I INTERNACIONAL

• I .............

INTERNACIONAL

Política Internacional

AUTORIDADES DE CANCILLERÍA

Embajadora Sandra Erica Jovel Polanco MINISTRA DE RELACIONES EXTERIO RES

Embajador Luis Fernando Carranza Cifuentes VICEMINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

Embajador Jairo David Estrada Barrios VICEMINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

Embajadora Alicia Virginia Castillo Sos a VICEMINISTRA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

Embajador Pablo César Garcia Sáenz VICEMINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

Embajadora María Luisa Ramirez Coronado DIRECTORA GENERAL DE CANCILLERíA

Embajadora Mónica Renata Bolaiios Pérez DIRECTORA GENERAL DE RELACIONES

INTERNACIONALES MULTILA TERALES Y ECONÓMICAS

Embajadora Julia Arabella Woolfolk de Chinchilla DIRECTORA GENERAL DE

ASUNTOS CONSULARES Y MIGRATORlOS

Embajadora Sonia Regina Martínez de Palencia DIRECTORA GENERAL DE ASUNTOS JURÍDICOS,

TRA T ADOS INTERNAClONALES Y TRADUCCIONES

Embajador Eduardo Antonio Escobedo San abria DIRECTOR GENERAL DE LIMITES Y

AGUAS INTERNACIONALES

Embajador Leonardo Salvador Ramos Suria DIRECTOR GENERAL DE

PROTOCOLO Y CEREMONIAL DLPLOMÁ TICO

Director: Embajador Luis Alberto Padilla

Afto 3 -No. 6 - Guatemala, Diciembre de 2018

CONSEJO EDITORIAL

Embajador Jairo David Estrada Barrios

Embajador Gabriel Aguilera Peralta

Embajador Luis Alberto Padilla

Embajadora Sara Solis Castafieda

Mgtr. Rubén Nájera Contreras

Mgtr. Marco Vinicio Quan Ramirez

Política Internacional es una publicación de la Academia Diplomática deI

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Guatemala y que se

publica semestralmente. Los artículos publicados son de exclusiva

responsabilidad de los autores y no reflejan necesariamente el pensamiento de la revista. Se permite la reproducción o traducción de los artículos a condición de mencionar la fuente y enviar dos copias a la redacción de Política Internacional.

Política Internacional 2a. Ave. 4-17, Zona 10 Ciudad de Guatemala

Teléfonos: 2410-0000 - 2410-0057 Correo Electrónico:

[email protected]

Logo de la Academia Diplomática: EI símbolo representa a Hunahpú e Ixbalanqué, gemelos de la creación maya, simbolos dei sol, la luna y dei

movimiento constante. Este movimiento se expresa en el símbolo como la comunicación de dos vías - diálogo- así como en la forma que alude a dos manos estrechándose (amistad y la cooperación). EI color verde representa

a la naturaleza, la vida y la sabiduría.

Año 3 - Número 6 - Julio/Diciembre 2018 - Guatemala

Política InternacionalC O N T E N I D O

Presentación 5

ARTICULOS

• LaConfiguracióndelaGranEurasiaysu ImpactoenlaGobernanzaGlobal. 7 Andrés Serbin

• CrisisdeGlobalización,CrisisdeHegemonia: UnEscenariodeCambioEstructuralpara AméricaLatinayElCaribe. 22 José Antonio Sanahuja

• OverlappingRegionalism,NoIntegration: ConceptualIssuesandTheLatinAmericanExperiences. 46 Andrés Malamud • HaciaunaCiudadaníaTransnacional.LaMovilidadHumanaylos ProcesosMigratoriosenlaEradelAntropoceno. 60 Luis Alberto Padilla

• HowMigrationTransformsCitizenship:International, MultinationalandTransnationalPerspectives. 109 Rainer Bauböck

ENSAYOS • Globalización,DeslocalizaciónyDesigualdad UnaEconomíadelAbsurdo. 131 Josep Burgaya

• TheBanningofNuclearWeaponsand TheNon-ProliferationTreaty. 144 Sergio Duarte

CONTENIDO

DOCUMENTOS

• ConsideracionesparaunDiscernimientoÉticosobrealgunos AspectosdelActualSistemaEconómicoyFinanciero. 152 OficinadePrensadelaSantaSedeBolletino Sala Stampa Della Santa Sede

• ExtractosdelDiscursodePresentacióndelaReformaMigratoria enChileyElementosSobresalientesenMateriaRegulatoria. 175 Sebastián Piñera

Política Internacional - Año 3 - Número 6 - Julio/Diciembre 2018 - Guatemala

ABSTRACT:Twentyyearsafteritsfoundation,MERCOSURhasfailedtomeetitsdeclaredgoals.Farfrombeingacommonmarketandnotyetacustomsunion,ithasneitherdeepenednor(legally)enlarged.All theotherregionalistprojects inLatinAmericafareevenworse,although they have arguably fostered domestic democracy, economic reforms and morepeacefulregionalrelations.Thispaperintroducesaconceptualtoolkitforcomparingregionalintegration, and then applies it to explain the dispersed goals and declining performanceof theLatinAmericanexperiences.Theaim is to showhow the strengtheningofnationalsovereignty–asopposedtoitspoolingordelegation–isattheheartofmostcontemporaryregionalist strategies.

KEYWORDS: Comparative regional integration, regionalism, LatinAmerica, Mercosur.

