Un estudio del sector energetico puede iniciarse con la Presidencia de Getulio Vargas hasta hoy.  Para la primera lectura, entre on line a la Revista Digital de la Escuela de Estudios para Graduados de la UB, "Politica y Diplomacia" y va a encontrar un paper mio del año 2006 "Brasil como actor global". En el paper encontrara otras referencias bibliograficas utiles. Tambien consulte los newletters (libres) de la FIESP de Brasil.

Energy – production, promise exports? Itaipu/ParaguayMilitary – beef up against us, spending, unsc, South American Defense CouncilMercosur – presidency?Agriculture - ?Trade partners - ?Technology

Brazil boosts military spending more than 50 percentFrom correspondents in Brasilia

October 29, 2007 11:56am

http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,22665045-23109,00.html

BRAZIL has announced it plans to boost its military spending by more than 50 percent in 2008, to around US$5 billion ($5.4 billion), and draw up a new defense plan, but told its neighbors they should not worry.

"Brazil has well established, peaceful relations with all South American nations ... one of our political priorities is economic and structural integration of the region ... (and in 2008) we'll also be strenghtening our military links," Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, said in a public speech.

Brazil, he added, cannot "neglect its defense. Therefore, we will increase our budget outlays and investment in the army, navy and air force by more than 50 percent".

He also said Brazil "is elaborating a national stretegy defense plan that will determine each military branch's mission and the equipment it needs for its activities".

Mr Jobin said the military equipment envisioned in the plan includes new fighter jets.

Brazil in 2002 mothballed military programs to buy 12 fighther jets worth around four billion dollar, and build a nuclear submarine over 10 years for a total cost of 1.3 billion dollars. These programs could be relaunched in 2008.

According to official figures made public on Sunday, Brazil has requested in its 2008 budget proposal to Congress some $5 billion for its military forces, with the possibility of raising it to $5.64 billion.

In 2007, Brazil's military budget was around $3.5 billion.

Brazil to strengthen marine forces to uphold sovereignty www.chinaview.cn 2008-08-11 14:53:26   Print

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/11/content_9166756.htm

    BRASILIA, Aug. 11 (Xinhua) -- Brazil decided to strengthen its marine forces in an effort to safeguard its sovereignty in response to the American presence in the region, local media reported on Monday.

    The plan was recently revealed by the minister of the Secretary of Strategic Subjects of Brazil, Roberto Mangabeira Unger.

    Not only will the marines receive reinforcement, but the armed forces of Brazil in general will be fortified, local media quoted the Brazilian minister as saying.

    "The presence of the United States Marines in international water throughout the Southern Cone only reiterates the importance for Brazil to take better care of its own defense shield," Unger said.

    "One of the main reasons to reform the concept of our national defense is to be able to count on our own defense shield," the minister said.

    "We cannot be subject to any type of intimidation if Brazil is to play a bigger role in international politics," the minister added.

    The cabinet of Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is currently discussing details of the reorganization of the armed forces.

    The Brazilian armed forces decided to increase their numbers and capability in a bid to better patrol their coastline.

    Brazil has discovered a significant oil reserve off its coast recently.

IntroductionBrazil's Armed Forces (Forças Armadas) have played an active political role ever since they helped overthrow the empire in 1889. From 1930 until 1964, they asserted their moderating power (poder moderador) and intervened frequently in the political process. In 1964 the military ousted the civilian president and governed for twenty-one years.

A national security doctrine, with two major elements, guided the military regime. The first element was a broad definition of security that included not only defense against external aggression but also internal defense against insurgency and communism. By using repressive measures, the military countered domestic insurgencies successfully from 1967 through 1973. The second element was economic development. Under the military, the role of the state in the economy grew considerably with the expansion of Brazil's industrial base. High economic growth rates of the 1968-73 period helped to legitimize military government.

The armed forces returned to the barracks in March 1985. Although they have continued to assert themselves politically, their political influence has been reduced substantially because of several factors. First, as Brazil has sought to consolidate its democracy, the National Congress (Congresso Nacional; hereafter, Congress) and civilian ministries have become more involved and influential in broadly defined security issues . Second, the military was forced to compete with civilian ministries for extremely limited resources and was unable to halt a continual decline in its share of government expenditures. And third, although the 1988 constitution preserves the external and internal roles of the armed forces, it places the military under presidential authority. Thus, the new charter changed the manner in which the military could exercise its moderating power.

Furthermore, the armed forces were unable to promote and fund pet projects effectively in the nuclear, space, missile, and armament arenas. President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92) exposed Brazil's secret, military-sponsored nuclear bomb program, the so-called Parallel Program (Programa Paralelo). As a result, several of Brazil's nuclear programs were placed under international monitoring. Collor also placed the Brazilian space program controlled by the Brazilian Air Force (Força Aérea Brasileira--FAB) under civilian oversight. In addition, the Brazilian government announced in early 1994 that Brazil would seek to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (see Glossary), and succeeded in doing so in October 1995. Brazil's armaments industry, supported by the military regime, collapsed without any major intervention by the state to shore it up.

Geopolitical changes and a shifting civil-military balance within Brazil recast the country's security interests. One geopolitical change in the early 1990s included a transformation from bipolarity toward multipolarity in the international system. Another change involved greater integration between Brazil and Argentina. Political and economic uncertainties in 1995 also influenced the Brazilian military's perceptions of the country's national security.

Since the 1950s, Brazil's rate of military expenditures has been among the lowest in the world. In 1993 this figure dropped to only 1.1 percent of the gross national product. This trend reflects the low level of external threat. Brazil is by far the largest country in Latin America and enjoys generally good relations with its ten South American neighbors. There is no threat to Brazil's internal security in the narrow sense of insurgencies. The politically inspired terrorism of the late 1960s and 1970s is nonexistent.

Despite the low level of defense expenditures, Brazil's armed forces are the largest in Latin America, with 314,000 active-duty troops and officers in 1997, including 132,000 conscripts. The Brazilian Army (Exército Brasileiro), the largest service (accounting for 66 percent of the total armed forces), has 200,000 active-duty troops and officers. The Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil), totals 64,700 members, and the Brazilian Air Force (FAB), 50,000.

With no serious external or internal threats, the armed forces are searching for a new role. They are expanding their presence in the Amazon under the Northern Corridor (Calha Norte) program. In 1994 Brazilian troops joined United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in five countries. The Brazilian military, especially the army, has become more involved in civic-action programs, education, health care, and constructing roads, bridges, and railroads across the nation.

Debate in Brazil concerning national security policy has been practically nonexistent. Political dialogue is limited to discussion of the revisions of the constitution, where only modest changes in the role of the armed forces are expected. None of the political parties, except the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores--PT), has articulated a position on defense matters. Although some civilians are experts in defense matters, their influence is negligible. There is no tradition of congressional oversight of the military, and the defense-related bureaucracy remains minuscule. Civil society continues to show a complete lack of interest in issues related to defense. The modest attempts by the armed forces to reevaluate their role, structure, doctrine, strategy, and tactics are conducted in a vacuum. Some analysts believe that the creation of a ministry of defense is a necessary condition for establishing civilian control of the military.

BUDGET

Data on Brazil's military expenditures need to be approached with caution. Their accuracy is complicated by high rates of inflation since the late 1950s, by secrecy surrounding the funding of various military-related projects, by personnel costs that are sometimes hidden in other budgets, and by the common practice of mixing the accounts of the national treasury, the Central Bank, and the Bank of Brazil (Banco do Brasil--BB). However, even if the figures generally attributed to Brazilian defense expenditures understate their true value, there is consensus that Brazil is among the countries with the lowest levels of military expenditures, and that those levels have declined in the last three decades. For example, the rate of military expenditures in relation to GDP has dropped steadily: in the 1960s, it averaged 2 percent; in the 1970s, 1.5 percent; in the 1980s, 1 percent; and in the early 1990s, less than 0.5 percent. In 1993 that rate reached a mere 0.3

percent. Brazil in 1993 ranked 133d out of 166 countries in military expenditures as a share of government expenditures. Within South America, only Guyana and Suriname ranked lower.

Political scientist Paulo S. Wrobel notes that these data point to a correlation between the type of government (military or civilian) and military expenditures. That correlation is made even clearer if one examines military expenditures as a share of the federal budget: in 1970 that figure was 20 percent; in 1993 it was only 1.3 percent. The 1993 figure was the lowest since independence in 1822. The highest figure was in 1864 and 1865, at the early stages of the Paraguayan War, when defense expenditures accounted for 49.6 percent of all government expenditures.

Brazil's low level of military expenditures can be attributed to the perception that the country has few external threats and to Brazil's large size in relation to its neighbors. In terms of threats, the deepening integration process with Argentina since the early 1980s virtually has removed the only potential external threat to Brazil.

Despite its low rate of military expenditures, in absolute terms Brazil is by far the largest military power in Latin America. In 1993 it ranked nineteenth among 166 countries in total military expenditures; the next highest in Latin America was Argentina, which ranked twenty-fourth. From 1988 through 1993, Brazil's military expenditures totaled US$43.12 billion (in constant 1993 dollars; an average of US$7.19 billion per year). They totaled US$10.6 billion in 1996. The defense budget in 1997 totaled US$12 billion.

The armed forces have had some minor triumphs on budget issues. In early 1994, the Franco administration announced that it would cut US$22 billion in the federal budget, dividing the cuts equally across ministries. The military ministers reacted quickly, going directly to the president to criticize the proposed reductions. They succeeded in lowering the proposed military cuts by at least US$300 million.

In late 1993 and early 1994, the armed forces were more vocal in their criticism of the low levels of military expenditures. They pointed out, for example, that the air force work week began on Monday afternoon, after lunch, and ended at Friday noon, before lunch, in order to save on the cost of feeding the officers and troops.

