Weber Samuel

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TAKING EXCEPTIONT O DECISION:WALI'ER BENJAMIN A N DC A R L SCHMITT

SAMUELWEBER... as in the epigramabove an engravingdepictinga stage on which therestand,to the left,a buffoonand, to the right,a prince: "When he stage is empty,ooland kingwill no longer count or anything."-Walter Benjamin,TheOrigin of GermanTragicDrama

1In December 1930 WalterBenjaminsends the following letterto Carl Schmitt:EsteemedProfessorSchmitt,

Youwill receiveany daynow rom thepublishermybook TheOriginof theGermanMourningPlay. With hese linesI wouldlikenotmerelyto announce tsarrival,but alsoto expressmy oy at beingable to send it toyou, at thesuggestionofMr.AlbertSalomon.Youwill veryquicklyrecognizehow muchmybook is indebted oyoufor itspresentationof the doctrineof sovereigntyin the seventeenthcentury. PerhapsI may also say, inaddition, thatI have also derived rom your later works,especially the "Diktatur,"confirmation fmymodesofresearch n thephilosophyofartfromyoursinthephilosophyof the state. If the reading of my bookallows thisfeeling to emerge in an intelligiblefashion, thenthepurposeof my sendingit toyou will be achieved.

Withmyexpression of special admirationYourveryhumbleWalterBenjamin [GS 1:3.8871

This etter s not tobe found nthetwovolumesof Benjamin'sCorrespondence, ublishedin 1966. The esteemthatBenjaminexpressedfor the eminentpoliticalthinkerwho,justa few years ater,wastopublish exts suchas"DerFiihrer chiitztdasRecht" "TheFiihrerProtectstheLaw") (1934) and "Die deutscheRechtswissenschaft m Kampfgegen denjiidischen Geist" ("GermanJurisprudencen Its Struggle against the Jewish Spirit")(1936) hardlyfits the picturethatBenjamin'stwo editors and former riends,GershomScholem and Theodor Adomo, intended to make known to a broad audience. Asunderstandable stheirdecision to excludethis letter s, itnonethelessexpressesa malaisethat s related o thewayin whichthefigureof WalterBenjamin endsto resistany attemptat univocalclassificationorstraightforwardvaluation. It is asthough hefact thathe hadbeen able to admireanddraw nspiration rom the workof a Catholicconservativewhodiacritics 22.3-4: 5-18 5iacritics / fall-winter 1992


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was soon to become a conspicuousmemberof the Nazi partycould only muddyandconfusethe meaningof an oeuvrethatboth AdornoandScholem,whatever heir otherdifferences about t mightbe, agreedwas of exemplarysignificance. It is as thoughtheacknowledgment f a debtamounted o a general dentificationandthus,in view of laterdevelopments, o a moral contaminationof Benjaminby Schmitt.Suchamalaise spalpable nthe remark f RolfTiedemann,whois to be creditedwithpublishingthe letter to Schmitt n the criticalapparatus e assembledfor the edition ofBenjamin'sCollectedWritings hathe edited. The letter,he remarks,s "denkwiirdig,"althoughhe doesnotsayjustwhat sortof thoughts tmightelicit ordeserve[GS1:3.887].One response that is often encountered n this context traces Benjamin's interestinSchmittback to thecritiqueof liberal,parliamentary emocracysharedbyboth. But thisexplanation,as evident and as accurateas it maybe, hardlysuffices to accounteitherforthe "debt"mentionedby Benjamin n his letter,or for themanner n whichit manifestsitself in his book. Rather, he work of Schmitt igures n thatbookforat least two relatedbutverydistinctreasons. First of all, the"playof mourning" twork in the Trauerspieland above all thecharacter f its "origin"bothimplya certainrelationshipo historyandto politics.' Second, and more specifically, Benjamin encounters the question ofsovereigntynotsimplyas athemeof Germanbaroqueheater,butasamethodologicalandtheoreticalproblem:as we shallsee, according oBenjaminevery attemptointerpretheGermanbaroqueriskssuccumbing o a certain ackof sovereignty. Let us examine usthow these two factorshelp to explain Benjamin'srecourseto Schmitt.The Germanbaroque mourning play has as its "trueobject" and "substance""historical ife as representedby its age." But therelationshipbetween the Trauerspielandhistoryis farfroma one-way street: if baroque heater s concernedprimarilywithhistory, hishistory s in turnconstruedas a kind of Trauerspiel.This is whyBenjamin'formulation,hereaselsewhere,mustbe readasrigorouslyaspossible: The"trueobject"of baroquedrama is not just "historical ife" as such, but rather "historical ife asrepresentedby its age [das geschichtlicheLeben wie es jene Epochesich darstellte]"[Origin62/Ursprung51]. Theprimary epresentationndrepresentative fhistory nthebaroqueage,however,is thesovereign:"TheSovereignrepresentshistory.He holdsthecourse of historyin his handlike a scepter" 65].