RESUMEN:Veinte años después de su fundación,MERCOSUR ha fallado en alcanzarsus objetivos declarados. Lejos de ser un mercado común todavía no es una unión aduanera y tampoco ha podido profundizar (legalmente) su ampliación.Todos los otros proyectosregionalistas enAmérica Latina lo hacen aún peor, aunque puedan argumentar que hanpromovidolademocracia,reformaseconómicasyunasrelacionesregionalesmáspacíficas.En este artículo se introduce un marco conceptual para comparar los procesos de integración regional,paraluegoaplicarloafindeexplicarporqueladiversidaddeobjetivosharepercutidoen unos resultados cada vezmenores en la experiencia latinoamericana. El propósito esmostrar de qué manera el fortalecimiento de las soberanías nacionales – que se opone a que éstas sean compartidas o delegadas – constituye el punto medular de la mayor parte de estrategias regionalistas.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Integración regional comparativa, regionalismo, América Latina, Mercosur.

ConceptualIssuesandTheLatinAmericanExperiences(Regionalismo Sobrepuesto, Sin Integración:

CuestionesConceptualesyExperienciasLatinoamericanas)

Overlapping Regionalism, No Integration:

ANDRÉSMALAMUD*

* Andres Malamud es investigador principal de la Universidad de Lisboa. Autor de numerosos artículos y trabajos académicos ha sido profesor de la Universidad de Buenos Aires de donde es graduado, habiéndose doctorado en la Instituto Universitario Europeo. Ha sido investigador en el Instituto Max

Planck de Alemania y en el College Park de la Universidad de Maryland, entre otros. Este artículo fue publicado originalmente como workingpaper por el Centro para Estudios Avanzados Robert Schuman del Instituto Universitario Europeo.

47Andrés Malamud

IntroductionIn the 1960s, the first wave of Latin

American integrationwaspartly fosteredbytherisingthreatofafortress Europe andtheneedtojoinforcestoconfrontit.Inthe1990s,however, the European Union (EU) hadbecomebothamodelandapartnerforanewwaveofregionalorganizationsthatincluded,prominently, theAndeanCommunity (CANaccording to its Spanish acronym) and theCommon Market of the South (Mercosur).But by showing the limits and dangers ofill-designedregional institutions, thecurrentcrisis of European integration has dealt ablow to the belief that pooling sovereigntyisthenecessarywayaheadfornationstates.Yet, political activity on a regional basis still commands a great deal of attention from chief executives and foreign policyelitesworldwide.Thisarticleapproachestheevolution of regionalism with two aims inmind:first,toclarifykeyconceptsandrefineanalytical categories; and second, to apply theseconceptsandcategoriestocontemporaryLatinAmericanexperienceswithintegrationin order to evaluate their performance andprospects.

OnConceptsandParadigmaticDebates

In the field of political science andinternational relations, two broad strands ofliterature have developed to account for thevoluntary clustering of independent states into regionalgroupings.Inchronologicalorder,thefirstchristeneditssubjectmatterasregionalintegration and has focused mainly onEuropesincethelate1950s(Haas1958);thesecond strand opted for a fuzzier label, namely regionalism,andsincethe1990shasfocusedon all continents though only marginally

onEurope (Hettne, Inotai andSunkel1999:Hettne andSöderbaum1998).The focusonEurope of the former strand does notmeanthat the forerunners of integration studieslackedcomparativeambitions,asearlyworksonLatinAmericashow(Haas1967;HaasandSchmitter1964);rather,integrationprocessesfailedtotakerootandwereonlyconsolidatedinEurope,stagnatingorrecedingelsewhere.

The first problem faced by those whostudy comparative regional integration is not empirical or theoretical, but conceptual.Unlikepioneeringmasterpiecessuchasthoseproduced by Nye (1968), Claude (1971) or Lindberg (1963), too many contemporary studies suffer from conceptual stretching orfuzziness or both. Although most authorsusually provide some kind of definition forthephenomenon theyanalyze, fewdo so inasatisfactorymanner.Thus,mostdefinitionsareeithertoovagueortooambiguous.Take,for example, the influential characterizationby Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 7) “Newregionalismisacomprehensive,multifacetedand multidimensional process, implying thechange of a particular region from relativeheterogeneitytoincreasedhomogeneitywithregard toanumberofdimensions, themostimportant being culture, security, economic policies and political regimes”. In thisdefinition,analyticalcategoriesareexplicitlynon-exhaustive,implicitlynon-exclusive,andarenotrankedbyprecedenceorhierarchy.Thiscannotplausiblyproducemeasurableindicatorsandtestablehypotheses.Hettneand Söderbaum (1998: 9) further defineregionalization as “increasing levels of “regionness”, namely the process wherebya geographical region is transformed from apassiveobject toasubjectwithacapacityto articulate the interests of the emergingregion (emphasis added). Here, confusion

48 OverlappingRegionalism,NoIntegration:ConceptualIssuesandTheLatinAmericanExperiences

reaches new heights, as the word region is used simultaneously to connote objective geography and subjective interests, as wellasanexistingobjectandanemergingentity.Hegels distinction between in sich and für sich isawonderfulphilosophicalinsight,butmodernscholarshiprequiresdifferentnamesfor different things, clear definitions andconceptsthatcanberenderedoperational.

A way out of conceptual stretchingand fuzziness consists of understanding contemporary regionalism as an umbrella expression that covers a multiplicity ofdistinct phenomena.AndrewHurrell (1995)enumerates five of these, arguing that noneshould be given the exclusive rights to usethe term: (a) regionalization, (b) regionalawarenessandidentity,(c)regionalinterstatecooperation, (d) state-promoted regional integration, and (e) regional cohesion. Thefirst regionalization can be understoodassocialoreconomicinterdependence,whichis usually the outcomeof informal,market-driven processes. The second - regionalidentity - conveys a cultural rather thanapoliticaloreconomicnotion.Thecommonfeatureofbothphenomena is thatneither isnecessarily intended but is brought aboutby uncoordinated factors-such as increasingtradeormigrationflowsorcommonhistoricalroots.Thefollowingthreesubtypesrespondtoadifferentlogic:theyareeithertheoutcomeof formal state decisions cooperation and integrationoraconsequenceofsuchdecisionsregionalcohesion.Whilecooperationentailsvoluntary compliance, integration requires some degree of sovereignty transfer, whichdiscourages unilateral with drawal andraisesthecostsofprocessreversion.Inthesesubtypes, Hurrell (1995: 44) claims, “theregion plays a defining role in the relationsbetweenthestates(andothermajoractors)of