Military salaries were raised substantially in mid-1991 and in April 1992. According to one report, before the second raise, a four-star general with forty years in the service was earning about US$1,700 a month, and many soldiers earned only a few hundred dollars a month. In contrast, a congressional deputy earned more than US$6,000 a month.

The armed forces have been trying to protect their priority projects: the army--Calha Norte and the "defense" of the Amazon ; the navy--its nuclear-powered submarine; the air force--its AMX subsonic fighter. Each project has had special funding from the federal government, aside from the general military budget. Additional funding has sometimes been available through various government agencies.

In essence, the armed forces are being squeezed in an unintended fashion by a neoliberal economic model that stresses cuts in government expenditures and privatizations. Not only has their budget been cut, but they no longer have the ready-made sinecure of state enterprises in which to work at the time of retirement. Indeed, under the military regime, state enterprises became bloated with retired military officers. A 1983 study by political scientist Walder de Góes identified more than 8,000 retired officers who were in positions within the state enterprises and federal bureaucracy.

What the defense spending levels suggest is that the military is having to compete with virtually every civilian ministry and, in many cases, is coming up short. Moreover, even though the military is still the most influential player on some issues, the number of civilian actors involved in the decision-making process has increased. In many cases, the military has been displaced by civilians. The Ministry of Finance has become the dominant actor on budget issues. Although the armed forces can try to appeal directly to the president, such an approach is not guaranteed to succeed. Also, the armed forces must deal directly with a Congress responsible for approving the budget.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/brazil/budget.htm

S. American defense spending not arms race: BrazilMon Apr 14, 2008 11:27pm EDT

By Frank Jack Daniel

CARACAS (Reuters) - South America has a right to beef up its armed forces but is not in an arms race, Brazil's defense minister said on Monday, as the region raises military spending on the back of high oil, food and metals prices.

Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, who is in Venezuela to discuss a planned South American security council, said the region needed military power to strengthen its presence on the world stage.

"There is no arms race in South America," he said after meeting with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, an antagonist of the United States who is using oil dollars to modernize his armed forces.

"It is important that countries have weapons. The projection of power by South America depends on its dissuasive powers of defense," said Jobim.

Brazil, Chile and Venezuela are enjoying a boom thanks to high commodities prices even as Haiti and some countries in Central America struggle to pay record prices for food and energy.

OPEC member Venezuela has bought Russian jets and assault rifles with its oil dollars. Agricultural powerhouse Brazil is looking to buy a nuclear submarine as it revitalizes its large but outdated military.

Some security analysts fear bigger arms budgets and political differences between Venezuela and Colombia could lead to a destabilizing build-up of weapons in the region.

Brazil and Venezuela are leftist allies who want to reduce Latin America's reliance on the United States, but who also vie for regional influence. 

Brazil aspires to a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. It proposed a regional defense group in the wake of a crisis last month that took Andean countries close to war.

Jobim said the group is not intended to have operational capacity but would coordinate defense policy in the region. He said the body, which excludes the United States, will be up and running by the end of the year.

"This is a South American council and we have no obligation to ask for a license from the United States to do it," he said during the visit to Caracas.

The resolution to a crisis, sparked last month when Colombia bombed a rebel camp in Ecuador, was reached without U.S. involvement and was seen as a milestone for Latin American diplomacy.

Chavez had escalated the crisis by ordering tank battalions

to Venezuela's border with Colombia.

The socialist former paratrooper increased military spending to $1.92 billion in 2006, up 67 percent from 2003, according to Sweden's SIPRI group, which tracks arms expenditures worldwide.

Venezuela, which has a fleet of U.S.-built F16 fighter jets in disrepair because Washington will not sell Chavez spare parts, has bought 24 Russian-made Sukhoi jets.

Brazil's military spending hit an estimated $13.5 billion in 2006, up 13 percent compared to 2003

Washington ally Colombia, which is fighting a civil war against Marxist rebels, has a bigger arms budget as a proportion of GDP than its neighbors and a modern fighting force supported by the United States.

Jobim, who is due to travel to Guayana and Suriname this week said he would also visit countries from Argentina to Colombia to drum up support for the regional defense body.

Building Brazil's Defense November 6, 2007

On the heels of an announcement that President Lula Inácio da Silva’s administration intends to hike its military budget in 2008, Brazil unveiled plans to enhance its defense strategy. The proposal includes the purchase of 36 fighter jets, most likely from a European manufacturer, for $2.2 billion dollars, along with a transfer of military technology. 

In late October, Brasilia revealed plans to increase defense spending by roughly 50 percent to more than $5 billion.  The move followed the Lula administration’s creation of a National Defense Strategy Group with the goal of creating a defense development plan and driving up Brazilian exports of military equipment. Speaking at a ceremony to inaugurate the group, Lula drummed up support for the plan,

emphasizing not only that Brazil’s armed forces must recuperate power but also build knowledge of military technology.

Yet Brazil’s decision to increase its defense budget to the highest level since the end of military rule has raised eyebrows at the possibility of an arms race in the region. Neighboring Venezuela has drawn international attention with its purchase of $3 billion worth of Russian military equipment in 2006 as well as a 2007 deal to buy five submarines from Moscow. Brazilian ex-President Jose Sarney warned in Época of an arms buildup in South America, saying Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s military spending indicates intention to continue investing in weapons of war. Sarney will speak at AS/COA’s 7th Annual Latin America Conference on November 30.

However, Brazil’s Defense Minister Nelson Jobim stressed that Brazil has no plans to embark on an arms race and has good relations with the ten countries it borders. Law professor and Minister of Long-term Planning Roberto Mangabeira Unger pointed out that an improved defense strategy would serve as a cornerstone to secure Brazil’s borders from drug and weapons smuggling.

http://as.americas-society.org/article.php?id=723

France eyeing military technology transfers with Brazil

A military march in Brasilia. Brazil plans to boost its defense budget by 50 percent. (AP Photo/Eraldo Peres)

Tue Feb 12, 2008

SAINT-GEORGES DE L'OYAPOCK (Guyana), Feb 12 (Reuters) - France is considering making military technology transfers to Brazil, notably for the Rafale fighter jet, President Nicolas Sarkozy said on Tuesday.

"I told the Brazilian president that on the issue of submarines, we were ready that one of the Scorpene submarine be made in Brazil, that regarding fighter jets and helicopters, we were ready to organise technology transfers so that helicopters and jet fighters, I am notably thinking about the Rafale, be made in Brazil," Sarkozy told a joint news conference.

(Reporting by Emmanuel Jarry )

http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNews/idUSPAC00924320080212

France, Brazil forge military pact

France Ready to Transfer Technology for Fighter Planes, Submarine to Brazil

NATHALIE SCHUCKAP News http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=43751

Feb 12, 2008 22:53 EST

France is ready to transfer technology to Brazil so that an attack submarine, helicopters and the Rafale fighter plane can be built there, French President Nicolas Sarkozy said Tuesday.

<br/>

Sarkozy met with his Brazilian counterpart, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, in Saint-Georges de Oyapock, on the border with Brazil on the second and last day of his trip to France's largest overseas territory.

Sarkozy also said France was willing to transfer technology to allow a French attack submarine and fighter planes to be built in Brazil, but he stopped short of any nuclear technology transfer.

"I said to the Brazilian president that we were ready for the Scorpene submarine to be built in Brazil, that on the question of combat aircraft like helicopters and fighter planes — I'm thinking of the Rafale — to be built in Brazil," the French president said.

The Scorpene class submarine is a conventional attack submarine, but Brazilian officials have said they want the diesel-powered sub to serve as a model for the development of a Brazilian nuclear submarine that would be the first in Latin America.

The Rafale, used by the French Navy and French Air Force, has been a difficult sell, with its first potential foreign sale — 14 to Libya — in negotiations.

Sarkozy said he did not want transfers to be limited to the military domain.

"Our ambition is larger," Sarkozy said. "We want to act together, reflect together, build together." France and Brazil want to work together "in the service of peace."

Source: AP News

Colombia and Brazil enter into military pactSat Jul 19, 2008

http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN19334961

BOGOTA, July 19 (Reuters) - Colombia's U.S.-backed president entered into defense pact with the left-of-center government of Brazil on Saturday, marking a step in regional cooperation aimed at fighting cocaine-funded Marxist rebels.

Conservative President Alvaro Uribe announced the deal in Bogota during a visit by Brazilian leader Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

The accord stands in stark contrast with Colombia's diplomatic wrangling with the leftist governments of its other neighbors, Ecuador and Venezuela.

Uribe said Colombia will join the agreement only after receiving assurances that Marxist rebels fighting a 44-year-old insurgency in the country will never be allowed to join the pact, although other governments may participate in the future.

"Given this understanding, Colombia has decided to join the agreement," said Uribe, whose popularity has shot up to over 90 percent since the July 2 military rescue of rebel-held hostage Ingrid Betancourt, a French-Colombian politician.

Colombia's relations with it Ecuador and Venezuela have been troubled over the issue of security. Uribe accuses them of not doing enough to help Colombia fight the rebels while Ecuador and Venezuela have portrayed Uribe as a pawn of the United States.

"By inviting Colombia into the agreement, Lula, as a left-of-center leader, is showing that he understands something that Ecuador and Venezuela do not: that's what's best for Colombia is best for the region," said political commentator Ricardo Avila.

The agreement sets the stage for cooperation in military training, intelligence and weapons procurement. It aims to help both sides police the border between Brazil and Colombia, an area that has been known as a haven for drug traffickers. (Reporting by Luis Jaime Acosta, editing by Chris Wilson)

Brazil Signs Deal with France to Build Eurocopters03 July 2008

http://www.army-technology.com/news/news5493.html

Brazil signed an agreement on Monday with France for Eurocopter to build helicopters in the South American country, the government said, as part of a broader strategic defence alliance.