Benjamin's nsistence on the historicalsubjectmatterof Trauerspiel hus leadshimnecessarilyto thequestionof political sovereigntyand ts relation o history. Butit is notmerelythe thematicaspectof his subject hat eadsBenjamin o examinethequestionofsovereigntyandhence to the theoriesof Schmitt.In his letter,Benjaminwritesthathe hasfound nSchmitt' worksa "confirmation" f his ownstyleofresearch,"meine[n] igenenForschungsweisen."JustwhatBenjaminmightbereferringobecomes clearer f we turnto thebeginningof the firstchapterof his book, "Trauerspiel ndTragedy."Benjaminbegins his study properwith a notion elaborated n the "Epistemo-Critical rologue":namely,that the "conceptualization"f aphilosophical nvestigationsuch as the one heproposes must be "directed owardsthe extreme [die notwendigeRichtung aufs Ex-treme]"[57/45].Inthusforegroundinghe constitutive mportanceof a "turn oward heextreme"ntheprocessof "philosophical onceptualization,"Benjaminplaceshimselfsquarely n atradition hatgoesbackatleast toKierkegaard' essayonRepetition; utthe textin whichthis mode of thinkingimpresseditself most profoundlyupon Benjaminwas probablySchmitt'sPolitischeTheologie[PoliticalTheology], hefirstchapterof which concludesby insistingon the significanceof "the extreme case":

1. I have discussed the historicalityof Benjamin'snotionof Ursprung,as elaborated n his"Epistemo-CriticalPrologue" to this book, in "Genealogyof Modernity: History, MythandAllegory in Benjamin'sOriginof the GermanMourningPlay" [MLN106 (1991) esp. 467-74].6


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Precisely a philosophyof concretelife must not withdrawrom the exceptionand the extremecase, but must be interested n it to the highestdegree. Theexceptioncan be moreimportant o itthan the rule,notbecause of a romanticironyfortheparadox,butbecause the seriousnessofaninsightgoes deeperthanthe clear generalizations inferred rom what ordinarily repeats itself. Theexception is more interestingthan the rule. The rule proves nothing; theexceptionproveseverything:itconfirmsnotonlythe rulebutalso itsexistence,whichderivesonly rom theexception. [15]

In the "Epistemo-CriticalPrologue"(ErkenntniskritischeVorrede)to the Trauerspielbook,whereBenjaminseeks to elaborate hepremisesand mplicationsof his readingofthe Germanbaroque heateras an"idea," t is preciselyto the "extreme"hathe appealsin order to indicate just how the "idea"distinguishes itself from the subsumptivegeneralityof theconcept:The idea is best explainedas the representationof the context in which theuniqueandextreme Einmalig-Extreme] tandsalongside itscounterpart.It isthereforeerroneoustounderstand he mostgeneralreferenceswhichlanguagemakesas concepts,insteadof recognizing hemas ideas. It is absurd oattemptto explainthegeneral as theaverage. Thegeneral is the idea. Theempirical,on the otherhand,can be all the moreprofoundlyunderstood hemoreclearlyit is seen as an extreme. [35]

What s characteristic f theEinmalig-Extremes, as Schmittexplicitlystates,that t is a"borderlinenotion": it is situated at the extremity of what is familiar, identicallyrepeatable,classifiable;it is thepointat which the generallyfamiliar s on the verge ofpassinginto somethingelse, thepointat which it encounters he other,the exterior. Tothink he "idea" saconfiguration f singular xtremes Einmalig-Extreme)s toconstrueits being as a function of that which it is not.Suchpassages ndicatehowBenjamin' mode of investigation,hisForschungsweise,is indebted o thatof Schmitt: bothsharea certainmethodologicalextremism or whichthe formationof a conceptis paradoxicallybutnecessarilydependentupona contactoran encounterwith a singularitythat exceeds or eludes the concept. This singularencountertakesplace in andas the "extreme"andit is the readinessto engage in thisencounter,accordingto Benjamin,thatdistinguishes"philosophicalhistory"from arthistory, literaryhistory,oranyotherform of historythatpresupposes hegivennessof ageneralconceptunderwhich the phenomena t addressesare to be subsumed:

Philosophical history,thescience of origin, is theform which, in the remotestextremesand theapparentexcesses of theprocess of development,revealstheconfigurationof the idea-the sum total of all possible meaningful uxtaposi-tions of such opposites. Therepresentationof an idea can under no circum-stances be consideredsuccessfulunless thewholerangeofpossible extremes tcontains has been virtuallyexplored. [47]The circle of extremes can be traversedonly potentiallynot only because the extremesthemselves areneverfullypresentorrealizedas such. Rather, heyarticulate hemselveshistorically n termsof a split into a Vor-undNachgeschichte. Thispre-andposthistoryof the singular dea constitutes"the abbreviatedandobscuredfigure of the remainingworldof ideas"[47].Thisfigureis to be deciphered abzulesen). Andit is here,precisely,thatBenjaminfinds himselffacedwitha problem hatseemsto beara particular elation o the Germanbaroqueand its interpretation:diacritics / fall-winter 1992 7


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That characteristic feeling of dizziness which is induced by the spectacle of thespiritual contradictions of this epoch is a recurrent feature in the improvisedattempts to capture its meaning.... Only by approaching the subjectfrom somedistance, and initially, forgoing any view of the whole, can the mind be led,through a more or less ascetic apprenticeship, to the position of strength fromwhich it is possible to take in the whole panorama and yet remain in control ofoneself. [56]

In thebaroque, he "circle"of potentialextremesto be traversedn thestagingof an ideahas becomeanencirclementof contradictions ndof antitheses romwhichthere seemsno escape, butonly the "dizziness," hevertigothat its spectacleelicits.What sorts of contradictions nd antithesesencircle the Germanbaroque?Not theleast of theseappears o be a singulardiscrepancybetween its artistic ntentionsand theaesthetic meansat its disposal. And it is here thatBenjaminencounters heproblemofsovereignty n a guise that seems to be peculiar o theGerman heaterof the time: "TheGermandramaof theCounter-Reformationeverachieved hatsupplenessof formwhichbendsto every virtuosotouch,suchas Calder6ngave the Spanishdrama. It took shape... in anextremelyviolenteffort,and thisalonewouldsuggestthatno sovereign geniusimprintedhis personalityon this form"[49].What s modem,topical,aktuell,about hebaroquengeneral,andabout heGermanbaroque n particular,s thus tied on the one hand to a certain ack of sovereignty,to acertain ncapacityof producingconsummateartistic orms,andon theotherto an effortof thewill that strives to compensate or thislackbutinsteadthreatenso overwhelmallthose who seek to interprett:

