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    Rushing Attacks and Defensein Wireless Ad Hoc Network Routing Protocols

     Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, and David B !ohnson

    Presenter" #andee$ %a$akshiC# &'()-AC*# + Proect &

    *nstructor" Prof es.ek / ilien, 0all 1))&

    De$art2ent of Co2$uter #cienceWestern %ichigan 3niversit4

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    5utline

    5n-De2and Routing Protocols

    Rushing Attacks

    Rushing Attack Prevention 6valuation

    Conclusion

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    *ntroduction

    Wireless Ad hoc network  a collection of 2o7ile co2$uters 8or nodes9 coo$erate

    to forward $ackets

    d4na2ic to$olog4

    self-organi.ation

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    *ntroduction 8cont9

    Routing $rotocol /rans$ort #u7s4ste2

     Neigh7or #tate %aintenance

    Data7ase %aintenance

    Ad hoc network routing $rotocols Run in untrusted environ2ents

    Provide resilience against 2isconfigured nodes

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    Routing Protocols

    Proactive routing $rotocol /a7le-Driven routing $rotocol

    Reactive routing $rotocol #ource-*nitiated 5n-De2and routing $rotocol

    0orward R53/6 R6:36#/ $ackets when needed

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    Co2$arison 7etween /a7le-Driven

    Routing and 5n-De2and Routing

    Table-driven Routing On-demand Routing

    Availability of

    Routing information

    *22ediatel4 fro2

    Route /a7leAfter Route discover4

    Route updatesPeriodic advertise2ents When re;uested

    Routing overhead Pro$ortional to si.e ofnetwork regardless of

    network traffic

    Pro$ortional to nu27er of

    co22unication nodes andincrease with increased node

    2o7ilit4

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    5n-De2and Route Discover4

     A

     A

     A-B

     A-C 

     A-C-E 

     A-C-E 

     A-C-E 

     A-B-D

     A-B-D-G  A-B-D-G 

     A-B-D-G 

    B

    G

    D

    E

    C

     A

    F

    H

    source

    Destination

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    /he Rushing Attack 

    5n-de2and routing $rotocols use du$licate su$$ression at each node" first

    R53/6 R6:36#/ that reaches a node is considered legiti2ate, ne

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    Wh4 is the Attack Possi7le=

    An attacker can send faster, 74 avoiding the dela4s that are $art of the

    design of 7oth routing and %AC 8>)1((79 $rotocols

    Why Delay in ROUTE REQUET for!arding "

    #n a $A% protocols using time division On-demand protocols generally specify a delay

    Remove these delays at both the $A% and routing layers"

     - more collisions

    Attacker can send at a higher wireless trans2ission level

    An attacker can take advantage of a wor2hole, to create flood rushing

    attacks, use the wor2hole to rush the $ackets ahead of the nor2al flow

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    Rushing Attack 6

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    Rushing Attack 6

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    Rushing Attack 6

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    Rushing Attack 6

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    Rushing Attack 6

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    Rushing Attack 6

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    Wor2hole Attack 

    Attacker records a $acket at one location in the network,tunnels the $acket to another location

    Packets may 7e re$la4ed fro2 the far end of the wor2hole

    Puts attacker in a $owerful $osition *t@s a re$la4 so authentication does not hel$

    A$$lications of the Wor2hole Attack 

    Denial-of-#ervice Routing Disru$tions

    3nauthori.ed Access

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    Routing /ree

     Ad#%ted &ro' C(ris )#rlo&

    #*d D#+id ,#-*er.s

    ,S/A slides

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    Wor2hole Attack 

    /unnel $ackets received inone $lace of the networkand re$la4 the2 in another

     $lace

    /he attacker can have noke4 2aterial All it re;uiresis two transceivers and onehigh ;ualit4 out-of-7andchannel

     Ad#%ted &ro' C(ris )#rlo&

    #*d D#+id ,#-*er.s

    ,S/A slides

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    Disru$ted Routing

    %ost $ackets will 7e routedto the wor2hole

    /he wor2hole can dro$ $ackets or selectivel4forward $ackets to avoiddetection

     Ad#%ted &ro' C(ris )#rlo&

    #*d D#+id ,#-*er.s

    ,S/A slides

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     Network Assu2$tion

     Network links are 7idirectional *gnore unidirectional links

    *gnore a22ing attack 

    Re;uires additional hardware 6asier to detect

    Disregard attacks on %AC $rotocol %AC 8%ediu2 Access Control9 A5HA and #lotted A5HA

    %ediu2-si.ed )~ )) nodes Clustering

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    #ecurit4 Assu2$tions And e4 #etu$

    F#st #ut(e*tic#tio* %rotocol

    *st#*tly+eri&i#le ro#dc#st #ut(e*tic#tio*

    )eys setu% Bro#dc#st #ut(e*tic#tio* $ey #re distriuted i*

    #d+#*ce

    oer&ul #tt#c$er 

    Coordi*#ted #tt#c$er 

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    #ecure Routing Re;uire2ents And Protocol

    #ecure Neigh7or Detection

    #ecure route delegation

    Rando2i.ed R53/6 R6:36#/ forwarding

    Si*-leHo%

    G#t(er n

    EESS:

    #*do'ly

    C(oose 1

    Secure /ei-(or 

    Detectio*

    ;ri-i*#l outi*-

    rotocol

    yes

    *o

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    #ecure Neigh7or Detection

