Labor Relation1

8/11/2019 Labor Relation1

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Labor Relations

BROTHERHOOD LABOR UNITY MOVEMENT vs HON. ZAMORA (1991)

FACTS:

Petitioners-members of Brotherhood Labor Unit Movement of the Philippines

(BLUM), worked as cargadores or pahinante since 1961 at the SMC Plant. Sometime in

January 1969, the petitioner workersnumbering 140 organized themselves and engaged in

union activities. Believing that they are entitled to overtime and holiday pay, the petitioners aired their

gripes and grievances but it was not heeded by the respondents. One of the union member

was dismissed from work. Hence, the petitioners filed a complaint of unfair labor practiceagainst respondent SMC on the ground of illegal dismissal.

On the other hand, SMC argued that the complainant are not or have never been their

employees but they are the employees of the Guaranteed Labor Contractor, an independentlabor contracting firm

Labor Arbiter Nestor Lim rendered a decision in favor of the complainants which was

affirmed by the NLRC

On appeal, the Secretary set aside the NLRC ruling stressing the absence of an employer-

employee relationship

Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent

San Miguel Corporation

HELD: YES

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are

generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) thepayment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the

employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. It is

the called "control test" that is the most important element


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In the CAB, petitioners worked continuously and exclusively for an average of 7 years for the

company. Considering the length of time that the petitioners have worked, there is justification to

conclude that they were engaged to perform activities necessary or desirable in the usualbusiness of trade of the respondent. Hence, petitioners are considered regular employees.

Even assuming that there is a contract of employment executed between SMC and the said labor

contractor, the court ruled that Guaranteed and Reliable Labor contractors have neithersubstantial capital nor investment to qualify as an independent contractor under the law. The

premises, tools and equipments used by the petitioners in their jobs are all supplied by the

respondent SMC. It is only the manpower or labor force which the alleged contractors supply,suggesting the existence of a "labor only" contracting scheme prohibited by law

It is important to emphasize that that in a truly independent contractor-contractee relationship,the fees are paid directly to the manpower agency in lump sum without indicating or implyingthat the basis of such lump sum is the salary per worker multiplied by the number of workers

assigned to the company.

In the CAB, the alleged independent contractors were paid a lump sum representing only the

salaries the workers were entitled to, arrived at by adding the salaries of each worker which

depend on the volume of work they had accomplished individually. Therefore, there is noindependent contractor-contractee relationship.

WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.

HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY vs GULMATICO (1994)

FACTS:

Respondent-Union, the National Federation of Sugar Workers-Food and General Trades,filed an action against petitioner Hawaiian Phil Co. for claims under RA 809 (The Sugar Act

of 1952). Respondent Union alleged that they have never availed of the benefits due them

under the law.


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Under the said act: the proceeds of any increase in participation granted to planters

under this Act and above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his

laborers in the following proportions. 60% of the increase participation for the laborers and40% for the planters.

Petitioner argued that respondent Labor Arbiter Gulmatico has no jurisdiction over the

case considering their case does not fall under those enumerated in Article 217 of the LaborCode which provides the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. Further,petitioner contends that it has no ER-EE relationship with the respondent sugar workers and

that respondent union has no cause of action because it is the planters-employers who is

liable to pay the workers share under LOI No. 854.

Issue1: Whether public respondent Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case

against petitioner

HELD: NO

While jurisdiction over controversies involving agricultural workers has been transferred from

the Court of Agrarian Relations to the Labor Arbiters under the Labor Code, said transferred

jurisdiction is however, not without limitations. The controversy must fall under one of the casesenumerated under the Labor Code which arise out of or are in connection with an ER-EErelationship

In the CAB, there is no ER-EE relationship between petitioner company and respondent union.

Hence, respondent Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case againstpetitioner.

Issue1: Whether respondent union has a cause of action

HELD: NO

To have a cause of action, the claimant must show that he has a legal right and the respondent a

correlative duty in respect thereof, which the latter violated by some wrongful act or omission.

In the instant case, it would show that the payment of the workers share is liability of the

planters-employers, and not of the petitioner milling company. It is disputed that petitioner

milling company has already distributed to its planters their respective shares. Hence, it hasfulfilled its part and has nothing more to do with the subsequent contribution by the planters of

the workers share.


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DAYAG vs HON. CENIZARES, JR. (1998)

FACTS:

Petitioners were hired to work as tower crane operators by one Alfredo Young, a buildingcontractor doing business in the name of Youngs construction. In 1991, they were

transferred to Cebu City to work for Youngs Shoemart Cebu Project. Petitioner WilliamDayag asked permission to go to Manila to attend family matters and was allowed to do so

but was not paid for January 23-30 due to his accountability for the loss of certain

construction tools. The other petitioners left due to harassment by Young. Thereafter,petitioners banded together and filed a complaint against Young before the NCR Arbitration

Branch NLRC which was assigned to Labor Arbiter Cenizares.

Young filed a Motion to transfer the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region

VII of the NLRC. He contended that the case should be filed in Cebu City because there iswhere the workplace of the petitioners.

Petitioners opposed the same, arguing that all of them are from Metro Manila and thatthey could not afford trips to Cebu. Besides, they claimed that respondents main office is inCorinthian Garden in QC.

Labor Arbiter Cenizares GRANTED Youngs motion to transfer the case in Cebu.

Petitioners appealed to NLRC but it was dismissed. Hence, they filed a MFR and this

time the Commission SET ASIDE its previous decision and remanded the case to theoriginal arbitration branch of the NCR for further proceedings.

Young filed his own MFR and the NLRC reinstated its first decision directing the

transfer of the case to Cebu City.

Issue: Whether the Labor Arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained

Youngs motion to transfer

HELD: NO


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The SC ruled that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not

technicalities. Petitioners were able to file an opposition on the motion to transfer case which

was considered by Labor Arbiter Cenizares. Hence, there is no showing that they have beenunduly prejudiced by the motions failure to give notice and hearing.

However, Young cannot derive comfort from this petition. The SC held that the question of

venue relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits ofthe case. This is to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witness and to promote the ends

of justice under the principle that the State shall afford protection to labor. The reason for this

is that the worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party, the nearest governmentalmachinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the other party is

not to be given the choice of another competent agency sitting in another place as this will

unduly burden the former

In the instant case, the ruling specifying the NCR Arbitration Branch as the venue of the present

action cannot be considered oppressive to Young because his residence in Corinthian Gardens

also serves as his correspondent office. Hearing the case in Manila would clearly expedite theproceedings and bring speedy resolution to the instant case.


NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES vs LAZARO (1988)

FACTS:

The Commercial Bank and Trust Company entered into a collective bargainingagreement with Commercial Bank and Trust Company Union, representing the file and rank

of the bank with a membership of over 1,000 employees

In 1980, the union, together with the National Union of Bank EEs submitted to bankmanagement proposals for the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement. The

following day, however, the bank suspended negotiations with the union. The bank entered

into a merger with BPI which assumed all assets and liabilities.


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The Union went to the CFI Manila, presided over by respondent Judge Lazaro, and filed

a complaint for specific performance, damages, and preliminary injunction against private

respondents.

Private Respondent filed a Motion toDismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of

the court. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint partook of

unfair labor practice dispute and jurisdiction over which is vested in the labor arbiter.