Confronted with a literature which sought, in a sense, to reduce both itstechnique, the unfailing richness of its creations, and the vehemence of its claimsto value, one should emphasize the necessity of that sovereign attitude which therepresentation of the idea of a form demands. Even the danger of allowingoneself to plunge from the heights of knowledge into the profoundest depths ofthe baroque state of mind. [56]The lackof sovereigntyof theGermanbaroque heater, s well as thepowerof itswill

seekingto compensate or that ack,rendera"sovereignattitude" llthe more mperativeandallthemoredifficultfor thosewho seek to interprett. Thisis atleastoneexplanationforwhy Benjamin s led to look for a "confirmation"f his styleof research n the Lehreof Schmittconcerning,precisely,the questionof sovereignty.2

2. Here thequestion houldat leastbe raised npassingwhether he "dizziness thatBenjaminhereidentifieswith he Germanbaroque s notalso, inpartat least,a resultofhis own determinationof the origin as a Strudel, a vortex or maelstrom that "reisst in seine RhythmikdasEntstehungsmaterialhinein" [29]. The "rhythm" f the origin is split betweena tendencytorestore and to reproduce (Restauration,Wiederherstellung),on the one hand, and a certain"incompletion"Unvollendetes,Unabgeschlossenes)on the other. Thissplitin theoriginis whatthen articulatesitselfas the division intopre- andposthistory. The lackof a center, ully presenttoitself,in theoriginisperhapsthe "origin"ofthatSchwindelgefiihl hatBenjamin ssociateswiththebaroque ngeneral,and its Germanvariant nparticular. It remains obedetermined, owever,whether hisconnection ndicatesthat hebaroque s aparticularlyoriginary ge, orratherwhetherthe origin itself is notparticularly baroque. Nor is thereany guaranteethat the answer to thisquestionmustconform o the schemaof an either/or,a simpledecision. Wewill returnverybrieflyat the end of this paper to the relation between "decision" and "rhythm"as articulated inBenjamin'sbook.

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2If theprimaryobjectof the GermanTrauerspiels historyas representedn thefigureofthe sovereign,the destinyof the ruler n the baroque heatermanifests a regularity hatsuggeststheinevitabilityof a naturaloccurrence:"Theconstantlyrepeateddramaof therise and fall of princes... appearedo thewriters ess as a manifestationof morality hanas the naturalaspectof the course of history,essential in its permanence"88]. Historyas arepetitiveand neluctableprocessof riseand all is identifiedwith the natureof a fallencreationwithoutanydiscernible,representable ossibilityof eithergraceorsalvation. Itis the loss of theeschatologicalperspective hatrenders hebaroque onceptionof history"inauthentic" ndakin to a state of nature.Such aconceptionor confusionof historywith nature ntailsat east two fundamentalconsequencesfor a theaterwhose primaryconcernis, as we have seen, precisely thespectacleof thishistory.First, he loss of theeschatologicaldimensionresults naradicaltransformation f the dramaticelement of the theater, nsofar as it had been tied to anarrative-teleological onceptionof history. ThetraditionalAristoteliananalysisof theplot in terms of "unity of action" resulting from the exposition, development, andresolutionof conflict, is no longer applicable. "History," s Benjaminputsit, "wandersonto the stage [Die Geschichte wandert in den Schauplatz hinein]" [92/89]. Second, thebaroquenaturalization f historyprofoundlyaffects the figureof the sovereign, primaryexponent,weremember, f history.Thenaturalistic estinyof theprincedoes notmerelyimply the rise and fall of an individualfigure,but moresignificantly,the dislocationofsovereignty as such. Out of this dislocation Benjamin develops what he calls "thetypologyandpoliticalanthropology"f thebaroque.The reason hat his"typology"mustbe elucidatedat the outset is because it arises out of thearticulation, rrather,disarticu-lation of sovereignty,and hence of history,the primaryobjectof the GermanbaroqueTrauerspiel.Benjamin'sreconstruction f the political anthropologyof the baroqueconsists ofthreefigures,of varyingstatureandstatus,andyet each of which is unthinkablewithoutthe others. This trio embraces hetyrant, hemartyr,and theplotter derIntrigant).It isthe first and the last thatwill be of particularnterest o us here.The pointof departureor this typology is, of course,the figureof theprince. It ishere thatBenjaminmakesexplicitreference o CarlSchmitt' theoryof sovereignty. Tograspthe significanceof Benjamin'suse of Schmitt, t will be helpfulif we first reviewcertainaspectsof the latter' discussion of sovereignty,startingwith the famouspassageat the beginningof Political Theology n which the notion is first announced:

Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception [Ausnahmezustand].Only this definition can do justice to a borderline concept. Contrary to the

imprecise terminology that isfound inpopular literature, a borderline conceptis not a vague concept, but one pertaining to the outermost sphere. [5]

Despite the apparentand seductive clarity of this definition, it nevertheless leaves anumberof problemsunresolved,above allregardinghe notionof the "stateofexception."Firstof all, thestate of exception,Schmitt nsists,is notsimply equivalent, nGerman, oa state of emergency or of siege: not every "danger"or "threat"constitutes anAusnahmezustandn Schmitt'ssense, since noteveryexception perse representsa threatto the norm.Thestateof exceptionthatconstitutes heobjectandproductof thesovereigndecisionis one thatthreatensor calls intoquestiontheexistence and survivalof the stateitself as hithertoconstituted. Sovereignty s constitutedas thepowerto decide uponor

