JOHN STUART MILL IV Sobre La Llibertat

8/2/2019 JOHN STUART MILL IV Sobre La Llibertat

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JOHN STUART MILL

SOBRE LA LLIBERTAT

IV. DELS LMITS DE L'AUTORITAT DE LA SOCIETAT SOBRE L'INDIVIDU

1. Quin s doncs el lmit just de la sobirania de l'individu sobre ellmateix? On comena l'autoritat de la societat? Quina esfera de lavida humana pertoca a la individualitat i quina a la societat?

2. Cadascuna d'elles rebr la part que li correspon, si disposa d'aquellaque l'afecta ms particularment. A la individualitat li hauria de

pertocar aquell mbit de la vida en el qual s'interessa sobretotl'individu; a la societat, aquell mbit que interessa sobretot lasocietat.

3. Per b que la societat no es basi en un contracte i per b que no s'higuanyi res inventant-ne un per tal de deduir-ne obligacions socials,tots els qui reben la protecci de la societat li deuen alguna cosa acanvi pel benefici percebut, i el fet de viure en societat faindispensable que cadasc es vegi en l'obligaci d'observar una certalnia de conducta envers la resta. Aquesta conducta consisteix, primer

de tot, a estar-se de lesionar els interessos dels altres o, millor dit,certs interessos que, ja sia per disposici legal o per consentimenttcit, sn considerats drets subjectius; i, segonament, en el fet quecada persona assumeixi la seva part (fixada segons un principiequitable) dels treballs i sacrificis que suposi la defensa de la societato dels seus membres quan siguin objecte d'ofenses i vexacions. Lasocietat es troba plenament justificada d'imposar, costi el que costi,aquestes condicions a aquells que voldrien incomplir-les. Per la

JOHN STUART MILL

On Liberty

Chapter 4. Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual.

WHAT, THEN, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual overhimself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of humanlife should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?

Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularlyconcerns it. To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is

chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chieflyinterests society.

Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose isanswered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations fromit, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for thebenefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that eachshould be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. Thisconduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rathercertain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit

understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in eachperson's bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of thelabours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its membersfrom injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified inenforcing, at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. Nor isthis all that society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful toothers, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going to


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societat pot fer quelcom ms. Els actes d'un individu poden resultarnocius als altres o faltar a la deguda consideraci que es mereix llurbenestar, sense necessitat d'arribar a violar algun dels seus drets

constituts. En aquest cas, l'ofensor pot ser punit justament perl'opini, per no per la llei. Tan bon punt com un aspecte delcomportament d'una persona afecta d'una manera perjudicial elsinteressos d'altri, la societat hi t jurisdicci i esdev objecte dediscussi la qesti de si la intervenci de la societat s favorable odesfavorable al b com. Per no treu cap a res plantejar aquestaqesti quan la conducta d'una persona afecta noms els seus propisinteressos o no t necessitat d'afectar els interessos dels altres si noho volen (partint del supsit que totes les persones afectades snmajors d'edat i tenen un grau normal d'enteniment). En tots aquestscasos, l'individu hauria de gaudir d'una llibertat perfecta, tant jurdicacom social, per portar a terme l'acte que volgus i atenir-se a lesconseqncies.

4. Seria una interpretaci totalment errnia d'aquesta doctrina suposarque predica la indiferncia egoista, que pretn que a la vida els ssershumans no tenen cap mena de relaci amb les seves respectivesconductes i que no han de preocupar-se per la prosperitat o elbenestar dels altres, tret que llurs propis interessos no en siguinafectats. En lloc d'una disminuci hi ha necessitat d'un increment de

l'acci desinteressada per a promoure el b dels altres. Per labenevolncia desinteressada pot trobar altres instruments que elsfuets i els flagells, tant en un sentit literal com metafric, per apersuadir la gent de quin s el seu b. Sc la darrera persona amenysvalorar les virtuts de la prpia estimaci. Noms sn lessegones en importncia, si s que ho sn, desprs de les socials.L'objecte de l'educaci s el conreu de totes dues per igual. Per fins itot l'educaci obra tant per convicci i persuasi com per compulsi, i

the length of violating any of their constituted r ights. The offender maythen be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. As soon as any partof a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society

has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will orwill not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. Butthere is no room for entertaining any such question when a person'sconduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs notaffect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, andthe ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases, there should beperfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand theconsequences.

It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it isone of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have nobusiness with each other's conduct in life, and that they should not concernthemselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless theirown interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a greatincrease of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But

disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade peopleto their good than whips and scourges, either of the literal or themetaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the self-regardingvirtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social. Itis equally the business of education to cultivate both. But even educationworks by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is bythe former only that, when the period of education is passed, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated. Human beings owe to each other


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quan el perode de l'educaci s ja clos, precisament les virtuts de laprpia estimaci haurien de ser inculcades emprant la fora de lapersuasi. Els ssers humans es deuen ajut els uns als altres per tal de

distingir all ms bo d'all ms dolent, aix com estmuls per a escollirentre l'un i l'altre. S'haurien d'esperonar tothora a incrementarl'exercici de les seves facultats superiors i a acrixer la direcci de llurssentiments i fins vers objectes i contemplacions assenyats en comptesde necis, elevats en comptes de degradants. Per no t cap mena dejustificaci que una persona, o una colla d'elles, diguin a una altracriatura humana dotada d's de ra que no pot fer amb la seva vidaen benefici propi all que li plagui de fer-ne. Ella mateixa s lapersona ms interessada en el seu propi benestar i l'inters quequalsevol altre, llevat d'alguns casos de fort lligam personal, hi pot

tenir, s ftil, comparat amb aquell que ella mateixa hi t. L'intersque la societat hi t individualment (tret de quan la seva conductaafecta els altres) s fragmentari i totalment indirecte, mentre que,respecte als seus propis sentiments i circumstncies, l'home o la donams vulgars tenen mitjans de coneixement que superenincommensurablement els que pot posseir qualsevol altre. Lainterferncia de la societat amb la intenci d'anular el judici ipropsits d'aquests en all que noms els concerneix a ells, cal que esbasi en presumpcions generals que poden ser totalment falses i,

encara que siguin certes, corren el risc de ser aplicades malament alscasos individuals per persones no ms ben familiaritzades amb lesseves circumstncies que uns observadors externs. Aix, doncs, enaquesta esfera dels afers humans, la individualitat t el seu campd'acci propi. En el mutu capteniment dels ssers humans, cal ques'observin en la majoria dels casos regles generals per tal que la gentspiga a qu atenir-se, per pel que fa als interessos de cadasc laseva espontanetat individual t dret a exercitar-se lliurement. s

help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement tochoose the former and avoid the latter. They should be for ever stimulatingeach other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased

direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish,elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations. But neither oneperson, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to anotherhuman creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his ownbenefit what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested inhis own well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases ofstrong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with thatwhich he himself has; the interest which society has in him individually(except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect;while with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary

man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing thosethat can be possessed by any one else. The interference of society tooverrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself must begrounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether wrong, andeven if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, bypersons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases thanthose are who look at them merely from without. In this department,therefore, of human affairs, Individuality has its proper field of action. In theconduct of human beings towards one another it is necessary that general

rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may knowwhat they have to expect: but in each person's own concerns his individualspontaneity is entitled to free exercise. Considerations to aid his judgment,exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtrudedon him, by others: but he himself is the final judge. All errors which he islikely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evilof allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.


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possible que els altres ofereixin ajut al seu judici, exhortacions per aenfortir la seva voluntat, que fins i tot insisteixin repetidament, peren tot cas ell t la darrera paraula. Tots els errors que pugui cometre

contra els consells i les admonicions es troben mpliamentcontrarestats pel mal de deixar que els altres el compelleixin a ferall que jutgen s el seu b.

