Soviet Non-linear

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STUDIES ~OFFICEFort Le v n ot, . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kansas

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SOVIET NON-LINEAR COMBAT: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 90s

byLTC Lester W. Grau

Soviet Army Studies OfficeU. S. Army Combined Arms CenterFort Leavenworth, Kansas

September 1990

The views expressed here are those of theSoviet Army Studies Office. They should notnecessarily be construed as validated threat doctrine.

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SOVIET NON-LINEAR COMBAT: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 90s

In this time of turmoil in the Soviet Union, the SovietGeneral Staff is beset with a series of complex problems: thedirection of Soviet doctrine; the shape, size and manning of theSoviet armed forces; the function and future of the Warsaw Pact;the complete redrafting of war plans; and the use of militaryforces for civil control. However, one key function of theSoviet General Staff remains constant--to determine the nature offuture war and then develop the strategy, operational andtactical techniques, force structure, equipment, and trainingnecessary to meet its demands.

As the experience of the 1920s and 1930s demonstrates,Soviet theoretical concept,; were quite visionary and accurate.Today, the General Staff i.s again attempting to forecast thenature uf future war in light of the current "revolution inmilitary affairs"--a revolution whose key components are high-precision weapons, improved conventional munitions,microcircuitry, genetic engineering, and weapons employing newphysical principles.

FUTURE WARThe General Staff's view of future war envisions dynamic,

high-tempo, high-intensity land-air operations which will extendover vast expanses and include new areas such as space. Tacticalcombat will be even more destructive than in the past and will becharacterized by fragmented [ochagovyy] or non-linear combat.The front line will disappear and terms such as "zones of combat"will replace the outdated concepts of FEBA, FLOT and FLET. Nosafe havens or "deep rear" will exist. Nuclear war must beavoided at all costs, as it could escalate to strategic exchangeand the "destruction of all the world's people."'

The announced Soviet "defensive" orientation during theinitial period of future war (adopted to support the WarsawPact's "defensive doctrine") is now seen as a way to inflictsevere losses on the enemy with fewer forces, stop that enemy andcreate conditions necessary for a counteroffensive. Even withCFE-induced parity of forces, Soviet planners believe it will bepossible to achieve requisite superiorities of forces on mainaxes of offensives and counteroffensives by exploitingqualitative improvements in firepower and mobility and theeffects of surprise.2 Surprise, coupled with powerful air andartillery fire strikes, will allow a combatanL to rapidly insertground units, air-assault forces, and other specially-trained Qforces into the depths of his opponents' territory while covering [his own flanks with ]ong-range fires. Aviation and long-range,high-precision fires will attack reserve forces and support baseswhich could influence the operation. 3

,Dution/Availability Codes-- Avail and/or-

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There are many similarities between the problems facing theGeneral Staff today and the problems they faced in the 1960s. Inthe 1960s, the Soviets envisioned future war in terms of a non-linear, nuclear battlefield in which atomic weapons createdmaneuver corridors through which Soviet ground forces advanced toconduct meeting battles. The tempo of the offensive provided[flank] security to the attacker who attempted to maintain theinitiative while advancing deep into the communications zone ofthe enemy. Due to the expected wide-spread use of nuclearweapons,

combat has become exceptionally dynamic and highlymaneuverable, forcing subunits to change rapidly fromattack to defense and back again, and to changefrequently its combat formation. The attack willdevelop extremely irregularly with the absence of acontinuous front line and will be conducted in widerzones along axes. Under these conditions, combat willhave a fragmented [ochagovyy, non-linear] nature at thevarious troop echelons. 4

Indeed, "the broken nature of the front line, the presence ofintervals and gaps formed in the enemy's combat formation bynuclear strikes, and the conduct of the attack along axes createfavorable opportunities for the employment of maneuver." s

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets envisioned future war asbeing fought conventionally under nuclear-threatened conditionsand adapted tactics and reemphasized operational art in order tomeet this new vision.

Today, the Soviets perceive that nuclear weapons are lesslikely to be employed. Instead, they see their role taken overby high-precision weapons systems such as PLSS, JTACMS, andJSTARS and their Soviet analogues. 6 Consequently, futuretactical commanders need to be capable of displaying initiativeand conducting separate actions. 7

Linear warfare is roughly analogous to US football. Anattacking and defending side face one another on line. After ashort period of concerted effort to gain or deny ground oradvantage, both sides regroup and reform to try again. Non-linear warfare, as the Soviets envision it, is roughly analogousto soccer. There is constant activity with players on the sameteam simultaneously defending, attacking or making the transitionbetween the two. Team members rapidly coalesce into temporaryattack or defensive groups and then disperse again.

The Soviets see non-linear battle as one in which separate"tactically independent" battalions and regiments/brigades fight.meeting battles and secure their flanks by means of obstacles,long-range fires and tempo. There are no safe areas and

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combatants will suffer heavy attrition. Large units, such asdivisions and armies, may influence the battle through employmentof their reserves and long-range attack systems, but the outcomewill be decided by the actions of combined arms battalions andregiments/brigades fighting separately on multiple axes insupport of a common plan and objective. Attacks against prepareddefenses will be a rarity, as neither side will be able to tie intheir flanks or prepare defenses in depth.8

The Soviets have historical experience and theoreticalgrounding in non-linear war. Russian Civil War operations wereconducted by separate columns over vast areas with little concernfor flanks. Soviet war-planning in the 1960s envisioned anuclear, fragmented battlefield characterized by meeting battlesof separate battalions and regiments.9 Soviet desert fightingmethods and planning and experience in the employment ofairborne, airmobile and deep battle forces have all emphasizednon-linear war-fighting techniques.

Many of the 1960s tactical. concepts for i'.ghting andsurviving on tie nuclear battlefield are being reexamined todayfor applicability on the high-technology battlefield of tomorrow.For example, in the early 1970s, the Soviets developed theconcept of anti-nuclear maneuver (protivoyadernyy manevr] whichthey defined as "the organized shifting of subunits with the aimof withdrawing them from under the possible blows of enemynuclear means, to protect their survival and subsequent freedomof action to strike a blow on the enemy."I 0 This form ofdefensive maneuver also had an offensbve aspect which implementedmeasures "to rapidly disperse subunits or change the direction oftheir offensive.., and to conduct other measures related todefense against weapons of mass destruction."''

The Soviets concluded that operational and tactical maneuverprovided the most effective means of implementing anti-nuclearmaneuver. This led to the further development of the conceptsof operational maneuver (by operational maneuver groups-the OMG)and tactical maneuver (by forward detachments). The Sovietsrefined and fully developed thes- concepts by 1980.

Avoidance of enemy nuclear and high-precision weapontargeting has driven Soviet planners to study future non-linearwarfare. Maneuver is the basis for Soviet operational andtactical techniques designed to preempt, prevent or limit enemyuse of nuclear weapons. 12 Since high-precision weapons pose thesame threat as tactical nuclear weapons and may be employed morereadily and extensively than nuclear weapons, the Soviets haveapplied maneuver to the problem of surviving high-precisionweaponry as well. 1 3

The Soviets are preparing for future, non-linear combat byreexamining and reshaping their war-fighting concepts and

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structure. Results of this examination are evident in Sovietfuture force structure, tactics, fire support, logistics, andtroop control.