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aboutthe state of exceptionand thusin turn ncludestwo moments:first,a decision thata state of exception exists, and second, the effective suspensionof the state of lawpreviously nforce so that he statemaymeet andsurmounthechallengeof theexception.In thusdecidinguponthe stateof exception,thesovereignalsoeffectivelydetermines helimits of the state. And it is this act of delimitation hatconstitutespoliticalsovereigntyaccording o Schmitt.This is why thetranslation f Ausnahmezustands "state"of exceptionis notquiteaccurate,orrather,why it obscuresthe delicate balanceof similarityand distinction hatdetermine the relationshipof the state as Staat and the exception as Zustand. TheAusnahmezustands a "state"n the sense of havinga relativelydeterminatetatus;as a"Zustand,"t is

always also somethingdifferent .. from an anarchyand a chaos, [and thus]orderin thejuristicsense stillprevailsevenif it is notof theordinarykind. Theexistenceof the state is undoubtedproof f itssuperiorityover thevalidityofthelegal norm. Thedecision rees itselffromall normative ies and becomes in thetrue sense absolute. Thestatesuspendsthelaw in theexceptionon thebasis ofits rightof self-preservation,as one says. [12; my emphasis]

The paradoxor aporiaof Schmitt'spositionis suggestedhereby the conclusion of thepassagejust quoted. For if the "decision" s as radically independentof the norm asSchmittclaims, it is difficult to see how the decision of the state to suspend ts laws canbejustifiedatall, since alljustification nvolves preciselytheappealto a norm. This iswhy, in appealing o a "right o self-preservation," chmittacknowledgesthat the termis more "away of speaking" hanarigorousconcept: "Thestatesuspends helaw in theexceptionon the basis of its rightof self-preservation, s one says."On the one hand,then,the sovereigndecision marks herelationshipof the orderofthegeneral-the law, thenorm,theconcept-to thatwhich is radicallyheterogeneous oall suchgenerality. In this sense, thedecision as such is sovereign,that s, independentof all possible derivation rom or subsumption o a moregeneralnorm. It is a pureact,somewhatakin to the act of creationexcept that what it does is not so much to create asto interrupt nd to suspend. If suchinterruption ndsuspensioncan never be predictedor determinednadvance, heyarenonethelessnotarbitrarynsofarastheyareunderstoodas necessaryin order o preserve he state as the indispensableconditionof all possiblelaw and order.And yet, precisely insofar as it is situatedin this temporalityof repetitionandreproduction,he decisioncannotbe considered,Schmittnotwithstanding,o be entirelyabsolute. Rather,it constitutesitself in and as a break with . . ., an interruption rsuspensionof... a norm. In separatingwhatbelongsto thenormfrom what does not-and nthissenseeveryauthenticdecision,as Schmittasserts,has to do withanexception-the decision distinguishesitself from the simple negation of order,from "chaos andanarchy," s Schmittwrites,andcan indeed ayclaim tohavingsome sortof "legalstatus."Theproblem,however, s thatsuch a claim can be evaluatedand udgedonlyafterthe act,asit were,which is to say,from apointof view that s once againsituatedwithina systemof norms. ForSchmitt,this paradox s articulated s the fact that the state,which is thecondition of all law and order,is itself constitutedby a decision that is priorto andindependentof all such considerations:"Authorityprovesthat n order o createrights,it neednot beright" 20]. Onthe otherhand, henonlegaloralegalstatusof thesovereignandexceptionaldecisionis justifiableand indeed identifiableonly insofaras it providesthe conditions or thereappropriationf theexceptionbythenorm. The statethushas thefirstand the last wordin Schmitt'stheoryof sovereignty.This bringsus to a second aspectof Schmitt'sthought. Up to now, we have beenconsidering it in terms of a relatively abstract,general, and quasi-logical theory of10


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decision;but Schmitt'sthinking s also historical,as the verytitle of his book,PoliticalTheology, suggestsandas the following passagemakes manifest:

All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularizedtheological concepts not only because oftheir historical development-in whichthey were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, forexample, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver-but alsobecause of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary fora sociological consideration of these concepts. The exception injurisprudenceis analogous to the miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy canwe appreciate the manner in which thephilosophical ideas ofthe state developedin the last centuries. [36]

To be sure,in the "analogy" hat Schmitt s hereconstructing,"historicaldevelopment"is subordinatedo "systematic" onsiderations.At the sametime,it is only in a reflectionorrecallof the historical"transfer"-orrather,ransformation-of theologicalcategoriesintopoliticalones thatthe"systematic tructure" f politicaldiscourse s fully revealed.The salient raitof thatstructures, as we havealready een,itsdependenceupona certaintranscendence,uponthatwhich exceeds its self-identity,uponanirreduciblealterityandexteriority: just as the miraclein Augustiniandoctrine both exceeds andexplains thecreatedworld.If historical reflection upon the development of political discourse reveals itstheological origins and hence its dependence upon a certaintranscendence, he actualhistoricaldevelopmentof political theory and of theology has moved in an oppositedirection:

To the conception of God in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries belongsthe idea of his transcendence vis-a-vis the world, just as to that period'sphilosophy of state belongs the notion of the transcendence of the sovereign vis-a-vis the state. The nineteenth century was increasingly governed by represen-tations of immanence. [49]

