El retiro del Reino Unido frente a la Unión Europea y la ... · El retiro del Reino Unido frente a...

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Cañardo, Hernando Vicente El retiro del Reino Unido frente a la Unión Europea y la cuestión de Gibraltar elDial.com. Biblioteca Jurídica Online, 2017 Este documento está disponible en la Biblioteca Digital de la Universidad Católica Argentina, repositorio institucional desarrollado por la Biblioteca Central “San Benito Abad”. Su objetivo es difundir y preservar la producción intelectual de la Institución. La Biblioteca posee la autorización del autor para su divulgación en línea. Cómo citar el documento: Cañardo, H. V. (2017). El retiro del Reino Unido frente a la Unión Europea y la cuestión de Gibraltar [en línea] elDial DC231A. Disponible en: https://bibliotecadigital.uca.edu.ar/repositorio/investigacion/retiro-reino-unido-union-europea.pdf [Fecha de consulta: ….]

Transcript of El retiro del Reino Unido frente a la Unión Europea y la ... · El retiro del Reino Unido frente a...

  • Cañardo, Hernando Vicente

    El retiro del Reino Unido frente a la Unión Europea y la cuestión de Gibraltar

    elDial.com. Biblioteca Jurídica Online, 2017

    Este documento está disponible en la Biblioteca Digital de la Universidad Católica Argentina, repositorio institucional desarrollado por la Biblioteca Central “San Benito Abad”. Su objetivo es difundir y preservar la producción intelectual de la Institución.La Biblioteca posee la autorización del autor para su divulgación en línea.

    Cómo citar el documento:

    Cañardo, H. V. (2017). El retiro del Reino Unido frente a la Unión Europea y la cuestión de Gibraltar [en línea] elDial DC231A. Disponible en: https://bibliotecadigital.uca.edu.ar/repositorio/investigacion/retiro-reino-unido-union-europea.pdf [Fecha de consulta: ….]

  • El retiro del Reino Unido frente a la Unión Europea y la cuestión de Gibraltar

    Por Hernando Vicente Cañardo(*)

    I.Introducción Histórica.

    En 1704 el Peñón de Gibraltar es capturado por las escuadras del Almirante Rooke y el Príncipe de Hesse- Darmstadt, en el transcurso de la Guerra de la Sucesión Española capitulando el 4 de agosto de ese año.

    Desde entonces el territorio ha sido objeto de controversia entre España y el Reino Unido. La ocupación británica es legitimada a través del Tratado de Utrecht en 1713, convirtiéndose en Colonia en 1830.

    La Guerra de la Sucesión Española provoca que los territorios de la Corona Hispánica en Europa fueran entregados. Saboya recibe a Sicilia y parte del Ducado de Milán, y Carlos VI de Austria los Países Bajos Españoles, el Reino de Nápoles, Cerdeña y la mayor parte del Ducado de Milán. Portugal por su parte obtiene el reconocimiento de su soberanía entre los Ríos Amazonas y Oyapock u Oiapo que, en Brasil, y en 1715 recobra la Colonia del Sacramento que España había conquistado en la guerra.

    Por el Articulo X España debe ceder Gibraltar y por el XI Menorca a Gran Bretaña, además de otorgar una serie de privilegios comerciales [1]

    España intentó recuperarla militarmente en 1704, 1727, y el llamado Gran Asedio entre 1779 y 1783, sin embargo su decadencia irreversible en el Siglo XIX, y el ascenso de Gran Bretaña a potencia suprema, tornan este camino irrealizable. Allí comienza un largo sendero de reivindicaciones de carácter diplomático.

    España entiende que Gibraltar fue ocupado dentro del marco de una disputa monárquica española reclamando la soberanía, agregando que las estipulaciones del artículo X del Tratado de Utrecht no incluían el istmo ni las aguas territoriales.[2]

    El título jurídico de España es la existencia previa del Estado, un título originario, mientras que el título del Reino Unido es la cesión por tratado, un título derivado, e invoca el principio de la integridad territorial de acuerdo a la Resolución 1514 (XV) de la Asamblea General, especialmente el Párrafo 6. [3]La Asamblea General ha aprobado dos Resoluciones en relación al tema, la 2231(XXI) [4] y la 2353(XXII).[5]

    Se establece que la unidad nacional y la integridad territorial tienen prioridad sobre el derecho a la libre determinación: afirmándose en la última Resolución que: “Toda situación colonial que destruye parcial o totalmente la unidad nacional y la integridad territorial de un Estado es incompatible con los propósito y principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, especialmente el

  • Párrafo 6 de la Resolución 1514, e invita a los Gobiernos de España y el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte a reanudar la negociaciones previstas en las Resoluciones 2070 ( XX) y 2231 (XXI) de la Asamblea General con miras a poner fin a la situación colonial en Gibraltar y a salvaguardar los intereses de la población.”

    La celebración de los referéndums en 1967 y en 2002 demuestra, sin embargo que la población desea continuar vinculada al Reino Unido, configurándose así nuevamente un conflicto entre los principios de descolonización y autodeterminación de los pueblos.

    Por su parte el Reino Unido mantiene la posición que Gibraltar fue cedida por España de acuerdo a las estipulaciones del Tratado de Utrecht, dándole la propiedad absolutamente, sosteniendo que el principio de integridad territorial no anula al de autodeterminación.

    No se puede contemplar la opción de la independencia, pues para ellos se requeriría el consentimiento español, ya que el Artículo X le da a España un derecho de preferencia si Gran Bretaña renuncia a la soberanía. La independencia seria así una opción con el consentimiento español, y se rechaza de plano en 1976 para evitar la prolongación de restricciones fronterizas.[6]

    Los habitantes de Gibraltar están a favor de que la autodeterminación desplace al principio de la integridad territorial. Siendo territorio británico, puede haber una reclamación política a la devolución de la soberanía, pero de acuerdo al Derecho Internacional se cede a perpetuidad.

    España ha intentado anular a Utrecht para lograr la devolución, dando garantías de protección de intereses a los habitantes y permitiéndoles que mantengan la ciudadanía británica. Estos intentos se dan desde 1966, pero las negociaciones no prosperan ni a nivel bilateral o internacional.

    A fines del 2008 la Unión Europea, a través de la Comisión, incluyó la mayor parte de las aguas territoriales que rodean a Gibraltar bajo un área de conservación marina, conocida como Estrecho Oriental, que será mantenida por España, dando lugar a que el Reino Unido apelara ante la Corte de Justicia de las Comunidades sin éxito.[7]

    España argumentaba asimismo que los sistemas fiscales de Gibraltar afectan a la economía al comportarse como un paraíso fiscal. No obstante debe mencionarse que la situación se ha ido normalizando, pasando de ser paraíso fiscal a centro financiero internacional[8]

    Sin embargo el rol más importante del control del Peñón por el Reino Unido es el referido al Estrecho utilizado durante los Siglos XIX y XX para custodiar el acceso al Atlántico, al Mediterráneo y la ruta al Oriente. Aún hoy una cuarta parte del tráfico marítimo mundial lo atraviesa; si bien España posee bases más importantes para el control del mismo, como Algeciras, Tarifa, Cádiz y Rota. El llamado Cierre de la Verja, en 1969, supuso una clausura total de la frontera terrestre que duró hasta 1982, cuando se reabrió la frontera para las personas que es ampliada para los vehículos en 1985.

    En el 2006 se firmó el llamado Acuerdo a Tres Bandas entre el Reino Unido, España y Gibraltar, aceptando el Gobierno de España por primera vez, facilitándose los controles fronterizos y transportes. A pesar del levantamiento de restricciones, ha habido conflictos en el 2013 y 2014 en relación al status de las aguas jurisdiccionales que han alcanzado grave intensidad. Siendo lo

  • determinante en la actualidad las reclamaciones de la integridad territorial y las consideraciones relacionadas con aspectos económicos.

    II. Análisis jurídico de la cuestión.

    Uno de los aspectos sobre la controversia territorial es el relacionado a la ocupación británica del istmo, contraria al Tratado de Utrecht. La efectividad de la presencia británica sobre tal espacio desde el siglo XIX y la construcción de la Verja en el límite norte de esa zona neutral en 1909 no pueden remplazar la ausencia de título jurídico sobre el istmo.

    La historia de la negociación del Tratado de Utrecht demuestra que la solicitud británica de obtener una proyección de la ciudad hacia el norte, fue denegada. España ha mostrado oposición a la presencia británica en la lengua de tierra y objetó la construcción de un aeródromo que la atraviesa. El Acuerdo de Londres del 2 de diciembre de 1987 sobre la utilización conjunta del aeropuerto, que nunca se aplicó, comienza con un párrafo que coloca ese Acuerdo en el contexto del proceso negociador sobre todas las cuestiones, incluida la soberanía, proceso iniciado en Bruselas en 1984, y que no dio fruto. Los actos de España que dan por sentada la existencia de esa pista no pueden entenderse como aquiescencia.

