The EU has a long-standing tradition of providing protection to those who need it and shall continue to do so, in accordance also with its international obligations. A key priority, also of many Member States, remains the achievement of a Common European Asylum System in 2012 and some progress towards this goal was made. Following extensive and often difficult negotiations with the co-legislators, political agreement was reached on the extension of the Long-Term Residents Directive to include beneficiaries of international protection89 and the recast Qualification Directive.90 Progress has also been made with the Asylum Procedures and the Reception Conditions Directives following amended proposals in June 2011. Less positive were negotiations on the recast Dublin Regulation and the EURODAC Regulation, which were stalled for most of 2011. In order to move forward, the Commission calls on the European Parliament and the Council to adopt a constructive approach to negotiations in order that a fair and balanced compromise, acceptable for all parties concerned and increasing harmonisation, is reached. In this respect, the Commission has expressed its will to move forward with a proposal, including law enforcement access to EURODAC, if real progress in the negotiations on the whole package can then be made.

EASO has been operational since mid-2011 and the office will present an activity report on its first year in June 2012. As well as its support to Greece, EASO's main commitment has been on recruitment, the setting up of the necessary structures in Malta and taking responsibility for practical cooperation measures, such as the European Asylum Curriculum. Formal negotiations on the participation of associated countries, including Norway, to EASO are expected to be concluded during the first half of 2012. EASO should achieve independence by mid-2012, making full use of the practical cooperation measures and tools provided for in its founding Regulation.91 Likewise, Member States should also support EASO by making relevant experts and assets available on a structural basis, and not only in cases of particular pressure.

Solidarity continues to be an essential component of EU asylum policy. The Communication on intra-EU solidarity in asylum92 seeks to reinforce practical, technical and financial cooperation among Member States, moving towards a better allocation of responsibilities and

86 COM(2011) 751 final 87 Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008 88 Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 89 See Footnote 2. 90 Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 91 Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of 19 May 2010 92 COM(2011) 835 final

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an improved governance of the asylum system. All actors, in particular Member States, are requested to engage constructively in the follow-up to this Communication. In terms of existing actions, and with the agreed launching of the second phase of the EU Relocation from Malta (EUREMA) project,93 the Commission will undertake a thorough evaluation of the project in order to assess how relocation may then be further developed.

Third countries also benefit from the EU's solidarity in the area of asylum and a new priority, within the context of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, is to increase cooperation with relevant third countries in order to strengthen their asylum systems in compliance with international standards. Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) are a key instrument towards this goal.94 Another facet concerns resettlement95 in the EU in cooperation with third countries. The Commission thus welcomes the Council's and Parliament's decision to establish common EU resettlement priorities for 2013, paving the way for new rules concerning the financial support that EU Member States receive through the European Refugee Fund.96

Unaccompanied minors, and not only those who applied for asylum, continue to be a priority in the context of the Action Plan on Unaccompanied Minors (2010 – 2014).97 In 2011, at least 11 800 unaccompanied minors applied for asylum,98 more than in 2010 (around 10 700). Less is known about the numbers of those not in the asylum system.99 As well as integrating specific actions for unaccompanied minors into the anti-trafficking Directive (see below); the technical Schengen Borders Code proposal;100 and those to be undertaken by EASO, notably with regard to age assessment; emphasis is also placed on continuous dialogue and close cooperation with the countries of origin and transit. A mid-term review of the implementation of the Action Plan will be presented in 2012.

The fight against trafficking in human beings, along with smuggling, also remain priorities. Again owing to its nature, data are scarce,101 but indications are that trafficking is increasing in scale. With the adoption of the Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims,102 the Commission, supported by the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, shall table its Integrated Strategy on Trafficking in Human Beings in 2012 focussing on concrete actions to more effectively tackle this phenomenon in order to inter alia realise the full potential of this Directive. Related to this, the outcomes of an initiative launched by the Commission in 2011 to obtain reliable and comparable data on trafficking in

93 The second phase aims to resettle over 360 refugees in 2011-2012. 94 A new RPP in North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia and when possible Libya) started in December 2011. 95 About 3 000 refugees were resettled in EU Member States in the course of 2011, 10 of whom have

annual resettlement programmes. 96 Council Press Release 6838/12 of 8 March 2012 on Common EU resettlement priorities for 2013 and

new rules on EU funding, 97 COM(2010) 213 final 98 Figure excludes numbers in ES and PL which were not available when this report was published. In

2010, there were 15 unaccompanied minors in ES and 230 in PL. 99 Some estimates are given in Table 10 of the accompanying Commission Staff Working Paper. 100 COM(2011) 118 final 101 Available data on the number of residence permits issued to victims of trafficking are now recorded by

Eurostat. In 2010, for example, this was 462 in IT, 304 in NL and in 108 in BE. Some numbers are also reported by Member States on the Commission's Anti-Trafficking website, http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/. Austria and Hungary in particular saw increased smuggling during 2011. According to the ICMPD yearbook 2010, the number of persons found being smuggled to Hungary was 350 in 2010, whilst a total of 6 664 persons were apprehended as being smuggled to Austria.

102 Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011

http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/

http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/

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human beings at EU level will be presented in 2012. Following the first implementation report on the Action-Oriented Paper on the EU external dimension on action against trafficking in human beings,103 and in line with the Council’s subsequent recommendations, this issue is and will continue to be systematically included in all relevant EU agreements and strategic partnerships with non-EU countries and also in all political dialogues on migration and mobility. Capacity-building is a key element of the EU's external action in this field, as well as compliance with international standards in this area, in particular ratification and implementation of the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime and its protocols on trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS – A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING COMMON CHALLENGES TOGETHER

Migration is and will continue to be an essential enhancement for the EU, not only in economic terms, but also in respect to the social and cultural aspects of our societies. Understandably, it has also contributed to certain perceptions which need to be aired through open and balanced debates, not dominated solely by anti-immigration rhetoric. Whilst the downsides of migration are often widely reported, one should not forget the positive contributions that migration brings and will need to bring in order for the EU to grow and continue to thrive. Effective integration benefits our increasingly diversified societies and this can only be achieved through further improvement of our societies' understanding and attitudes towards migrants, as well as for migrants themselves to have the incentives to become fully involved in the society in which they live.

A coherent EU migration policy needs to instil confidence in EU citizens that it is effectively managed to meet the needs of the EU, in partnership with third countries and in full respect of fundamental rights and freedoms. The caricature of a so-called "Fortress Europe" is not an accurate representation of EU policy. Rather, the EU has a duty to ensure that Europe's borders are safe and secure with appropriate legal channels for entry. This can only be achieved through the continued positive engagement of the EU, its institutions and its Member States, as well as of wider civil society, including migrant associations, plus the business community and trade unions, in order to have a policy which meets the needs of the EU and provides a safe haven to those requiring protection. Clearly, the EU cannot work in isolation, and dialogue with the outside world is an essential aspect to show inter alia the benefits that can result when migrating to the EU. Given this, the Commission considers that the EU should further strengthen its external migration policy, for which the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility provides the overarching framework.

Much has already been achieved since the initial development of a common policy in 1999 and the EU now has in place a comprehensive set of tools able to meet most needs. These tools must, however, be used more effectively and consistently. The historic events of 2011 demonstrated the need to have appropriate measures able to react in a dynamic manner and served to identify certain obstacles in the implementation of EU migration policy. The Commission played its role in reacting to these challenges, and will continue to do so, including by proposing how they might be addressed in the future. As well as the developments already described, the tabling of a proposed Asylum and Migration Fund Regulation104 showed how funding could be used to support and promote EU actions in both

103 Council document 12401/11 104 COM(2011) 751 final

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the short- and long-term with its focus on people flows and the integrated management of migration.

The Commission looks forward to further debates, notably in the European Parliament and the Council on the basis of this report, and in particular to taking forward the EU Action on Migratory Pressures - A Strategic Response.

Comité Económico y Social Europeo

CCMI/100 Industria de la defensa:

aspectos industriales, innovadores y sociales

Bruselas, 11 de julio de 2012

DICTAMEN

del Comité Económico y Social Europeo sobre el tema

«Necesidad de una industria europea de la defensa: aspectos industriales, innovadores y sociales» (Dictamen de iniciativa)

_____________

Ponente: Sr. Van Iersel

Coponente: Sra. Hrusecká _____________

CCMI/100 - CESE 1590/2012 EN-EGR/PLI/mc/gf/sz

ESRue Belliard/Belliardstraat 99 — 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel — BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Tel. +32 25469011 — Fax +32 25134893 — Internet: http://www.eesc.europa.eu

http://www.eesc.europa.eu/

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El 19 de enero de 2012, de conformidad con el apartado 2 del artículo 29 del Reglamento Interno, el Comité Económico y Social Europeo decidió elaborar un dictamen de iniciativa sobre el tema

«Necesidad de una industria europea de la defensa: aspectos industriales,

innovadores y sociales». La Comisión Consultiva de las Transformaciones Industriales, encargada de preparar los trabajos en este asunto, aprobó su dictamen el 11 de junio de 2012. En su 482° Pleno de los días 11 y 12 de julio de 2012 (sesión del 11 de julio de 2012), el Comité Económico y Social Europeo ha aprobado por 132 votos a favor, 1 en contra y 9 abstenciones el presente Dictamen.

*

* *

1. Conclusiones y recomendaciones 1.1 El mundo está sujeto a rápidos cambios geopolíticos. La posición dominante del mundo

occidental es objeto de desafíos tanto económicos como políticos. Mientras los presupuestos de defensa en toda la Unión Europea están sufriendo recortes, los gastos de defensa de China, India, Brasil, Rusia y otros países están aumentando. Por lo tanto, el CESE pide al Consejo y a la Comisión que realicen una evaluación global de los aspectos determinantes de la posición de la UE y su papel en el mundo, que tenga como resultado una actualización convincente de las políticas exterior, de seguridad y de defensa europeas.

1.2 La política de defensa está configurada por los intereses estratégicos de los países, las amenazas

percibidas y sus objetivos políticos, que en Europa se establecen mayoritariamente con criterios nacionales. Los planteamientos obsoletos conducen visiblemente a aumentar la fragmentación, las carencias, el exceso de capacidad y la falta de interoperabilidad de las capacidades de defensa europeas. Los argumentos a favor de introducir mejoras son aplastantes; es una

cuestión de voluntad política. Esto ya se argumentó de manera convincente ¡en 1986!1 La

actual situación es mucho más acuciante en términos políticos, económicos y de defensa. El CESE exhorta al Consejo a trabajar en serio en un paraguas defensivo de la UE.

1.3 La política de seguridad y defensa debería potenciar la confianza de la UE y sus Estados

miembros en sus propios medios. Debería inspirar confianza en la sociedad y en los ciudadanos,

1

Véase ‘Towards a Stronger Europe’ (Hacia una Europa más fuerte), informe elaborado por un equipo de estudio independiente creado por los ministros de Defensa de naciones del Grupo del Programa Europeo Independiente para elaborar propuestas destinadas a mejorar la competitividad de la industria europea de equipamiento de la defensa.

CCMI/100 - CESE 1590/2012 EN-EGR/PLI/mc/gf/sz .../...

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en unos soldados equipados adecuadamente, en las empresas y en los trabajadores del sector. Los ciudadanos de la UE tienen derecho a una protección adecuada. Es cada vez más necesario un armamento europeo con garantías de futuro. Para lograr dicho objetivo, las actuales prácticas aisladas de los Estados miembros resultan del todo insuficientes y malgastan el dinero de los contribuyentes.

1.4 De acuerdo con las políticas y prácticas actuales en Estados Unidos y otros países protagonistas

(emergentes) del panorama mundial, y dada la exclusiva responsabilidad de los gobiernos para proteger a los ciudadanos y garantizar la seguridad, el CESE destaca la necesidad de definir los intereses estratégicos europeos en el marco de la política común de seguridad y defensa

(PCSE)2. A fin de cuentas, el triángulo formado por los asuntos exteriores y seguridad, la

defensa y la capacidad industrial es indivisible, sirviendo de apoyo a la posición de Europa en el mundo, a sus intereses políticos y económicos y a sus valores (derechos humanos, democracia). El Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior (SEAE) debería estar directamente involucrado.

1.5 El CESE señala que, si Europa quiere mantener una industria de seguridad y defensa sólida

creando una masa crítica para lograr mayor eficiencia y una mejor relación coste-eficacia, es necesario un cambio radical en la mentalidad y las políticas. Estas últimas deberán generar un futuro estable y predecible para las fuerzas armadas acorde con el peso económico y tecnológico de Europa. Habida cuenta de las grandes diferencias existentes entre Estados miembros, la responsabilidad principal en esta materia recae en los principales Estados miembros productores.

1.6 El CESE considera que hay argumentos sólidos para reforzar la planificación europea y el

compromiso de coordinación:

el sector es complicado y requiere una alta intensidad de conocimientos, así como una planificación a largo plazo

a pesar de las privatizaciones, los gobiernos tienen una alta participación en la industria de la defensa como clientes, reguladores y proveedores de licencias de exportación

las carencias de la estructura actual y las (fuertes) limitaciones presupuestarias exigen reajustes ordenados en vez de los actuales enfoques aislados que perjudican la credibilidad tanto interna como externa

debería alentarse una coordinación eficaz entre los principales países productores y los países no productores o con producción menos importante, a fin de fomentar las compras de armamento en Europa, y aprovechar todos los conocimientos disponibles, tanto de las grandes empresas como de las pymes en todo el continente

por último, el éxito de la producción de la industria europea en el mundo dependerá del desarrollo de un mercado interior estable en Europa.

2

La política común de seguridad y defensa forma parte integrante de la política exterior y de seguridad común, Tratado de la Unión Europea (TUE), art. 42 y siguientes. DO C 115 de 9.5.2008.


http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:SOM:ES:HTML

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1.7 Además de las medidas de la Agencia Europea de Defensa (AED) y del paquete de defensa

de 20073, el CESE aboga por una política industrial europea bien diseñada para el sector de la

defensa, con sus características específicas de requisitos estatales y financiación pública. En el marco de la Estrategia Europa 2020, esta política industrial deberá estar basada en competencias nacionales y europeas compartidas –con la AED y la Comisión como socios de pleno derecho– así como en consultas con la industria de la defensa y otras partes interesadas, incluidos los agentes sociales y la necesidad de un diálogo social bien organizado.

1.8 Las políticas y la financiación de la UE deberían vincular las inversiones de la UE y las

inversiones nacionales a fin de reducir la fragmentación y duplicación del gasto público, potenciando la calidad y la interoperabilidad.

1.9 Una I+D de vanguardia es crucial para el desarrollo de armamentos de «nueva generación», que

son muy necesarios. La industria nunca podrá por sí sola asumir exclusivamente este tipo de I+D. La principal responsabilidad recae en los gobiernos, por lo que resulta muy vulnerable a los actuales recortes presupuestarios. El Consejo y las partes interesadas deberían establecer urgentemente e iniciar lo antes posible programas de investigación que ayuden a la industria europea a hacer frente a la dependencia no deseada con respecto a otros países. La tecnología de «doble uso» es una necesidad. El programa de I+D de la UE ha de desempeñar una función de apoyo, y ha de garantizar una cooperación transfronteriza eficaz en materia de I+D.

1.10 Debe planificarse en la medida de lo posible el refuerzo de la base tecnológica e industrial de la

defensa europea. Para ello son necesarias medidas satisfactorias a nivel de la UE4.

1.11 Es necesaria una mayor coordinación entre la Comisión, la AED y otras partes interesadas

relevantes de la UE. Resulta muy oportuno el compromiso renovado del presidente Barroso5,

del vicepresidente Tajani y del comisario Barnier, así como la creación de la Task Force de Defensa. El CESE también acoge favorablemente la Resolución prospectiva del PE sobre la

Defensa europea y la amplia gama de cuestiones en juego6.

1.12 En el mismo espíritu y a fin de reforzar la iniciativa de la CE de crear una Task Force de

Defensa, el CESE insta a la Comisión a que plantee públicamente estas cuestiones. Asimismo, la Comisión debería pensar en proporcionar elementos de respuesta adecuados a los resultados que emergen de las diferencias entre las capacidades industriales y tecnológicas de los Estados

3

Directivas 2009/43/CE (DO L 146, de 10.6.2009) y 2009/81/CE (DO L 216, de 20.8.2009). El paquete de defensa fue adoptado por el Consejo y el PE en 2009. Debería haber sido incorporado por los Estados miembros en el verano de 2011. El paquete de defensa también contenía una Comunicación titulada «Estrategia para una industria europea de la defensa más sólida y competitiva», COM(2007) 764, de 5.12.2007.

4 Los Fondos europeos deberían participar en este proceso: el futuro PM8, el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, el Fondo de

Cohesión, el Fondo Social Europeo. 5

Estado de la Unión (UE), noviembre de 2011.

6 Resolución del PE de 14 de diciembre de 2011 sobre el impacto de la crisis financiera en el sector de la defensa en los Estados

miembros de la UE (2011/2177(INI)).


http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:146:SOM:ES:HTML

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:216:SOM:ES:HTML

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miembros, así como de las diferencias en los niveles de inversión en investigación y defensa en general.

2. Introducción 2.1 El artículo 42 del Tratado de la Unión Europea establece que la política común de seguridad y

defensa forma parte integrante de la política exterior y de seguridad común. El artículo 42(3) añade que los Estados miembros pondrán a disposición de la Unión, a efectos de la aplicación de dicha política, capacidades civiles y militares. Desde 2005 la Agencia Europea de Defensa (AED) viene trabajando para fortalecer la base industrial y tecnológica del sector de la defensa y dotar a los soldados de un mejor equipamiento. No obstante, los avances realizados son muy limitados.

2.2 La realización del mercado interior y una coordinación financiera eficaz son máximas

prioridades en la actualidad. La estrategia Europa 2020 está prestando un fuerte apoyo a ambos objetivos. Este salto adelante también debería inspirar nuevos avances en la defensa europea.

2.3 No obstante, el sector de la defensa no está experimentando una evolución similar. El pacto

militar celebrado entre Francia y el Reino Unido en 1998 parecía que iba a generar una nueva mentalidad y un nuevo punto de partida. Este mismo espíritu de cooperación más estrecha en materia de defensa se reflejó en la fundación de la Empresa Europea de la Defensa y el Espacio (EADS), en 2003, pero no se hizo lo necesario para lograr una mayor consolidación. Es significativo que, pese a las intenciones manifestadas previamente, los países LoI (grupo de países con una capacidad de producción importante, como Francia, Alemania, Reino Unido, Italia, España y Suecia) aún no hayan presentado propuestas viables de racionalización o consolidación.

2.4 El estancamiento ha conducido a enfoques nacionales y a un énfasis en la producción nacional.

Se ha producido una cierta renacionalización. Todas las empresas industriales con sede en Europa se están centrando en los mercados de exportación, y no existe un planteamiento estratégico común, ni entre los gobiernos ni entre los socios industriales.

2.5 Mientras tanto, los mercados potenciales se verán cada vez más afectados por nuevos desafíos.

El desarrollo de armamentos en las economías emergentes representa un enorme desafío. China, India, Brasil y Rusia (los países BRIC) lo están afrontando, seguidos por algunos países más pequeños. Se espera que el presupuesto de defensa de China pase de los 120 000 millones de euros actuales a 250 000 millones en 2015. Rusia ha anunciado un fuerte aumento de su presupuesto de defensa hasta 2015. Estados Unidos gasta más del doble del presupuesto total de la UE: 450 000 millones de euros, frente a 204 000 millones de euros en 2007, y el presupuesto europeo se está reduciendo cada vez más. El presupuesto total de I+D en la Unión Europea no supera el 20 % del estadounidense. El 50 % del presupuesto europeo de defensa se destina a personal, mientras que en EE.UU este porcentaje es del 25 %. Europa tiene más soldados, pero


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están mucho peor equipados. Las condiciones mundiales ya no serán nunca como antes, y el tiempo no está de nuestra parte.

2.6 En las últimas décadas, numerosos estudios han recomendado adaptar la industria de la defensa

al mercado mundial. Todos ellos subrayan carencias duraderas, ya que los mercados de la defensa han demostrado ser muy imperfectos, al seguir apoyando la mayoría de los Estados a su «propia» industria. Los intentos por mejorar los mercados, como el paquete de defensa de 2007 de la UE, buscan superar algunas deficiencias de mercado y prácticas nacionales divergentes.

2.7 Las cuestiones en juego son complejas, debido en parte al larguísimo periodo que transcurre

desde la fase de diseño hasta que los productos son operativos. Por lo tanto, el CESE considera que un amplio enfoque desde una perspectiva tecnológica, económica y social sería una manera más adecuada de debatir este ámbito que limitarse a examinarlo desde la perspectiva de la defensa.

2.8 Un punto clave es la divergencia de conceptos estratégicos entre los países que poseen una

industria de armamentos importante, en particular en lo que se refiere a la definición de «interés esencial de seguridad nacional» y en la relación entre la seguridad nacional y los mercados de exportación. Algunos países más pequeños poseen una industria bastante bien desarrollada, mientras que otros carecen prácticamente de instalaciones de producción. Está claro que los planteamientos de todos los países difieren en función de sus necesidades y de su potencial, teniendo como resultado la fragmentación y una visión fragmentada de la industria de la defensa. Operaciones como la de Libia ponen claramente en evidencia las carencias cada vez mayores en los sistemas de armamento. Deberían reconocerse y evaluarse claramente sus consecuencias.

2.9 Esta evolución afecta tanto a las inversiones como al empleo. La industria de la defensa es un

sector de alta tecnología que da empleo directo a 600 000 trabajadores cualificados, y empleo indirecto a otros dos millones. Existen presiones preocupantes para introducir más recortes. Con frecuencia las instalaciones de producción están concentradas en determinadas regiones, que podrían convertirse en centros de excelencia; no obstante, corren el peligro de verse afectadas por los recortes financieros. Estos emplazamientos sufrirán mucho si la reorganización y los recortes se producen de manera no programada ni estructurada.

2.10 El empleo actual también constituye, por supuesto, una preocupación importante para los

distintos gobiernos, y a su vez puede frenar el desarrollo de una visión común tan necesaria para afrontar adecuadamente las consecuencias sociales de una industria de la defensa en declive, incluida la pérdida de know-how y sus efectos sobre el capital humano. En cambio, una visión común favorecerá una creación de empleo equilibrada y evitará el riesgo de que los investigadores y cuadros técnicos y científicos sumamente especializados emigren a terceros países, algo que iría en contra de los objetivos que la UE pretende conseguir con la Estrategia Europa 2020.


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2.11 Los planteamientos de la UE y el marco intergubernamental pueden y deben trabajar en la misma perspectiva. Mientras prevalezca la soberanía nacional, los resultados de cualquier marco común tendrán frutos limitados, con escasas mejoras en lo que se refiere al exceso de capacidad, las duplicidades y la fragmentación. Son evidentes las contradicciones existentes entre la filosofía de la soberanía nacional, por una parte, y las necesidades financieras, tecnológicas, económicas y sociales, por otra.

2.12 Así pues, resulta preocupante que el objetivo de «poner en común y compartir», esto es, la

organización de la interdependencia europea, no se haya planteado en términos de una estrategia común. Pese a que existe una amplia concienciación sobre la transformación del contexto internacional, la presión externa aparentemente no es aún lo bastante fuerte como para fomentar planteamientos y soluciones comunes. En cambio, y esto es bastante significativo, los países europeos aún quieren seguir siendo dependientes de EE.UU en materia de contratos de defensa, en lugar de hacer sus adquisiciones en Europa.

2.13 Si Europa quiere mantener una industria de seguridad y defensa sólida, capaz de desarrollar y

producir sistemas de vanguardia, y por lo tanto de garantizar su propia seguridad, es necesario un cambio radical en la mentalidad y las políticas. Seguir esperando precipitaría una reducción de capacidades por debajo de niveles desde los que la UE podría recuperar su posición de vanguardia en ámbitos esenciales. Esta recuperación sería aún más difícil en la medida en que los recortes del gasto en I+D afectarían directamente a toda una generación de investigadores y trabajadores cualificados. Si Europa no tiene éxito, pueden desaparecer industrias, se perderá empleo y se esfumará el know-how, dejando a Europa a merced de otros países. Es necesario que aquellos que se preocupan por Europa y la seguridad europea sientan la necesidad urgente de actuar.

3. Contexto político 3.1 El Tratado de la Unión Europea destaca con razón el estrecho vínculo entre las políticas

exterior, de seguridad y de defensa. Una política exterior eficaz ha de construirse sobre unas capacidades de defensa convincentes. A su vez, unas capacidades adecuadas de defensa han de diseñarse y desarrollarse teniendo en cuenta las amenazas percibidas y los objetivos acordados en un contexto internacional muy complicado y frágil.

3.2 El factor central es la posición y el papel de la UE en el mundo del mañana, teniendo en cuenta

los rápidos cambios en la realidad geopolítica, donde surge un número cada vez mayor de protagonistas mundiales. Desde esa perspectiva, el CESE considera que ya es hora de un impulso concertado en Europa. La experiencia pasada y reciente demuestra que la continuidad de los enfoques tradicionales podría perjudicar la influencia de Europa y los Estados miembros.

3.3 El CESE solicita un futuro estable y predecible para las fuerzas armadas europeas acorde con el

actual peso económico y tecnológico de Europa. El larguísimo plazo que transcurre desde el


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diseño de los sistemas hasta que son operativos refuerza la necesidad de tomar decisiones desde este mismo año.

