Paper WISC RodriguesVieira

8/2/2019 Paper WISC RodriguesVieira

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Framing anarchy: a framework to analyse foreign policy based oninteractions among state, market, and civil society actors in

domestic and transnational levels

Mr. Vincius Rodrigues Vieira

(Doctoral Student in International Relations,Nuffield College, University of Oxford)

(E-mail: [email protected])

Paper presented at the Third Global International Studies Conference (WISC)University of Porto, Porto, Portugal, 20 th August, 2011

Section: Domestic constraints in foreign policy

Word Count: 10,737 (without bibliography)


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Rodrigues Vieira-Framing Anarchy: Foreign Policy and Market, Civil Society, and State Actors 2

1. Introduction

The world has been witnessing since the 1980s three major phenomena in political

terms: 1) an increasing interconnection and interdependence among states in a context in

which non-state actors play an increasing role in politics; 2) the rise of identity as a relevant

factor in public life as much as class is; and 3) the emergence of powers out of the West, such

as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the BRICs. 1 Each phenomena posits a theoretical

question: 1) how domestic structures change vis--vis foreign influences; 2) how non-

economic factors interplay with economic ones in shaping national preferences; and 3) what

are the sources of empowerment of countries in world where many see states as losing

importance in comparison to non-state actors located in the market and the civil society?

Current theories of International Relations (IR) face limitations in explaining these

complex interactions, insofar as the linkages between the state and the societal actors in both

domestic and international realms are either ignored or not fully taken into account. These

accounts remain state-centred or economic-centred. Power, however, is not only economic or

political. Power is essentially symbolic, bounded by conceptions of society sets of

constitutive norms related to existence, focused on identity, and survival, with aims to

organise economic production. These conceptions, however, are not shaped and reshaped as

states and societal actors economic and non-economic want. Moreover, power also has a

social component. Such a fact limits the explanations of the origins of policy-making in times

of change, such as the post-Cold War period. During these periods of change, societal actors

are not in constant, well-defined positions, forming stable interest groups. They may transit

across diverse identities to which they are linked in order to either increase or preserve power

in economic and social terms and, therefore, increase their chances to have political leverage

to legitimize their views of the world through discourses and material capabilities.

1

BRICs is an acronym that refers to the fast-growing developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.It was coined by the bank Goldman Sachs in 2001. These countries now have regular meetings and, in the endof 2010, invited South Africa to join them, forming the BRICS.


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In this paper, I intend to develop an analytical framework that can be generalizable to

situations in which countries became more powerful and, therefore, due to their changing

systemic position, changed or adapted their foreign policy. The framework is based on the

sociological notion of fields/arenas 2 and seeks to explain how systemic transformations

affect in economic and associational terms societal actors located within countries, and

eventually impact policy-making and international regimes. In the development of the

framework, I confront my theoretical concerns with major works of main schools of thought

in IR that sought to integrate domestic and systemic independent (causal) variables. None of

those schools Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, and Constructivism suffice because they

either ignore contexts in which societal actors are influenced by multiple identities or, in

considering identity issues, does not frame them in clear analytical units and leaves out

economic/productive factors, considering them only in the sphere of discourses. Therefore, in

being a theoretical tool that allows the combination of production and identity issues, the

notion of fields can contribute to bridge the divide rationalism-constructivism in IR.

The paper is organised as follows: first, I discuss the ontological assumptions and

epistemological implications of IR theories and the limitations they present in accounting for

phenomena in periods of systemic transformation. Afterwards, I introduce the notion of fields

to IR, defining the fields (arenas of production, association, and redistribution, as well as the

state-as-government in the domestic arena only) that compose both domestic and

international spaces and how societal actors located in both operate bounded by conceptions

of existence and of survival, interacting between different fields. In this stage, to consolidate

my argument, I bring elements of the theoretical accounts that I criticized earlier. The

conclusion revaluates the arguments presented and discusses the trade-offs the framework

implies in terms of empirical research. Whenever it is possible, I illustrate my theoretical

2 Bourdieu 1991, 185.


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arguments with concrete cases, especially from Brazil and India, two of the BRICs whose

foreign policy and systemic position changed after economic liberalisation in the 1990s.

2. Ontological assumptions, epistemological implications, and general limitations

In epistemological terms, IR research has largely been framed by the agent-structure

positivist opposition, which considers both choices and constraints actors face in a given

environment. Although some constructivists (namely the non-post-modernist ones) 3 buy into

this assumption to develop their research, rational-choice scholars have been the most

engaged in this dichotomy. Nonetheless, as Snidal says, the rational- choice approach might

seem ineffective for studying change. The concept of equilibrium is inherently static since it

is defined as the absence of any tendency to change . 4 More flexible than rational-choice

scholarship, constructivist approaches even when they work in terms of agents and

structure do not consider the possibility of detaching actors from the environment where

they are located. Such assumption, however, has not been used as an advantage over

rationalism, including on this rational-choice, to provide better tools to understand continuity

and change in the international system.

This fault-line from both rationalist and constructivist approaches derives from a

common ontological problem: the idea that anarchy is at the origin of the international system

even when, as it is in the case of constructivism, processes of socialization takes place and

bounds actors together. On the one hand, the anarchical assumption makes rationalists to

overemphasize due to different reasons according to the approach systemic constraints

(anarchy itself in the case of structural realists and international regimes as means to deal

with anarchy in the case of Neoliberals). On the other, the same assumption leads

3 Smith (2000, 391) defines three variants of social-constructivism: neo-classical, based on intersubjective

meaning; naturalistic, which derives from scientific realism, being, thus, closer to rationalist scholarship; andpost-modernist, that proposes a break with scientific epistemology.4 Snidal 2002, 82.


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constructivists to deny the fact that constructions (norms and institutions) over anarchy are

not random or only historically-contingent.

To put it simply, nation-states were not created on a tabula rasa . Economic and social

exchanges used to happen between political units prior to the Westphalia Treaty. So the state-

system was created upon a network of material and social-cultural exchanges, bounded by a

given set of ideas. As Fearon and Wendt argue, material is not the same thing as

objective... material factors matter at the limit, but how they matter depends on ideas . 5 The

latter can also be either causal mechanisms or constitutive parts of the social world. 6 In fact,

as Ruggie says, constitutive rules are the institutional foundation of international life. No

consciously organized realm of human activity is imaginable without them, including

international politics . 7 Ideas, thus, have at least three roles in human life: firstly, they frame

material capabilities, such as the value we attribute to goods. Secondly, they frame social

capabilities, like group identities. Lastly, ideas are tools through which we interpret both

capabilities. Thus, unlike Lake and Powell assume, the strategic setting in which choices are

made depends not only on information asymmetries, 8 but also on the cognition of the

available information.

In dealing with the opposition agency-structure, Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism

miss the same point: identities play a role in production and, therefore, in economic foreign

policy, 9 and have more importance in preference formation in times of change since

distribution of power among societal actors is likely to be in flux. To understand the dynamic

of redistribution in critical junctures and, thus, of policy-making and shifts in conceptions of

existence and survival, it is needed to go beyond traditional political economic approaches

and to bring in identities and norms as explicit analytical elements.