    El Acuerdo de Córdoba de 18 de septiembre de 2006 se refiere a cuestiones ligadas al aeropuerto, así como a otros asuntos, dejando claro que esos acuerdos se refieren a “la solución de problemas concretos, pero no tienen ninguna repercusión en absoluto en lo que atañe a la soberanía y a la jurisdicción.

    El artículo X establecía que la ciudad debía abastecerse por mar y solo en caso de que ese tráfico fuera interrumpido se permitiría comprar en España las mercancías necesarias para evitar magnas angustias a la población, pero al mismo tiempo esto no significaba comerciar con el territorio circundante. Durante el régimen franquista y hasta 1985, se mantuvo aislado Gibraltar. En ese año la política cambió debido al ingreso de España a la Unión Europea, para desarrollar el conjunto de la región e intentar atraer a la población a España. Esto se hizo en el contexto de la incorporación a las instituciones europeas, como se verifica en el Canje de Notas entre España y el Reino Unido con ocasión de la adhesión a la Comunidad Europea, que se refiere explícitamente al “proceso negociador bilateral”. Sin embargo, los sucesivos pasos para facilitar los intercambios no han dado lugar a avances de importancia hacia el objetivo español de recuperar el territorio.

    Al contrario, aprovechando el fin del aislamiento, el Reino Unido ha potenciado la creación de un espacio de servicios internacionales en el Peñón, en contra de la letra y el espíritu de Utrecht. En ese plan a mediano plazo de convertir a Gibraltar en un centro de negocios, la aplicación del Derecho Comunitario en Gibraltar sirve al menos para evitar la tendencia británica y gibraltareña a crear un limbo jurídico donde hubieran podido ampararse actividades dudosas. Hay que recordar que solo en 2013 el Reino Unido ha aceptado actuar contra paraísos fiscales que son parte de su territorio, como la Isla de Man, Guernsey y Jersey.[9]

    La Declaración número 55 al Tratado de Lisboa de 2007 confirma la responsabilidad del Reino Unido a ese respecto.[10]La exigencia de aplicación del Derecho Comunitario está siendo confirmada por sucesivas sentencias del Tribunal de Justica de Luxemburgo que obligan al Reino Unido a acatar sus normas en Gibraltar, ya sea sobre información bancaria o el impuesto de sociedades.

  • La decisión española de terminar el aislamiento por tierra de Gibraltar pretendía avanzar en las negociaciones sobre la retrocesión. Pero esta idea no ha progresado, mientras el Reino Unido ha tutelado la economía de Gibraltar dando a la ciudad un estatuto político autónomo reforzado.

    La primera condición que es la definición y extensión del territorio, no ha sido cumplida por el Reino Unido con la ocupación de la zona neutral del istmo no cedida en el tratado, y la segunda condición (el aislamiento) ha sido ignorada por España al facilitar los intercambios.

    La tercera condición que impone la vuelta a la soberanía española en caso de cambio de régimen por parte de Gran Bretaña ha evolucionado también de manera determinante. En este caso, las actuaciones del Reino Unido equivalen a un cambio político como los previstos en el Tratado de Utrecht, lo que significa que España ha ganado su derecho a “redimir” Gibraltar, y la cesión de 1713 puede entenderse terminada. El punto de partida es el propio texto del Tratado que indica una lista comprensiva y abierta de posibles acciones de Gran Bretaña que desencadenan la retrocesión…..la finalidad de la clausula es clara, pues prevé “que se dará a la Corona de España la primera acción antes que a otros para redimirla”.

    El intento de cambio de régimen tuvo lugar en la década de 1960, cuando se buscó la descolonización al amparo de Naciones Unidas. Frente a la consulta organizada en 1967, en la que los gibraltareños respaldaron en su gran mayoría la independencia, Naciones Unidas entendió que el referéndum contravenía peticiones anteriores de la Organización y que no se habían tenido suficientemente en cuenta los derechos de España, por lo que instaba a la continuación de las negociaciones de los dos países.[11]

    Las Naciones Unidas entendían que Gibraltar no era un caso de descolonización sino un derecho adquirido por el Reino Unido a través de tratado. Al no poder lograr una independencia internacionalmente reconocida, se redacto una Orden Constitucional el 23 de mayo de 1969, que continuaba el estatuto de Gibraltar como Crown Colony, pero con una cierta autonomía en los asuntos domésticos, mientras que cuestiones clave como la defensa y las relaciones exteriores quedaban en manos del Reino Unido.

    Se trata de una constitución otorgada, es decir, no es un texto redactado de manera democrática sino ofrecido por el gobierno del Reino Unido a la colonia. En el preámbulo de esa constitución se contiene el famoso compromiso unilateral de respetarla voluntad de los gibraltareños, que afecta a la tercera condición del Tratado de Utrecht.[12]

    El Reino Unido no podría unilateralmente desentenderse de su compromiso con España referido a la cesión territorial y al derecho de retrocesión. El texto no se refiere a la soberanía territorial, que no es del Reino Unido, sino al vínculo de soberanía personal y nacionalidad que une al mismo con el pueblo de Gibraltar.

    Al comienzo del mismo párrafo se dice que Gibraltar es parte de los Dominios de su Majestad, lo que apunta a la propiedad cedida y no a la soberanía territorial. Durante décadas, la razón fundamental del Reino Unido para no llevar a cabo negociaciones con España sobre Gibraltar fue que el país estaba regido por una dictadura. Cuando la situación en España se modifica tras la sanción de la Constitución de 1978, se produjo una primera larga fase negociadora que acompañó la entrada de España en las instituciones occidentales, la Alianza Atlántica y las Comunidades

  • Europeas.

    Estas negociaciones dieron lugar a las declaraciones de Lisboa en 1980, de Bruselas en 1984, al canje de notas en 1985 con ocasión de la entrada de España en la Comunidad Europea, que menciona el “proceso negociador bilateral”, y al acuerdo de Londres del 2 de diciembre de 1987 sobre el aeropuerto. [13]

    La participación española en las instituciones occidentales, no produjo avances en la solución de la controversia sobre Gibraltar.

    Una segunda fase negociadora dio lugar al Régimen acordado sobre cómo tratar a las autoridades de Gibraltar en el contexto europeo, a un acuerdo de cooperación policial y a la esperanza de un estatuto pactado de co-soberania durante una etapa transitoria, proyecto que nunca se vio plasmado en un documento público.

    Se propuso en la Cámara de los Comunes un régimen de soberanía compartida, que fue criticado en el Parlamento y luego sometido al sufragio de los gibraltareños.[14]

    Tras este rechazo, el Parlamento británico volvió a tratar la cuestión, y sus miembros encontraron justificado el bloqueo del Acuerdo con España en razón de la opinión de los gibraltareños, en contra de la condición pactada en el Tratado de Utrecht.

    Esta actitud revela una contradicción: una apariencia de negociación que esconde una ausencia de voluntad británica de atender a la solicitud española.

    El Reino Unido, produce otra constitución otorgada para Gibraltar el 14 de diciembre de 2006,7 dándole un estatuto permanente ahora ya no como colonia sino como British Overseas Territory. [15]

    En el preámbulo se incluye la promesa al pueblo de Gibraltar de no alterar su estatuto contra sus deseos, y un nuevo párrafo que denota la contradicción entre el papel del referéndum en el proceso y las competencias del Reino Unido, que se confirma como plenamente responsable de la política exterior de Gibraltar:

    La diferencia entre el intento de independencia de la década de los 60 y el régimen de autogobierno actual; es que el primero estaba hecho en el contexto de la descolonización.

    Si Naciones Unidas hubiera decidido respaldar el principio de libre determinación en Gibraltar, la cesión del Tratado de Utrecht habría perdido sentido, porque un principio nuevo de Derecho Internacional respaldado por la ONU habría supuesto la superación del antiguo derecho, y una norma de iuscogens superveniens: la libre determinación de los pueblos coloniales, habría modificado el Tratado. Pero la presencia británica en Gibraltar siguió basándose en Utrecht.

    La Orden Constitucional de 1969 fue un intento de buscar una alternativa a la descolonización fallida. En cambio, la Orden Constitucional de 2006 es un intento de definir un estatuto permanente para Gibraltar, una vez descartadas las negociaciones sobre la soberanía tras las dos fases de la década de 1980 y la terminada en 2002. El párrafo del preámbulo de 2006 menciona por primera vez el “autogobierno” de Gibraltar, lo que supone un cambio de régimen político.