Brazil's military will purchase Super Cougar helicopters to be built by Helibras, Eurocopter's subsidiary in Brazil, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said during a signing ceremony at an existing Helibras plant in the central Minas Gerais state.

"This plant will produce the aircraft that will serve our Armed Forces and strategic sectors of our economy, such as oil exploration on off-shore platforms," Lula said.

Eurocopter will invest $300m-$400m to expand the plant, the company said in a statement.

Both sides have yet to negotiate the exact number of helicopters to be purchased by Brazil's military from Eurocopter, the helicopter subsidiary of EADS.

But Brazil's Defence Minister Nelson Jobim said Brazil intended to buy 50 Super Cougar models, the first of which would be delivered in 2010.

France's Defence Minister Herve Morin cancelled his planned visit to Brazil for the signing ceremony, a spokesman for the presidential palace in Brasilia said.

Under the agreement, France would transfer technology and help Brazil expand the export capacity of its aviation industry by aiding the assembly of helicopter components such as engines and electrical systems, the statement said.

"By 2010 we want the domestic content of our defense purchases to rise to 50% and by 2020 to 80%," said Lula.

Both countries are expected to also sign by December a strategic defense alliance including the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine in Brazil.

Brazil has embarked on a major programme to upgrade its armed forces, planning to buy and build equipment to defend offshore oil riches and a porous border in the Amazon jungle.

By Raymond Colitt, Reuters

Brasileiros apóiam viagem de avaliação de risco na Bolívia

As águas que sitiaram as cidades de Trinidad e Santa Ana de Yacumã no mês passado, deixando para trás mais de 19 mil desabrigados, agora seguem para o município de Guayaramerin, na divisa da Bolívia com o Brasil. Durante o vôo, é fácil perceber que a massa de água se desloca sobre o território boliviano, de sul ao norte do país, transformando rios em verdadeiros oceanos de água doce.

Esse foi o cenário encontrado pelo Contra-Almirante Rafael Bandeira Arze, do Comando Conjunto de Desastres Naturais da Bolívia, e pelo Coronel-Aviador Gilvan Chaves Coelho, chefe da missão de ajuda humanitária brasileira, em missão de avaliação de riscos realizada nesta semana (nos dias 27 e 28). Em

dois dias, a comitiva percorreu quase mil quilômetros em helicóptero do Exército Brasileiro, passando por cinco localidades que estão sob ameaça de inundações.

"A missão serviu para que o Comando Conjunto Boliviano avaliasse a situação dessas localidades e quais ações deverão ser implementadas nas próximas semanas”, disse o Coronel-Aviador Coelho, Chefe do Centro de Operações Correntes do Brasil na Bolívia, que reúne militares e aeronaves da Força Aérea e do Exército Brasileiro.

Segundo a Marinha Boliviana, a massa de água que provocou as inundações saiu de Cochabamba, abriu uma frente de 70 quilômetros de extensão sobre o país, atingiu Trinidad com 70 centímetros acima da enchente do ano passado e caminha para as áreas mais baixas do país. Até agora, são quase 80 mil os desabrigados pela inundação.

Em Puerto Siles, a água cerca um povoado e uma unidade da Marinha Boliviana. A população sente os efeitos da tragédia. “Temos registrado casos de doenças de pele e infecções típicas das condições em que vive a população”, explica o médico Remo Enrique Guzman Vargas, o único profissional de saúde do povoado. Nessa localidade, o médico da Força Aérea Brasileira deixou remédios do seu kit de salvamento e os militares do povoado receberam caixas de rações da Marinha Brasileira. A localidade já recebeu suprimentos por meio de apoio aéreo.

Em Exaltacion, perto de Trinidad, a população pediu ajuda para enviar suprimentos a comunidades isoladas, barracas para os refugiados e apoio para o resgate de moradores ribeirinhos. Na sede da prefeitura local, os brasileiros da comitiva foram aplaudidos durante reunião com o Comando Conjunto de Desastres Naturais. “Vamos agradecer aos brasileiros pela ajuda prestada ao povo boliviano”, disse o Almirante.

Em Guayaramerin, o nível da água tem subido dois centímetros por dia desde janeiro, segundo as autoridades da região. A cidade se prepara para a chegada da massa de água, prevista para ocorrer até o dia 15 de março. No ano passado, a inundação deixou mais de 1.100 famílias desabrigadas nas áreas

ribeirinhas.

Desde 28 de janeiro, os militares brasileiros transportaram mais de 135 toneladas de alimentos e remédios e resgataram mais de 2.000 pessoas na Bolívia. O suprimento entregue é suficiente para alimentar mais de 13 mil pessoas, mais da metade do número de desabrigados no Estado de Beni. Na Bolívia, a ajuda internacional chega por meio de balsas e com o apoio, principalmente, dos helicópteros militares.

Veja fotos e assista a imagens da operação de ajuda humanitária

Fonte: CECOMSAER

29/02/208 - AERONÁUTICA - Brasileiros apóiam viagem de avaliação de risco na Bolíviahttps://www.defesa.gov.br/imprensa/index.php?page=pesquisa_not&palavra=brasil&datain=07/07/2005&datafin=07/07/2008

Thursday, June 28, 2007

UOP to develop biofuel technology for military jets UOP LLC, a Honeywell company, announced [*.pdf] today it will accelerate research and development on renewable energy technology to convert vegetable oils to military jet fuels. UOP developed a technique based on hydroprocessing that may yield fuels that meet the stringent requirements.

The goal of the project, which is backed by US$6.7 million in funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), is to develop and commercialize processes to produce a bio-based Jet Propellant 8 (JP-8) used by U.S. and NATO militaries.The focus of our renewable energy efforts has been to develop technologies that align with today’s standard refinery practices, but allow a broader range of feedstock options. We are confident that we have assembled a strong team of experts that will be successful in proving the viability of biofeedstock technologies for JP-8 and other jet fuels, while offering the U.S. military another option for sustainable liquid fuels critical to their programs. - Jennifer Holmgren, director of UOP’s Renewable Energy and Chemicals business unit.Bio-jet fuels, seen as the last biofuel frontier, have received a considerable amount of interest lately, with major aerospace manufacturers, airlines, biotech companies, universities, and governments (Argentina, US) participating in research to produce viable fuels for use in jet engines. Last year DARPA launched its BioFuels BAA (Broad Agency Announcement) aimed at exploring a wide range of energy alternatives and fuel efficiency efforts in a bid to reduce the military's reliance on oil to power its aircraft, ground vehicles and non-nuclear ships.

Under the BAA, DARPA funds research and development efforts to develop a process that efficiently produces a surrogate for petroleum based military jet fuel - JP-8 (properties *.pdf) - from oil-rich crops produced by either agriculture or aquaculture

(including but not limited to plants, algae, fungi, and bacteria) and which ultimately can be an affordable alternative to petroleum-derived JP-8. Approximately 4.5 billion gallons of JP-8 fuel are used by the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army and NATO annually.

Current commercial processes for producing biodiesel such as transesterification (schematic, click to enlarge) yield a fuel that is unsuitable for military applications, which require higher energy density and a wide operating temperature range. Subsequent secondary processing of biodiesel is currently inefficient and results in bio-fuel JP-8 being prohibitively expensive.

The goal of DARPA's BioFuels program is therefor to enable an affordable alternative to petroleum-derived JP-8. The primary technical objective of the program is to achieve a 60% (or greater) conversion efficiency, by energy content, of crop oil to JP-8 surrogate and elucidate a path to 90% conversion:

bioenergy :: biofuels :: energy :: sustainability :: biodiesel :: vegetable oils :: bio-jet fuel :: biokerosene :: hydroprocessing :: JP-8 :: DARPA ::

Proposers were encouraged to consider process paths that minimize the use of external energy sources, which are adaptable to a range or blend of feedstock crop oils, and which produce process by-products that have ancillary manufacturing or industrial value. Current biodiesel alternative fuels are produced by transesterification of triglycerides extracted from agricultural crop oils. This process, while highly efficient, yields a blend of methyl esters (biodiesel) that is 25% lower in energy density than JP-8 and exhibits unacceptable cold-flow features at the lower extreme of the required JP-8 operating regime (-50F).

Potential approaches to produce a surrogate fuel for JP-8 may include thermal, catalytic, or enzymatic technologies or combinations of these. It is anticipated that the key technology developments needed to obtain the program goal will result from a cross-disciplinary approach spanning the fields of process chemistry and engineering, materials engineering, biotechnology, and propulsion system engineering. The key challenges are to develop and optimize process technologies to obtain a maximum conversion of crop oil to fuel.

JP-8 is a kerosene-based, high-performance fuel that is less flammable and less hazardous than other fuel options, allowing for better safety and combat survivability. In addition to jets, JP-8 is also used to fuel heaters, stoves, tanks, and other vehicles in military service. Commercial airliners use Jet A and Jet A-1, which is also kerosene-based.

UOP's processUOP's bid was selected and the company will now work with Honeywell Aerospace, Cargill, Arizona State University, Sandia National Laboratories and Southwest Research Institute on the project, which is expected to be completed by the end of 2008. Fuel produced by the new process will have to meet stringent military specifications and is expected to achieve 90 percent energy efficiency for maximum conversion of feed to fuel, reduced waste and reduced production costs. UOP expects the technology will be

viable for future use in the production of jet fuel for commercial jets.

UOP, formed its Renewable Energy & Chemicals business unit in late 2006 to commercialize solutions for production of renewable biofuel energy. At that time, UOP announced it has developed, along with European energy company Eni, a hydroprocessing technique to convert vegetable oils and waste into a high-cetane green diesel fuel with low emissions and high efficiency. The process, called UOP/Eni Ecofining, uses existing refinery infrastructure and technology. Earlier this month, UOP announced Eni will build the first Ecofining facility in Italy. The facility is projected to start up in early 2009 (earlier post).