5 Fearon and Wendt 2002, 58.6 Ibid., 60.7

Ruggie 1998, 873.8 Lake and Powell 1999, 30-31.9 For a non-systematic account of this argument, please read Sterling-Folker 2009, 137.


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If one takes for granted that economic factors, particularly changing prices, coped

with political ones, such the access to state institutions, the Pluralist-Liberal literature would

suffice for this analysis. In spite of the existence, prior to domestic pluralism, of a literature

that tried to unfold the domestic-international links, mainly through Foreign Policy Analysis

(FPA), 10 the most substantial contribution to the field emerged in the end of the 1980s, with

Putnams two set level game metaphor ,11 which represented an advance within the Positivist

school, dominated at that time by the Neorealism-Neoliberalism debate. 12 However, its

parsimonious design ignores complex interactions between the state-as-government, the

market, and the civil society the major units of analysis in contemporary politics. 13

In the subsequent years, two major trends emerged within Pluralist Theory, one more

focused on economic factors and other that attributed to institutional constrains more

leverage. The first explains changes in domestic coalitions as related mainly to shifts in the

international prices, an argument derived from Neoclassical Economics. 14 The second unites

economic interest with constraints given by institutions 15 and asymmetries of information

within the state and market and between these two arenas. 16 Eventually, however, what

prevail are economic interests, as in Moravcsiks analysis of the process of Europea n

integration. He argues that this process reflected patterns of commercial advantage, the

relative bargaining power of important governments, and the incentives to enhance the

credibility of interstate commitments. Most fundamental of these was commercial interest. 17

Integration advanced while and when there was convergence among the negotiating parts. In

this case, however, preferences are take for granted, perhaps because most of his empirical

10 Among the foundational works in FPA, it is worth mentioning Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1954, which focuseson decision-making process rather than only on foreign policy outputs.11 Putnam 1988.12 Among other references, for a summary of this debate please read Nye 1988.13 Hurrell 2007.14 Frieden and Rogowski 1996, 29. For an earlier version of this argument, please see Milner 1988.15

Keohane and Milner 1996, 244 and 251.16 Ibid., 20.17 Moravcsik 1998, 3.


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case took place during a time of predominance of an economic paradigm Keynesianism

and in a region of the world that is the part of the core of the system, being, thus, less

vulnerable to critical junctures and, therefore, likely to face more stability.

Nonetheless, in focusing on price variations, institutional constraints, and information

asymmetries, Pluralism offers a comprehensive and relatively parsimonious account of the

links between preference formation and decision-making in foreign policy. That said, such

accomplishments do not eliminate the pitfalls of that approach. Firstly, there is still no

consensus on how to define relevant domestic factors. 18 Secondly, in accounting for domestic

politics, pluralism that focuses on markets, institutions, and information does not have a clear

theory of the international environment. 19 Finally, the links between grassroots movements in

non-economic issues and economic foreign policy still have to be better explored in

analytical terms.

Therefore, it is logic to hypothesize that identity issues play a role in the process of

transfer of power among economic societal actors, such as firms and sectors. Such hypothesis

reiterates the argument that those actors cannot be conceived only in economic terms, but

also in what concerns identities. For analytical purposes, those actors could be equated to

interest groups. Nonetheless, in order to conceive them in flux, I propose the division of

society in both domestic and international levels into two major fields: an arena of

production and other of association. The former corresponds to the market, where

commoditised flows and monetary accumulation talks place, whereas the latter is civil

society, where identities are reproduced and discourses of appropriation of the social world

are consolidated. Their overlap corresponds to the political arena, which in the domestic

realm needs a fourth arena to coordinate redistribution and regulate the exchange domestic-

international: the state-as-government. Insofar as neither in market nor in civil society actors

18 Moravcsik 1993, 14.19 Ibid., 23.


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always reach a consensus on how production should be appropriated and association should

be organized, they turn to the state-as-government, which assumes a redistributive role in

both material and identity terms. It means that sectors traditionally conceived only in

economic terms, such as primary (raw materials), secondary (industry), and tertiary

(services), are within civil society too and have access to the state-as-government.

Other works already consider civil society as an analytical unit that interacts with the

state and the market. For instance, Moravcsik uses the word civil society to describe the place

where all interest groups either economic or non-economic are located. 20 Also, in his

analysis of European integration, he establishes clear links among actors in domestic and

international levels. In his own words, European integra tion can best be explained as

series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints

and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents,

the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of international

institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments. 21 However, as long as

Moravcsik aims to explain policy outcomes something that by now does not exist in the

Doha Round , he considers preferences and actors as stable, leaving aside the possibility

that the co-relation between economic and identity power might be in flux. Furthermore,

despite the fact that Moravcsik and others had already explored the linkages domestic-

international under Pluralist lenses, there is no notice that the empirical cases were located in

the periphery or semi-periphery of the world-system. Such a fact is enough to argue for the

pursuit of analytical models that fit better in non-Western societies.

In those societies, given the pattern of state-as- governments dominance over societal

actors, state-centric approaches could suffice to explain national preferences in periods

without significant transformations. Historical-Sociological works and Neo-Marxist ones, not

20 Moravcsik 1998, 22.21 Ibid., 18.


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to mention the Realist tradition with a clear theory of the state, seem to provide a good

account of this dynamic. In following State-Centric Realist premises, 22 Brooks and Wohlforth

consider that, under capitalist markets, economy became disentangled from the political

arena, which, in turn, implies in distinct interests from political actors, such as political

parties and those located within the state and economic ones 23. Nonetheless, they do not

mention if a relative detachment from the political arena happened with the arena of

association. Neoclassical Realism, which tries to integrate both systemic and unit-level

variables, 24 also leaves aside civil society as an arena relatively autonomous from economic

interests and where non-economic interests arise. Such a critique is further elaborated ahead.

Marxist approaches, when they consider the domestic arena, also tend to focus on the

state, which is considered an extension of the bourgeoisie power. 25 Only class identity is

taken into account, a factor that does not suffice to explain Brazils and Indias cases due to

the same reasons domestic pluralism does not either. Arrighis account of successive world -

hegemonies advances this question, insofar as it addresses how one hegemon establishes

dominance not only through material capabilities, but also in entailing common values that

holds the units of the international system together. 26 This is a Neo-Marxist approach, which

is based upon analytical categories defined by Gramsci to overcome the materialist excesses

of original Marxism. Among these categories, there is civil society, which stands [b]etween

the economic structure and the state with its legislation and its coercion, 27 serving as the

locus of resistance and legitimation of the system through informal norms and collective

actors. That is, ideas and norms have a role in processes of change and continuity in both

domestic and systemic terms. For Neo-Marxists, however, systemic trends ultimately prevail,

22Among the major works of this tradition, there is Gilpin 1981, and Krasner 1978.23 Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 98.24 Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009, 13.25

Krasner 1978, 25.26 Arrighi 1993.27 Gramsci 1971, 208.