3.4 Desde un punto de vista social y político, el CESE destaca cuatro aspectos importantes relativos

a la necesidad de unas capacidades de defensa europea eficaces:

protección de la población

necesidad de contar con soldados bien equipados

empleo estable y predecible

actuaciones humanitarias y militares bien diseñadas en el mundo. 3.5 Actualmente se está debatiendo el futuro de la PCSD, aunque no suele plantearse en estos

términos. Muchas cuestiones como la utilización de grupos de combate, la polémica sobre la implantación de un cuartel general operativo único, la financiación de las misiones de la UE correspondientes a la PCSD, cómo lograr contribuciones para dichas misiones y las exigencias de revisión de la estrategia europea de seguridad equivalen en la práctica a un debate sobre la PCSD aunque no se le llame así. Plantearlo de esta manera supondría un paso adelante. Además, en todas las deliberaciones relativas a estas importantes cuestiones, también deberían estudiarse las implicaciones de las decisiones (o de su ausencia) para la industria. Esto demostrará además la fuerte conexión existente entre las capacidades industriales y la aplicación de una PCSD. La principal responsabilidad recae en los gobiernos.

3.6 La relación transatlántica y la OTAN tienen una importancia vital. Durante mucho tiempo, los

estadounidenses han criticado fuertemente la manera en que los europeos velan por sus obligaciones de defensa en el marco de la Alianza. A ambos lados del Atlántico se solicita continuamente la consolidación de un «pilar europeo» de la OTAN. Hasta ahora, ha venido sucediendo todo lo contrario.

3.7 La ausencia de un «pilar europeo» propiamente dicho tiene raíces políticas profundas. Aún no

existe una voluntad política suficiente en Europa para definir los intereses «estratégicos» europeos ni las capacidades militares clave comunes. En cambio, EE.UU y otros países utilizan el concepto de actividades estratégicas, que incluye toda la investigación y la industria que contribuye a la seguridad global de sus ciudadanos, ya sea civil o militar.

3.8 En este contexto, el CESE considera que en la construcción de un «pilar europeo», la

dependencia exagerada de las capacidades militares europeas con respecto a Estados Unidos debe sustituirse por una relación más equilibrada. Paralelamente al tan necesario debate sobre los intereses estratégicos europeos comunes, que es responsabilidad exclusiva de los gobiernos, debería iniciarse lo antes posible una planificación ordenada mediante la cooperación entre las instituciones europeas, los Estados miembros y las industrias de la defensa, así como una revisión progresiva de los hábitos de los Estados miembros de adquirir automáticamente material ya comercializado en Estados Unidos.


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3.9 Mejorar las condiciones de la cooperación industrial con las empresas de EE.UU en condiciones más equitativas será beneficioso tanto desde el punto de vista financiero como industrial.

4. Industria europea de la defensa 4.1 Existe una estrecha relación entre la políticas exterior y de seguridad/defensa y las industrias de

la defensa. A pesar de las privatizaciones, los gobiernos tienen una alta participación en la industria de la defensa como clientes, reguladores y proveedores de licencias de exportación.

4.2 Las industrias de la defensa tienen un importante margen de maniobra en los mercados de

exportación. Esto se debe en parte a la privatización, y en parte a la incitación por los gobiernos: la crisis económica está convirtiendo a algunos ministerios de defensa en promotores declarados de las exportaciones. En cualquier caso, la crisis está obligando al sector de la defensa a considerar las exportaciones como un elemento central de su modelo de negocios. 2011 fue en términos generales un año muy rentable para las industrias europeas. Las empresas también tienen bastante éxito en el desarrollo de producción de «doble uso».

4.3 Protagonistas mundiales como China, India y Brasil tienen sus propias ambiciones en materia

de política exterior, que se traducen en el aumento de los presupuestos de defensa. Actualmente esta situación crea supuestas oportunidades para las exportaciones europeas. ¿Cuánto tiempo va a durar esta situación? A la industria le va todavía razonablemente bien, pero sus resultados se basan en gran medida en inversiones realizadas hace 20 ó 25 años. Si se siguen reduciendo o se estancan las inversiones en este preciso momento, las consecuencias ya serían irreversibles en un futuro próximo.

4.4 Además, cabe esperar que las potencias emergentes empiecen a desarrollar su industria

independientemente de las industrias de los países occidentales y que, más tarde, como futuros competidores de Europa en los mercados de terceros países, bloqueen con mayor frecuencia las importaciones procedentes de los países occidentales o las vinculen a determinadas condiciones.

4.5 Por el momento, en Europa no está previsto el inicio de ningún programa importante, lo que sin

duda afectará al éxito de las exportaciones futuras. Además, desde hace ya algún tiempo, ningún país emergente importante ha exigido un nivel relevante de transferencia de tecnología y producción a su territorio.

4.6 Los contratos de exportación específicos se utilizarán con toda probabilidad para copiar

tecnología de las industrias occidentales. En estos casos, una alternativa al bloqueo de las importaciones podría ser el establecimiento de instalaciones de producción (y desarrollo) en los países interesados. Actualmente no puede saberse con certeza en qué medida esta evolución afectará a las instalaciones y las oportunidades de trabajo en Europa. A más largo plazo, es probable que la posición de la industria europea se vea perjudicada por los gigantes emergentes.


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Potenciar la tecnología y la producción en estos países también afectará a los mercados de exportación europeos (potenciales) en otros terceros países. La competencia en productos y precios será cada vez más agresiva.

4.7 Debido al largo período de tiempo necesario desde la fase de desarrollo a la de producción, así

como a las inversiones tecnológicas y la innovación continua, Europa requiere una coordinación específica a fin de garantizar una industria de la defensa moderna y segura de sí misma. Mientras las dimensiones del mercado vengan determinadas sobre todo por las fronteras nacionales, dicho mercado estará casi siempre por debajo de la masa crítica, incluso en los grandes Estados miembros. Las exportaciones a terceros países pueden mitigar esta situación hasta cierto punto, pero el futuro es incierto y las condiciones de mercado distan a menudo de ser estables.

4.8 La reducción continuada de los presupuestos, que en las actuales circunstancias implica unas

limitaciones importantes, debería servir de señal de alarma. Esta reducción afecta sin duda a los presupuestos de inversión y contratación en un momento en que los costes operativos y de mantenimiento siguen estando en el mismo nivel o aumentan debido a las operaciones militares en curso (Afganistán, Libia, operaciones contra la piratería, por mencionar algunas).

4.9 Esto tiene como resultado el aplazamiento o incluso la cancelación de inversiones

indispensables para la industria a fin de garantizar el mantenimiento y la renovación de las capacidades de producción y desarrollo. Además, en tiempos difíciles la propia industria estará menos dispuesta a invertir en dicho mantenimiento o en nuevas actividades. Solo trabajando juntos de manera coherente podrán garantizarse las inversiones necesarias.

4.10 El CESE aboga por una política industrial europea bien diseñada para el sector de la defensa,

que vaya desde el diseño de los sistemas hasta la fase operativa. Esta es una cuestión de política industrial específica. Por su propia naturaleza, se trata de un mercado público: la I+D ha de financiarse más allá del capital inicial, debido a que los márgenes no son rentables al principio y a los requisitos específicos de los gobiernos. Es necesario determinar las capacidades industriales clave europeas y las políticas de inversión para fomentar una producción europea sólida. Puesto que ningún país cuenta con recursos suficientes para financiar armamentos «de nueva generación», es necesario combinar los objetivos nacionales con los europeos, y los recursos nacionales con los europeos, tanto desde el punto de vista financiero como industrial. La gobernanza debería basarse en competencias nacionales y de la UE compartidas, conforme a lo acordado en la estrategia Europa 2020. Esta es también una etiqueta eficaz para optimizar la coordinación entre las instituciones europeas y dentro de la Comisión y que todavía funciona muy por debajo de sus posibilidades. En este contexto, la Task Force que empezará a funcionar dentro de poco como una plataforma –Comisión, AED, SEAE– para estudiar las prioridades, capacidades y carencias, puede prestar un apoyo valioso.


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4.11 La I+D es un tema central. La industria de la defensa realiza una actividad industrial de alta

tecnología y con gran intensidad de conocimientos, que también será necesaria para el desarrollo completo de prototipos. La I+D no es casi nunca una cuestión exclusiva de la industria. El período de desarrollo y los ciclos de vida de los sistemas son sencillamente demasiado largos, y el impacto financiero es demasiado grande para que la industria corra con todos los riesgos financieros. La historia demuestra que todos los programas exitosos se desarrollan conjuntamente por los gobiernos y la industria.

4.12 Un porcentaje muy elevado de la I+D de defensa en el mundo procede de los gobiernos, ya sea

directamente o indirectamente mediante adquisiciones. Por lo tanto, no resulta sorprendente que las industrias de la defensa estén evitando por lo general los riesgos financieros excesivos, dada la naturaleza de los productos. La I+D de la defensa es especialmente vulnerable a los recortes de los gobiernos.

4.13 Por lo tanto, además de la consolidación industrial, la investigación, la tecnología y el

desarrollo requieren que los Estados miembros acuerden una financiación suficiente y una puesta en común de los recursos. Las inversiones en materia de defensa exigen un alto grado de financiación para I+D y proyectos tecnológicos. Además, deberá garantizarse el acceso a las tecnologías vitales. Si no pudiera accederse a estas tecnologías vitales para el desarrollo y la producción debido a restricciones a las exportaciones impuestas por otros, surgirían graves problemas para lograr los objetivos europeos de seguridad.

4.14 La I+D desarrollada al margen de las organizaciones de defensa juega un papel cada vez más

importante, debido a los avances científicos y tecnológicos independientes en muchos ámbitos. A menudo solo en las fases finales del desarrollo es la aplicación última la que determina si la I+D puede considerarse como «de defensa» o «civil». La I+D de «doble uso» es cada vez más importante para las aplicaciones de defensa, como, por ejemplo en TI. Por lo tanto, es de vital importancia para la base tecnológica e industrial de la defensa europea (EDTIB) incentivar la «I+D» de doble uso, sobre todo porque permite la financiación desde el exterior de las comunidades de defensa.

4.15 La financiación pública de I+D a nivel de la UE debería acordarse entre los Estados miembros.

Puede realizarse a través del próximo octavo Programa Marco (PM8) o de un fondo independiente, preferentemente mediante paquetes de ámbitos de investigación avanzada, como por ejemplo la nanotecnología y la inteligencia artificial. Deberán planificarse procedimientos especiales, habida cuenta de la relación entre la industria de la defensa y el sector público.


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4.16 La AED y la Comisión deberían tener un papel prominente, como se prevé en el marco europeo

de cooperación, entre otras cosas para evitar interferencias políticas cotidianas. La AED debería

tener la oportunidad de desempeñar plenamente el papel que le confiere el Tratado de Lisboa7.

4.17 Una mano de obra adecuada con cualificaciones actualizadas es indispensable para un programa

industrial y de I+D de la defensa8. Este es otro argumento de peso a favor de un marco estable

para la I+D y la industria en vez de una reestructuración desordenada. Hay que tener en cuenta que los trabajadores del sector de la defensa son la base sobre la que se construye el futuro de las capacidades de defensa. La consulta de la industria, los institutos de I+D, la educación superior, las organizaciones militares y los sindicatos interesados, así como la comunicación con todos ellos, deberán ayudar a garantizar la organización adecuada de la reestructuración en curso y de la producción de armamentos con miras al futuro en Europa.

4.18 Las restricciones presupuestarias hacen necesario evitar los solapamientos y la ineficacia. Una

consolidación controlada no equivale necesariamente a crear grandes empresas. Significa generar una masa crítica y una calidad suficientes con arreglo a las normas internacionales que garanticen una posición competitiva en los mercados interiores y en los terceros países. Es cada vez más necesario coordinar la planificación de los proyectos a nivel europeo por parte de los gobiernos, las partes interesadas relevantes de la UE y la industria.

4.19 Las diferencias de tamaño y de producción de las industrias son una realidad. Existen grandes

diferencias en la importancia industrial de los Estados miembros. Un acuerdo entre los países participantes debería consistir en parte en garantizar que las industrias de países no LoI (=productores principales) estén vinculadas a proyectos relevantes. Este enfoque no solo es deseable desde el punto de vista político, sino que además fomenta una relación fructífera entre empresas grandes y pequeñas, así como con los institutos de investigación. Las pymes deberían contribuir con éxito como proveedoras a las cadenas de especialización inteligentes.

4.20 Es necesario prestar especial atención a la vulnerabilidad percibida en los países de Europa

central debido a su delicada posición geográfica. En vista de la necesidad de hacer que los ciudadanos de estos países se sientan adecuadamente protegidos y de la conveniencia de aprovechar plenamente los conocimientos técnicos específicos en el ámbito de la defensa, el CESE destaca la necesidad de integrar adecuadamente los conocimientos y competencias disponibles en los países de Europa central en los proyectos de defensa actuales y futuros.

4.21 Un mercado europeo integrado de productos para la defensa generaría un mercado interior más

estable. Además de combinar los mercados nacionales existentes, un mercado europeo alentaría la armonización e incluso la normalización de los requisitos y las normas de contratación entre

7

Véanse el artículo 45, apartado 1, y el artículo 42, apartado 3, del TUE, DO C 115, de 9.5.2008.

8 Véase: A comprehensive analysis of emerging competences and skill needs for optimal preparation and management of change

in the EU defence industry, Informe final, mayo de 2009, documento elaborado por Eurostrategies para la Comisión Europea.


http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:SOM:ES:HTML

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los distintos Estados miembros. Una mayor armonización o normalización mejoraría las condiciones económicas y financieras potenciando la competitividad de las empresas europeas en un mercado global.

4.22 Un mercado europeo de la defensa tendría una masa crítica suficiente. En este contexto, el

CESE señala las consecuencias negativas de que los Estados miembros sigan adquiriendo productos ya comercializados en terceros países, en particular en Estados Unidos. En primer lugar, neutraliza las ventajas de un mercado europeo de la industria; en consecuencia, los precios de esos productos de la defensa aumentarían para sus clientes europeos si se impidiera a la industria vender en mercados de terceros países donde la competencia (entre estados) será sin duda cada vez mayor. En segundo lugar, los países europeos que hacen sus adquisiciones en EE.UU pagan los costes de la tecnología americana, que están incluidos en el precio de esos productos.

4.23 Habida cuenta de las perspectivas políticas financieras e internacionales, es indispensable

celebrar un debate fundamental a nivel europeo y extraer conclusiones operativas. En caso de que algunos Estados miembros no deseen participar en un marco común, debería prevalecer el principio de la «cooperación reforzada». Solo podrá lograrse un mercado de dimensiones comparables a las del estadounidense con una mayor integración y una actitud favorable a la adquisición de productos europeos. Sin un mercado interior efectivo, hay motivos para dudar seriamente de las posibilidades de la industria europea para competir a nivel mundial.

5. Algunas cuestiones específicas 5.1 El panorama industrial de las distintas fuerzas armadas -tierra, mar y aire- presenta diferencias

significativas entre los distintos países. Existe una serie de ámbitos en los que se considera que ningún país puede seguir desarrollando por sí solo nuevas generaciones de armamento.

5.2 En el ejército de tierra solo un número limitado de grandes empresas integradoras de sistemas

puede desarrollar y producir tanques de combate (Main Battle Tanks, MBT) y vehículos militares más ligeros. Los principales productores europeos son Francia, Alemania y Reino Unido. Existe una amplia gama de fabricantes de subsistemas y proveedores de tercer nivel con pocos representantes de Europa Central.

5.3 Muchos países desarrollan su «propia» industria naval, construyendo buques cuyas dimensiones

y complejidad varían mucho de un país a otro. Los países LoI y los Países Bajos también son líderes en las actividades de concepción y en complejas instalaciones de investigación naval que son muy diferentes de las utilizadas para el desarrollo de la construcción de embarcaciones de uso civil. También en este ámbito existe una amplia gama de fabricantes de subsistemas y proveedores de tercera fila.

5.4 Los aviones militares solo se desarrollan y producen en unos pocos países. Esta industria se

concentra en un número reducido de empresas, en su mayoría multinacionales, que operan a


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nivel europeo y fuera de Europa. Las principales empresas son EADS, BAE-Systems, Dassault y Saab-Aircraft. La investigación en aerodinámica avanzada también se limita a unos pocos países.

5.5 El sector de la electrónica, que incluye mando, comunicación y control, tiene una importancia

creciente para la defensa y cuenta con importantes fabricantes como Thales, BAE-Systems y Finmeccanica. Los mayores grupos industriales de electrónica europeos, como Philips y Siemens, tienen una participación menos importante en el sector de la defensa. En cualquier caso, para estos grupos el volumen de producción necesario para la producción en serie rentable de componentes electrónicos específicos como los circuitos integrados para la defensa es muy pequeño. No obstante, la participación de estos grandes grupos industriales subraya la importancia del doble uso en este ámbito.

5.6 En lo que se refiere a municiones y explosivos, el número de industrias se ha reducido

gradualmente en las últimas décadas, debido en parte a las restricciones medioambientales. La seguridad pública ha obligado a estas industrias o bien a trasladar sus antiguos centros de producción o simplemente a cerrarlos.

5.7 El acceso a las tecnologías vitales es fundamental, y debería apoyarse en el marco de una

PCSD. Lo mismo puede decirse de determinados materiales como las fibras de carbono o los materiales para los componentes electrónicos.

5.8 El paquete de defensa de 2007, adoptado en 2009, puede servir de apoyo en este ámbito. Los

Estados miembros deberían haber incorporado las directivas en el verano de 2011. Aún es demasiado pronto para mostrarse satisfechos o escépticos sobre sus efectos inmediatos en la creación de un mercado interior. El proceso aún no ha terminado, y queda por ver la aplicación del objetivo de transferencia intercomunitaria de productos de la defensa, así como conceptos tales como el de intereses esenciales de seguridad nacional.

5.9 El artículo 346 del TFUE prevé una excepción en la legislación de la UE en materia de

contratación, a fin de proteger los intereses esenciales de seguridad nacional. Esta formulación tan general puede impedir una evolución adecuada del mercado, sobre todo en las tan deseables cadenas de suministro. El CESE aboga por una interpretación más concreta del artículo 346 que genere oportunidades suficientes para soluciones europeas y cadenas europeas de suministro óptimas, fomentando la seguridad del suministro, las especialidades disponibles en los Estados miembros y una buena relación calidad-precio.

5.10 La seguridad de la información nacional plantea problemas similares a los mencionados en el

punto 5.9 y también debe revisarse. También es una cuestión importante y delicada para la participación de las industrias europeas en proyectos de defensa en Estados Unidos.


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CCMI/100 - CESE 1590/2012 EN-EGR/PLI/mc/gf/sz

5.11 «El intercambio y la puesta en común», incluidos los programas de formación comunes,

deberían constituir un programa para el futuro. Una condición básica es que las meras palabras se sustituyan por una planificación concreta y un enfoque específico con medidas claramente determinadas. No obstante, mientras no exista un acuerdo sobre las doctrinas de defensa resultará muy difícil que «el intercambio y la puesta en común» se produzca de forma viable.

Bruselas, 11 de julio de 2012.

El Presidente del

Comité Económico y Social Europeo

Staffan NILSSON

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Director Ejecutivo provisional de la Agencia para la gestión operativa de

sistemas informáticos de gran magnitud en el espacio de libertad, seguridad y

justicia

Fecha de recepción: 17 de julio de 2012

A: D. Uwe CORSEPIUS, Secretario General del Consejo de la Unión Europea

Asunto: Presentación del Informe de actividad anual de 2011 de la Agencia para la

gestión operativa de sistemas informáticos de gran magnitud en el espacio de

libertad, seguridad y justicia

Se adjunta a la atención de las Delegaciones el Informe de actividad anual de 2011 de la Agencia

para la gestión operativa de sistemas informáticos de gran magnitud en el espacio de libertad,

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RR\910696ES.doc PE487.816v03-00

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PARLAMENTO EUROPEO 2009 - 2014

Documento de sesión

A7-0266/2012

2.8.2012

INFORME

sobre la supuesta utilización de países europeos por la CIA para el transporte y la detención ilegal de presos: seguimiento del informe de la Comisión TDIP del Parlamento Europeo (2012/2033(INI))

Comisión de Libertades Civiles, Justicia y Asuntos de Interior

Ponente: Hélène Flautre

Ponente de opinión (*): Sarah Ludford, Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores (*) Procedimiento de comisiones asociadas – artículo 50 del Reglamento

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PR_INI

ÍNDICE

Página

PROPUESTA DE RESOLUCIÓN DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO.................................... 3

OPINIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES............................................. 23

RESULTADO DE LA VOTACIÓN FINAL EN COMISIÓN................................................ 32

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PROPUESTA DE RESOLUCIÓN DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

sobre la supuesta utilización de países europeos por la CIA para el transporte y la

detención ilegal de presos: seguimiento del informe de la Comisión TDIP del Parlamento

Europeo

(2012/2033(INI))

El Parlamento Europeo,

– Visto el Tratado de la Unión Europea (TUE) y, en particular, sus artículos 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 y 21,

– Vista la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, en particular, sus artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 18 y 19,

– Vistos el Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos Políticos y los protocolos al mismo,

– Vistos los instrumentos pertinentes de las Naciones Unidas en materia de derechos humanos, en particular el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos de 16 de diciembre de 1966, la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Tortura y Otros Tratos o Penas Crueles, Inhumanos o Degradantes de 10 de diciembre de 1984 y sus protocolos, y la Convención Internacional para la protección de todas las personas contra las desapariciones forzadas de 20 de diciembre de 2006,

– Visto el artículo 5 del Tratado del Atlántico Norte de 1949,

– Visto el Reglamento (CE) nº 1236/2005 del Consejo, de 27 de junio de 2005, sobre el comercio de determinados productos que pueden utilizarse para aplicar la pena de muerte o infligir tortura u otros tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes1,

– Visto el Programa de Estocolmo – Una Europa abierta y segura que sirva y proteja al ciudadano2, y la Comunicación de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo, al Consejo, al Comité Económico y Social Europeo y al Comité de las Regiones, de 20 de abril de 2010, «Garantizar el espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia para los ciudadanos europeos: Plan de acción por el que se aplica el Programa de Estocolmo» (COM(2010)0171),

– Vistas las Directrices sobre la política de la UE frente a terceros países en relación con la tortura y otros tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes, y las Directrices de la UE sobre la pena de muerte,

– Vista la Declaración de Bruselas, de 1 de octubre de 2010, adoptada por la Sexta Conferencia de las Comisiones Parlamentarias encargadas de la Supervisión de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Seguridad de los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea,

1 DO L 200 de 30.7.2005, p. 1. 2 DO C 115 de 4.5.2010, p. 1.

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– Visto el Estudio conjunto de las Naciones Unidas sobre las prácticas mundiales en relación con la detención secreta en el contexto de la lucha contra el terrorismo elaborado por el Relator Especial sobre la promoción y la protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales en la lucha contra el terrorismo, Martin Scheinin, el Relator Especial sobre la tortura y otros tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes, Manfred Nowak, el Grupo de Trabajo sobre la detención arbitraria, representado por su Vicepresidenta, Shaheen Sardar Ali, y el Grupo de Trabajo sobre las Desapariciones Forzadas o Involuntarias, representado por su Presidente, Jeremy Sarkin1,

– Visto el informe del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, elaborado por el Relator Especial sobre la tortura y otros tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes, relativo a las comisiones de investigación en respuesta a las pautas o prácticas de tortura y otras formas de maltrato2,

– Visto el Informe de Martin Scheinin, Relator Especial sobre la promoción y la protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales en la lucha contra el terrorismo, titulado «Recopilación de buenas prácticas relacionadas con los marcos y las medidas de carácter jurídico e institucional que permitan garantizar el respeto de los derechos humanos por los servicios de inteligencia en la lucha contra el terrorismo, particularmente en lo que respecta a su supervisión»3,

– Vistas las contribuciones del Consejo de Europa, en particular los trabajos del antiguo Comisionado de los Derechos Humanos, Thomas Hammarberg, y del Comité Europeo para la Prevención de la Tortura (CPT), así como las correspondientes resoluciones de la Asamblea Parlamentaria del Consejo de Europa, en particular las tituladas «Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states»4 y «Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report»5, y el informe de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Derechos Humanos de la Asamblea Parlamentaria intitulado «Abuse of state secrecy and national security: obstacles to parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of human rights violations»6,

– Vistos los asuntos presentados ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos humanos Al-Nashiri contra Polonia, Abu Zubaydah contra Lituania, Abu Zubaydah contra Polonia y El-Masri contra «Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia», que la Gran Sala examinó el 16 de mayo de 2012,

– Vista su Resolución, de 25 de noviembre de 2009, sobre la Comunicación de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo titulada «Un espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia al servicio de los ciudadanos − Programa de Estocolmo»7,

1 A/HRC/13/42, 19.02.10. 2 A/HRC/19/61, 18.1.2012. 3 A/HRC/14/46, 17.5.2010. 4 Resolución 1507 (2006). 5 Resolución 1562 (2007). 6 Doc. 12714, 16.9.2011. 7 DO C 285E, de 21.10.2010, p. 12.