Issue: Whether courts may take cognizance of claims for damages arising from labor controversy

HELD: NO

The SC sustained the dismissal of the case and held that the act complained of involves

collecting bargaining which is categorized to be an unfair labor practice. Under the Labor Code,all cases involving unfair labor practices shall be under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters.

As correctly held by the respondent court, an unfair labor practice controversy is within the

original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the exclusive appellate jurisdictionof the NLRC. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not necessarily by the nature of action. In the

CAB, PD No. 442, as amended by Batas Blg. 70, has vested jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiters,a jurisdiction the courts may not assume.

WHEREFORE, PETITION DENIED

DY vs NLRC (1986)

FACTS:

Private Respondent Carlito H. Vailoces was the manager of the Rural Bank of Ayungon

(Negros Oriental). He was also a director and stockholder of the bank.


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In 1983, a special stockholders meeting was called for the purpose of electing the

members of the banks Board of Directors. Petitioner Lorenzo Dy was elected president.

Vailoces was not re-elected as bank manager.

Vailoces filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the Ministry of Labor

and Employment against Lorenzo Dy asserting that Dy, after obtaining control of the

majority stock of the bank, called an illegal stockholders meeting and elected a Board ofDirectors controlled by him; and that he was illegally dismissed as manager, without givinghim the opportunity to be heard first.

Dy denied the charge of illegal dismissal and pointed out that Vailoces position was an

elective one, and he was not re-elected as bank manager because of the Boards loss ofconfidence in him brought about by his absenteeism and negligence in the performance of his

duties

The Executive Labor Arbiter ruled that Vailoces was illegally dismissed because he was

not afforded due process of law. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter because ofthe appeal of the petitioners was filed late.

Issue: Whether the election of the Directors were validly held

HELD: YES

Under PD No. 902-A, Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees,

officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations, are explicitly declared to

be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

In the CAB, it shows that the controversy between the parties is intra-corporate in nature because

it revolves around the election of directors, officers or managers of the Rural Bank of Ayungon,

the relation between and among its stockholders, and between them and the corporation. It iswell settled that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and

void.

Therefore, the judgment of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are void for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED


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ESPINO vs NLRC and PAL (1995)

FACTS:

Petitioner Leslie W. Espino was the Exec. Vice President-Chief Operating Officer of

respondent Phil Airlines (PAL) when his service was terminated in 1990 as a result of the

findings of the panels created by then President Corazon C. Aquino to investigate theadministrative charges filed against him. It appears that petitioner and other several senior

officers of PAL were charged for their involvement in 4 cases, labeled as Goldair,

Robelle, Kabash/Primavera, and Middle East.

The PAL Board of Directors issued separate resolutions wherein Espino was consideredresign from the service effective immediately for loss of confidence

Espino filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL with the NLRC, ArbitrationBranch, NCR.

PAL argued that board resolutions cannot be reviewed by the NLRC and that the recourse

of the petitioner Espino should have been addressed by way of appeal, to the OP.

Labor Arbiter Cresencio J. Ramos rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Espino

PAL asserted that the Labor Arbiters decision is null and void for lack of jurisdictionover the subject matter as it is the SEC, and not the NLRC which has jurisdiction over

involving dismissal or removal of corporate officers.

NLRC promulgated a resolution and this time ruled in favor of PAL on the ground oflack of jurisdiction

Petitioner Espino contended that it is the NLRC that has jurisdiction over the case as it

involves the termination of a regular employee and involves claim for backwages and otherbenefits and damages

Issue: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the petitioner for illegal

dismissal

HELD: NO

Under P.D. No. 902-A, it is the Securities and Exchange Commission and not the NLRC that has

original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the removal from employment of

corporate officers. Under the said decree, the SEC has the exclusive and original jurisdiction tohear and decide cases involving Controversies in the election or appointments of directors,

trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.


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It has been ruled that a corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act and/or an intra -

corporate controversy and that nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom which the Board of

Directors may have in taking such action. Evidently, this intra-corporate controversy must beplace under the specialized competence and expertise of the SEC.

The fact that petitioner sought payment of his backwages, other benefits, as well as damages and

attorney's fees in his complaint for illegal dismissal will not operate to prevent the SEC fromexercising its jurisdiction under PD 902-A. As to the contention of Espino that PAL is estopped

from questioning the jurisdiction of the NLRC, it is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject

matter is conferred by law and the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised anytime even onappeal.

WHERFORE, PETITION IS DENIED

MAINLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. vs MOVILLA (1995)

FACTS:

Ernest Movilla, who was a CPA during his lifetime, was hired by Mainland in 1977.Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of Administrative Officer. He has a monthly

salary of P4,700.00/month and he was registered with SSS as an employee of petitioner

corporation

In 1991, The DOLE conducted a routine inspection on petitioner corporation and found

that it committed some irregularities in the conduct of its business. On the basis of its

findings, DOLE ordered petitioner corporation to pay its 13 employees, which included

Movilla, an amount representing their salaries, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay

differentials, unpaid wages and 13th month pay. All the employees listed in the DOLEsorder were paid by petitioner except Movilla.

Movilla filed a case against petitioner with the DOLE in Davao City. However, in 1992,Movilla died while the case was being tried. Hence, he was substituted by his heirs, private

respondents herein.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the controversy is intra-corporate in nature hence it is the SEC who has jurisdiction over and not the Labor Arbiter.


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Respondent Abraham Tumala, Jr. was salesman petitioner company in Davao City. In the

annual Sumakwel contest conductedby the company, he was declared the winner of the

Lapu-Lapu Award for his performance as top salesman of the year, an award whichentitled him to a prize of a house and lot. Petitioner company, despite demands, have unjustly

refused to deliver said prize.

It was alleged that in 1980, petitioner company, in a manner oppressive to labor andwithout prior clearance from the Ministry of Labor, arbitrarily and illegally terminated hisemployment. Hence, Tumala filed a complaint in the CFI Davao and prayed that petitioner be

ordered to deliver his prize of house and lot or its cash equivalent, and to pay his back

salaries and separation benefits.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent

Tumala maintains that the controversy is triable exclusively by the court of general

jurisdiction

Issue: Whether it is the court of general jurisdiction and not the Labor Arbiter that has exclusivejurisdiction over the recovery of unpaid salaries, separation and damages

HELD: NO

SC ruled that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over thesubject matter is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given

by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of

doubt.

Under the Labor Code, the NLRC has the exclusive jurisdiction over claims, money or

otherwise, arising from ER-EE relations, except those expressly excluded therefrom. The claim

for the said prize unquestionable arose from an ER-EE relation and, therefore, falls within thecoverage of P.D. 1691, which speaks of all claims arising from ER-EE relations, unless

expressly excluded by this Code. To hold that Tumalas claim for the prize should be passed

upon by the regular courts of justice would be to sanction split jurisdiction and multiplicity of

suits which are prejudicial to the orderly of administration of justice.



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SAN MIGUEL CORP. vs NLRC (1988)

FACTS:

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) sponsored an Innovation Program which grant

cash rewards to all SMC employees who submit to the corporation ideas and suggestions

found to beneficial to the corporation.

Private Respondent Rustico Vega, who is a mechanic in the Bottling Department of the

SMC submitted an innovation proposal which supposed to eliminate certain defects in the

quality and taste of the product San Miguel Beer Grande.