FORCE STRUCTUREThe Afghanistan war provided the Soviet Union's latestexperience with non-linear warfare. During that conflict, theSoviets found that -arate combined arms brigades composed ofmotorized rifle, . , air-assault and artillery battalions andsupport elements were more responsive and effective in a numberof combat situations. At this same time, the Sovietsexperimented with various battalion and brigade structures and alimited number of "new army corps" in their quest for the optimumforce structure for waging future war. Apparently, the economiccost of the corps/brigade structure prevented its current,universal adoption as a replacement for the division/regimentstructure.1 4 However, separate, combined arms brigades remainwithin the Soviet force structure.' 5In their search for increased combat power andmaneuverability, the Soviets have normally extended the combinedarms concept to maneuver-battalion level by constitutingbattalion tactical groups for exercises and war. 1 6 Thesebattalion tactical groups are modern tank or motorized riflebattalionswith significant tailored reinforcements. The tank ormotorized rifle battalion may be furnished withconsiderable quantities of reinforcements--an artillerybattalion or battery, antitank weapons, an antiaircraftbattery (platoon) and engineer and chemical troopsubunits. Tank subunits may be added to a motorizedrifle battalion and motorized rifle subunits may beadded to a tank battalion.'7In future non-linear warfare, there will be no time toreorganize and regroup formations and units after the fightingbegins. The meeting battle and combat in the depths of enemyterritory will require that all necessary force elements be onhand and fully integrated prior to combat. 18 The Soviets arestudying the feasibility of creating permanent battaliontactical groups or combined arms battalions so that they will betrained and organized before time of crisis or war.The Soviets have developed the combined arms concept furtherand are currently considering combined arms integration at theplatoon level. A May 1990 Voyennyy Vestnik article proposes theroutine creation of combat groups of two tanks and a BMP or twoBMPs and a tank. These teams would be formed by cross-attachment, not traditional attachment, and would move by bounds

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using fire and maneuver. Companies would routinely form twoplatoons into these teams and retain the third, nonintegratedplatoon as a reserve.' 9TACTICS

Future, non-linear combat is sharply affecting maneuverforce tactics. Defensive positions, attack options and methodsof defense are all being debated.

. rwo!

Figure 1Figure 1 demonstrates a trefoil defense and shows a US

mechanized infantry platoon with the platoon CP at the hub of thetrefoil and a rifle squad deployed along each axis. The squadaxis (beginning at the platoon CP) consists of two-man fightingpositions, the squad APC, an ATGM and a ground-mounted heavymachine gun. The 1985 Soviet article in which figure 1 appearedclaimed that the US Army believed that this configuration allowedfire to be concentrated on an enemy approaching from anydirection. However, the US Army does not and never did deployits mechanized infantry platoons in this manner. 20

In July 1987, the trefoil reappeared as a Soviet concept.This time it depicted a defending Soviet tank company and tankbattalion. This article initiated a debate that continues tothis day as to the advantages of the trefoil, the quatrefoil, andthe standard position defense. 2 1 FW,ai 9 A cY+ r I +1robut as the debate unfolded, it became clear that it was a debateon a combined arms battalion dcfense: 22

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The figure clearly shows the trefoil and its advantages of all-

round fire capability, the lessened time and field fortificationwork required to prepare a battalion defense, and, when properlycamouflaged, the difficulty in determining the defensive area andattacking it with high-precision weapons.The Soviets have begun a new tactical debate focusing on howa combined arms battalion should fight. As in the past, theyhave disguised this debate using as an analogy how the US Armyemploys a battalion tactical group. Figure 3 shows how theSoviets portray the US Army battalion tactical group :2 3

US BATTALION TACTICAL GROUPS CONSIST OF EITHER A-Math 1n with 1-2 attached tank companies-Tank Bn with 1-2 attached rnech companies-Balanced an with equal number of tank &mech companiesPOSSIBLE REINFORCEMENTS:-Vulcan platoon (4) with Stinger section (4).-Engineer platoon or mobillIty/countermobtility platoon

(4 ALB &up to 6 earthmovers).-Chem Ical/biological recon squad.-SP artillery battery to artillery battalion.-Up to a company or AT helicopters.-From 4 to 6 je t aircraft.-An avlatlon/hellcopter antitank group (with 2 to 4 A- 10and 4 to 6 AH-64).

Figure 2 -

Thefigre clarlyshows thetrefoilandthscadvtagTes fs atl-

type groups are poitrayed as having attached companies, insteadof the US system of cross-attaching companies.24 Some of thereinforcements are more typically Soviet than US (e.g., thechemical/biological reconnaissance squad). Whereas the US Armywill reinforce a battalion with an artilleoy batry, it will notnormally aattaon atilro Flionto a maneuver battalion--a common Soviet practice.25 While the US Joint Air Attack Team

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(JAAT) resembles the aviation/helicopter antitank group, it isseldom attached below US brigade level. Indeed, the "battaliontactical group" most closely resembles the future Soviet combinedarms battalion postulated by Lhe Soviet Army Studies Office(SASO) in 1989 (Figure 4).26

Combinedff Battalon B10ams bn eo

i 0 tanks 3 PA I RA~rtllery AI Antitank] [ AntlirQA,,,,E TIAGS.17b platoon platoon platoon

6 AGS.17 2 - SPG,9 9 - SA-7/14/162 1.2S9 4-AJ./AT.4

Supply Reeepir&dcalpairM&platoon istationEngineerplatoon

Figure 4When the Soviets write about a US maneuver battaliondeployed for combat, they describe a combined arms organization.Figure 5 depicts a mechanized battalion in march column withthree mechanized infantry companies, a tank company, an artillerybattery, an antitank company, mortar platoon, vulcan platoon anda single CP (circled). 27

echsqd Fward Securily ElemetTak Co A~/' ]hIhl Forward Patrol

l4ech id Tfius l4ec.5C@M echCC (mlnusplt) battery Mortar/AT , ,ADA I 4 CMh Co tnkptt eethsqd lReronpalltrCD-*- w> -04- -- 4-i-- I- [D.-ho L3-5 A*M P*,~

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Figure 5However, when the Soviets write about the battalion tacticalgroup, there are three CPs incorporated in the formation. Figure6 depicts a battalion in march column with four company task

forces, a mortar platoon, an air defense platoon, and engineerplatoon and three control points (circled). 28

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Fwvwa Paol Coaba Secuity Min BodyRac. Pit Company Teame

P8 (N.ecfC, eak pt. EIIPhpi TSBCm| ,k a topDt--Flak' p

UP to6to Security u o4t

Figure 6The first control point is the Command Group [gruppa

komandira/GK]. It consists of the battalion commander, chief ofstaff and signal officer. Its function is to control maneuverforces. The second control point is the Center of Control ofCombat Actions [tsentr upravleniya boyevymi deystviyami/TSUBDI.Its members are the battalion deputy commander, artillerycommander, air defense platoon leader, engineer platoon leaderand aviation forward contr.oller. Its function is to controlfire support and provide protection for the formation. The thirdcontrol point is the Rear Point of Control [tylovoy punktupravleniya/TPU]. It consists of the deputy for the rear, chiefof armaments and support platoon leader. Its function is toprovide combat support for the formation. This differs from theUS system for command and control in a battalion, but isidentical to the one predicted for the Soviet combined armsbattalion by SASO in 1989 (Figure 7).29

Figure 7The Soviets believe the meeting battle will be the most

common feature of non-linear warfare. Meeting battles permit oneto force his will on the enemy, support a high tempo of advanceand a high intensity of combat, and use maneuver to concentrateforces to strike an enemy's vulnerable spot (the center of

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tactical equilibrium). A Soviet analyst portrayed such a battlein a 1989 article (Figure 8).30 "-". Adv a wz.*O..