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– Vistas sus Resoluciones de 14 de febrero de 20071 y 19 de febrero de 20092 sobre la supuesta utilización de países europeos por la CIA para el transporte y la detención ilegal de presos,

– Vistas sus Resoluciones sobre Guantánamo, en particular las de 9 de junio de 2011 sobre «Guantánamo: decisión inminente sobre la pena de muerte»3, de 4 de febrero de 2009 sobre el retorno y la reintegración de los reclusos del centro de detención de Guantánamo4, y de 13 de junio de 2006 sobre la situación de los detenidos en Guantánamo5, así como su Recomendación al Consejo de 10 de marzo de 2004 sobre el derecho de los presos de Guantánamo a un juicio justo6,

– Vista su Resolución de 15 de diciembre de 2010 sobre «La situación de los derechos fundamentales en la Unión Europea (2009): aplicación efectiva tras la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa»7,

– Vista su Resolución de 14 de diciembre de 2011 sobre «La política antiterrorista de la UE: logros principales y retos futuros»8,

– Visto el discurso pronunciado por Jacques Barrot, Vicepresidente de la Comisión, en Estrasburgo el 17 de septiembre de 20089,

– Vistas las declaraciones de la Comisión sobre la necesidad de que los Estados miembros interesados investiguen las acusaciones de participación en el programa de traslados extraordinarios y detenciones secretas de la CIA, y los documentos, incluidas cuatro cartas enviadas a Polonia, cuatro a Rumanía y dos a Lituania entre 2007 y 2010, que la ponente transmitió a la Comisión,

– Vista la Comunicación de la Comisión al Consejo y al Parlamento Europeo, de 15 de octubre de 2003, sobre «El artículo 7 del Tratado de la Unión Europea - Respeto y promoción de los valores en los que está basada la Unión» (COM(2003)0606),

– Vista la carta de 29 de noviembre de 2005 de la Presidencia de la UE a la Secretaria de Estado de los Estados Unidos, Condoleezza Rice, en la que pedía «aclaraciones por parte de los Estados Unidos en relación con estos informes [presunta detención o transporte de sospechosos de terrorismo en algunos Estados miembros de la UE o a través de ellos] con la esperanza de disipar las preocupaciones de los parlamentos y del público»,

– Vistas las sesiones nº 2748 y 2749 del Consejo de Asuntos Generales y Relaciones Exteriores de 15 de septiembre de 2006, en las que se debatió el punto «La lucha antiterrorista – Centros de detención secreta»,

1 DO C 287E de 29.11.07, p. 309. 2 DO C 76E de 25.3.2010, p. 51. 3 Textos Aprobados P7_TA(2011)0271. 4 DO C 67 E, de 18.3.2010, p. 91. 5 DO C 300E, de 9.12.2006, p. 136. 6 DO C 102E, de 28.4.2004, p. 521. 7 DO C 169E de 15.6.2012, p. 49. 8 Textos Aprobados P7_TA(2011)0577. 9 SPEECH/08/716, «Une politique visant à assurer l’effectivité des droits fondamentaux sur le terrain».

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– Vista la Declaración de la UE de 7 de marzo de 2011 en el 16º período de sesiones del Consejo de Derechos Humanos sobre el mencionado Estudio conjunto de las Naciones Unidas sobre las detenciones secretas,

– Visto el artículo titulado «Counter-terrorism and human rights», de Villy Sovndal, Gilles de Kerchove y Ben Emmerson, publicado en el número del 19 de marzo de 2012 de «European Voice»,

– Vista la respuesta de la Secretaria de Estado de los Estados Unidos, Condoleezza Rice, de 5 de diciembre de 2005 a la carta de la Presidencia de la UE de 29 de noviembre de 2005 en la que señalaba que los traslados extraordinarios son una herramienta esencial para la lucha contra el terrorismo, que no solo los Estados Unidos, ni su actual Administración, recurren a ellos, y en la que desmiente las acusaciones relativas a la participación directa de los Estados Unidos en la tortura, subrayando que el objeto de los traslados extraordinarios no es someter a torturas a la persona implicada, así como las declaraciones de la Secretaria de Estado de los Estados Unidos, Condoleezza Rice, en las que confirma que los Estados Unidos respetan la soberanía de sus socios1,

– Visto el discurso del expresidente de los Estados Unidos, George W. Bush, pronunciado en la Sala Este de la Casa Blanca el 6 de septiembre de 2006, en el que reconocía la existencia de un programa de traslados extraordinarios y detenciones secretas dirigido por la CIA, que incluía operaciones en el extranjero,

– Vistas las memorias de George W. Bush, publicadas el 9 de noviembre de 2010,

– Vista la versión no clasificada, publicada en agosto de 2009, del informe de 2004 del Inspector General de la CIA, John Helgerson, sobre los interrogatorios de la CIA durante la era Bush,

– Visto el informe de 2007 del Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja sobre el tratamiento de catorce detenidos de alto nivel en custodia de la CIA, que se puso a disposición del público en 2009,

– Vistas las distintas iniciativas a escala nacional para esclarecer la participación de algunos Estados miembros en el programa de traslados extraordinarios y detenciones secretas de la CIA, incluidas la investigación en curso en Dinamarca y las investigaciones ya concluidas en Suecia, las investigaciones penales realizadas en Polonia y el Reino Unido, las anteriores investigaciones penales en Italia, Alemania, Lituania, Portugal y España, la investigación de todos los grupos parlamentarios en el Reino Unido, y las anteriores investigaciones parlamentarias en Alemania, Lituania, Polonia y Rumanía,

– Vista la investigación judicial realizada en Portugal durante dos años, cerrada repentinamente en 2009,

– Vistas las conclusiones de las investigaciones nacionales ya realizadas en algunos Estados miembros,

1 «Remarks en route to Germany», Preguntas y respuestas con la prensa de Condoleezza Rice, Berlín, 5 de diciembre de 2005, y «Press Availability at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council», Bruselas, 8 de diciembre de 2005.

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– Vistas las numerosas informaciones aparecidas en los medios de comunicación y el periodismo de investigación, entre otros, en particular los informes de ABC News en 20051 y 20092 y los informes del Washington Post en 20053, sin las que estos actos de traslados extraordinarios y detenciones habrían continuado siendo totalmente secretos,

– Vistos los estudios e investigaciones realizados y los informes elaborados desde 2005 por investigadores independientes, organizaciones de la sociedad civil y organizaciones no gubernamentales nacionales e internacionales, muy en particular Human Rights Watch

4, Amnistía Internacional y Reprieve,

– Vistas las audiencias de su Comisión de Libertades Civiles, Justicia y Asuntos de Interior (LIBE) celebrada el 27 de marzo de 2012, y de su Subcomisión de Derechos Humanos celebrada el 12 de abril de 2012, la visita de una delegación de la Comisión LIBE a Lituania del 25 al 27 de abril de 2012, la visita de la ponente a Polonia el 16 de mayo de 2012 y todas las contribuciones escritas y orales que ha recibido la ponente,

– Vista la solicitud conjunta de datos sobre vuelos presentada al Director de Eurocontrol por el Presidente de la Comisión de Libertades Civiles, Justicia y Asuntos de Interior y la ponente el 16 de abril de 2012 y la exhaustiva respuesta recibida de Eurocontrol el 26 de abril de 2012,

– Vista la nota de la DG IPOL titulada «The results of the inquiries into the CIA's programme of extraordinary rendition and secret prisons in European states in light of the new legal framework following the Lisbon Treaty»,

– Vistos los artículos 48 y 50 de su Reglamento,

– Vistos el informe de la Comisión de Libertades Civiles, Justicia y Asuntos de Interior y la opinión de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores (A7-0266/2012),

A. Considerando que el Parlamento ha condenado el programa de traslados extraordinarios y detenciones secretas de los Estados Unidos, dirigido por la CIA, que implica numerosas violaciones de los derechos humanos, entre ellas la detención legal y arbitraria, la tortura y otros malos tratos, violaciones del principio de no devolución y desapariciones forzosas; considerando que su Comisión Temporal sobre la supuesta utilización de países europeos por la CIA para el transporte y la detención ilegal de presos (en adelante la «Comisión temporal ») ha documentado el uso del espacio aéreo y el territorio europeo por la CIA, y que desde entonces el Parlamento ha reiterado su exigencia de que se investigue exhaustivamente la colaboración de los gobiernos y organismos nacionales con el programa de la CIA;

1 «Sources Tell ABC News Top Al Qaeda Figures Held in Secret CIA Prisons», ABC News, 5.12.2005. 2 «Lithuania Hosted Secret CIA Prison to Get «Our Ear»», ABC News, 20.8.2009. 3 «CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons», 2.11. 2005, y «Europeans Probe Secret CIA Flights», Washington Post, 17.11.2005. 4 Entre otros: Declaración de Human Rights Watch sobre los centros de detención secretos de los Estados Unidos en Europa, de 6.11.2005; Informe de Amnesty International Europa titulado « Open secret: Mounting evidence of Europe’s complicity in rendition and secret detention», de 15.11.2010; Informe de Reprieve titulado «Rendition on Record: Using the Right of Access to Information to Unveil the Paths of Illegal Prisoner Transfer Flights», de 15.12.2011.

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B. Considerando que el Parlamento Europeo ha hecho en repetidas ocasiones un llamamiento para que la lucha contra el terrorismo respete plenamente la dignidad humana, los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, también en el contexto de la cooperación internacional en la materia, sobre la base del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE, las constituciones nacionales y la legislación en materia de derechos fundamentales, así como que ha reiterado recientemente dicho llamamiento en su informe sobre política antiterrorista de la UE, en el que también se señalaba que el respeto de los derechos humanos es una condición previa para garantizar la eficacia de esta política;

C. Considerando que el Parlamento Europeo ha condenado repetida y enérgicamente prácticas ilegales entre las que figuran las «entregas extraordinarias», el rapto, la detención sin juicio, la desaparición, las prisiones secretas y la tortura, y que ha pedido una completa investigación sobre el supuesto grado de implicación de algunos Estados miembros en la colaboración con las autoridades de los Estados Unidos, en particular la CIA, también en relación con operaciones realizadas en el territorio de la UE;

D. Considerando que el objeto de la presente Resolución es que se realice «un seguimiento político de las actividades de la Comisión Temporal y supervise cualquier evolución, en particular en el caso de que el Consejo y/o la Comisión no adopten las medidas apropiadas; que [se]determine si existe un riesgo claro de vulneración grave de los principios y valores en que se funda la Unión Europea, y que le recomiende cualquier resolución, sobre la base de los artículos 6 y 7 del Tratado de la Unión Europea, que estime necesaria en este contexto»1;

E. Considerando que la UE se basa en el compromiso con la democracia, el Estado de Derecho, los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, el respeto de la dignidad humana y del Derecho internacional no solamente en sus políticas interiores, sino también en su dimensión exterior; que el compromiso de la UE con los derechos humanos, reforzado por la entrada en vigor de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE y el proceso de adhesión al Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales, debe reflejarse en todos los ámbitos políticos a fin de que la política de derechos humanos de la UE resulte eficaz y creíble;

F. Considerando que es indispensable contar con un proceso adecuado de rendición de cuentas para mantener la confianza de los ciudadanos en las instituciones democráticas de la UE, proteger y promover de forma eficaz los derechos humanos en las políticas interiores y exteriores de la UE y garantizar la legitimidad y eficacia de las políticas de seguridad basadas en el Estado de Derecho;

G. Considerando que hasta ahora ningún Estado miembro ha cumplido plenamente sus obligaciones de proteger, mantener y respetar los derechos humanos internacionales y evitar su vulneración;

H. Considerando que los instrumentos por los que se rige la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común (PESC) incluyen la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, el Pacto Internacional de las Naciones Unidas de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (PIDCP) y sus dos

1 Apartado 232 de su Resolución de 14 de febrero de 2007 antes mencionada.

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Protocolos Facultativos, así como la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Tortura (CAT) y su Protocolo Facultativo, el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE y el Convenio Europeo para la Prevención de la Tortura y de las Penas o Tratos Inhumanos o Degradantes, que, en su conjunto, no solamente prohíben la tortura por completo sino que también implican una obligación positiva de investigar supuestos casos de tortura y de proporcionar medios de reparación e indemnizaciones; que las Directrices de la UE sobre la tortura establecen el marco para los esfuerzos de la UE orientados a «prevenir y erradicar la tortura y los malos tratos en todo el mundo»;

I. Considerando que para garantizar la promoción del Derecho internacional y el respeto de los derechos humanos todos los acuerdos de asociación, comerciales y de colaboración contienen cláusulas relativas a los derechos humanos; que la UE también mantiene diálogos políticos con terceros países sobre la base de las Directrices en materia de derechos humanos, que incluyen la lucha contra la pena de muerte y la tortura; que, en el marco del Instrumento Europeo para la Democracia y los Derechos Humanos (IEDDH), la UE respalda a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil que luchan contra la tortura y que ofrecen ayuda para la rehabilitación de las víctimas de tortura;

J. Considerando que la detención secreta, que es una forma de desaparición forzada, puede equipararse, si se practica de modo generalizado y sistemático, a un crimen contra la humanidad; que los estados de excepción y la lucha contra el terrorismo constituyen un entorno propicio para la detención secreta;

K. Considerando que, aunque la UE ha demostrado su compromiso de evitar la connivencia con la tortura a través del Reglamento (CE) nº 1236/20051 del Consejo, recientemente modificado, en diciembre de 20112, por el que se prohíbe toda exportación o importación de productos cuya única utilidad práctica sea aplicar la pena de muerte, infligir tortura u otros tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes, sigue siendo necesario adoptar medidas adicionales para garantizar una completa cobertura;

L. Considerando que el hecho de confiar solamente en las garantías diplomáticas para autorizar la extradición o deportación de una persona a un país sobre el que existen motivos suficientes para creer que podría correr el peligro de ser torturada o de recibir malos tratos es incompatible con la prohibición absoluta de la tortura en el Derecho internacional, el Derecho de la UE, así como en la legislación y constituciones nacionales de los Estados miembros3;

M. Considerando que el Consejo admitió el 15 de septiembre de 2006 que «la existencia de centros de detención secretos donde los detenidos son mantenidos en un vacío jurídico no es conforme al Derecho internacional humanitario ni a la normativa sobre derechos humanos», pero no ha reconocido y condenado hasta ahora la participación de algunos

1 DO L 200 de 30.7.2005, p. 1. 2 DO L 338 de 21.12.2011, p. 31. 3 Artículo 5 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; artículo 7 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos; artículo 3 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales (CEDH) y jurisprudencia relacionada; así como el artículo 4 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea.

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Estados miembros en el programa de la CIA, a pesar de que las autoridades políticas y judiciales de algunos Estados miembros han reconocido el uso del espacio aéreo y el territorio europeo por parte de la CIA;

N. Considerando que se siguen cometiendo violaciones de los derechos humanos al amparo del programa de la CIA, como pone de manifiesto, en particular, el mantenimiento en régimen de detención administrativa en la bahía de Guantánamo de Abu Zubaydah y Abd al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, a quienes la investigación penal realizada en Polonia sobre las prisiones secretas de la CIA les confirió la condición de víctimas;

O. Considerando que las Naciones Unidas, el Consejo de Europa, algunos medios de comunicación nacionales e internacionales, periodistas de investigación y la sociedad civil han revelado nuevos datos concretos sobre la ubicación de los centros secretos de detención de la CIA en Europa, los vuelos para traslados extraordinarios a través del espacio aéreo europeo y las personas transportadas o detenidas;

P. Considerando que la realización de actos ilegales en territorio de la UE puede haberse llevado a cabo en el marco de acuerdos bilaterales o multilaterales de la OTAN;

Q. Considerando que investigaciones nacionales y estudios internacionales demuestran que miembros de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico del Norte (OTAN) acordaron implicarse en medidas de la campaña contra el terrorismo que permitían el tráfico de vuelos secretos y el uso del territorio de Estados miembros de la UE para el programa de entregas extraordinarias dirigido por la CIA, lo que indica que algunos Estados miembros, que también son miembros de la OTAN, conocían la existencia de dicho programa;

R. Considerando que el Estudio conjunto de las Naciones Unidas sobre las prácticas mundiales en relación con la detención secreta en el contexto de la lucha contra el terrorismo (A/HRC/13/42), elaborado por el Relator Especial sobre la promoción y protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales en la lucha contra el terrorismo, el Relator Especial sobre la tortura y otros tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes, el Grupo de Trabajo sobre la detención arbitraria y el Grupo de Trabajo sobre las desapariciones forzadas o involuntarias, exponía en detalle el uso de lugares de detención secretos en el territorio de los Estados miembros de la Unión como parte de un programa de la CIA; considerando asimismo las correspondientes cartas de seguimiento que fueron enviadas a los Estados miembros en las que se solicitaba información adicional según se detalla en los Informes de las Comunicaciones de los Procedimientos Especiales, incluido el de 23 de febrero de 20121;

S. Considerando que el informe del Consejo de Europa de 2011 señala que los datos obtenidos de las autoridades polacas en 2009 y 2010 «demuestran sin duda alguna» que siete aeronaves asociadas con la CIA aterrizaron en Polonia y que la información publicada en los medios de comunicación de dicho país ha recogido las acusaciones realizadas contra el antiguo jefe de la inteligencia polaca, y ha revelado posibles contactos entre los agentes de inteligencia y el Gobierno polaco en relación con el uso de un centro de detención de la CIA en territorio polaco; que, en 2011, periodistas de investigación rumanos trataron de demostrar la existencia de un centro secreto con datos del Registro

1 A/HRC/19/44.

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Nacional de Información Clasificada rumano1, basándose en la información facilitada por antiguos empleados de la CIA; que las autoridades rumanas han negado la existencia de este centro secreto, y que la investigación parlamentaria realizada por el Parlamento rumano no la ha probado; considerando que algunos antiguos disidentes libios han emprendido acciones legales contra el Reino Unido por la participación directa del MI6 en su traslado extraordinario, detención secreta y tortura, así como en los de sus familias;

T. Considerando que las autoridades lituanas se han esforzado por arrojar luz sobre la participación de Lituania en el programa de la CIA a través de investigaciones parlamentarias y judiciales; considerando que la investigación parlamentaria de la Comisión de Seguridad Nacional y Defensa del Seimas sobe el presunto transporte y reclusión de personas detenidas por la CIA en territorio lituano determinó que cinco aeronaves relacionadas con la CIA aterrizaron en Lituania entre 2003 y 2005, y que a petición de la CIA se prepararon dos instalaciones adaptadas para la reclusión de detenidos en Lituania (proyectos nº 1 y 2); considerando que la delegación de la comisión LIBE agradece a las autoridades lituanas haber recibido a los diputados al Parlamento Europeo en Vilnius en abril de 2012 y permitido que dicha delegación accediera al proyecto nº 2; considerando que la disposición de los edificios y las instalaciones interiores parecen compatibles para la detención de prisioneros; considerando que muchas preguntas acerca de las operaciones de la CIA en Lituania permanecen sin respuesta, a pesar de las investigaciones judiciales posteriores llevadas a cabo en 2010 y cerradas en enero de 2011; considerando que las autoridades lituanas han manifestado su disposición a reabrir las investigaciones si se tuviera conocimiento de nuevas informaciones, y considerando que la Fiscalía se ofreció a facilitar más información sobre la investigación penal en respuesta a una solicitud por escrito del Parlamento;

U. Considerando que las autoridades portuguesas aún no han aclarado los numerosos indicios de que muchos vuelos, identificados por, entre otros, la Comisión Temporal, han servido para realizar traslados entre Bagram, Diego García, prisiones secretas y Guantánamo;

V. Considerando que las investigaciones judiciales y sus resultados sobre la logística para ocultar estas operaciones ilegales, que incluían planes de vuelo falsos, el uso de aeronaves civiles y militares en vuelos declarados como vuelos del Estado y el uso de empresas de aviación privadas para llevar a cabo los traslados extraordinarios de la CIA, han revelado igualmente el carácter sistemático y el alcance de la participación europea en el programa de la CIA; considerando que un análisis de los nuevos datos presentados por Eurocontrol confirma, en particular, la hipótesis de que los contratistas que llevaban a cabo las misiones de entrega extraordinaria cambiaban de un avión a otro a media ruta para ocultar el origen y destino de los traslados de prisioneros;

W. Considerando que la UE ha adoptado políticas de seguridad interior y lucha antiterrorista basadas en la cooperación policial y judicial y la promoción del intercambio de información de inteligencia; que estas políticas deben sustentarse en el respeto de los derechos fundamentales y el Estado de Derecho, así como en un control parlamentario democrático efectivo de los servicios de inteligencia;

X. Considerando que, según el CPT, «las técnicas de interrogatorio que se aplican en las 1 «Inside Romania’s secret CIA prison», The Independent, 9.12.2011.

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instalaciones de detención de la CIA en el extranjero han violado sin duda la prohibición de la tortura y los tratos inhumanos y degradantes»1;

Y. Considerando que las relaciones entre la UE y los Estados Unidos se basan en una sólida asociación y cooperación en múltiples ámbitos basada en unos valores comunes compartidos como la democracia, el Estado de Derecho y los derechos fundamentales; que tanto la UE como los EE.UU. han reforzado su compromiso de lucha contra el terrorismo desde los atentados terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001, en particular con la Declaración conjunta UE-EE.UU. sobre la lucha contra el terrorismo, de 3 de junio de 2010, pero que está claro que es necesario asegurar el cumplimiento en la práctica de los compromisos adquiridos y superar las divergencias entre las políticas de la UE y de los Estados Unidos en materia de lucha contra el terrorismo;

Z. Considerando que en diciembre de 2011 las autoridades de los EE.UU. aprobaron la Ley de Autorización de Defensa Nacional (NDAA), que codifica en el Derecho la detención indefinida de las personas sospechosas de participar en acciones terroristas en los EE.UU. y socava el derecho a contar con las debidas garantías procesales y un juicio justo; que se ha presentado un recurso judicial en relación con el ámbito de dicha Ley;

AA. Considerando que, el 22 de enero de 2009, el Presidente Obama firmó tres órdenes ejecutivas por las que se prohíbe la tortura durante los interrogatorios, se crea un grupo de trabajo interinstitucional para revisar sistemáticamente los procedimientos y las políticas de detención y revisar todos y cada uno de los casos, así como la orden de cierre del centro de detención de Guantánamo;

AB. Considerando, no obstante, que el cierre del centro de detención de Guantánamo todavía no se ha llevado a cabo debido a la fuerte oposición del Congreso de los EE.UU.; que, a fin de acelerar dicho cierre, los EE.UU. han pedido a Estados miembros de la UE que se hagan cargo de presos de Guantánamo; que la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos ha expresado su profunda decepción porque no se haya cerrado Guantánamo y por el afianzamiento de un sistema de detención arbitrario;

AC. Considerando que los presos de Guantánamo todavía siguen siendo juzgados por tribunales militares, en particular a raíz de la decisión del Presidente de los EE.UU. de 7 de marzo de 2011 de firmar una orden ejecutiva por la que se levanta la suspensión de dos años sobre los nuevos juicios militares y la ley de 7 de enero de 2012 por la que se prohíben las transferencias de presos de Guantánamo a los EE.UU. para ser juzgados;

Aspectos generales

1. Recuerda que las estrategias antiterroristas solamente pueden ser eficaces si se llevan a cabo respetando estrictamente las obligaciones en materia de derechos humanos y, en particular, el derecho a un proceso justo;

2. Reitera que la eficacia de las medidas antiterroristas y el respeto de los derechos humanos no son contradictorios sino que son objetivos complementarios que se apoyan mutuamente; recuerda que el respeto de los derechos humanos es un elemento

1 Informe del CPT de 19 de mayo de 2011 sobre su visita a Lituania, del 14 al 18 de junio de 2010.

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fundamental para que las políticas de lucha contra el terrorismo tengan éxito;

3. Insiste en el carácter altamente sensible de las políticas de lucha antiterrorista; considera que solo verdaderos motivos de seguridad nacional pueden justificar el secreto; recuerda, no obstante, que en ningún caso el secreto de Estado debe prevalecer sobre los derechos fundamentales inalienables y que, por tanto, los argumentos basados en el secreto de Estado nunca pueden utilizarse para limitar la obligación legal de los Estados de investigar las graves violaciones de los derechos humanos; considera que las definiciones de información clasificada y de secreto de Estado no deben ser excesivamente laxas, y que los abusos del secreto de Estado y de la seguridad nacional son un importante obstáculo para el ejercicio del control democrático;

4. Subraya que las personas sospechosas de terrorismo no deben ser sometidas a procedimientos especiales; recuerda que todas las personas deben poder beneficiarse de las garantías previstas por el principio de un proceso equitativo, tal como está definido en el artículo 6 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos;

5. Reitera su condena de las prácticas de entrega extraordinaria, las prisiones secretas y las torturas, que están prohibidas en virtud de la legislación nacional e internacional en materia de respeto de los derechos humanos y que infringen, entre otras cosas, el derecho a la libertad, a la seguridad, a un trato humano, a no ser torturado, a la no devolución, a la presunción de inocencia, a un juicio justo, a la asistencia jurídica y a la igualdad de protección en el marco de la ley;

6. Insiste en la necesidad de prever garantías que eviten que en un futuro se infrinjan los derechos fundamentales con la puesta en marcha de políticas antiterroristas;

7. Considera que, si bien algunos Estados miembros han manifestado su disposición a respetar el Derecho internacional, hasta ahora no han cumplido correctamente la obligación que les impone el Derecho internacional de investigar las graves violaciones de los derechos humanos relacionadas con el programa de la CIA, y lamenta los retrasos para sacar a la luz toda la información al respecto, para poder resarcir plenamente a las víctimas lo antes posible, incluso ofreciendo disculpas e indemnizaciones, cuando así proceda;