Petitioner Corporation did not accept the said proposal and refused Mr. Vegassubsequent demands for cash award under the innovation program. Hence, Vega filed a

complaint with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment in Cebu. He argued that hisproposal had been accepted by the methods analyst and was implemented by the SMC and itfinally solved the problem of the Corporation in the production of Beer Grande.

Petitioner denied of having approved Vegas proposal. It stated that said proposal was

turned down for lack of originality and the same, even if implemented, could not achievethe desire result. Further, petitioner Corporation alleged that the Labor Arbiter had nojurisdiction.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the claim of

Vega is not a necessary incident of his employment and does not fall under Article 217 ofthe Labor Code. However, in a gesture of compassion and to show the governments concern

for the working man, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay Vega P2,000 as financial

assistance. Both parties assailed said decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC set aside thedecision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered SMC to pay complainant the amount of P60,000

Issue: Whether the Labor Arbiter and the Commission has jurisdiction over the money claim

filed by private respondent

HELD: NO

The Labor Arbiter and the Commission has no jurisdiction over the money claim of Vega.

The court ruled that the money claim of private respondent Vega arose out of or in connectionwith his employment with petitioner. However, it is not enough to bring Vegas money claim

within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.


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During the 1st week of December 1976, Suario went to respondent BPI but was verbally

informed that he was already dismissed. He wrote a letter to the respondent bank requesting

for a written and formal advise as to his real status. The lawyers of BPI replied that hisservices is terminated. Therefore, Suario filed a complaint for separation pay, damages and

attorneys fees against the BPI on the ground that he was illegally dismissed.

The Labor Arbiter ordered BPI to pay Suarios claim for separation pay. His claim fordamages and attorneys fee were dismissed for lack of merit

On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter

Issue1: Whether NLRC has no authority to entertain claims for moral and other forms ofdamages

HELD:NO

P.D. 1691, a decree which substantially reenacted Article 217 of the Labor Code in its originalform, nullified P.D. 1367 and restored to the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction toaward all kinds of damages in cases arising from ER-EE relationship.

Issue2: Whether petitioner Suario is entitled to his claim for moral damages

HELD: NO

Although it is already settled that Labor Arbiters are allowed to award moral and other forms of

damages arising from ER-EE relations, it is consistently ruled that in the absence of a wrongfulact or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded

The SC did not find any bad faith or fraud on the part of the bank officials who denied the

petitioners request for 6 months leave of absence without pay. He was merely given personal

assurances which could be reconsidered in later developments. There is no evidence that theymeant to deceive the petitioner.

Therefore, the fact that petitioners request was denied, does not entitle him to damages.

WHEREFORE, PETITION DENIED.


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SOCO vs MERCANTILE CORP. OF DAVAO (1987)

FACTS:

Respondent Mercantile Corp is engaged in the sale and distribution of Ice Cream in

Davao. Petitioner, who was employed as driver of respondents delivery van, was the

President MERCO Employees Labor Union, an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers

(FFW).

An investigation was conducted due to reports that Soco was carrying on his union

activities during working hours. It appears that on January 1979, Soco was ordered to deliver

ice cream at Imperial Hotel and Your Goody Mart, but he deviated from his usual route andwent to his co-employee, who was then off duty. The personnel officer advised Soco toreport to his office to explain his unauthorized deviation but Soco did not comply. MERCO

wrote to FFW asking for a grievance conference but Soco refused to attend in his belief that

such in unnecessary. Hence, MERCO suspended Soco for 5 days for violation of CompanyRule No. 19(a).

On February 13, 1979, Soco, after making deliveries of ice cream, went to the Office of

the SPFL Union. The Manager of MERCO saw the company vehicle parked along the street.He called two of his co-employees and took out the rotor of the van. When Soco came out of

the building, he was unable to start the engine and called for company assistance. Again, he

was advised to report to the office to explain but refused to do so. He also refused to attend in

the grievance conference. Soco filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against MERCO alleging that the 5 days

suspension imposed on him was on account of his union activities. On the other hand,

MERCO filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of Soco. These 2 caseswere consolidated and tried jointly as agreed by the contending parties

The Regional Director granted MERCOs application to terminate employment of

petitioner and dismissed the Socos complaint for unfair labor practice

On appeal, the Deputy Minister of Labor affirmed

Petitioner Soco argued that under Policy No. 6 of the Ministry of Labor and Employment

(MOLE), the Regional Director has no jurisdiction to hear and decide unfair labor practice

cases because such belongs to the Conciliation Section of the Regional Office of the MOLE.In short, such cases should be first resolved by the Labor Arbiter and not the Regional

Director. Furthermore, Soco asserts that the Deputy Minister of Labor violated the

constitutional provision of security of tenure of employees and that assuming that he violated

the company rule, he cannot be dismissed because his violation only minimal and did nothamper the operations of MERCO.

Issue1: Whether the Regional Director has no authority to decide the unfair labor practice cases


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HELD1: NO

After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, its too

late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or the power of the court.

In the CAB, in the initial hearing conducted by the Regional Director, it was agreed by the

parties to consolidate the 2 cases considering that both cases concern the same parties and the

issues involved are interrelated. Petitioner Soco obviously accepted the jurisdiction of theRegional Director by presenting his evidence. By having asked for affirmative relief, without

challenging the Regional Director's power to hear and try his complaint for unfair labor practice,

he cannot rightfully now challenge the resolution made in said cases by the same Director, basedon the latter's alleged lack of jurisdiction.

Issue2: Whether petitioner can avail the security of tenure

HELD2:

It is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations

necessary or proper for the conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinary measures

in order to implement said rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. A ruleprohibiting employees from using company vehicles for private purpose without authority from

management is, from our viewpoint, a reasonable one.

The Court is not unmindful of the fact that petitioner has, as he says, been employed withpetitioner Company for eighteen (18) years. On this singular consideration, the Court deems it

proper to afford some equitable relief to petitioner due to the past services rendered by him to

MERCO. Thus, it is but appropriate that petitioner should be given by respondent MERCO,

separation pay, equivalent to one month salary for every year of his service to said Company.

WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DENIED but MERCO is nevertheless, ordered to grant Soco his

separation pay.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE vs NLRC (1993)


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FACTS:

Petitioner DOA and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services

to be provided by the latter to the said government entity. In September 13, 1990, severalguards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-

payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and

overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DOA and the Sultan Security Agency beforethe Regional Arbitration Branch in Cagayan De Oro City

The Labor Arbiter found DOA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Agency for the

payment of money claim of the guards

The Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce

and execute the judgment against the DOA and Sultan. The City Sheriff levied on execution

3 motor vehicles of the DOA

Petitioner DOA filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer

for preliminary injunction with the NLRC Cagayan De Oro. It argued that the writ ofexecution was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the

DOA. Hence, its decision was null and void. It also pointed out that the attachment of itsproperty would jeopardize its governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good

NLRC --- dismissed the petition for injunction for lack of basis and a Temporary Stay of

Execution is issued for a period of 2 months but not extendible.

DOA charges NLRC for grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ ofexecution. It argued that money claims against the Department falls under the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Further, the DOA asserts that the NLRC has

disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.