To these"representationsf immanence"belongtheidentificationof rulerandruledand,above all, thatof the state with the legal order (Identitit des Staates mitderRechtsordnung)[49/63]. But if thedevelopmentof modemthoughthas thustended o efface theoriginaryand constitutiverelationshipof thepoliticalto transcendence,n the nameof notions ofautonomyandself-identity,Schmitt' own approachdoes not seem to be entirelyfreeofsuchtendencies.Thiscan be seeninthe manner nwhich he conceivesthe "consciousnessof the analogy"betweenpoliticalandtheological categories,whichfor himis thekey toauthenticallyhistoricalandsystematicalunderstanding.For whatemergesin Schmitt'sdiscussion of the relationof politics andtheology isthathe construes he analogybetween themaboveall in terms of identity,rather han nterms of transformation r of alteration. For instance, he finds confirmationof histheological-political thesis in the position of Atger, for whom "the monarchin theseventeenth-centuryoctrineof the statewasidentifiedwithGod andoccupied nthe statethe position precisely analogousto thatoccupiedin the worldby God in the Cartesiansystem"[45]. The method that Schmittadvancesin Political Theology,which he calls"thesociology of concepts,"thus employs the notion of "analogy" n order to reducedifference to identity,as the following programmatic eclarationclearlydemonstrates:"Themetaphysical magethataparticular pochforgesof theworldhasthe samestructureas what the worldimmediatelyunderstandso be appropriate s a form of its politicalorganization. The determination f such an identityis the sociology of the conceptof



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sovereignty" [46; my emphasis]. Onewould be tempted o say that Schmitt'scritiqueseeks to replace the Immanenzvorstellungen of modern political theory withIdentititsvorstellungenhatseek to recall heheterogeneityofpoliticalconceptsout of theoblivion intowhichtheyhavefallen,butonlysucceed nonceagainreducing heiralterityto the same: to "the same structure" nd to "the determination f... an identity."3

Withthe ambivalenceof Schmitt'sapproach o thepoliticalin mind,let us now turn othe manner n which the questionof sovereigntyemerges in Benjamin'sstudyof theGermanbaroque heater:Thesovereign representshistory.Heholds the courseof history n his hand ikea scepter. Thisview is by no meanspeculiar to thedramatists. It is based oncertain constitutionalnotions. A new concept of sovereigntyemergedin theseventeenthcentury rom a final discussion of thejuridical doctrinesof themiddleages .... Whereasthe modernconcept of sovereigntyamounts to asupremeexecutivepoweron thepartoftheprince,thebaroqueconceptemergesfrom a discussion of the state of emergency,and makes it the most importantfunction of the prince to exclude this [den auszuschliessen].. [54-55; myemphasis]

A note at the end of this passagerefers to Political Theology. And yet the very wordswhichseemonlytoparaphrase chmittconstitutenfact aslightbutdecisive modificationof his theory. Schmitt,we remember,definessovereigntyas constitutedby thepowertomake a decision that consists of two moments: first, the determination hat state ofexceptionexists, andsecond,theeffective suspensionof the state of law with the end ofpreserving he stateas such. ForSchmitt, hen,thestateof exceptionmustbe "removed,"beseitigt, "doneaway with,"but only in each particularcase, never as such: that ispreciselywhat Schmittcriticized moder political theoryfor tryingto do, by excludingconsiderationof the stateof exceptionfrom the determination f sovereignty.Benjamin,by contrast,describesthe taskof thesovereign n theverytermsthatSchmittrejects:thesovereign is charged with the task of "excluding" the state of exception, "denauszuschliessen."Inshort, hatwhich is already"exterior,"heAus-nahmezustand,s tobe exteriorizedonce again,aus-geschlossen,andthis appliesnot simply to the state ofexceptionas anindividual,determinatehreat o the state-the positionof Schmitt-butto the state of exceptionas such, thatis, as that which transcends he statein general.3In short, the function assigned to the sovereign by the baroque, according toBenjamin, s thatof transcending ranscendenceby making t immanent,an internalpartof the state and of the world,of the stateof the world. And the reasonwhy thebaroqueis so attached o the stateof the worldBenjaminexplainsas follows:

Thereligiousmanof thebaroqueera clings so tightlyto theworldbecauseofthefeelingthathe is beingdrivenwith t towarda cataract. Thebaroqueknowsnoeschatology;andforthatveryreasonitpossesses nomechanismbywhichallearthly hingsaregathered ogetherand exaltedbeforebeing consigned o theirend. Thehereafter s emptiedof everythingwhich contains theslightestbreath3. "Aber bderextremeAusnahmefall irklichausderWeltgeschafftwerdenkannodernicht,das ist keinejuristische Frage. Ob man das Vertrauenund die Hoffnunghat, er lasse sichtatsdchlichbeseitigen, hdngtvonphilosophischen, nsbesonderegeschichtsphilosophischen dermetaphysischenUberzeugungen b" [13].

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of this world, andfrom it the baroqueextracts a profusion of things whichcustomarilyescaped the grasp of artisticformulationand, at its highpoint,brings themviolently into the light of the day, in order to clear an ultimateheaven,enabling t,as a vacuum,onedaytodestroy he worldwithcatastrophicviolence. [66]Whatthebaroque ejects s anyadmissionof the limitationof immanence,and t does soby emptyingtranscendence f all possible representable ontent. Far fromdoing awaywith transcendence,however,suchemptying only endows it with a force that is all themorepowerful: that of thevacuum,of the absoluteand unboundedother,which, sinceitisnolongerrepresentable,s also nolonger ocalizable"out here" ras a"beyond."Theothernessthatis no longerallowed to remaintranscendent hereforereappearshis sideof thehorizon,represented s a "cataract,"byss,or fall. Or,even moreradically,suchtranscendencewill be representedby, andas, allegory.