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28 which complicates the detachment of those trends from local shifts. In the Brazilian and

Indian cases, systemic accounts would predict a further liberalisation than actually happened

and, therefore, a foreign policy more cooperative with the West. International Political

Economy, which combines the interplay betw een the power and wealth motive (micro-

level) or between international capitalism and its political organization (macro- level) 29,

could attain analytical concerns with non-economic factors, but it leaves aside identity issues

as domestic pluralism does.

Constructivism and other approaches that emphasize processes of socialisation

among which I include the Historical-Sociological literature have analytical elements to

understand the interplay between economic and non-economic issues. Nonetheless, due to the

lack of clear units of analysis, those approaches cannot explain how ideas interact with

material factors. Those accounts only say why that interaction happens: material-identity

exchange is a matter of fact because we live in a socially constructed world. However, Wendt

recognizes that ideas are not alone in the social world. There is rump materialism , a

residual category of elements that, in spite of being socially shared, are not based on culture,

such as geographical and natural factors. 30 The problem, though, lies in the fact that it is still

unclear how rump materialism interacts with socially -built beliefs. Furthermore, in spite of

the fact that Constructivism sets up processes of change, such as reflexivity (social learning),

the mechanisms through which they operate remain under-theorized. 31 Under this account,

ideational structures have more than a regulative effect on actors behaviour, constituting

them in a mutual relationship. Actors, thus, can, through acts of social will, change

structures. 32 What is still missing is how constraints to reframe the world operate even in non-

static periods. This requires theorizing how the Wendtian conceptions of self that states have

28 Teschke 2008, 173.29 Guzzini 1998, 160.30

Wendt 1999, 130-1 and 136.31 Drulk 2006.32 For a summary of this argument, please read Copeland 2006.


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are changed. Also, the lack of clear analytical units generates a contradiction within

Constructivism. Structured as a critique of Neorealism and, to a less extent, to Neoliberalism,

Constructivism preserves the rationalist state-centrism, in which the market and the civil

society are missed as analytical units. Up to date, there is no notice of systematic account of

Constructivism in economic factors. Moreover, the social genesis and maintenance of identity

has not been systematized either. Manns and Tillys Historical -Sociology attempted to do so,

but their analytical units remain fuzzy and with unclear distinctions between the domestic and

international realms. Furthermore, while a broad conception of international identity explains

preference-formation in the analysed cases (a why question), the how question remains

unanswered.

3. Defining fields in International Relations

The concept of fields was created by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. In his

own words, [t]he field as a whole is defined as a system of deviations on different levels and

nothing, either in the institutions or in the agents, the acts or the discourses they produce, has

meaning except relationally, by virtue of the interplay of oppositions and distinctions. 33

Following other Constructivist works, this is a political-cultural approach, as long as it

presupposes that each field composes a set of norms, which defines relations between actors

within it . According to Fligstein, the first author who has applied Bourdieus concept to

markets, fields contain collective actors who try to produce a system of domi nation in that

space. 34 This, however, does not mean pure power, but also rules, as long as a field is an

autonomous universe, a kind of arena in which people play a game which has certain rules,

rules which are different from those of the game that is p layed in the adjacent space. 35 Mann

also employs the term arena in his social theories, but specifically to refer to the international

33

Bourdieu 1991, 185.34 Fligstein 2001, 15.35 Bourdieu 1991, 215.


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realm. However, as Hobden argues, Mann never defines it, although suggests that it is a place

for competition and conflict similar to the Bourdieuan idea of fields. 36

The mechanisms which Constructivism misses can be unpacked once the constitution

of the fields I defined above and the patterns of relationships among them are clarified. Each

field 37 is a political-cultural construction, which, however, is influenced by relationships of

power and norms in contiguous fields and subfields, as collective societal actors might be

conceived. Conceptions of existence and of survival set limits to societal action, particularly

in what concerns the process of reframing fields. Those definitions and dynamics will be

explored ahead. For now, it suffices to say that, in conceiving the market, the civil society,

the political arena, and the state-as-government as fields that are bounded by conceptions of

existence and survival, the model considers how capital/capabilities (material and social

conditions to exercise power) and the interpretation of those capabilities of a given country

change vis--vis its own constraints and those of the world-system and how those both

constraints changed. Unlike in the agent-structure dichotomy, in an analytical model based on

fields the description of both domestic and international arenas is not static. In this model,

there are grey zones, located at the periphery of these arenas. The peripheral areas which

are not necessarily geographical, but, as the other arenas above described, abstract/theoretical

representations of social domains of action lack clear rules. More than nothing, power

prevails there, as happens in illegal activities, not directly legitimized by the state-as-

government ( figure 1 ).

In each arena, societal groups try less to maximise their interests than to survive

materially and in terms of identity vis--vis each other. These identities, expressed in

conceptions of existence and survival, in turn, shape national trajectories 38 and might be

influenced by conceptions that come from outside the domestic realm. In the international

36

Hobden 1998, 132.37 Bourdieu 1991, 185.38 Zysman 1994.


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sphere, these conceptions hold together the system, which is better understood if conceived as

a society, 39 and are legitimised in the international political arena through acts of consent and

power in which hegemons and international organisations play a central role.

Figure 1Fields and transversal subfields/sectors domestic and international arenas

Source : Own elaboration, based on Rodrigues Vieira 2010, 33.

3.1. Conceptions of existence and conceptions of survival

Actors cannot reframe fields as they want. There are limitations, given not only by the

rules and power distribution within each arena and the connections with societal actors in

other fields. Long-term narratives which emerge through multi-causal processes, ranging

from state policies to the action of epistemic communities40

frame fields, composing a

dimension of norms that enables different degrees of collective action in productive,

associational, and redistributive terms. These long-term narratives correspond to conceptions

of existence and survival.

39 Bull 1995.40 Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 402.

Domestic arena International arena


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Conceptions of existence, however, last longer than conceptions of survival because

they are less linked to practical issues, being more applicable to asynchronic links. Both,

however, are what constructivists would call constitutive norms. 41 Conceptions of existence

tie together different eras based on foundational myths in order to attribute, across history,

meaning to societal units of organisation. These conceptions are always historically

structured, fictions with real effects, historical narratives. They are meta-paradigms that

eventually structure power and rules (regulative norms) 42, although might be incrementally

changed through shifts in the distribution of productive and associational capabilities, or

suddenly broken apart in revolutionary situations that create tabula rasa contexts. Among

these conceptions, there are nationalist discourses, religions, philosophies of life. To use

Manns definition, it is an ideological power, which eventually set norms of behaviour. 43 In

studies within IR, conceptions of existence are relevant as long as they contribute to bind

together societal actors in attributing them a collective identity that conforms and is

conformed to micro-identities that emerge from subfields, such as ethnic groups. The most

relevant conception of existence in an IR study is nationalism.