NLRC, on the other hand, argue that petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit byconcluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency

Issue: Whether the DOA can be sued

HELD:

Under the Constitution, it says that the State cannot be sued without its consent. This simplymeans that a sovereign is exempt from suit on the ground that there can be no legal right asagainst the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. This doctrine is also called

the royal prerogative of dishonesty because it grants the State the prerogative to defeat any

legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability


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This rule is not really absolute for it does not say that state may not be sued under any

circumstances. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be

made through a general law or special law. On the other hand, Implied consent is when the Stateitself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a

contract

In the CAB, the claims of the security guards arising from the Contract for Service, clearlyconstitute money claims. Under Act No. 3083, a general law, the State consents and submits to

be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.

However, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit


HAGONOY WATER DISTRICT vs NLRC (1988)

FACTS:

Private Respondent Dante Villanueva was employed as service foreman by petitioner

Hagonoy when he was indefinitely suspended and thereafter dismissed for abandonment ofwork and conflict of interest

Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and underpayment of

wages and emergency cost of living allowance against Hagonoy with the Ministry of Laborand Employment in San Fernando, Pampanga

Petitioner Hagonoy moved for dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Being

government entity, its personnel are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and

not by the Labor Code. And the protests concerning the lawlessness of dismissal from service

fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the Ministry of Laborand Employment.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on favor of Villanueva

NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. A Writ of Execution was issued by

the Labor Arbiter to garnish petitioner Hagonoys deposits with the planters Development

Bank.

Hagonoy filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution with Application forWrit of

Preliminary Injunction. NLRC denied the application.


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Issue: Whether local water districts are GOCC whose employees are subject to the provisions ofthe Civil Service Law

HELD: YES

The Labor Arbiter, in asserting that it has jurisdiction over the employees of Hagonoy, relied on

P.D. No. 198, known as Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 which exempts employees ofwater districts from the application of the Civil Service Law. However, the Labor Arbiter failed

to take into account that P.D. 1479 wiped away the said exemption

Moreover, the NLRC relied upon Article 9, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution which providesthat: [T]he Civil Service embraces ... government owned or controlled corporations with

original charters.

At the time the dispute in the CAB arose, and at the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision

(which is on March 17, 1986), the applicable law is that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to

render a decision that he in fact rendered. By the time the NLRC rendered its decision (August

20, 1987), the 1987 Constitution has already come into effect. The SC believes that the 1987Constitution does not operate retroactively as to confer jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiter to

render a decision, which was before outside the scope of its competence.

Therefore, a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter without jurisdiction over the case is a

complete nullity, vesting no rights and imposing no liabilities. Villanueva, if he so wishes, may

refile this complaint in an appropriate


Sadol vs. Pilipinas Kao, Inc., et al (1990)


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Facts:

Petitioner was dismissed from work by private respondents who are owners of Vega & Co.,

private recruitment agency, with assignment at respondent PKI. He filed a complaint forreinstatement and backwages with the DOLE in Cagayan de Oro City. The Labor Arbiter ruled

in favor of Sadol and ordered respondents to pay petitioners separation pay at one month for

every year of service. Both parties appealed but respondents appeal was filed out of time. Theappeal of respondent was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

Issue: Whether the respondent has lost the right to appeal

HELD: YES

A party, who failed to appeal on time from a decision of the Labor Abiter to the NLRC, may still

participate in a separate appeal timely filed by the adverse party by a Motion for Reconsideration

of the NLRC decision. In the CAB, there is no question that respondents failed to file a timely

appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, having lost the right to appeal, therespondent may choose to file a Motion for Reconsideration instead.

St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC and B. Aricayos (1998)

Facts:

P. respondent was dismissed from work by petitioner for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00.Hence, a complaint was filed for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Petitioner argued that

respondent was not its employee. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner declaring that no

employer-employee relationship between the parties and therefore his office had no jurisdictionover the case. On appeal, the NLRC set aside the questioned decision and remanding the case tothe labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals.


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Held: YES

The Supreme Court clarified and stressed that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme

Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment is that the special civil action of certiorari wasand still the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The concurrent original

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be availed of only under compelling and exceptional

circumstances.

To further explain, (1) the way to review NLRC decision is through the special civil action of

certiorari under Rule 65; (2) the jurisdiction of such action belongs both to the SC and CA; but

(3) in line with the doctrine of hierarchy, of courts, the petition should be initially presented tothe lower court of the two courts, that is the Court of Appeals.

Sunshine Transportation Inc. vs NLRC and R. Santos (1996)

Facts:

P. respondent Santos was dismissed from work as a bus driver by Petitioner for failing to submita written explanation why he failed to report for his scheduled trip. Respondent filed a complaint

with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner

and dismissed the complaint. This was affirmed by the NLRC but granted Santps money claims.Unsatisfied with the decision, petitioner elevated the case to the SC charging the NLRC with

grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether the petitioner may avail the special civil action for certiorari?

Held: NO

A petition for certiorari should be preceded by exhaustion of administrative remedies. Under said

doctrine, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special action for certiorarimay be availed of. In the case at bench, the petitioner make a claim that it filed a motion for the

reconsideration of the challenged decision before it came to us through this action.


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Midas Touch Food Corp. vs NLRC and Iris Fe Isaac (1996)

Facts:

Respondent Iris Fe Isaac was dismissed as operations manager by petitioner for alleged lack of

self confidence. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter

which rendered a decision in favor of petitioner finding the said dismissal to be valid. However,

petitioner was ordered to pay the complainants there separation pay, etc. Both parties appealed tothe NLRC and the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed, this time ruling in favor of Isaac.

Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the SC assailing the decision of the NLRC.

Issue: Whether the petitioner may avail the special civil action for certiorari?

Held: YES

The rule requiring motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari admits of

certain exceptions, among which is the finding that under the circumstances of the case, a motion

for reconsideration would be useless.

In this case, the Supreme Court found it quite impossible for the NLRC to reverse itself under the

foregoing facts and so, a motion for reconsideration will be deemed useless.

Alindao vs Hon. Hoson (1996)

Facts:

Petitioner applied for employment for Saudi Arabia through private respondent Hisham General

Services Contractor. She paid a placement fee of P15,000.00 without receipt. When she arrivedin Saudi arrived in Saudi Arabia, she was made to work as a domestic helper. Because of unfair

working conditions, she worked at several residences until she saved enough money to return


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home. When she arrived in the Philippines, she filed with POEA a complaint against Hisham for

breach of contract. The POEA rendered a decision suspending Hisham and to pay petitioner her

money claims. Hisham appealed to the NLRC and filed a MFR with the POEA. The NLRCaffirmed the decision of the POEA. Hisham now argues that the order cannot be enforced

because the MFR was still pending with the POEA. Respondent POEA administrator Joson find

the MFR of Hisham to be meritorious. Hence, petitioner elevated this case to the SC

Issue: Whether the petitioner may avail the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a

motion for reconsideration?

Held: YES

It has been held that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with inthe following instances: (1) when the issue raised is one purely of law; (2) where public interestis involved; (3) in cases of urgency; and (4) where special circumstances warrant immediate or

more direct action.

On the other hand, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrativeremedies are: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; and (2) where the

controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of

jurisdiction.

The petition involves a pure question of law and the challenged order is void for want ofjurisdiction on the part of respondent Joson.

Metro Transit Organization vs. CA, et al. (2002)

Facts:

Respondent Ruperto Evangelista, a cash assistant in the treasury division of the petitioner, was

dismissed from work for being alleged to be responsible for the loss of tokens. He was

terminated for lack of trust and confidence. Evangelista filed a case for illegal dismissal. TheLabor Arbiter ruled in his favor and ordered his reinstatement with payment of full backwages.