thatregionandtherestoftheworld”,whileconstituting“theorganizingbasisforpolicywithintheregion across a range of issues” (emphasisadded).Thisdefinitionalsousesthesameconceptsimultaneouslyforanactorandanarena:here,theregion “plays a role” regarding “policy within the region”. Suchubiquitousconfusionisarguablyrootedinthenominalization of the adjective regional. This word, however, indicates scope, notsubstance (Malamud 2010: 654). The lattershould be conveyed by a noun, which caneitherbeaprocess (integration)oranentity(organization). To give an example,Europe isanintelligiblybuthighlyambiguousnounthat should not be collapsedwith Europeanintegration or with the European Union. Inthese two expressions, “integration” and“union”arenounswhile“European”becomesanadjectivethatdelimitsaparticularrangeofotherwisegeneralphenomena.

So what is regional integration?Regardlessoftime,Haas`s(1971:6)definitionis sufficiently clear and parsimonious toserve as a point of departure: a “process of how and why nation states voluntarilymingle,mergeandmixwith theirneighborsso as to lose the factual attributes ofsovereigntywhile acquiring new techniquesfor resolving conflicts among themselves”To this, Schmitter (2004) has convenientlyadded, “by creating common and permanent, institutions capable of making decisionsbinding on all member” Contrary to common usageinLatinAmericanpolitics,whereafterany international dispute statesmen rush todeclare that “the conflict is over, now it istimefor integration”,theoppositeofconflictis not integration but cooperation. Actually, integration is just a subset of cooperation-andnotthemostsuccessfuloreventhemostfrequent. Nor is regional integration just

49Andrés Malamud

increasingtradeflows(akaregionalization)orthevariousmanifestationsofDeutschet al conceptualization (1957) such asrecurrent contacts among elites, facilitating communicationbetweenormeetingsamongpeople across national borders, or even promoting symbols of common identity.

Although there is nothing in the abovedefinitionthatgivestheeconomyprimacyoverotherdomains,thefactisthatreallyexistingintegration attempts have regularly adoptedeconomic goals, whether efficiency gainsthroughbenefitsofscaleorjointdevelopmentthrough cooperation and solidarity. Asregardsthemarketdimension,therearefourprogressive levels of achievement (Balassa1961).Thesimplest,thefree-tradezone, isanareainwhichdomesticobstaclestotradearedismantled;thismeansthatcustomstariffs are not imposed on the products ofany member country. A customs union takesthingsonestepfurther:atthisstageacommonexternaltariffisestablished,fixingtheamountthatproductscomingfromtherestoftheworldhavetopaytoenterthearea.Thisimpliesthatthemembercountriesformasingleentityinthearenaofinternationaltrade.Thethirdstep,a common or single market, is a customs union towhichthefreemobilityofproductivefactorsbetweenthemembercountriesandacommontrade policy are added. It contemplates thecoordination of sectoral macro-economic policiesamongitsmembersandrequirestheharmonizationofnationallegislation.Fourth,an economic union appends centralized monetaryinstitutionsandcommonfinancialpoliciestothesinglemarket.Itgoesbeyondsimple coordination and harmonizationamong the member countries, and includesthe establishment of unified supranationalagencies such as a central bank and asingle currency. Fiscal coordination is also required,astheEurocrisishasmadeclear.

Regardless of the economic goalsof regional integration, the necessity ofestablishingsomekindofcommoninstitutionalarrangementsfostersnon-economiclinkages.Higher levels of state-promoted economicintegrationarelikelytoincreaseflowsoftradeand investment, i.e. growing regionalizationin the sense of the first subtype definedby Hurrell. Likewise, increasing flows ofpeople and communications can nurture a regionalawareness,asinthesecondsubtype.Although none of these means regionalintegrationasdefinedabove,theymaycreatefurtherdemandsforit,amechanismthattheneo-functionalist literature calls spillover.1 Spillover is theunintendedprocesswherebyintegration between states in one sectorcreates incentives for integration in furthersectorsinordertofullycapturethebenefitsofintegrationintheoriginalsector.

Just like the development of capitalismandtheemergenceofthebourgeoisiecreatedtheneedforlargermarkets,whichinturnledto the consolidation of the nation-state, theeffects of economic integration spill over into the political arena and foster new politicalcenters that command authority over largerterritories. This is why regional integrationcan be compared to the historical processof state building, even though the former isvoluntary while the latter has seldom beenso.Asbothprocessesaimat thecreationofa larger political community, they feature acommon foundational nature. This standsin contrast to normal-time politics, whenorganizational apparatuses are devoted to daily administration. The EU case isillustrative: as it consolidated as a political

1 Neofunctionalism is an approach that was originally developed by Ernst Haas (1958; 1964) to explain processes of international integration such as the European Coal and Steel Community and the International Labor Organization.


community, its management gradually became “business as usual and the scholarly focusmoved from integration to governance - and from international relations to comparative politics (Hix 1994). Hence, the EU startedtobecomparedmorewithfederalstatesandlesswithotherinternationalorganizations.Asithappened,thenatureofthebeastchangedfrom polity-makingto policy-making. Lately, though,theEurocrisishasre-equilibratedtheweightofthetwodimensions.