An example is the discourses on racial democracy 44 and on secularism 45 which framed

ideas about national identity and both social and state action during most of the 20 th Century

in Brazil and India, respectively. In both Brazilian and Indian cases, those nationalist

discourses aimed to incorporate at least in symbolic terms into the nation any person who

were born in, respectively, Brazils and Indias territory, no matter their ethnic or religious

background. Nonetheless, conceptions of existence may be replaced by new ones in times of

social disruption, as it was the case of Nazism in Germany, in 1930s, which became its own

national creed after the Weimar Republic.

41 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891.42 Ibid.43

Hobden 1998, 120.44 Rodrigues Vieira 2008.45 Katzenstein, Kothari, and Mehta 2001.


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Also, those conceptions of existence provided and, to some extent, still provide

most of the acceptable limits for institutional reforms. For instance, Racial Democracy in

Brazil and Secularism in India implied in nationally-based projects of development, including

in material/economic terms as the ISI experience shows. If, in the 1990s, reforms in Brazil

and India sought to dismantle the inward-looking development strategy that had been in place

since the 1930s, later in the decade and more clearer in the 2000s, interventionism became

fashionable again. 46 This is evidence that the change in the mainstream conception of survival

in the world economy, from Keynesianism to Neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s, 47 faced

limits in Brazil and India thanks for the conceptions of existence existent in each nation-state

and which were more suitable for state interventionism than for economic laissez-faire. In

spite of losing relative economic leverage, groups can resist or at least adapt themselves to

process of change if they are more linked to mainstream conceptions of existence in the

country. The hypothetical mechanisms through which it happens will be detailed ahead. For

now, it suffices to keep on mind that conceptions of existence constrain changes in

conceptions of survival even in times of critical junctures.

Conceptions of survival structure immediate actions of societal actors through

framing patterns of production and association with immediate focus in economic

organisation. As conceptions of survival, Keynesianism and ISI supported state-

interventionism, generating expectations among entrepreneurs on state-relief, while

Neoliberalism emphasises competition, stimulating less state-centric solutions, without

meaning a smaller role for the state, which does play a role in creating markets and

promoting de-regulation. 48 They tend to last for a shorter time and are less stable than

conceptions of existence because they are more susceptible to external junctures and have an

46

Bresser-Pereira 2009; Kohli 2009.47 Hall 1986.48 Polanyi 2001.


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immediate character. Crises in production, for instance, may require new paradigms that will

be converted into policies and, in turn, reframe societal action.

An example is the collapse of Keynesianism in the 1970s as both a set of economic

ideas and a set of policies for social organisation, which opened room for the development of

deregulatory policies based on the Neoliberal economic paradigm that had been acquiring

respectability among academics in the previous years. 49 On the other hand conceptions of

existence are much more dependent on arenas that in which the flows tend to be more

national/endogenous-based, as it is the case of the field of association and the state as

government. In fact, it is not a coincidence that states-as-territories where societal actors

within the arena of association and the state as government lack internal cohesiveness and a

coherent and legitimate discourse that binds them together are more vulnerable to foreign

pressures, as it was the case of just-born African states that in the 1980s onwards were

submitted by international organisations, such as the World Bank and the International

Monetary Fund, to structural-adjustment programs which later revealed to be unfit to local

realities. 50

However, Brazil and India resisted to liberalisation until almost 20 years after the

first challenges to Keynesianism. So it is inevitable to ask whether these empirical facts

challenge the notion of critical juncture as a period of systemic transformation that affects all

members of a given system, such as the international one. The literature on historical-

institutionalism has devoted some attention to achieve a better definition and a better tool to

define a critical juncture, although there is no consensus on that. That said, evidence suggests

that one can talks about systemic junctures important facts that cannot be defined a priori

that impacts systemic units up to a point that they face a critical juncture 51 as it was the case

49 Hall 2010. 50

For an example of how international organisations projects may be totally unfit for local realities and lack understanding of conceptions of existence and survival, please see Ferguson 1990.51 Pierson 2004, 12.


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of Brazil and India in the beginning of the 1990s. Due to economic crisis, both countries

embraced liberalisation amid confidence crisis from the international society and deficits in

the balance of payments. 52

Therefore, I contend that the resilience of conceptions of survival depends, on the one

hand, on the coherence and legitimacy of conceptions of existence among the constituencies

of a given country. This legitimacy, in turn, derives from the balance of economic and social

power within countries. On the other hand, this balance impacts the process of continuous

legitimation of the conceptions. Imbalances, such as inequality and sudden changes in a given

status quo through critical junctures, undermine, first, the dominant conception of survival

and, if this conception is not adapted to produce a new balance in productive and

associational terms, the conception of existence is undermined. Another possible outcome is

the corruption of the conception to the limit that the society that organises itself upon that

same conception can still recognise itself as distinct from others.

3.2. Fields of societal action

To employ a Hegelian metaphor, conceptions of existence and survival are the

superstructure/constitutive dimension that shapes /conforms the base, the practical

realm, composed, in the presented model, by three major arenas: production, association, and

redistribution, respectively correspondent, in current times, to the market, the civil society,

and the political arena. These fields exist in both national and transnational levels. In the

domestic arena or state-as-territory there is a fourth arena: the state-as-government.

Societal actors organise themselves in subfields that are transversal to each arena. The

ability to have power hereby defined as the capacity of shaping a given field or fields

according to ones interests in any field is given by the leverage of each societal actor in

terms of production and association. Power, thus, ultimately corresponds to symbolic

52 Bresser-Pereira 2009; Jenkins 1999.


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power the power to influence the frame and reframe conceptions of existence, of survival,

and processes of redistribution in the political arena and within the state as government. It is

not enough to have economic leverage without associational power 53 and, thus, without

linkages with the prevailing conceptions of existence and survival in a given country.

Symbolic capital, thus, is equal to power under this equation, which comprises economic and

social capital.

This model resembles Gr amscis ideas on civil society, the market and the state. In his

framework, whereas the market corresponds to the economic sphere, which can be defined as

the arena where individuals and firms exchange goods, services and assets, 54 the civil society

serves as the locus of resistance and legitimation of the system 55 through informal norms and

collective actors (which I have been calling societal groups) that operate based on those

norms. Nonetheless, in the proposed framework, civil society does not stand between the

market and the state: it is a distinctive arena. It has an autonomous dynamic that eventually

contributes to its legitimation and to the legitimation of the entire domestic arena: what

happens in the market also contributes to the formation of conceptions of existence and

survival and, therefore, to overall legitimation. Also, the need to conceptualise civil society in

transnational terms demands its redefinition, insofar as there is no authority similar to states

to conform it in the international arena.

Firstly, I define the arena of production, followed by a discussion on the arena of

association. As mentioned before, the overlapping between both corresponds to the arena of

redistribution, where political disputes take place in both domestic and international arenas.

Finally, I define the state-as-government in a Neo-Weberian fashion. In all steps, I frame the

discussion on the literature on IR that seeks somehow to integrate the domestic and

53

As suggested by Bourdieu 1991, 170.54 See Fligstein 2001.55 Gramsci 1971, 208.


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international realms, especially in what concerns the ultimate focus of this thesis

formulation of economic foreign policy.