In thisperspective, he "function" f thesovereign o "exclude" he stateof exceptionconformsfully to theattemptof the Germanbaroque o exclude transcendence.But thevery samedesire to exclude transcendence lso condemnsthe functionof thesovereignto malfunction: for unlikethe political-theological"analogy"of Schmitt,the baroquesovereign-and particularly,he Germanbaroque overeign-is definedpreciselybyhisdifferencefrom God,just as baroque mmanence sets itself up in contradistinctionotheological transcendence. At the very point in time when the political sovereignsuccessfullygainshis independence is-a-vistheChurch,he differencebetweenworldlypowerandthatof thedivine cannolongerbeignored.Theresult,asBenjamin ormulatesit, turnsoutto be directlycontrary o the conclusion of Schmitt: "The evel of the stateof creation, he terrainon whichtheTrauerspiels enacted,also unmistakably xercisesa determiningnfluence on thesovereign. Howeverhighlyhe is enthronedover subjectandstate,his status s confinedto the world of creation;he is the lord of creatures,butheremains a creature" 85]. Schmitt,we recall, had construed the theological-politicalanalogyin termsof a relationshipof essentialsimilarity: The sovereigntranscends hestateas God transcends he creation. By contrast,Benjamin'snotionof secularizationstressespreciselythe incommensurabilityf thechangeit entails. Such incommensura-bilitybecomeseven more evidentin thespecific case of Germanbaroque heater:"Therejectionof the eschatologyof the religiousdramas s characteristic f the new dramathroughoutEurope;nevertheless the rash flight into a naturedeprived of grace isspecificallyGerman"81]. The Germanbaroqueheater"flees"wildlytonature-which,we remember,s for it the other ace of history-only to discoverthat here s no graceorconsolationto be had there,either. The undoingof the sovereignis the fact thatin acreationleft entirely to its own devices, without any other place to go, the state ofexceptionhas become the rule [see Garcfa-Diittmann11 ff.].The resultis thatthesovereignfindshimself in a situation n which a decisionis asimperativeas it is impossible:

Theantithesisbetweenthepower of the ruler and his capacityto rule led to afeature peculiartotheTrauerspiel,which s,however,onlyapparently genericfeatureand whichcanbe illuminatedonly againstthebackground f thetheoryof sovereignty. Theprince, who is responsible or making the decision toproclaim the state of emergency,reveals, at thefirst opportunity, hat he isalmost incapableof makinga decision. [70-71 ]

The sovereignis incapableof makinga decision,becausea decision, in the strictsense,is notpossiblein a worldthat eavesnoplaceforheterogeneity: heinauthentic,"natural"historyof the baroqueallows for no interruption r radicalsuspensionof its perennial

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interruptions.The sovereignreactsby seekingto gatherall powerand thusbecomes atyrant;andyet the morepowerhe has, the more he demonstrateshis incapacity o arriveat an effective decision. Facedwith thissituation, hetyrant aneasily turn ntoamartyr.Bothfigures,Benjaminobserves,areforthebaroqueonlytwo sides of thesamecoin,"theJanus-heads f the crowned... thenecessarilyextremeforms of theprincelycharacter"[69].Inemphasizing hedictatorial endencyof thesovereign,Benjamin ollows Schmittherepractically o the letter("Thetheoryof sovereignty,which takes as its examplethespecialcase in whichdictatorialpowersareunfolded,positivelydemands hecompletionof theimageof the sovereign,as tyrant" 69]). Butin so doing,he arrivesat a resultthatis almostdiametricallyopposedto thatof Schmitt: theverynotionof sovereignty tselfis putradically ntoquestion. Oneextreme llustration f this is thefigureof Herod,Kindof theJews, "who,as autocrat onemad,becameemblematicof aderanged reation" ndas such also an exemplaryillustrationof the fate of the "sovereignfor the seventeenthcentury":"thesummitof creation,erupting ntomadness ike a volcano anddestroyinghimselfandhis entirecourt.... Hefalls victim to thedisproportion etweentheunlimitedhierarchicaldignity with which he is divinely invested and the humble estate of hishumanity"[70]. Thekey to thesecularization f which theGermanbaroque s the resultis thusforBenjaminnot so much ananalogybasedon proportion, ndhenceon identity,as a relation based on disproportion, on a Missverhaltniss.Theeffects of thisdisproportion o notstopat thedismantlingof thesovereign,whois splitinto anultimately neffectiveif bloody tyrantanda no moreproductivemartyr; ordoes it come to rest atanyof thecompromisespossiblebetween thesetwo poles, such asthatrepresentedby the "stoic ostentation" hatoften characterizesbaroquerepresenta-tions of theprince.Rather, hesplittingof thesovereign s accompaniedbytheemergenceof a thirdfigure,who stands n radicaldissymmetry o the other two. Thatfigure,whocompletes the baroque "political anthropologyand typology," is the "plotter," heIntrigant:and t is he who turnsout tohold thekeyto the fateof sovereignty ntheGermanbaroquemourningplay.