Integration can develop in two ways.Negativeintegrationreferstothedismantlingof national barriers on trade and theprohibition of discriminatory behavior,while positive integration implies commonpolicies that shape the conditions underwhichmarketsoperate (Scharpf1996).Thisdistinction between market-creating and market-regulating functions is significantbecause the formermaybeattained throughintergovernmental proceedings, while thelatter requires enforcement by supranational agencies and rules. Since negative and positive integration are generally sequential, the useof this criterion supports the view of thosewhoseethepassageofintergovernmentalismto supranationalism as progressive over time; bethatasitmay,progressivedoesnotmeanirreversible.

Irrespective of its degree of formal supranationality, a regional organization may tend to privilege either the authority ofimpersonalinstitutionsorthedecisionofspecific power-holders. The orientation ofagivenorganizationinthisregardismoreafunctionofthestate-societynexusofthe(larger)member states rather than of the regionalconstitutionorlegalsystem(SöderbaumandSbragia2010).Theconsequenceisthatsomeblocs may be mainly rule-oriented whileothersremainmorepower-oriented.

A further distinction regards integrationand convergence. The former means thatmember-states get ever closer, while thelatterconveystheybecomemore similar. As an example,Greece ismore integratedwithGermanye.g.theyshareacommoncurrencyand military affiliation within NATO thanNorway with Sweden, yet the latter pairfeatures more similarities in political, economic, and social terms or in any othersignificantindicators.

International organizations may perform three roles (Archer 2001): they can serveas arenas for dialogue and cooperation, they can be used as instruments by otheractors (especially their member states), andthey can assume an independent identity asactorsinpursuitoftheirownobjectives aproperty called actorness. These rolesare non-exclusive and convey increasingcomplexity.Integrationonlystartsbeyondthesecond one.

There are three sets of conditions for aprocess of regional integration to develop: demand, supply (Mattli 1999), and inertial factors. Demand conditions emerge from higher levels of regional interdependence,as transnational transactors perceive thatcross-border activities are too costly and call on national or supranational authorities tolowertransactionscoststhroughcooperation,coordination and, eventually, integration. Supplyconditionsrefertoregionalleadership,understoodasthecapacityandwillofoneormore actors either topayadisproportionateshareof thecosts requiredby the regionalundertaking or to undertake monitoring,enforcement and brokerage. Inertialconditionstaketheformofdemandorsupplyconditions that become institutionalized,lockinginpreviousagreementsandcreatingpath-dependent effects that may protect

51Andrés Malamud

integration processes in times of declining demand or supply conditions but may also makethemtoorigid.

Althoughsomecouldjudgetheargumentspresented so far asEuro-centric, the goal isprecisely the opposite: to provide tools tounderstandregionalismindifferentworldareaswithouteitherequalizingthemorconsideringthemincommensurable.Integrationshouldbeunderstood as,

“a potentially global phenomenon,and thus one that should be recognizedwhenever it appears. This calls forstandarddefinitions and theory thatcantravel.Thinkofdemocracy: thereareasmanytypesthereofastherearecountriesin which citizens are formally equaland rulers are accountable; yet, lackingthese characteristics,we do not call it ademocracy.Thesameappliestoregionalintegration: either there are sovereignstatesthatvoluntarilytransferparcelsof sovereignty to joint decision-makingor there are not, and in this casewe donot call it integration.We have resistedthe temptation to stretch conceptualdefinitionsordisposeofworkingtheorieswhenagivenphenomenondoesnotturnoutasexpected,aslongasthoseconceptsand theories are capable of explainingwhythishappened.EUlessonsareusefulto understand South American travailswith regional integration preciselybecausetheycanalsomakesenseofnon-integration-insteadofcallingitotherwiseand pretending that it is a new animal”(MalamudandSchmitter2011:155).Since geographic vicinity is constant,

neighborhood spillovers are unavoidableand their joint management appears as areasonable goal. However, the means forachieving it are diverse and not determined

by historical legacies or globalizationpressures. In recent years, different forms ofregionalinteractionotherthanintegrationhave developed worldwide, and severalapproaches were developed that replicatedthecomplexificationofrealitywithfuzzinessandambiguityattheanalyticallevel.Butouranalytical categories have fizzled out andarefailing tocall thingsby theirname. It istime to call a spade a spade, to streamline our conceptualtoolkitandapplyittotheempiricalfield.

OnLatinAmerica`sObsessionwithRegionalismand

MisadventureswithIntegrationLatin American attempts at regionalism

have never converged into a single project.The first wave, following the WesternEuropeanexperimentwithcoalandsteelandeither supported or neglected by theUnitedStates,includedtwomutuallyexclusiveblocs:the CentralAmerican CommonMarket andthe LatinAmerican Free TradeAssociation(ALALC).2 Subsequent experiences as theAndean Community and the CaribbeanCommunity (CARICOM) also included small subsets of countries, giving rise to a long-lastingpatchworkofsegmentedregionalisms.Today, there are a few associations thatencompasses several subregional blocs or even the whole subcontinent, such as theUnionofSouthAmericanStates(UNASUR)and the Community of LatinAmerican andCaribbean States (CELAC); but the formerbringstogetheronlyhalfoftheLatinAmericanstates while the latter lacks legal status,

2 Both organizations were founded in 1960. CACM initially brought together El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua but soon expanded to include Costa Rica, while ALALC comprised 11 states: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.


organizational structure and institutional authority.

UNASUR is a Brazil-sponsored regional cooperation agreement, masterminded for theunspokengoalofcarvingoutaBraziliansphereofinfluencebycuttingoffUSinfluenceand offsetting Mexican competition for

leadership.Itcontemplatesthepromotionofphysicalintegrationthroughtransport,energyandcommunicationnetworks,butitdoesnot envision any transfer of sovereignty. Accordingly, it should be considered asa tool for top-level dialogue and political coordination, but not an integration attempt.

LatinAmerica:SegmentedRegionalism

From top left, by row: (1) the Americas, (2) Latin America, (3) ALBA, (4) North America (NAFTA), (5) Central America (SICA), (6) South America (UNASUR), (7) Mercosur, (8) Andean Community, and (9) Pacific Alliance. Source: Malamud and Gardini (2012: 122).