.co- olt -Co MSecuity Objectof Theatack- -- -bJF15SP -B 4iZ Ia t d tA

[] - "--,We"s pitGKV1AryaF ge8- ,ectrstPi t,;d

Figure 8 depicts a battalion tactical group, armed with USsystems, in a meeting battle. It has

the three Soviet controlpoints (circled). The battalion

on the left consists of three

tank companies and a mechanized company organized into threecompany teams, an artillery battalion of 55-mm SP howitzers,a

Vulcan platoon, a Stinger section, an engineer platoon and anantitank helicopter company. Despite the portrayal of US Arayorganizations and weapons systems, the tactics depicted areSoviet.A 197 battalion tactical group attack on a hasty defense isillustrated in Figure 9.31

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Figure 9 Flanking Group SnTank p p(o aerVn)

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The battalion tactical group attacks from the march from thesouth with a dismounted company team and an antitank reserve tohold the nose of the enemy. Two company teams, followed by thecommand group, attack on the left to bypass the defending enemyand to seize a "goose egg" objective. The "goose egg" is forceoriented (not terrain oriented) and contains the asspmbly areafor a tank-heavy counterattack force. 3 2 On the rig .c, the IFVsfrom the dismounted company team attack on an independent axisto envelope the defending enemy. A mortar battery provides firesupport while an air defense platoon defends the force.

This use of IFVs, minus their dismounted infantry, on aseparate axis is a key feature of proposed Soviet combined armsbattalion tactics. US commanders normally leave their IFVs insupport of dismounted infantry and do not separate the two. Inthe US view, dismounted infantry are essential to defeat the AT-threat against the IFV, whil, the IFV's ATGM capability wouldnot be up to a direct confrontation with enemy armor.

The Soviets feel that a group of BMPs, without theirinfantry squads, acting as an armored group [bronegruppa] on anindependent axis is ali effective, survivable force. The Sovietsfurther believe that t 30-mm chain gun on the BMP-2 is aneffective match for any enemy AT-weapons. The BMP-2 also mountsan ATGM system, but probably cannot contend with a directconfrontation against enemy armor. 3 3

In 1990, the Soviets updated their concept of a battaliontactical group attack on a hasty defense (Figure 10). 3 4

Do TacttiGroup Object of Attack

e mrchwith a n e a d n114.idgGroup AT .4ka ue

Fi'psay10 Mthemarch withoanattn eereadadsontdcmayta

(in the south) holding the nose of the enemy. Two company teamsI0


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are attacking in the nqrth from the march to roll up the enemyflank, envelop the defending enemy and seize a "goose egg"objective (containing an arriving self-propelled artillery unitand a mechanized force). In the south, the IFVs from thedismounted company ,team are again attacking on an independentaxis to envelop the defending enemy. A mortar battery and self-propelled artillery battalion are providing fire support while anair defense platoon is defending the force. A FASCAM strike isdelaying further mechanized reinforcements into the area, while areconnaissance patrol is pushing deeper into the enemy area.

Should the enemy have had twelve hours or more to preparehis defenses, the battalion tactical group would have conductedan attack against a prepared defense. It would attack in an areaup to five kilometers in width and up to eight kilometers deep.The attack may be initiated up to ten kilometers from the enemydefensive position. The battalion tactical group's attack on aprepared defense is illustrated in Figure 11. 35Object o nTac Grp Atack


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defending force. Ra-'.er, it seizes part of the "goose egg"objective where enemy artillery is located.

In 1990, the Soviets updated the attack on a prepareddefense as shown in figure 12.36

Zone of combat Action Zone of potentialAe Tactical Group Object o Attack

s alycny Teams a tak

Cmpany~~eax RacclarolLe -e ATpil I mta

thFsae novin h rna assul ,oersnea

a"rer a] ofTm RATpe i rec spi t e

reup3 Te b eMPGroup v i

Figure 12After an intense preparation by organic, attached andsupporting artillery, company teams are attacking dismounted. A

self-propelled artillery battalion, mortar battery, air defenseplatoon and air defense section are supporting the attack. Notthe IFVs are involved in the frontal assault, however, since anarmored group [bronegruppa] of IFVs, less its dismountedinfantry, is attacking on the southern flank of the enemyposition. A reconnaissance platoon precedes the platoon-sizedbronegruppa.3 7 The bronegruppa's objective is to attack thereserve company of 0hedefending battalion, while air and FASCAMstrikes seal off the area from counterattack forces.

The bronegruppa concept is clearly Soviet and was apparentlydeveloped during the Afghanistan conflict. The Soviets are nowopenly attributing the bronegruppa concept to their own forcesand discuss the use of the bronegruppa in the offensive anddefensive. 38 In March 1990, the following tactical example waspublished (Figure 13).39

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;Arp.0 ACAFm64.-./-)irt I~T.r - (-.-Figure 13

A tank battalion conducts a heliborne landing using itsattached motorized rifle company to seize a river crossing site,and then attacks to link up with that company in its bridgehead.Company BMPs are placed under the command of one of the platoonleaders as a bronegruppa to attack on an independent axis withinthe battalion scheme of maneuver. The circles show thebronegruppa in an assembly area separate from the dismountedmotorized rifle company, and then attacking around the flank of avillage to conduct a river crossing.

The battalion tactical group's defensive posture looks evenmore Soviet. The Soviets almost always form internal fire sacswithin their battalion and higher defensive positions, andchannel the enemy attack into these sacs so that he can bedestroyed by fire from three sides. 4 0 Figure 14 shows a battaliontactical group in a defensive setting. 4''--I/

AACRema"p"',Aec,pi

Figurec14I' CogTatgs~v

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(;to Mech COKMFigure 14 Tank 0 (esereC)

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This battalion tatical group defends an area 5-8 kilometerswide and 8-12 kilometers deep. Forward of the main defense, itdeploys combat outposts consisting of a reconnaissance platoon,three motorized rifle platoons, an antitank company and a mortarbattery. Combat outposts channel the enemy attack through afalse position and into an internal fire sac. The battalion maindefense consists of two company teams forward with a mechanizedcompany defending in depth. Two bronegruppa are formed with theIFVs of th: two forward-defending company teams. They and a tankcompany serve as mobile reserves. The left bronegruppa movesfrom an assembly area to a firing line from which it fires intothe flank of the fire sac. The right bronegruppa counterattacksin conjunction with the tank company to destroy enemy forceswithin the fire sac. The tank company also has a counterattackmission forward of the combat outposts. Air defense forces arepositioned to provide coverage of the entire force. The TSUBDis located where it can control fires external to and within thefire sac. The other two control points are not shown.A later variant of this concept is shown in Figure 15.42

elnih Pit' I\ ~ AT n

I' TN "0 Q

company'sb"ou te at ac mi s o s h veGe e rw o bl c n

ik~Co(Rserve

Figure 15- -In this variant, a third bronegruppa is formed from IFVsbelonging to mechanized platoons in combat outposts. It has acounterattack mission forward of the main defense. Both of the~~-----------a now have counterattack missions. The tankcompany's counterattack missions have been redrawn to a blockingposition on line with the mechanized company and a single

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counterattack to seal the base of the penetration (a traditionalmission of supporting artillery).