8. Estima que las dificultades que los Estados miembros han encontrado para realizar investigaciones conducen a que no se cumplan plenamente sus obligaciones internacionales, lo que puede perturbar la confianza mutua en lo que respecta a la protección de los derechos fundamentales y, por consiguiente, se convierte en responsabilidad de la UE en su conjunto;

9. Reitera que el compromiso de los Estados miembros y la UE de investigar la participación europea en el programa de la CIA está en consonancia con el principio de cooperación sincera y leal consagrado en el artículo 4, apartado 3, del TUE;

El proceso de rendición de cuentas en los Estados miembros

10. Expresa su preocupación por los obstáculos con los que se han topado las investigaciones parlamentarias y judiciales nacionales sobre la participación de algunos Estados miembros

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en el programa de la CIA, que están documentados detalladamente en el Informe del Consejo de Europa de 2011 sobre el abuso de los secretos de Estado y la seguridad nacional, que incluye la falta de transparencia, la clasificación de documentos, el predominio de intereses nacionales y políticos, el estrecho mandato de las investigaciones, la limitación del derecho de las víctimas a una participación y defensa eficaces, la inexistencia de técnicas de investigación rigurosas y de cooperación entre las autoridades de investigación en toda la UE; pide a los Estados miembros que no sustenten sus procedimientos penales nacionales en este tipo de fundamentos jurídicos, que permiten el cierre de los procedimientos penales invocando cláusulas prescriptivas que conducen a la impunidad, y que respeten el principio del Derecho internacional consuetudinario que reconoce que dicha legislación no puede ni debe aplicarse a los casos de graves violaciones de los derechos humanos;

11. Insta a los Estados miembros que no hayan cumplido esta obligación, a que realicen investigaciones independientes y eficaces sobre las violaciones de derechos humanos, teniendo en cuenta todas las nuevas pruebas que han salido a la luz; pide, en especial, a los Estados miembros que investiguen la existencia de cárceles secretas en su territorio o de operaciones en las que se haya privado de libertad a personas en el marco del programa de la CIA en instalaciones situadas en su territorio;

12. Observa que la investigación parlamentaria llevada a cabo en Rumanía ha concluido que no se han encontrado pruebas que demuestren la existencia de un local de detenciones secretas de la CIA en territorio rumano; pide a las autoridades judiciales que inicien una investigación independiente sobre los presuntos centros de detención secretos de la CIA en Rumanía, en particular a la luz de las nuevas pruebas sobre los vuelos realizados entre Rumanía y Lituania;

13. Alienta a Polonia a que prosiga con la investigación penal sobre las detenciones secretas que está realizando, pero lamenta la falta de comunicación oficial sobre el alcance, la realización y la situación de dicha investigación; pide a las autoridades de ese país que lleven a cabo una investigación rigurosa y con la debida transparencia, que permita la participación efectiva de las víctimas y sus abogados;

14. Constata que las investigaciones parlamentarias y judiciales realizadas en Lituania entre 2009 y 2011 no han podido demostrar la detención secreta de personas en Lituania; pide a las autoridades lituanas que cumplan su compromiso de volver a abrir la investigación penal sobre la participación de Lituania en el programa de la CIA, si surgen informaciones nuevas, en vista de las nuevas pruebas facilitadas por Eurocontrol que muestran que el avión N787WH, que supuestamente transportaba a Abu Zubaydah, aterrizó en Marruecos el 18 de febrero de 2005 en su ruta hacia Rumanía y Lituania; señala que el análisis de los datos de Eurocontrol revela igualmente nueva información de los planes de vuelo entre Rumanía y Lituania, con cambio de avión en Tirana (Albania), el 5 de octubre de 2005, y de Lituania a Afganistán, vía El Cairo (Egipto), el 26 de marzo de 2006; considera indispensable que las nuevas investigaciones abarquen, además del abuso de poder por parte de funcionarios nacionales, la posible detención ilegal y el maltrato de personas en territorio lituano; invita a la Fiscalía General a que sustancie y documente las afirmaciones que hizo durante la visita de la delegación de la Comisión LIBE, en el sentido de que las conclusiones «categóricas» de la investigación judicial señalan «que no hubo detenidos en

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las instalaciones de los proyectos nº 1 y 2 en Lituania»;

15. Toma nota de la investigación penal iniciada en el Reino Unido sobre los traslados extraordinarios a Libia, y celebra la decisión de continuar la investigación sobre la cuestión más amplia de la responsabilidad del Reino Unido en el programa de la CIA una vez finalizada la primera investigación; pide al Reino Unido que lleve a cabo esta investigación con la debida transparencia y permita la participación efectiva de las víctimas y la sociedad civil;

16. Reconoce que las investigaciones de los Estados miembros se deben basar en pruebas judiciales sólidas y en el respeto de los sistemas judiciales nacionales y del Derecho de la UE, y no solo en las especulaciones de los medios de comunicación y de la opinión pública;

17. Pide a Estados miembros, como Finlandia, Dinamarca, Portugal, Italia, el Reino Unido, Alemania, España, Irlanda, Grecia, Chipre, Rumanía y Polonia, mencionados en el informe de la Comisión Temporal, que revelen toda la información necesaria sobre todos los aviones sospechosos asociados con la CIA en sus respectivos territorios; pide a todos los Estados miembros que respeten el derecho a la libertad de información y que respondan de forma adecuada a las peticiones de acceso a la información; expresa, a la luz de lo anterior, su preocupación por que la mayoría de los Estados miembros, con excepción de Dinamarca, Finlandia, Alemania, Irlanda y Lituania, no han respondido de forma adecuada a las solicitudes de acceso a la información de Reprieve y de Access Info

Europe en relación con las investigaciones que realizan sobre casos de entrega extraordinaria;

18. Pide a los Estados miembros que revisen las disposiciones o interpretaciones complacientes con la tortura, como el dictamen jurídico de Michael Wood (mencionado en la Resolución mencionada del PE de 14 de febrero de 2007), que, en contra de la jurisprudencia internacional, defiende que recibir o usar información obtenida bajo tortura es legítimo a condición de que no se sea directamente responsable de tal tortura (lo que estimula y justifica la «subcontratación» de la tortura);

19. Pide a todos los Estados miembros que firmen y ratifiquen la Convención Internacional para la protección de todas las personas contra las desapariciones forzadas;

20. Pide a los Estados miembros que, a la luz de la mayor cooperación e intercambio de información entre sus servicios de inteligencia y seguridad, garanticen que estos servicios y sus actividades sean objeto de un pleno control democrático a través de la supervisión interna, ejecutiva, judicial y parlamentaria independiente que proceda, preferiblemente a cargo de comisiones parlamentarias especializadas con un mandato y competencias amplios, incluida la de solicitar información, y con suficientes recursos de investigación para poder examinar no solo cuestiones como las políticas, la administración y las finanzas, sino también la labor operativa de estos servicios;

Respuesta de las instituciones de la UE

21. Considera fundamental que la UE condene toda práctica abusiva en la lucha contra el terrorismo, incluido cualquier acto de este tipo llevado a cabo en su territorio, de modo

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que la UE no solo pueda estar a la altura de sus valores sino, también, defenderlos de forma creíble en sus asociaciones exteriores;

22. Recuerda que el Consejo no se ha disculpado oficialmente por haber infringido el principio inscrito en los Tratados de cooperación leal entre las Instituciones de la Unión cuando intentó inducir a error al Parlamento Europeo facilitándole versiones intencionadamente abreviadas de las actas de las reuniones del COJUR (Grupo de trabajo del Consejo sobre Derecho Internacional Público) y del COTRA (Grupo de trabajo del Consejo sobre Relaciones Transatlánticas) con altos funcionarios norteamericanos; sigue esperando las disculpas del Consejo;

23. Espera que el Consejo, por fin, publique una declaración en la que reconozca la participación de algunos Estados miembros en el programa de la CIA y las dificultades que han encontrado los Estados miembros en el marco de las investigaciones;

24. Pide al Consejo que conceda su pleno apoyo a los procesos de investigación de la verdad y rendición de cuentas en los Estados miembros mediante la inclusión formal de este tema en las reuniones del Consejo JAI, el intercambio de información, la prestación de asistencia a las investigaciones y, en particular, respondiendo positivamente a las solicitudes de acceso a los documentos;

25. Pide que el Consejo celebre audiencias con las agencias de seguridad competentes de la UE, en particular Europol, Eurojust y el Coordinador de la Lucha Antiterrorista de la UE, a fin de aclarar hasta qué punto conocían la participación de algunos Estados miembros en el programa de la CIA, así como la respuesta de la UE; pide igualmente al Consejo que proponga salvaguardias para garantizar el respeto de los derechos humanos a la hora de intercambiar información de inteligencia, y para delimitar estrictamente las funciones entre las actividades de inteligencia y las actividades policiales y judiciales, de modo que no se permita a los servicios de inteligencia asumir competencias de arresto y detención, y que presente un informe al Parlamento en el plazo de un año;

26. Pide al Consejo que aliente la puesta en común de buenas prácticas entre los Estados miembros en lo relativo al control parlamentario y judicial sobre los servicios de información, asociando a ese esfuerzo a los Parlamentos nacionales y al Parlamento Europeo;

27. Reitera su llamamiento al Consejo y a los Estados miembros para que excluyan, como base para la extradición o deportación de personas que se supone amenazan la seguridad nacional, las garantías diplomáticas imposibles de verificar cuando existan razones reales para creer que estas personas corren peligro de sufrir tortura o malos tratos o que podrían ser juzgadas a partir de pruebas obtenidas mediante estos procedimientos;

28. Pide a las autoridades competentes que no apelen al secreto de Estado en relación con la cooperación de los servicios de inteligencia internacionales con el fin de bloquear la obligación de rendir cuentas y las reparaciones, e insiste en que solamente auténticos motivos de seguridad nacional pueden justificar el secreto, que, en cualquier caso, queda sin efecto por las obligaciones no derogables en materia de derechos fundamentales, tales como la prohibición absoluta de la tortura;

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29. Insta a las autoridades competentes a que garanticen que se realiza una distinción estricta entre las actividades de los servicios de inteligencia y las de los servicios de seguridad, por un lado, y los organismos encargados del cumplimiento de la ley, por otro, todo ello para garantizar que se respeta el principio general de nemo iudex in sua causa;

30. Subraya que la Comisión Temporal que realizó de la investigación en la que se basan sus Resoluciones del Parlamento de 14 de febrero de 2007 y de 19 de febrero de 2009 puso de manifiesto que los procedimientos de autorización y control del sobrevuelo del espacio aéreo de los Estados miembros o del aterrizaje de una aeronave civil en su territorio presentaban lagunas importantes, de modo que se prestaban a abusos no solamente para realizar las «entregas extraordinarias» de la CIA, sino, también para que resultase muy fácil esquivarlos a cualquier persona dedicada a la delincuencia organizada, incluidas las redes terroristas; recuerda, igualmente, la competencia de la Unión en materia de seguridad del transporte y la recomendación del Parlamento Europeo a la Comisión de regular y controlar la gestión del espacio aéreo, aeropuertos y aviación no comercial de la UE; pide, por ello, a la UE y a los Estados miembros que no retrasen más una revisión exhaustiva de su aplicación del Convenio relativo a la Aviación Civil Internacional (Convenio de Chicago), en lo tocante a la autorización e inspección de las aeronaves civiles que sobrevuelen el espacio aéreo de los Estados miembros o aterricen en su territorio, a fin de cerciorarse de la mejora de la seguridad y de que se realizan controles sistemáticos, para lo que se requiere la identificación previa de pasajeros y tripulaciones, y que garanticen que todos los vuelos clasificados como «vuelos de Estado» (que están excluidos del ámbito de aplicación del Convenio de Chicago) obtengan una autorización previa y adecuada; recuerda igualmente la recomendación del Parlamento Europeo de que los Estados miembros cumplan de manera efectiva el Convenio de Tokio sobre infracciones y ciertos otros actos cometidos a bordo de las aeronaves;

31. Toma nota de las iniciativas de la Comisión en respuesta a las recomendaciones del Parlamento; considera lamentable, no obstante, que estas no hayan formado parte de un programa y estrategia más amplios para garantizar la rendición de cuentas por las violaciones de los derechos humanos cometidas en el marco del programa de la CIA, así como la reparación e indemnización necesarias para las víctimas;

32. Pide a la Comisión que investigue si la colaboración con el programa de la CIA infringió disposiciones de la UE, en particular las relativas al asilo y la cooperación judicial;

33. Pide a la Comisión que facilite y apoye la asistencia mutua y la cooperación judicial respetuosas de los derechos humanos entre las autoridades de investigación, así como la cooperación entre los abogados que trabajan por la rendición de cuentas en los Estados miembros y, en particular, para garantizar el intercambio de la información importante y promover un uso eficaz de todos los instrumentos y recursos de que dispone la UE;

34. Pide a la Comisión que adopte en el plazo de un año un marco, que incluya obligaciones en materia de información para los Estados miembros, para el seguimiento y apoyo a los procesos nacionales de rendición de cuentas, que incluya directrices sobre investigaciones conformes con los derechos humanos, sobre la base de las normas desarrolladas por el Consejo de Europa y las Naciones Unidas;

35. Pide a la Comisión que, en vista de las deficiencias institucionales reveladas en el

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contexto del programa de la CIA, adopte medidas destinadas a reforzar la capacidad de la UE para prevenir y corregir las violaciones de los derechos humanos a escala de la UE y que refuerce el papel del Parlamento;

36. Pide a la Comisión que estudie la posibilidad de proponer medidas para una cooperación y un intercambio de información permanentes entre el Parlamento Europeo y las comisiones parlamentarias para la supervisión de los servicios de inteligencia y seguridad de los Estados miembros en aquellos casos en que existan indicios de que dichos servicios han realizado acciones conjuntas en el territorio de la UE;

37. Pide a la Comisión que presente propuestas para establecer modalidades de control democrático de las actividades de inteligencia transfronteriza en el marco de la política antiterrorista de la UE; anuncia su intención de hacer pleno uso de sus competencias parlamentarias para controlar las políticas antiterroristas, de conformidad con las recomendaciones elaboradas por el Departamento Temático del Parlamento Europeo (PE 453.207);

38. Pide al Defensor del Pueblo Europeo que investigue el incumplimiento por parte de la Comisión, el Consejo y los servicios de seguridad de la UE, en particular Europol y Eurojust, del respeto de los derechos fundamentales y los principios de buena administración y cooperación leal en su respuesta a las recomendaciones de la Comisión TDIP;

39. Pide a la UE que garantice el pleno cumplimiento de sus propias obligaciones internacionales y que los instrumentos de la política exterior y las políticas de la UE, tales como las Directrices sobre la tortura y los diálogos en materia de derechos humanos, se respeten plenamente, para poder encontrarse en mejores condiciones de exigir la rigurosa aplicación de las cláusulas de derechos humanos en todos los acuerdos internacionales que firme, así como que inste a sus principales aliados, incluidos los Estados Unidos, a que respeten su propia legislación nacional y el Derecho internacional;

40. Reafirma que la lucha internacional contra el terrorismo y la cooperación internacional, bilateral o multilateral en este ámbito, incluso en el marco de la OTAN o entre los servicios de inteligencia y las fuerzas de seguridad, solo debe llevarse a cabo en el marco del respeto pleno de los derechos humanos y de las libertades fundamentales y bajo una supervisión judicial y democrática apropiada; pide a los Estados miembros, a la Comisión, al Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior (SEAE) y al Consejo que garanticen la aplicación de estos principios en sus relaciones exteriores, e insiste en que deben realizar una valoración exhaustiva del historial de sus socios en materia de derechos humanos antes de celebrar acuerdos nuevos de esta naturaleza, en particular en materia de cooperación de los servicios de inteligencia e intercambio de información; revisar los acuerdos vigentes en aquellos casos en que los socios no respeten los derechos humanos; e informar al Parlamento Europeo de dichas conclusiones y evaluaciones;

41. Insta a que no se repita en el futuro la interferencia de los servicios especiales extranjeros en los asuntos de los Estados miembros soberanos de la UE y a que la lucha contra el terrorismo respete en todo momento los derechos humanos, las libertades fundamentales, la democracia y el Estado de Derecho;

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42. Recuerda que el Protocolo Facultativo de la Convención contra la Tortura requiere la creación de unos sistemas de control que abarquen todas las situaciones de privación de libertad, y subraya que la adhesión a este instrumento internacional incrementa la protección; recomienda encarecidamente que los países socios de la UE ratifiquen el Protocolo Facultativo, creen unos mecanismos de prevención nacionales independientes, que cumplan los Principios de París, y ratifiquen la Convención internacional para la protección de todas las personas contra las desapariciones forzadas;

43. Reitera su petición, de conformidad con el Derecho internacional y, en particular, con el artículo 12 de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Tortura, a todos los países que se enfrentan a acusaciones creíbles para que hagan todo lo posible a fin de aportar todas las aclaraciones necesarias y, si lo justifican las pruebas, que realicen investigaciones y pesquisas exhaustivas de todos los supuestos actos de entrega extraordinaria, prisiones secretas, tortura y otras violaciones graves de los derechos humanos, para revelar la verdad y, si procede, depurar responsabilidades e impedir la impunidad, incluso llevando ante los tribunales a quien corresponda cuando existan pruebas de responsabilidad penal; insta, en este sentido, a la Alta Representante/Vicepresidenta de la Comisión y a los Estados miembros a que adopten todas las medidas necesarias para garantizar un seguimiento correcto del Estudio conjunto de las Naciones Unidas sobre las prácticas mundiales en relación con la detención secreta en el contexto de la lucha contra el terrorismo, en particular, en lo relativo a las cartas de seguimiento enviadas el 21 de octubre de 2011 por los titulares de las Relatorías Especiales a 59 Estados, en las que se solicitaba a sus respectivos Gobiernos que presentaran información actualizada sobre el cumplimiento de las recomendaciones contempladas en dicho estudio;

44. Pide que la UE garantice que los Estados miembros, así como sus asociados y socios (en particular los firmantes del Acuerdo de Cotonú) que han aceptado acoger a antiguos presos de Guantánamo, les brinden realmente pleno apoyo en lo que a condiciones de vida se refiere y les faciliten la integración en la sociedad, tratamiento médico, incluida recuperación psicológica, acceso a documentos de identificación y de viaje, el ejercicio al derecho a la reunificación familiar y de todos los demás derechos fundamentales previstos para las personas acogidas al estatuto de asilo político;

45. Expresa su especial preocupación por el procedimiento incoado por una comisión militar norteamericana en relación con Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, que podría ser condenado a muerte si es declarado culpable; pide a las autoridades de los EE.UU. que descarten la condena a muerte del Sr. al-Nashiri y reitera su postura contraria a la pena de muerte, adoptada ya hace mucho tiempo, en todos los casos y bajo cualquier circunstancia; señala que el caso del Sr. al-Nashiri se encuentra ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos desde el 6 de mayo de 2011; pide a las autoridades de todos los países en los que el Sr. al-Nashiri haya estado detenido que utilicen todos los recursos existentes para intentar que no sea condenado a la pena de muerte; insta a la Alta Representante/Vicepresidenta de la Comisión a que plantee el caso del Sr. al-Nashiri con carácter prioritario ante los EE.UU., de conformidad con las Directrices de la UE en materia de pena de muerte;

46. Reitera que la aplicación íntegra de la cláusula en materia de derechos humanos recogida en los acuerdos con terceros países es crucial en las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y

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sus Estados miembros con estos países y considera que ha llegado el momento de reexaminar el modo en el que los Gobiernos europeos han cooperado con los aparatos represivos de dictaduras justificándolo en la lucha contra el terrorismo; considera, en este sentido, que la Política de Vecindad Europea revisada recientemente debe velar decididamente por la reforma del sector de la seguridad, que debe asegurar, en particular, una separación clara de las funciones de los servicios de inteligencia y las de los servicios encargados de la aplicación de la ley; insta al SEAE, al Consejo y a la Comisión a que refuercen su cooperación con el Comité para la Prevención de la Tortura y otros mecanismos relevantes del Consejo de Europa en la planificación y aplicación de proyectos de asistencia en materia de lucha contra el terrorismo con terceros países y en los diálogos de lucha contra el terrorismo, cualesquiera que sea su naturaleza, con terceros países;

47. Pide al Gobierno de la Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia que depure responsabilidades y vele por la rendición de cuentas en relación con el secuestro, aparentemente por un error de identificación, de Khaled el-Masri, que conllevó su detención ilegal y presuntas torturas; lamenta la pasividad de la Fiscalía de Skopie en relación con una posible investigación penal sobre la denuncia del Sr. El-Masri; señala que el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos ha asumido este caso y que la Gran Sala celebró una primera vista el 16 de mayo de 2012; considera que el supuesto comportamiento del Gobierno de la Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia en relación con este caso no es coherente con los principios fundamentales de la UE en relación con los derechos fundamentales y el Estado de Derecho y que debe ser abordado adecuadamente por la Comisión en relación con la candidatura de la Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia para la adhesión a la UE;

48. Pide a las autoridades de la OTAN y de los Estados Unidos que realicen sus propias investigaciones, que colaboren estrechamente con las investigaciones judiciales o parlamentarias de la UE y de los Estados miembros sobre estas cuestiones1, incluso, si procede, respondiendo rápidamente a las solicitudes de asistencia judicial mutua, que revelen información sobre los programas de entrega extraordinaria y otras prácticas que violan los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, y que proporcionen a los representantes legales de los sospechosos toda la información necesaria para la defensa de sus clientes; solicita que se confirme que todos los acuerdos de la OTAN, así como los acuerdos OTAN-UE y otros acuerdos trasatlánticos, respetan los derechos fundamentales;

49. Elogia las iniciativas de la sociedad civil de los Estados Unidos de constituir en 2010 un grupo de trabajo de los dos partidos e independiente para examinar la política del Gobierno de los EE.UU. y sus acciones relacionadas con la captura, detención y enjuiciamiento de «presuntos terroristas» y las condiciones de detención durante los Gobiernos de Clinton, Bush y Obama;

50. Pide a los Estados Unidos, dado el papel primordial de la asociación trasatlántica y el liderazgo de los Estados Unidos en este ámbito, que investiguen de forma exhaustiva y que garanticen la depuración de responsabilidades con respecto a cualquier abuso que se haya practicado, que se apliquen plenamente las disposiciones legislativas nacionales e

1 Véase, entre otras, la Resolución del Parlamento de 9 junio de 2011 antes mencionada.

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internacionales con vistas a poner fin a los vacíos jurídicos, que acaben con los juicios militares, que apliquen plenamente el Derecho penal a los presuntos terroristas, y que restablezcan la revisión de la detención y el habeas corpus, las garantías procesales, la protección frente a la tortura, y la no discriminación entre los ciudadanos extranjeros y estadounidenses;

51. Pide al Presidente Obama que cumpla la promesa realizada en enero de 2009 de cerrar el centro de detención de Guantánamo, que permita que todos los detenidos contra los que no se vayan a presentar cargos regresen a sus países de origen o a otros países seguros lo antes posible, y que se juzgue sin demora a los detenidos de Guantánamo contra los que existan suficientes pruebas admisibles en un juicio público y equitativo, ante un tribunal imparcial e independiente, y que asegure que, si son condenados, sean encarcelados en los Estados Unidos de conformidad con los principios y normas internacionales vigentes; pide, del mismo modo, que se investiguen las violaciones de derechos humanos registradas en Guantánamo y que se depuren responsabilidades;

52. Pide que, a cualquier detenido contra el que no se vayan a presentar cargos y que no pueda ser repatriado a su país de origen debido a un riesgo real de tortura o persecución, se le brinde la oportunidad de reintegrarse en los Estados Unidos bajo protección humanitaria y que se le conceda una reparación1, e insta, también, a los Estados miembros de la UE a que se ofrezcan a acoger a estos antiguos reclusos de Guantánamo;

53. Pide a las autoridades de los EE.UU. que revoquen el poder de detención indefinida sin cargos o juicios al amparo de la NDAA;

54. Pide a la Conferencia de Presidentes de Delegación que garantice el inicio de diálogos parlamentarios sobre la protección de los derechos humanos, al mismo tiempo que se trabaja en la lucha contra el terrorismo sobre la base de las conclusiones del Estudio conjunto de las Naciones Unidas sobre las prácticas mundiales en relación con la detención secreta en el contexto de la lucha contra el terrorismo, y de su seguimiento, y del cumplimiento de la compilación de las Naciones Unidas sobre buenas prácticas en los marcos institucionales y legales, y de las medidas que aseguran el respeto de los derechos humanos por parte de los servicios de inteligencia en el marco de la lucha contra el terrorismo, incluida su supervisión;

55. Se compromete a dedicar su próxima reunión parlamentaria conjunta con los parlamentos nacionales a examinar el papel que desempeñan los parlamentos para garantizar la rendición de cuentas por las violaciones de los derechos humanos en el contexto del programa de la CIA y a promover una mayor cooperación e intercambio periódico de información entre los órganos nacionales de supervisión encargados del control de los servicios de inteligencia, ante las autoridades nacionales competentes, e instituciones y agencias de la UE;

56. Expresa su determinación de seguir cumpliendo con el mandato que le encomendó la Comisión Temporal, con arreglo a los artículos 2, 6 y 7 del TUE; encarga a su Comisión de Libertades Civiles, Justicia y Asuntos de Interior que aborde esta cuestión, junto con la Subcomisión de Derechos Humanos, ante el Pleno un año después de la aprobación de

1 Véase el apartado 3 de su Resolución de 4 febrero de 2009, antes mencionada.

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esta Resolución; considera esencial que en ese momento se evalúe el grado de cumplimiento de las recomendaciones aprobadas por el Parlamento Europeo y, en su caso, se analicen las razones por las que no fueron seguidas;