  • El Reino Unido intentó en primer lugar la independencia de Gibraltar pero, como no tuvo el suficiente apoyo internacional, otorga un estatuto intermedio que es diferente al de “propiedad” de la Corona británica, pactado con España en Utrecht. El mismo párrafo también afirma por primera vez la “soberanía británica” sobre Gibraltar, que tampoco es compatible con la cesión de 1713 de propiedad sin jurisdicción territorial. Afirmar que el pueblo de Gibraltar tiene la decisión sobre la retrocesión a España, es incompatible con el Tratado de Utrecht.

    Al dictar un sistema constitucional para Gibraltar que llama de “auto-gobierno” en 2006, el Reino Unido realiza actos jurídicos que pueden entenderse incluidos dentro de la lista de supuestos que provocarían la retrocesión , ya que dar un nuevo estatuto jurídico a Gibraltar fuera del marco descolonizador supone un cambio de régimen político del tipo que estaba previsto en Utrecht. La clave estaría en si las medidas de Reino Unido equivalen a enajenar de cualquier modo la propiedad en el sentido del texto. La insistencia en la promesa unilateral de atender a la voluntad de los gibraltareños “enajena” la propiedad británica concedida en el tratado a través de la Constitución de 2006 y del referéndum para aprobarla.

    Esa enajenación no se realiza con respecto a otra potencia o Estado, sino con respecto a la población de Gibraltar, que ha sido modificada sustancialmente en diversas ocasiones históricas, mientras que la retrocesión a España no depende según el Derecho Internacional de esa voluntad local sino de la decisión de Gran Bretaña de cambiar el régimen de la propiedad de cualquier modo. Hay que recordar que, según la cesión original, el derecho de España resurgía desde el momento en que al Reino Unido le pareciere conveniente dar, vender, enajenar traspaso de soberanía plena, porque el Reino Unido no puede disponer como quiera de esa posesión, sino una transmisión de la propiedad y el uso con ciertas condiciones.

    El análisis de las tres condiciones pactadas revela en primer lugar, por lo que se refiere al territorio, que el Reino Unido ocupa la zona del istmo sin título jurídico actual para ello. Cabe reiterar que la segunda condición -“sin comunicación alguna abierta con el país circunvecino por parte de tierra” - ha sido levantada por España desde 1985 con el fin de favorecer los intercambios y avanzar en las negociaciones para la retrocesión. Sin embargo, el resultado de la apertura ha sido más bien un reforzamiento del estatuto político y de la economía de Gibraltar en contra de lo que perseguía España, por lo que puede volverse a la situación anterior. Como se ha dicho, la tercera condición establecía claramente que España tenía derecho a “redimir” Gibraltar, es decir, dar por terminada la cesión, en el caso de que al Reino Unido le pareciera conveniente dar, vender o enajenar de cualquier modo la propiedad cedida. Esta situación se ha confirmado desde 2006, cuando el Reino Unido ha sometido una nueva Constitución a Gibraltar que asegura un estatuto de autogobierno.

    El primer cambio de régimen que intentó el Reino Unido, la descolonización, no pudo aplicarse a Gibraltar porque Naciones Unidas reconoció que la propiedad británica partía de una cesión de España. Ante esa imposibilidad, el Reino Unido ha decidido “enajenar” su propiedad a la población existente, en contra de lo pactado en el Tratado de Utrecht.

    De acuerdo al Derecho Internacional y haciendo una interpretación del artículo X, la cesión de España habría terminado y se han recuperado los derechos soberanos de origen sobre el territorio cedido.

    En el caso de que el gobierno español estime que tal razonamiento está fundado y crea conveniente reclamar una retrocesión de Gibraltar utilizando la clausula final del articulo X, dicha

  • postura jurídica no alteraría inmediatamente la situación practica en Gibraltar. En todo caso, la presencia británica sería más precaria desde el punto de vista jurídico internacional porque el título que el Reino Unido tiene sobre Gibraltar habría caducado de acuerdo con lo originalmente pactado en Utrecht.

    III. Propiedad y Soberanía.

    A pesar de lo afirmado, debe tenerse en cuenta sin embargo que la propiedad sobre un territorio, de acuerdo al Derecho Internacional, solo se da en el marco de la soberanía de un Estado.

    Con respecto a la soberanía y propiedad, el sentido contemporáneo de los términos es diferente. La soberanía política es el poder del Estado para legislar, para administrar justicia, para gobernar en general. Ejercitando la misma puede afectar, crear, modificar y regular los derechos de propiedad. De esta forma la soberanía política establece los parámetros en los cuales el derecho de propiedad opera. Ese derecho de propiedad, sin embargo tiene un componente de soberanía al tener el propietario un poder limitado pero real frente a los otros, que es similar al que tiene el Estado sobre sus súbditos y territorio, es decir una diferencia de grado.

    Un análisis de ambos conceptos en el Derecho Internacional excede los límites del trabajo, pero puede mencionarse que la doctrina los consideraba equivalentes en ese tiempo.[16]Grocio en el Capítulo VI del Jure Belli Ac Pacis: On the Acquisition of Territory and Property by Right of Conquest, afirmaba al respecto que la guerra otorgaba la propiedad o dominio: II. “But according to the law of nations, not only the person, who makes war upon just grounds; but any one whatever, engaged in regular and formal war, becomes absolute proprietor of everything which he takes from the enemy: so that all nations respect his title, and the title of all, who derive through him their claim to such possessions. Which, as to all foreign nations, constitutes the true idea of dominion:”IV. “Lands are not understood to become a lawful possession and absolute conquest from the moment they are invaded. For although it is true, that an army takes immediate and violent possession of the country which it has invaded, yet that can only be considered as a temporary possession, unaccompanied with any of the rights and consequences alluded to in this work, till it has been ratified and secured by some durable means, by cession, or treaty. For this reason, the land without the gates of Rome, where Hannibal encamped, was so far from being judged entirely lost, that it was sold for the same price that it would have been sold for before that period.”

    “Now land will be considered as completely conquered, when it is inclosed or secured by permanent fortifications, so that no other state or sovereign can have free access to it, without first making themselves masters of those fortifications. On this account Flaccus, the Sicilian, assigns no improbable conjecture for the origin of the word territory, because the enemy is deterred from entering it. At least there is as much probability in this conjecture, as in that of Varro, who derives it from the word terendo, treading the soil. Frontinus deduces it from terra, the earth, and Pomponius from the terror of judicial authority exercised in each country. Xenophon however in his book on tributes, seems to accord with the first of these opinions: for he says, that in time of war the possession of a country is kept by walls, strong holds, and barriers.

    XI.“Things immoveable are generally taken by some public act, such as marching an army into the country, or placing garrisons there. So that, as Pomponius has said, "lands taken from the enemy become the property of the state, and form no part of the booty belonging to the individual captors. Thus among the Hebrews and Lacedaemonians, lands that were made a conquest, were divided by lot. The Romans too either retained conquered lands to let them out for rent, sometimes leaving a small portion to the ancient possessor, or divided them among colonists, whom they sent out, or made them tributary; innumerable instances of which we meet with in their histories, their laws, and

  • treaties on the admeasurements of lands.”[17]

    Por su parte Vattel afirma sobre el tema: en su obra: S. VIII. 9. Efectos generales de la paz.-“Los efectos generales y necesarios de la paz son reconciliar a los enemigos, y hacer cesar toda hostilidad, volviendo a poner entre ambas naciones en su estado natural.”