Arena of production: The contemporaneous capitalist market corresponds to the arena of

production in both domestic and international scales. Its roots which can be found on

medieval trade networks precede the formation of the state-system, with commercial

exchanges among Europe, Asia, and North Africa. The creation of nation-states and their

consolidation enhanced further the development of production as long as they established

markets through institutions with the aim to reduce transaction costs 56, such as a common

currency, and conquered, in some cases, exclusive markets abroad through colonisation. The

trend, however, was that economic actors were subordinated to state-based projects even

when colonisation enterprises guaranteed significant freedom for private actors. With the

development of capitalism and multiplication of economic actors, the field of production

gained leverage vis--vis the state as government. In fact, as mentioned before, production

precedes to the formation of the interstate system. In the cases of colonised countries, such as

the case of Brazil and India, it is more evident than in the core of the system.

Markets have already been conceptualised as fields, challenging the existence of

universal rational behaviour in economics and the Neoclassical view that predicts

convergence in market organisations as a result of the pursuit for efficiency. 57 In conceiving

markets as fields, economic sociologists imply that 1) markets are political-cultural

creations, 58 2) they are embedded in other social relationships, 59 such as the ones that seek

redistribution (politics) and association (civil society), and 3) more than maximisation of

56 North 1981.57

Fligstein 2001, 68.58 Ibid.59 Granovetter 1985.


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profits, actors, particularly firms, seek stability in order to survive, 60 and try to use the state to

keep and develop rules and policies to attain such a goal.

IR scholarship that seeks to integrate market actors and factors to explain

transnational links has, in general, a more restricted view of the market and, therefore, of its

relations with actors based within other fields, particularly those in the state-as-government.

An example is the Realist tradition that recognizes the role of economic factors in IR. Gilpin

considers that there is, at least in the modern world, a reciprocal relationship between

economics and politics: 61 economic factors influence state behaviour and changes in the

political arena, whereas groups in the domestic arena attempt to organise economic relations

to increase their relative share in the national surplus. 62 Other Realists, however, does not

defend the profit-maximising principle, emphasising the idea of stability that the market-as-

fields approach defends. For instance, Krasner, i n his study of U.S. governments role i n the

supply of raw materials for the American economy, identifies that such supply is important

not only for military purposes, but also in times of peace, when [u]nstable supplies and

prices can upset the general functioning of the economy and strain on the political system. 63

It could explain why Brazil, in spite of the prospective expansion of exports of primary goods

with the openness of agricultural markets, resisted, during most of the negotiations at the

Doha Round, to make further concessions in industrial tariffs. 64

Domestic Pluralism sides more with the profit-maximizing rationale, although some

authors within this tradition provide a clearer account of the interactions between actors in

production and the state. Frieden and Rogowski demonstrate that, with liberalisation, there is

a trend that sectors whose production and profits increase will support further openness in

60 Fligstein 2001, 70.61 Gilpin 1975, 21.62

Gilpin 1981, 67-68.63 Krasner 1978, 39.64 Narlikar 2010.


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economy, whereas segments harmed by the process will seek protection from the state. 65 This

happens because, even when a government keeps the national economy relatively closed, a

facilitation of trade thanks for technological changes (such as in transportation) impact

domestic economies. In bringing politics into market, Rogowski takes a step towards an

institutional approach. For him, beneficiaries of a process of change in economy will try to

deepen it through political means, whereas the increase in economic leverage is likely to

correspond to an increase of political power. Therefore, the shifts in income will be translated

into disputes to influence the policy-making, 66 a process that will be further discussed ahead,

as state-as-government is conceptualised. An example can be the increasing influence of the

agricultural sector over Brazilian government after the liberalisation.

Marxism in IR considers that struggle of classes is at the centre in the dispute for

power in the market. In this process, eventually the dominant class captures the state to make

it work on its behalf. In transnational terms, systemic Structural-Marxist theories, such as

Wallersteins world -systems, suffices in explaining overall patterns of integration of the

periphery into the world economy. 67 However, in considering the system as the unit of

analysis, this approach misses the dynamics of change that may emerge within countries and

empower them. Neo-Marxists face the same limitation, 68 although at least they work with the

concept of civil society, the departing point to overcome economic-centred accounts of the

links between societal actors and the state.

Arena of association: known in current times as civil society, it is the field where both

individual and collective actors gather in groups to claim for participation in the outcomes of

production and for a given pattern of redistribution. These claims may happen indirectly,

through the structuration of new conceptions of existence and survival with the aim to replace

65 Frieden and Rogowski 1996, 29; Milner 1988, 15.66

Rogowski 1989.67 Wallerstein 200768 Teschke 2008, 173.


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the dominant ones. Those groups are not necessarily derived from production relationships,

arising from non-economic patterns of interaction, such as religions and ethnic groups.

As in the arena of production, the basic constitutive elements of the arena of

association precede the formation of the international system. Prior to the state system, there

were transnational identities, such as the ones based on religion and ethnicity. In most cases,

these patterns of association were linked to forms of political power, such as the Catholic

Church in Western Europe during the Middle Age. However, the fact that these arenas that

initially were polities does not exclude other: those patterns of association remained as

historical legacies or were re-elaborated through conceptions of existence that compete with

national identities, composing part of the arena of association. Also, even when countries

followed primarily the logic of sovereignty and controlled its population strictly to extract

resources for war, the arena of association already existed, although was not analytically

relevant, given the low degree of freedom of its members. With the expansion of civil and

political rights, societal actors within the arena gained more freedom to organise themselves.

Within Social Sciences, civil society as an analytical unit usually corresponds to

the space of social life open and autonomous from the state and in which actors share a set of

values that enable them to act collectively. 69 Among those set of values, there are conceptions

of existence. Nonetheless, the autonomy from the state is not constant. It is notorious that

authoritarian regimes reframe, through the state apparatus, the organisation of civil society to

back their policies. It happened in Latin American corporatist states, between 1930 and 1950,

when labour unions could only operate as extensions of authoritarian regimes, such as

Getlio Vargass presidency in Brazil (1930-1945). 70 Likewise, co-optation of civil society

may also happen due to its disintegration, with the atomisation of individuals, as it is argued

69 Diamond 1999, 221.70 Rodrigues Vieira 2008.


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to have happened in the interwar period in Germany with social disruption and the rise of

Nazism.

Usually the degree of autonomy of civil society is co-related to the degree of

democracy. The theoretical roots of this relationship lies in Toquevilles Democracy in

America , which establishes a causal link between independent/autonomous association

among people and the strength of democracy and government accountability. 71 Later,

political theorists and social scientists enriched the idea of civil society with the concept of

social capital. According to Coleman, this kind of capital corresponds to norms and

expectations related to economic activities that do not arise from strict economic patterns. 72

Putnam expanded this concept, including, as factors of high social capital, trust and the

density of networks among societal actors in order to develop co-ordinated actions. 73

Bourdieu, nonetheless, offers a different definition of social capital, more useful as a

theoretical tool to understand interactions within the arena of association. According to him,

[s]ocial capital is the aggregate of the actu al or potential resources which are linked to

possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual

acquaintance and recognition which provides each of its members with the backing of the

collectively-owned capital, a credential which entitles them to credit. 74

Considering this last definition, I assume that a societal actors social capital is high if

the most important identities it is attached to are entrenched with the predominant

conceptions of existence and survival in the country where the actor is based. Thus it is not

possible to precisely talk about social capital of a society, but only of the social capital of

each of its groups, as one defines the economic capital of a firm or an economic sector.