57. Pide al Consejo, a la Comisión, al Defensor del Pueblo Europeo, a los Gobiernos y Parlamentos de los Estados miembros, los países candidatos y los países asociados, al Consejo de Europa, a la OTAN, a las Naciones Unidas, así como al Gobierno y a ambas Cámaras del Congreso de los Estados Unidos que mantengan informado al Parlamento de todos los acontecimientos que tengan lugar en los ámbitos que forman parte del contenido del presente informe;

58. Encarga a su Presidente que transmita la presente Resolución al Consejo, a la Comisión, al Defensor del Pueblo Europeo, a los Gobiernos y Parlamentos de los Estados miembros, los países candidatos y los países asociados, al Consejo de Europa, a la OTAN, a las Naciones Unidas, así como al Gobierno y ambas Cámaras del Congreso de los Estados Unidos,

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6.7.2012

OPINIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

para la Comisión de Libertades Civiles, Justicia y Asuntos de Interior

sobre la supuesta utilización de países europeos por la CIA para el transporte y la detención ilegal de presos: seguimiento del informe de la Comisión TDIP del Parlamento Europeo (2012/2033(INI))

Ponente: Sarah Ludford (*)

(*) Procedimiento de comisiones asociadas – artículo 50 del Reglamento

SUGERENCIAS

La Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores pide a la Comisión de Libertades Civiles, Justicia y Asuntos de Interior, competente para el fondo, que incorpore las siguientes sugerencias en la propuesta de resolución que apruebe:

A. Considerando que la Unión Europea se basa en el compromiso con la democracia, el Estado de Derecho, los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, el respeto de la dignidad humana y del Derecho internacional no solamente en sus políticas interiores, sino también en su dimensión exterior; que el compromiso de la UE con los derechos humanos, reforzado por la entrada en vigor de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE y el proceso de adhesión al Convenio para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales, debe reflejarse en todos los ámbitos políticos a fin de que la política de derechos humanos de la UE resulte eficaz y creíble;

B. Considerando que los instrumentos que regulan la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común (PESC) incluyen la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, el Pacto Internacional de las Naciones Unidas de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (PIDCP) y sus dos Protocolos Facultativos, así como la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Tortura (CAT) y su Protocolo Facultativo, el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE y el Convenio Europeo para la Prevención de la Tortura y de las Penas o Tratos Inhumanos o Degradantes, que, en su conjunto, no solamente prohíben la tortura por completo sino que también implican una obligación positiva de investigar supuestos casos de tortura y de proporcionar medios de reparación e

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indemnizaciones; que las Directrices de la UE sobre la tortura establecen el marco para los esfuerzos de la UE orientados a «prevenir y erradicar la tortura y los malos tratos en todo el mundo»;

C. Considerando que la detención secreta, que es una forma de desaparición forzada, puede equipararse, si se practica de modo generalizado y sistemático, a un crimen contra la humanidad; que los estados de excepción y la lucha contra el terrorismo constituyen un entorno propicio para la detención secreta;

D. Considerando que para garantizar la promoción del Derecho internacional y el respeto de los derechos humanos todos los acuerdos de cooperación, comercio y colaboración contienen cláusulas relativas a los derechos humanos; que la UE también mantiene diálogos políticos con terceros países sobre la base de las Directrices en materia de derechos humanos, que incluyen la lucha contra la pena de muerte y la tortura; que, en el marco del Instrumento Europeo para la Democracia y los Derechos Humanos (IEDDH), la UE respalda a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil que luchan contra la tortura y que brindan ayuda a la rehabilitación de las víctimas de tortura;

E. Considerando que el Estudio conjunto de las Naciones Unidas sobre las prácticas mundiales en relación con la detención secreta en el contexto de la lucha contra el terrorismo (A/HRC/13/42), elaborado por el Relator Especial sobre la promoción y protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales en la lucha contra el terrorismo, el Relator Especial sobre la tortura y otros tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes, el Grupo de Trabajo sobre la detención arbitraria y el Grupo de Trabajo sobre las desapariciones forzadas o involuntarias, exponía en detalle el uso de lugares de detención secretos en el territorio de los Estados miembros de la Unión como parte de un programa de la CIA, así como las correspondientes cartas de seguimiento que fueron enviadas a los Estados miembros en las que se solicitaba información adicional según se detalla en los Informes de las Comunicaciones de los Procedimientos Especiales, incluyendo el de 23 de febrero de 2012 (A/HRC/19/44);

F. Considerando que las relaciones entre la UE y los Estados Unidos se basan en una sólida asociación y cooperación en múltiples ámbitos basada en unos valores comunes compartidos como la democracia, el Estado de Derecho y los derechos fundamentales; que tanto la UE como los EE.UU. han reforzado su compromiso de lucha contra el terrorismo desde los atentados terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001, en particular con la Declaración conjunta UE-EE.UU. sobre la lucha contra el terrorismo, de 3 de junio de 2010, pero que está claro que es necesario asegurar el cumplimiento en la práctica de los compromisos adquiridos y superar las divergencias entre las políticas de la UE y de los Estados Unidos en materia de lucha contra el terrorismo;

G. Considerando que en diciembre de 2011 las autoridades de los EE.UU. aprobaron la Ley de Autorización de Defensa Nacional (NDAA), que codifica en el Derecho la detención indefinida de las personas sospechosas de participar en acciones terroristas en los EE.UU. y socava el derecho a recibir las debidas garantías procesales y un juicio justo; que se ha presentado un recurso procesal en relación con el ámbito de dicha Ley;

H. Considerando que, el 22 de enero de 2009, el Presidente Obama firmó tres órdenes ejecutivas por las que se prohíbe la tortura durante los interrogatorios, la creación de un

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grupo de trabajo interinstitucional para revisar sistemáticamente los procedimientos y las políticas de detención, así como la revisión individual de todos y cada uno de los casos, así como la orden de cierre de Guantánamo;

I. Considerando, no obstante, que el cierre de Guantánamo todavía no se ha llevado a cabo debido a la fuerte oposición del Congreso de los EE.UU.; que, a fin de acelerar dicho cierre, los EE.UU. han pedido a los Estados miembros de la UE que alojen a presos de Guantánamo; que la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos ha expresado su profunda decepción porque no se haya cerrado Guantánamo y por el afianzamiento de un sistema de detención arbitrario;

J. Considerando que los presos de Guantánamo todavía siguen siendo juzgados por tribunales militares, en particular a raíz de la decisión del Presidente de los EE.UU. de 7 de marzo de 2011 de firmar una orden ejecutiva por la que se levanta la suspensión de dos años sobre los nuevos juicios militares y la ley de 7 de enero de 2012 por la que se prohíben las transferencias de presos de Guantánamo a los EE.UU. para ser juzgados;

K. Considerando que el Parlamento Europeo ha hecho en repetidas ocasiones un llamamiento a favor de la lucha contra el terrorismo para respetar plenamente la dignidad humana, los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, incluida la cooperación internacional en la materia, sobre la base del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE, las constituciones nacionales y la legislación en materia de derechos fundamentales, así como que ha reiterado recientemente dicho llamamiento en su informe sobre política antiterrorista de la UE, en el que también se señalaba que el respeto de los derechos humanos es una condición previa para garantizar la eficacia de esta política;

L. Considerando que, aunque la UE ha demostrado su compromiso de evitar la connivencia con la tortura a través del Reglamento (CE) nº 1236/2005 del Consejo1, recientemente modificado, en diciembre de 2011,2 por el que se prohíbe toda exportación o importación de productos cuya única utilidad práctica es aplicar la pena de muerte, infligir tortura u otros tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes, sigue siendo necesario adoptar medidas adicionales para garantizar una amplia cobertura;

M. Considerando que el hecho de confiar solamente en las garantías diplomáticas para autorizar la extradición o deportación de un individuo a un país sobre el que existen motivos suficientes para creer que las personas podrían correr el peligro de ser torturadas o de recibir malos tratos es incompatible con la prohibición absoluta de la tortura en la legislación nacional, la legislación europea y de la UE, así como en la legislación y constituciones nacionales de los Estados miembros;3

N. Considerando que el Parlamento Europeo ha condenado repetida y enérgicamente prácticas ilegales entre las que figuran las «entregas extraordinarias», el rapto, la

1 DO L 200 de 30.7.2005, p. 1. 2 DO L 338 de 21.12.11, p. 31. 3 Artículo 5 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos; artículo 7 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos; artículo 3 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales (CEDH) y la jurisprudencia relacionada; ásí como el artículo 4 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea.

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detención sin juicio, la desaparición, las prisiones secretas y la tortura, y que ha pedido una completa investigación sobre el supuesto grado de implicación de algunos Estados miembros en materia de colaboración con las autoridades de los Estados Unidos, en particular la CIA, y que se refieren al territorio de la UE;

O. Considerando que la realización de actos ilegales en territorio de la UE puede haberse llevado a cabo en el marco de acuerdos bilaterales o multilaterales de la OTAN;

1. Recuerda que las estrategias antiterroristas solamente pueden ser eficaces si se llevan a cabo respetando estrictamente las obligaciones en materia de derechos humanos y, en particular, el derecho a un proceso justo;

2. Reitera su condena de las prácticas de entrega extraordinaria, las prisiones secretas y las torturas, que están prohibidas en virtud de la legislación nacional e internacional en materia de respeto de los derechos humanos y que infringen, entre otras cosas, el derecho a la libertad, a la seguridad, a un trato humano, a no ser torturado, a la no devolución, a la presunción de inocencia, a un juicio justo, a asesoramiento jurídico y a una igualdad de protección en el marco de la ley;

3. Considera fundamental que la UE condene cualquier práctica abusiva en la lucha contra el terrorismo, incluido cualquier acto de este tipo llevado a cabo en su territorio, de modo que la UE pueda vivir no solamente conforme a sus valores sino, también, defenderlos de forma creíble en sus asociaciones exteriores;

4. Reitera que la aplicación íntegra de la cláusula en materia de derechos humanos recogida en los acuerdos es crucial en las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y sus Estados miembros con terceros países y considera que ha llegado el momento de reexaminar el modo en el que los Gobiernos europeos han cooperado con los instrumentos de represión de las dictaduras en nombre de la lucha contra el terrorismo; considera, en este sentido, que la Política de Vecindad Europea revisada recientemente debe velar decididamente por la reforma del sector de la seguridad, que debe asegurar, en particular, una separación clara de las funciones de los servicios de inteligencia y las de los servicios encargados de la aplicación de la ley; insta al SEAE, al Consejo y a la Comisión a que refuercen su cooperación con el Comité para la Prevención de la Tortura y otros mecanismos relevantes del Consejo de Europa en la planificación y aplicación de proyectos de asistencia en materia de lucha contra el terrorismo con terceros países y en los diálogos de lucha contra el terrorismo, cualesquiera que sea su naturaleza, con terceros países;

5. Reitera su petición, de conformidad con el Derecho internacional y, en particular, con el artículo 12 de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Tortura, a todos los países que se enfrentan a acusaciones creíbles para que hagan todo lo posible a fin de aportar todas las aclaraciones necesarias y, si lo justifican las pruebas, que realicen investigaciones y pesquisas exhaustivas de todos los supuestos actos de entrega extraordinaria, prisiones secretas, tortura y otras violaciones graves de los derechos humanos, para revelar la verdad y, si procede, determinar la responsabilidad e impedir la impunidad, incluso llevando a los individuos ante los tribunales cuando existan pruebas de responsabilidad penal; insta, en este sentido, a la Alta Representante/Vicepresidenta de la Comisión y a los Estados miembros a que adopten todas las medidas necesarias para garantizar un seguimiento correcto del Estudio conjunto de las Naciones Unidas sobre las

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prácticas mundiales en relación con la detención secreta en el contexto de la lucha contra el terrorismo, en particular, en lo relativo a las cartas de seguimiento enviadas el 21 de octubre de 2011 por los titulares de las Relatorías Especiales a 59 Estados, en las que se solicitaba a sus respectivos Gobiernos que presentaran información actualizada sobre el cumplimiento de las recomendaciones contempladas en dicho estudio;

6. Pide a las autoridades de la OTAN y de los Estados Unidos que realicen sus propias investigaciones, que colaboren estrechamente con las investigaciones judiciales o parlamentarias de la UE y de los Estados miembros sobre estas cuestiones1, incluso, si procede, respondiendo rápidamente a las solicitudes de asistencia judicial mutua, que revelen información sobre los programas de entrega extraordinaria y otras prácticas que violan los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, y que proporcionen a los representantes legales de los sospechosos toda la información necesaria para la defensa de sus clientes; solicita que se confirme que todos los acuerdos de la OTAN, así como los acuerdos OTAN-UE y otros acuerdos trasatlánticos, respetan los derechos fundamentales;

7. Elogia las iniciativas de la sociedad civil norteamericana de constituir en 2010 un grupo de trabajo bipartidista e independiente para examinar la política del Gobierno de los EE.UU. y sus acciones relacionadas con la captura, detención y enjuiciamiento de «presuntos terroristas» y la custodia norteamericana durante los Gobiernos de Clinton, Bush y Obama;

8. Pide a las autoridades competentes que no apelen al secreto de Estado en relación con la cooperación de los servicios de inteligencia internacionales con el fin de bloquear la obligación de rendir cuentas y las reparaciones, e insiste en que solamente auténticos motivos de seguridad nacional pueden justificar el secreto, que, en cualquier caso, queda sin efecto por las obligaciones no derogables en materia de derechos fundamentales, tales como la prohibición absoluta de la tortura;

9. Pide a la UE que garantice el pleno cumplimiento de sus propias obligaciones internacionales y que los instrumentos de la política de exterior y las políticas de la UE, tales como las Directrices sobre la tortura y los diálogos en materia de derechos humanos, se respeten plenamente, para poder encontrarse en mejores condiciones de exigir la rigurosa aplicación de las cláusulas de derechos humanos en todos los acuerdos internacionales que firme, así como que inste a sus principales aliados, como los Estados Unidos, a que respeten su propia legislación nacional y el Derecho internacional;

10. Recuerda que el Protocolo Facultativo de la Convención contra la Tortura requiere la creación de unos sistemas de control que abarquen todas las situaciones de privación de libertad, e insiste en que la adhesión a este instrumento internacional incrementa la protección; recomienda encarecidamente que los países socios de la UE ratifiquen el Protocolo Facultativo y creen unos mecanismos de prevención nacionales independientes, que cumplan los Principios de París, y que ratifiquen la Convención internacional para la protección de todas las personas contra las desapariciones forzadas;

11. Pide al Gobierno de la Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia que aclare las

1 Véase, entre otras, la Resolución del Parlamento Europeo, de 9 de junio de 2011, sobre Guantánamo: decisión inminente sobre la pena de muerte (P7_TA(2011)0271).

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responsabilidades y vele por la rendición de cuentas en relación con el rapto, aparentemente por un error de identificación, del Sr. D. Khaled el-Masri, que conllevó su detención ilegal y presuntas torturas; lamenta que la Fiscalía de Skopie no adoptara medidas para efectuar una investigación penal sobre el recurso presentado por el Sr. El-Masri; toma nota de que el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos ha asumido este caso y que la Gran Sala celebró una primera vista el 16 de mayo de 2012; considera que el supuesto comportamiento del Gobierno de la Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia en relación con este caso no es coherente con los principios fundamentales de la UE en relación con los derechos fundamentales y el Estado de Derecho y que debe ser abordado adecuadamente por la Comisión en el marco del proceso de adhesión de la Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia a la UE;

12. Expresa su especial preocupación por el procedimiento incoado por una comisión militar norteamericana en relación con Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, que podría ser condenado a muerte si es declarado culpable; pide a las autoridades de los EE.UU. que descarten la condena a muerte del Sr. al-Nashiri y reitera su postura contraria a la pena de muerte, adoptada ya hace mucho tiempo, en todos los casos y bajo cualquier circunstancia; señala que el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos se ha ocupado del caso del Sr. al-Nashiri desde el 6 de mayo de 2011; pide a la autoridades del país en el que haya estado detenido el Sr. al-Nashiri que utilicen todos los recursos existentes para velar porque no sea condenado a la pena de muerte; insta a la Alta Representante/Vicepresidenta de la Comisión a que plantee el caso del Sr. al-Nashiri con carácter prioritario ante los EE.UU., de conformidad con las Directrices de la UE en materia de pena de muerte;

13. Reafirma que la lucha internacional contra el terrorismo y la cooperación internacional, bilateral o multilateral en este ámbito, incluso en el marco de la OTAN o entre los servicios de inteligencia y las fuerzas de seguridad, solo debe llevarse a cabo en el marco del respeto pleno de los derechos humanos y de las libertades fundamentales y bajo una supervisión judicial y democrática apropiada; pide a los Estados miembros de la UE, a la Comisión, al Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior (SEAE) y al Consejo que garanticen la aplicación de estos principios en sus relaciones exteriores, e insiste en que deben realizar una valoración exhaustiva del historial de sus socios en materia de derechos humanos antes de celebrar acuerdos nuevos de esta naturaleza, en particular en materia de cooperación de los servicios de inteligencia e intercambio de información; revisar los acuerdos vigentes en aquellos casos en que los socios no respeten los derechos humanos; e informar al Parlamento Europeo de dichas conclusiones y evaluaciones;

14. Reitera su llamamiento al Consejo y a los Estados miembros para que excluyan, como base para la extradición o deportación de personas que se supone amenazan la seguridad nacional, garantías diplomáticas imposibles de verificar cuando existen razones reales para creer que los individuos podrían correr peligro de sufrir tortura o malos tratos o que podrían ser juzgados a partir de pruebas obtenidas mediante estos procedimientos;

15. Insta a las autoridades competentes a que garanticen que se realiza una distinción estricta entre las actividades de los servicios de inteligencia y las de los servicios de seguridad, por un lado, y los organismos encargados del cumplimiento de la ley, por otro, todo ello para garantizar que se defiende el principio general de «nemo iudex in sua causa»;

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16. Subraya que la comisión temporal del Parlamento Europeo encargada de la investigación en la que se basan sus Resoluciones de 14 de febrero de 2007 y de 19 de febrero de 2009 puso de manifiesto que los procedimientos de autorización y control del sobrevuelo del espacio aéreo o del aterrizaje de una aeronave civil en su territorio presentaban lagunas importantes, de modo que se prestaban a abusos no solamente por parte de «las entregas extraordinarias» de la CIA, sino, también, que a cualquier persona dedicada a la delincuencia organizada, incluidas las redes terroristas, resultaba muy fácil esquivarlos; recuerda, igualmente, la competencia comunitaria en materia de seguridad del transporte y la recomendación del Parlamento Europeo a la Comisión de regular y controlar la gestión del espacio aéreo, aeropuertos y aviación no comercial de la UE; pide, por ello, a la UE y a los Estados miembros que no retrasen más una revisión exhaustiva de su transposición del Convenio relativo a la Aviación Civil Internacional (Convenio de Chicago), en lo tocante a la autorización e inspección de las aeronaves civiles que sobrevuelen su espacio aéreo o aterricen en su territorio, a fin velar por la mejora de la seguridad y de realizar controles sistemáticos, para lo que se requiere la identificación previa de pasajeros y tripulaciones, y se garantiza que todos los vuelos clasificados como «vuelos de Estado» (que están excluidos del ámbito de aplicación del Convenio) obtengan una autorización previa y adecuada; recuerda igualmente la recomendación del Parlamento Europeo de que los Estados miembros cumplan de manera efectiva el Convenio de Tokio sobre infracciones y ciertos otros actos cometidos a bordo de las aeronaves;

17. Pide a la Conferencia de Presidentes de Delegación que garanticen el inicio de diálogos parlamentarios sobre la protección de los derechos humanos, al mismo tiempo que se trabaja en la lucha contra el terrorismo sobre la base y el seguimiento de las conclusiones del Estudio conjunto de las Naciones Unidas sobre las prácticas mundiales en relación con la detención secreta en el contexto de la lucha contra el terrorismo y el cumplimiento de las Naciones Unidas de las buenas prácticas en los marcos institucionales y legales y de las medidas que velan por el respeto de los derechos humanos por parte de los servicios de inteligencia en el marco de la lucha contra el terrorismo, incluida su supervisión;

18. Solicita a los Estados Unidos, dado el papel primordial de la asociación trasatlántica y el liderazgo de los Estados Unidos en este ámbito, que investiguen de forma exhaustiva y que garanticen la depuración de responsabilidades con respecto a cualquier abuso que se haya practicado, que se apliquen plenamente las disposiciones legislativas nacionales e internacionales con vistas a poner fin a los vacíos jurídicos, que acaben con los juicios militares, que apliquen plenamente el Derecho penal a los presuntos terroristas, y que restablezcan la revisión de la detención y el habeas corpus, las garantías procesales, la protección frente a la tortura, y la no discriminación entre los ciudadanos extranjeros y estadounidenses;

19. Pide al Presidente Obama que cumpla la promesa realizada en enero de 2009 de cerrar Guantánamo, que permita que todos los detenidos contra los que no se vayan a presentar cargos regresen a sus países de origen o a otros países seguros lo antes posible, y que se juzgue sin demora a los detenidos de Guantánamo contra los que existan suficientes pruebas admisibles en una vista pública y justa, ante un tribunal imparcial e independiente, de forma que, si son condenados, sean encarcelados en los Estados Unidos de conformidad con los principios y normas internacionales vigentes; exige, del mismo modo, que se investiguen las violaciones de derechos humanos registradas en

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Guantánamo y que se depuren responsabilidades;

20. Pide a las autoridades de los EE.UU. que revoquen el poder de detención indefinida sin cargos o juicios al amparo de la NDAA;

21. Pide a todos los Estados miembros que firmen y ratifiquen la Convención de las Naciones Unidas para la protección de todas las personas contra las desapariciones forzadas;

22. Pide que, a cualquier detenido contra el que no se vayan a presentar cargos y que no pueda ser repatriado a su país de origen debido a un riesgo real de tortura o persecución, se le brinde la oportunidad de reintegrarse en los Estados Unidos bajo protección humanitaria y que se le conceda una reparación,1 e insta, también, a los Estados miembros de la UE a que se ofrezcan a acoger a estos antiguos reclusos de Guantánamo;

23. Pide que la UE garantice que los Estados miembros, así como sus asociados y socios, en particular en el marco del Acuerdo de Cotonú, que han aceptado acoger a antiguos presos de Guantánamo, les brinden realmente pleno apoyo en lo que a condiciones de vida se refiere y les faciliten la integración en la sociedad, tratamiento médico, incluida recuperación psicológica, acceso a documentos de identificación y de viaje, el ejercicio al derecho a la reunificación familiar y de todos los demás derechos fundamentales previstos para las personas acogidas al estatuto de asilo político;

1 Véase el apartado 3 de la Resolución del Parlamento Europeo, de 4 de febrero de 2009, sobre el retorno y la reintegración de los reclusos del centro de detención de Guantánamo (P6_TA (2009)0045).

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Miembros presentes en la votación final Pino Arlacchi, Elmar Brok, Jerzy Buzek, Tarja Cronberg, Arnaud Danjean, Michael Gahler, Marietta Giannakou, Andrzej Grzyb, Anna Ibrisagic, Liisa Jaakonsaari, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, Jelko Kacin, Ioannis Kasoulides, Tunne Kelam, Nicole Kiil-Nielsen, Evgeni Kirilov, Maria Eleni Koppa, Andrey Kovatchev, Paweł Robert Kowal, Eduard Kukan, Vytautas Landsbergis, Ryszard Antoni Legutko, Krzysztof Lisek, Sabine Lösing, Ulrike Lunacek, Mario Mauro, Francisco José Millán Mon, Alexander Mirsky, María Muñiz De Urquiza, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Norica Nicolai, Raimon Obiols, Kristiina Ojuland, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Alojz Peterle, Bernd Posselt, Hans-Gert Pöttering, Libor Rouček, Tokia Saïfi, Nikolaos Salavrakos, György Schöpflin, Werner Schulz, Adrian Severin, Marek Siwiec, Geoffrey Van Orden, Kristian Vigenin, Sir Graham Watson, Boris Zala

Suplente(s) presente(s) en la votación

final

Charalampos Angourakis, Jean-Jacob Bicep, Véronique De Keyser, Andrew Duff, Tanja Fajon, Hélène Flautre, Elisabeth Jeggle, Baroness Sarah Ludford, Carmen Romero López, Helmut Scholz, Indrek Tarand, Alejo Vidal-Quadras, Dominique Vlasto, Joachim Zeller

Suplente(s) (art. 187, apdo. 2) presente(s)

en la votación final

Petru Constantin Luhan

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Miembros presentes en la votación final Jan Philipp Albrecht, Edit Bauer, Mario Borghezio, Rita Borsellino, Emine Bozkurt, Arkadiusz Tomasz Bratkowski, Simon Busuttil, Philip Claeys, Carlos Coelho, Ioan Enciu, Frank Engel, Cornelia Ernst, Monika Flašíková Beňová, Hélène Flautre, Kinga Gál, Kinga Göncz, Sylvie Guillaume, Anna Hedh, Salvatore Iacolino, Sophia in ‘t Veld, Lívia Járóka, Timothy Kirkhope, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Baroness Sarah Ludford, Monica Luisa Macovei, Svetoslav Hristov Malinov, Véronique Mathieu, Anthea McIntyre, Louis Michel, Claude Moraes, Antigoni Papadopoulou, Georgios Papanikolaou, Carmen Romero López, Renate Sommer, Rui Tavares, Nils Torvalds, Kyriacos Triantaphyllides, Wim van de Camp, Axel Voss, Josef Weidenholzer, Cecilia Wikström, Tatjana Ždanoka

Suplente(s) presente(s) en la votación

final

Elena Oana Antonescu, Michael Cashman, Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, Leonidas Donskis, Dimitrios Droutsas, Lorenzo Fontana, Mariya Gabriel, Monika Hohlmeier, Hubert Pirker, Raül Romeva i Rueda, Salvador Sedó i Alabart, Michèle Striffler

Suplente(s) (art. 187, apdo. 2) presente(s)

en la votación final

Zita Gurmai, Nadja Hirsch, Elisabeth Jeggle

SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DE MEDIO AMBIENTE

MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA, ALIMENTACIÓN Y MEDIO AMBIENTE

BORRADOR DE ANTEPROYECTO DE LEY DE PROTECCIÓN Y USO SOSTENIBLE DEL LITORAL Y DE MODIFICACIÓN DE LA LEY 22/1988, DE 28 DE JULIO, DE COSTAS.

EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS

I

La necesidad de reformar, en este momento, la Ley de Costas surge de la concepción marcadamente transitoria con la que se reguló el dominio público marítimo-terrestre. Los efectos últimos de muchas de las disposiciones promulgadas en 1988, que ahora se modifican, se diferían en el tiempo. Sin embargo, ha sido precisamente la fuerza con la que el tiempo se impone y consolida situaciones, la que exige someter a aquel régimen a una profunda revisión. Ya no desde una perspectiva meramente axiomática, sino desde una visión integradora que garantice la protección del litoral y dote de verdadera seguridad jurídica a las relaciones que allí se desenvuelven.

Se parte del análisis crítico de la aplicación de la ley anterior, que en ciertas ocasiones ha tolerado resultados inaceptables medioambientalmente. Superando esta circunstancia la reforma pretende ser un medio eficaz para proteger la integridad del dominio público marítimo-terrestre y preservar su uso común.

La reforma respeta el complejo reparto competencial que se da sobre el litoral. Marco en el que el Estado asume la función de garante de la protección y defensa del demanio marítimo-terrestre, de acuerdo con el artículo 132.2 de la Constitución. Al tiempo, dispone de dos títulos competenciales generales para dictar esta norma, a saber, el relativo a la regulación de las condiciones básicas que garanticen la igualdad de todos los españoles en el ejercicio de los derechos y en el cumplimiento de los deberes constitucionales (artículo 149.1.1.ª), como el que le atribuye la competencia para dictar la legislación básica sobre protección del medio ambiente (artículo 149.1.23.ª).

La presente ley se estructura en dos grandes bloques, el primero implica una modificación parcial y profunda de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio, de Costas, y el segundo establece el nuevo régimen de prórroga selectiva de las concesiones otorgadas al amparo de la legislación anterior, y un conjunto heterogéneo de disposiciones que complementan a la modificación de la Ley de Costas. En definitiva, constituye un todo integrado que se orienta a garantizar la protección del litoral y otorgar seguridad jurídica.

II

La protección del litoral constituye un objetivo fundamental de esta reforma. Los elementos que con esta finalidad se introducen son principalmente preventivos, no obstante, se incorpora un mecanismo defensivo.

Se modifica la Ley de Costas para posibilitar que el Delegado de Gobierno, a instancia del Ministro de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente pueda suspender en vía administrativa los actos y acuerdos adoptados por las entidades locales que afecten a la

de 23 Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente

integridad del dominio público marítimo-terrestre o de la servidumbre de protección. Se trata de posibilitar una actuación cautelar rápida y eficaz que evite la ejecución de un acto ilegal, sin perjuicio de que en el plazo de diez días deba recurrirse el mismo ante los tribunales de lo Contencioso-Administrativo.

La prevención resulta fundamental para la conservación del medio, y un modo eficaz de prevenir lo encarna la regulación específica que atiende a las características peculiares del objeto regulado. Así, se introduce una reforma en relación con el uso de las playas, posibilitando que el posterior desarrollo reglamentario establezca un régimen diferenciado para las playas urbanas —las contiguas con suelos urbanizados— y para las playas naturales —las contiguas a espacios protegidos o suelo rural—, determinando que respecto de estas últimas se imponga un nivel de protección alto y se restrinjan las ocupaciones.

Finalmente, en el ámbito de la protección preventiva debe subrayarse la introducción de criterios de eficiencia energética y ahorro de agua en las reformas de edificios que la legislación de costas permite realizar.

III

El nuevo marco normativo pretende dotar a las relaciones jurídicas que se dan en el litoral de una mayor seguridad jurídica. Su ausencia ha generado problemas que van más allá de los estrictamente jurídicos, y que han provocado desconfianza y desconcierto.

La seguridad jurídica es el pilar que sustenta esta reforma y su establecimiento resultaba una tarea indispensable para superar el marco anterior. Este principio se manifiesta en la determinación misma de la delimitación del concepto de dominio público marítimo-terrestre, en la modificación de las reglas que rigen las concesiones y autorizaciones, así como en las limitaciones a la propiedad privada de los terrenos contiguos al domino público.

La ley precisa el concepto de dominio público marítimo-terrestre, tanto en lo que se refiere a la zona marítimo-terrestre como a las playas. También introduce definiciones de los accidentes geográficos que se emplean en la definición el propio precepto.

En relación al concepto de dominio público marítimo-terrestre natural, la norma acota el deslinde imponiendo que para la fijación de las olas en los mayores temporales conocidos se esté a las referencias comprobadas que se dispongan. Se especifica en relación con los terrenos inundados artificialmente, que estos no pasaran a ser dominio público, salvo que antes de la inundación ya lo fueran.

En cuanto a las playas se eliminan del concepto de demanio natural las dunas artificiales y las dunas muertas, entendiendo por estas los sistemas arenosos de carácter fijo que no contribuyen a garantizar la estabilidad de la playa y defensa de la costa.


La ley reforma a la Ley de Costas para que esta prevea las consecuencias que se producen en los supuestos de revisión de deslindes por alteración del dominio público marítimo-terrestre y se introducen reglas especiales, para realizar algunos deslindes.

Se establece como obligatoria la inscripción de los bienes de dominio público marítimo-terrestre, siguiendo así el criterio general marcado por la Ley de Patrimonio de las Administraciones Públicas. Con el fin de establecer una concordancia entre la realidad física de la costa y el Registro de la Propiedad. Así mismo, se garantiza, mediante anotación marginal, la constancia registral del proceso administrativo de deslinde en la inscripción de todas las fincas que puedan resultar afectadas por este. Con esta medida se consigue que los ciudadanos, en general y los adquirentes, en particular, dispongan de la información exacta sobre terrenos que están en dominio público o que pueden pasar a formar parte de él. La publicidad no solo se circunscribe a la registral, sino que, la ley impone que se publiquen en la página web del Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente las líneas de deslinde.

En relación con el régimen concesional, la ley introduce importantes cambios. En el régimen general se modifica el plazo máximo de duración de las concesiones que pasa a ser de 75 años (al igual que el fijado en la mencionado Ley de Patrimonio de las Administraciones Públicas y en el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Aguas). Además, se permite la transmisión mortis causa e intervivos de las concesiones. En el primer caso se amplía el plazo de notificación que deben hacer los causahabientes para poder subrogarse en la concesión de uno a cuatro años, se trata de evitar el riesgo de que se produzca la pérdida del derecho por el transcurso de un plazo tan breve, sobre todo teniendo en cuenta las dificultades que puedan tener los extranjeros. En el caso de las transmisiones inter vivos, su validez requiere la previa autorización de la Administración.

El artículo segundo de la ley establece una prórroga extraordinaria para las concesiones existentes, otorgadas al amparo de la normativa anterior. Se da respuesta, a la extinción de las concesiones previstas en la disposición transitoria primera de la Ley de Costas, que preveían, con carácter general, un plazo máximo de 30 años de duración, que finalizará en 2018. Debe subrayarse que no se trata de una prórroga indiscriminada, sino que su otorgamiento queda supeditado a un informe favorable del órgano ambiental autonómico, en los casos en que se trate de ocupaciones destinadas a la industria extractiva, energética, química, petroquímica, textil y papelera. Este es un ejemplo donde la seguridad jurídica que supone la continuidad de la ocupación se conjuga con la protección del litoral que podrá conllevar la expulsión efectiva de todas aquellas concesiones que no sean ambientalmente sostenibles. Esta prórroga extraordinaria tendrá una duración máxima de 75 años.

En materia de autorizaciones se aumenta el plazo máximo de duración de 1 año a 4 años.

La principal novedad que se introduce respecto de la zona de servidumbre de protección es la dirigida a las edificaciones que legítimamente la ocupan, a cuyos titulares se


les permitirá realizar las obras de reparación, mejora, modernización y consolidación, siempre que no impliquen un aumento de volumen, altura ni superficie. Eliminando para ello el requisito de la autorización administrativa previa, por el de la declaración responsable. En la que tendrán que incluir, como ya se ha indicado, que tales obras cumplen con los requisitos de eficiencia energética y ahorro de agua.

A su vez, también se prevé reducir el ancho de esta servidumbre de 100 metros a 20 metros en relación con los núcleos de población que sin poder acogerse a lo dispuesto en la disposición transitoria cuarta de la Ley de Costas, por no ser suelo calificado como urbano, si tenían en aquella fecha características propias de él. Reducción que se contempla también, como posibilidad excepcional, para las rías evitando que cuando algún tramo de estas emerge tierra adentro, a distancia de la ribera del mar, genere, por defecto, una servidumbre de 100 metros.

Se ha regulado, desde la perspectiva del dominio público marítimo-terrestre, el régimen de las urbanizaciones marítimo-terrestres, garantizando que los canales navegables sean dominio público y que el planeamiento urbanístico prevea, a través de viales, el tránsito y el acceso a los canales.

La ley prevé que a los bienes declarados de interés cultural que ocupan el dominio público, se les otorgue una concesión y se les aplique su régimen jurídico propio.

En suma, esta reforma pretende sentar las bases de un uso del litoral que sea sostenible en el tiempo y respetuoso con la protección medioambiental. Con este fin, los cambios que se introducen otorgan certeza y claridad, al tiempo que resuelven los problemas que a corto plazo planteaba la legislación anterior.

Artículo primero. Modificación de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio, de Costas.

Uno. Se modifica el artículo 3 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«Son bienes de dominio público marítimo-terrestre estatal, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 132.2 de la Constitución:

1. La ribera del mar y de las rías, que incluye:

a) La zona marítimo-terrestre o espacio comprendido entre la línea de bajamar escorada o máxima viva equinoccial, y el límite hasta donde alcancen las olas en los mayores temporales conocidos, de acuerdo con las referencias comprobadas que se dispongan, o cuando lo supere, el de la línea de pleamar máxima viva equinoccial. Esta zona se extiende también por las márgenes de los ríos hasta el sitio donde se haga sensible el efecto de las mareas.


Se consideran incluidas en esta zona las marismas, albuferas, marjales, esteros y, en general, las partes de los terrenos bajos que se inundan como consecuencia del flujo y reflujo de las mareas, de las olas o de la filtración del agua del mar.

No obstante, no pasarán a formar parte del dominio público marítimo-terrestre aquellos terrenos que sean inundados artificial y controladamente, como consecuencia de obras o instalaciones realizadas al efecto, siempre que antes de la inundación no lo fueran».

b) Las playas o zonas de depósito de materiales sueltos, tales como arenas, gravas y guijarros, incluyendo escarpes, bermas y dunas, que estén en desarrollo, desplazamiento o evolución, formadas por la acción del mar o del viento marino, u otras causas naturales, tengan o no vegetación. Las dunas se incluirán hasta el límite que resulte necesario para garantizar la estabilidad de la playa y la defensa de la costa.

2. El mar territorial y las aguas interiores, con su lecho y subsuelo, definidos y regulados por su legislación específica.

3. Los recursos naturales de la zona económica y la plataforma continental, definidos y regulados por su legislación específica.

4. A los efectos de esta ley se entiende por:

Albufera: cuerpos de aguas costeras que quedan físicamente separados del océano, en mayor o menor extensión por una franja de tierra.

Berma: parte casi horizontal de la playa, interior al escarpe o talud de fuerte pendiente causada por el oleaje.

Duna: depósitos sedimentarios, constituidos por montículos de arena tengan o no vegetación que se forman en torno a algún obstáculo, y que se alimentan de la arena transportada desde la playa por la acción del mar, del viento marino o por otras causas naturales.

Escarpe: escalón vertical en la playa formado por la erosión de la berma.

Estero: caños en una marisma.

Marisma: terreno muy llano y bajo que se inunda periódicamente como consecuencia del flujo y reflujo de las mareas.

Marjal: terreno bajo cubierto por un manto de agua que da soporte a abundante vegetación».


Dos. Se modifica el apartado 3 del artículo 4 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«Los terrenos cuya superficie sea invadida por el mar siempre y cuando la invasión tenga lugar por causas ajenas a la intervención humana. Y en todo caso, siempre que los terrenos inundados sean navegables».

Tres. El párrafo único del artículo 11 pasa a ser el apartado 1 y se introduce un nuevo apartado 2 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«2. Practicado el deslinde, la Administración del Estado deberá inscribir los bienes de dominio público marítimo-terrestre, de acuerdo con la Ley 33/2003, de 3 de noviembre de Patrimonio de las Administraciones Públicas».

Cuatro. Se modifica el apartado 4 del artículo 12, y se suprime el apartado 6 del mismo precepto. El apartado 4 queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«4. El acuerdo de incoación del expediente de deslinde, acompañado del plano del área afectada por el mismo y de la relación de propietarios afectados, se notificará al Registro de la Propiedad, interesando certificación de dominio y cargas de las fincas inscritas a nombre de los titulares que resulten del expediente y de cualesquiera otras fincas que resulten del plano aportado y de los sistemas de georreferenciación de fincas registrales, así como la constancia de la incoación del expediente en el folio de cada una de ellas.

Con carácter simultáneo a la expedición de la referida certificación, el registrador extenderá nota marginal en el folio de las fincas de las que certifique, en la que hará constar:

a) La incoación del expediente de deslinde.

b) La expedición de la certificación de dominio y cargas de las fincas afectadas por el deslinde.

c) La advertencia de que pueden quedar afectadas por el deslinde, pudiendo así, las fincas incorporarse, en todo o en parte, al dominio público marítimo-terrestre o estar incluidas total o parcialmente en la zona de servidumbre de protección

d) La circunstancia de que la resolución aprobatoria del procedimiento de deslinde servirá de título para rectificar las situaciones jurídico registrales contradictorias con el deslinde».

Cinco. Se modifica el apartado 2 del artículo 13 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:


«2. La resolución de aprobación del deslinde será título suficiente para rectificar, en la forma y condiciones que se determinen reglamentariamente, las situaciones jurídicas registrales contradictorias con el deslinde. Dicha resolución será título suficiente, asimismo, para que la Administración proceda a la inmatriculación de los bienes de dominio público. En todo caso los titulares inscritos afectados podrán ejercitar las acciones que estimen pertinentes en defensa de sus derechos, siendo susceptible de anotación preventiva la correspondiente reclamación judicial.»

Seis. Se introduce un artículo 13 bis que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«1. Los deslindes se revisarán cuando se altere la configuración del dominio público marítimo-terrestre. La incoación del expediente de deslinde tendrá los efectos previstos en el artículo 12.

2. Los titulares de los terrenos que tras la revisión del deslinde se incorporen al dominio público marítimo-terrestre pasarán a ser titulares de un derecho de ocupación y aprovechamiento, a cuyo efecto la Administración otorgará de oficio la concesión, salvo renuncia expresa del interesado.

La concesión se otorgará por setenta y cinco años, respetando los usos y aprovechamientos existentes, sin obligación de abonar canon.

La Administración no otorgará la concesión a la que se refiere el apartado anterior, cuando la ocupación afecte a la integridad del dominio público marítimo-terrestre.

3. Los titulares de las obras e instalaciones que tras la revisión del deslinde se incorporen a la zona de servidumbre de protección podrán realizar obras de reparación, mejora, consolidación y modernización siempre que no impliquen aumento de volumen, altura ni superficie.

Estas obras deberán suponer una mejora en la eficiencia energética. A tal efecto y cuando les resulte aplicable tendrán que obtener una calificación energética final que alcance una mejora de dos letras o una letra B, lo que se acreditará mediante la certificación de eficiencia energética, de acuerdo con lo previsto en el Real Decreto 42/2007, de 19 de enero, por el que se aprueba el procedimiento básico para la certificación de eficiencia energética de edificios de nueva consturcción o con renovaciones importantes, o lo que cualquier otra norma pueda establecer en el futuro para la certificación de edificios existentes.

Asimismo, en estas obras, cuando proceda, se emplearán los mecanismos, sistemas, instalaciones y equipamientos individuales y/o colectivos que supongan un ahorro efectivo en el consumo de agua. En el caso de que afecten a jardines y espacios verdes, para su riego fomentarán el uso de recursos hídricos marginales, tales como aguas regeneradas o aguas de lluvia almacenadas.


Circunstancias que deberán acreditar ante la Administración, mediante una declaración responsable, de acuerdo con lo previsto en el artículo 71 bis de la Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y Procedimiento Administrativo Común, con carácter previo a la autorización urbanística que proceda. En caso de que las obras o instalaciones afecten a la servidumbre de tránsito se requerirá autorización previa de la Adiministración del Estado».

Siete. Se introduce un nuevo apartado 3 al artículo 23 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«En las riberas de las rías la extensión de esta zona podrá reducirse por la Administración del Estado, de acuerdo con la de la Comunidad Autónoma y Ayuntamiento correspondiente, hasta un mínimo de 20 metros, en atención a las características topográficas o hidrográficas, a la anchura de sus cauces y a la distancia de la ribera de la ría respecto del límite interior de la ribera del mar».

Ocho. Se modifica la letra c) del apartado 1 del artículo 25 y el apartado 2 del mismo precepto, y se introduce un nuevo apartado 4 que quedan redactados del siguiente modo:

«c) Las actividades que impliquen la destrucción de yacimientos de áridos naturales o no consolidados, entendiéndose por tales los lugares donde existen acumulaciones de materiales detríticos tipo arenas o gravas».

«2. Con carácter ordinario, solo se permitirán en esta zona, las obras, instalaciones y actividades que, por su naturaleza, no puedan tener otra ubicación, como los establecimientos de cultivo marino o las salinas marítimas, o aquellos que presten servicios necesarios o convenientes para el uso del dominio público marítimo-terrestre, así como las instalaciones deportivas descubiertas. En todo caso, la ejecución de terraplenes, desmontes o tala de árboles deberán cumplir las condiciones que se determinen reglamentariamente para garantizar la protección del dominio público».

«4. Reglamentariamente se establecerán las condiciones en las que se podrá autorizar la publicidad, a que se refiere la letra f) del apartado 1 de este artículo, siempre que sea parte integrante o acompañe a instalaciones o actividades permitidas y no sea incompatible con la finalidad de la servidumbre de protección».

Nueve. Se introduce un nuevo apartado 6 en el artículo 33 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«Reglamentariamente se desarrollará el régimen de ocupación y uso de las playas atendiendo a su naturaleza. Se dotará a las playas naturales de un elevado nivel de protección que restrinja las ocupaciones, autorizando únicamente las que sean indispensables o estén previstas en la normativa aplicable. Se regulará la


ocupación y uso de las playas urbanas de modo que se garantice una adecuada prestación de los servicios que sea compatible con el uso común».

Diez. Se modifica el apartado 1 del artículo 38 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«1. Estará prohibida la publicidad permanente a través de carteles o vallas o por medios acústicos o audiovisuales.

Excepcionalmente, y en las condiciones que se establezcan reglamentariamente se podrá autorizar la publicidad siempre que sea parte integrante o acompañe a instalaciones o actividades permitidas en el dominio público marítimo-terrestre y siempre que sea compatible con su protección».

Once. Se modifica el apartado 1 del artículo 49 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«La adscripción de bienes de dominio público marítimo-terrestre a las Comunidades Autónomas para la construcción de nuevos puertos y vías de transporte de titularidad de aquellas, o de ampliación o modificación de los existentes, se formalizará por la Administración del Estado. La porción de dominio público adscrita conservará tal calificación jurídica, correspondiendo a la Comunidad Autónoma la utilización y gestión de la misma, adecuadas a su finalidad y con sujeción a las disposiciones pertinentes. En todo caso, el plazo de las concesiones que se otorguen en los bienes adscritos no podrá ser superior a setenta y cinco años».

Doce. Se modifica el apartado 4 del artículo 52 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«El plazo de vencimiento será el que se determine en el título correspondiente, y no podrá exceder de cuatro años, salvo en los casos en que esta Ley establece otro diferente».

Trece. Se modifica el apartado 1 del artículo 55 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«Las autorizaciones podrán ser revocadas unilateralmetne por la Administración en cualquier momento, sin derecho a indemnización, cuando produzcan daños en el dominio público, impidan su utilización para actividades de mayor interés público o menoscaben el uso público y cuando resulten incompatibles con la normativa aprobada con posterioridad. En este último caso, solo se revocará la autorización, si en el plazo de tres meses desde que le fuera comunicada tal circunstancia a su titular, este no hubiera adaptado su ocupación a la nueva normativa o la adaptación no fuera posible física o jurídicamente».


Catorce. El párrafo único del artículo 65 pasará a ser el apartado 1 y se introduce un nuevo apartado 2 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«2. En ningún caso podrán ser titulares de concesiones las personas en quienes concurra alguna de las prohibiciones de contratar previstas en el Real Decreto Legislativo 3/2011, de 14 de noviembre, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Contratos del Sector Público.

Cuando posteriormente al otorgamiento de la concesión, el titular incurra en alguna de las prohibiciones de contratar se producirá la extinción de la concesión.

En caso de declaración de concurso y mientras no se haya producido la apertura de la fase de liquidación, no se producirá la extinción de la concesión, si su titular prestare las garantías suficientes, a juicio de la Administración, para continuar con la ocupación, en los términos previstos en el título concesional».

Quince. Se modifican los apartados 2 y 3 del artículo 66 que quedan redactados del siguiente modo:

«2. El plazo será el que se determine en el título correspondiente, que en ningún caso podrá exceder de setenta y cinco años».

«3. Cuando el objeto de una concesión extinguida fuese una actividad amparada por otra conesión de explotación de recursos mineros o energéticos otorgada por la Administración del Estado por un plazo superior, su titular tendrá derecho a que se le otorgue una nueva concesión de ocupación del dominio público marítimo-terrestre por un plazo igual al que reste de viegencia a la concesión de explotación, sin que en ningún caso pueda exceder de setenta y cinco años».

Dieciseís. Se modifica el apartado 2 del artículo 70 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«Las concesiones serán transmisibles por actos intervivos y mortis causa.

La transmisión inter vivos solo será válida si con carácter previo la Administración reconoce el cumplimiento, por parte del adquirente, de las condiciones establecidas en la concesión.

En caso de fallecimiento del concesionario, sus causahabientes, a título de herencia o de legado, podrán subrogarse en los derechos y obligaciones de aquel, siempre que en el plazo de cuatro años comuniquen expresamente a la Administración el fallecimiento y la voluntad de subrogarse. Transcurrido dicho plazo sin que se hubiera hecho la comunicación, la concesión quedará extinguida».

Diecisiete. Se introducen dos nuevas letras, j) y k), al apartado 1 del artículo 78 que quedan redactadas del siguiente modo:


«j) Incurrir en prohibición de contratar, de acuerdo con el artículo 65.2 de esta ley»

k) La falta de la comunicación expresa prevista en el artículo 70.2 de esta ley en los casos de transmisión mortis causa de las concesiones».

Dieciocho. Se modifican el artículo 84 que quedan redactado del siguiente modo:

«1. Toda ocupación o aprovechamiento del dominio público marítimo-terrestre en virtud de una concesión o autorización, cualquiera que fuere la Administración otorgante, devengará el correspondiente canon en favor de la Administración del Estado, sin perjuicio de los que sean exigibles por aquélla.

2. Están obligados al pago del canon, en la cuantía y condiciones que se determinan en esta Ley, los titulares de las concesiones y autorizaciones antes mencionadas.

3. Para la determinación de la cuantía del canon se tendrán en cuenta las siguientes prescripciones:

3.1. Ocupación del dominio público marítmo-terrestre:

a) Por ocupación de bienes de dominio público marítimo-terrestre, la valoración del bien ocupado se determinará por equiparación al mayor de los tres valores siguientes: el valor catastral, el comprobado por la Administración a efectos de cualquier tributo, o el precio, contraprestación o valor de adquisición declarados por los sujetos pasivos, aplicables a los terrenos contiguos a sus zonas de servidumbre que tengan un aprovechamiento similar a los usos que se propongan para el dominio público.

En caso de no existir un aprovechamiento similar, se tomará la media de los valores utilizados para la determinación de los cánones devengados por las concesiones otorgadas en el dominio público marítimo-terrestre en ese término municipal.

El valor resultante será incrementado con el importe medio estimado de los beneficios netos anuales, antes de impuestos, que sea previsible obtener en la utilización del dominio público durante un período de 10 años. Si la duración de la concesión tuviera un plazo inferior a 10 años, esa estimación será por todo el período concesional.