DARPA is the central research and development organization for the Department of Defense (DoD). It manages and directs selected research and development projects for DoD for the advancement of military roles and missions. This is UOP’s first project with DARPA.

UOP LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc. and is part of Honeywell’s Specialty Materials strategic business group. Based in Phoenix, Honeywell’s aerospace business is a leading global provider of integrated avionics, engines, systems and service solutions for aircraft manufacturers, airlines, business and general aviation, military, space and airport operations.http://biopact.com/2007/06/uop-to-develop-biofuel-technology-for.html

South America Looks to Create NATO-Style Defense Council Written by Cyril Mychalejko    Wednesday, 16 April 2008

Chávez & JobimThe governments of Brazil and Venezuela are leading efforts to create a NATO-style South American Defense Council, which could be formed by the end of the year.-The regional body would coordinate defense policies, deal with internal conflicts and presumably wane Washington's influence in its "backyard." The idea gained traction after Colombia illegally launched a military operation in Ecuador to assassinate members of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP).

The governments of Ecuador and Venezuela responded by sending troops to their countries' Colombian border, causing fear that a larger conflict could ensue.

Washington, at least in public, has supported the idea of the South American initiative.

"I not only have no problem with it, I trust Brazil's leadership and look forward to coordination with it," said U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.

Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim reportedly told Rice and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley that the U.S. should "watch from the outside and keep its distance."

"This is a South American council and we have no obligation to ask for a license from the United States to do it," said Jobim during a visit to Caracas on Monday.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had previously championed the idea for members of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) to create a coordinated defense council, but believes that the two bodies can co-exist.

"I once said that if NATO exists - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - why couldn't SATO exist? The South Atlantic Treaty Organization," said Chavez. "We've placed it on the table for Latin America once again.”

Cyril Mychalejko is an editor at UpsideDownWorld.orghttp://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1225/63/

Venezuela and Brazil Advance on South American Defense CouncilApril 15th 2008, by James Suggett - Venezuelanalysis.com

President Hugo Chávez and Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim (Prensa Presidencial) Mérida, April 15, 2008 (venezuelanalysis.com)-- A South American defense council to mediate regional conflicts and defend South America from foreign intervention could be concretized this year, the Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim said after meeting with President Hugo Chávez in Caracas Monday.

“We are going to make it so that the strength of South America is born of the union of our peoples,” the minister told the press Monday evening.

“It is impossible to talk about problems in isolated form; we should resolve the problems in conjunction and in unity," Jobim articulated, assuring that any problem affecting one South American country affects the whole region.

Although regional military integration had been discussed in the past, the topic was recharged by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva during the diplomatic crisis sparked by Colombian military incursions into Ecuadorian territory in March.

Jobim and Chávez decided to put the topic on the agenda of the summit of UNASUR, a South American integration organization, scheduled for May 23rd. In the meantime, Jobim will confer with every South American president. If the presidents decide at the summit decide to move forward on the council, Jobim intends to hold a general “ascertainment” meeting within four months, and then "it is a reality that by the end of this year it could be constituted," he proclaimed Monday.

The minister made clear that "there is no possibility of participation by the United States because the council is South American and the U.S. is not in South America,” and said he already met with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to firmly establish this.

He made special mention of the fact that “we have no obligation to ask for a license from the United States to do this," and emphasized that the council could help South America “acquire a very strong presence in the concert of world relations."

President Chávez pledged enthusiastic support for the council as well as several other regional integration efforts that stretch beyond South America.

“From Mexico to Argentina, we are one whole nation,” Chávez proclaimed Sunday at a

demonstration in Caracas to commemorate the six year anniversary of the U.S.-backed two-day coup against his presidency.

“If a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exists,” he postulated, “why can’t a SATO exist, a South Atlantic Treaty Organization?"

However, Minister Jobim clarified that distinct from NATO, “the intention of the council is not to form a classical military alliance,” specifying that “there is no operational intention,” and “there is no expansionist pretension.”

The defense council would promote joint military trainings and defense bases, and “military industrial integration” in order to “ensure the supply of the necessary elements for defense,” the minister clarified.

“Dissuasive defense” would be the aim, he continued, adding that it is important for countries to acquire arms and maintain their militaries “in order to have and to project a capacity for dissuasion.”

This in no way constitutes an arms buildup, Jobim insisted. He said those who have made public statements suggesting that a Latin American arms race is taking place, such as the U.S. government, “are mistaken” and “want to impede South American unity.”

This was echoed by Alberto Müller Rojas, spokesperson for the newly formed United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and retired general, who reiterated Monday that South American countries, “are not thinking about promoting an arms race.”

Instead, Rojas considers the defense council a “guarantee of peace” in the region, because it will help South America “achieve a space where we can act with relative freedom of movement to resolve our problems.”

The party leader insisted that "the war we wish to defend is to overcome the enormous social inequalities that grip the continent," but maintained that an organized defense is important in order to repel external interference.

Brazil was the only Latin American country to rank among the top 15 countries in world military spending in 2006, when it spent $13.4 billion on the military, ranking 14th and encompassing 1% of the world’s military spending, according to the Sweden-based Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Venezuelan military spending was $1.9 billion that year, SIPRI records show, and the New York Times reports Pentagon figures that show increases since then.

Also, the only arms producer in Latin America is Brazil’s Embraer corporation, which is perched to benefit from sales to members of the proposed council. With $390 million in sales in 2005, Embraer ranked 93rd in the world among arms producers, according to SIPRI.

In comparison, the top three arms production companies were U.S.-based Boeing, and Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin, which sold a combined $82.1 billion in 2005. The United States was by far the world’s top military spender, with a budget of $529 billion in 2006, encompassing 46% of world military spending, SIPRI figures show.

Since 2003, Chávez and Lula have discussed a joint navigation of the Orinoco River in order to “strengthen the sovereignty of the Amazon,” in the words of the Venezuelan president. In January 2008, Chávez and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega proposed a joint military force with Bolivia, Cuba, and Dominica, which are all members of the fair trade initiative called the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). Shortly after this, Lula announced Brazil would move forward on a “Regional Block of Military Power” that would be managed by the defense council that Jobim and Chávez discussed in Caracas Monday. http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3361

UNASUR Summit might give origin to the South American Defense CouncilABN 23/05/2008Caracas, Distrito CapitalCaracas, May 23 ABN.- “Everything we can do to strengthen the support of the United States in order to defeat drug dealing, we will keep doing it,” said recently the president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, regarding the possible installation of a military base in the neighbor country. Uribe knows very well the relevance of the drug traffic issue and so he remarks the “help” that the United States might offer.

But behind the apparent urgency of seeking cooperation to struggle against drug dealers, there is the intention of establishing an imperialist enclave to maintain in strict surveillance every movement of Hugo Chávez's administration.

As a matter of fact, to guard Chávez's movements is a possibility also made clear when, on Saturday May 17^th , a US military airplane infringed Venezuela's air space during “espionage labors”, as it was denounced by the socialist leader himself.

Facing all of this, the proposal of the South American Defense Council, to be analyzed at the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) Summit in Brazil, gets huge importance.

In fact, they try to start with the initiative suggested by Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, during the tension created by the military Colombian incursion in Ecuadorian territory, which resulted in the massacre of around twenty members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), among them the second-in-command of this organization, Raul Reyes.

Free from operational aims

Some find similarities between the South American Defense Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which joins militarily the United States and countries of West Europe. However, there are clear differences between both organizations.

Different to NATO, the South American Defense Council would not have operational military nor expansionist aims. In accordance with declarations from Brazil's Ministry of Defense, Nelson Jobim, “the Council does not expect to create a classical military alliance. There is no operational aim, but the possibility of integration in matters of training and integral concept of defense. This is how we are very different from the language of classical alliances, as NATO.”

Obviously, the United States would not be included in this initiative because the South American Defense Council would be a completely South American bloc. Jobim himself stated, “We do not have any obligation to ask permission to the United States in order to carry out this. And they also understand our necessity to integrate.”

Despite the self-appointed vociferous leaders who talk about an “arms race in South America,” many experts coincide in that it is logic that our countries acquire arms because it is necessary to establish a deterrent projection of power before possible enemies, even more when there are rumors of a possible installation of a US military base in Colombia and when a US airplane infringed Venezuela's sovereignty “by mistake”.

The region's importance

For those who still do not understand the validity of defending this territory before the possibility of attacks or aggressions to specific resources, it is worth to recall some vital issues.

In South America, we have a Gross Domestic Product of 973 thousand 613 million dollars, which turns us into the fifth world power. Besides, we have a population of 361 million inhabitants, fourth worldwide.

We occupy an area superior to 17 million square kilometers.

Our exports add up to 181 thousand 856 million dollars.

We have 27% of the world sweet water.

We have eight million square kilometers of forests and two oceans at our disposal.

We are the region that produces and exports more food in the world.

We have a hydrocarbon reserve for 100 years or maybe more.