    Capitulo Segundo- De los Tratados de Paz. IX. “Finalmente, es preciso observar, que cuando entramos en el examen de si se requiere el consentimiento de la Nación para enajenar alguna parte del estado, entendernos de aquellas partes que aún están bajo el poder de la Nación, y no de aquellas que durante la guerra, han venido a caer en poder del enemigo, porque no estando la Nación en posesión de ellas, toca solo al Soberano , si tiene la administración plena y absoluta del gobierno, la facultad de hacer la guerra y la paz; y juzgar, si es conveniente abandonar estas partes del estado, o el continuar la guerra para recobrarlas, sin que sirva de obstáculo el decir, que no podría por sí solo enajenarlas válidamente, pues que gozando del imperio pleno 'y absoluto'', tiene derecho para prometer que jamás la Nación volverá a tomar las armas para recobrar estas tierras, villas o provincias que abandona: y esto basta para asegurar una quieta y, pacífica posesión al enemigo que las ha conquistado.” [18]

    Estas dos brevísimas menciones demuestran qu los términos propiedad y enajenar se refería al traspaso de la soberanía, de acuerdo a la doctrina de la época

    IV. Un hecho nuevo. La salida de Gran Bretaña de la Unión Europea.

    No obstante, el futuro de Gibraltar puede modificarse tras las negociaciones que se han iniciado por el retiro del Reino Unido de la Unión Europea.[19]

    La Unión Europea establece una serie de Guías para la negociación de este proceso, estableciéndose que ningún acuerdo comercial se realizaría hasta que el Reino Unido abandone el bloque, y que las normas comunitarias incluidas aquellas referidas a la jurisdicción de la Corte de Justicia, se aplicarían en el período de transición.[20]

    El documento rechaza la negociación por sectores ya que eso debilitaría la integridad del Mercado Común. En las Guías se establece que una vez que el Reino Unido abandone el bloque “ningún acuerdo entre la Unión y el Reino Unido se aplicará al territorio de Gibraltar, sin un acuerdo previo entre España y el Reino”.

    Esto le daría a España la posibilidad de excluir a Gibraltar de cualquier acuerdo futuro entre el Reino y la Unión si no está satisfecha con el status del territorio.

    La falta de mención a Gibraltar en la carta donde se notifica la intención de retirarse que envía la Primer Ministro a la Unión en base al Artículo 50 del Tratado de Lisboa, daría a entender que no está el Peñón en la misma categoría e importancia que Escocia e Irlanda del Norte.

    España entiende que la omisión se debe a que Gibraltar es una colonia donde hay un contencioso y de allí que se deba negociar bilateralmente.

    La Primera Ministra a su vez establece que se deberá respetar el principio de autodeterminación y no se negociara la transferencia de soberanía sin el consentimiento de los habitantes de Gibraltar.

  • Según sus dichos “la Carta del Artículo 50 es una notificación de retiro de la Unión Europea, Gibraltar no es miembro de la misma, por separado, ni es parte del Reino Unido, para los propósitos del Derecho Comunitario, pero estaría cubierta en las negociaciones”[21]

    Si bien España siempre ha deseado la soberanía sobre Gibraltar o al menos una soberanía en conjunto, sus ambiciones más actuales se reducen a que el territorio no tenga aeropuerto y que normalice o modifique el porcentaje de los impuestos corporativos.

    De acuerdo a la Unión, el texto de las guías significa que cualquier acuerdo realizado después del retiro y su aplicación a Gibraltar como territorio en disputa requeriría el consentimiento de España. Esto significa que tras la salida, la Unión defenderá o representará los intereses de España.

    La Unión le da a España un veto efectivo sobre cualquier acuerdo que se aplicase a Gibraltar, que es un territorio donde hay una disputa de soberanía. Así España podría reintroducir controles o restricciones fronterizas. El mismo tema o cuestión se plantea con los controles que se puedan dar entre Irlanda del Norte que es parte del Reino Unido y la República de Irlanda que ahora es invisible, al ser ambos Estados miembros de la Unión

    En Gibraltar la situación sería diferente ya que una vez que Gran Bretaña quede fuera de la Comunidad, que garantizaba la libertad de movimientos, España podría tomar medidas para aislar el territorio.

    Se entiende que mencionar a Irlanda del Norte y no a Gibraltar ha sido una omisión deliberada. Al no mencionar los intereses de Gibraltar, la puerta queda abierta para que sea considerado un territorio en disputa. Gran Bretaña misma, desde la votación en junio del 2016, ha quedado en un estado de animación suspendida, esperando el resultado de las negociaciones que modificaran todos los ámbitos o aspectos de su relación con Europa. El deseo de liberarse de la burocracia de Bruselas y limitar la inmigración, deberá equilibrarse con la defensa de los intereses de Escocia, Gibraltar e Irlanda del Norte que estuvieron en desacuerdo con la salida.

    Es evidente que las negociaciones que durarán por lo menos dos años lo dejaran a Gibraltar en una posición vulnerable, al depender en gran medida del tráfico fronterizo para las fuentes de trabajo y los recursos, asfixiando la economía que depende en gran medida de los servicios financieros, el juego on line y el comercio electrónico.[22]

    La participación de Gibraltar en la Unión Europea es la de un territorio europeo, de cuyas relaciones exteriores un Estado Miembro es responsable, y ese status cesará cuando el Reino Unido se retire, con la posibilidad de acceso reducido al Mercado Interno, y tal vez medidas coercitivas por parte de España.

    En 1969 el Gral. Franco cerró la frontera afectando suministros, trabajos y dejando familias divididas hasta 1985. Al unirse el Reino al Mercado Común en 1973 con el Acuerdo de Accesión, Gibraltar adquiere una conexión renovada con Europa, ya que el bloqueo la marginaba, y la reapertura de la frontera en 1985 fue una condición para que España ingresara en el Mercado Común en 1986

    La experiencia de Gibraltar con el Mercado o la Unión ha sido diferente de la de Gran Bretaña ya que no busca librarse de la burocracia ni de las reglas opresivas que determinan el tamaño de los

  • aparatos electrónicos o las frutas, sino aprovechar las libertades y la prosperidad económica

    El enclave goza de autogobierno, salvo en materia de defensa y relaciones exteriores, y sus residentes tienen nacionalidad británica. Gibraltar en el año 2002 celebró un referéndum donde el 99% rechaza la soberanía conjunta y en el referido a la salida de la Unión el 95,9 % afirma que quiere permanecer en la misma.

    El Consejo Europeo ha mencionado, y vale repetirlo, que cuando el Reino Unido deje la Unión, “ningún acuerdo entre la Unión y Gran Bretaña se aplicará al territorio de Gibraltar sin el acuerdo de España y el Reino Unido “

    Esto le dará efectivamente a España el derecho de excluir el territorio de cualquier acuerdo a un mercado único entre la Unión y Gran Bretaña si Madrid no acepta.

    En definitiva, la cuestión ha tomado un giro inesperado, y solo el tiempo dirá si esto favorece a los intereses españoles en recuperar el territorio, o si Gibraltar continuará siendo un enclave británico en Europa.

    (*) Profesor Titular de Derecho Internacional Público. Universidad Católica Argentina “Santa María de los Buenos Aires.” Profesor Titular Doctorado en Ciencias Jurídicas Universidad Católica Argentina “Santa María de los Buenos Aires.” Ex Catedrático Grado 5 Derecho Internacional Público Universidad Católica del Uruguay “Dámaso Larrañaga.”[1]ARTICLE XI. Moreover the Catholic King doth in like manner for himself, his heirs and successors, yield to the crown of Great Britain the whole island of Minorca, and doth transfer thereunto forever, all right, and the most absolute dominion over the said island, and in particular over the town, castle, harbour, and fortifications of the bay of Minorca, commonly called Port Mahon, together with the other ports, places, and towns situated in the aforesaid island. But it is provided, as in the above-written article, that no refuge or shelter shall be open to any ships of war of the Moors in Port Mahon, or in any other port of the said island of Minorca, whereby the Spanish coasts may be infested by their excursions: and the Moors and their ships shall only be allowed to enter the island aforesaid on account of traffic, according to the agreement of treaties. The Queen of Great Britain promises also on her part, that if at any time it shall happen that the island of Minorca, and the ports, towns, and places therein situated, be by any means hereafter alienated from the crown of her kingdoms, the preference shall be given to the crown of Spain, before any other nation whatever, of redeeming the possession and propriety of the aforesaid island. Her Royal Majesty of Great Britain moreover engages, that she will take care, that all the inhabitants of the said island, both ecclesiastical and secular, shall safely and peaceably enjoy all their estates and honors, and the free use of the Roman Catholic religion shall be permitted: and measures shall be taken for preserving the aforesaid religion in that island, provided the same be consistent with the civil government and laws of Great Britain. Those likewise who are now in the service of his Catholic Majesty, shall enjoy their honors and estates, though they continue in the said service , and it shall be lawful for any person, who is desirous to leave the said island, to sell his estate, and pass freely with the value thereof into Spain.ARTICLE XII

    The Catholic King doth furthermore hereby give and grant to her Britannic Majesty, and to the company of her subjects appointed for that purpose, as well the subjects of Spain, as all others, being excluded, the contract for introducing negroes into several parts of the dominions of his