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To understandwhatdistinguishesthe plotterfrom the other two figures in the baroquepolitical"typology," tmustbe emphasized hat heincapacityof thesovereignto decideinvolves the transformation otmerelyof anindividualcharacterype,but of themannerin whichhistoryitself is representedn the Trauerspiel.Andthis in turndetermines heway in whichrepresentationakesplace. With the splitof thesovereigninto tyrantandmartyr,what is dislocated is notjust theunityof a character,but the unityof characteras such. This disarticulation s of particular mportancefor baroquetheater. If theAristotelian heoryof tragedyassigns primarymportance o theunityandwholeness ofaction,andrequires o thisend"consistency" f character Poetics 1454a],it is preciselythisconsistencyandunitythat areunderminedogetherwith thestatusof the sovereign.Nothing, however, demonstrates he distanceof the Trauerspiel rom the Aristoteliantheoryof tragedymore than he fact that t is preciselythisdisarticulation f unity-of thesovereign and hence of the action-that contributesto the peculiar theatricalityofbaroquedrama,as the following passage suggests:Just as compositions with restful lighting are virtually unknown in manneristpainting, so it is that the theatricalfigures of this epoch always appear in theharsh light of their changing resolve. What is conspicuous about them is not somuch the sovereignty evident in the stoic turns ofphrase, as the sheer arbitrari-



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ness ofa constantly hiftingemotionalstorm n whichthefiguresofLohensteinespecially sway about like torn andflapping banners. And theyalso bear acertain resemblance o the igures of El Greco in the smallnessof theirheads,if we understand this in a metaphoricalsense. For their actions are notdeterminedby thought,butby changingphysical impulses. [71;my emphasis]

Fromthis account t is clear thatthedilemmaof the sovereignin baroquedrama s alsoand aboveall that of the subjectas such: it is no longerdeterminedby its "head"-thatis, byitsconsciousness, ts intentions-but byforces thatare ndependent f it, thatbuffetand driveit from one extremeto another.A powerfuldynamic s thusunleashed,which,however,does not really go anywhere. Instead, ike "torn lags"whippedaboutin thewind,thebaroque iguresaredrivenby "tempestuous ffects"over whichtheyhave littlecontrol. What results s a rhythmof abruptandunpredictable hangesandshifts,and itis this rhythm hatdetermines he structure f the "plot" n the Trauerspiel.Moreover,since neitherplotnor characters sufficientlyunified or consistentto providea compre-hensive frameworkfor the play, this frameworkmust be sought elsewhere. Thatelsewhereturnsout to be the theater tself, as stage,as artifice,and as apparatus.This isimplicit n thepassagecited,which describeshow the "theatricaliguresof theageappearimgrellenScheine"-in the"harsh ight"-"of theirchangingresolve." Thedismantlingof decision, of a definitive,ultimate,andabsoluteact, gives way to a differentkindofacting: thatwhichtakesplaceon a stagelit upby spotlights; hephrasegrellenScheine,which recursfrequently n Benjamin'stext,recalls theScheinwerferof the theater.Inthetheatrical pacethusopenedbythedislocationof theactionandof thesubject,andin the confusion thatresults,thesovereigntyof thetyrant s replacedby themasteryof the plotter: "In contrast o the spasmodicchronologicalprogressionof tragedy,theTrauerspiel akes place in a spatialcontinuum,which one might describeas choreo-graphic. The organizerof its plot, the precursorof the choreographer,s the intriguer"[95]. The discontinuoustemporalityof decision, here associated with tragedy, isreplaced-that is, resituated-within a "spatialcontinuum"n whichexceptional nter-ruptionsareno longerpossiblebecausetheyhave become therule. Theregularnatureofthe interruption aradoxicallybecomesprogrammable, nd theprogrammer, r "chore-ographer,"s the"intriguer." heetymologyof the word n-trigare, ocon-foundandcon-fuse, is all the moreappropriaten a worldin which the clear-cutseparationof the de-cision is no longereffective. The intrigueor plot is thusdesignatedby Benjaminas aVerwicklung:an imbroglioor entanglement,but one that is organized. The baroquedrama hus dependsupona plot that is based not upona sovereignsubjectbutuponamasterfulorganizerorpromoter Veranstalter).It is preciselythecalculatingnatureofthismastery hat ascinates hebaroqueaudience:"Hiscorrupt alculationsawaken n thespectator f theHaupt-undStaatsaktionen llthe more nterestbecause he latterdoesnotrecognizeheresimplyamasteryof theworkingsof politics,butananthropological, venaphysiologicalknowledgewhich fascinatedhim"[95]. Theamoral alculatednessof theplottercontrastsradicallywith the attitudesof both the tyrantand the martyr.Foronlytheintriguer onfrontsa stateof theworld nwhichtheexceptionhas becometherule,andtherefore n which universalprinciples-and be it the principleof the interruption fprinciplequa decision-can no longerbe countedupon. The intriguer xploitsmecha-nismsof humanactionas the resultof forcesover which therecan be noultimatecontrol,but whichcan thereforebe made the subjectof probabilistic alculations.Thecontingencyof such calculations urns he"intrigue"ntosomethingcloserto agameorto theexhibitionof a certainvirtuosity,rather han o theexpressionof acosmicstrategyfor the good of all or of the state. Thus, not only the subjectmatterof theTrauerspiel-historical action-changes, but its dramaturgical tructureas well. Theplot is replacedby plotting: "Baroquedramaknowsno otherhistoricalactivitythanthe

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corrupt nergyof schemers" 88]. At the sametime, however, the structureof the plotchanges:Itdiffers rom the so-called antitheticalplot ofclassical tragedybyvirtueof theisolationofmotives,scenes,andtypes.... thebaroquedramaalso likes to showtheantagonists ncrudely lluminated eparatescenes[in grellesLichtgestellteSonderszenen],where motivationusuallyplays an insignificantpart. It couldbe said thatbaroque intriguetakesplace likea change of scenery,so minimalis the illusionisticintention. [75]