5. No vull dir amb aix que els sentiments que una persona inspiri alsaltres no hagin de ser afectats de cap manera per les seves qualitats odefectes personals, cosa que no s possible ni desitjable. Si seminent en alguna de les qualitats que contribueixen al seu b, aix elfa digne d'admiraci, ja que aix s'acosta ms a la perfecci ideal de lanaturalesa humana. Si, en canvi, s summament deficient en aquestesqualitats, se'n seguir un sentiment contrari a l'admiraci. Hi ha un

grau de niciesa i un grau d'all que hom pot anomenar (tot i queaquesta expressi s fora objectable) la baixesa o la depravaci delgust, els quals, encara que no puguin justificar fer mal a la personaque els manifesten, la fan tornar necessriament i justa un objected'aversi o, en casos extrems, fins i tot de menyspreu, car s difcilque una persona tingui fortament aquestes qualitats contrries sensenodrir aquests sentiments. Malgrat que no faci mal a ning, unapersona pot obrar talment que no tinguem ms remei que jutjar-lo iveure'l com un ruc o un sser d'ordre inferior i, com que s

comprensible que s'estimi ms evitar aquest judici i aquest sentiment,prevenir-lo d'antuvi de les desagradables conseqncies a qus'exposa s prestar-li un servei. De fet, convindria que aquest bonservei fos fet ms lliurement del que actualment permeten lesnocions corrents d'urbanitat i que una persona pogus honradamentcridar l'atenci a una altra si creu que no obra b, sense sserconsiderat per aix grollera o presumptuosa. Igualment tenim dret,en diversos aspectes, a obrar d'acord amb la nostra opini

I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by othersought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities ordeficiencies. This is neither possible nor desirable. If he is eminent in any ofthe qualities which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object ofadmiration. He is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of humannature. If he is grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the oppositeof admiration will follow. There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what

may be called (though the phrase is not unobjectionable) lowness ordepravation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to theperson who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject ofdistaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt: a person could not havethe opposite qualities in due strength without entertaining these feelings.Though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us tojudge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: andsince this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, itis doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any other

disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. It would be well,indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than thecommon notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person couldhonestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without beingconsidered unmannerly or presuming. We have a right, also, in variousways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to theoppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are notbound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though


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desfavorable d'alg, no pas de cara a l'opressi de la sevaindividualitat, ans en l'exercici de la nostra. No estem obligats, perexemple, a cercar la seva companyia; tenim el dret d'evitar-la (per

no pas a fer ostentaci d'aquesta evitaci), car tenim el dret a escollirla companyia que ens s ms grata. Tenim el dret, que en algunscasos pot esdevenir el nostre deure, de prevenir els altres en contraseu, si creiem que el seu exemple o conversa pot tenir un efectepernicis sobre aquells amb el quals s'ajunta. No tenim l'obligacid'utilitzar a favor seu els nostres bons oficis, llevat d'aquells casos enqu procurem el seu millorament. Per aquestes diverses maneres unapersona pot sofrir penalitats molt greus ocasionades pels altres perfaltes que noms l'afecten directament a ell mateix; per pateixaquestes penalitats noms en la mesura que sn conseqncies

naturals i, podrem dir-ne, espontnies, de les faltes mateixes, noperqu li siguin infligides intencionalment per tal de punir-lo. Unapersona que demostra temeritat, entestament, urc, que no pot viureamb mitjans moderats, que no pot abstenir-se de rabeigs nobles, quepercaa plaers carnals a expenses dels de la sensibilitat o del'intellecte, cal que esperi ser objecte d'un rebaix en l'opini delsaltres i tenir una part menor dels seus sentiments favorables, perd'aix no t ra per queixar-se'n, fora que hagi merescut llur favor peruna excellncia especial en les seves relacions socials i hagi conquerit

aix un ttol a llurs bons oficis, que no es vegi afectat pels seus propisdemrits.

6. El que tracto de sostenir s que els inconvenients que snestrictament inseparables del judici desfavorable dels altres, sn elsnics als quals una persona hauria d'estar subjecta per aquella part dela seva conducta i del seu carcter que afecta el seu propi b, perque no afecta els interessos dels altres en les seves relacions amb ell.Els actes lesius als nostres semblants requereixen un tractament

not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the societymost acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to cautionothers against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a

pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others apreference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to hisimprovement. In these various modes a person may suffer very severepenalties at the hands of others for faults which directly concern onlyhimself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the naturaland, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves,not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment.A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit- who cannot livewithin moderate means- who cannot restrain himself from hurtfulindulgences- who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of

feeling and intellect- must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others,and to have a less share of their favourable sentiments; but of this he hasno right to complain, unless he has merited their favour by specialexcellence in his social relations, and has thus established a title to theirgood offices, which is not affected by his demerits towards himself.

What I contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly inseparablefrom the unfavourable judgment of others, are the only ones to which aperson should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct andcharacter which concerns his own good, but which does not affect theinterest of others in their relations with him. Acts injurious to others requirea totally different treatment. Encroachment on their rights; infliction onthem of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights; falsehood or


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totalment diferent. La violaci de llurs drets; l'acte d'inferir-losprdues o danys no justificades pels nostres drets; la falsedat i laduplicitat en els nostres tractes amb ells; l's injust o poc geners dels

nostres avantatges aprofitant-se d'ells; fins i tot la nostra inhibiciegoista de defensar-los contra l'agressi, aquests sn actesmereixedors de reprovaci moral i, en els casos greus, de reparaci ide cstig. I no sols aquests actes, sin les disposicions que hi menensn tamb immorals i objectes dignes de desaprovaci que podendonar origen a una mena d'aversi. La tendncia a la crueltat, lamalcia i la malfiana; l'enveja, la passi ms antisocial i odiosa detotes; la dissimulaci i la manca de sinceritat; la irascibilitat per causainsuficient i el ressentiment desproporcionat a la provocaci; lesnsies de domini sobre els altres; la cobejana d'acaparar una part

ms gran dels avantatges que pertoquen a cadasc (la teleologia delsgrecs); l'orgull que obt gratificaci amb l'enviliment dels altres;l'egoisme que creu que el jo i els seus interessos sn ms importantsque tota la resta i que decideix totes les qestions dubtoses al seufavor, sn tots ells vicis morals i constitueixen un carcter moraldolent i odis, a diferncia dels defectes personals abans esmentats,que de fet no sn ben b immoralitats i que per ms intensitat queostentin no denoten malignitat. Poden ser prova d'un cert grau deniciesa o d'una manca de dignitat personal i d'amor propi, per

noms sn dignes de reprovaci moral quan suposen una infracci deldeure envers els altres, per mor dels quals l'individu est obligat atenir cura de si mateix. Tots aquells que denominem deures enversnosaltres no sn socialment obligatoris, llevat que les circumstnciesels converteixin alhora en deures envers els nostres semblants. Elterme deure cap a un mateix, quan significa quelcom ms queprudncia, vol dir amor propi o creixement personal, per capd'aquests dos ning no s responsable davant dels seus semblants,

duplicity in dealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages overthem; even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury- theseare fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral

retribution and punishment. And not only these acts, but the dispositionswhich lead to them, are properly immoral, and fit subjects ofdisapprobation which may rise to abhorrence. Cruelty of disposition; maliceand ill-nature; that most anti-social and odious of all passions, envy;dissimulation and insincerity, irascibility on insufficient cause, andresentment disproportioned to the provocation; the love of domineeringover others; the desire to engross more than one's share of advantages (thepleonexia of the Greeks); the pride which derives gratification from theabasement of others; the egotism which thinks self and its concerns moreimportant than everything else, and decides all doubtful questions in its

own favour;- these are moral vices, and constitute a bad and odious moralcharacter: unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which arenot properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, donot constitute wickedness. They may be proofs of any amount of folly, orwant of personal dignity and self-respect; but they are only a subject ofmoral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others, for whosesake the individual is bound to have care for himself. What are called dutiesto ourselves are not socially obligatory, unless circumstances render themat the same time duties to others. The term duty to oneself, when it means

anything more than prudence, means self-respect or self-development, andfor none of these is any one accountable to his fellow creatures, becausefor none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held accountableto them.


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car aquesta rendici de comptes no ocasionaria cap b a lahumanitat.