  • Catholic Majesty in America, commonly called El Pacto de el Assiento de Negros, for the space of thirty years successively, beginning from the first day of the month of May, in the year 1713, with the same conditions on which the French enjoyed it, or at any time might or ought to enjoy the same, together with a tract or tracts of land to be allotted by the said Catholic King, and to be granted to the company aforesaid, commonly called La Compañia de el Assiento, in some convenient place on the river of Plata (no duties or revenues being payable by the said company on that account during the time of the above-mentioned contract, and no longer); and this settlement of the said society, or those tracts of land, shall be proper and sufficient for planting, and sowing, and for feeding cattle for the subsistence of those who are in the service of the said company, and of their negroes; and that the said negroes may be there kept in safety till they are sold; and moreover, that the ships belonging to the said company may come close to land, and be secure from any danger. But it shall always be lawful for the Catholic King to appoint an officer in the said place or settlement, who may take care that nothing be done or practised contrary to his royal interests. And all who manage the affairs of the said company there, or belong to it, shall be subject to the inspection of the aforesaid officer, as to all matters relating to the tracts of land above-mentioned. But if any doubts, difficulties, or controversies, should arise between the said officer and the managers for the said company, they shall be referred to the determination of the governor of Buenos Ayres. The Catholic King has been likewise pleased to grant to the said company several other extraordinary advantages, which are more fully and amply explained in the contract of the Assiento, which was made and concluded at Madrid the 26th day of the month of March of this present year 1713. Which contract or Assiento de Negros, and all the clauses, conditions, privileges, and immunities contained therein, and which are not contrary to this article, are and shall be deemed and taken to be part of this treaty, in the same manner as if they had been here inserted word for word.

    [2]Articulo X. Tratado de Utrecht 13 de Julio de 1713

    "El Rey Católico, por sí y por sus herederos y sucesores, cede por este Tratado a la Corona de la Gran Bretaña la plena y entera propiedad de la ciudad y castillos de Gibraltar, juntamente con su puerto, defensas y fortalezas que le pertenecen, dando la dicha propiedad absolutamente para que la tenga y goce con entero derecho y para siempre, sin excepción ni impedimento alguno. Pero, para evitar cualquier abuso y fraudes en la introducción de las mercaderías, quiere el Rey Católico, y supone que así se ha de entender, que la dicha propiedad se ceda a la Gran Bretaña sin jurisdicción alguna territorial y sin comunicación alguna abierta con el país circunvecino por parte de tierra. Y como la comunicación por mar con la costa de España no puede estar abierta y segura en todos los tiempos, y de aquí puede resultar que los soldados de la guarnición de Gibraltar y los vecinos de aquella ciudad se ven reducidos a grandes angustias, siendo la mente del Rey Católico sólo impedir, como queda dicho más arriba, la introducción fraudulenta de mercaderías por la vía de tierra, se ha acordado que en estos casos se pueda comprar a dinero de contado en tierra de España circunvecina la provisión y demás cosas necesarias para el uso de las tropas del presidio, de los vecinos y de las naves surtas en el puerto. Pero si se aprehendieran algunas mercaderías introducidas por Gibraltar, ya para permuta de víveres o ya para otro fin, se adjudicarán al fisco y presentada queja de esta contravención del presente Tratado serán castigados severamente los culpados. Y su Majestad Británica, a instancia del Rey Católico consiente y conviene en que no se permita por motivo alguno que judíos ni moros habiten ni tengan domicilio en la dicha ciudad de Gibraltar, ni se dé entrada ni acogida a las naves de guerra moras en el puerto de aquella Ciudad, con lo que se puede cortar la comunicación de España a Ceuta, o ser infestadas las costas españolas por el corso de los moros. Y como hay tratados de amistad, libertad y frecuencia de comercio entre los ingleses y algunas regiones de la costa de África, ha de entenderse siempre que no se puede negar la entrada en el puerto de Gibraltar a los moros y sus naves que sólo vienen a comerciar. Promete también Su Majestad la Reina de Gran Bretaña que a los habitadores de la dicha Ciudad de Gibraltar se les concederá el uso libre de la Religión Católica Romana. Si en algún tiempo a la Corona de la Gran Bretaña le pareciere conveniente dar, vender, enajenar de cualquier modo la propiedad de la dicha Ciudad de Gibraltar, se ha convenido y concordado por este Tratado que se dará a la Corona de España la primera acción antes que a otros para redimirla."

  • [3] RESOLUCION 1514 (XV), DECLARACIÓN SOBRE LA CONCESION DE LA INDEPENDENCIA

    A LOS PAISES Y PUEBLOS COLONIALES

    6. Todo intento encaminado a quebrantar total o parcialmente la unidad nacional y la integridad territorial de un país es incompatible con los propósitos y principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.

    [4]Question of Gibraltar

    The General Assembly,

    Having examined the question of Gibraltar,

    Having heard the statements of the administering Power and the representative of Spain,

    Having heard the statements of the petitioners,

    Recalling its resolution 2070 (XX) of 16 December 1965, and the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on 16 October 1964,

    Recalling further its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

    Taking into account the noted willingness of the administering Power and of the Government of Spain to continue present negotiations,

    Regretting the occurrence of certain acts which had prejudiced the smooth progress of these negotiations,

    1. Regrets the delay in the process of decolonization and in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Gibraltar;

    2. Calls upon the two parties to continue their negotiations, taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory, and asks the administering Power to expedite, without any hindrance and in consultation with the Government of Spain, the decolonization of Gibraltar, and to report to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as soon as possible, and in any case before the twenty-second session of the General Assembly;

    3. Requests the Secretary-General to assist in the implementation of the present resolution.

    [5] The General Assembly having considered the question of Gibraltar,

    Having heard the statements of the administering Power and of the representative of Spain,

    Recalling its Resolution 1514 (XV) of the 14th December 1960,

    Recalling further, the resolution adopted on the 1st September 1967 by the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly Resolutions 2070 (XX) of the 16th December 1965 and 2231 (XXI) of the 20th December 1966 and the consensus adopted on the 16th October 1964 by the Special Committee,

    Considering that any colonial situation which partially or completely destroys the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and especially with paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly;

    1. Regrets the interruption of negotiations recommended in General Assembly Resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI);

    2. Declares the holding of the referendum of 10th September 1967, by the administering Power to be a contravention of the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 2231 (XXI) and of those of the Resolution approved on 1st September 1967 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

  • 3. Invites the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume without delay the negotiations provided for in General Assembly Resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI), with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar and to safeguarding the interests of the population upon termination of that situation;

    4. Requests the Secretary-General to assist the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly in its twenty-third session. [6]HattersleyMemorandumGibraltar

    HC Deb 03 August 1976 vol 916 cc726-7W726W

    §Mrs. Hart

    asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what communication he has had with the Government of Gibraltar since the visit to London on 25th and 26th June of the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition.

    §Mr. Hattersley

    After the talks the British Government set out their views on the proposals of Gibraltar in a memorandum dated 26th June, copies of which are in the Library of the House. The substance of these views was that proposals which implied that there should be a new form of integration with Britain were neither practicable nor desirable in the interests of Gibraltar. The position of the people of Gibraltar is safeguarded both constitutionally and economically by the Gibraltar Constitution Order 1969 and by Her Majesty's Government's existing undertakings. We have since confirmed in a message through the Governor to the Chief Minister that our concern is to avoid innovations which might result in prolongation of the frontier restrictions imposed by Spain.

    My right hon. Friend has this week replied to a letter from the Gibraltar Trades Council requesting discussions on the future of Gibraltar before the General Election which is due there shortly. He has reminded it that although Her Majesty's Government must retain ultimate responsibility on issues of constitutional change, we remain ready to discuss with elected representatives any proposals which have general support. He added that what 727W is now required is a period of calm in Gibraltar during which the issues of interest and concern to the people can be discussed and fully debated in a quiet and reasonable way, and the election can be held.

    [7]Case T-176/09: Order of the General Court of 24 May 2011 — Government of Gibraltar v Commission (Action for annulment — Directive 92/43/EEC — Conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora — Decision 2009/95/EC — List of sites of Community importance for the Mediterranean biogeographical region — Inclusion in the site of Community importance called ‘Estrecho oriental’ of an area of the territorial waters of Gibraltar and of an area of the high seas — Partial annulment — Non-severability — Inadmissibility)

    http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1492129229780&uri=CELEX:62009TB0176

    The Gibraltarian government was trying to get the court to overturn a European Commission 2008 ruling that listed the waters as Spain's protected site under EU law. From an ecological standpoint, the waters are seen as valuable and must be protected because they are transit routes for sea creatures such as dolphins and turtles, the EC said.

    http://elpais.com/elpais/2011/06/02/inenglish/1306992047_850210.html

    [8]http://www.investmenteurope.net/other/gibraltar-completes-its-passage-from-tax-haven-to-international-financial-centre/

    [9]http://docplayer.net/24193575-Tackling-offshore-tax-evasion-a-new-criminal-offence.html

    [10]Los Tratados se aplicaran a Gibraltar como territorio europeo cuyas relaciones exteriores asume un Estado miembro. Ello no supone modificación alguna de las respectivas posiciones de los Estados miembros de que se trata.”