Now, consider this. Is it that crazy to think that a superpower might take over so many resources? Is it a fantasy the aspiration of hindering the ideological environment that gains more ground every time? Is it too risky to desire to preserve these resources and these ideas through a South American Defense Council? These are some of the questions to fly on the air of the UNASUR Summit, held this Friday 23^rd at Brazil.http://www.abn.info.ve/go_news5.php?articulo=134112&lee=17

TRATADO CONSTITUTIVO DE LA UNIÓN DE NACIONES SURAMERICANAS*

La República Argentina, la República de Bolivia, la República Federativa del Brasil, la República de Colombia, la República de Chile, la República del Ecuador, la República Cooperativa de Guyana, la República del Paraguay, la República del Perú, la República de Suriname, la República Oriental del Uruguay y la República Bolivariana de Venezuela,

PREÁMBULO

APOYADAS en la historia compartida y solidaria de nuestras naciones, multiétnicas, plurilingües y multiculturales, que han luchado por la emancipación y la unidad suramericana, honrando el pensamiento de quienes forjaron nuestra independencia y libertad a favor de esa unión y la construcción de un futuro común;

INSPIRADAS en las Declaraciones de Cusco (8 de diciembre de 2004), Brasilia (30 de septiembre de 2005) y Cochabamba (9 de diciembre de 2006);

AFIRMAN su determinación de construir una identidad y ciudadanía suramericanas y desarrollar un espacio regional integrado en lo político, económico, social, cultural, ambiental, energético y de infraestructura, para contribuir al fortalecimiento de la unidad de América Latina y el Caribe;

CONVENCIDAS de que la integración y la unión suramericanas son necesarias para avanzar en el desarrollo sostenible y el bienestar de nuestros pueblos, así como para contribuir a resolver los problemas que aún afectan a la región, como son la pobreza, la exclusión y la desigualdad social persistentes;

SEGURAS de que la integración es un paso decisivo hacia el fortalecimiento del multilateralismo y la vigencia del derecho en las relaciones internacionales para lograr un mundo multipolar, equilibrado y justo en el que prime la igualdad soberana de los Estados y una cultura de paz en un mundo libre de armas nucleares y de destrucción masiva;

RATIFICAN que tanto la integración como la unión suramericanas se fundan en los principios rectores de: irrestricto respeto a la soberanía, integridad e inviolabilidad territorial de los Estados; autodeterminación de los pueblos; solidaridad; cooperación; paz; democracia; participación ciudadana y pluralismo; derechos humanos universales, indivisibles e interdependientes; reducción de las asimetrías y armonía con la naturaleza para un desarrollo sostenible;

ENTIENDEN que la integración suramericana debe ser alcanzada a través de un proceso innovador, que incluya todos los logros y lo avanzado por los procesos de MERCOSUR y la CAN, así como la experiencia de Chile, Guyana y Suriname, yendo más allá de la convergencia de los mismos;

CONSCIENTES de que este proceso de construcción de la integración y la unión suramericanas es ambicioso en sus objetivos estratégicos, que deberá ser flexible y gradual en su implementación, asegurando que cada Estado adquiera los compromisos según su realidad;

RATIFICAN que la plena vigencia de las instituciones democráticas y el respeto irrestricto de los derechos humanos son condiciones esenciales para la construcción de un futuro común de paz y prosperidad económica y social y el desarrollo de los procesos de integración entre los Estados Miembros;

ACUERDAN:

Artículo 1 Constitución de UNASUR

Los Estados Parte del presente Tratado deciden constituir la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) como una organización dotada de personalidad jurídica internacional.

Artículo 2Objetivo

La Unión de Naciones Suramericanas tiene como objetivo construir, de manera participativa y consensuada, un espacio de integración y unión en lo cultural, social, económico y político entre sus pueblos, otorgando prioridad al diálogo político, las políticas sociales, la educación, la energía, la infraestructura, el financiamiento y el medio ambiente, entre otros, con miras a eliminar la desigualdad socioeconómica, lograr la inclusión social y la participación ciudadana, fortalecer la democracia y reducir las asimetrías en el marco del fortalecimiento de la soberanía e independencia de los Estados.

Artículo 3Objetivos Específicos

La Unión de Naciones Suramericanas tiene como objetivos específicos:

a) el fortalecimiento del diálogo político entre los Estados Miembros que asegure un espacio de concertación para reforzar la integración suramericana y la participación de UNASUR en el escenario internacional;

b) el desarrollo social y humano con equidad e inclusión para erradicar la pobreza y superar las desigualdades en la región;

c) la erradicación del analfabetismo, el acceso universal a una educación de calidad y el reconocimiento regional de estudios y títulos;

d) la integración energética para el aprovechamiento integral, sostenible y solidario de los recursos de la región;

e) el desarrollo de una infraestructura para la interconexión de la región y entre nuestros pueblos de acuerdo a criterios de desarrollo social y económico sustentables;

f) la integración financiera mediante la adopción de mecanismos compatibles con las políticas económicas y fiscales de los Estados Miembros;

g) la protección de la biodiversidad, los recursos hídricos y los ecosistemas, así como la cooperación en la prevención de las catástrofes y en la lucha contra las causas y los efectos del cambio climático;

h) el desarrollo de mecanismos concretos y efectivos para la superación de las asimetrías, logrando así una integración equitativa;

i) la consolidación de una identidad suramericana a través del reconocimiento progresivo de derechos a los nacionales de un Estado Miembro residentes en cualquiera de los otros Estados Miembros, con el fin de alcanzar una ciudadanía suramericana;

j) el acceso universal a la seguridad social y a los servicios de salud;

k) la cooperación en materia de migración, con un enfoque integral, bajo el respeto irrestricto de los derechos humanos y laborales para la regularización migratoria y la armonización de políticas;

l) la cooperación económica y comercial para lograr el avance y la consolidación de un proceso innovador, dinámico, transparente, equitativo y equilibrado, que contemple un acceso efectivo, promoviendo el crecimiento y el desarrollo económico que supere las asimetrías mediante la complementación de las economías de los países de América del Sur, así como la promoción del bienestar de todos los sectores de la población y la reducción de la pobreza;

m) la integración industrial y productiva, con especial atención en las pequeñas y medianas empresas, las cooperativas, las redes y otras formas de organización productiva;

n) la definición e implementación de políticas y proyectos comunes o complementarios de investigación, innovación, transferencia y producción tecnológica, con miras a incrementar la capacidad, la sustentabilidad y el desarrollo científico y tecnológico propios;

o) la promoción de la diversidad cultural y de las expresiones de la memoria y de los conocimientos y saberes de los pueblos de la región, para el fortalecimiento de sus identidades;

p) la participación ciudadana a través de mecanismos de interacción y diálogo entre UNASUR y los diversos actores sociales en la formulación de políticas de integración

suramericana;

q) la coordinación entre los organismos especializados de los Estados Miembros, teniendo en cuenta las normas internacionales, para fortalecer la lucha contra el terrorismo, la corrupción, el problema mundial de las drogas, la trata de personas, el tráfico de armas pequeñas y ligeras, el crimen organizado transnacional y otras amenazas, así como para el desarme, la no proliferación de armas nucleares y de destrucción masiva, y el desminado;

r) la promoción de la cooperación entre las autoridades judiciales de los Estados Miembros de UNASUR;

s) el intercambio de información y de experiencias en materia de defensa;

t) la cooperación para el fortalecimiento de la seguridad ciudadana, y

u) la cooperación sectorial como un mecanismo de profundización de la integración suramericana, mediante el intercambio de información, experiencias y capacitación.

Artículo 4Órganos

Los órganos de UNASUR son:

1. El Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno;

2. El Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores;

3. El Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados;

4. La Secretaría General.

Artículo 5Desarrollo de la Institucionalidad

Podrán convocarse y conformarse reuniones Ministeriales Sectoriales, Consejos de nivel Ministerial, Grupos de Trabajo y otras instancias institucionales que se requieran, de naturaleza permanente o temporal, para dar cumplimiento a los mandatos y recomendaciones de los órganos competentes. Estas instancias rendirán cuenta del desempeño de sus cometidos a través del Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados, que lo elevará al Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno o al Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, según corresponda.

Los acuerdos adoptados por las Reuniones Ministeriales Sectoriales, Consejos de nivel Ministerial, los Grupos de Trabajo y otras instancias institucionales serán presentados a consideración del órgano competente que los ha creado o convocado.

El Consejo Energético de Suramérica, creado en la Declaración de Margarita (17 de abril de 2007), es parte de UNASUR.

Artículo 6El Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno

El Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno es el órgano máximo de UNASUR.

Sus atribuciones son:

a) establecer los lineamientos políticos, planes de acción, programas y proyectos del proceso de integración suramericana y decidir las prioridades para su implementación;

b) convocar Reuniones Ministeriales Sectoriales y crear Consejos de nivel Ministerial;

c) decidir sobre las propuestas presentadas por el Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores;

d) adoptar los lineamientos políticos para las relaciones con terceros.

Las reuniones ordinarias del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno tendrán una periodicidad anual. A petición de un Estado Miembro se podrá convocar a reuniones extraordinarias, a través de la Presidencia Pro Tempore, con el consenso de todos los Estados Miembros de UNASUR.

Artículo 7La Presidencia Pro Tempore

La Presidencia Pro Tempore de UNASUR será ejercida sucesivamente por cada uno de los Estados Miembros, en orden alfabético, por períodos anuales.

Sus atribuciones son:

a) preparar, convocar y presidir las reuniones de los órganos de UNASUR;

b) presentar para su consideración al Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores y al Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados el Programa anual de actividades de UNASUR, con fechas, sedes y agenda de las reuniones de sus órganos en coordinación con la Secretaría General;

c) representar a UNASUR en eventos internacionales, previa delegación aprobada por los Estados Miembros;

d) asumir compromisos y firmar Declaraciones con terceros, previo consentimiento de los órganos correspondientes de UNASUR.

Artículo 8El Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores

El Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores tiene las siguientes atribuciones:

a) adoptar Resoluciones para implementar las Decisiones del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno;

b) proponer proyectos de Decisiones y preparar las reuniones del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno;

c) coordinar posiciones en temas centrales de la integración suramericana;

d) desarrollar y promover el diálogo político y la concertación sobre temas de interés

regional e internacional;

e) realizar el seguimiento y evaluación del proceso de integración en su conjunto;

f) aprobar el Programa anual de actividades y el presupuesto anual de funcionamiento de UNASUR;

g) aprobar el financiamiento de las iniciativas comunes de UNASUR;

r) implementar los lineamientos políticos en las relaciones con terceros;

h) aprobar resoluciones y reglamentos de carácter institucional o sobre otros temas que sean de su competencia;

j) crear Grupos de Trabajo en el marco de las prioridades fijadas por el Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno.