7. La distinci entre la prdua de consideraci en la qual una persona

pot justament incrrer per defecte de prudncia o de dignitatpersonal i la reprovaci que li correspon per trepitjar els drets delsaltres no s purament nominal. Hi ha una gran diferncia en elsnostres sentiments i en la nostra conducta envers ella segons si ensdesplau en coses en les quals nosaltres creiem que tenim el dret desotmetre-la a control o en coses en les quals sabem que no el tenim.Si alg ens desplau podem expressar-li el nostre disgust i podemmantenir-nos allunyats d'una persona o d'un objecte que ensdesplagui, per no per aix hem de sentir-nos empesos a fer-li la vidaimpossible. Hem de pensar que ja est suportant o b que li tocar

suportar tot el pes de les conseqncies del seu error i, que si ells'entesta a malmetre la seva vida amb les seves barrabassades, no peraquesta ra hem de voler desgraciar-la-hi encara ms. En comptes dedesitjar punir-lo, haurem de maldar ms aviat per alleujar les sevespenalitats a base de mostrar-li com pot evitar o guarir els mals que elseu capteniment tendeix a presentar-li. Pot ser per a nosaltres unobjecte digne de compassi, tal vegada d'avorriment, per no d' ira oressentiment. No hem de tractar-lo com un enemic de la societat: lacosa pitjor que nosaltres podem sentir-nos justificats a fer s deixar-lo

tot sol, si s que no decidim benvolament a ingerir-nos en la sevavida mostrant cura o preocupaci per ell. Es tracta veritablement d'uncas diferent si ha infringit les normes necessries per a la proteccidels seus semblants, tant individualment com collectiva. Lesconseqncies perjudicials dels seus actes llavors no recauen sobreell, sin sobre els altres, i la societat, com a protectora dels seusmembres, ha de prendre represlies contra ell, ha d'infligir-li doloramb el propsit exprs de castigar-lo i assegurar-se que la punici

The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may

rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and thereprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of others,is not a merely nominal distinction. It makes a vast difference both in ourfeelings and in our conduct towards him whether he displeases us in thingsin which we think we have a r ight to control him, or in things in which weknow that we have not. If he displeases us, we may express our distaste,and we may stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing thatdispleases us; but we shall not therefore feel called on to make his lifeuncomfortable. We shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear, thewhole penalty of his error; if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall

not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still further: instead of wishing topunish him, we shall rather endeavour to alleviate his punishment, byshowing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bringupon him. He may be to us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not ofanger or resentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy of society: theworst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, ifwe do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for him. Itis far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection ofhis fellow creatures, individually or collectively. The evil consequences of his

acts do not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the protectorof all its members, must retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for theexpress purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficientlysevere. In the one case, he is an offender at our bar, and we are called onnot only to sit in judgment on him, but, in one shape or another, to executeour own sentence: in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any sufferingon him, except what may incidentally follow from our using the same liberty


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sigui prou severa. En un cas, es tracta d'un delinqent davant elnostre tribunal i ens sentim empesos no sols a enjudiciar-lo, sin,d'una forma o d'una altra, a executar la nostra prpia sentncia; en

l'altre cas, no ens incumbeix d'infligir-li cap mena de sofrena, llevatde la que pugui derivar-se incidentalment del nostre dret d'usar de lamateixa llibertat de regulaci dels nostres afers que li reconeixem aell en els seus.

8. Hi ha moltes persones que refusaran d'admetre la nostra distincientre l'esfera de la vida d'una persona que solament l'afecta a ella iaquella que afecta els altres. Com s possible (poden preguntar-se)que un mbit de la conducta d'un membre de la societat pugui serindiferent als altres membres? No hi ha ning que sigui un sserenterament isolat: s impossible que una persona es mogui

seriosament o permanentment sense que el mal atenyi almenys alsindividus ms propers amb qui es relaciona i sovint els s ituats msenll d'aquests. Si ell causa lesi a les seves propietats, perjudica elsqui directament o indirecta en depenen i normalment fa minvar, enun grau ms o menys gran, els recursos generals de la comunitat. Sideteriora les seves facultats corporals o mentals, no solament causamal a tots aquells que en depenen, encara que sigui noms en unapart de la seva benaurana, ans s'inhabilita per prestar els serveis quedeu en general als seus conciutadans, tal vegada esdev una crrega a

llur afecte o benevolncia i, si tal conducta fos molt freqent, seriadifcil trobar un acte delictiu que suposs una minva ms gran al bcom general. Per ltim, si pels seus vicis o follies una persona no famal als altres, tanmateix (hom pot allegar) el seu exemple podriasser noble i, per tant, se li pot demanar que reguli la seva conducta,la visi o el coneixement de la qual podria corrompre o esgarriaralguns dels seus semblants.

9. I dhuc (hom podria afegir-hi) si les conseqncies de la mala

in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him in his.

The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life whichconcerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many persons willrefuse to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of amember of society be a matter of indifference to the other members? Noperson is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do

anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischiefreaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them. If heinjures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectlyderived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a greater or less amount,the general resource; of the community. If he deteriorates his bodily ormental faculties, he not only brings evil upon all who depended on him forany portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering theservices which he owes to his fellow creatures generally; perhaps becomesa burthen on their affection or benevolence; and if such conduct were very

frequent, hardly any offence that is committed would detract more fromthe general sum of good. Finally, if by his vices or follies a person does nodirect harm to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by hisexample; and ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake ofthose whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt ormislead.

And even (it will be added) if the consequences of misconduct could be


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conducta es poden confinar a l'individu vicis o eixelebrat, sconvenient que la societat abandoni a llur propi senderi aquellsindividus que no tenen prou preparaci? Si els nens i els menors

d'edat tenen un clar dret a rebre protecci contra ells mateixos, noconv tamb que la societat la proporcioni igualment a les personesmadures que s'han mostrat incapaces d'autonomia? Si el joc, labeguda, la incontinncia, la peresa, la brutcia sn tan ofensives algoig i un obstacle tan gran al millorament com molts o la gran majoriadels actes interdits per la llei, per qu (hom pot preguntar) la llei nos'ha d'escarrassar, en la mesura que aix s'adiu amb la factibilitat i lesconvenincies socials, a reprimir tamb aquestes activitats? I com acomplement de les imperfeccions inevitables del dret, no feria boque l'opini organitzs una vigilncia extrema contra aquests vicis i

sancions rgidament amb punicions socials aquells reconeguts perpracticar-los? No es tracta (hom pot dir) de restringir la individualitatni d'impedir el tanteig d'experincies de vida noves i originals. Lesniques coses que hom cerca d'evitar sn activitats que han estatprovades i condemnades des dels inicis del mn fins ara; coses quel'experincia ha mostrat que no sn tils ni convenients per a laindividualitat de ning. Per tal que una veritat moral o prudencialpugui considerar-se establerta cal un cert perode de temps i undeterminat grau d'experincia, i el que simplement hom pretn s

d'impedir que una generaci rera l'altra caigui pel mateix precipicique ha estat fatal als seus predecessors.10. Admeto plenament que el mal que una persona es causa a ella

mateixa, pot afectar greument, ads per les seves simpaties, ads pelsseus interessos, els que s'hi relacionen i, en un grau menor, la societaten el seu conjunt. Quan per una conducta d'aquesta mena unapersona es veu arrossegada a violar una obligaci clara i adjudicableenvers una altra persona o persones, aquest cas ja no cau dins l'mbit

confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to abandonto their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it? If protectionagainst themselves is confessedly due to children and persons under age, is

not society equally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who areequally incapable of self-government? If gambling, or drunkenness, orincontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as injurious to happiness,and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many or most of the actsprohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should not law, so far as isconsistent with practicability and social convenience, endeavour to repressthese also? And as a supplement to the unavoidable imperfections of law,ought not opinion at least to organise a powerful police against these vices,and visit rigidly with social penalties those who are known to practise them?There is no question here (it may be said) about restricting individuality, or

impeding the trial of new and original experiments in living. The only thingsit is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemnedfrom the beginning of the world until now; things which experience hasshown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality. There mustbe some length of time and amount of experience after which a moral orprudential truth may be regarded as established: and it is merely desired toprevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipicewhich has been fatal to their predecessors.