This was affirmed by the NLRC. Hence, petitioner directly filed with the Court of Appeals a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA, on the other hand, affirmed the ruling of both the


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labor arbiter and NLRC, holding that a motion for reconsideration is necessary before resorting

to a petition for certioarari.

Issue: Whether the petitioner may elevate the case before the CA without first filing a motion forreconsideration with the NLRC?

Held: NO

Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is

filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its imputed errors.However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule:

(1) when the issue raised is one purely of law; (2) where public interest is involved; (3) in casesof urgency; and (4) where special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.

On the other hand, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative

remedies are: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; and (2) where thecontroverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of

jurisdiction.

To dispense with a motion for reconsideration, there must a be concrete, compelling and validreason for the failure to comply with the requirement.

MAI Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al (1987)

Facts:

The Regional Director declared that petitioner illegally dismissed its Customer EngineeringManager Rodolfo Nolasco. It ordered petitioner to reinstate Nolasco and to pay him his full

backwages. The petitioner complied to pay Nolasco but declined to reinstate him. Nolasco filed

a complaint with the Labor Arbiter to recover damages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the

complaint for being a duplication of the earlier labor case involving the same parties. Nolascoreceived the notice of the Labor Arbiters decision 12 days after. He filed an appeal before the

NLRC. Petitioner opposed the appeal and contended that it should be dismissed because it was

filed out of time. NLRC ruled that since the order of the Regional Director requiring


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reinstatement of Nolasco with full back wages had already become final and executory, attacks

against that order "on the merits or in substance can no longer be entertained

Issue: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: YES

The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take account of the fact, as shown

in the record, that the appeal of Nolasco was late because it was not filed within the reglementary

period

No acceptable reason has been advanced by Nolasco, and none appears upon the record, to

excuse his tardiness in the taking of the appeal. Petitioner's opposition to the appeal should havebeen sustained, and the NLRC should never have taken cognizance of the appeal.

PAL vs. NLRC (1989)

Facts:

Private respondent Dolina completed his training course with PAL as pilot. He was given

temporary appointment for 6 months as Limited First Officer. He applied for regularization asFirst Officer and undergoes the required psychological examination wherein his "Adaptability

Rating" was found to be "unacceptable" and the Pilot Acceptance Qualifications Board finds him

not qualified for regular employment in the Company. Dolina was placed under preventivesuspension; hence he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.


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The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of Dolina justified, hence, PAL discontinued the payment

of Dolinas salary. Dolina objected on the ground that the discontinuance an earlier agreement

that he would be kept in the payroll until the case was finally resolved by arbitration. On appeal,the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but ordered the company to continue

paying Dolinas salary since the arbitration case was not yet over.

Issue: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Dolina was

entitled to his salaries "until this case is finally resolved."

Held: YES

The order of the NLRC to continue paying Dolina his salary was an abuse of discretion. The

clause "pending final resolution of the case by arbitration" should be understood to be limited

only to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, such that when the latter rendered his decision,

the case was finally resolved by arbitration.

Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC (1990)

Facts:

In the case of Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC (1988), the SC dismissed the petition on the ground

that petitioner failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. The entry ofjudgment having been effected, the NLRC, in the process of execution, made a computation ofthe award to the private respondents. Petitioner filed a motion to stay execution/reconsideration

citing supervening events that affect the computation of the award as follows:

(1) The computation on separation pay did not consider the length of service of each complainant

as borne out from the records; (2) The computation did not consider the wage exemptions

granted the petitioner-respondent company; (3) The computation included payment of awards toa respondent who had already been recalled to active duty, one who was already paid in a case

separately filed, and another who was already paid; (4) All the capital assets of the petitioner

have already been attached and/or otherwise foreclosed.

The NLRC denied the motion and ordered immediate implementation of the partial writ of

execution


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Issue: Whether the execution of a final judgment of the NLRC may be stayed in view of

supervening events.

Held: YES

Generally, one a judgment becomes final and executory, it canno longer be disturbed, altered ormodified. The principle, however, admits of exceptions as in cases where, because of

supervening events, it becomes imperative, in the higher interest of justice, to direct its

modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances orwhenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice.

There can be no question that the supervening events cited by petitioner would certainly affect

the computation of the award in the decision of the NLRC. It is the duty of the NLRC to considerthe same and inquire into the correctness of the execution, as such supervening events may affectsuch execution.

Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. vs. CA (2002)

Facts:

Petitioner contended that a sheriff of the NLRC erroneously and unlawfully levied certain

properties which it claims as its own. It filed a 3rd party claim with the Labor Arbiter andrecovery of property and damages with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case. In the CA, the

court dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping and that the proper remedy was

appeal in due course, not certiorari or mandamus. Petitioner filed a MFR and argued that thefiling of a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria with the RTC was proper because it is a remedyspecifically granted to an owner (whose properties were subjected to a writ of execution to

enforce a decision rendered in a labor dispute in which it was not a party). The MFR was denied.

Hence, petitioner filed this appeal.


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Issue: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the case

Held: YES

A third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision against a

judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The thirdparty may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third

party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event he failed in the remedy

first availed of.

Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies:

a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and

b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the NLRC.

Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper action with a

competent court to recover ownership of the property illegally seized by the sheriff.

The filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC did not preclude the

petitioner from filing a subsequent action for recovery of property and damages with theRegional Trial Court. And, the institution of such complaint will not make petitioner guilty of

forum shopping.

Nova vs. Judge Sancho Dames II (2001)

Facts:

Complainant Greogorio S. Nova filed with the NLRC complaint for illegal dismissal against

R.A. Broadcasting Corporation represented by its Vice President for Operations Vilma J.

Barcelona and Station Manager Deo Trinidad. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor ofNova and ordered R.A. Broadcasting to pay his separation pay and full backwages. NLRC

affirmed such decision and denied the MFR filed by R.A. Construction on the ground that it was

filed out of time. The NLRC issued an alias writ of execution and the property of Sps. Barcelona

was scheduled in an auction sale. The said spouses filed with the RTC Camarines Norte actionfor damages with prayer of TRO to restrain the NLRC from conducting the scheduled public

auction. The RTC granted the TRO. Nova argued that under the Labor Code, issuance of the

TRO or preliminary injunction in a case arising from labor dispute is prohibited.


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TOYOTA MOTOR PHIL. CORP vs. TOYOTA MOTOR PHIL. CORP LABOR UNION (1997)

FACTS:


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Toyota Motor Phil Corp. Labor Union filed a petition for certification election with Dept. of

Labor, for all rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Petitioner seek the

denial of the holding of the certification election on 2 grounds: (1) the union, being process ofregistration had no legal personality to file the same as it was not a legitimate labor organization

at the time the petition was file; and (2) that the union was composed of both rank-and-file and

supervisory employees in violation of the law. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition forcertification election in favor with the grounds stated by petitioner. However, on appeal, theSecretary of Labor set aside the decision of the Me-Arbiter and ordered the holding of the

certification election contending that the union was already a legitimate labor organization at the

time of the filing of the petition evidenced by a certificate of registration.

Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the

certification election

Held: YES. Petition Granted.

A labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor

organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not

being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employeescannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file apetition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining.