    [11]Este es el contenido de la importante resolución de la Asamblea General 2353 de 1967

    [12]Whereas Gibraltar is part of Her Majesty’s dominions and Her Majesty’s Government have

  • given assurances to the people of Gibraltar that Gibraltar will remain part of Her Majesty’s dominions unless and until an Act of Parliament otherwise provides, and furthermore that Her Majesty’s Government will never enter into arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another state against their freely and democratically expressed wishes

    [13] The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Spain, His Excellency Sr Don Francisco Fernández Ordoñez, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Howe, meeting in London on 2 December 1987.

    Taking into account the joint communiqué agreed at Brussels on 27 November 1984 which established a negotiating process between both countries aimed at overcoming all the differences between them over Gibraltar and at promoting cooperation on a mutually beneficial basis on a number of matters including aviation.

    Taking into account also the discussions within the Council of the European Community about the European Commission's proposals for liberalising air transport.

    Understanding, as a result of the conversations which have taken place between the two Ministers, that both Governments consider that greater cooperation over the use of Gibraltar airport will be beneficial for both countries and for the population of Gibraltar and the Campo de Gibraltar.

    And in view of the fact that the application of the European Community air transport policy to Gibraltar airport will mean an increase in its civil use.

    Have agreed the following arrangements:

    1. The aeronautical authorities of the two sides will hold regular consultations about all questions relating to the development of the civil use of the airport, including those relating to the establishment of new services to third countries.

    Permission for Spanish airlines to operate services between airports of the Kingdom of Spain and Gibraltar, under paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the draft EC Decision on Capacity and Market Access, will be given by the Spanish authorities.

    2. The Spanish authorities will build a new terminal at La Linea de la Concepcion adjacent to the northern side of the existing frontier-fence. Passengers using this terminal will have direct access to the airport through a gate in the south side of the terminal.

    3.1 The Spanish terminal will be used by the following categories of passengers:

    · Passengers from any country, flying in aircraft of any company and of any nationality, whose destination on disembarking is any point on the territory situated to the north of the frontier fence.

    · Passengers proceeding from any point of the territory situated to the north of the frontier fence who embark in aircraft of any company and of any nationality, for any destination.

    3.2 The British terminal will be used by all other passengers.

    3.3 When appropriate, passengers will be subject to customs and immigration controls in the respective terminals.

    4.1 A committee will be established to coordinate the civil air transport activities of the British and Spanish terminals and their relation with the airport's other services. The committee will consist of an equal number of members appointed by each Government.

    4.2 The arrangements in paragraph 4.1 will be kept under review by the Working Group on Civil Aviation Questions established in 1985 under the auspices of the Anglo/Spanish Coordinators. This working group will report regularly to the Coordinators. The reports will contain any recommendations for further cooperation in the use of Gibraltar airport.

    5. The British and Spanish Governments will ensure that effective measures are taken within the existing and new terminals respectively to screen passengers and their carry-on items, and to carry out appropriate checks on crew, cargo and aircraft stores prior to and during boarding. There will be

  • close cooperation between the authorities responsible for security within the two terminals and between them and the existing authorities responsible for security elsewhere at the airport, so as to ensure that the highest standards of security are maintained.

    6. There will be continued discussions between the two sides about further strengthening of air safety and traffic control arrangements in the area.

    7. The present arrangements and any activity or measure undertaken in applying them or as a consequence of them are understood to be without prejudice to the respective legal positions of Spain and the United Kingdom with regard to the dispute over sovereignty over the territory in which the airport is situated.

    8. The above arrangements will come into operation when the British authorities have signified to the Spanish authorities that the legislation necessary to give effect to paragraph 3.3 above is in force, or on completion of the construction of the Spanish terminal, whichever is the later, but in any event not more than one year after the notification referred to above. London, December 2, 1987

    [14]https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020712/debtext/20712-06.htm 12 Jul 2002: Column 1165-Gibraltar11 amThe Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Jack Straw): With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I should like to make a statement about Gibraltar. As the House will know, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe and I had planned to be in Madrid this morning for a meeting, under the Brussels process with Spanish Foreign Minister, Josep Pique. However, because of the Cabinet changes in Spain this week, the new Foreign Minister, Ana de Palacio, has asked us to postpone the meeting until after the summer, and we have agreed.

    Some time ago, I undertook to report to the House before the summer recess on the progress of our talks. Had today's meeting taken place, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe would have made a statement early next week in my absence on a long-arranged visit to the far east. In view of the postponement of today's talks, however, I thought it right to take the first opportunity to report to the House myself.

    There has been a dispute between Britain and Spain over Gibraltar for the last 300 years. As the House will be aware, in 1984 the then Conservative Government decided that the only way in which to make progress to resolve the dispute was to talk to Spain about both the practical issues of concern to Gibraltar and the sovereignty issue which mattered to Spain. The so-called Brussels process was thus born.

    This Government decided last year to relaunch those negotiations. We did so because we had reached the same conclusion as our predecessors—that the status quo was damaging to Gibraltar, and also damaging to Britain. It is damaging to Gibraltar because Gibraltar will not thrive while the dispute festers and its people have to put up with everyday disruption: queues at the border, insufficient telephones lines, inadequate air services and much else. Moreover, Gibraltar has an uncertain future in isolation from the European Union's single market and the global marketplace, and as tax havens are phased out.

    The dispute is also damaging to Britain's interests because we are trying to build a strategic alliance with Spain to help deliver the European Union that we both seek, and because Spain has repeatedly blocked European measures we want—measures, for example, to make air travel safer, flights cheaper and delays shorter. Above all, the dispute affects the 30,000 Gibraltarians; but it also affects 60 million Britons. It needs to be solved for good. I know that there are those who think we should simply tackle the practical irritants faced by Gibraltarians, but that has been tried for decades and it has failed. The only way of securing a stable and prosperous future for Gibraltar is through a comprehensive and permanent settlement of the dispute, and that means an agreement with Spain on all issues including—as flagged up by the Brussels communiqué itself in 1984—sovereignty.

    By taking the latter approach, we have made significant progress towards a solution. It may be helpful if I remind the House of the phases of the process on which we are embarked. In the first phase, the current one, our objective has been to agree the framework—the principles—of a new permanent settlement for Gibraltar. That is what we 12 Jul 2002 : Column 1166--have been working

  • on for the past year or so. If and when we were able to reach agreement with Spain on such a framework, we would publish it in a joint declaration—a statement of intent by the two Governments. Thereafter, in the second phase, there would be further detailed negotiations—in which the Government of Gibraltar would again be invited to participate fully—to produce a comprehensive package, including a new draft treaty, based on the principles set out in the joint declaration. The United Kingdom would ratify such a treaty only after securing the consent of the Gibraltarians in a referendum.

    After 12 months of negotiation, we and Spain are in broad agreement on many of the principles that should underpin a lasting settlement. They include the principles that Britain and Spain should share sovereignty over Gibraltar—[Hon. Members: "Sell-out!"]—including the disputed territory of the isthmus; that Gibraltar should have more internal self-government—[Hon. Members: "Sell-out!"]—that Gibraltar should retain its British traditions, customs and way of life; that Gibraltarians should retain the right to British nationality, and should gain the right to Spanish nationality as well—[Hon. Members: "Surrender!"]—that Gibraltar should retain its institutions—its Government, House of Assembly, courts and police service; and that Gibraltar could, if it chose, participate fully in the European Union single market and other EU arrangements. [Interruption.]

    [15]GIBRALTAR CONSTITUTION ORDER 2006- PROCLAMATION

    Whereas the Gibraltar Constitution Order 2006 (“the Constitution Order 2006”) has on the 28th day of December 2006 been published in the Gazette and, in accordance with section 1(2) of the Constitution Order 2006, has come into force;

    And whereas section 2 of the Constitution Order 2006 provides that the Constitution set out in Annex 1 to the Constitution Order 2006 shall (subject to the transitional and other provisions set out in Annex 2 to the Constitution Order 2006) have effect in Gibraltar and the Gibraltar Constitution Order 1969 shall be revoked, from the “appointed day”:−

    Now therefore, in exercise of the power conferred on me by section 1(3) of the Gibraltar Constitution Order 2006, I hereby proclaim the 2nd day of January 2007 as the “appointed day”. Given under my hand and the Public Seal of Gibraltar this 30th day of December, 2006.