Las reuniones ordinarias del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores tendrán una periodicidad semestral, pudiendo convocar la Presidencia Pro Tempore a reuniones extraordinarias a petición de la mitad de los Estados Miembros.

Artículo 9El Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados

El Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados tiene las siguientes atribuciones:

a) implementar mediante la adopción de las Disposiciones pertinentes, las Decisiones del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, y las Resoluciones del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, con el apoyo de la Presidencia Pro Tempore y la Secretaría General;

b) preparar las reuniones del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Ebxteriores;

c) elaborar proyectos de Decisiones, Resoluciones y Reglamentos para la consideración del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores;

d) compatibilizar y coordinar las iniciativas de UNASUR con otros procesos de integración regional y subregional vigentes, con la finalidad de promover la complementariedad de esfuerzos;

e) conformar, coordinar y dar seguimiento a los Grupos de Trabajo;

f) dar seguimiento al diálogo político y a la concertación sobre temas de interés regional e internacional;

g) promover los espacios de diálogo que favorezcan la participación ciudadana en el proceso de integración suramericana;

h) proponer al Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores el proyecto de presupuesto ordinario anual de funcionamiento para su consideración y aprobación.

El Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados está conformado por una o un representante acreditado por cada Estado Miembro. Se reúne con una periodicidad

preferentemente bimestral, en el territorio del Estado que ejerce la Presidencia Pro Tempore u otro lugar que se acuerde.

Artículo 10La Secretaría General

La Secretaría General es el órgano que, bajo la conducción del Secretario General, ejecuta los mandatos que le confieren los órganos de UNASUR y ejerce su representación por delegación expresa de los mismos. Tiene su sede en Quito, Ecuador.

Sus atribuciones son:

a) apoyar al Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, al Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, al Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados y a la Presidencia Pro Tempore, en el cumplimiento de sus funciones;

b) proponer iniciativas y efectuar el seguimiento a las directrices de los órganos de UNASUR;

c) participar con derecho a voz y ejercer la función de secretaría en las reuniones de los órganos de UNASUR;

d) preparar y presentar la Memoria Anual y los informes respectivos a los órganos correspondientes de UNASUR;

e) servir como depositaria de los Acuerdos en el ámbito de UNASUR y disponer su publicación correspondiente;

f) preparar el proyecto de presupuesto anual para la consideración del Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados y adoptar las medidas necesarias para su buena gestión y ejecución;

g) preparar los proyectos de Reglamento para el funcionamiento de la Secretaría General, y someterlos a la consideración y aprobación de los órganos correspondientes;

h) coordinar con otras entidades de integración y cooperación de América Latina y el Caribe para el desarrollo de las actividades que le encomienden los órganos de UNASUR;

i) celebrar, de acuerdo con los reglamentos, todos los actos jurídicos necesarios para la buena administración y gestión de la Secretaría General.

El Secretario General será designado por el Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno a propuesta del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, por un período de dos años, renovable por una sola vez. El Secretario General no podrá ser sucedido por una persona de la misma nacionalidad.

Durante el ejercicio de sus funciones, el Secretario General y los funcionarios de la Secretaría tendrán dedicación exclusiva, no solicitarán ni recibirán instrucciones de ningún Gobierno, ni entidad ajena a UNASUR, y se abstendrán de actuar en forma incompatible con su condición de funcionarios internacionales responsables únicamente ante esta organización internacional.

El Secretario General ejerce la representación legal de la Secretaría General.

En la selección de los funcionarios de la Secretaría General se garantizará una representación equitativa entre los Estados Miembros, tomando en cuenta, en lo posible, criterios de género, idiomas, étnicos y otros.

Artículo 11Fuentes Jurídicas

Las fuentes jurídicas de UNASUR son las siguientes:

1. El Tratado Constitutivo de UNASUR y los demás instrumentos adicionales;

2. Los Acuerdos que celebren los Estados Miembros de UNASUR sobre la base de los instrumentos mencionados en el punto precedente;

3. Las Decisiones del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno;

4. Las Resoluciones del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores; y

5. Las Disposiciones del Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados.

Artículo 12Aprobación de la Normativa

Toda la normativa de UNASUR se adoptará por consenso.

Las Decisiones del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, las Resoluciones del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores y las Disposiciones del Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados, se podrán acordar estando presentes al menos tres cuartos (3/4) de los Estados Miembros.

Las Decisiones del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, las Resoluciones del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, que se acuerden sin la presencia de todos los Estados Miembros deberán ser consultadas por el Secretario General a los Estados Miembros ausentes, los que deberán pronunciarse en un plazo máximo de treinta (30) días calendario, luego de haber recibido el documento en el idioma correspondiente. En el caso del Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados, dicho plazo será de quince (15) días.

Los Grupos de Trabajo podrán sesionar y realizar propuestas siempre que el quórum de las reuniones sea de mitad más uno de los Estados Miembros.

Los actos normativos emanados de los órganos de UNASUR, serán obligatorios para los Estados Miembros una vez que hayan sido incorporados en el ordenamiento jurídico de cada uno de ellos, de acuerdo a sus respectivos procedimientos internos.

Artículo 13Adopción de Políticas y Creación de Instituciones,Organizaciones y Programas

Uno o más Estados Miembros podrán someter a consideración del Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados una propuesta de adopción de políticas, creación de instituciones, organizaciones o programas comunes para ser adoptados de manera consensuada, sobre la base de criterios flexibles y graduales de implementación

según los objetivos de UNASUR y lo dispuesto en los Artículos 5 y 12 del presente Tratado.

En el caso de programas, instituciones u organizaciones en que participen Estados Miembros con anterioridad a la vigencia de este Tratado podrán ser considerados como programas, instituciones u organizaciones de UNASUR de acuerdo a los procedimientos señalados en este artículo y en consonancia con los objetivos de este Tratado.

Las propuestas se presentarán al Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados. Una vez aprobadas por consenso se remitirán al Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores y, subsecuentemente, al Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, para su aprobación por consenso. Cuando una propuesta no sea objeto de consenso, la misma sólo podrá ser sometida nuevamente al Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados seis meses después de su última inclusión en agenda.

Aprobada una propuesta por la instancia máxima de UNASUR, tres o más Estados Miembros podrán iniciar su desarrollo, siempre y cuando se asegure, tanto la posibilidad de incorporación de otros Estados Miembros, como la información periódica de su avance al Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados.

Cualquier Estado Miembro podrá eximirse de aplicar total o parcialmente una política aprobada, sea por tiempo definido o indefinido, sin que ello impida su posterior incorporación total o parcial a la misma. En el caso de las instituciones, organizaciones o programas que se creen, cualquiera de los Estados Miembros podrá participar como observador o eximirse total o parcialmente de participar por tiempo definido o indefinido.

La adopción de políticas y creación de instituciones, organizaciones y programas será reglamentada por el Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, a propuesta del Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados.

Artículo 14Diálogo Político

La concertación política entre los Estados Miembros de UNASUR será un factor de armonía y respeto mutuo que afiance la estabilidad regional y sustente la preservación de los valores democráticos y la promoción de los derechos humanos.

Los Estados Miembros reforzarán la práctica de construcción de consensos en lo que se refiere a los temas centrales de la agenda internacional y promoverán iniciativas que afirmen la identidad de la región como un factor dinámico en las relaciones internacionales.

Artículo 15Relaciones con Terceros

UNASUR promoverá iniciativas de diálogo sobre temas de interés regional o internacional y buscará consolidar mecanismos de cooperación con otros grupos regionales, Estados y otras entidades con personalidad jurídica internacional, priorizando proyectos en las áreas de energía, financiamiento, infraestructura, políticas sociales, educación y otras a definirse.

El Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados es el responsable de hacer seguimiento a las actividades de implementación con el apoyo de la Presidencia Pro Tempore y de la

Secretaría General. Con el propósito de contar con una adecuada coordinación, el Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados deberá conocer y considerar expresamente las posiciones que sustentará UNASUR en su relacionamiento con terceros.

Artículo 16Financiamiento

El Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados propondrá para su consideración y aprobación al Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores el Proyecto de Presupuesto ordinario anual de funcionamiento de la Secretaría General.

El financiamiento del presupuesto ordinario de funcionamiento de la Secretaría General se realizará en base a cuotas diferenciadas de los Estados Miembros a ser determinadas por Resolución del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, a propuesta del Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados, tomando en cuenta la capacidad económica de los Estados Miembros, la responsabilidad común y el principio de equidad.

Artículo 17Parlamento

La conformación de un Parlamento Suramericano con sede en la ciudad de Cochabamba, Bolivia, será materia de un Protocolo Adicional al presente Tratado.

Artículo 18Participación Ciudadana

Se promoverá la participación plena de la ciudadanía en el proceso de la integración y la unión suramericanas, a través del diálogo y la interacción amplia, democrática, transparente, pluralista, diversa e independiente con los diversos actores sociales, estableciendo canales efectivos de información, consulta y seguimiento en las diferentes instancias de UNASUR.

Los Estados Miembros y los órganos de UNASUR generarán mecanismos y espacios innovadores que incentiven la discusión de los diferentes temas garantizando que las propuestas que hayan sido presentadas por la ciudadanía, reciban una adecuada consideración y respuesta.

Artículo 19Estados Asociados

Los demás Estados de América Latina y el Caribe que soliciten su participación como Estados Asociados de UNASUR, podrán ser admitidos con la aprobación del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno.