In the given case, as respondent union's membership list contains the names of at least 27

supervisory employees in Level Five positions, the union could not, prior to purging itself of itssupervisory employee members, attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being

one, it cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for certification election. Theunion's composition being in violation of the Labor Code's Prohibition of unions composed of

supervisory and rank-and-file employees, it could not possess the requisite personality to file for

recognition as a legitimate labor organization.

ATLAS LITHOGRAPHIC SERVICE vs. LAGUESMA (1992)

FACTS:

A petition for certification election was filed by private respondents Kampil-Katipunan on

behalf of the supervisors union, a union where the supervisory, administrative personnel,


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production, accounting and confidential employees of the petitioner were affiliated. Petitioner

opposed the petition on the ground that Kampil Katipunan cannot represent the supervisory

employees for the purpose of collective bargaining because said Kampil Katipunan alsorepresents the rank-and-file employees union. The Med-Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of

the private respondent. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Med-

Arbiter. Petitioner now argue that to allow the supervisory employees to affiliate with theKampil Katipunan is tantamount to allowing the circumvention of the principle of theseparation of unions under Art. 245 of the Labor Code.

Issue: Whether a local union of supervisory employees may be allowed to affiliate with anational federation of labor organizations of rank-and-file employees for purpose of CBA?

Held: NO. Petition Granted

We agree with the petitioner's contention that a conflict of interest may arise in the areas of

discipline, collective bargaining and strikes. Members of the supervisory union might refuse to

carry out disciplinary measures against their co-member rank-and-file employees.

Under Article 245 of the Labor Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715 provides:

Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization: right of

supervisory employees.Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form anylabor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labororganization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor

organizations of their own.

The Court construes Article 245 to mean that supervisors shall not be given an occasion to

bargain together with the rank-and-file against the interests of the employer regarding terms and

conditions of work. Thus, if the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors wouldmerge with the rank and-file or where the supervisors' labor organization would represent

conflicting interests, then a local supervisors' union should not be allowed to affiliate with the

national federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively

participates in union activity in the company.

SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR vs. HON. FERRER-CALLEJA (1989)


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FACTS:

Petitioner SPF filed with the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file

employees of private respondent Apex Minong Co. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition anddirected the holding of the certification election. During the pre-election conference, petitioner

union objected to the inclusion in the list of workers prepared by Apex the following: (1)

employees occupying the positions of Supervisor I, II and III; (2) employees underconfidential/special payrolls; and (3) employees who were not paying dues. According to

petitioner, the mentioned employees were disqualified from participating in the certification

election since the Supervisors were managerial employees while the last two were disqualifiedby virtue of their non-membership in the Union and their exclusion from the benefits of the

collective bargaining agreement. After the certification of election was conducted, respondent

Union filed an urgent motion to open the challenged ballots. The Med-Arbiter granted the

motion and directed the challenged ballots be opened and inventoried. Petitioner appealed to the

BLR wherein respondent Director Ferrer-Calleja dismissed said appeal and affirmed the decisionof the Med-Arbiter and ordered that the 197 ballots should be opened and canvassed. As a

consequence of the opening and canvass of the challenged ballots, the Med-Arbiter

Issue: Whether respondent Director committed grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the

197 employees from voting in the certification election

Held: NO

The functions of the questioned positions are not managerial in nature because they only executeapproved and established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement the

said policies or not. The respondent Director, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion

in dismissing the petitioner's appeal from the Med-Arbiter's Order to open and count thechallenged ballots in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in certifying the

respondent Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file

employees of respondent Apex .

As regards the employees in the confidential payroll, the petitioner has not shown that the nature

of their jobs is classified as managerial except for its allegation that they are considered bymanagement as occupying managerial positions and highly confidential. Neither can payment ornon-payment of union dues be the determining factor of whether the challenged employees

should be excluded from the bargaining unit since the union shop provision in the CBA applies

only to newly hired employees but not to members of the bargaining unit who were not membersof the union at the time of the signing of the CBA. It is, therefore, not impossible for employees

to be members of the bargaining unit even though they are non-union members or not paying

union dues.


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GOLDEN FARMS INC. vs. HON. FERRER-CALLEJA (1989)

FACTS:

The National Federation of Labor (NFL) filed a petition for certification election in behalf of

certain employees and foreman of petitioner before the DOLE. Petitioner opposed said petition

arguing that

The NFL appealed but it was dismissed. Hence, it re-filed the petition for certification which was

also dismissed.

Issue:

Held:

PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. vs. HON. TORRES (1974)

FACTS:

Issue:

Held:


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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS vs. HON. TORRES (1994)

FACTS:

Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining

representative of respondents bank employees occupying supervisory positions. The Bank

moved to dismiss on the ground that said supervisory employees were actuallymanagerial/confidential employees, thus, they are ineligible to join, assist or form a union. The

Med-Arbiter granted the petition and directed the holding of the certification election. The Bank

appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Said court partially granted the appeal ruling that the

Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers aredeclared managerial employees and cannot join the union of the supervisors.

Issue: Whether

Held:

Petitioner concludes that subject employees are not managerial employees but supervisors. Even

assuming that they are confidential employees, there is no legal prohibition against confidential

employees who are not performing managerial functions to form and join a union. A confidentialemployee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or

care and protection of the employer's property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles outmanagerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under thedoctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified.

MERALCO vs. HON. QUISUMBING (1999)

FACTS:

A petition for certification election was filed by the labor organization of staff and technical

employees of MERALCO seeking to represent regular employees of MERALCO. MERALCOcontended that those in the Patrol Division and Treasury Security Service Section, since these

employees are tasked with providing security to the company, they are not eligible to join the

rank and file bargaining unit. The Med-Arbiter ruled that having been excluded from the existing


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Collective Bargaining Agreement for rank and file employees, these employees have the right to

form a union of their own, except those employees performing managerial functions. The

Secretary of Labor affirmed said order.

Issue: Whether security guards may join rank-and-file or supervisors union

Held:

Under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor organization of the rank

and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or

that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory

employees, the Secretary of Labor must likewise apply the provisions of RA 6715 to securityguards by favorably allowing them free access to a labor organization, whether rank and file or

supervisory, in recognition of their constitutional right to self-organization.

MARIANO vs. ROYAL INTEROCEAN LINES (1961)

FACTS

Petitioner Ermidia A. Mariano was a stenographer-typist and filing clerk of respondent

when she was dismissed from work. She sent a letter to the managing directors of thecompany in HK through its manager in the Philippines, respondent J.V. Kamerling. In the

letter, she complained about Kamerlings inconsiderate and untactful attitude towards the

employees under him and the clients of the company. Kamerling adviced petitioner that herletter had been forwarded to the managing directors in HK and that said directors believedthat it was impossible to maintain her in the company.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of her dismissal from the managing directors in HK but

received no answer to any of her 5 letters.

The Company finally offered a compromise settlement with the petitioner whereby she

would be paid a sum equivalent to 6 months salary, provided that she would sign a quitclaim

embodying a provision that she would release the company from any liability arising from


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her employment. Not satisfied with the compromise, the petitioner filed a complaint for

unfair labor practice against the company. The CIR rendered judgment holding the company

guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered them to reinstate petitioner to her former position.

The company filed with the SC a petition to review the decision of the CIR. The SC ruled

in favor of the company. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether the petitioner was guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing the respondent

Held: NO. Petition Denied.