53Andrés Malamud

Although CELAC acts as the EUcounterpart in EU-Latin America and theCaribbeanmeetings,whichbringtogether60states(27Europeanplus33fromLAC),thefact is that thesemeetings long predated itscreation.CELAC is a hollow container thatregionalpowersusetosignalpolicypositionsor towaveideologicalbannerssuchasanti-AmericansentimentorSouth-Southsolidarity.It is also one more arena for states to trade theirdifferencesandforheadofgovernmentstobuildmutual trust,but it isnot - andhasno prospects of becoming - an international actor. And, to be sure, nor is it an integration project.

In the last decade, a further type ofregionalismpurportedlyhasbeen identified:post-liberal or post-hegemonic regionalism(Sanahuja 2009; Riggirozzi and Tussie2012). The argument is that the newconstruct has shifted the focus away fromeconomics and, by lambasting the failureof neo-liberal reforms, features a more ideological (aka progressive) stance.Policy coordination and common identities come to the fore as market and investmentrelations recede. The topmost examples ofthiskindoregionalismareUNASURandtheVenezuelan-sponsored Bolivarian Alliancefor the Peoples of our America (ALBA).These undertakings discursively reject theneo-functionalist premise that integration isdriven by a convergence of interests ratherthan ideological commonalities.However, abacklash is underway, as Chile, Colombia,Peru and Mexico have signed a treaty toestablishaPacificAlliancethat-onceagain-putstheeconomyfirst.Itsgoalistofosterfreetrade and market integration in oppositionto the ideological radicalization of LatinAmerican regionalism (Malamud and Gardini 2012:120).Yet,thisgroupinghasapolitical

impact worth considering as it challengesintotheregion,out-performingMercosuranddiluting UNASUR.

ThesegmentednatureofLatinAmericanregionalism is not always competitive butfrequently overlapping, as shown by thefigureattached.Ofthenineblocsfeaturedinthemaps,onefeaturestandsout:

“not one country participates in at least half of them. In the Western hemisphere,regionalismisalwayssub-regionalandthereis no common core or political centre. Therealityisthat,everytimeanewblocisborn,itdoessobyexcludingneighbouringcountriesand by intentionally differentiating itself from other (sub)regionalorganisations.Decentredsub-regionalisms rather than concentricregionalism has been the end-productof such logic, by which sub-regionalintegration proceeds through regional orhemispheric disintegration” (Malamud andGardini 2012:120).

As argued above, integration was notpursued by all these regional undertakings,but it was explicitly promised by some ofthem. However, it has not been deliveredbyanyof them-barringpartialandusuallyreversedachievements.ThecaseofMercosur,whichusedtobeseenasthemostsuccessfulandpromisingexperienceofLatinAmericanintegration, offers an eloquent illustration of thetransformationsbroughtaboutbymeagerresultsandchanginggoals.

If the success of an organization ismeasured by the attainment of the goalsestablished in its treaties, Mercosur is anoutright failure. After more than twentyyears,itisneitheracommonmarketnorevenacustomsunion.Worse,itdoesnotworkasan effective free trade zone, since unilateral tariffrestrictionsareerectedatwillandnon-


tariffbarriers abound.Chilehasnot appliedfor membership as the founders expected,and chains of value and regional industrialcomplexes have only developed outside thescope of the treaties - as in the automobilesectoral agreement betweenArgentina andBrazil. It would be unfair to ignorethat Mercosur has accomplished othercommendable goals such as facilitating thetransitionstodemocracy,lockingindomesticeconomic reforms and consolidating a regional securitycommunity.Butthesedidnotrequirethetransferofsovereigntyandcanthereforeberegardedastheresultofcooperationratherthanintegration.

One of the few aspects that makesMercosur look as if it works is legalinternational actorness. Unlike the AndeanCommunity, fifteen years after they began,Mercosur is stillnegotiatingwith theEUasabloc.However, it isBrazilonitsownthatsits at top international tables such as theBRICS (largest emerging economies), IBSA (largest Southern hemisphere democracies),BASIC (emerging economies environmental coalition), and the WTO 4-party final-negotiationsgroup,nottospeakofitsbidtooccupy a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council against Argentina`s will(Malamud 2011).

Finally,theonlycaseofenlargementhasledtoapoliticalconflictoverthesuspensionof Paraguay to allow the ratification ofVenezuela`s accession. The rift created alegal limbo regarding the status of the twomembers and the validity of the legislationdecidedduringtheexclusionofParaguay,asthis contradicts the unanimity decision ruleand therefore puts into question Paraguay`sfuturecommitmenttoabidebytherules.

Mercosur is a case of supply-side integration,asthepoliticaldecisiontoestablish

the organization was not made in responseto previous economic interdependence or societaldemands.Itskeyworkingmechanismhas been called interpresidentialism,meaning the outcome of combining aninternational strategy, namely presidential diplomacy, with a domestic institution,namely presidentialism (Malamud 2005a). Presidential diplomacy is the customaryuse of direct negotiations between nationalpresidentsratherthanprofessionaldiplomatseverytimeacrucialdecisionhastobemadeor a critical conflict needs to be solved. Inturn, presidentialism South American stylegrants chief executives the power to strikedeals without seeking approval by eitherparliamentsorcabinets.Theconsequenceofthis combination is thatMercosur has beenpower-orientedratherthanrule-orientedfromits inception.

Accordingly, the legalization or judicia-lization of the bloc`s procedures is nothingmorethanamyth.Itstopdisputesettlementinstitutionshavebeencalledupon16timesin 20 years. Legal institution-building, as manifested by the establishment of the so-called Permanent ReviewTribunal in 2006,wasnotundertakeninresponsetofunctionalneedsbut ratherbecauseof thepressureofepistemic communities and transnational networks: blunt simplification - jobs forlawyers(andjudges)servestoconveythepoint.