Los derechos y obligaciones de los Estados Asociados serán objeto de reglamentación por parte del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores.

Artículo 20Adhesión de Nuevos Miembros

A partir del quinto año de la entrada en vigor del presente Tratado y teniendo en cuenta el propósito de fortalecer la unidad de América Latina y el Caribe, el Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno podrá examinar solicitudes de adhesión

como Estados Miembros por parte de Estados Asociados, que tengan este status por cuatro (4) años, mediante recomendación por consenso del Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores. Los respectivos Protocolos de Adhesión entrarán en vigor a los 30 días de la fecha en que se complete su proceso de ratificación por todos los Estados Miembros y el Estado Adherente.

Artículo 21Solución de Diferencias

Las diferencias que pudieren surgir entre Estados Partes respecto a la interpretación o aplicación de las disposiciones del presente Tratado Constitutivo serán resueltas mediante negociaciones directas.

En caso de no lograr una solución mediante la negociación directa, dichos Estados Miembros someterán la diferencia a consideración del Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados, el cual, dentro de los 60 días de su recepción, formulará las recomendaciones pertinentes para la solución de la misma.

En caso de no alcanzarse una solución ésta instancia elevará la diferencia al Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, para su consideración en su próxima reunión.

Artículo 22Inmunidades y Privilegios

UNASUR gozará, en el territorio de cada uno de los Estados Miembros, de los privilegios e inmunidades necesarios para la realización de sus propósitos.

Los representantes de los Estados Miembros de UNASUR y los funcionarios internacionales de ésta, gozarán asimismo de los privilegios e inmunidades necesarios para desempeñar con independencia sus funciones, en relación con este Tratado.

UNASUR celebrará con la República del Ecuador el correspondiente Acuerdo de Sede, que establecerá los privilegios e inmunidades específicos.

Artículo 23Idiomas

Los idiomas oficiales de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas serán el castellano, el inglés, el portugués y el neerlandés.

Artículo 24Duración y Denuncia

El presente Tratado Constitutivo tendrá una duración indefinida. Podrá ser denunciado por cualquiera de los Estados Miembros mediante notificación escrita al Depositario, que comunicará dicha denuncia a los demás Estados Miembros.

La denuncia surtirá efectos una vez transcurrido el plazo de seis (6) meses desde la fecha en que la notificación haya sido recibida por el Depositario.

La notificación de denuncia no eximirá al Estado Miembro de la obligación de pago de las contribuciones ordinarias que tuviere pendientes.

Artículo 25Enmiendas

Cualquier Estado Miembro podrá proponer enmiendas al presente Tratado Constitutivo. Las propuestas de enmienda serán comunicadas a la Secretaría General que las notificará a los Estados Miembros para su consideración por los órganos de UNASUR.

Las enmiendas aprobadas por el Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, seguirán el procedimiento establecido en el Artículo 26, para su posterior entrada en vigencia.

Artículo 26Entrada en Vigor

El presente Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas entrará en vigor treinta días después de la fecha de recepción del noveno (9o) instrumento de ratificación.

Los instrumentos de ratificación serán depositados ante el Gobierno de la República del Ecuador, que comunicará la fecha de depósito a los demás Estados Miembros, así como la fecha de entrada en vigor del presente Tratado Constitutivo.

Para el Estado Miembro que ratifique el Tratado Constitutivo luego de haber sido depositado el noveno instrumento de ratificación, el mismo entrará en vigor treinta días después de la fecha en que tal Estado Miembro haya depositado su instrumento de ratificación.

Artículo 27Registro

El presente Tratado Constitutivo y sus enmiendas serán registrados ante la Secretaría de la Organización de Naciones Unidas.

Artículo Transitorio

Las Partes acuerdan designar una Comisión Especial, que será coordinada por el Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados y estará integrada por representantes de los Parlamentos Nacionales, Subregionales y Regionales con el objetivo de elaborar un Proyecto de Protocolo Adicional que será considerado en la IV Cumbre de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno. Esta Comisión sesionará en la ciudad de Cochabamba. Dicho Protocolo Adicional establecerá la composición, atribuciones y funcionamiento del Parlamento Suramericano.

Suscrito en la ciudad de Brasilia, República Federativa del Brasil, a los veintitrés días del mes de mayo del año dos mil ocho, en originales en los idiomas portugués, castellano, inglés y neerlandés, siendo los cuatro textos igualmente auténticos

http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/tratado_constitutivo.htm

Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, durante a Reunião Extraordinária de Chefes de Estado e de Governo da União de Nações Sul-Americanas - UNASUL

Brasilia, 23 de mayo de 2008

Primeiramente, apenas para que cada Presidente acompanhe, a idéia é que tenha um pequeno discurso meu, agora, como anfitrião. Depois, o nosso querido companheiro Evo Morales ocupa a Presidência e faz o seu discurso. Depois, assinaremos o Tratado. Depois, o companheiro Evo Morales convida a nossa querida Michelle Bachelet, que também faz o seu discurso. Depois, então, ficamos os Presidentes aqui, para termos um tempo livre para debate.

Vamos esperar a imprensa chegar e enquanto a imprensa se arruma... Entre nós hoje tem um aniversariante, o companheiro Alan García, que completa 34 anos de idade, ou 39. Por coincidência, hoje também, eu completo 34 anos de casado.

O Governo e o povo brasileiros se sentem profundamente honrados em receber os Presidentes e chefes de Governo da União de Nações Sul-Americanas, neste momento histórico em que assinaremos o Tratado Constitutivo da Unasul. É uma particular alegria, para mim, ser o anfitrião desta reunião, tendo ao meu lado o companheiro Evo Morales. Quero transmitir-lhe, caro Evo, o meu reconhecimento pessoal pela competência e dedicação com que a Secretaria Pro Tempore boliviana trabalhou neste ano e meio. Quando lançamos em Cuzco, em dezembro de 2004, os fundamentos deste empreendimento, poucos imaginavam que quatro anos mais tarde teríamos constituído uma verdadeira união sul-americana. A América do Sul renova a confiança na capacidade de seus povos de construírem um destino comum de desenvolvimento, justiça social, democracia e paz.

O Tratado Constitutivo dá personalidade jurídica à Unasul, que ganha expressão política e meios institucionais para realizar seus objetivos. Tiraremos proveito da vastidão de nosso território, banhado pelos oceanos Atlântico e Pacífico e pelo mar do Caribe. Valorizaremos a diversidade de nossos povos e de nossa cultura. Construiremos nossa unidade sobre a base dos processos de integração bem-sucedidos do Mercosul e da Comunidade Andina. Nosso foro será enriquecido pela contribuição caribenha, por meio da Guiana e do Suriname. Mais de 300 milhões de homens e mulheres se beneficiam, hoje, de uma excepcional fase de crescimento econômico e de exitosos programas de inclusão social. Constituem enorme base produtiva e grande mercado de bens de consumo. Não por acaso, somos hoje um dos principais pontos de atração de investimento no mundo.

A América do Sul é hoje uma região de paz, onde floresce a democracia. Todos os seus governantes foram eleitos em pleitos democráticos e com ampla participação popular. A instabilidade que alguns pretendem ver em nosso continente é sinal de vida, especialmente de vida política. Não há democracia sem povo nas ruas, sem confronto de idéias e de propostas. Tampouco há democracias sem regras e sem diálogo. Esses progressos nos campos econômico e sociopolítico nos conferem crescente projeção num novo mundo multipolar que se está constituindo.

Com este Tratado Constitutivo, a América do Sul ganha estatuto de ator global. Estamos superando a inércia e as resistências que, ao longo de 200 anos de vida política independente, impediram que trilhássemos juntos o caminho da unidade. Ao darmos institucionalidade à nossa União, estamos transformando em realidade o sonho integrador de nossos próceres e libertadores. Já no preâmbulo, o Tratado nos

lembra que a integração sul-americana é essencial para o fortalecimento da América Latina e do Caribe. Com a entrada em vigor do Tratado, nossos vizinhos latino-americanos e caribenhos estão convidados a associar-se à União. A Unasul nasce, assim, aberta a toda a região, e nasce também sob o signo da diversidade e do pluralismo. As decisões da Unasul serão tomadas por consenso, que se construirá na base do diálogo, da harmonia e do respeito mútuo. Por meio do exercício permanente do entendimento, afiançaremos a estabilidade regional e o desenvolvimento em bases solidárias.

Senhoras e senhores Presidentes,

O Tratado Constitutivo não é um fim em si mesmo, é o fundamento normativo para que nossa União possa alcançar seus objetivos. Queremos avançar rapidamente com projetos inovadores e de grande alcance em áreas prioritárias, como integração financeira e energética, melhoria da infra-estrutura regional e das conexões rodoviárias e ferroviárias, estabelecimento de uma vigorosa agenda de cooperação em políticas sociais e fortalecimento da cooperação educacional.

O Conselho Energético e os grupos de trabalho já colocaram sobre a mesa elementos que nos permitirão ter um plano de ação com propostas concretas e metas alcançáveis. Necessitamos de trocas comerciais justas e equilibradas. Precisamos fazer do comércio um instrumento de crescimento econômico e progresso social em prol, sobretudo, dos mais pobres. Devemos incentivar a criação de cadeias de integração produtiva entre nossas empresas estatais e privadas. Vamos desenvolver parcerias em setores estratégicos, como indústria aeronáutica, construção naval, medicamentos e equipamentos militares. São mecanismos abrangentes e estruturais para superar as assimetrias entre nossos países.

Senhoras e senhores,

Estou convencido de que é chegada a hora de aprofundarmos nossa identidade sul-americana, também no campo da defesa. Nossas Forças Armadas estão comprometidas com a construção da paz. A presença de muitos de nossos países na MINUSTAH, força da ONU que garante a segurança no Haiti, é exemplo dessa determinação. Devemos articular uma visão de defesa na região fundada em valores e princípios comuns, como o respeito à soberania e à autodeterminação, a integridade territorial dos Estados e a não-intervenção em assuntos internos.