The Soviets currently employ bronegruppa in the defense.They constitute battalion and company bronegruppa from tanks andBMPs (minus their infantry). Bronegruppa are formed from second-echelon or reserve formations and are used to secure flanks,close gaps created by enemy use of high-precision weapons, anddestroy air-assault forces. 4 3

Figure 16 depicts a defense by a balanced battalion tacticalgroup: 4 4

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outpsts o hepTan e theCo a w ehaie opne

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Soou

Figur 16 DiP ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .oftedfnsGaenreuce frou-2klmtestppt

formation.~ ~ ~G1Thes copaie positoeoreroradascma

defend in the center of the formation and have reserve positionsat a depth to which they can retreat and contain the fire sac.The mortar battery is split into two platoon firing positions andair defense forces are split to provide complete coverage. Theantitank reserve is also split into two groups. As before, twobronegruppa have been formed from the IFVs of the forwarddefending mechanized forces. The TSUBD is located where it cancontrol fires external to and within the fire sac.

A later version of this example is Figure 1 o. ar

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I V' Uec'J Pit

I~l Ta.("n6ehC Mech 0o -%k AP Ire$It~ ,

Figure 17 , .. '-A tank platoon reserve has be constituted to the rear of the

left bronegruppa and the TSUBD has been moved to a centrallocation, but at the base of the fire sac.The battalion tactical group also has a point defensemission (Figure 18).46

/ mission (Figu L /%j)) ( Res er ,'"C--U

G-oup . p /

FiReure 18

The point defense can cover up to a 5 x 5 kilometer area.Company teams, without their IFVs, occupy strongpoints facingthe most likely enemy avenue of approach. Patrols provide earlywarning on these approaches. Three bronegruppa are formed fromthe company IFVs. One bronegruppa serves as a reserve within the16


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point defense and occupies any of three reserve positions onorder. The two other bronegruppa, the tank company, and theantitank reserve occupy assembly areas and prepare on-orderdefensive positions, firing lines and counterattack lines.

Clearly, the Soviets have been debating the formation andtactics of the future combined arms battalion under the rubricof the US battalion tactical group. Linear mis-ions to specificobjective depths have been replaced by force-oriented "goose egg"objectives at varying depths. Bronegruppa, which the Sovietsacknowledge as their own concept, are constituted from BMPs,without accompanying infantry. Rather than performing thetraditional role of infantry support, these bronegruppaaccomplish independent missions. An unprecedented level ofmaneuver is being built into the low-level tactical defense.

FIRE SUPPORTAviation will continue its important role in supporting

ground combat in future non-linear war. One current problemthat the Soviets are addressing is how to employ and controlhigh-speed jet aircraft and helicopters in the same airspace.As shown earlier, the Soviets credit the US with routinelyattaching an "aviation/helicopter antitank group" to battaliontactical groups. This group nominally consists of 2-4 A-10"Warthog" close support aircraft and 4-6 AH-64 "Apache"helicopters. As previously mentioned, the battalion tacticalgroup is a euphemism for the Soviet combined arms battalion, andone assumes that the Soviets are not discussing the JAAT, butrather a new Soviet close support concept.

In January 1990, a Soviet article provided an open-sourceglimpse at what may be the prototype Soviet "aviation/helicopterantitank group" (Figure 19).47

19 ,'"'-'" a% . -1.4-O( ' /Mu-2171

_~ icI . C JAI ;a1'IC

-~ ~UpJNC P-.41cop

5 4N3-~8CY25 84CFigure 19 -- h

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Figure 19 shows a regiment supported by eight SU-25"Frogfoot" ground support aircraft (bottom circles) and four MI-28 "Havoc" helicopter gunships (Lopcircle). The eight"Frogfoot" aircraft initially attack an enemy artillery battalionand then split into two groups of four to attack a battalion CPand a reinforcing company. The four "Havc" attack a defendingmotorized rifle company in coordination with the artillery firesof the regimental artillery group. Although this"aviation/helicopter antitank group" is not hunting tanks, andalthough it is supporting a regiment and not a battalion, thisexample.represents an effort to employ and control high-speedaircraft and attack helicopters in the same airspace. Further,the aircraft are quite similar in mission and design to theabove-mentioned US "Warthog" and "Apache" aircraft. Thisconcept, when refined, should prove a valuable asset on the non-linear battlefield. It could also provide a deep-battle role forSoviet attack helicopters. Currently, the Soviets are reluctantto conduct cross-FLOT helicopter flights without air cover fromfighter aircraft. On a non-linear battlefield (with no FLOT),the aviation/helicopter antitank group mix may be able to survivein deep battles away from friendly air defenses.

As the Soviets seek to avoid nuclear exchange in future war,they see that theater operations, employing new, lethal, high-precision weaponry and initial surprise/deception, must achievetheir objectives rapidly before the enemy can deploy and utilizesurviving nuclear and high-precision weapons. High-precisionweapons include reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-firecomplexes, automated fire control systems, antitank rocketsystems, field artillery homing munitions, various guidedmissiles, radar seek'ng missiles, guided bombs and cassettemunitions.48

The reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire complexesnow figure prominently in Soviet writings on future war. 49 Thereconnaissance-strike complex (razvedyvatl'no-udarnyykompleks/RUK) is the unified, automated system which providessupport and combat employment of high-precision, long-rangeweapons. This system provides real-time reconnaissance, targetdesignation, and vectoring to an intelligence fusion and firedirection center. The center provides guidance to dedicatedhigh-precision weaponry which destroys the target in real ornear-real time. 5 0 Reconnaissance-strike complexes employ weaponssystems which can function effectively at operational depths(surface-to-surface missiles and aircraft-delivered "smart"munitions) and are represented by such Western technology as"Assault Breaker," "LSS, JSTARS and JTACMS. A system usuallyincludes four main interconnected components: an automatedreconnaissance and guidance system, a mobile ground controlcenter, the high-precision weapons, and a means for the precisedetermination of the location of all the system components. 5'

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The reconnaissance-fire complex (razvedyvatel'no-ognevoykompleks/ROK) is similar to the reconnaissance-strike complex,but functions at tactical depths and employs artillery, multiplerocket launchers and short-range, surface-to-surface missiles fortarget destruction.52

Due to the revolutionary expansion of the destructivecapability of new weaponry, battle will be initiated at ever-greater ranges, forces and weapons will disperse even more andbecome more mobile to survive, and maneuver forces will quicklyintermingle with enemy forces or hug cities to avoid effectivetargeting. 53 The significant expansion of weapon range, alongwith increased reconnaissance and rapid information-processingcapability have enhanced the ability of "defensive" systems toactively influence the battle long before ground forces come intophysical contact. The ability of "defensive" systems to identifydeep targets, reach out and destroy them has enabled the moderndefense to assume many of the advantages previously Pnjoyed onlyby the offense. 5 4 Thus, in the Soviet perspective of the futurebattlefield, the distinction between the offense and defense isdisappearing.

In this neq environment, the role of conventional artillerywill increase. Sufficient artillery must be immediatelyavailable to seize fire superiority from the very beginning ofthe conflict. 5 5 Revolutionary improvements in munitions,ordnance, reconnaissance and control systems will force theSoviets to shift from their curfent normative-based firing (whichexpends vast amounts of ammunition and creates a sizablelogistics burden) to accurate, point-target engagements. Therange of guns and mortars will increase to 30-40 kilometers.Conventional and nuclear projectiles will also increase inlethality. Multiple rocket launchers will fire fuel-air, remote-mining and antitank smart munitions. Since these systems will bemore mobile, they will be able to fire at greater depths andservice larger areas without having to form into the presentlyemployed large artillery groups. 5 6 Improved, automated firecontrol systems will computerize the planning and control ofartillery fires to allow effective fires separate from artillerygroups and in support of non-linear combat.51 Artillery will bere-integrated into maneuver battalions to support this non-linearcombat. 58

THE RECONNAISSANCE-FIRE GROUPWhile the Soviets are developing technology to implement the

reconnaissance-fire complex concept, they have already fielded atimely and less costly substitute using current systems to serveas a stop-gap reconnaissance-fire complex while the next-generation complex is being developed. The reconnaissance-firegroup (razvedyavatel'no-ognevaya gruppa/ROG) links dedicatedreconnaissance assets to a firing group headquarters and firing

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battalions to provide near-real time destruction of tacticaltargets. 5 9 It provides flexible, lower-level, decentralized andresponsive artillery support coupled to tactical commanders.