Furthermore, Toquevilles notion of civil society can be left aside if on assumes that trust is

71 Tocqueville 1835.72

Coleman 1990 , 302.73 Putnam 1993 , 173.74 Bourdieu 1986.


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not the most important factor for social cohesiveness. It can be enhanced from the state-as-

government or through redistributive arrangements.

Now it is needed to mention a caveat about the separation of the social space of a

country into three distinct arenas. Analytically, there is a gain to separate association from

production rather than fusing both concepts in a wider definition of interest groups that

includes social capital, therefore going beyond economic and organisational strength based

on rational-choice assumptions. 75 This separation makes evident the existence of non-

economic factors and its influence over public policies including international economic

negotiations whose main target is the production becomes more evident. Thus, shifts in

non-economic arrangements are better recognisable, as well as their impact in policy-making.

Reification of production and association through the static notion of interest groups ignore

these dynamics.

Arena of redistribution: The combination of societal groups capabilities in production and

association is directed correspondent to their potential strength (capital) in the arena of

redistribution, that is, the political arena. I argue that the essence of politics is redistribution ,

although in social science this concept is often associated to left-wing parties. The fact,

however, is that political disputes always impact power distribution, in spite of the fact that a

power-holder hardly assumes that is working on the expansion of inequality. The key to

persuade constituencies and hold power in either democratic or non-democratic regimes

lies in having some degree of symbolic capital, what enables a societal actor to defend its

standpoint. 76

In this context, it is worth to bring in Bourdieus expanded definition of this kind of

capital. According to him, symbolic capital is nothing other than capital, of whatever

kind, when it is perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception arising from the

75 The classic statement on this conception of interest groups comes from Olson 1971.76 Bourdieu 1986.


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incorporation of the structure of its distribution. 77 The field of production of symbolic power

was never well defined by Bourdieu. The obvious point one can derive from his theoretical

framework, however, is that power is essentially symbolic, insofar as it creates the social

world. The currency for power, under this logic, is capital, which has an economic

(productive) and social (identity) dimension. This combined capital can be converted into

political capital with aims to influence or control the state-as-government. Political capital,

says Bourdieu, is a form of symbolic capital and the product of subjective acts of

recognition and, in so far as its credit and credibility, exists only in and through

representation, in an d through trust, belief and obedience. 78 With this capital, one can have

access to the centralised regulation of social relations, 79 which includes the legitimation of

conceptions of existence and survival through the state.

That is, actual symbolic power derives from the combination of strength in

association, production, and redistribution. Symbolic power matters because redistribution

gains legitimacy according to conceptions of existence and survival, on the one hand, and to

the distribution of power/capabilities in association and productive terms. The more a societal

group buys into dominant conceptions of existence and survival, the more likely it is to gain

economic and associational leverage. Likewise, the more a group improves its position in

productive and associational terms, the larger is its ability to influence patterns of

redistribution, although not necessarily it will convert its economic-social capital into

political power. Ideas, here, are essential, because they have the power to mobilise. 80 In fact,

Bourdieus concept of struggle over representation and identity particularly in ethnic and

77 Bourdieu 1991, 238.78

Ibid., 192.79 Hobden 1998, 121.80 Bourdieu 1991,190.


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regional terms is twofold: involves mental images and social demonstrations that

manipulate those images. 81

These processes aim to bring societal actors into the state-as-government to either

control or influence it, and, therefore, to impact public policies. As in any other field, the

institutional design of the political arena varies from country to country. For instance, under

representative democracy, there are political parties, state-society councils, and interest

groups. This last case deserves a point of clarification: some actors usually conceived as

interest groups, such as business associations, labour unions, or even large firms are not

essentially located in the political arena. Nonetheless, these societal actors may move from

the arena of production as it is the case of firms and from the arena of association as it is

the case of labour unions and business associations to use their power and defend a given

pattern of redistribution. Also, it is worth mentioning that, specifically in the case of Brazil

and India, since the end of the 1970s at least there is a fourth relevant actor that transits

constantly between civil society and the political arena: social movements. Before the advent

of democracy, redistribution operated mainly through other means besides what is known as

politics, such as war, rent-seeking, aristocracy, oligarchy all of which may have residual

effects even up to nowadays. It is the case in Brazil and India, where political parties are now

stable, 82 although need to be complemented by other subfields, such as social movements 83 or

even family-controlled firms, 84 to link societal actors in the arena of redistribution with the

state-as-government.

State-as-government: it is also a field, which establishes a symbolic and territorial domain

over the parts of the arenas of production, appropriation and redistribution that compose the

domestic arena. All states-as-territories have a state-as-government, although it varies in

81 Ibid., 221.82

For the Brazilian case, please read Power 2010 . On India, please see Katzenstein, Kothari, and Mehta 2001.83 Gowda and Sridharan 2007.84 Ross-Schneider 2009 .


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terms of institutional design and linkages between the sections of the other arenas that are

part of either the domestic or international realm. Also, states-as-government are not

necessarily unique entities, with complete internal coherence. They have multidimensional

functions and tools. 85 It may have specific bureaucracies (clusters) that are more effective in

designing and implementing public policies than others thanks for specific institutional

characteristics, such as the qualification of professionals as well as their commitment to

work.

In the literature on states in the developing world, Brazil and India are seen as

inchoate states, which, despite their bureaucratisation, remain partially subjected to rent-

seeking. 86 As far as this work is concerned, the most relevant section of the state-as-

government is the one that is responsible for international trade negotiations. In the case of

Brazil, it is the Ministry of Foreign Relations (known as Itamaraty ), whereas in India the

Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoC) designs the strategies at the WTO. Both are,

according to the literature on the topic, 87 bureaucracies with more autonomy and internal

coherence than most of both Brazilian and Indian states. Itamaraty and MoC for instance,

have no political appointees but the head of ministry, who is selected by the head of

government. MoC, however, as mentioned in the introduction, has linkages with internal

societal actors, from firms to business groups. That said, the fact is that the state, through the

ministry, remains as a strong gatekeeper for societal demands. 88 In fact, especially in federal

systems, such as the Brazilian and the Indian, stateness is a negotiated process with domestic

actors. 89 These notions on the Brazilian and Indian states are affiliated to the Neo-Weberian

tradition; 90 a reaction to the theoretical models that emphasised domestic pluralism and

85 King and Lieberman 2009, 547 88.86 Evans 1995; Kohli 2004.87 On India, please read Narlikar 2008. On Brazil, please see Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007.88

Narlikar 2008, 277.89 King and Lieberman 2009, 558.90 The most famous work on this is Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985.