I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself may seriouslyaffect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearlyconnected with him and, in a minor degree, society at large. When, byconduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignableobligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the


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de la moralitat privada, i llavors esdev susceptible de desaprovacimoral en el sentit apropiat del terme. Si, posem per cas, un home, perintemperncia o extravagncia, deixa de pagar els seus deutes o b,

havent assumit la responsabilitat moral d'una famlia, per la mateixacausa deixa de ser capa d'educar o mantenir els seus fills, mereix unajusta reprovaci i pot ser castigat, per si ho s ho ser a causa de lainfracci del seu deure envers la seva famlia o els seus creditors, nopas per la seva extravagncia. Si els recursos que s'havien consagrar ala famlia fossin destinats a la inversi ms prudent de totes, laculpabilitat moral seria la mateixa. George Barnwell occ el seu oncleper aconseguir diners per a la seva amistanada, per si ho hagus fetper muntar un negoci, hauria estat condemnat igualment a la forca.De 1a mateixa manera, en el sovintejat cas d'un home que causa

problemes a la seva famlia per donar-se a mals hbits, mereix retretsper la seva duresa i ingratitud, per tamb pot sser-ne objecte perconrear hbits que en ells mateixos no sn viciosos, si causen afliccia aquells amb els quals comparteix la seva vida o que depenen d'ellper vincles personals per a llur conhort. Quisvulla que no rex en laconsideraci generalment deguda als interessos i sentiments delsaltres, sense que s'hi vegi emps per algun imperatiu moral o justificatper una preferncia permissible, s subjecte a la desaprovaci moralper aquesta incapacitat per no pas pel seu origen o pels errors,

merament personals, que remotament li poden haver menat. Demanera semblant quan una persona s'incapacita per ra del seucomportament privat per a l'exercici de qualsevol deure precs enversla collectivitat que li ha estat encomanat, s culpable d'una infraccisocial. s injustificat de castigar alg perqu est ebri, per en canvical punir un soldat o un policia que s'embriagui estant de servei. Enresum, sempre que existeix un dany o un risc de dany definits, ja sia aun individu o a la collectivitat, el cas ja no cau dins l'mbit de la

proper sense of the term. If, for example, a man, through intemperance orextravagance, becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having undertaken themoral responsibility of a family, becomes from the same cause incapable of

supporting or educating them, he is deservedly reprobated, and might bejustly punished; but it is for the breach of duty to his family or creditors, notfor the extravagance. If the resources which ought to have been devoted tothem, had been diverted from them for the most prudent investment, themoral culpability would have been the same. George Barnwell murdered hisuncle to get money for his mistress, but i f he had done it to set himself up inbusiness, he would equally have been hanged. Again, in the frequent caseof a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits, hedeserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude; but so he may forcultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to those with

whom he passes his life, who from personal ties are dependent on him fortheir comfort. Whoever fails in the consideration generally due to theinterests and feelings of others, not being compelled by some moreimperative duty, or justified by allowable self-preference, is a subject ofmoral disapprobation for that failure, but not for the cause of it, nor for theerrors, merely personal to himself, which may have remotely led to it. Inlike manner, when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the performance of some definite duty incumbent on himto the public, he is guilty of a social offence. No person ought to be

punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should bepunished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definitedamage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public,the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that ofmorality or law.


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llibertat i entra de ple dins el de la moralitat o el dret.11. Per amb referncia al perjudici merament contingent o, com podria

anomenar-se, el menyscapte que una persona causa a la societat per

una actuaci que ni viola un deure especfic envers la collectivitat niocasiona un dany perceptible a qualsevol individu determinable llevatd'ell mateix, aquest menyscapte s un dels que la societat potpermetre's de suportar per mor del b ms gran de la llibertathumana. Si calgus castigar a les persones adultes per no tenir curad'elles mateixes, ms valdria que fos pel seu propi b ms que no pasamb el pretext d'impedir que menyscabin llur capacitat de prestar unsbeneficis a la societat que aquesta no pretn tenir el dret d'exigir.Per no estic gens d'acord a tractar aquesta qesti com si la societatno tingus altres mitjans per tal d'elevar els seus membres ms febles

al nivell ordinari de conducta racional que esperar que perpetrinalguna acci irracional i aleshores infligir-los una punci jurdica omoral per aquesta transgressi. La societat t un poder absolut sobreells en les primeres etapes de llur existncia: ha tingut a la sevadisposici tot el perode de la infncia i de la minoritat amb l'objectede fer les provatures necessries perqu fossin capaos d'unaconducta racional en la vida. La generaci existent s responsable dela formaci i de les circumstncies que envolten la generaci segent.No s possible que faci tornar els membres de la futura generaci

perfectament bons i assenyats, perqu lamentablement ella tamb sdeficient en bondat i seny. Els seus millors esforos no sn sempre, encerts casos individuals, totalment reeixits. Per s capa d'aconseguirque la generaci que puja sigui, en lnies generals, tan bona i un xicmillor que ella mateixa. Si la societat deixa que un nombreconsiderable dels seus membres creixin com infants, incapaos de serinfluts per la consideraci racional dels motius distants, el blasme perles conseqncies s imputable a ella mateixa. Armada no sols amb

But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called,constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct whichneither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible

hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the inconvenience is onewhich society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of humanfreedom. If grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care ofthemselves, I would rather it were for their own sake, than under pretenceof preventing them from impairing their capacity or rendering to societybenefits which society does not pretend it has a right to exact. But I cannotconsent to argue the point as if society had no means of bringing its weakermembers up to its ordinary standard of rational conduct, except waiting tillthey do something irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally,for it. Society has had absolute power over them during all the early portion

of their existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage inwhich to try whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in life.The existing generation is master both of the training and the entirecircumstances of the generation to come; it cannot indeed make themperfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably deficient ingoodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always, in individualcases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to make therising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself. Ifsociety lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere

children, incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distantmotives, society has itself to blame for the consequences. Armed not onlywith all the powers of education, but with the ascendency which theauthority of a received opinion always exercises over the minds who areleast fitted to judge for themselves; and aided by the natural penaltieswhich cannot be prevented from falling on those who incur the distaste orthe contempt of those who know them; let not society pretend that itneeds, besides all this, the power to issue commands and enforce


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els poders de l'educaci, sin tamb amb l'ascendent que l'autoritatde l'opini admesa sempre exerceix sobre les ments d'aquells que snmenys aptes per a jutjar per si sols, i ajudada per les sancions naturals

que no poden deixar d'abatre's sobre aquells que incorren en eldisgust o el menyspreu d'aquells que els coneixen; no permetrem quela societat pretengui que necessita, a ms de tot aix, el poder dedecretar ordres i d'imposar obedincia en l'mbit dels interessospersonals dels individus, en el qual, tant per raons d'estricta justciacom de govern, la decisi hauria de recaure en aquells que han depatir-ne les conseqncies. No hi ha res que tendeixi a desacreditar i afrustrar els millors mitjans d'influir la conducta que el recurs alspitjors. Si entre aquells als quals es tracta de junyir a la prudncia o ala temperncia s'hi troben alguns amb carcters vigorosos i

independents, es rebellaran indefectiblement contra el jou. Unapersona d'aquesta mena no acceptar mai que els altres tinguin dret acontrolar les seves coses, de la mateixa manera que el tenen a l'horad'impedir-li que els perjudiqui en les coses prpies. Llavors fcilmenthom considera un senyal de valor i coratge desafiar obertamentaquesta autoritat usurpadora i fer amb ostentaci exactament tot elcontrari del que prescriu, com en el cas de la moda grollera que vatenir xit en temps de Carles II per la fantica intolerncia moral delspuritans. Respecte al que hom addueix sobre la necessitat de protegir

la societat contra el mal exemple que representen per altri els viciososi els llibertins, s veritat que aquest pot tenir efectes perniciosos,especialment sobre el malfactor que veu com es pot causar perjudicials altres amb impunitat. Per ara estem parlant de conducta que,sense causar mal a altri, ocasiona gran dany al mateix agent, i noacabo de veure com els qui creuen aix poden deixar de pensar que1'exemple, en regla general, s ms saludable que noble, ja que, si bposa al descobert la mala conducta, tamb posa en evidncia les

obedience in the personal concerns of individuals, in which, on all principlesof justice and policy, the decision ought to rest with those who are to abidethe consequences.

Nor is there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the bettermeans of influencing conduct than a resort to the worse. If there be amongthose whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance any of

the material of which vigorous and independent characters are made, theywill infallibly rebel against the yoke. No such person will ever feel thatothers have a right to control him in his concerns, such as they have toprevent him from injuring them in theirs; and it easily comes to beconsidered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face of such usurpedauthority, and do with ostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins; asin the fashion of grossness which succeeded, in the time of Charles II., tothe fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans. With respect to what is saidof the necessity of protecting society from the bad example set to others bythe vicious or the self-indulgent; it is true that bad example may have apernicious effect, especially the example of doing wrong to others withimpunity to the wrong-doer. But we are now speaking of conduct which,while it does no wrong to others, is supposed to do great harm to the agenthimself: and I do not see how those who believe this can think otherwisethan that the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful,since, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful or degradingconsequences which, if the conduct is justly censured, must be supposed to


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conseqncies doloroses o degradants que, si l'actuaci s justamentblasmada, recauen forosament sobre tots o la majoria d'aquells quehi concorren.