The ROG consists of several artillery battalions, adedicated artillery reconnaissance sutanit, a group headquarters(and sometimes a helicopter for adjusting fires), and isconstituted from an existing artillery group (normally a divisionartillery group--DAG or army artillery group--AAG) for thepurpose of suppressing or destroying particularly important enemytactical targets. Priority targets include tactical nucleardelivery means, self-propelled artillery and mortar batteries,FASCAM delivery systems, command posts, reconnaissance systems,and combat helicopters located on aircraft carrier decks.

A ROG, employed in both the offense and defense, isassigned a region or zone of fire responsibility. Figure 20shows a two-battalion ROG with two dedicated sound-rangingplatoons.

_L4

kj kj

Figure 20This ROG, part of a defending division's DAG, has a zone of

responsibility covering most of the division's sector to therange of participating reconnaissance and artillery subunits (inthis case 20-25 kilometers). Each artillery battalion and theROG ,eadquarters have a forward observation post. A divisionalartillery radar surveillance unit is also providing support.Although not part of this particular ROG, the artillerysurveillance unit provides target information and fireadjustment to the ROG. The sound-ranging platoons have detectedtwo batteries of 155-mm howitzers designated as targets 6, and62.

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Figure 21Figure 21 depicts the control sequence of the ROG. A

defending division has constituted a ROG and designated anartillery regiment headquarters as the ROG headquarters. Asound-ranging platoon, which is part of the two-howitzer-battalion ROG, locates an enemy howitzer unit and passes thisinformation simultaneously to the ROG headquarters and the FDCsof the firing battalions (three solid lines). The FDCs computefiring data and pass it to their batteries while the ROGcommander decides whether to attack the target, when to attackit, and whether to suppress or destroy it. The ROG FDC andbattalion FDCs compare firing data as they are determined. Oncethe ROG commander decides to attack the target, the fire missionis passed to the firing battalions and the sound-ranging platoon(dashed lines). The sound-ranging platoon then adjusts fires onthe target. Should other targets be identified by seniorartillery commanders, the ROG can rapidly reintegrate into theparent artillery group to conduct necessary fires. 6 0

LOGISTICSProvisioning and maintaining a force on a non-linear battlefield may prove to be the ultimate logistician's nightmare. TheSoviet experience in Afghanistan has provicd them with a recent

demonstration of the vulnerability of lines of communication andthe need for maneuver units to carry extra ammunition and POL. 61The Soviets are also reviewing their experience in resupplying21


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operational maneuver groups (OMGs), airborne drops, air-assaultlandings and forward detachments for lessons learned on how toresupply forces and maintain equipment on a nonlinearbattlefield. Several steps were taken throughout the 1980s tobetter ecuip the Soviet forces for future war:

-the establishment of a materiel support battalion atdivision and a materiel support company at regiment levels. 62

-the establishment of a deputy for the rear at maneuverbattalion level.63

-the heavy use of helicopters to move troops and supplies,coupled with increased aviation resources and materiel supportairfields engaged in resupply. 6 4

-research and development in caseless ammunition, liquidpropellants, fuel efficient engines, and wing-in-ground (WIG)technology.65

-development of the reconnaissance-fire complex and pointtarget engagement to replace normative artillery fires.

The Soviets may also be planning to increase their supplyand maintenance organization within a combined arms battalion. 6 6TROOP CONTROL

The Soviets place great trust in the mathematical modellingand support of operations and combat. At least 43 tacticalcalculations are routinely used at the maneuver battalion level.Approximately one-third of these celculations have beenconverted to easy-to-use nomographs, another third have beenconverted to handy computing forms, and most have been formattedfor use in the battalion programmable calculator. Theseformulae are primarily concerned with computing time andtonnages, exposure and expenditure rates, and optimization anddetermination of effectiveness in various actions andactivities. 6? The assistant battalion chief of staff normallycalculates the necessary data for the battalion.6 8

In the past, qualitative correlation of forces and meanscalculations and "scientific" (mathematical) verification of theplan was done at army and front level. The Soviets devised amethodology whereby coefficients of commensurability (orstandard units of armament) were determined for individualweapons systems. Using such factors as firepower, range, speed,

k." &JL.L11 U11thSoviets determined coefficients of commensurability for allweapons systems. This gave them a qualitative basis with whichto compare similar and dissimilar weapons systems. This methodcould then be extended by comparing TOE units on the basis of

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their equipment, which enabled the army or front commanders todetermine quantitative and qualitative combat potentials andcalculate the correlation of forces and means. The Sovietsexpanded this methodology to modify the qualitative combatpotential of units by factoring mathematical values for terrain,weather, morale, training, mobilization, combat fatigue, type ofcombat action, direction and location of attack, and artilleryand aviation fires. This operational methodology provided a moreaccurate representation of a planned action and enabledcommanders to envision the operation, verify its success, anddetermine friendly and enemy losses, tempo and rates of advance.Computer support has enhanced and supported this process. 6 9

At the tactical level, a quantitative or "finger drill"correlation of forces and means was conducted. As the Sovietslook to future, non-linear war, however, they see a greater needfor more finite, tactical planning tools to determine tacticalcorrelation of forces and means. The tactical commander cannotrely on operational commands to provide "scientificallysubstantiated" input in a timely fashion useful at the tacticallevel. Instead, the tactical commander must be capable of rapid,substantiated decisions and must be provided with rugged,reliable planning aids. Thus, new formulae are being developedto support qualitative correlation of forces and meanscomputations at battalion level. Two such recently-publishedformula sets provide a methodology for analyzing possibleoutcomes of combat to select optimum potential courses of actionin a comparatively short time, using predefined data andemploying normal weather and terrain.

The first example is a formula for determining the strikepotential of subunits in combat. It is used to calculate theexpected depth that an attacking subunit will achieve as afunction of its strike potential.

=N[Y.(I- n) - -ino)]oxoNoIYo (I- Ho)-(l --n~o)I DaK

when Y,(1- 7,)>(-I71',) and Yo(I-17o)>/HO),

where Aa, No -are the strengths of the subunits of theattacker and defender, expressed in terms ofcombat units or of the combat potential ofthe subunits.

F,,17o -are the expected casualties of the subunitsof each side during close combat (expressedas a fraction of the whole).23


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rl %, 17o -are the critical loss points of theattacker and defender beyond which theywill lose their capability to conductcoordinated combat (expressed as a fractionof the whole).Ou -is the width of the attack in kilometers.

(DO,r0 -is the width and depth of the defendersposition in kilometers.Y Yo -are the percentage of TOE personnel manningof the sides expressed as a decimal.

K -is the coefficient of combat effectivenessof the combat unit of the defending side.An example would be to determine the expected depth anattacking subunit would attain, which had a given combat

potential of 150, was at 100% TOE manning (1.0) and attacked adefender with a given combat potential of 194 which was at 85%(0.85) manning. The expected casualties to the attacker duringclose combat are 0.1 (10%) and 0.4 (40%) to the defender. Thedegree of combat loss at which combat effectiveness is lost is0.5 (50%) for the attacker and 0.7 (70%) for the defender. Thewidth of the attack zone is 5 km. The defending subunits occupyan area 8 km wide by 10 km deep. The coefficient of combateffectiveness of the defending combat unit is 2.5.