The utter indifference to psychological or moral "motivation,"combined with theencapsulationof conflicting figures through"ingrelles Licht gestellte Sonderszenen"precludesany sortof resolution n a totalizingdenouement. What nterests hebaroqueis not so much the dramatic resolution of conflict as its representation hrough amechanismthatacknowledgesand even flaunts its own theatricality.The buffetingofindividual igures n the winds of passion inds itsadequate epresentationn astaging hatdemonstratests own artifices.The privilegedsite and scene of such emphaticallytheatricalartifice is the court:"The mageof the setting,or,moreprecisely,of thecourt,becomes thekey to historicalunderstanding.For the court s the settingparexcellence.... IntheTrauerspiel he courtrepresentshe timeless naturaldecorof thehistoricalprocess" 92]. The"eternal, atural"characterattributedo the court in the baroquetestifies to the situationof a historicalperiod n which "ChristendomrEurope s divided ntoanumberof Christianprovinceswhose historicalactionsno longerclaim to be integratedn theprocessof redemption"[78]. Thus, with the eschatologicalperspectiveblocked, the irreduciblepartialityandprovincialityof the local courtrenders t theexemplarysite andstageof a movementofhistorythat has been reducedto conspiratorial lotting,the aim of whichis the destabi-lizationrather han hetakingof power. This is whythe structural ynamicsof theplottercauses him to resemble comic figuresor the fool rather han the princewho would besovereign. If theplotter s most athome in the court, t is only insofar as he knows thatthere can be "noproperhome [keineeigene Heimstdtte]"orhim [96].Inthis sense theplottercanbe saidto be theExponentdes Schauplatzesas thatplaceinwhichnoone,including hesovereign,can be at home. Unlike thesovereign,however,theplotter"knows" hat he court s a theaterof actionsthatcan neverbe totalizedbutonlystaged with moreor less virtuosity. By thusheeding only the rulesof thegamewithoutseekingtoreachultimateprinciples, heplotterbeginswherethesovereignhopesto end:withthe ex-clusionof thestateof exception. The stateof exception s excludedas theater.Whatcharacterizes his theaters that nit,nothingcan everauthenticallyakeplace,leastof all the stage itself.

In theEuropeanTrauerspiel s a whole... thestage is also notstrictlyfixable,not an actualplace, but it too is dialectically split. Bound to the court, it yetremains a travellingtheatre;metaphorically ts boardsrepresent he earth asthesetting createdfor the enactmentof history;itfollows the courtfromtownto town. [119]If the stage of baroquetheater is "dialecticallysplit" and thus "inauthentic,"whatdistinguishesthe Germanbaroque s the impossibilityof a dialecticalAufhebung hatwouldconstitutea totality: "The ntriguealonewould have been able to bringabout hatallegorical totality of scenic organization,thanks to which one of the images of thesequence stands out, in the image of the apotheosis, as different in kind, and givesmourningatone andthe same timethecueforitsentryandexit"[235]. But it is precisely



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theinability o reachsuch anapotheosis hatcharacterizes he Germanbaroque heaterncontrast o its Spanishcounterpartn Calder6n.Andyet if this limits its aestheticvalue,it is also whatgives it its distinctivehistorical-philosophical ignificance.Thetheaterof theGermanbaroquedivergesbothfromclassicaltragedyand romtheSchmittiantheoryof sovereigntyin that it leaves no place for anythingresemblingadefinitivedecision. Rather,t is preciselythe absenceof suchaverdictandthepossibilityof unendingappealand revision that marks he Trauerspiel:The legal analogy may reasonablybe taken urther and, in the sense of themedieval iteratureoflitigation,onemayspeakofthetrialofthecreaturewhosecharge against death-or whoever else was indicated n it-is onlypartiallydealt with and is adjournedat the end of the Trauerspiel. Its resumption simplicitin theTrauerspiel.... [137; my emphasis]

Nothingcould demonstratemoreclearlythe distance between this eternalrevisionandSchmitt' notion of an absoluteandabsolutelydefinitive andultimatedecision. Here,asthere, the questionof decision, of its power and its status,is always tied to a certaindetermination f space. Whereas n Benjamin,however,this determinations revealedto be the errant tageof an inauthenticandunlocalizableplace,for Schmittdecision canbe situated n terms of an unequivocalpoint:The legal force of a decision is different rom the result of substantiation.Ascriptionis not achieved with the aid of a norm; it happensthe other wayaround.Apoint ofascription irstdetermineswhatanorm s andwhatnormativerightness s. Apointof ascriptioncannotbederivedfroma norm,onlya qualityof content. [32; my emphasis]

If Schmitt asserts here that the norm presupposes a "point of ascription," aZurechnungspunktupon which one must count, but which the norm as such cannotprovide, he unmistakablemplication s thatdecision alone doesprovidesuchapoint. Inhis reinscriptionof Schmitt,Benjamin akesexceptionto thispoint, therebyrevealing tto be a stageuponwhich anythingcan happen,even a miracle,butnothingdefinitivelydecided.

WORKS CITEDBenjamin,Walter. Briefe [Correspondence].Ed. Gershom Scholem and TheodorW.Adomo. Frankfurt m Main:Suhrkamp,1966.. TheOriginof GermanTragicDrama. Trans.JohnOsborne.London:New LeftBooks, 1977. Translationsoccasionallymodified.GesammelteSchriften.Frankfurt m Main:Suhrkamp,1980. [GS]. Ursprungdes deutschenTrauerspiels.Frankfurt m Main:Suhrkamp,1963.Garcia-Dtittmann, lexander.Das Geddchtnisdes Denkens: Versuch iberAdornound

Heidegger. Frankfurt m Main:Suhrkamp,1991.Schmitt,Carl. Political Theology:FourChapterson theConceptof Sovereignty.Trans.GeorgeSchwab. Cambridge,MA: MITP, 1985. Translations ccasionallymodi-fied.Politische Theologie, Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souverinitit. Berlin:Duncker& Humblot,1985.

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