As the respondent's dismissal has no relation to union activities and the charges filed by her

against the petitioner had nothing to do with or did not arise from her union activities, the

dismissal did not constitute Unfair Labor Practice. Despite the employees right to selforganization, the employer still retains his inherent right to discipline his employees, his normal

prerogrative to hire or dismiss them. In this case, the court ruled that the dismissal of theemployee was unjustified, but the employer did not commit Unfair Labor Practice because theact has no union connection.

WISE AND CO. INC. vs. WISE AND CO. INC. EMPLOYEES UNION (1989)

FACTS:

The management issued a Memorandum Circular introducing a profit-sharing scheme for

its managers and supervisors.

Respondent Union wrote to petitioner to ask that the union members be allowed to

participate in the profit-sharing program. The management denied the request on the ground

that such participation was not provided in the CBA

When renegotiation of the CBA was approaching, the management wrote to the Union

that it was willing to consider including the union members in the profit-sharing schemeprovided that the negotiations would be concluded prior to December 1987

Sometime later, the company distributed the profit-sharing benefit not only to themanagers and supervisors but also to all rank-and-file employees not covered by the CBA

because they were excluded from the definition of bargaining unit.

This caused the respondent Union to file a notice of strike alleging that petitioner wasguilty of unfair labor practice because the union were discriminated against in the grant of

the profit sharing benefits


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Issue: Whether the grant by management of profit sharing benefits to its non-union memberemployees is discriminatory against its workers who are union members and amounts to ULP?


There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner as the situation of the union employeesare different and distinct from the non-union employees. Discrimination per se is not unlawful.

There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated.

The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees outside the "bargaining unit"falls under the ambit of its managerial prerogative. It appears to have been done in good faith and

without ulterior motive. More so when as in this case there is a clause in the CBA where the

employees are classified into those who are members of the union and those who are not. In thecase of the union members, they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBAcontract which constitute the law between the contracting parties. Both the employer and the

union members are bound by such agreement.

PHIL. GRAPHIC ARTS INC. vs. NLRC (1988)

FACTS:

In October 1984, petitioner corporation was forced by economic circumstances to require

its workers to go on mandatory vacation leave in batches of seven or nine for periods ranging

from 15, 30, to 45 days. The workers were paid while on leave but the pay was chargedagainst their respective earned leaves.

As a result, the private respondents filed complaints for unfair labor practice and

discrimination.

Issue: Whether the forced vacation leave without pay constitutes unfair labor practice



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There was no unfair labor practice in this case. Private respondents never questioned the

existence of an economic crisis but, in fact, admitted its existence. There is basis for the

petitioner's contentions that the reduction of work schedule was temporary, that it was taken onlyafter notice and consultations with the workers and supervisors, that a consensus was reached on

how to deal with deteriorating economic conditions and reduced sales and that the temporary

reduction of working days was a more humane solution instead of a retrenchment and reductionof personnel. The petitioner further points out that this is in consonance with the CBA betweenthe employer and its employees.

Likewise, the forced leave was enforced neither in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive norwanton manner, or out of malice or spite. Hence, ULP is not committed.

DABUET vs. ROCHE PHARMACEUTICALS (1987)

FACTS:


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The petitioners, all officers of the Roche Products Labor Union, wrote the respondentcompany expressing their grievances and seeking formal conference with management

regarding the previous dismissal of the unions president and vice-president.

At the meeting, instead of discussing the problems affecting the labor union andmanagement, the companys general manager allegedly berated the petitioners for writing the

said letter and called the letter and the person who prepared it stupid.

Feeling that he was the one alluded to, since he had prepared the letter, the counsel forthe labor union filed a case for Grave Slander against the general manager. The charge was

based on the affidavit executed by the petitioners.

In turn, the company and the manager filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioners

alleging that their affidavit contained false statements

The company construed the execution by petitioners of the affidavit as an act of breach

of trust and confidence. Hence, they were suspended and later on dismissed.

Issue: Whether respondent company, in terminating the employment of the petitioners withoutjust and lawful cause, committed an unfair labor practice.

Held: YES. Petition Granted

Respondent company had committed unfair labor practice in dismissing the petitioners without

just and valid cause. Their dismissal, under the circumstances, amounted to interference with,

and restraint or coercion of, the petitioners in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted

activities for their mutual aid and protection

Breach of trust and confidence, the grounds alleged for petitioners' dismissal, "must not be

indiscriminately used as a shield to dismiss an employee arbitrarily.

MADRIGAL & CO. vs. HON. ZAMORA (1987)

FACTS:


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In December 1973, respondent Madrigal Central Office Employees Union sought for the

renewal of its CBA with the petitioner company. It proposed a wage increase of P200.00 a

month, an allowance of P100.00 a month, and other economic benefits.

By an alleged resolution of its stockholders, the petitioner reduced its capital stock from

765,000 shares to 267,366 shares. Petitioner alleged that because of the desire of the

stockholders to phase out the operations of the Madrigal & Co. due to lack of businessincentives and prospect, it had to reduce its capital stock and effected a retrenchment policy(downsizing) of its employees and operations

Petitioner applied for clearance to terminate the services of a number of employees

pursuant to its retrenchment program. Respondent union filed a complaint of illegal lockoutagainst the petitioner.

Respondent Union filed a complaint for ULP.

Issue: Whether the mass-lay off of petitioner due to alleged income loss constitutes ULP

Held: YES. Petition Denied

The petitioners capital reduction efforts, to camouflage the fact that it has been making

profits, and to justify the mass lay-off of its employees, especially union members, were anULP which can neither be countenanced nor condoned.

Petitioner, confronted with the demand of the union for wage increases, decided to evade itsresponsibility towards the employees by a devised capital reduction. While the reduction in

capital stock created a need for retrenchment, it was just a mask for the purge of union members,

who, by then, had agitated for wage increases. In the face of the petitioner company's piling

profits, the unionists had the right to demand for such salary adjustments.

Retrenchment can only be availed of if the company is losing or meeting financial reverses in its

operation. Thus the mass lay-off or dismissal of the employees under the guise of retrenchmentpolicy is a lame excuse and a veritable smoke-screen of its scheme to bust the Union and thus

unduly disturb the employment tenure of the employees concerned, which act is certainly an

ULP.

COMPLEX ELECTRONICS UNION. vs. NLRC (1999)

FACTS:


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Complex Electronics Corporation was a subcontractor of electronic products. Itscustomers were foreign-based companies with different product lines. One of its customers is

the Lite-On Philippines Electronics Co.

Complex received a message from Lite-On Philippines requiring it to lower its price by10%. Complex informed Lite-On that such request was not feasible as they were already

incurring losses at the present prices of their products. Complex informed the employees that

it was left with no alternative but to close down the operations of the Lite-On Line. Thecompany promised that it would follow the law by giving 1 month notice and retrenchment

pay.

Sometime later, the machinery, equipment and materials being used for production at

Complex were pulled-out from the company premises and transferred to the premises ofIonics Circuit, Inc. in Laguna. The following day, Complex totally closed its operation.

The Complex Employees Union filed a complaint for ULP, illegal closure/illegal lockout

and money claims. It claims that business has not ceased at Complex but was merely

transferred to Ionics, a runaway shop, which is an act constituting ULP. To prove that Ionicswas just a runaway shop, petitioner asserts that Complex owns the majority of the shares

comprising the increased capital stock of Ionics. The Union alleged that the reason for theclosure of the establishment was due to the union activities of the employees.