La estimación de dichos beneficios se realizará teniendo en cuenta los estudios económicos que facilite el solicitante de la concesión o autorización, así como las informaciones que pueda recabar y las valoraciones que pueda efectuar la Administración otorgante, directamente o por comparación con otras concesiones existentes. En ningún caso esta estimación será inferior al 20 por 100 del importe de la inversión a realizar por el solicitante.

b) Para las ocupaciones de infraestructuras de saneamiento, abastecimiento, electricidad y comunicaciones, de interés general, se abonará un canon de 0,006 euros por


metro cuadrado de superficie ocupada, incrementado en los rendimientos que sea previsible obtener en la utilización de dicho dominio. En ningún caso esta estimación será inferior al 20 por 100 del importe de la inversión a realizar por el solicitante.

c) En el caso de ocupaciones de obras e instalaciones la base imponible se calculará sumando lo dispuesto en los apartados a), párrafos tercero y cuarto, y b) de este artículo al valor material de dichas obras e instalaciones.

d) En los supuestos de ocupaciones de obras e instalaciones en el mar territorial se abonará un canon de 0,006 euros por metro cuadrado de superficie ocupada, al que se sumará lo dispuesto en el apartado a), párrafos tercero y cuarto. En el caso de que estas ocupaciones se destinen a la investigación o explotación de recursos mineros y energéticos se abonará un canon de 0,006 euros por metro cuadrado de superficie ocupada.

3.2. Por aprovechamiento de bienes de dominio público marítimo-terrestre, el valor del bien será el de los materiales aprovechados a precios medio de mercado.

4. En el caso de cultivos marinos la base imponible del canon de ocupación y aprovechamiento del dominio público marítimo-terrestre se calculará con arreglo a las siguientes reglas:

a) Se considerará como valor de los terrenos ocupados la cantidad de 0,006 euros por metro cuadrado.

b) En cuanto a los rendimientos que se prevé obtener en la utilización del dominio público marítimo-terrestre, se considerarán los siguientes coeficientes:

Tipo 1. Cultivos marinos en el mar territorial y aguas interiores 0,4 €/m2.

Tipo 2. Cultivos marinos en la ribera del mar y de las rías 0,16 €/m2.

Tipo 3. Estructuras para las tomas de agua de mar y desagües desde cultivos marinos localizados en tierra 5 €/m2.

Estas cantidades se revisarán por Orden del Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, teniendo en cuenta la variación experimentada por el Índice General Nacional del sistema de Índices de Precios de Consumo.

5. El tipo de gravamen anual será del 8 por 100 sobre el valor de la base, salvo en el caso de aprovechamiento, que será del 100 por 100.

6. El canon de ocupación a favor de la Administración General del Estado que devengarán las concesiones que las Comunidades autónomas otorguen en dominio público marítimo-terrestre adscrito para la construcción de puertos deportivos o pesqueros, se calculará según lo previsto en esta Ley y en su normativa de desarrollo. La estimación del


beneficio que se utilice para obtener la base imponible del canon, en ningún caso podrá ser inferior al 3,33 por 100 del importe de la inversión a realizar por el solicitante.

7. El canon podrá reducirse un 90 por 100 en los supuestos de ocupaciones destinadas al uso público gratuito.

En las concesiones otorgadas a entidades náutico-deportivas para el desarrollo de sus actividades de carácter no lucrativo, el importe del canon de ocupación podrá reducirse un 75 por 100. Para la obtención de dicha reducción será preciso que la Federación deportiva correspondiente certifique que las respectivas entidades se encuentren debidamente inscritas y que ejercen exclusivamente la actividad náutico-deportiva.

En el caso de que estas entidades destinen una parte de sus ocupaciones objeto de concesión a actividades distintas de la náutico-deportiva y que tengan carácter lucrativo, esas ocupaciones se calcularán, a efectos de la determinación del canon, según las reglas generales recogidas en los apartados anteriores.

Con objeto de incentivar mejores prácticas medioambientales en el sector de la acuicultura, el canon se reducirá un 40 por 100 en el supuesto de concesionarios adheridos, con carácter permanente y continuado, al sistema comunitario de gestión y auditoría medioambiental (EMAS). Si no estuvieran adheridos a dicho sistema de gestión pero dispusieran del sistema de gestión medioambiental UNE-EN ISO 14001:1996, los concesionarios tendrán una reducción del 25 por 100.

8. Las Comunidades autónomas y las corporaciones locales estarán exentas del pago del canon de ocupación en las concesiones o autorizaciones que se les otorguen, siempre que éstas no sean objeto de explotación lucrativa, directamente o por terceros. Igualmente quedarán exentos del pago de este canon los supuestos previstos en el apartado 2 del artículo 54 de esta Ley.

9. El devengo del canon, calculado de acuerdo con los criterios establecidos en los apartados anteriores, tendrá carácter anual y se producirá con el otorgamiento inicial de la concesión o autorización. Será exigible en la cuantía que corresponda y en los plazos que se señalen en las condiciones de dicha concesión o autorización. En el caso previsto en el apartado 3.2 de este artículo, el devengo se producirá cuando el aprovechamiento se lleve a cabo.

En el supuesto de autorizaciones y concesiones de duración superior a un año, cuyo canon se haya establecido o haya sido revisado, aplicando la Orden de 30 de octubre de 1992, del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, por la que se determina la cuantía del canon de ocupación y aprovechamiento del dominio público marítimo-terrestre, el mismo quedará actualizado anualmente, de forma automática, incrementando o minorando la base del vigente mediante la aplicación a la misma de la variación experimentada por el Índice General Nacional del sistema de Índices de Precios de Consumo en los últimos doce meses, según los datos publicados anteriores al primer día de cada nuevo año. El devengo del


canon, cuya base se haya actualizado conforme a lo expuesto, será exigible en los plazos fijados en las condiciones establecidas en cada título.

En el caso de las concesiones de duración superior a un año, cuyo canon no se haya establecido o revisado aplicando la Orden de 30 de octubre de 1992, previamente se procederá a su revisión conforme a la misma. Una vez realizada esta revisión quedará actualizado anualmente tal como establece el párrafo anterior.»

Diecinueve. Se modifica el artículo 119, su actual párrafo pasa a ser el apartado 1 y se introduce un nuevo apartado 2 que queda redactado del siguiente modo:

«2. Sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el apartado anterior y de acuerdo con el procedimiento previsto en el artículo 67 de la Ley 7/1985, de 2 de abril, de bases del régimen local, el Delegado del Gobierno, a instancia del Ministro de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente, podrá suspender los actos y acuerdos adoptados por las entidades locales que afecten a la integridad del dominio público marítimo terrestre o de la servidumbre de protección o que supongan una infracción manifiesta de lo dispuesto en el artículo 25 de la presente ley.»

Veinte. Se modifican los apartados 2 y 3 de la disposición transitoria primera y se introduce un nuevo apartado 5, que quedan redactadas del siguiente modo:

«2. Los terrenos de la zona marítimo-terrestre o playa que no hayan podido ser ocupados por la Administración al practicar un deslinde anterior a la entrada en vigor de esta ley, por estar inscritos en el Registro de la Propiedad y amparados por el artículo 34 de la Ley Hipotecaria, quedarán sujetos al régimen establecido en la presente ley para la utilización del dominio público, si bien los titulares inscritos, pasarán a ser titulares de un derecho de ocupación y aprovechamiento del dominio público marítimo-terrestre, a cuyo efecto deberán solicitar la correspondiente concesión.

No obstante lo anterior, si los terrenos se destinaran a la industria extractiva, energética, química, petroquímica, textil y papelera, la concesión solo se otorgará previo informe favorable del órgano ambiental de la Comunidad Autónoma en la que radique la ocupación. El informe determinará los efectos que la ocupación tiene para el medio ambiente e incluirá, en los casos que proceda, las condiciones que deba contemplar la concesión para garantizar una adecuada protección del medio ambiente.

Todo ello sin perjuicio de las acciones civiles que aquellos puedan ejercitar en defensa de sus derechos».

«3. En los tramos de costa en que el dominio público marítimo-terrestre no esté deslindado o lo esté parcialmente a la entrada en vigor de la presente ley, se procederá a la práctica del corresondiente deslinde, cuya aprobación surtirá los efectos previstos en el artículo 13 para todos los terrenos que resulten incluidos en el


dominio público, aunque hayan sido ocupados por obras. Si bien, los titulares registrales de los terrenos, amparados por el artículo 34 de la Ley Hipotecaria, que resulten comprendidos en el deslinde practicado pasarán a ser titulares de un derecho de ocupación y aprovechamiento del dominio público marítimo-terrestre en los términos previstos en el apartado segundo de esta disposición».

«5. No obstante lo dispuesto en los apartados anteriores, si los terrenos, a que estos se refieren, hubieran sido inundados artificial y controladamente como consecuencia de obras o instalaciones realizadas al efecto y estuvieran destinados a actividades de cultivo marino o a salinas marítimas se excluirán del dominio público marítimo-terrestre, aun cuando sean naturalmente inundables.

A estos terrenos les será de aplicación el régimen dispuesto en la presente ley para la zona de servidumbre de protección».

Veintiuno. Se modifican las letras a), b) y c) del apartado 2 de la disposición transitoria cuarta, y se introduce un nuevo apartado 3 que quedan redactados del siguiente modo:

«a) Si ocupan terrenos de dominio público marítimo-terrestre, serán demolidas al extinguirse la concesión.

Mientras la concesión esté vigente, sus titulares podrán realizar obras de reparación, mejora, consolidación y modernización siempre que no impliquen aumento de volumen, altura ni superficie de las construcciones existentes».

«b) Si se emplazan en la zona de servidumbre de tránsito, los titulares de las construcciones e instalaciones podrán realizar las obras de reparación, mejora, consolidación y modernización siempre que no impliquen aumento de volumen, altura ni superficie de las construcciones existentes y sin que el incremento de valor que aquellas comporten pueda ser tenido en cuenta a efectos expropiatorios. Tales obras no podrán ser autorizadas por el órgano urbanístico competente, sin que con carácter previo, la Administración del Estado emita un informe favorable en el que conste que la servidumbre de tránsito queda garantizada. Este informe deberá emitirse en el plazo de dos meses desde su solicitud, si en dicho plazo no se emitiera se entenderá que tiene carácter favorable».

«c) En el resto de la zona de servidumbre de protección y en los términos en que la misma se aplica a las diferentes clases de suelo conforme a lo establecido en la disposición transitoria tercera, podrán realizarse, obras de reparación, mejora, consolidación y modernización siempre que no impliquen aumento de volumen, altura ni superficie de las construcciones existentes y sin que el incremento de valor que aquéllas comporten pueda ser tenido en cuenta a efectos expropiatorios. En caso de demolición total o parcial, las nuevas construcciones deberán ajustarse íntegramente a las disposiciones de esta ley».


«3. Las obras, a las que se refiere el apartado segundo de esta disposición transitoria, cuando les sea aplicable, deberán:

a) suponer una mejora en la eficiencia energética. A tal efecto, tendrán que obtener una calificación energética final que alcance una mejora de dos letras o una letra B, lo que se acreditará mediante la certificación de eficiencia energética, de acuerdo con lo previsto en el Real Decreto 42/2007, de 19 de enero, por el que se aprueba el procedimiento básico para la certificación de eficiencia energética de edificios de nueva construcción o con renovaciones importantes, o lo que cualquier otra norma pueda establecer en el futuro para la certificación de edificios existentes.

b) Emplear los mecanismos, sistemas, instalaciones y equipamientos individuales y/o colectivos que supongan un ahorro efectivo en el consumo de agua. En el caso de que afecten a jardines y espacios verdes, para su riego fomentarán el uso de recursos hídricos marginales, tales como aguas regeneradas o aguas de lluvia almacenadas.

No podrán ser autorizadas por el órgano urbanístico competente sin que los titulares de las concesiones acrediten haber presentado ante la Administración del Estado y los de las construcciones e instalaciones ante los órganos competentes de las Comunidades Autónomas o, en su caso, de los Ayuntamientos una declaración responsable en la que de manera expresa y clara manifiesten que tales obras no supondrán un aumento del volumen, altura ni superficie de las construcciones existentes y que cumplen con los requisitos establecidos anteriormente sobre eficiencia energética y ahorrro de agua, cuando les sean de aplicación. La declaración responsable se ajustará a lo dispuesto en el artículo 71 bis de la Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y Procedimiento Administrativo Común».

Veintidós. Se introduce una nueva disposición adicional décima, que queda redactada del siguiente modo:

«Disposición adicional décima.

1. Son urbanizaciones marítimo-terrestres los núcleos residenciales en tierra firme dotados de un sistema viario navegable, construido a partir de la inundación artificial de terrenos privados.

2. Las urbanizaciones marítimo-terrestres deberán contar con un plan urbanístico que se ajuste a las prescripciones que en materia de dominio público marítimo-terrestre se establecen en esta disposición y en sus normas de desarrollo.

3. La realización de las obras para consturir los canales navegables de la urbanización marítimo-terrestre que dan lugar a la invasión por el mar o por las aguas de los ríos hasta donde se hagan sensible el efecto de las mareas de terrenos


que antes de dichas obras no sean de dominio público marítimo-terrestre, ni estén afectadas por la servidumbre de protección, producirán los siguientes efectos:

a) El terreno inundado se incorporará al dominio público marítimo-terrestre. No obstante, no se incluirán en el dominio público marítimo-terrestre los terrenos de propiedad privada colindantes a la vivienda y retranqueados respecto del canal navegable que se destinen a garaje náutico individual y privado.

b) La servidumbre de protección preexistente con anterioridad a las obras mantendrá su vigencia. No se generará unas nuevas servidumbres de protección ni de tránsito, en torno a los espacios inundados.

c) El planeamiento urbanístico deberá garantizar a través de viales el tránsito y acceso a los canales, en la forma que se establezca reglamentariamente.

4. Las obras para la construcción de los canales navegables precisarán del correspondiente título administrativo para su realización y en ningún caso afectarán a tramos de costa que constituyan playa o espacios protegidos, de acuerdo con lo que se disponga reglamentariamente».

Veintitrés. Se introduce una nueva disposición adicional undécima que queda redactada del siguiente modo:

«Disposición adicional undécima.

1. Los bienes declarados de interés cultural situados en dominio público marítimo-terrestre quedarán sujetos al régimen concesional previsto en la presente ley, a cuyo efecto la Administración otorgará la correspondiente concesión, en el plazo de un año a contar desde la fecha de la declaración de interés cultural.

2. A los bienes declarados de interés cultural que se encuentren situados en el dominio público marítimo-terrestre, la zona de servidumbre de tránsito, de servidumbre de protección o de influencia se les aplicarán las medidas derivadas de dicho régimen con preferencia a las contenidas en esta ley, sin perjuicio de lo previsto en la disposición transitoria tercera apartado 3. 3.ª» .

Artículo segundo. Prórroga de las concesiones otorgadas al amparo de la normativa anterior.

1. Las concesiones para la ocupación del dominio público marítimo terrestre existentes, que hayan sido otorgadas antes de la entrada en vigor de la presente ley, podrán ser prorrogadas, a instancia de su titular, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el presente artículo.


Esta prórroga se aplicará a las concesiones una vez que se extinga el plazo para el que fueron concedidas, aunque no se hubiera agotado el plazo legal máximo previsto y el título concesional previera su prórroga.

2. El concesionario solicitará esta prórroga durante los seis meses previos a la extinción del plazo de la concesión.

3. La duración de esta prórroga en ningún caso excederá de setenta y cinco años. La resolución por la que se acuerde la prórroga podrá fijar un plazo de duración inferior, y prever, a su vez, prorrogas sucesivas dentro de aquel límite temporal.

4. En el caso de concesiones que amparen ocupaciones para usos destinados a la industria extractiva, energética, química, petroquímica, textil y papelera, la prórroga solo será concedida previo informe favorable del órgano ambiental de la comunidad autónoma en la que radique la ocupación. El informe determinará los efectos que la ocupación tiene para el medio ambiente e incluirá, en los casos que proceda, las condiciones que deba contemplar la concesión para garantizar una adecuada protección del medio ambiente. Si el informe no fuera emitido en el plazo de tres meses se considerará que es desfavorable.

5. Las concesiones así prorrogadas se regirán en todo lo demás, por lo dispuesto en la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio de Costas.

Disposición adicional primera. Publicación de la línea de deslinde

Las líneas de deslinde se publicarán en la sede electrónica del Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente.

Disposición adicional segunda. Revisión de los deslindes.

1. La Administración General del Estado deberá proceder a iniciar la revisión de los deslindes ya ejecutados y que se vean afectados como consecuencia de la aprobación de la presente ley.

2. La Administración General del Estado revisará los deslindes en los casos en que el límite interior de la zona marítimo-terrestre se hubiera fijado tomando como referencia los mayores temporales conocidos, cuando estos, de acuerdo con las referencias comprobadas que se dispongan, no hubieran alcanzado el límite establecido en el deslinde, en al menos cinco ocasiones, en los diez años inmediatamente anteriores a la fecha en la que se haya practicado el deslinde, o en defecto de referencias conocidas en ese periodo, en los diez años inmediatamente anteriores a la entrada en vigor de esta ley.

Disposición adicional tercera. Deslinde en determinados paseos marítimos

La línea exterior de los paseos marítimos que la Administración General del Estado haya construido, durante el periodo comprendido entre la entrada en vigor de la Ley


22/1988, de 28 de julio, de Costas y la entrada en vigor de la presente ley, se entenderá a todos los efectos como línea interior de la ribera del mar.

A efectos de esta disposición no se considerarán paseos marítimos aquellas instalaciones que no hayan supuesto una alteración del terreno que les sirve de soporte, tales como las pasarelas o los intinerarios de madera apoyados sobre el terreno o sobre pilotes.

Disposición adicional cuarta. Deslinde de la isla de Formentera

1. Con carácter excepcional y debido a la especial configuración geológica de la isla de Formentera, respecto de ella se entenderá que queda incluido en el dominio públicio marítimo-terrestre:

a) El espacio de territorio que baña el mar en su flujo y reflujo, en donde sean sensbiles las mareas, y las mayores olas en los termporales ordinarios en donde no lo sean. A estos efectos, se entiende que son temporales ordinarios los que se han repetido, al menos, en tres ocasiones en los cinco años inmediatamente anteriores al momento en que se inicie el deslinde

b) Las playas, entendiendo por tales las riberas del mar o de las rías formadas por arenales o pedregales en superficie casi plana, con vegetación nula o escasa y característica.

2. En el plazo de dos años desde la entrada en vigor de la ley, la Administración General del Estado practicará el correspondiente deslinde, de acuerdo con lo establecido en el apartado anterior.

3. A las construcciones e instalaciones emplazadas en la zona de servidumbre de tránsito o protección les será de aplicación lo dispuesto en la disposición transitoria cuarta de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio, de Costas.

La servidumbre de protección tendrá, en todo caso, una extensión de cien metros medida tierra adentro desde el límite interior de la ribera del mar.

4. Los propietarios de los terrenos de la isla de Formentera que no formen parte del dominio público marítimo-terrestre y que dispusieren de título inscrito en el Registro de la Propiedad podrán reclamar la propiedad, de acuerdo con la disposición adicional quinta de esta ley.

Disposición adicional quinta. Reclamación del derecho de propiedad sobre los terrenos que han dejado de ser dominio público marítimo-terrestre.

Los propietarios de terrenos que de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en la presente ley no formen parte del dominio público, y que dispusieran de título inscrito en el Registro de la Propiedad con anterioridad a la entrada en vigor de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio, de


Costas, pueden reclamar su derecho de propiedad sobre tales terrenos ante la Jurisdicción Civil. El derecho de propiedad se reconocerá sin perjuicio de lo señalado en el artículo 4.5 de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio, de Costas.

Disposición adicional sexta. Exclusión de determinados núcleos de población del dominio público marítimo-terrestre.

1. Se excluyen del dominio público-marítimo terrestre los núcleos de población que se enumeran en el anexo de esta ley, en la extensión que se fija en la planimetría incorporada al propio anexo.

2. Los terrenos excluidos del dominio público marítimo-terrestre, de acuerdo con el apartado anterior, se incorporarán al Patrimonio del Estado como bienes patrimoniales y se regirán por lo previsto en la Ley 33/2003, de 3 de noviembre, de Patrimonio de las Administraciones Públicas.

Disposición transitoria primera. Titulares registrales de terrenos situados en el dominio público marítimo terrestre.

1. Los titulares de los terrenos a los que se refieren los apartados segundo y tercero de la disposición transitoria primera de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio, de Costas, podrán solicitar la concesión prevista en aquella disposición en el plazo de seis meses desde la entrada en vigor de esta ley.

2. Aquellos titulares de una concesión u otro derecho de ocupación o aprovechamiento obtenidos de acuerdo con lo previsto en el apartado segundo de la disposición transitoria primera de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio, de Costas, podrán optar por mantener su derecho o solicitar una nueva concesión en los términos previstos en el anterior apartado.

Disposición transitoria segunda. Aplicación de la disposición transitoria tercera apartado 3 de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio de Costas.

1. En el plazo de dos años desde la entrada en vigor de la presente ley, se podrá instar que el régimen previsto en la disposición transitoria tercera apartado tres de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio de Costas se aplique igualmente a los núcleos o áreas, que a su entrada en vigor no estuvieran clasificados como suelo urbano pero que en ese momento reunieran los siguientes requisitos necesarios para aquella clasificación:

a) Que contaran con acceso rodado, abastecimiento de agua, evacuación de aguas residuales y suministro de energía eléctrica.

b) Que estuvieran comprendidos en áreas transformadas y aptas para la edificación o consolidadas por ella, al menos, en la mitad de su superficie.


2. Para la aplicación de esta disposición será necesario que estos núcleos o áreas sean clasificados por la Administración urbanística como suelo urbano, previo informe favorable del Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente que deberá pronunciarse sobre la compatibilidad de tales núcleos o áreas con la integridad y defensa del dominio público marítimo-terrestre. Este informe deberá emitirse en el plazo de seis meses desde que haya sido solicitado por la Administración urbanística, en caso de que no se emitiera en este plazo se entenderá que es desfavorable.

3. Las Administraciones urbanísticas que ya hayan clasificado como suelo urbano a los núcleos o áreas a los que se refiere el apartado primero de esta disposición deberán solicitar al Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente el informe previsto en el apartado segundo de esta disposición en el plazo de tres meses desde la entrada en vigor de la presente ley. El informe deberá emitirse en el plazo de seis meses desde que haya sido solicitado, en caso de que no se emitiera en este plazo se entenderá que es desfavorable.

4. Si para el correcto examen de la solicitudes presentadas fuera necesario ampliar el plazo para emitir el informe al que se refieren los dos apartados anteriores, el Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente acordará la ampliación del tal plazo que no podrá ser superior a seis meses. La ampliación se comunicará a las Administraciones peticionarias.

Disposición transitorio tercera. Plazo para solicitar la concesión de ocupación de bienes declarados de interés cultural.

La concesión prevista en la disposición adicional undécima de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio, de Costas, de los bienes cuya declaración de interés cultural sea anterior a la entrada en vigor de la presente ley, se otorgará por la Administración en el plazo de un año a contar desde esa fecha.

Disposición transitoria cuarta. Aplicación de la reforma a los procedimientos administrativos pendientes.

Los procedimientos administrativos en trámite que se encuentren pendientes de resolución a la fecha de entrada en vigor de la presente ley, deberán ser resueltos conforme a la nueva normativa. Los actos de trámite dictados al amparo de la legislación anterior y bajo su vigencia conservarán su validez, siempre que su mantenimiento no produzca un efecto contrario a esta ley.

Disposición transitoria quinta. Inscripción de los bienes de dominio público

Para el cumplimiento de la obligación de inscribir los bienes de dominio público, la Administración General del Estado tendrá un plazo de dos años contados a partir de la entrada en vigor de esta ley.

Disposición derogatoria única. Derogación normativa


Se derogan cuantas normas de igual o inferior rango contradigan o se opongan a lo dispuesto en la presente ley.

Disposición final primera. Títulos competenciales

Esta ley se dicta al amparo de lo establecido en el artículo 149.1.1.ª y en el artículo 149.1.23.ª de la Constitución que atribuyen al Estado competencias en la regulación de las condiciones básicas que garanticen la igualdad de todos los españoles en el ejercicio de los derechos y en el cumplimiento de los deberes constitucionales y en materia de legislación básica sobre protección del medio ambiente.

La disposición adicional quinta se dicta al amparo de la cláusula 6.ª del artículo 149.1 de la Constitución.

Los apartados cuatro y cinco del artículo primero se dictan al amparo de la cláusula 8.ª del artículo 149.1 de la Constituación.

Los apartados tres, catorce, quince, dieciseís, diecisiete, dieciocho, veinte, veintiuno, veinticuatro del artículo primero; el artículo segundo y la disposición transitoria quinta se dictan al amparo de la cláusula 18.ª del artículo 149.1 de la Constitución.

Disposición final segunda. Revisión del Reglamento de Costas y facultades de desarrollo.

En el plazo de seis meses desde la entrada en vigor de esta ley, el Gobierno aprobará la revisión del Reglamento General para desarrollo y ejecución de la Ley 22/1988, de 28 de julio, de Costas.

Disposición final tercera. Entrada en vigor.

La presente Ley entrará en vigor al día siguiente de su publicación en el «Boletín Oficial del Estado».


ANEXO

Relación de núcleos que se excluyen del dominio público marítimo-terrestre en virtud de la disposición adicional sexta, en la extensión que se fija en la planimetría.