12. Per el ms fort de tots els arguments contra 1a ingerncia de lacollectivitat en la conducta purament personal s que, quan s'hiimmisceix, hi ha moltes probabilitats que ho faci malament i en elspunts menys adients. En qestions de moralitat social, de deureenvers els altres, l'opini del pblic, aix s, de la majoriaaclaparadora, tot i que sovint sigui incorrecta, s probable que mssovint sigui correcta, perqu en aqueixes qestions els seus membresno fan altra cosa que jutjar els seus propis interessos i la manera comun determinat comportament, si es permet la seva prctica, els potafectar. Per l'opini d'una majoria semblant, imposada a tall de llei

sobre la minoria, en qestions de capteniment personal, s tanprobable que sigui encertada com desencertada, car en aquestesocasions l'opini pblica vol dir, en el millor dels casos, l'opinid'algunes persones sobre all que s bo o dolent per a altres personesi molt sovint ni tan sols significa aix, car el pblic, passant per altamb la ms perfecta indiferncia el plaer o la convenincia d'aquellsla conducta dels quals censura, noms considera la seva prpiapreferncia. N'hi ha molts que consideren com una ofensa contra ellsqualsevol comportament que els desplau i que experimenten com un

ultratge a llurs sentiments, com en el cas d'un fantic religis, quequan fou acusat de menystenir els sentiments religiosos dels altres,respongu que sn ells qui menystenen els sentiments d'ell totpersistint en llur culte o credo abominable. Per no hi ha paritat entreel sentiment d'una persona pel que fa a la seva prpia opini i elsentiment d'una altra que s ofesa pel fet que e lla la mantingui, comno n'hi ha entre el desig d'un lladre de robar una bossa i el desig delseu propietari legtim de conservar-la. I el gust d'una persona s una

be in all or most cases attendant on it.

But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public

with purely personal conduct is that, when it does interfere, the odds arethat it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. On questions of socialmorality, of duty to others, the opinion of the public, that is, of anoverruling majority, though of wrong, is likely to be still oftener right;because on such questions they are only required to judge of their owninterests; of the manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to bepractised, would effect themselves. But the opinion of a s imilar majority,imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, isquite as likely to be wrong as r ight; for in these cases public opinion means,at the best, some people's opinion of what is good or bad for other people;

while very of it does not even mean that; the public, with the most perfectindifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whoseconduct they censure, and considering only their own preference. There aremany who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they havea distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religiousbigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, hasbeen known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in theirabominable worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling ofa person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at

his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse,and the desire of the right owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as muchhis own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse. It is easy for any one toimagine an ideal public which leaves the freedom and choice of individualsin all uncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstainfrom modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned. Butwhere has there been seen a public which set any such limit to itscensorship? or when does the public trouble itself about universal


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qesti tan prpia com la seva opini o la seva bossa. s fcil perqualsevol d'imaginar un pblic ideal que dna un marge de llibertat id'elecci als individus en totes les qestions incertes, i noms els

exigeix que s'abstinguin dels modes de conducta que ha condemnatl'experincia universal. Per, on s'ha vist mai un pblic que marquitals lmits a la seva censura? o b, quan s que el pblic es preocupade l'experincia universal? En les seves ingerncies en la conductapersonal la collectivitat poques vegades pensa en altra cosa que en laperversitat que suposa obrar o sentir diferent d'ella mateixa, i aquestcriteri, finament disfressat, s el que nou dcimes parts delsmoralistes i escriptors especulatius mantenen davant els ulls delshomes com els dictats de la religi i la f ilosofia. Aquests ensenyen queles coses sn certes perqu ho sn: perqu sentim que ho sn. Ens

diuen que escorcollem dins de les nostres ments i cors a la recerca delleis de conducta que ens obliguin a nosaltres mateixos i a tots elsaltres. Qu pot fer el pobre pblic sin aplicar aquestes instruccions ifer que els seus propis sentiments personals del b i del mal, si sntolerablement unnimes entre els seus membres, siguin obligatorisper a tothom?

13. El mal assenyalat aqu no existeix solament en teoria, i potser caldresperar que especifiqui els casos en qu el pblic d'aquest temps ipas inverteix imprpiament les seves preferncies en el carcter de

les lleis morals. No estic escrivint un assaig sobre les aberracions delssentiments morals existents. Es tracta d'un tema massa feixuc per asser discutit a tall de digressi i per via d'illustraci. Nogensmenys,calen exemples per a mostrar que el principi que mantinc sd'importncia seriosa i prctica i que no estic tractant d'erigir unabarrera contra mals imaginaris. I no s difcil mostrar, amb abundantsexemples, que una de les propensions humanes ms universals seixamplar els lmits del que hom pot anomenar vigilncia moral fins a

experience? In its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom thinkingof anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself; andthis standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to mankind as the

dictate of religion and philosophy, by nine-tenths of all moralists andspeculative writers. These teach that things are right because they are right;because we feel them to be so. They tell us to search in our own minds andhearts for laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others. What canthe poor public do but apply these instructions, and make their ownpersonal feelings of good and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in them,obligatory on all the world?

The evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory; and it mayperhaps be expected that I should specify the instances in which the publicof this age and country improperly invests its own preferences with thecharacter of moral laws. I am not writing an essay on the aberrations ofexisting moral feeling. That is too weighty a subject to be discussedparenthetically, and by way of illustration. Yet examples are necessary toshow that the principle I maintain is of serious and practical moment, andthat I am not endeavouring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils. And itis not difficult to show, by abundant instances, that to extend the bounds ofwhat may be called moral police, until it encroaches on the mostunquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual, is one of the most


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arribar a violar la llibertat de l'individu ms inqestionablementlegtima.

14. A tall de primer exemple, considerem les antipaties que els homes

nodreixen sense cap altra justificaci contra les persones ambopinions religioses diferents de les seves, car no practiquen llursobservances religioses, en especial llurs abstinncies religioses. Percitar un exemple ms aviat trivial, res en la creena o prctica delscristians fa ms per enverinar l'odi que senten els musulmans contraells que el fet que mengin carn de porc. Hi ha pocs actes que elscristians i els europeus considerin amb un disgust menys dissimulatcom el que produeix als mahometans aquesta manera de satisfer lafam. En primer lloc, es tracta d'una ofensa contra llur religi, peraquesta circumstncia no explica ni el grau ni la mena de repugnncia

que senten, car el vi s tamb prohibit per llur religi i tots elsmusulmans consideren que prendre'n est mal fet, per no sfastigs: L'aversi que experimenten envers la carn de l'animalimpur s, al contrari, d'un carcter peculiar que s'acosta a l'antipatiainstintiva que la idea de brutcia, una vegada que amara totalment elssentiments, sempre sembla despertar; fins i tot en aquells que tenenuns hbits personals escrupolosament nets, i de la qual el sentimentd'impuresa religiosa, tan intens entre els hinds, en constitueix unbon exemple. Suposem ara que en un poble format per una majoria

musulmana, aquesta insists en el fet de no permetre menjar carn deporc dins els lmits del pas. Aquest fet no seria gens nou en els pasosmahometans. Seria un exercici legtim de l'autoritat moral de l'opinipblica? i, en cas negatiu, per qu no? Aquesta prctica inspirarealment fstic a la collectivitat en qesti. Els seus membres pensensincerament que s prohibida i avorrida per la divinitat. Tampocaquesta prohibici podria ser blasmada com una persecuci religiosa.s possible que el seu origen fos religis, per no seria una persecuci

universal of all human propensities.

As a first instance, consider the antipathies which men cherish on no better

grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are different fromtheirs do not practise their religious observances, especially their religiousabstinences. To cite a rather trivial example, nothing in the creed or practiceof Christians does more to envenom the hatred of Mahomedans againstthem than the fact of their eating pork. There are few acts which Christiansand Europeans regard with more unaffected disgust than Mussulmansregard this particular mode of satisfying hunger. It is, in the first place, anoffence against their religion; but this circumstance by no means explainseither the degree or the kind of their repugnance; for wine also is forbiddenby their religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong,

but not disgusting. Their aversion to the flesh of the "unclean beast" is, onthe contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy,which the idea of uncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks into thefeelings, seems always to excite even in those whose personal habits areanything but scrupulously cleanly, and of which the sentiment of religiousimpurity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remarkable example. Suppose nowthat in a people, of whom the majority were Mussulmans, that majorityshould insist upon not permitting pork to be eaten within the limits of thecountry. This would be nothing new in Mahomedan countries.* Would it be

a legitimate exercise of the moral authority of public opinion? and if not,why not? The practice is really revolting to such a public. They also sincerelythink that it is forbidden and abhorred by the Deity. Neither could theprohibition be censured as religious persecution. It might be religious in itsorigin, but it would not be persecution for religion, since nobody's religionmakes it a duty to eat pork. The only tenable ground of condemnationwould be that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of


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per ra de religi, ja que el fet de menjar carn de porc no constitueixun deure en la religi de ning. L'nic motiu de condemna defensabled'aquesta prohibici seria que la collectivitat no t dret a immiscir-se

en els gustos personals i en els interessos privats dels individus.