Issue: Whether Complex Electronics Corp. committed ULP

HELD: NO

Resorting to a runaway shop is ULP. A runaway shop is defined as an industrial plant movedby its owners from one location to another to escape union labor regulations or state laws, but the

term is also used to describe a plant removed to a new location in order to discriminate against

employees at the old plant because of their union activities. It is one wherein the employer

moves its business to another location or it temporarily closes its business for anti-unionpurposes.

In this case, Ionics was not set up for the purpose of transferring the business of Complex. Atthe time the labor dispute arose, Ionics was already existing as an independent company. Itcannot, therefore, be said that the temporary closure in Complex and its subsequent transfer of

business to Ionics was for anti-union purposes.

We, likewise, disagree with the Union that there was in this case an illegal lockout/illegal

dismissal. Lockout is the temporary refusal of employer to furnish work as a result of an


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industrial or labor dispute. It may be manifested by the employer's act of excluding employees

who are union members.

PROGRESSIVE DEVPT CO. vs. CIR (1977)

FACTS:

The Araneta Coliseum Employees Association (ACEA) in behalf of 48 members, filed

for ULP against petitioner Progressive Devpt Corp., its officers, and the Progressive

Employees Union (PEU).

The complainants alleged that they were dismissed because they refused to resign fromthe ACEA and to affiliate with the PEU.

There is evidence that the Progressive Employees Union became inactive after the death

of Atty. Reonista the former counsel of the Progressive Development Corporation. Thisshows that the Progressive Employees Union was organized to camouflage the petitioner

corporation's dislike for the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association and to stave off the

latter's recognition. Further, the PEU did not conclude and enter into a CBA with themanagement.

Issue: Whether the dismissal of the employees constitutes ULP

Held: YES

The dismissal of employees because of their refusal to resign from their union and to join theunion favorable to the employer constitutes ULP. Under the circumstances and equity of the

case, and considering the length of time and the union-busting activities of petitioner, the

individual complainants are granted back wages for five (5) years without qualification or

deduction.

BATAAN SHIPYARD vs. NLRC (1988)


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FACTS:

The National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) is a labor organization in petitioner

Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. The Company has thousand employees in itspayroll and more than a hundred of them belong to the said labor organization.

Sometimebefore 1984, the Company filed with the NLRC an application for the

retrenchment of 285 of its employees on the ground that the firm had been incurring heavylosses. In the meantime, some employees who had been on sick leave earlier were considered

retrenched. All of those so retrenched happen to be officers and members of the NAFLU.

Issue: Whether the Company is guilty of discriminatory acts in the selection of employees to beretrenched

Held: YES.

The retrenchment undertaken by the Company is valid. However, the manner in which this is

exercised should not be tainted with abuse of discretion. Labor is a person's means of livelihood.He cannot be deprived of his labor or work without due process of law. The retrenchment of

employees who belong to a particular union, with no satisfactory justification why saidemployees were singled out, constitutes ULP.

In this case, the Company had indeed been discriminatory in selecting the employees who wereto be retrenched. All of the retrenched employees are officers and members of the NAFLU. Itleads Us to conclude that the firm had been discriminating against membership in the NAFLU,

an act which amounts to interference in the employees' exercise of their right of self-

organization. This interference is considered an act of ULP

TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION vs. NLRC (1987)

FACTS:


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Tanduay Distillery, Inc. (TDI) and Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU) entered into

a CBA which contained a union security clause, which provided: All workers who are or

may during the effectivity of this Contract, become members of the Union in accordancewith its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a condition of their continued employment,

maintain membership in good standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement.

While the CBA was still in effect, a number of the TDLU, joined another union, theKaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in TDI.

The TDLU required those who disaffiliated to explain why they should not be punished

for disloyalty. TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members. The

committee recommended that the disaffiliating members be expelled and that they should beterminated from service in pursuant to the union security clause. Acting on said request, the

company terminated the employment of the disaffiliating union members.

Issue: Whether the dismissal of the disaffiliating members pursuant to a security clause

constitutes ULP

Held: NO

The private respondents cannot escape the effects of the security clause of their own applicable

CBA. Union Security Clauses in CBA, if freely and voluntarily entered into, are valid andbinding. Thus, the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor unions demand

in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute ULP.

The respondent employer did nothing but to put in force their agreement when it separated theherein complainants upon the recommendation of said union. Such a stipulation is not only

necessary to maintain loyalty and preserve the integrity of the union but is allowed by the Magna

Charta of Labor when it provided that while it is recognized that an employee shall have the rightto self-organization, it is at the same time postulated that such right shall not injure the right of

the labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of

membership therein

In Villar v. Inciong, we held that "petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliation from their union

and to form a new organization of their own must however, suffer the consequences of their

separation from the union under the security clause of the CBA"


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MABEZA vs. NLRC (1997)

FACTS:

Petitioner Norma Mabeza contends that she and her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme

in Baguio City were asked by the hotel's management to sign an instrument wherein it statesthat they are in compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provisions of law.

Petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City Prosecutor's Office to swear to

the truth of her statement. Her refusal displeased the employer.


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Thereafter, she was ordered to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove her

belongings from the hotel. Subsequently, she as charged with of abandonment of job and

stealing of company property; finally she was dismissed for loss of confidence.

Issue: Whether the dismissal constitutes ULP?

Held: YES

The act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observedlabor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with the act of terminating or

coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme constitutes unfair labor

practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers to seek better terms and

conditions of employment through concerted action. In not giving positive testimony in favor ofher employer, petitioner had reserved not only her right to dispute the claim and proffer evidence

in support thereof but also to work for better terms and conditions of employment.

RANCE vs. NLRC (1988)

FACTS:

Polybag Manufacturing Corporation and Polybag Workers Union entered into a CBAwhich provides a union security clause which states that a union member who loses his

membership in the union shall be dismissed from service by the company.

Petitioners, who were members of the Polybag Workers Union, were expelled by saidunion for disloyalty for allegedly joining the National Federation of Labor Union

(NAFLU). Because of the expulsion, petitioners were dismissed by the Corporation upon the

unions demand. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found the CBA and theunion security clause validand considered the termination of petitioners justified.

Petitioners argue that their dismissal is not valid because they did not affiliate with the

NAFLU. They claim that there is a connivance between respondents Company and Union in

their illegal dismissal in order to avoid the payment of separation pay by respondentcompany.


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Issue: Whether the act of asking help from another union constitutes disloyalty

Held: NO

The mere act of seeking help from the NAFLU cannot constitute disloyalty as contemplated in

the Collective Bargaining Agreement. At most it was an act of self-preservation of workers who,

driven to desperation found shelter in the NAFLU who took the cudgels for them.


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KIOK LOY vs. NLRC (1986)

FACTS:

In a certification election held, the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa, a legitimate late labor

federation, won and was subsequently certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of

the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant.


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The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining

agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals but the

requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company.

As a result, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike", with the BLR on the ground of

unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.

In the labor arbiter: due to series of postponements, and non-appearance at the hearingconducted it ruled that the Company has waived its right to present further evidence and,therefore, considered the c

Labor Relation1

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Transcript of Labor Relation1