Rocafel, término municipal de Alicante, provincia de Alicante

Puerto de Santa Pola, término municipal de Santa Pola, provincia de Alicante

Empuriabrava, término municipal de Castelló d’Empuries, provincia de Girona

Platja d’Aro, término municipal de Castell Platja d’Aro, provincia de Girona

Ría Punta Umbría, término municipal de Punta Umbría, provincia de Huelva

Caño del Cepo, término municipal de Isla Cristina, provincia de Huelva

Casco urbano, término municipal de Isla Cristina, provincia de Huelva

Pedregalejo, término municipal de Málaga, provincia de Málaga

El Palo, término municipal de Málaga, provincia de Málaga

Oliva, término municipal de Oliva, provincia de Valencia

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DG E 2 A ES



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AVIATIO� 123 JAI 570 E�FOPOL 247

�OTA DE TRA�SMISIÓ� Emisor: Por el Secretario General de la Comisión Europea, D. Jordi AYET

PUIGARNAU, Director Fecha de recepción: 25 de julio de 2012 Destinatario: D. Uwe CORSEPIUS, Secretario General del Consejo de la Unión

Europea N.° doc. Ción.: COM(2012) 412 final Asunto: Informe de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo

Informe anual de 2011 relativo a la aplicación del Reglamento (CE) n.º 300/2008, sobre normas comunes para la Seguridad de la Aviación Civil



ES ES

COMISIÓN EUROPEA



I�FORME A�UAL DE 2011 RELATIVO A LA APLICACIÓ� DEL REGLAME�TO (CE) �º 300/2008, SOBRE �ORMAS COMU�ES PARA LA SEGURIDAD DE LA

AVIACIÓ� CIVIL


Este informe abarca el período comprendido entre el 1 de enero y el 31 de diciembre de 2011

I�TRODUCCIÓ�

El año 2011 fue el primero en que se aplicaron plenamente el Reglamento (CE) nº 300/2008 y sus disposiciones de aplicación, ya que las normas para la seguridad de la aviación revisadas entraron en vigor en abril de 2010. La Comisión trabajó sin pausa con los Estados miembros y el sector durante todo el año para garantizar la aplicación coherente de este nuevo marco jurídico. El régimen de inspección gestionado por la Comisión permitió recabar observaciones útiles sobre las principales dificultades de aplicación, así como determinar los campos que precisaban pequeñas adaptaciones para aumentar la claridad de este nuevo marco jurídico.

El presente informe describe las actividades de inspección de la Comisión durante 2011 y repasa la evolución del sector en los ámbitos de la legislación, los ensayos, los estudios y las relaciones internacionales.

PRIMERA PARTE

I�SPECCIO�ES

1. CO�SIDERACIO�ES GE�ERALES

En virtud del Reglamento (CE) nº 300/2008, la Comisión tiene la obligación de realizar inspecciones de las administraciones de seguridad aérea de los Estados miembros (las «autoridades competentes») y de los aeropuertos, operadores y entidades. Suiza también está incluida en el programa de la Unión, mientras que Noruega e Islandia (y Liechtenstein) son inspeccionadas por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC con arreglo a disposiciones paralelas. Para llevar a cabo su labor de inspección, la Comisión dispone de un equipo de diez inspectores de seguridad de la aviación. Respalda esta labor de inspección un grupo de inspectores nacionales –87 en la actualidad–, designados por los Estados miembros, Islandia, Noruega y Suiza. En el anexo figura un cuadro que resume todas las supervisiones del cumplimiento realizadas hasta la fecha por la Comisión y por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC.

2. I�SPECCIO�ES DE LAS AUTORIDADES �ACIO�ALES COMPETE�TES

La Comisión supervisó la labor de diez autoridades competentes en 2011; todas ellas habían sido objeto de inspecciones previas de la Comisión. Estas inspecciones mostraron en varios Estados miembros notables mejoras en relación con años anteriores. Las deficiencias más frecuentes en 2011 eran similares a las de 2010 y estaban relacionadas con la plena adaptación, todavía pendiente, de los programas nacionales de seguridad de la aviación y de

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los programas nacionales de control de calidad al nuevo marco jurídico que brinda el Reglamento (CE) nº 300/2008.

En lo que se refiere a la aplicación de las medidas, en algunos Estados miembros seguía observándose una falta de capacidad para detectar y corregir los incumplimientos con prontitud. Ciertos Estados miembros no supervisaron todos los aspectos requeridos de la legislación, siendo a veces poco adecuadas las actividades de seguimiento. A pesar de que las legislaciones de todos los Estados miembros prevén sanciones, estas no siempre se aplicaron cuando las deficiencias no se rectificaban rápidamente.

La crisis financiera y la consiguiente presión sobre los presupuestos públicos también afectaron a los recursos disponibles para actividades nacionales de supervisión del cumplimiento en algunos Estados miembros.

3. I�SPECCIO�ES I�ICIALES E� LOS AEROPUERTOS

En 2011 se realizaron diecinueve (19) inspecciones iniciales de aeropuertos, al igual que en 2010. Se cubrieron todos los capítulos (aunque no en cada inspección). El porcentaje global de medidas básicas que en 2011 cumplieron los requisitos fue de un 80 %, porcentaje idéntico al de 2010.

En el ámbito de las medidas tradicionales1, las deficiencias observadas se debían esencialmente a factores humanos y no se diferenciaron en demasía de las de años anteriores. Los incumplimientos observados en el ámbito de las medidas tradicionales en los aeropuertos inspeccionados en 2011 se refirieron sobre todo a la calidad del control del personal, así como a ciertos requisitos en materia de seguridad de la carga. En particular, siguió planteando problemas la inadecuada calidad de los registros manuales del personal. En el ámbito de la carga, la mayor parte de los incumplimientos se refiere a la selección de los métodos más adecuados de control, habida cuenta de la naturaleza del envío, y a las normas aplicables. Estos problemas relacionados con factores humanos merecen especial atención y, hasta que se disponga de nuevas alternativas tecnológicas o de procedimiento, tendrían que subsanarse intensificando las actividades de formación y supervisión.

Además, algunas medidas adicionales introducidas en el nuevo marco reglamentario no habían sido plenamente aplicadas por los aeropuertos inspeccionados en 2011. Se observó que se incumplían los métodos y las normas de control de las provisiones de a bordo y de los suministros de aeropuerto (al no haberse implantado plenamente una cadena de suministro segura), y que no se habían efectuado evaluaciones de riesgos para establecer medios y frecuencias adecuados de las patrullas en los aeropuertos. Las autoridades competentes de los Estados miembros deberán poner todo su empeño en aplicar estas nuevas disposiciones.

4. I�SPECCIO�ES DE SEGUIMIE�TO

De conformidad con el artículo 13 del Reglamento (UE) nº 72/2010, la Comisión realiza de forma sistemática un número limitado de inspecciones de seguimiento. Estas suelen practicarse en los casos en que se han detectado varias deficiencias graves durante la inspección inicial, aunque, en menor medida, también se realizan de forma aleatoria para comprobar la corrección de las actividades nacionales de supervisión del cumplimiento y de los informes elaborados. En 2011 se llevaron a cabo cinco actividades de este tipo, que por lo general confirmaron que las deficiencias detectadas se habían rectificado debidamente.

1 Se entiende por medidas «tradicionales» las medidas que ya se aplicaban en virtud del marco jurídico

del Reglamento (CE) nº 2320/2002.

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5. EXPEDIE�TES ABIERTOS, CASOS DEL ARTÍCULO 15 Y ACCIO�ES JUDICIALES

Los expedientes de inspección permanecen abiertos hasta que la Comisión considera que se han adoptado las medidas correctoras adecuadas. Durante el año 2011 se archivaron treinta expedientes (dieciocho aeropuertos y doce autoridades competentes). En total, a finales de año permanecían abiertos doce expedientes de autoridades competentes y doce de inspección de aeropuertos.

Si las deficiencias observadas en un aeropuerto se consideran de tal gravedad que suponen una amenaza significativa para el nivel general de seguridad de la aviación civil en la Unión, la Comisión debe activar el artículo 15 del Reglamento (UE) nº 72/20102. Para ello, debe avisarse de la situación a todas las demás autoridades competentes y ha de considerarse la posibilidad de adoptar medidas adicionales para los vuelos procedentes del aeropuerto en cuestión. En 2011 no fue necesario activar el citado artículo.

La otra posible sanción en los casos más graves, o a falta de corrección o de observarse una recurrencia prolongada de las deficiencias, consiste en incoar un procedimiento de infracción. En 2011 se incoaron dos procedimientos de infracción a raíz de inspecciones de las administraciones nacionales. En ambos casos, el Estado miembro en cuestión había dejado de aplicar su programa nacional de seguridad de la aviación. En ese mismo año se archivaron otros tres procedimientos de infracción tras haberse rectificado las deficiencias detectadas.

6. EVALUACIO�ES DE LOS PROPIOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS

El punto 18 del anexo del Reglamento (UE) nº 18/2010 de la Comisión3 obliga a los Estados miembros a presentar todos los años a la Comisión a finales del mes de marzo un informe que abarque los resultados de sus actividades nacionales de supervisión del cumplimiento en el período comprendido entre enero y diciembre del año anterior. Las contribuciones de los Estados miembros para el período de referencia de enero a diciembre de 2010 se enviaron en el plazo estipulado y se ajustaron al modelo de la Comisión.

El análisis de los citados informes pone de manifiesto que varios Estados miembros no respetaron completamente los requisitos referentes al alcance y la frecuencia de las actividades nacionales de supervisión. Además, bastantes Estados miembros declararon que aún no habían elaborado protocolos normalizados para los ensayos encubiertos de los requisitos de seguridad de la aviación. La Comisión ha incorporado estas cuestiones en el programa del grupo de trabajo sobre inspecciones creado en el marco del Comité de Reglamentación de Seguridad de la Aviación para ayudar a los Estados miembros a cumplir los requisitos comunes.

2 Reglamento (UE) nº 72/2010 de la Comisión, de 26 de enero de 2010, por el que se fijan los

procedimientos de las inspecciones que realice la Comisión en el ámbito de la seguridad de la aviación, DO L 23 de 27.1.2010, p. 1.

3 Reglamento (UE) nº 18/2010 de la Comisión, de 8 de enero de 2010, por el que se modifica el Reglamento (CE) nº 300/2008 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo en lo que se refiere a las especificaciones de los programas nacionales de control de calidad en el campo de la seguridad de la aviación civil, DO L 7 de 12.1.2010, p. 3.

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SEGU�DA PARTE

LEGISLACIÓ� Y HERRAMIE�TAS COMPLEME�TARIAS


Los nuevos actos legislativos en materia de seguridad de la aviación adoptados en 2011 se referían ante todo a la implantación de escáneres de seguridad y a nuevos requisitos aplicables a la carga y el correo procedentes de terceros países.

Una vez concluida una evaluación de impacto completa, se adoptaron normas legislativas que regulan la instalación de escáneres de seguridad. Con ellas se garantiza que dichos escáneres se utilizan de forma armonizada y garantizan un elevado nivel de seguridad, respetando al mismo tiempo los derechos fundamentales de los pasajeros, en especial en lo tocante a la salud, la intimidad y la protección de datos, así como el derecho de los pasajeros a negarse a pasar por los escáneres de seguridad. La Comisión pondrá especial empeño en que los Estados miembros respeten plenamente estas normas.

En respuesta al incidente de carga aérea registrado en Yemen a finales de octubre de 2010, la Comisión, los Estados miembros y las partes interesadas elaboraron sin dilación los requisitos legales oportunos con respecto a la carga transportada por avión a la UE desde terceros países.

Además, las dificultades de ejecución previsibles en materia de control de líquidos exigieron la modificación de la fecha de aplicación de la primera fase del control obligatorio de líquidos en los aeropuertos de la UE. Se creó un grupo de trabajo y se encargó un estudio para analizar todos los factores pertinentes relacionados con la instalación de equipos de control de líquidos en los aeropuertos de la UE. Por último, resultó necesario ampliar el plazo para la utilización de los equipos de detección de explosivos de la norma 2, adoptándose el acto correspondiente en el otoño de 2011.

2. LEGISLACIÓ� COMPLEME�TARIA ADOPTADA

Los nuevos textos legislativos adoptados en 2011 fueron los siguientes:

• Reglamento (UE) nº 720/20114, que completa las normas básicas comunes sobre la seguridad de la aviación civil en lo que se refiere a la introducción gradual del control de líquidos, aerosoles y geles en los aeropuertos de la UE.

• Reglamento (UE) nº 859/20115, por el que se establecen medidas detalladas para la aplicación de las normas básicas comunes de seguridad aérea en lo que atañe a la carga y al correo aéreos.

• Reglamento (UE) nº 1087/20116, por el que se establecen medidas detalladas para la aplicación de las normas básicas comunes de seguridad aérea, en lo relativo a los equipos de detección de explosivos.

4 Reglamento (UE) nº 720/2011 de la Comisión, de 22 de julio de 2011, por el que se modifica el

Reglamento (CE) nº 272/2009, DO L 193 de 23.7.2011, pp. 19–21. 5 Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) nº 859/2011 de la Comisión, de 25 de agosto de 2011, que modifica el

Reglamento (UE) nº 185/2010, DO L 220 de 26.8.2011, pp. 9–15. 6 Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) nº 1087/2011 de la Comisión, de 27 de octubre de 2011, que modifica el

Reglamento (UE) nº 185/2010, DO L 281 de 28.10.2011, pp. 12–13.

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• Reglamento (UE) nº 1141/20117, que completa las normas básicas comunes sobre la seguridad de la aviación civil, en lo que respecta al uso de escáneres de seguridad en los aeropuertos de la UE.

• Reglamento (UE) nº 1147/20118, por el que se desarrollan las normas básicas comunes sobre la seguridad de la aviación civil en lo que respecta al uso de escáneres de seguridad en los aeropuertos de la UE.

• Decisión 2011/5862/UE9, por la que se establecen medidas detalladas para la aplicación de las normas básicas comunes de seguridad aérea en lo relativo a la carga y al correo aéreos.

• Decisión 2011/8042/UE10, por la que se establecen medidas detalladas para la aplicación de las normas básicas comunes de seguridad aérea en lo relativo a los escáneres de seguridad.

Estos textos se ultimaron en seis reuniones ordinarias y dos reuniones especiales del Comité de Reglamentación de Seguridad de la Aviación y seis reuniones del Grupo Consultivo de Partes Interesadas en materia de Seguridad Aérea.

3. BASE DE DATOS DE AGE�TES ACREDITADOS Y EXPEDIDORES CO�OCIDOS

Para reforzar la cadena de suministro segura en la carga aérea y el correo aéreo, así como para facilitar su aplicación homogénea en la UE, se creó la base de datos de agentes acreditados y expedidores conocidos (RAKC, por sus siglas en inglés), que se viene manteniendo desde su pleno despliegue el 1 de junio de 2010 con arreglo a un contrato marco de la Comisión. La base de datos RAKC contenía a finales de 2011 unas 8 500 entradas de agentes acreditados y expedidores conocidos (estos últimos, validados de forma independiente). Se trata del único instrumento jurídico importante que consultan los agentes acreditados para aceptar los envíos de otro agente acreditado o de un expedidor conocido.

A raíz de la entrada en vigor de los nuevos requisitos aplicables a las compañías aéreas que transportan carga a la UE desde terceros países, se ha comenzado a ampliar la base de datos a fin de incorporar también a dichas compañías.

4. I�SPECCIO�ES E� LOS AEROPUERTOS DE LA UE – MA�UALES

Los Reglamentos (CE) nº 300/2008 y (UE) nº 72/2010 exigen que las supervisiones del cumplimiento efectuadas por los servicios de la Comisión en materia de requisitos de seguridad de la aviación civil sean objetivas y se ajusten a una metodología estándar.

Para contribuir a este objetivo, la Comisión ha elaborado y actualiza dos manuales completos con sugerencias detalladas y asesoramiento para los inspectores de la UE en el terreno. Tales manuales se revisan periódicamente.

7 Reglamento (UE) nº 1141/2011 de la Comisión, de 10 de noviembre de 2011, por el que se modifica el

Reglamento (CE) nº 272/2009, DO L 293 de 11.11.2011, pp. 22–23. 8 Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) nº 1147/2011 de la Comisión, de 11 de noviembre de 2011, que

modifica el Reglamento (UE) nº 185/2010, DO L 294 de 12.11.2011, pp. 7–11. 9 Decisión 2011/5862/UE de la Comisión, de 17 de agosto de 2011, dirigida a todos los Estados

miembros; no publicada en el DO (material restringido y confidencial). 10 Decisión 2011/8042/UE de la Comisión, de 14 de noviembre de 2011, dirigida a todos los Estados

miembros; no publicada en el DO (material restringido y confidencial).

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TERCERA PARTE

E�SAYOS Y ESTUDIOS

1. E�SAYOS

Se realiza un «ensayo», a efectos de lo dispuesto en la legislación de la UE en materia de seguridad aérea11, cuando un Estado miembro, de acuerdo con la Comisión, decide utilizar durante un período limitado un medio o un método que no está reconocido por la legislación vigente para sustituir uno de los controles de seguridad reconocidos, siempre que dicho ensayo no perjudique a los niveles generales de seguridad. Desde el punto de vista jurídico, el término no se aplica si un Estado miembro o una entidad procede a evaluar un nuevo control de seguridad que se esté aplicando además de uno o varios de los controles regulados por la legislación.

En 2011 se iniciaron nuevos ensayos en España y el Reino Unido. Se referían a la utilización de equipos de detección de rastros de explosivos y de detectores manuales de metales para el control de los tocados que llevan los pasajeros por motivos religiosos. Además, en 2011 prosiguieron algunos ensayos de escáneres de seguridad antes de la adopción oficial de la normativa de la UE que regula la instalación de dichos escáneres. Todavía sigue en curso uno de esos ensayos en el Reino Unido.

2. ESTUDIOS

Las normas de la UE sobre seguridad de la aviación establecen que, a partir del 29 de abril de 2013, debe procederse al control de todos los líquidos (tanto los que lleva el viajero antes de entrar en el aeropuerto como los que adquiere en tiendas francas) en lugar de rechazarlos. A fin de garantizar la adopción de medidas adecuadas y concretas para cumplir ese plazo, a finales de 2011 la Comisión creó un grupo de trabajo dedicado a esta cuestión e inició un estudio para evaluar los efectos que podía tener el control de los líquidos en el funcionamiento de los aeropuertos de la UE.

Asimismo, a lo largo del año se efectuó un estudio sobre la tecnología de proyección de imágenes para la detección de artículos peligrosos (TIP), utilizada para el control del equipaje de cabina y facturado. El informe final, que ha de presentarse en 2012, se basará en el análisis de los resultados de los ensayos secretos efectuados tanto en aeropuertos que utilizan la tecnología TIP como en los que no lo hacen.

Por último, la Comisión inició un estudio sobre los efectos de las nuevas normas de seguridad de la UE en las mercancías entrantes al final de 2011. Se espera que el informe definitivo, que ha de presentarse a finales de 2012, aporte su contribución en los plazos previstos, antes de que finalice el período transitorio para las validaciones independientes de las compañías aéreas que transportan carga de terceros países a la UE, que expira el 30 de junio de 2014.

11 Véase el artículo 12, apartado 8 («Métodos de control con nuevas tecnologías») del anexo del

Reglamento (UE) nº 185/2010 de la Comisión por el que se establecen medidas detalladas para la aplicación de las normas básicas comunes de seguridad aérea, DO L 55 de 5.3.2010, p. 1.

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CUARTA PARTE

DIÁLOGO CO� ORGA�ISMOS I�TER�ACIO�ALES Y TERCEROS PAÍSES


La Comisión colabora plenamente con los organismos internacionales y con los socios clave de terceros países a la hora de preparar y participar en reuniones internacionales en que se abordan cuestiones de seguridad. Coordina la posición de la UE con abundantes intervenciones y presentación de documentos. También entabla diálogos, si procede, con terceros países determinados sobre problemas bilaterales o temas de interés común. Impulsar esas relaciones con los organismos internacionales y los terceros países clave garantiza que la UE esté bien informada y situada para influir en la política mundial sobre seguridad de la aviación, tanto desde la perspectiva de la elaboración de normas como desde la de su aplicación, ámbito en el que es importante crear capacidades en algunas regiones del mundo.

2. ORGA�ISMOS I�TER�ACIO�ALES

La Comisión participa, en representación de la UE, en la reunión anual del Grupo sobre seguridad de la aviación de la OACI. En la reunión de 2011 del Grupo (Montreal, 21-25 de marzo), la Comisión Europea y los Estados miembros de la UE presentaron documentos al Grupo sobre la seguridad de la carga aérea –referentes tanto a las normas de la UE en preparación como a la necesidad de consolidar las normas internacionales– y sobre las normas de la UE en materia de control de líquidos.

Asimismo, la Comisión participa periódicamente en las reuniones de la Conferencia Europea de la Aviación Civil (CEAC), en especial las del Foro de Seguridad de la CEAC y las del Grupo operativo técnico de la CEAC, que se encarga de cuestiones tecnológicas. En algunos casos, la labor de la CEAC ha contribuido a la del Comité de Reglamentación de Seguridad de la Aviación Civil de la UE.

3. TERCEROS PAÍSES

La Comisión prosiguió en varios foros un diálogo activo con los Estados Unidos sobre los temas relacionados con la seguridad de la aviación, especialmente en el Grupo sobre cooperación en materia de seguridad del transporte UE-EE.UU., que culminó las labores de creación de un control de seguridad único, aplicable a partir del 1 de abril de 2011, gracias al cual los pasajeros y equipajes procedentes de aeropuertos estadounidenses que se encuentran en tránsito en aeropuertos de la UE para tomar un vuelo de conexión no deben someterse necesariamente de nuevo a controles de seguridad12. En 2011, la Comisión participó en inspecciones de aeropuertos estadounidenses en relación con la aplicación del control de seguridad único.

La Comisión también intervino en varias ocasiones en respuesta a la preocupación de los Estados miembros por las medidas adicionales de seguridad impuestas por los Estados Unidos a las compañías aéreas de la UE, en especial en el ámbito de la seguridad de la carga aérea, en que las peticiones de los EE.UU. parecían redundantes, habida cuenta de los controles de

12 Reglamento (UE) n° 983/2010 de la Comisión, de 3 de noviembre de 2010, que modifica el Reglamento

(UE) n° 185/2010, DO L 286 de 4.11.2010, p. 1.

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seguridad practicados dentro del régimen de seguridad de la aviación de la UE. A este respecto, la Comisión mostró su acuerdo con un programa de reconocimiento de la carga en el marco del cual los Estados Unidos se esforzarán por reconocer las medidas de seguridad de la UE en lugar de las medidas estadounidenses equivalentes. El trabajo sobre esta iniciativa se intensificó en el segundo semestre de 2011 al objeto de ultimarlo en 2012.

CO�CLUSIÓ�

Aunque, por lo general, en la UE se sigue garantizando un elevado nivel de seguridad, las inspecciones de la Comisión permitieron detectar algunas deficiencias. En lo que se refiere a las medidas tradicionales, las deficiencias observadas en los controles de personal y de carga se debían esencialmente a factores humanos. En las medidas adicionales aplicadas en virtud del nuevo marco jurídico del Reglamento (CE) nº 300/2008, los demás incumplimientos detectados se refirieron a las patrullas en los aeropuertos, a la evaluación de riesgos y al control de las provisiones de a bordo y de los suministros de aeropuerto. En general se siguieron de forma satisfactoria las recomendaciones de la Comisión en materia de medidas correctoras, lo cual confirma la importancia de un régimen sólido de inspección de la UE y de un control de calidad adecuado a escala nacional. La Comisión seguirá esforzándose por que todos los requisitos legales se cumplan plenamente y con la debida corrección, recurriendo a su sistema de evaluación paritaria e incoando procedimientos de infracción formales cuando sea necesario.

En el ámbito legislativo se adoptaron nuevas normas de desarrollo en 2011 para hacer posible, ante todo, la instalación de escáneres de seguridad de acuerdo con determinadas condiciones y aumentar la seguridad de la carga y el correo que se introducen en la UE. Estas y otras medidas también se están llevando a la esfera internacional en los contactos con organizaciones internacionales y terceros países con ánimo de incrementar los niveles de seguridad de la aviación en todo el mundo.

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Anexo Inspecciones de la Comisión a 31 de diciembre de 2011

Estado �úmero de inspecciones entre enero y diciembre de

2011 (incluidas las inspecciones de

seguimiento)

�úmero total de inspecciones de 2004 a

2011 (incluidas las inspecciones de

seguimiento)

Austria 0 9

Bélgica 1 10

Bulgaria 1 6

Chipre 1 6

República Checa 2 7

Dinamarca 2 9

Estonia 1 5

Finlandia 1 8

Francia 3 15

Alemania 3 17

Grecia 1 13

Hungría 2 7

Irlanda 0 8

Italia 3 15

Letonia 1 5

Lituania 0 4

Luxemburgo 0 6

Malta 0 3

Países Bajos 0 7

Polonia 2 9

Portugal 0 8

Rumanía 0 3

Eslovaquia 0 4

Eslovenia 1 5

España 2 14

Suecia 2 11

Reino Unido 4

17

Estados que no son miembros de la UE:

Suiza

1 5

11

TOTAL 34 236

Inspecciones del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC a 31.12.2011

Estado �úmero de inspecciones entre enero y diciembre de 2011 (incluidas las inspecciones de seguimiento)

�úmero total de inspecciones de 2004 a 2011 (incluidas las inspecciones de seguimiento)

Islandia 2 9

Noruega 4 35

TOTAL 6 44

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