15. I si volem acostar-nos un xic ms a casa, la majoria dels espanyolsconsideren una gran impietat ofensiva en major grau a l'sserSuprem, retre-li culte per mitj d'altres rituals que no siguin elsprescrits per l'Esglsia Catlica i la legislaci espanyola interdeix sobre

el territori sota la seva jurisdicci tota altra mena de culte pblic. Elspobles d'Europa meridional consideren els clergues casats personesno sols irreligioses, sin impdiques, indecents, grolleres i fastigoses.Qu en pensen els protestants d'aquests sentiments perfectamentsincers i dels intents d'imposar-los sobre els no catlics? Tanmateix, siels homes estan justificats a intervenir en la llibertat d'altri en cosesque no pertoquen a llurs interessos, a partir de quin principi spossible d'excloure d'una manera coherent aquests casos? o qui potblasmar els qui cobegen reprimir el que consideren un escndol alsulls de Du i de l'home?

16. No pot adduir-se argument millor per prohibir quelcom, que sconsiderat com una immoralitat personal, que el que invoquen per ala supressi d'aquestes prctiques els qui les tenen per impies, i, amenys que estem disposats a adoptar la lgica dels perseguidors i aafirmar que nosaltres podem perseguir els altres perqu tenim ra,mentre que ells no ens han de perseguir perqu estan equivocats,hem d'anar amb compte a l'hora d'admetre un principi que, si ens fos

individuals the public has no business to interfere.

* The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point. When this industrious and

enterprising tribe, the descendants of the Persian fire-worshippers, flying from their native country

before the Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were admitted to toleration by the Hindoosovereigns, on condition of not eating beef. When those regions afterwards fell under the dominion of

Mahomedan conquerors, the Parsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condition

of refraining from pork. What was at first obedience to authority became a second nature, and the

Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork. Though not required by their religion, the double

abstinence has had time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the East, is a religion.

To come somewhat nearer home: the majority of Spaniards consider it agross impiety, offensive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being, toworship him in any other manner than the Roman Catholic; and no otherpublic worship is lawful on Spanish soil. The people of all Southern Europe

look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious, but unchaste, indecent,gross, disgusting. What do Protestants think of these perfectly sincerefeelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against non-Catholics? Yet, ifmankind are justified in interfering with each other's liberty in things whichdo not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possibleconsistently to exclude these cases? or who can blame people for desiringto suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of God and man?

No stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regardedas a personal immorality, than is made out for suppressing these practicesin the eyes of those who regard them as impieties; and unless we are willingto adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute othersbecause we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they arewrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent


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aplicat a nosaltres, reputarem com una gran injustcia.17. Hi ha la possibilitat que hom objecti -sense raque els exemples

precedents estan extrets de contingncies impossibles entre

nosaltres, car l'opini, en aquest pas, no s probable que imposil'abstinncia de certes carns, que s'immisceixi en matria de cultes oen matria de matrimoni, segons les creences o la inclinaci delsinteressats. Aix, posar un proper exemple basat en una ingernciaen la llibertat, el perill de la qual no ha passat del tot. En tot tempsque els puritans disposaren de poder suficient, com ara a NovaAnglaterra o a Gran Bretanya al temps de la Repblica, han maldatamb xit considerable per a descoratjar tota mena de diversionspbliques i gaireb totes les privades, en especial la msica, la dansa,els jocs pblics o altres reunions destinades a la diversi aix com el

teatre. En aquest pas resten encara grups importants de personesque segons les seves nocions de la moralitat i de la religi condemnenaquests tipus d'esbarjos. Com que aquestes persones pertanyensobretot a la burgesia, que constitueix el poder dominant en lacondici social i poltica present del regne, no s gens. impossible queaquests sectors arribin a assolir algun dia una majoria en elParlament. Qu els semblaria als membres de la part restant de lacomunitat el fet que les diversions permeses siguin regulades pelssentiments religiosos i morals dels calvinistes i metodistes ms

estrictes? No desitjarien sense dilaci que aquests pietosos intrusoses fiquessin en llurs propis assumptes? Aix s precisament el que calcontestar a tot govern i a tot pblic que t la pretensi que ninggaudeixi dels plaers que ells troben dolents. Ara b, si el principi de lapretensi fos adms, ning no podria raonablement objectar al fetque fos aplicat en el sentit de la majoria o algun altre poderpreponderant al pas i tothom hauria d'estar disposat a acceptar laidea d'una repblica cristiana, tal com l'entengueren els primers

as a gross injustice the application to ourselves.

The preceding instances may be objected to, although unreasonably, as

drawn from contingencies impossible among us: opinion, in this country,not being likely to enforce abstinence from meats, or to interfere withpeople for worshipping, and for either marrying or not marrying, accordingto their creed or inclination. The next example, however, shall be takenfrom an interference with liberty which we have by no means passed alldanger of. Wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently powerful, as inNew England, and in Great Britain at the time of the Commonwealth, theyhave endeavoured, with considerable success, to put down all public, andnearly all private, amusements: especially music, dancing, public games, orother assemblages for purposes of diversion, and the theatre. There are still

in this country large bodies of persons by whose notions of morality andreligion these recreations are condemned; and those persons belongingchiefly to the middle class, who are the ascendant power in the presentsocial and political condition of the kingdom, it is by no means impossiblethat persons of these sentiments may at some time or other command amajority in Parliament. How will the remaining portion of the communitylike to have the amusements that shall be permitted to them regulated bythe religious and moral sentiments of the stricter Calvinists andMethodists? Would they not, with considerable peremptoriness, desire

these intrusively pious members of society to mind their own business? Thisis precisely what should be said to every government and every public, whohave the pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which theythink wrong. But if the principle of the pretension be admitted, no one canreasonably object to its being acted on in the sense of the majority, or otherpreponderating power in the country; and all persons must be ready toconform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by theearly settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to theirs


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colonitzadors de Nova Anglaterra, si una confessi religiosa semblanta la seva arribs mai a recuperar el seu terreny perdut, com lesreligions presumptament decadents han fet tan sovint.

18. Imaginem una altra contingncia, tal vegada de realitzaci msprobable que la darrera esmentada. Existeix declaradament una fortatendncia en el mn modern vers una constituci democrtica de lasocietat, acompanyada o no d' institucions poltiques populars. Homafirma que en el pas on aquesta tendncia es materialitza msplenament -on tant la societat com el govern sn ms democrtics-,els Estats Units, el sentiment de la majoria, a la qual qualsevolmanifestaci d'un estil de vida ms ostents o costs del que llursmembres poden esperar emular s de mal gust, opera com una lleisumpturia fora efica, i en moltes parts de la Uni tota persona que

posseeix uns ingressos molt grans no sempre troba mitjans adientsper a despendre'ls sense incrrer en la desaprovaci popular. Si baquesta mena d'afirmacions sens dubte sn exagerades com arepresentaci dels fets existents, l'estat de coses que descriuen nosolament s concebible i possible, ans un resultat probable delsentiment democrtic, conjuminat amb la idea que la collectivitat tun dret de veto sobre la manera en qu els individus despenen elsseus ingressos. Noms cal que suposem, a ms, una difusiconsiderable de les opinions socialistes per tal que esdevingui infame

als ulls de la majoria la possessi de ms d'una petita quantitat debns o de qualsevol renda que no sigui procedent del treball manual.Opinions semblants en principi a aquestes ja prevalen fora dins lamenestralia i pesen opressivament sobre aquells qui sn susceptiblesde ser influts per l'opini d'aquesta classe, o sia, els seus propismembres. s sabut que els mals treballadors manuals, queconstitueixen la majoria d'operaris en moltes branques de laindstria, sn decididament de l'opini que ells haurien de cobrar el

should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground, as religions supposed to bedeclining have so often been known to do.

To imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realised thanthe one last mentioned. There is confessedly a strong tendency in themodern world towards a democratic constitution of society, accompaniedor not by popular political institutions. It is affirmed that in the countrywhere this tendency is most completely realised- where both society andthe government are most democratic- the United States- the feeling of themajority, to whom any appearance of a more showy or costly style of livingthan they can hope to rival is disagreeable, operates as a tolerably effectualsumptuary law, and that in many parts of the Union it is really difficult for aperson possessing a very large income to find any mode of spending it

which will not incur popular disapprobation. Though such statements asthese are doubtless much exaggerated as a representation of existing facts,the state of things they describe is not only a conceivable and possible, buta probable result of democratic feeling, combined with the notion that thepublic has a right to a veto on the manner in which individuals shall spendtheir incomes. We have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion ofSocialist opinions, and it may become infamous in the eyes of the majorityto possess more property than some very small amount, or any income notearned by manual labour. Opinions similar in principle to these already

prevail widely among the artisan class, and weigh oppressively on thosewho are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that class, namely, its ownmembers. It is known that the bad workmen who form the majority of theoperatives in many branches of industry, are decidedly of opinion that badworkmen ought to receive the same wages as good, and that no one oughtto be allowed, through piecework or otherwise, to earn by superior skill orindustry more than others can without it. And they employ a moral police,which occasionally becomes a physical one, to deter skilful workmen from


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mateix salari que els bons i que no hauria d'estar perms, ja siatreballant a preu fet o altrament, de guanyar ms que els altresmercs a una aptitud o esfor superior. I aix fan servir una vigilncia

moral, que ocasionalment pot esdevenir coacci fsica, per tald'impedir que els treballadors qualificats rebin, i els empresaris elsofereixin, una remuneraci ms gran per un servei ms til. Si elpblic t jurisdicci sobre qestions privades, no entenc perquaquests treballadors obren malament ni que hom pugui blasmar unpblic determinat per afirmar la mateixa autoritat sobre la conductad'un individu, si s'accepta que el pblic general t el dret a afirmar-lasobre les persones en general.

19. Per, sense necessitat d'ocupar-nos de casos hipottics, als nostresdies es practiquen usurpacions importants de la llibertat de la vida

privada, i encara hom commina d'efectuar-ne d'altres ms grans ambuna certa probabilitat d'xit, i hi ha qui proposa opinions que declarenun dret illimitat del pblic no noms a prohibir per llei tot all quecreu que s dolent, sin a interdir una srie de coses que admet quesn innocents a fi de barrar el pas a les que creu dolentes.

20. Sota el pretext d'impedir la intemperncia, el poble d'una colniaanglesa i el de gaireb la meitat dels Estats Units, han hagut de sofrirla prohibici per llei de fer un s qualsevol de les begudesfermentades, com no sia per raons mdiques, car la interdicci de la

seva venda significa, de fet, la prohibici del seu s. I tot i que laimpossibilitat de l'execuci d'aquesta llei ha provocat la sevarevocaci en alguns dels estats que l'adoptaren, dhuc en aquell queli ha donat el seu nom, s'ha encetat una campanya, secundada ambun zel considerable per molts dels filantrops declarats, a fi d'iniciaruna agitaci a favor d'una llei semblant en aquest pas. L'associaci, oAliana com s'autodenomina, que ha estat constituda per aaquesta finalitat, ha adquirit una certa notorietat a travs de la

receiving, and employers from giving, a larger remuneration for a moreuseful service. If the public have any jurisdiction over private concerns, Icannot see that these people are in fault, or that any individual's particular

public can be blamed for asserting the same authority over his individualconduct which the general public asserts over people in general.

But, without dwelling upon supposititious cases, there are, in our own day,gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practised, and stillgreater ones threatened with some expectation of success, and opinions

propounded which assert an unlimited right in the public not only toprohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but, in order to get atwhat it thinks wrong, to prohibit a number of things which it admits to beinnocent.

Under the name of preventing intemperance, the people of one Englishcolony, and of nearly half the United States, have been interdicted by lawfrom making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medicalpurposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be,prohibition of their use. And though the impracticability of executing thelaw has caused its repeal in several of the States which had adopted it,including the one from which it derives its name, an attempt hasnotwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with considerablezeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate for a similar law inthis country. The association, or "Alliance" as it terms itself, which has beenformed for this purpose, has acquired some notoriety through the publicitygiven to a correspondence between its secretary and one of the very few


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publicitat donada a la correspondncia entre el seu secretari i un delspocs homes pblics anglesos que creu que les opinions d'un poltics'han de basar en principis. La participaci de Lord Stanley en aquesta

correspondncia segurament enrobustir les esperances jadipositades en ell per aquells qui saben que les qualitats que aquestpoltic ha manifestat en algunes de les seves aparicions pbliquesmalauradament sn ben rares entre tots aquells que figuren a lagaleria d'homes pblics. L'rgan de l'Aliana, que deplorariapregonament el reconeixement de qualsevol principi que pogus seremprat per tal de justificar el fanatisme i la persecuci es permetd'assenyalar l'mplia i insalvable barrera que separa aquestsprincipis dels de l'associaci. Totes les qestions relatives alpensament, a l'opini, a la conscincia, em semblen -diu- situar-se

fora de l'esfera de la legislaci; totes les que es refereixen a l'acci,hbit i relaci socials, subjectes noms a un poder discrecionalconferit a l'Estat i no pas a l'individu, entren en canvi de ple dins ella.Cal remarcar que no n'esmenta una tercera classe diferent de les duesanteriors, a saber, els actes i els hbits que no sn socials, sinindividuals, si b s precisament a aquesta darrera classe a la qualpertany sens dubte l'acte de beure licors fermentats. La venda de lesbegudes alcohliques, tanmateix, entra dins del comer i aquest s unacte social. Per la infracci de qu hom es plany no es refereix a la

llibertat del venedor, sin a la del comprador i consumidor, car l'Estatpodria perfectament b prohibir beure vi amb la intenci manifestad'impossibilitar la seva obtenci. El secretari, tanmateix, continuadient: Reclamo, com a ciutad, el dret de legislar sempre que elsmeus drets socials sn envats per l'acci social d'un altre. I comdefineix aquests drets socials? Si hi ha res que envaeix els meusdrets socials, certament ho fa el trfic de begudes fortes. Anorrea elmeu dret primari de seguretat creant i estimulant constantment el

English public men who hold that a politician's opinions ought to befounded on principles. Lord Stanley's share in this correspondence iscalculated to strengthen the hopes already built on him, by those who know

how rare such qualities as are manifested in some of his public appearancesunhappily are among those who figure in political life. The organ of theAlliance, who would "deeply deplore the recognition of any principle whichcould be wrested to justify bigotry and persecution," undertakes to pointout the "broad and impassable barrier" which divides such principles fromthose of the association. "All matters relating to thought, opinion,conscience, appear to me," he says, "to be without the sphere of legislation;all pertaining to social act, habit, relation, subject only to a discretionarypower vested in the State itself, and not in the individual, to be within it."

No mention is made of a third class, different from either of these, viz., actsand habits which are not social, but individual; although it is to this class,surely, that the act of drinking fermented liquors belongs. Selling fermentedliquors, however, is trading, and trading is a social act. But the infringementcomplained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the buyerand consumer; since the State might just as well forbid him to drink wine aspurposely make it impossible for him to obtain it. The secretary, however,says, "I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights areinvaded by the social act of another." And now for the definition of these"social rights." "If anything invades my social rights, certainly the traffic instrong drink does. It destroys my primary right of security, by constantlycreating and stimulating social disorder. It invades my right of equality, byderiving a profit from the creation of a misery I am taxed to support. Itimpedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, bysurrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralising


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desordre social. Envaeix el meu dret a la igualtat extraient un beneficide la creaci d'una misria, al sosteniment de la qual haig decontribuir amb els impostos que pago. Impedeix el meu dret al lliure

desenvolupament moral i intellectual envoltant el meu cam deperills i afeblint i desmoralitzant la societat, de la qual tinc el dret areclamar ajuda i tracte mutus. Una teoria dels drets socials, sensepari amb cap altra que fins ara hagus trobat probablement maiexpressi en forma escrita, que no s res ms que aix: que s un dretabsolut de tot individu que tot altre individu obri en tots els aspectesexactament com ell faria; que qualsevol que no hi rex en la qestims insignificant viola el meu dret social i em dna dret a posardemanda per tal que sigui rescabalat el greuge. Un principi tanmonstrus s molt ms perills que qualsevol intromissi concreta en

la llibertat. No hi ha violaci de la l libertat que no pogus justificar; noreconeix en absolut cap dret a la llibertat, llevat potser del demantenir opinions en secret, sense mai revelar-les a ning, car des delmoment que una opini que jo considero noble passa pels llavisd'alg, envaeix tots els drets socials que m'atribueix l'Aliana.Aquesta doctrina atribueix a tots els homes un inters creat mutu enllur perfecci moral, intellectual, i dhuc fsica, definida per cadareivindicador segons el seu propi criteri.