= 150[1,0(1 - 0,I)-(I - 0,5)1.8.10 9,5 KM.194[0,85(1 - 0,4) - (I - 0,7)].5.25

In this ex-mple, the attauking force will penetrate to a depth of9.5 kilometers. 70The next tactical formulae are designed to provide amethodology for analyzing the possible outcomes of combat toselect the optim,,m potential action in a comparatively short timeusing predefired data and Pmploying normal weather and terrain.7'Unlike the previous formula, which did not discuss how combat

potential and critical loss points were derived in tacticalmodelling, these formulae consider the types of militaryequipment and weapnnry, their coefficients of commensurability,the calculations of thpir qualita-tive characters; permissablecasualties, and the mathematical expectation of the degree ofdestruction of a side by firepower. Figures 22 and 23 are datatables which support such computation.

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Coerricient orNattpn Type of Military Equipment CommensurabilityA Tank "5" 1.0Tank "6" 1.12Tank *7" 1.5

IFV 1.6RPG' 0.3B Tank "60" 1.02IFV 1.4AT rocket complex 0.95AT launcher 0.3

C Tank "1' 1.09IFV 0.45AT rocket complex 0.78RPG 0.12

Figure 22National Defense % Offense % Meeting

Prepared Unprepared Against AgainstPrepared Unprepared Battle %Forces Defenses Defenses

B 55 45 30 35 40C 60 50 35 40 45

Figure 23Figure 22 shows representative coefficients ofcommensurability for equipment of three nations (nation A ispresumed to be the Soviet Union). 7 2 Figure 23 shows the degreeof destruction that the subunits of nations B and C endure beforethey lose their combat effectiveness in various types of combat.The formulae to determine the possibility for a subunit todestroy an enemy in the course of a mission are as follows:a) In the offense

11 " (K c l .I - -K c +i + . -tK c n -iH[l - ( Z , -t-Z 2 - h )L' lf 's I ;f

b) In the defenseK'n (Kc =I -- Kc, it . F c i.I- (Z, + Z2 - A,)]Co --_ (KoI + K',2..+..+ K,5 .i) M)

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where Kel, K'c2, Ken= coefficients of commensurability of themilitary means of subunits of nation A;

K:,, "'s =coefficients of commensurability of themilitary means of subunits of nations B & C;==quantity of means of a given.type:

ZI, Z 2 =degree of destruction by which combatpotential may be lost;Al =mathematical expectation of the degree of

destruction by artillery and aviation;=the coefficient of superiority of thedefense over the offense;

C =the combat potential of the subunit.

When calculating the combat potential in a meetingengagement, the offensive formula is used, but the factor for thecoefficient of superiority of the defense over the offense is notincluded.

An example is an attack by a tank platoon of country A armedwith type "7" tanks, which has an attached motorized rifle squadmounted on an IFV. The attack is conducted from the marchagainst a defending squad of country B.

Data:a) Type of combat action: offensive.b) Types of military equipment of a side, its quality andcoefficient of commensurability:The attackers:--Tank "7" Kcl = 1.5, quantity i = 3--IFV, Kc2 = 0.8, quantity i = 1.The defenders--IFV, Ksl = 1.4, quantity i = 1--Antitank launcher, Ks2 = 0.3, quantity = 3.c) Mathematical expectation of the degree of destruction ofthe defenders in the period of fire preparation and support ofthe attack: M = 0.4.d) Losses to the subunit in the period approaching the

attack line cannot exceed Zi = 0.3.e) Degree of destruction to the defender, at which theylose combat potential (2d table), Z2 = 0.55.

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f) Coefficient of superiority of the defender over theattacker = 3.

cR== (1,5,3 + 0,8.1).11 - (0,3 + 0,55 -0,4) = 0,7.3 (1,4.I+ 0,3,3)- (I-0,4)

If the combat potential is greater than or equal to 1, thenthe subunit will fulfill its mission. If, (as in this case-0.7),the combat potential is less than 1, the defenders can defeat theattacker. That means that a way must be found to allow theattacker to fulfill his assigned mission. The commander decidedto first attack the IFV with tank platoon fire from 2000 metersout. Then, having destroyed the IFV, he decided to close withand destroy the short-range antitank launchers. Testing hisdecision for the two phases discloses the following:

(1,5.3 + 0,8. 1). -- (0,3 + 0,55-0,4)] 131,4 (1- 0,4) ,19.

(1,5.3 + 0,8.1) .[I - (0,3 + 0,55 - 0,4)]CD 2 =1.9.3.0,3.3. (1- 0,4)Thus, moving the attack line back to 2000 meters and conductingthe attack in two phases would allow the commander to succeed.

These formulae have been programmed for the battalionprogrammable calculator to save time and prevent mathematicalerrors.The importance of these formulae is that they allow thebattalion commander to function much more independently than hecould under the old troop control system. It provides a rapidway of verifying his decision and can serve as a substitute forcombat experience and intuition. The Soviet tactical commanderwill need more such troop control aids to lead on the fragmented,non-linear battlefield.

CONCLUSIONSThe Soviet General Staff faces severe problems, butcontinues to perform the critical function of studying futurewar. They do not consider current problems of the Soviet Unionas terminal, and will continue to serve in adversity, as they

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have in the past. As the Soviets ponder modern technology, theyfind themselves on the beginning of another, daunting revolutionin military affairs which will require them once again toreadjust their war-fighting methods. As they prepare for future,non-linear war fought with new, expensive technologies, they areexperimenting and preparing to make major changes in forcestructure, tactics, fire support, logistics support and troopcontrol. Although the Soviet Union lacks an economic base strongenough to implement these changes fully, many of the precursorsto these changes are now becoming apparent. The resolution ofthe many complex problems now facing the Soviet military andSoviet state will determine the extent to which these changes canbe realized.

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ENDNOTES

1. V. G. Rer'.-nhienko, Taktika [Tactics] (Moscow: Voyenizdat,1987), 63, 181, 194. Much of the General Staff's examinationappears to be a reexamination of the non-linear war-fightingtechniques developed in the early 1960s for combat on thenuclear, non-linear battlefield. This is logical, as high-precision weapons can now perform many of the missions of nuclearweapons without the collateral damage. Today, however, thetraditional role of the General Staff in determining defensepolicy is being challenged by civilian theoreticians from outsidethe Ministry of Defense. Many of these theoreticians are fromThe Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada. The civilianviewpoint is often at apparent odds with that of the GeneralStaff, but has succeeded in implanting the vision of a "nuclearwinter" and the non-utility of nuclear weapons among the generalSoviet populace.2. G. I. Salmanov, "Sovetskaya voyennaya doktrina i nekotoryyevzglyady na kharakter voyny v zashchitu sotsializma" [Sovietmilitary doctrine and several views on the nature of war in thedefense of socialism], Voyennaya mysl' [Military thought](December 1988), 9.3. Ibid., 9-10.4. D. F. Loza, G. I. Garbuz arid I. F. Sazonov, Motostrelkovyybatal.'on v sovremennom boyu [The motorized rifle battalion incontemporary combat] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1965), 4.5. Ibid.6. "Tn terms of their capabilities, high-precision weaponssystems such as reconnaissance-strike complexes and futurehypersonic guided missiles and smart bombs resemble thecapabilities of tactical nuclear weapons. They could sharplyincrease the losses of personnel, armament and equipment as asingle rocket could knock out entire tank or motorized riflecompanies." These weapons systems "change the nature of moderncombined-arms combat ....Combat is becoming increasingly dynamicand fluid and the significance of the long-range fire batt.e tothe course and outcome of combat is growing dramatically."Reznichenko, 28-29. Respectively, PLSS, JSTARS, and JTACMS arePrecision Location Strike System, Joint Surveillance and TargetAcquisition Radar System, and Joint Tactical Missile System.7 .."N n-in-a ..... ,.,ovY, j co l, Increases 'C.'16 i-ipact ofindependent actions by battalions and regiments fighting inisolated sectors and the importance of securing their flanks,intervals and rear ....[It] requires swift penetrations deep intoenemy territory, and frequent flanking movements and envelopments