     Neigh7or Detection /wo nodes detect a 7idirectional link 7etween the2selves

    *n Proactive routing $rotocol

    *n Reactive routing $rotocol

    Re;uire2ents #ender-receiver can check that the other is within the nor2al

    co22unication range

     Node needs to hear Neigh7or Re;uest

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    #ecure Neigh7or Detection

    /hree-round 2utual authentication $rotocol

    S  7roadcasts a Neigh7or Re;uest $acket

     R return a Neigh7or Re$l4 $acket to #

    # sends a Neigh7or erification to B

    #hort dela4 ti2ing Within a 2a

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     Notation

    { }

    ( )

    M  A

    M  A

    M B A

     AH M B A

     A

     A

    B A

    ∑∗→

      ←

     si-*#tureits4it('ess#-ero#dc#sts*odet(#t'e#*s

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    #ecure Neigh7or Detection 8cont9

    { }

    ( )( )

    { }

    ( )( )

    ( )( )

    3

    3

    2

    2

    1

    1

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    #ecure Neigh7or Detection 8cont9

    *ntegration with an 5n-De2and Protocol A* " R6:36#/ Neigh7or Re;uestA

    BA" Neigh7or Re$l4BA  Neigh7or Re;uestB

    AB" Neigh7or erificationAB  Neigh7or Re$l4AB

    B* " R6:36#/ Neigh7or erificationAB Neigh7or erificationBA

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    #ecure Route Delegation 

    Delegate neigh7or to forward the Route Re;uest $acket

    /o verif4 that both nodes of each adacent node $air indeed

     7elieves to 7e a neigh7or 

    A received R53/6 R6:36#/#R id 

    %A EFRoute Delegation,A,B,#,R,idG

    %A E#ign8H8%A99

     A B:

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    Rando2i.ed %essage 0orwarding 

    /o 2ini2i.e the chance that a rushing adversar4 can do2inate all returnedroutes

    Rando2i.ed 2essage forwarding Collects a nu27er of R6:36#/s #elects a R6:36#/ at rando2 to forward

    /he nu27er of R6:36#/ $ackets collected /he 2ore the 7etter=

    /he algorith2 74 which ti2eouts are chosen /o$olog4 closer  Ieogra$hicall4 closer  Rando2l4

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    #ecure Route Discover4 

    /o secure an4 $rotocol using an on-de2and Route Discover4 $rotocol

    #ecure Neigh7or Detection

    #ecure route delegation

    Rando2i.ed R53/6 R6:36#/ forwarding

    /o li2it the nu27er of R6:36#/s that traverse an attacker 

    /he nodes that don@t have n distinct $ath to the source of the R6:36#/

    Choose a rando2 ti2eout

    /wo addition securit4 o$ti2i.ations

    6ach R6:36#/ signed

    3se location infor2ation

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    6valuation

    #i2ulation 6valuation 3nderl4ing $rotocol" Adriane

    H5R# as 7roadcast signature

    ()) nodes

    ())) 2 < ())) 2

    Rando2 wa4$oint 2odel

    Pause /i2e" ), J), &), (1), J)), &)), '))

    Workload" flows K $ackets $er second

    &K-74te $ackets

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    Packet Deliver4 Ratio

    L of 5ffered traffic D#R 

    ''>L to ())L

    Ariadne 'L to ())L

    RAP

    M&L to KMML

    %AC-la4er congestion

    Slide courtesy !2"

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    %edian atenc4

    D#R and Ariadne .ero 2ean latenc4

    RAP

    Congestion Waiting to forward a

    R6:36#/

    Slide courtesy !2"

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    5verall

    6valuation

    RAP adds significant costs

    Higher costs due to congestion at lower 7it rates

    RAP is designed to 7e used onl4 when necessar4 5nl4 when underl4ing $rotocol is una7le to discover a

    working route

    #ecurit4 Anal4sis

    Attacker needs to $ro$agate R53/6 R6:36#/ fro2 eachR53/6 D*#C56RY fro2 2an4 locations

    Wouldn@t do it if the4 considered due to intrusion detection

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    Conclusion

    Descri7ed the Rushing attack 

    Presented RAP 8Rushing Attack Prevention9

    RAP incurs higher overhead, 7ut it can find usa7le

    routes when other $rotocols cannot work 

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    References

    )*+ ,ih-%hun u(Adrian .errig( David &/0ohnson (

    1Rushing attac's and defense in !ireless ad hoc net!or' routing protocols2( 

    Proceedings of the 1))J AC% worksho$ on Wireless securit4, #an Diego, CA,

    3#A Availa7le at"htt$"wwwecec2ueduOadrian$roectssecure-routingwise1))J$df 

    )3+ Rushing Attac's and Defense in Wireless Ad oc 4et!or' Routing

    .rotocols ,ih-%hun u( Adrian .errig( and David &/ 0ohnson

    .resenter5 Tammy 4guyen Availa7le at"

    htt$"wwweecswsueduOs2ediditeaching#$ring)rushing($$t

    http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/secure-routing/wise2003.pdfhttp://www.eecs.wsu.edu/~smedidi/teaching/Spring05/rushing1.ppthttp://www.eecs.wsu.edu/~smedidi/teaching/Spring05/rushing1.ppthttp://www.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/secure-routing/wise2003.pdf