    R FULTON,Governor.

    [16]Ederington, L. Benjamin. "Property as a Natural Institution: The Separation of Property from Sovereignty in International Law."American University International Law Review 13, no. 2 (1997): 263-331.

    [17]http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp_306.txt

    [18]Emmeric de VattelEl Derecho de Gentes o Principios de la Ley Natural Aplicados a la Conducta y a los Negocios de las Naciones y de los Soberanos .Traducida al Español por el Lic. Don Manuel Pascual Hernández. Imprenta de la Compañía 1820.

    [19]Si bien el proceso recién comienza , ya existe abundante bibliografía sobre el tema :

    Prime Minister’s letter to European Council President, Donald Tusk, announcing the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU under Article 50 TEU

    Institute for Government, Brexit Explained: the Article 50 letter and Brexit Explained: Article 218

    General Secretariat of the Council, European Council (Art. 50) (29 April 2017) - Draft guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification under Article, 50 TEU, 31 March 2017

    European Commission - Fact Sheet, Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union – Q&A, 29 March 2017

    European Commission, brexit_timeline_EN.pdf

    Cm 9417, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union, February 2017

    European Council press release 160/17, Remarks by President Donald Tusk following the UK

  • notification, 29 March 2017

    European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Dept C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, The Brexit Negotiations: an Assessment of the Legal, Political and Institutional Situation in the UK, March 2017

    EP Policy Dept. Constitutional Affairs, The Impact and Consequences of Brexit for Northern Ireland, Jonathan Tonge, University of Liverpool, 2017

    Chatham House, EU Citizens Back Their Leaders’ Negotiating Stance on Brexit, 29 March 2017

    EU Observer, 30 March 2017, Transparency is key EU tactic in Brexit talks

    Open Europe, 29 March 2017, Open Europe responds to the triggering of Article 50, Aarti Shankar

    Open Europe, 29 March 2017, Vincenzo Scarpetta, Theresa May triggers Article 50 – what next?

    EurActiv 29 March 2017, Gabriel: No ‘UK rebate’ in Brexit talks

    Politico, 29 March 2017, 8 takeaways on Article 50 day. Theresa May’s strategy? Aim high, speak softly and carry a big stick

    European Commission White Paper on the Future of Europe, Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, 1 March 2017

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    13 Commons Library Briefing, 31 March 2017

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    EP study for Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Brexit and the European Union: General Institutional and Legal Considerations, Miguel Tell Cremades and Petr Novak, January 2017

    [20]NOTE From: General Secretariat of the CouncilTo: Delegations

    Subject: European Council (Art. 50) (29 April 2017)- Draft guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification under Article50 TEU

    Delegations will find attached the draft European Council (Art. 50) guidelines following the United Kingdom’s notification under Article 50 TEU, prepared by the President of the European Council.

    On 29 March 2017, the European Council has received the notification by the United Kingdom ofits intention to withdraw from the European Union and Euratom. This allows for the opening of negotiations as foreseen by the Treaty.

    European integration has brought peace and prosperity to Europe and allowed for an unprecedented level and scope of cooperation on matters of common interest in a rapidly changing world. Therefore, the Union's overall objective in these negotiations will be to preserve its interests, those of its Member States, its citizens and its businesses.

    The United Kingdom's decision to leave the Union creates significant uncertainties that have the potential to cause disruption, in particular in the UK but also in other Member States. Citizens who have built their lives on the basis of rights flowing from the British membership of the EU face the prospect of losing those rights. Businesses and other stakeholders will lose the predictability and certainty that come with EU law. With this in mind, we must proceed according to a phased approach giving priority to an orderly withdrawal.

    In these negotiations the Union will act as one. It will be constructive throughout and will strive to find an agreement. This is in the best interest of both sides. The Union will work hard to achieve that outcome, but it will prepare itself to be able to handle the situation also if the negotiations were to fail.

    These guidelines define the framework for negotiations under Article 50 TEU and set out the overall positions and principles that the Union will pursue throughout the negotiation. The European

  • Council will remain permanently seized of the matter, and will update these guidelines in the course of the negotiations as necessary.

    I. CORE PRINCIPLES.1. The European Council will continue to base itself on the principles set out in the statement of Heads of State or Government and of the Presidents of the European Council and the

    European Commission on 29 June 2016. It reiterates its wish to have the United Kingdom as a close partner in the future. It further reiterates that any agreement with the United Kingdom will have to be based on a balance of rights and obligations, and ensure a level-playing field.

    Preserving the integrity of the Single Market excludes participation based on a sector-by –sector approach. A non-member of the Union, that does not live up to the same obligations a sa member, cannot have the same rights and enjoy the same benefits as a member. In this context, the European Council welcomes the recognition by the British Government that the four freedoms of the Single Market are indivisible and that there can be no "cherry picking".

    2. Negotiations under Article 50 TEU will be conducted as a single package. In accordance with the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, individual items cannot be settled separately. The Union will approach the negotiations with unified positions, and will engage with the United Kingdom exclusively through the channels set out in these guidelines and in the negotiating directives. So as not to undercut the position of the Union, there will be no separate negotiations between individual Member States and the United Kingdom on matters pertaining to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union.

    II. A PHASED APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS

    3. On the date of withdrawal, the Treaties will cease to apply to the United Kingdom, to those of its overseas countries and territories currently associated to the Union, and to territories for whose external relations the United Kingdom is responsible. The main purpose of the negotiations will be to ensure the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal so as to reduce uncertainty and, to the extent possible, minimize disruption caused by this abrupt change.

    To that effect, the first phase of negotiations will aim to:

    – settle the disentanglement of the United Kingdom from the Union and from all the rights and obligations the United Kingdom derives from commitments undertaken as Member State;

    – provide as much clarity and legal certainty as possible to citizens, businesses, stakeholders and international partners on the immediate effects of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union.

    The European Council will monitor progress closely and determine when sufficient progress has been achieved to allow negotiations to proceed to the next phase.

    4. While an agreement on a future relationship between the Union and the United Kingdom as such can only be concluded once the United Kingdom has become a third country, Article 50TEU requires to take account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union in the arrangements for withdrawal. To this end, an overall understanding on the framework for the future relationship could be identified during a second phase of the negotiations under Article 50. The Union and its Member States stand ready to engage in preliminary and preparatory discussions to this end in the context of negotiations under Article 50 TEU, as soon as sufficient progress has been made in the first phase towards reaching a satisfactory agreement on the arrangements for an orderly withdrawal.

    5. To the extent necessary and legally possible, the negotiations may also seek to determine transitional arrangements which are in the interest of the Union and, as appropriate, to provide for bridges towards the foreseeable framework for the future relationship. Any such transitional arrangements must be clearly defined, limited in time, and subject to effective enforcement mechanisms. Should a time-limited prolongation of Union acquis be considered, this would require existing Union regulatory, budgetary, supervisory and enforcement instruments and structures to apply.

  • The core principles set out above should apply equally to the negotiations on an orderly withdrawal, to any preliminary and preparatory discussions on the framework for a future relationship, and to any form of transitional arrangements.

    7. The two year timeframe set out in Article 50 TEU ends on 29 March 2019.

    III. AGREEMENT ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL

    8. The right for every EU citizen, and of his or her family members, to live, to work or to study in any EU Member State is a fundamental aspect of the European Union. Along with other rights provided under EU law, it has shaped the lives and choices of millions of people.

    Agreeing reciprocal guarantees to settle the status and situations at the date of withdrawal of EU and UK citizens, and their families, affected by the United Kingdom's withdrawal from

    the Union will be a matter of priority for the negotiations. Such guarantees must be enforceable and non-discriminatory.

    9. Also, the United Kingdom leaving the Union will impact EU businesses trading with and operating in the United Kingdom and UK businesses trading with and operating in the Union.

    Similarly, it may affect those who have entered into contracts and business arrangements or take part in EU-funded programmes based on the assumption of continued British EU membership. Negotiations should seek to prevent a legal vacuum once the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom and, to the extent possible, address uncertainties.

    10. A single financial settlement should ensure that the Union and the United Kingdom both respect the obligations undertaken before the date of withdrawal. The settlement should cover all legal and budgetary commitments as well as liabilities, including contingent liabilities.

    11. The Union has consistently supported the goal of peace and reconciliation enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement, and continuing to support and protect the achievements, benefits and commitments of the Peace Process will remain of paramount importance. In view of the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland, flexible and imaginative solutions will be required, including with the aim of avoiding a hard border, while respecting the integrity of

    the Union legal order. In this context, the Union should also recognize existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between the United Kingdom and Ireland which are compatible with EU law.