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to strike the enemy flank and rear."Tbid., 63.8. "Absence of a continuous front, considerable dispersal of theforces and presence of exposed flanks and large gaps all promotemaneuver, bold envelopments, deep encirclements, rapid advanceson the enemy flanks and rear, and sudden and decisive strikesfrom different directi'ons. The highly mobile character of modernbattle means that protracted, carefully measured combat actionsare not consistent with the potential of modern weapons andequipment and would hinder their effective employment.Contemporary combat emphasizes movements, marches, combat fromthe march, and dynamic mobile battle. Forces will often switchfrom combat to column formation swiftly advancing and widelymaneuvering to achieve varied goals and missions." Ibid, 60.9. In the late 1950s, the US Army attempted to come to gripswith non-linear or fragmented warfare by creating Pentomicdivisions. These divisions formed five battle groups tailored tofunction independently on the nuclear battlefield.10. F. D. Sverdlov, "K voprosu manevra v boyu" [On the questionof maneuver in combat], Voyennyy vestnik [Military herald,hereafter VV], No. 8 (August 1972), 31.11. Ibid.12. "The continuous conduct of battle at a high tempo createsunfavorable conditions for enemy use of weapons of massdestruction. He cannot determine targets for nuclear strikesprecisely and will be forced to shift his nuclear delivery meansoften." Reznichenko, 72.13. Yu. Molostov and A. Novikov, "Vysokotochnoye oruzhiye"[High-precision weapons], Sovetskoye voyennoye obozreniye [Sovietmilitary review] (January 1988), 13. Another tactic is to "hug"cities and enemy forces. Soviet forces plan to move adjacent toor into cities and close with enemy forces so that they cannot bereadily targeted. Consequently, the composition of the firsttactical and operational echelons should change dramatically andtheir significance will increase. (Reznichenko, 292). "Therearises the problem of defining the optimal structure for thefirst and second tactical echelons. With the enemy using high-precision weapons, the role of the first echelon has to grow. Itmust be capable of achieving the mission without the secondechelon or reserve." (Molostov and Novikov, 13).14. David M. Glantz and Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Force

I, IAR LA-LJO %. tui ericl! iLairy Review,Vol LXVIII (December 1988), 64-65.15. "Vstrechi veteranov" [Veterans' gatherings], Krasnaya zvezda[Red Star, hereafter cited as KZ], 8 May 1990, 6. The article

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outlines the visit of veterans to a separate guards motorizedrifle brigade named in honor of the 60th anniversary of thefounding of the USSR. The brigade is located in the Moscowmilitary district and was apparently reformed as a brigade in1977. V. Moroz, "Proshu zachuslit' ryadovym..." [I want toenlist as a private...], KZ, 3 April 1990 concerns a forum onmilitary reform. Guards Colonel Boris Nikolayevich Polyakov, thecommander of the Guards Motorized Rifle Sevastopol Brigade, was aparticipant.16. Lester W. Grau, "Reorganizing for Battalion-level Combat,"Military Review, Vol LXIX (December 1989), 65-72; and Lester W.Grau, "The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion--Reorganizing forTactical Flexibility," (Ft. Leavenworth: Soviet Army StudiesOffice, 1989).17. Reznichenko, 208.18. Ibid., 286.19. T. Timerbulatov, "Atakuyut boevyye gruppy" [Combat groupsattack], VV, May 1990, 68-70. If this concept is adopted, itwill change Soviet tactics considerably. It would mean that theSoviets must abandon many of their battle drills, rely less onthe protection of artillery, allow greater low-level initiativeand modify their emphasis on tempo. It would also seem torequire a professional NCO corps in order to make it work.20. Normally, when the Soviets want to begin a debate ordiscuss a problem which they are having, they will couch the itemin terms of "according to Western experts ...." Although Sovietarticles on US technology, force structure and tactics arenormally very accurate, occasionally they will attribute tacticalconcepts and procedures to the United States when they wish tobegin a debate on tactical concepts and procedures. These mayhave no relationship to anything the US Army is actually doing orstudying. In this example, the Soviets discussed the US platoonin the trefoil defense when they were actually beginning a debateon their own tactics. Figure 1 is from I. Alexsandrov, "U.S.Mechanized Infantry Platoon in the Perimeter Defense",Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye [Foreign military review,hereafter ZVO], August 1985, 33-34 as translated by FBIS, ForeignMilitary Review, JPRS-UMA-86-001 dated 8 January 1986.21. James F. Gebhardt, "Restructuring the Soviet TacticalDefense", International Defense Review, June 1990.22. N. Surgutanov and T. Timerbulatov, "A shto, esli boyevoyporyadok postroit'tak..."(And what if the combat formation isthis structured...], VV (August 1987), 36-38.

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23. G. Fedulov, "Batal'onnaya takticheskaya gruppa SSHA vovstrechnom boyu" [USA battalion tactical group in the meetingbattle], VV (July 1989), 75-77.24. The Soviets normally attach a company to another battalionwithout compensating the losing battalion. The gaining battalionfights reinforced while the losing battalion fights minus thatcompany. The US Army cross-attaches companies. Thus, amechanized battalion which is reinforced with a tank company willin turn attach a mechanized company to the tank battalion whichprovided the tank company.25. Grau, "The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion," 16-18.26. Ibid., 26.27. A. Smirnov, "Motopekhotnyy batal'on na marshe" [Themechanized infantry battalion on the march], VV (April 1986): 89-91.28. Fedulov, 76.29. Grau, "The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion," 28. This studyfurther predicted that the Soviets would establish a deputy forthe rear at battalion level. The Soviets proposed establishingthis post in September 1975 in Tyl i snabzheniye [Rear andsupply] in Maludin's article "Rear support of a tank battalion onthe offensive with a forcing of a water obstacle." The fact thatthere is now a deputy for the rear at battalion level isconfirmed in P. Konoplya, "Vazhnoye usloviye uspekha" [Animportant condition for success], VV (October 1989), 45; V.Kirillin and S. Agafonov, "V rayone oborony batal'ona" [In thebattalion defensive region], Tyl vooruzhennykh sil [Rear of thearmed forces] (August 1988), 26; and A. Zuyev, "Batal'on zanyaloboronu" [The battalion occupied the defense], Tyl vooruzhennykhsil (November 1989), 22. Establishment of the deputy for therear at battalion level will allow the Soviets to do two thingssupport more effectively, control and fight a combined armsbattalion, and mobilize forces rapidly. Traditionally, theSoviets have demobilized by collapsing a larger formation into asmaller one. Thus, a division would collapse into a regiment anda regiment would collapse into a battalion. Critical functionswould be maintained in the smaller formation to easemobilization. The deputy for the rear may represent the abilityfor combined arms battalions to rapidly expand into regiments,should the situation demand.30. Fedulov, 75.31. K. Volodin, "Batal'onnyye takticheskiye gruppy sukhoputnykhvoysk SSHA" [Battalion tactical groups of the US ground forces],ZVO (November 1987), 19.