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interdependence based on non-state actors. 91 Unlike in the Marxist models, under Neo-

Weberianism the state is not a product of class relations, but rather a unit with some degree of

autonomy from other societal actors. 92

Historical-Sociology has analytical tools to connect Neo-Weberianism with IR

through Realism. Historical-Sociology disagrees with anarchical systemic assumptions, but

overlaps with State-Centred Realist accounts on how the state-as-government interacts with

societal actors in both domestic and international level. 93 Insofar as the state conceived as

an autonomous actor formulates foreign policy, its structure defines what is national interest

and power. Thus, what actually matters is state power. 94 As Krasner summarises , a statist

paradigm views the state as an autonomous actor. The goals sought by the state cannot be

reduced to some summation of private desires. These objectives can be called appropriately

the national interest. 95 Neoclassical Realism tries to integrate these assumptions to systemic

dynamics, as long as it builds upon the complex relationship between the state and society

found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of Neorealism about the

constraints of the international system. 96 However, in doing so, it still faces at least five

problems. First of all, it overemphasizes security issues over economic ones. Secondly, it still

offers no account of the mechanics of the relationships within the state and the nation-state.

Thirdly, as a consequence, the role of identities that emerge from civil society remains un-

theorised, as in domestic pluralism. 97 Fourthly, insofar as it has no understanding of the

market and the civil society, it cannot clearly explain challenges to the state from non-state

actors. Lastly, it is restricted to FPA, rather than putting state decisions into a bigger picture

in times of change.

91 An example of such approach is Risse-Kappen 1995.92 For this, please read Hobdens (1998, 93) analysis of Theda Skocpols States and Social Revolutions .93 Hobden 1998, 139.94 Zakaria 1998, 9 and 187.95

Krasner 1978, 5-6. 96 Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009, 13.97 The principles of this approach can be found at Moravcsik 1997.


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3.3. Interactions among fields

The theoretical gain in conceiving social arenas as fields lies in the fact that they allow us to

make macro and micro analysis of social processes depending on the research focus, while

grasping causal mechanisms of change. For analytical purposes, I define three basic

movements in the interaction between the arenas: A) international junctures to domestic

changes in production and association; B) domestic changes in production and association to

domestic changes in redistribution; and C) changes in redistribution to changes in public

policies. All these movements impact conceptions of existence and survival.

Before detailing each movement, a caveat is necessary. This model is potentially

applicable to explain shifts in power in the international system unless the analysed state is a

hegemon. A systemic factor (an international juncture) is always the contextual variable that,

with historical legacies manifested through conceptions of existence, leads to changes in

foreign policy (the dependent variable). However, the outcome depends on steps B and C,

which encompass both the independent (distribution of economic and social capital among

societal actors) and the intervening (access of societal actors to bureaucracy, as well as its

internal organisation) variables of the model.

Movement A: The international-domestic movement happens when new conceptions of

existence and/or survival emerge and gain predominance in the international arena. Thanks

for the more openness of economic than of non-commoditized flows, conceptions of survival

are more likely to be challenged than conceptions of existence. However, the extent to which

conceptions of survival in the domestic scale adapt themselves to the international one is

given by the conceptions of existence and if they are linked to the strongest sectors in both

production and associational arenas.

Simmons and Elkins argue that choices for picking up liberalising economic foreign

policy tools are influenced by the choices of other governments as much as they are by


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exogenously given domestic institutions or preferences that can be traced back to domestic

political or economic structures. 98 As the proportion of countries that adopt a given policy

in this case liberalisation increases, the reputatio nal costs of being attached to old -

fashioned conceptions of survival increase as well. Also, there is a learning process based on

other experiences, especially in those of countries that are culturally-similar. 99 This ideational

side of economic reform do vetails with Bourdieus account of how the social world is built.

According to him, the structuring principles of the world view are rooted in the objective

structures of the social world and because the relations of power are also present in peoples

minds in the form of the categories of perception of those relations . 100 If a country, however,

has a civil society deeply linked to the conception of existence that is dominant, the harder it

will be to accept international junctures without local adaptation. Otherwise, such an outcome

is less likely to happen if the arena of association is pervaded by strong transnational links

(e.g.: ethnicity and religion) correspondent to conceptions of existence that dispute primacy

with national ideals. Figure 2 exemplifies this process in a critical juncture.

Figure 2Movement A: Interaction conception of survival and sovereignty/intl. embeddedness

Source : Own elaboration

A civil society committed to the predominant conceptions of existence and survival,

as well as an economy that is not sensitive to exogenous shocks, compose the core of what I

98

Simmons and Elkins 2004, 172.99 Ibid., 176.100 Bourdieu 1991, 236.


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call sovereignty, the ability of a domestic arena to control exogenous influences. Total

sovereignty, however, would demand autarchy, what is impossible for any member of the

international society. 101 Therefore, a high degree of embeddedness in the international system

enables a country to potentially benefit from the exchange with other systemic units. From

these assumptions, I derive proposition 1 : The higher the degree of sovereignty and

international embeddedness of a state, the higher the possibility that it will adapt itself to

emerging conceptions of survival in the international arena and keep credibility in the

international society amid autonomy.

Movement B: Changes in conceptions of survival originated in hegemonic poles at it was

the case with Neoliberalism matter because they impact prices through economic

liberalisation, therefore, the world-wide distribution of power (capital) in the arena of

production. This is linked to the aforementioned domestic pluralist arguments that seek to

integrate domestic and international arenas. And, considering that economic capital is at

the root of all the other types of capital 102 , distribution of associational power is likely to

change as well in such a context. Production is not in opposition to association, as

contemporaneous global civil society theorists argue in the nave claim that opposes social

movements and non-governmental organisations to capitalists. 103 All

sectors/subfields/societal groups have an economic and an identity dimension.

The links between changing prices and politics were already explored by Rogowski.

His conclusions imply that beneficiaries of a process of change in economy will try to deepen

it through political means. Also, the increase in economic leverage is likely to correspond to

an increase of political power. Therefore, shifts in income will be translated into disputes to

influence policy-making. The means through which these disputes take place and their

101

Here I follow Bull 1995 definition of international society.102 Bourdieu 1986.103 An example of this account is Smith 2008.


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consequences depends on the structure of state and society liberalisation finds and reshapes.

Milner and Keohane consider that there are three major pathways through which international

economic changes affect the domestic arena: 1) creation of policy preferences and coalition;

2) triggering domestic economic and political crises; and 3) undermining the control of

government over macropolicy. 104

In any of these contexts, political institutions, in turn, have three roles: 1) blocking

price signals from the foreign markets that may produce realignments in the domestic arena;

2) freezing coalitions and policies; and 3) channelling political responses to changing

prices. 105 All these facts mean that different domestic institutions give rise to distinct patterns

of liberalisation. Institutions, Milner argues, should not only be employed as an analytical

category in state-society relations, but also within the state itself, as long as policy-formation

depends on interest convergence within different branches of government. Information also

matters in explaining outcomes in both negotiation and interest formation processes, as

asymmetries creates inefficiencies and political advantages. 106 Generally the executive power

tends to have more information about relevant issues for negotiations than the legislative and

the electorate. Such divide, however, cannot be taken for granted in states such as the

Brazilian and the Indian ones, where foreign policy making is centralised in the hands of the

head of government and a stable bureaucratic body.