Likewise, the development of aparliamentaryinstitutionhasbeenanoutcomeof professional lobbying by academics and national lawmakers, but also a legitimizingresourcebornoutofmimicryandisomorphism(RulandandBechle2011).Themarketplaceof ideas about regional integration is muchlimited to a single successful source, theEU. In fact, Parlasur has no legislative

55Andrés Malamud

tariffbarriers abound.Chilehasnot appliedfor membership as the founders expected,and chains of value and regional industrialcomplexes have only developed outside thescope of the treaties - as in the automobilesectoral agreement betweenArgentina andBrazil. It would be unfair to ignorethat Mercosur has accomplished othercommendable goals such as facilitating thetransitionstodemocracy,lockingindomesticeconomic reforms and consolidating a regional securitycommunity.Butthesedidnotrequirethetransferofsovereigntyandcanthereforeberegardedastheresultofcooperationratherthanintegration.

One of the few aspects that makesMercosur look as if it works is legalinternational actorness. Unlike the AndeanCommunity, fifteen years after they began,Mercosur is stillnegotiatingwith theEUasabloc.However, it isBrazilonitsownthatsits at top international tables such as theBRICS (largest emerging economies), IBSA (largest Southern hemisphere democracies),BASIC (emerging economies environmental coalition), and the WTO 4-party final-negotiationsgroup,nottospeakofitsbidtooccupy a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council against Argentina`s will(Malamud 2011).

Finally,theonlycaseofenlargementhasledtoapoliticalconflictoverthesuspensionof Paraguay to allow the ratification ofVenezuela`s accession. The rift created alegal limbo regarding the status of the twomembers and the validity of the legislationdecidedduringtheexclusionofParaguay,asthis contradicts the unanimity decision ruleand therefore puts into question Paraguay`sfuturecommitmenttoabidebytherules.

Mercosur is a case of supply-side integration,asthepoliticaldecisiontoestablish

competences, no oversight capacities, isnot demographically proportional, and hasvirtually no transnational party politics.

ThedistinctivenessofMercosurvis-à-visotherregionalprojectssuchasUNASURorALBA continues to be its treaty-based focus on market issues. Yet, few advances havebeen made regarding policy coordination and harmonization, and the threshold betweencooperation and integrationhas beenhardlycrossed. The only discipline that the blochas effectively imposed upon its membersis the prohibition to unilaterally sign tradeagreements,acompetencethatwastransferredto the regional level only to be gloomilyunderutilized.

Themainreasonforthisunderachievementwasidentifiedadecadeago,inwhatremainsthe most in-depth analysis of the bloc todate. In the view of its authors,Mercosur`sunderlying formula, i.e. preferential access totheBrazilianmarketinexchangeforArgentine support for Brazilian international strategies(Bouzasetal2002),hasexhaustedand never replaced its fuel.Thus,Mercosuracquiredadifferentmeaningforeachmemberstate, and national strategies have becomedisparateratherthancoordinated.

For Brazil, Mercosur no longer performs a significant economic role, as extra-regional partners dominate trade relations and regional investment is agreed bilaterally with each neighbor. Somewhat ironically,bothprogressiveactivistssuchasSamuelPinheiroGuimarães(2012)andpragmaticanalysts such asAlfredo Valladao (2006)agree that Brazil`s promotion of UNASURimperilsMercosur`sobjetivesandoperation.However, the latter also serves a politicalpurpose: to help manage relations withArgentina, the only regional country that

could seriously challenge or hinderBrazil`sglobal projection.3

By contrast, Mercosur has economicsignificanceforArgentinainsofarasBrazilisits largest trading partner (forBrazil,ChinaandtheUSarelargerpartnersthanArgentina).However, cars are the key commercial linkbetweenthetwocountries,thetradeinwhichis covered by an administered trade regime thatfallsoutsidethefreetradezone.Argentinaalso uses the bloc for unspoken politicalgoals suchas tyingBrazil to the regionandpreventing it from doing business or going global alone.

Former Brazilian foreign minister Celso Lafer once said that, for Brazil, negotiatingthe Free Trade Area of the Americas wasan option while Mercosur was its destiny.ParaphrasingLafer,itcouldbesaidthat,forParaguay, Mercosur is not its destiny but its doom:unavoidable,thoughnotnecessarilyagood thing. Landlocked, the country cannotaffordtobeleftoutofanassociationinwhichitstwocoastalneighborsparticipate.Andyetits recent suspension from the bloc becauseofanallegedcoupputsitintheworstoftwoworlds: itpays theclub`sSduesbutgetsnoperksofmembership.

By having direct access to the sea,Uruguay is less dependent on Mercosur than Paraguay. Nonetheless, the country`sbirth as a buffer state still resonates in thepresent, and offending any of its larger neighbors by leaving the bloc could set offpainful retaliations. Because leaving can be costlier than staying, strategic patienceand institutional inertia have carried theday. Additionally, the current left-of-centeradministrationtendstostandupfortheblocon ideological grounds.3 As suggested by Alfredo Valladão at the

conference “Mercosur at 20: Politics and Economics in the Southern Cone Latin American Centre, University of Oxford, 11th March 2011.


After six years of standoff, Venezuelanmembershipwasfinallyapprovedforreasonsof political expedience, as the suspensionof Paraguay by decision of three foreignpresidents (i.e. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) substituted for the congressionalratification of the accession protocol.However, as a few days later the Senateturnedtheprotocoldown,Venezuela`sstatusmightremaincontroversialonceParaguayisreadmitted. In any case, for an economy as uncompetitiveastheVenezuelantherationalefor belonging to the bloc is not related totrade but to the international legitimizationof its “revolutionary regime” and to stave off perceivedthreatsfromtheUS.