21. Un altre exemple important de la ingerncia illegtima en la justa

llibertat de l'individu, no solament projectada, sin efectuada ambxit des de fa temps, s la legislaci sabtica. Sens dubte, el fetd'abstenir-se de les ocupacions diries normals un dia a la setmana,en la mesura que ho permeten les exigncies de la vida, si b nomsobliga els jueus des del punt de vista religis, s un costum forabeneficis. I per tal com aquest costum no pot ser observat sense unconsentiment general entre les classes treballadores, donat que en lamesura que algunes persones treballant, poden imposar la mateixa

society, from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse." Atheory of "social rights" the like of which probably never before found itsway into distinct language: being nothing short of this- that it is the

absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall actin every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in thesmallest particular violates my social right, and entitles me to demand fromthe legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a principle is farmore dangerous than any single interference with liberty; there is noviolation of liberty which it would not justify; it acknowledges no right toany freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret,without ever disclosing them: for, the moment an opinion which I considernoxious passes any one's lips, it invades all the "social rights" attributed tome by the Alliance. The doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in

each other's moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be definedby each claimant according to his own standard.

Another important example of illegitimate interference with the rightfulliberty of the individual, not simply threatened, but long since carried intotriumphant effect, is Sabbatarian legislation. Without doubt, abstinence onone day in the week, so far as the exigencies of life permit, from the usualdaily occupation, though in no respect religiously binding on any exceptJews, is a highly beneficial custom. And inasmuch as this custom cannot beobserved without a general consent to that effect among the industriousclasses, therefore, in so far as some persons by working may impose thesame necessity on others, it may be allowable and right that the law shouldguarantee to each the observance by others of the custom, by suspending


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necessitat a d'altres, s permissible i just que la llei garanteixi acadasc l'observana per part dels altres del costum a base desuspendre les operacions ms importants de la indstria durant un

dia determinat. Per aquesta justificaci, fonamentada en l'intersdirecte que altres tenen en l'observana de la prctica per part decada individu, no es pot aplicar a les ocupacions voluntriamentescollides a les quals una persona li escau de dedicar les seves horesde lleure, com tampoc no s gens pertinent en el cas de lesrestriccions de les diversions per llei. s veritat que la diversid'alguns comporta la jornada laboral d'altres, per el plaer, per no dirl'esbarjo til de molts, val ben b el treball d'uns quants, sempre queaquesta ocupaci sigui lliurement escollida i hom se'n puguiacomiadar tamb lliurement. Els obrers tenen el perfecte dret de

pensar que, si tothom treballs el diumenge, caldria trescar set diesper una paga de sis, per mentre es deturin la gran majoria de feines,el petit nombre que han de feinejar per al goig dels altres obtenen unaugment proporcional dels seus guanys i, d'altra banda, no estanobligats a seguir en aquestes ocupacions, si s que prefereixen ellleure a l'emolument. Si calgus cercar un altre remei hom el podriatrobar en l'establiment per costum d'un dia de festa a la setmana peraquesta determinada classe de persones. L'nic motiu, doncs, quepermet la defensa de l'establiment de restriccions als esbargiments

dominicals s que sn censurables des del punt de vista religis, raque, per legislar, hauria de ser impugnada amb totes les nostresforces. Deoruin injuriae Diis curae. Resta encara per provar que lasocietat o algun dels seus servents han rebut la comesa del cel devenjar una suposada ofensa a l'Omnipotent, que no s alhora un tortals nostres semblants. La idea que s deure d'un home que un altresigui religis fou el fonament de totes les persecucions religiosesperpetrades fins ara i, s i l'admetssim, les justificaria plenament.

the greater operations of industry on a particular day. But this justification,grounded on the direct interest which others have in each individual'sobservance of the practice, does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in

which a person may think fit to employ his leisure; nor does it hold good, inthe smallest degree, for legal restrictions on amusements. It is true that theamusement of some is the day's work of others; but the pleasure, not to saythe useful recreation, of many, is worth the labour of a few, provided theoccupation is freely chosen, and can be freely resigned. The operatives areperfectly right in thinking that if all worked on Sunday, seven days' workwould have to be given for s ix days' wages; but so long as the great mass ofemployments are suspended, the small number who for the enjoyment ofothers must still work, obtain a proportional increase of earnings; and theyare not obliged to follow those occupations if they prefer leisure to

emolument. If a further remedy is sought, it might be found in theestablishment by custom of a holiday on some other day of the week forthose particular classes of persons. The only ground, therefore, on whichrestrictions on Sunday amusements can be defended, must be that they arereligiously wrong; a motive of legislation which can never be too earnestlyprotested against. Deorum injuriae Diis curae. It remains to be proved thatsociety or any of its officers holds a commission from on high to avenge anysupposed offence to Omnipotence, which is not also a wrong to our fellowcreatures. The notion that it is one man's duty that another should be

religious, was the foundation of all the religious persecutions everperpetrated, and, if admitted, would fully justify them. Though the feelingwhich breaks out in the repeated attempts to stop railway travelling onSunday, in the resistance to the opening of Museums, and the like, has notthe cruelty of the old persecutors, the state of mind indicated by it isfundamentally the same. It is a determination not to tolerate others indoing what is permitted by their religion, because it is not permitted by thepersecutor's religion. It is a belief that God not only abominates the act of


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Encara que el sentiment que es manifesta en els repetits intents detractar d'aturar el funcionament dels ferrocarrils els diumenges, en laresistncia a obrir els museus, etc.., no t la crueltat dels antics

perseguidors, l'estat d'nim que denota s fonamentalment el mateix.s la determinaci a no tolerar que els altres facin el que la sevareligi els permet, car no ho permet la religi del perseguidor. s lacreena que Du no sols abomina l'acte del descregut, sin que ensconsiderar culpables si no li fem la vida impossible.

22. No em puc estar d'afegir a aquests exemples de la poca consideracien qu normalment hom t la llibertat humana, el llenguatge de francesperit persecutori que esclata a la premsa d'aquest pas, sempre ques'ocupa de la notcia del fenomen remarcable del mormonisme. Hompodria fer molts comentaris sobre el fet inesperat i instructiu que una

suposada nova revelaci, i una religi, fundada sobre ella, producted'una palpable impostura, ni tan sols abonada pel prestigi de lesqualitats extraordinries del seu fundador, s creguda per centenarsde milers de persones i ha arribat a constituir el fonament d'unasocietat en l'poca dels diaris, dels ferrocarrils i del telgraf. All queac ens interessa s que aquesta religi, com les altres i millorsreligions, t els seus mrtirs; que el seu profeta i fundador fou linxatpels seus ensenya- ments; que altres dels seus fidels perderen llursvides a mans de la mateixa violncia desfermada; que foren expulsats

a la fora, com a comunitat, de la terra que els vei nixer, i que,desprs d'haver estat encalats vers un recs solitari. al bell mig deldesert, ara n'hi ha molts en aquest pas que gosen declararobertament que estaria b (si b no s convenient) enviar unaexpedici contra ells per tal d'obligar-los per la fora a professar lesopinions d'altres persones. L'article de la doctrina mormona queconstitueix la provocaci principal de l'antipatia que aix desborda lescontencions ordinries de la tolerncia religiosa s la seva sanci de la

the misbeliever, but will not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested.

I cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little accountcommonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecutionwhich breaks out from the press of this country whenever it feels called onto notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism. Much might be saidon the unexpected and instructive fact that an alleged new revelation, and

a religion founded on it, the product of palpable imposture, not evensupported by the prestige of extraordinary qualities in its founder, isbelieved by hundreds of thousands, and has been made the foundation of asociety, in the age of newspapers, railways, and the electric telegraph. Whathere concerns us is, that this religion, like other and better religions, has itsmartyrs: that its prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death bya mob; that others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawlessviolence; that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country inwhich they first grew up; while, now that they have been chased into asolitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly declarethat it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send an expeditionagainst them, and compel them

JOHN STUART MILL IV Sobre La Llibertat

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