    12. The Union should agree with the United Kingdom on arrangements as regards the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom in Cyprus and recognize in that respect bilateral agreements and arrangements between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom which are compatible with EU law, in particular as regards the situation of those EU citizens resident or working in the Sovereign Base Areas.

    13. Following the withdrawal, the Union with 27 Member States will continue to have the right sand obligations of the Union with 28 Member States in relation to international agreements. The United Kingdom will no longer be covered by agreements concluded by the Union or by Member States acting on its behalf or by both acting jointly. The European Council expects the United Kingdom to honour its share of international commitments contracted in the context of its EU membership. In such instances, a constructive dialogue with the United

    Kingdom on a possible common approach towards third country partners and international organizations concerned should be engaged.

    14. While the future location of the seats of EU agencies and facilities located in the United Kingdom is a matter for the 27 Member States, arrangements should be found to facilitate their transfer.

    15. Arrangements ensuring legal certainty and equal treatment should be found for all court procedures pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union upon the date of withdrawal that involve the United Kingdom or natural or legal persons in the United Kingdom. The Court of Justice of the European Union should remain competent to adjudicate in these procedures.

  • Similarly, arrangements should be found for administrative procedure spending before the European Commission and Union agencies upon the date of the withdrawal that involve the United Kingdom or natural or legal persons in the United Kingdom. In addition, arrangements should be foreseen for the possibility of administrative or court proceedings to be initiated post-exit for facts that have occurred before the withdrawal date.

    16. The withdrawal agreement should include appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms regarding the application and interpretation of the withdrawal agreement, as well as duly circumscribed institutional arrangements allowing for the adoption of measures necessary to deal with situations not foreseen in the withdrawal agreement. This should be done bearing in mind the Union's interest to effectively protect its autonomy and its legal order, including the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

    IV. PRELIMINARY AND PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS ON A FRAMEWORK FOR

    THE UNION - UNITED KINGDOM FUTURE RELATIONSHIP

    17. The European Council welcomes and shares the United Kingdom's desire to establish a close partnership between the Union and the United Kingdom after its departure. While a relationship between the Union and a non Member State cannot offer the same benefits as Union membership, strong and constructive ties will remain in both sides' interest and should encompass more than just trade.

    18. The British government has indicated that it will not seek to remain in the single market, but would like to pursue an ambitious free trade agreement with the European Union. Based on the Union's interests, the European Council stands ready to initiate work towards such an agreement, to be finalised and concluded once the United Kingdom is no longer a Member State.

    19. Any free trade agreement should be balanced, ambitious and wide-ranging. It cannot, however, amount to participation in the Single Market or parts thereof, as this would undermine its integrity and proper functioning. It must ensure a level playing field in terms of competition and state aid, and must encompass safeguards against unfair competitive advantages through, inter alia, fiscal, social and environmental dumping.

    20. Beyond trade, the EU stands ready to consider establishing a partnership in other areas, in particular the fight against terrorism and international crime as well as security and defence.

    21. The future partnership must include appropriate enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms that do not affect the Union's autonomy, in particular its decision-making procedures.

    22. After the United Kingdom leaves the Union, no agreement between the EU and the United Kingdom may apply to the territory of Gibraltar without the agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom.

    V. PRINCIPLE OF SINCERE COOPERATION

    23. Until it leaves the Union, the United Kingdom remains a full Member of the European Union, subject to all rights and obligations set out in the Treaties and under EU law, including the principle of sincere cooperation.

    24. The European Council recognizes the need, in the international context, to take into account the specificities of the United Kingdom as a withdrawing Member State, provided it remains loyal to the Union's interests while still a Member. Similarly the Union expects the United Kingdom to recognise the need of the 27 Member States to meet and discuss matters related to the situation after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom.

    25. While the United Kingdom is still a member, all ongoing EU business must continue to proceed as smoothly as possible at 28. The European Council remains committed to drive forward with ambition the priorities the Union has set itself. Negotiations with the United Kingdom will be kept separate from ongoing Union business, and shall not interfere with its progress.

    VI. PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 50

  • 26. The European Council endorses the arrangements set out in the statement of 27 Heads of State or Government on 15 December 2016.

    [21]THE PRIME MINISTER-10 DOWNING STREETLONDON SWlA 2AA-29 March 2017

    On 23 June last year, the people of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. As I have said before, that decision was no rejection of the values we share as fellow Europeans. Nor was it an attempt to do harm to the European Union or any of the remaining member states. On the contrary,

    the United Kingdom wants the European Union to succeed and prosper. Instead, the referendum was a vote to restore, as we see it, our national self-determination. We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe - and we want to remain committed partners and allies to our friendsacross the continent.

    Earlier this month, the United Kingdom Parliament confirmed the result of the referendum by voting with clear and convincing majorities in both of its Housesfor the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill. The Bill was passed by Parliament on 13 March and it received Royal Assent from Her Majesty

    The Queen and became an Act of Parliament on 16 March.

    Today, therefore, I am writing to give effect to the democratic decision of thepeople of the United Kingdom. I hereby notify the European Council in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Union. In addition, in accordance with the same Article 50(2) as applied by Article 106a of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, I hereby notify the European Council of the United Kingdom's intention to withdraw from the European Atomic Energy Community. References in this letter to the European Union should therefore be taken to include a reference to the European Atomic Energy Community.

    This letter sets out the approach of Her Majesty’s Government to the discussions we will have about the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union and about the deep and special partnership we hope to enjoy – as your closest friend and neighbour – with the European Union once we leave. We believe that these objectives are in the interests not only of the United Kingdom but of the European Union and the wider world too. It is in the best interests of both the United Kingdom and the European Union that we should use the forthcoming process to deliver these objectives in a fair and orderly manner, and with as little disruption as possible on each side. We want to make sure that Europe remains strong and prosperous and is capable of projecting its values, leading in the world, and defending itself from security threats. We want the United Kingdom, through a new deep and special partnership with a strong European Union, to play its full part in achieving these goals. We therefore believe it is necessary to agree the terms of our future partnership alongside those of our withdrawal from the European Union. The Government wants to approach our discussions with ambition, giving citizens and businesses in the United Kingdom and the European Union – and indeed from third countries around the world – as much certainty as possible, as early as possible.

    I would like to propose some principles that may help to shape our coming discussions, but before I do so, I should update you on the process we will be undertaking at home, in the United Kingdom.

    The process in the United Kingdom

    As I have announced already, the Government will bring forward legislation that will repeal the Act of Parliament – the European Communities Act 1972 – that gives effect to EU law in our country. This legislation will, wherever practical and appropriate, in effect convert the body of existing European Union law (the “acquis”) into UK law. This means there will be certainty for UK citizens and for anybody from the European Union who does business in the United Kingdom. The Government will consult on how we design and implement this legislation, and we will publish a White Paper tomorrow. We also intend to bring forward several other pieces of legislation that address specific issues relating to our departure from the European Union, also with a view to ensuring continuity and certainty, in particular for businesses. We will of course continue to fulfill our

  • responsibilities as a member state while we remain a member of the European Union, and the legislation we propose will not come into effect until we leave.

    From the start and throughout the discussions, we will negotiate as one United Kingdom, taking due account of the specific interests of every nation and region of the UK as we do so. When it comes to the return of powers back to the United Kingdom, we will consult fully on which powers should reside in Westminster and which should be devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. But it is the expectation of the Government that the outcome of this process will be a significant increase in the decision-making power of each devolved administration.

    Negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union..-We recognise that it will be a challenge to reach such a comprehensive agreement within the two-year period set out for withdrawal discussions in the Treaty. But we believe it is necessary to agree the terms of our future partnership alongside those of our withdrawal from the EU. We start from a unique position in these discussions – close regulatory alignment, trust in one another’s institutions, and a spirit of cooperation stretching back decades. It is for these reasons, and because the future partnership between the UK and the EU is of such importance to both sides, that I am sure it can be agreed in the time period set out by the Treaty.

    The task before us is momentous but it should not be beyond us. After all, the institutions and the leaders of the European Union have succeeded in bringing together a continent blighted by war into a union of peaceful nations, and supported the transition of dictatorships to democracy. Together, I know we are capable of reaching an agreement about the UK’s rights and obligations as a departing member state, while establishing a deep and special partnership that contributes towards the prosperity, security and global power of our continent.

    [22]http://theconversation.com/brexit-quel-avenir-pour-gibraltar 76333?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=facebookbutton

    Citar: elDial DC231A

    Publicado el: 5/8/2017

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