Insum,Mercosurisnotwhatitpurportstobeintheofficialdiscourse;rather,itisseveraldifferent thingsdependingonwho is asked.Itsbalancesheetispositivegiventheindirecteffects of upholding domestic democracyand the peaceful resolution of conflicts, butthe gap betweenwords and deedsmay endup definitely damaging its reputation andjeopardizing its usefulness. Should emptyrhetoric definitely gain the upper hand,Mercosur may survive but serve no furthercollective purpose. Indeed, really existingregional integration is notwhat itwas oncethoughttobe.

ConclusionsInLatinAmerica,regionalismhasevolved

through segmented proliferation rather thanenlargement,andthroughgoal-transformationrather than goal-attainment. The reasonsfor these unexpected developments can besummarizedasfollows.

First, economic facts trump political will. National economies are non-complementary and outward-oriented,

imposing a low ceiling on potential gainsfrom integration as Burges (2005) hasshown.Might any institutional arrangementcompensateforthisshortcoming?

The answer to the above question isnegative, as form has trumped function.Institutional deficits as in MERCOSUR orinstitutional precociousness or “surplus” as inCANhaveprevented functional spilloverfrom taking place (Malamud and Schmitter2011).Sowhataboutpragmaticfixes?

These fixes have not worked either, asideologyhasgraduallytrumpedpragmatism.Departing from its initial simplicity, Mercosur,whichhadoriginallylearnedmorelessons from theCANfailure than from theEUsuccess,hasincreasinglybecomelargelyrhetorical (Malamud 2005b; Doctor 2012).As the results show, though, programmaticaffinity and identity politics is no substitutefortheconvergenceofinterests.

Today`s landscape of Latin AmericanintegrationlookslikeJeanMonnet`sblueprintupsidedown:ratherthan“petitspas,grandseffets” therealityreflects“grandsmots,petitseffets” why talk but about integration if itdoes not deliver?

For some groups and observers, regional organizations - especially Mercosur - havebecomeanexistentialendper se ratherthanameanstoanend.Justascitizensareexpectedtodefendtheircountrywithoutquestioningitsraisond`etre,inchoateregionalidentityratherthaninterestsorreasoningarefrequentlyattherootofthedefenseofregionalwould-bepolities - a suggestive constructivist turn. For others,usuallyincludingscholars,politiciansand bureaucrats, regional organizations offer attractive opportunities to make a living: anew discipline for scholarly specialization,good salaries in region-funded contracts,

57Andrés Malamud

academic and political tourism, and theprestige of belonging to a small group of iniziati. In this case, it is not identity oradvantage arising from dismantling state bordersbutratherparticularisticintereststhatlie behind the defense of regionalism. Fortheir part, statesmen know that sovereigntyisnotrelinquishedbysigningpaperssotheyarefreetocontinuetoestablishandrelaunchregional organizations without integratinganything, and they can use regionalism asa foreign policy resource to achieve otherendssuchasinternationalvisibility,regionalstabilityandregimelegitimacy(Merke2010;Spektor2010).

Expressions such as “token integration`(Nye 1968: 377), “ceremonial regionalism” (Montesinos 1996), and integration-fiction(Peña1996)havebeencoinedtoportrayLatinAmericanintegration,withitscombinationofhigh-tonedrhetoricanddismalperformances.It often seems that decision- makers andtheir followerswant to talk integration intoexistence.Howeverabsurd thismayappear,thisbehaviorisfarfromunreasonable,sincepoliticians know that praising integrationgets them support, while actually engaginginitwouldhavematerialcosts.Thus,talkingwithout doing is not necessarily a sign ofcorruption, ignorance or cultural atavism: giventhedimconditionsforLatinAmericanintegration, it is simply a rational decision.

ReferencesArcher, Clive (2001) International

Organizations, London & New York,Routledge.

Balassa, Bela (1961) The Theory of Economic Integration.Westport, Conn.: GreenwoodPress.

Bouzas, Roberto, Pedro da Motta Veiga andRamónTorrent (2002) “In-depth analysisof Mercosur integration, its prospectives andtheeffectsthereofonthemarketaccessof EU goods, services and investment” Report presented to the Commission of the European Communities, Observatory of Globalization, Barcelona.

Burges, Sean W. (2005) “Bounded by therealityoftrade:practicallimitstoaSouthAmerican region”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18(3): 437-54.

Claude, Inis L. (1971) Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization.NewYork:RandomHouse.

Deutsch, Karl W., S.A. Burrell, R.A. Kann,M.LeeJr,M.Lichterman,R.E.Lindgren,F.L.Loewenheim,andR.W.VanWagenen.(1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Guimaraes, Samuel Pinheiro (2012),“Relatório ao Conselho de Ministros”, Alto Representante Geral do Mercosul, June, http://www.amersur.org.ar/Integ/Guimaraes1206.pdf, accessed 5 December 2012.

Haas,ErnstB.(1958)The Uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Haas,ErnstB.(1964)BeyondtheNation-State. Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press.


Haas,ErnstB.(1967)“TheUnitingofEuropeandthe“UnitingofLatinAmerica”Journal of Common Market Studies, 5(4), pp. 315-43.

Haas,ErnstB. (1971) “The studyof regionalintegration:reflectionsonthejoyandanguishof pretheorizing”, in L:N: Lindberg andS.A.Scheingold(eds)RegionalIntegration:Theory and Research. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress.

Haas,ErnstB.andPhilippeC.Schmitter(1964)“Economics and Differential Patterns of Integration:Projections about Unity in Latin America”, International Organization, 18(4), pp. 705-37.

Hettne,Bjorn,A. Inotai andO. Sunkel (eds.)(1999) GlobalismandtheNewRegionalismBasingstoke:Macmillan.