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32. The Soviets use line objectives in linear warfare and force-oriented "goose egg" objectives for non-linear warfare. SeeLester W. Grau, "Changing Soviet Objective Depths in Future War,"Military Review, Vol LXIX (December 1989), 44-53, and Lester W.Grau, "Changing Soviet Objective Depths: A Reflection ofChanging Combat Circumstances" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: SovietArmy Studies Office, 1989).33. Perhaps the Soviet answer is the "BMP-3", which was firstdisplayed at the 9 Nay 1990 Victory Day parade in Moscow. Itappears to be a "stretch" BMP, but has a large (100-mm?) gun, alarge caliber co-ax automatic cannon (30-mm?) and two bow-mountedmachine guns. With ammunition storage requirements, an automaticloader and a three man crew (driver, gunner and commander), thereappears to be little room for additional personnel. Perhaps th e"BMP-3" is not a BMP (infantry fighting vehicle). From the sizeof the gun, it might actually be a rapid fire mortar/artillerypiece or an assault gun/light tank. If so, it would fit well intothe combined arms battalion concept; within the fire supportsubunit or tank company. It might prove an ideal escort vehiclefor a BMP force attacking on an independent axis. Furthermore,labelling an artillery piece or light tank as a personnel carriermay be a ploy to help offset equipment reductions under the CFEagreements.34. V. Prishchepov, "Batal'onnyye takticheskiye gruppy SShA vnastuplenii" [Battalion tactical groups of the US in theoffensive], VV (July 1990), 74.35. Volodin, 19-20.36. Prishchepov, 75.37. As predicted by SASO in 1989, a reconnaissance platoon hasbeen incorporated into the motorized rifle battalion. See V.Ivanov and I. Sotnikov, "Polevoye obustroystvo voysk" [Fieldfacilities for forces], VV (April 1990), 50.38. An early example of the bronegruppa concept was publishedin 1983. In the June edition of VV, a tactical problem[Takticheskaya zadachal was given on page 40. The approvedanswer was given on page 48 of the September issue. It showed aBMP platoon, minus its infantry, used in an ambush forward of adefensive position. Examples of the bronegruppa in theAfghanistan war are A. Kravchenko, "Gruppa v zasade"[(Armored)group in ambush], VV (July 1989), 45-48 and V. Kurochkin, "Tankyv zelenoy zone" [Tanks in the green zone], VV (January 1990), 57-59. Two discussions of the contemporary use of the bronegruppaare A. Samofalov, "Desant uderzhivayet platsdarm" [The airlanding retains the bridgehead], VV (March 1990), 17-19 and Yu.Fotiyev and F.Yonin, "Vedeniye oborony" [Conduct of the defense],VV (March 1990), 13-16.

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39. Samofalov, 18.40. Jau.es F. Gebhardt, "Soviet Battalion in the Defense",Military Review, Vol LXIX (December 1989), 54-64.41. Volodin, 21.42. V. Zhukov, "Battal'onnaya takt~eheskaya gruppa armii SSHA voborne" [US Army battalion tacLical group in the defense], V(June 1988), 87-89.43. Fotiyev and Yonin, 13-16.44. Volodin, 21-22.45. Zhukov, 88.46. Volodin, 22-23.47. R. Karasik, "V rey;1ovom otryade" [In a raiding detachment],VV (January 1990), 35.48. Reznichenko, 24.49. The bulk of this artillery section and the followingreconnaissance-lire group section have been extracted from theauthor's "Soviet Artillery Planning in the Tactical Defense,"(Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Sov4,-t Army Studies Office, 1990).50. Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military encyclopedicdictionary], s.v. "Razvedivatel'no-udarnyy kompleks"[Reconnaissance-strike complex], 2d edition, (Moscow:Voyenizdat, 1986), 616-617.51. Reznichenko, 24-26.52. For an in-depth discussion, see Milan Vego, "Recce-strikeComplexes in Soviet Theory and Practice," (Ft. Leavenworth, KS:Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989).53. Harold S. Orenstein, "Warsaw Pact Views on Trends in GroundForces Tactics," International Defense Review (September 1989),1149-1152.54. Christopher Bellamy, "Budushchaya voyna: The Russian andSoviet View of the Military-Technical Character of Future War,"Part Two (draft) (Texas A & M University. Center for StrategicTechnology, 1990), 32.55. Salmanov, 10.

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56. Teofil Wojcik, Rozwazania spolczesnym natarciu[Reflections on the modern offer ive], (Polish Ministry ofDefense Publications, 1987), 242 as translated by Harold S.Orenstein, Soviet Army Studies Office.57. Reznichenko, 25.58. Grau, "The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion," 29-30.59. This discussion of the ROG is based on Zygmunt Czarnotta,"Integration of Reconnaissance and Fire," Przeglad WojskLadowych [Ground Forces Review), May 1987, as translated inHarold S. Orenstein, Selected Translations From the PolishMilitary Press, Volume III: Supplement (Ft. Leavenworth, KS:Soviet Army Studies Office, 1988), 38. The Polish gruparozpoznawczo-ogniowa/GRO has been translated into Russian asrazvedyvatel'no-ognevaya gruppa/ROG and treated as a Sovietconcept. The Polish open military press has historicallydiscussed Warsaw Pact concepts well in advance of the Soviet openmilitary press (as was the case with the OMG). The ROG hashistorical roots in the Soviet fire group of the 1930s. ThePolish article provides a detailed description of the training ofartillery battalions to function within a ROG.60. In the offense, the ROG will usually reintegrate into theDAG or AAG for phase 2 'fire preparation) fires. In the defense,the ROG will usually reintegrate for phase 2 fires and couldremain as part of the artillery group for phase 3 and 4 fires.61. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Ambush! The Road War inAfghanistan," Army (January 1988).62. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Soviet Logistics SupportConcepts Change," Army Logistician (March-April 1987), 2-7; andGraham H. Turbiville, Jr. and James F. Holcomb, Jr., "SovietDesant Forces," Part II, International Defense Review, Vol 21(October 1988), 9-10.63. See endnote 29.64. Turbiville, "Ambush."65. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Rear Service Support Conceptsand Structures," Military Review, Vol LXVIII (December 1988), 76-77.66. Grau, "The Soviet COmbined Arms Battalion," 23-28.67. A. Ya. Vayner, Informatika v voyennom dele [ Informatics inmilitary affairs] (Moscow: DOSAAF Publications, 1989).

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68. Yu. M. Artyunov, Shtab batal'ona v boyu [The battalion staffin combat] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1988), 9.69. In 1987, the author and John T. Banks reworked a course onSoviet operational art for the US Army Command and General Staffcollege. Course exercises utilized this Soviet methodology.Banks created a computer program to compute combat potentials,convert the potentials to reality by inputting situationalfactors, establish correlation of forces and means, and predictcasualty rates, time and rates of advance. The computer programreduced an eight hour process to ten minutes.70. Vayner, 91-92. Note that the Soviets follow the Europeancustom of using a comma in place of a decimal point' n theirmathematical formulae.71. The discussion of these formulae is extracted from R.Ulugbekov, "Modelirovaniye boya" [Modelling combat], VV (March1990), 44-48.72. It is interesting to note that some nations' IFVs have agreater coefficient of commensurability than their tanks. Thisis probably a reflection of the Soviet's belief that the modeinIFV is more flexible, survivable and capable on the future, non-linear battlefield than is the tank.

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