Furthermore, if economic capital has primacy over other manifestations of power, it is

not the only factor that determines the leverage of a societal actor vis--vis others in the

internal arena. The position of a given societal actor, says Bourdieu, depends on the position

it occupies in different fields in terms of power that is reflected in different kinds of capital,

such as economic and social. 107 It means that groups that have production and associational

104 Keohane and Milner 1996, 244.105

Ibid., 251.106 Ibid., 20.107 Bourdieu 1991, 231.


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capabilities not strongly linked to the conceptions of existence and survival tend to face more

difficulty in striving in a changing context. Sectors traditionally conceived as purely

economic are in fact transversal: they hold positions in associational terms as well.

For instance, Indias rice processing industry has workers of different non-economic

groups, mainly lower-caste Hindus. 108 In Brazil, export-led agriculture remains dominant in

regions where values of complex urban societies have not arrived yet. These are relevant

differences from the empirical cases from which liberal theorists derived their conclusions.

Their models were based on homogeneous societies, such as the European ones, already

shaped by the iron cage of capitalism, or heterogeneous societies where logrolling led to

constrain differences in times of prosperity, as it is in the US. 109 In fact, different

combinations of productive and associational powers are the root of different varieties of

capitalism: 110 a given conception of survival fuses with the predominant domestic conception

of existence, triggering a national trajectory. 111 The degree of adaptability of a sector to

changes in the conception of survival depends on its attachment to identities linked to the

conception of existence ( figure 3 ).

Figure 3Adaptation of a sector in terms of economic and social capital after a juncture

Source : Own elaboration

108 Kaur, Gosh, and Sudarshan 2007, 148.109

Snyder 1991.110 Hall and Soskice 2001.111 For trajectories of development, please read Zysman 1994.


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All this leads to proposition 2 : an economic sector gains strength amid critical

junctures when it is able to absorb innovations that arise from new conceptions of survival

while keeping leverage in the arena of association and, therefore, strong linkages to the

conception(s) of existence predominant in a given domestic arena.

Movement C: the trade-off between a Weberian state and a strong civil society does not seem

to be applicable either empirically or theoretically. A strong state is perfectly suitable to a

strong civil society and a strong market. However, the best adjective here to describe a state-

as-government that does not constrain the creative forces of societal actors is not strong. A

pair of variables defines a state such as this: social embeddedness its connections with

societal actors and autonomy its ability to preserve independent interests, which,

eventually, are not corporatist, but represent the national interest, even if defined by elites.

Originally, embeddeness and autonomy were defined by Evans 112 and Hobson. 113 They argue

that state strength (at least within specific bureaucracies) results from autonomy from private

interests and linkages with society.

Embeddeness and autonomy also affect the level of legitimacy of the state. An

imbalance between both variables can cause a rupture or mistrust between government and

societies. Unlike authors such as Jacobs and King suggest, legitimacy does not arise mainly

from redistribution to promote equality or at least to attenuate inequality. Legitimacy is

conquered based on stability of the overall domestic arena, which implies in balancing

winners and losers in terms of power. Also, state has to have a minimum of internal

coherence. Contemporaneous times offer plenty of examples of how state crisis impact other

domestic arenas, being the mostly recent the Great Recession in the US .114 Embeddeness may

take place through different means, which include formal and informal institutions. When

112

Evans 1995.113 Hobson 1997, 235.114 Jacobs and King 2009, 277.


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embeddeness fails in terms of representation, the state becomes more vulnerable to rent-

seeking activities and in failing to produce internal stability even amid lack of redistribution

to reduce inequality loses legitimacy. For instance, in the US, the comparatively weak

administrative capacity of the state has been susceptible to the demands and interests of the

financial sector. 115

This legitimacy, however, has to be kept into the boundaries set by conceptions of

existence and survival. For instance, the clashes over health care reform in the US derives at

least in part from the fact that it challenges principles that bounds the American national

character (e.g.: a Locke an conception of liberty that implies in a reduced role of the state

amid civil society) and the organisation of the economy unlike in Continental Europe,

health has been commoditised in the US since its foundation as a nation and as a market. A

similar process took place in Brazil and India in the 1990s, when liberal reforms in economy

had a more ambitious scope in the beginning than in the outcome. In both cases, the

governments that conducted the initial phase of institutional reform in Brazil, Fernando

Henrique Cardosos PSDB presidency (1995 -2003), and, in India, Narashima Rao s

Congress-led coalition (1991-1995) were, first, led to constrain its ambitions to keep

partially the nationalist legacy of the ISI years, and, after, were replaced in power by

coalitions that at least rhetorically were more aligned with state-centred practices, as it is

the case of Lula da Silvas PT in Brazil and Congress - and even Janata-led governments that

went into power after the second half of the 1990s. Socio-economic capital is not always

converted into political power. As figure 4 shows, such conversion depends on the degrees of

embeddeness and autonomy of the state-as-government.

Originally, the empowerment of the state vis--vis society happens, as Tilly and

Hobson among others argue, due to the extraction of resources, mainly through taxation to

115 Ibid.


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stability within the internal arena and coherence with the dominant domestic conception of

existence and conception of survival unless the coalition in power has a reformist program.

That said, in the elaboration of an issue in economic foreign policy, as it is the case in

negotiation preferences in WTO, issues regarding the international context and related to

sovereignty and international embeddeness at the time of policy elaboration play a role as

well, constraining through modified conceptions of existence and survival the final

preferences chosen as national ones by the state-as-government.

4. Conclusion

The theoretical gain in conceiving arenas of social action as fields lie in the fact that

this analytical tool allows to measure different dimensions of power without reifying sectors

that are traditionally conceived as purely economic. Social capital also matters, insofar as its

leverage determines the strength to which a given set of societal actors is attached to the

predominant conceptions of existence and, therefore, will be able to resist to changes in the

conception of survival. However, adaptations to shifts in economic organisation also matters

insofar as power, which is always symbolic, involves productive and associational leverage.

With productive and associational power, societal actors can participate in a more

decisive way in the arena of redistribution and influence the state-as-government, which,

nonetheless, has the final decision on the elaboration of public policies and legitimation of

new conceptions of society. Old conceptions of existence, however, are employed to

constrain new conceptions of society if there is the perceived risk of disruption within the

fields of the domestic arena. Thus, the limits to reframe them are not only the co-relation of

forces in domestic and international arenas, but also the long-standing conceptions of

existence that constrain societal action as a whole in the domestic arena, which filters the

impact of critical junctures posed by new conceptions of survival in the international system.

As the liberalising experience of Brazil and India suggest at a first glance, it is possible to


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investigate causal relationships within and between these units in an ad-hoc manner remain

opened. In sum, the bounded causality that the notion of fields suggest can be one step

further in bridging the sides of the debate rationalism vs. constructivism in the discipline.

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