Hettne, Bjorn and Fredrik Söderbaum (1998)“TheNewRegionalismApproach”,Politeia 17(3): 6-21.

Hix,Simon(1994)TheStudyoftheEuropeanCommunity:TheChallengetoComparativePolitics West European Politics, 17(1): 1-30.

Hurrell,Andrew “Regionalism in TheoreticalPerspective”, in L Fawcett andAHurrell(eds), Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and InternationalOrder (Oxford, Oxford University Press,1995).

Lindberg, Leon N. (1963) The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Malamud, Andrés (2005a) Presidential Diplomacy and the InstitutionalUnderpinnings of Mercosur. An Empirical Examination Latin American Research Review, 40(1): 138-64.

Malamud, Andrés (2005b) “MERCOSUR turns 15: between rising rhetoric and

decliningachievement”,Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18(3): 421-36.

Malamud, Andrés (2010) “Latin American Regionalism and EU Studies”,, Journal of European Integration, 32(6): 637-57.

Malamud,Andrés(2011)“ALeaderwithoutFollowers? The Growing DivergenceBetween the Regional and GlobalPerformance of Brazilian Foreign Policy”, Latin American Politics and Society, 53(3): 1-24.

Malamud, Andrés and Gian Luca Gardini (2012) “Has Regionalism Peaked? TheLatin American Quagmire and its Lessons”, The International Spectator, 47(1): 123-40.

Malamud, Andrés and Philippe C. Schmitter(2011) “The Experience of EuropeanIntegrationandthePotentialforIntegrationinSouthAmerica”,inAlexWarleig-Lack,Nick Robinson and Ben Rosamond (eds)New Regionalism and the European Union.Dialogues,ComparisonsandNewResearch Directions. London and NewYork:Routledge,135-57.

Mattli, Walter (1999) The Logic of Regional Integration. Europe and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Merke,Federico(2010)“DeBolívaraBush:los usos del regionalismo en América Latina”.PaperdeliveredattheV Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política, ALACIP, Buenos Aires, 28-30 July.

Montesinos, Verónica (1996) “Ceremonialregionalism, institutions and integration in theAmericas” Studies in Comparative International Development, 31(2): 110-23.

Nye, Joseph N. (1968) International Regionalism.Boston:Little,Brown&Co.

Peña,Félix(1996)“ElMercosurylosacuerdosde integración económica en América Latina;¿quéleccionespuedenextraersede

59Andrés Malamud

Haas,ErnstB.(1967)“TheUnitingofEuropeandthe“UnitingofLatinAmerica”Journal of Common Market Studies, 5(4), pp. 315-43.

Haas,ErnstB. (1971) “The studyof regionalintegration:reflectionsonthejoyandanguishof pretheorizing”, in L:N: Lindberg andS.A.Scheingold(eds)RegionalIntegration:Theory and Research. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress.

Haas,ErnstB.andPhilippeC.Schmitter(1964)“Economics and Differential Patterns of Integration:Projections about Unity in Latin America”, International Organization, 18(4), pp. 705-37.

Hettne,Bjorn,A. Inotai andO. Sunkel (eds.)(1999) GlobalismandtheNewRegionalismBasingstoke:Macmillan.

Hettne, Bjorn and Fredrik Söderbaum (1998)“TheNewRegionalismApproach”,Politeia 17(3): 6-21.

Hix,Simon(1994)TheStudyoftheEuropeanCommunity:TheChallengetoComparativePolitics West European Politics, 17(1): 1-30.

Hurrell,Andrew “Regionalism in TheoreticalPerspective”, in L Fawcett andAHurrell(eds), Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and InternationalOrder (Oxford, Oxford University Press,1995).

Lindberg, Leon N. (1963) The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Malamud, Andrés (2005a) Presidential Diplomacy and the InstitutionalUnderpinnings of Mercosur. An Empirical Examination Latin American Research Review, 40(1): 138-64.

Malamud, Andrés (2005b) “MERCOSUR turns 15: between rising rhetoric and

la experiencia acumulada?”Archivos delPresente, 2(24), Buenos Aires.

Riggirozzi, Pía and Diana Tussie (2012) The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism inLatin America.Dordrecht:Springer.

Ruland, Jurgen and Karsten Bechle (2011)“Defending State-Centric Regionalism through Mimicry and Localization:Regional Parliamentary Bodies in theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) and Mercosur” Occasional Paper N°2,SoutheastAsianStudiesattheUniversity of Freiburg.

Sanahuja, José Antonio (2009) “Delregionalismo abierto al regionalismo post-liberal. Crisis y cambio en la integración regional en América Latina”, Anuario de la Integración Regional de América Latina y elGranCaribe, 7: 12-54.

Scharpf,FritzW.(1996)“NegativeandPositiveIntegration in the Political Economy ofEuropeanWelfareStates”,inGaryMarks,Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter

and Wolfgang Streeck: Governancein the European Union. London: Sage Publications.

Schmitter, Philippe C. (2004) “Neo-Neofunctionalism”, in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, eds: European Integration Theory.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,45-74.

Söderbaum,FredrikandAlbertaSbragia(2010)“EU Studies and the New Regionalism:What can be Gained from Dialogue?”,Journal of European Integration, 32(6): 563-82.

Spektor, Matías (2010) “ideas de ativismoregional: a transformação das leiturasbrasileiras da região”; Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53 (1): 25-44.

Valladão, Alfredo G.A: (2006) “Brazil: AnAmbiguous Leader”, prepared for GIGA Conference on Regional Powes in Asia,Africa,LatinAmericaandtheMiddleEast,Hamburg,11-12December.

IMPRESO EN LOSTALLERES DE PROCOIN

GUATEMALA DICIEMBRE 2018600 EJEMPLARES

I INTERNACIONAL

Documents

Transcript of I INTERNACIONAL