Por isso, determinei ao meu Ministro da Defesa que realizasse consultas com todos os países da América do Sul sobre a constituição de um Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa. Creio que deveríamos discutir essa decisão aqui. Com esse mesmo espírito proponho a realização no Brasil, no segundo semestre deste ano, de uma reunião que permita detalhar o funcionamento e os objetivos do Conselho.

Caros companheiros,

A América do Sul vive momento de excepcional crescimento, com a redução da pobreza e da desigualdade. Criamos as condições para um desenvolvimento sustentado, que nos têm permitido enfrentar a atual instabilidade econômica mundial. Nossa região torna-se um interlocutor cada vez mais indispensável, à medida que o mundo se vê diante da necessidade de compatibilizar segurança alimentar, suprimento energético adequado e preservação do meio ambiente. Quando a escassez de alimentos ameaça a paz social em muitas partes do mundo, é em nossa região que muitos vêm buscar propostas. Temos consciência de nossas

responsabilidades globais, mas não abrimos mão de exercê-las de forma totalmente soberana. Não nos deixamos iludir, tampouco, pelos argumentos daqueles que, por interesses protecionistas ou motivações geopolíticas, se sentem incomodados com o crescimento de nossa indústria e de nossa agricultura e com a realização do nosso potencial energético. Uma América do Sul unida mexerá com o tabuleiro do poder no mundo, não em benefício de um ou de outro dos nossos países, mas em benefício de todos.

Senhoras e senhores Presidentes,

Estamos deixando para trás uma longa história de indiferença e de isolamento recíproco. Nossa América do Sul não será mais um mero conceito geográfico. A partir de hoje é uma realidade política, econômica e social, com institucionalidade própria. A Unasul deve ser construída como parte de nossos projetos nacionais de desenvolvimento, e essa tem sido a orientação do meu Governo desde o primeiro dia. O Brasil quer associar seu presente e seu futuro ao destino da América do Sul. Nenhum de nossos países pode, sozinho, aspirar à prosperidade. Mais do que generosos, temos que ser solidários. Hoje dotamos a América do Sul de um arcabouço flexível e ágil para articular as iniciativas comuns nesse processo ambicioso de integração. Nossos êxitos permitirão aumentar nossas ambições e realizar novos avanços.

Meus amigos e minhas amigas,

Temos razão de sobra para renovar o nosso orgulho, e o local em que estamos, que leva o nome do pai da Constituição brasileira, deputado Ulysses Guimarães, não poderia ser mais apropriado. Além de lutar com obstinação pela redemocratização do Brasil, Ulysses Guimarães soube aliar ousadia à capacidade de diálogo, o que tornou possível o consenso. Nossos governantes têm o sentido da história. Sabem que os contenciosos atuais, mesmo quando revestidos de dramaticidade, são passageiros, não devem se sobrepor ao projeto de integração. Juntos seremos mais soberanos.

Antes de convidá-los a proceder à assinatura do Tratado Constitutivo da União de Nações Sul-Americanas , eu quero passar a palavra ao nosso querido companheiro Evo Morales.

Muito obrigado

 http://www.comunidadandina.org/prensa/discursos/lula23-5-08.htm

The South American Defense Clusterfuck

After being the only country to back out of the South American Defense Council (CSD) during May's founding of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Colombia has now agreed to join the fledgling initiative. President Uribe reconsidered after speaking with Chilean President Michelle Bachelet and Brazil's Lula during the

latter's visit to Colombia. Lula was in Bogota over the weekend to sign Defense and other bilateral cooperation agreements between Colombia and Brazil.

Despite his country's reversal, Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos today stated that he "still does not know what [the CSD] is for" during an event at the Center for American Progress (video). Santos is in Washington in an attempt to exploit the July 2 hostage operation and push Congress to pass the Colombian Free Trade Agreement and grant $Billions more for Plan Colombia, which is already the biggest military partnership in the Americas. (NYT Op-ed co-authored w/ US Defense Secretary Gates).

Meanwhile, much has been made about Chavez sparking a so-called "arms race" by seeking to buy air defense systems and submarines from Russia. Venezuela doesn't need those things, because it's not like US fighter jets have violated Venezuelan airspace or that the world's superpower has a huge armada conducting military exercises off its coasts. It also shouldn't be concerning that armed-to-the-teeth Colombia doesn't worry about pesky little things like international borders when executing US-coordinated airstrikes.

Chavez is in Moscow to sign Venezuela and Russia's own military and economic agreements. New Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called Venezuela-Russia relations, "one of the key factors of security in the (South American) region". He also said that Venezuela was Russia's "most important partner". Anti-US flattery? Maybe, but more believable than, "US Seeks Improved Relations w/ Venezuela." That is how the State Dep. categorized Thomas Shannon's testimony to Congress last week. But when reading all of Shannon's remarks, it is clear that the top Latin American official means "improved relations" and continued funding of "the people of Venezuela," a.k.a. the mostly affluent, non-brown opposition. The only contemplated cooperation between the US and Venezuelan governments is on anti-drug operations.

So how do all these defense collaborations and conflicting agendas co-exist?

Defense Minister Santos stated that Colombia has only joined the CSD as long as 3 conditions are met. 1) Decisions made by the Council must be unanimous. 2) CSD's charter must include a specific condemnation of illegal armed groups (the FARC). 3) It will not accept restrictions on outside alliances (the US). So Santos may just "not be sure" if Colombia plans to utilize the CSD for it's military benefits, or merely to sabotage/neutralize it from within, which is certainly the desire some US military personnel are voicing to the Defense Minister as he pleads for more money.

For it's part, Brazil's push for the CSD is seen as an example of it's role as the moderating force between the South America's left and right as it steps up its leadership in the region. Lula stated that Brazil "must definitively assume responsibility over the integration of South America" and that it should "be a type of bridge that links all of the political currents of South America". The day before he traveled to Colombia, Lula was in Bolivia with Hugo Chavez to provide economic and political support to Evo Morales as he battles

the right-wing autonomy movements ahead of the August 10 recall referendum in that country.

The other key Brazilian interest in signing agreements with Colombia and getting them on board the CSD is promoting the material well-being of its arms, energy and aeronautic industries. This is also the overriding Russian concern in Venezuela according to the New York Times. Gazprom, of which Medvedev was once chairman, is one of three Russian energy giants that received exploration rights in Venezuela's oil and gas-rich Orinoco Delta. In addition, the two countries continued discussions on creating a "gas OPEC".

But Russia also has an axe to grind with the US over the Eastern European missile defense system and other intrusions of the US in it's geographical sphere of interest. There are reports that Russia will begin deploying nuclear-capable bombers to Cuba as an f-you over the missile defense plans. And Russian-Venezuela both desire seeking out partners in pushing for a strengthening of the United Nations' authority.

If Russia does increase it's presence in Latin America, it will be interesting to see how the US and others react. But to simplify the various military-technical maneuvers as a regional arms race led by Chavez ignores the financial and political interests of Brazil, the US and Russia. And if it does become an arms race, it shouldn't be placed at the feet of Chavez. After all, it doesn't matter whether you pay for your arms or if they are given to you when the quantity is added up.

http://www.borev.net/2008/07/the_south_american_defense_clu.html

Brazil Spearheads UNASUR Defense Council, but in a Surprise move, Colombia Withdraws

• Implications for Brazil• The Venezuela-Colombia Rift• Regional Autonomy• The Rebirth of the Fourth Fleet and with it the Ghost of Gunboat Diplomacy• The new Pattern of United States-South American Relations

Member states of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) signed a pact on Friday, May 23 in Brasília to establish judicial and political components for the emerging, limited union. On the docket was a plan to create a military coordinating component of UNASUR, the Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa (CSD). However, the CSD was destined to be founded without the important exception of Colombia, which recently confused its neighbors by revoking its intention to join. Brazil, in collaboration with Venezuela, spearheaded the creation of the defense portion of the pact, which will be increasingly NATO-like in structure.

Successfully founding the CSD, which had been scheduled to include Colombia, would

have represented an enormous victory for what has been called President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s “pragmatic left” leadership. It was no secret that Brasília hoped to use the CSD to strengthen regional ties across highly sensitive boundaries, with Colombia on the right, Venezuela on the left, and Brazil hoping to act as the mediating middle. However, the withdrawal of Bogotá, with one of the region’s most advanced militaries, has significantly weakened the pact from its onset. Brazilian defense minister, Nelson Jobim, described the basic tenets of the CSD as an integrated alliance without an operating field capability. CSD forces would cooperate, for example, in contributing to UN and other humanitarian missions if necessary. The alliance will also be expected to coordinate military technology and resources.

Brazil’s VisionConsiderable disparity exists in the distribution of military resources throughout the region. At the top, is Brazil with its major military capabilities, then supposedly closely followed by Colombia’s highly modernized military, which enjoys major U.S. support. In contrast, Guyana and several of the other smaller countries have meager forces. Once the CSD is operational, the coordination of technology and resources will be joined by a greater emphasis on arms sales among the signatory states. Brazil, the major weapons producer in the region (which turns out tanks, ships, fighter planes, and light arms) is set to be the primary beneficiary from renewed shipment of weapons to its neighbors.

Brasília hopes that increasing arms sales to non-traditional markets around the world, and the coordination of technology resulting from this newly formed alliance, will in the long run lessen dependence on the United States. In recent months, Brazil’s foreign policy has quietly shifted away from Washington towards autonomy, as it becomes an increasingly active player in a multipolar world.

In addition to acquiring new technology from Russia in various fields, Brasília has specifically attempted to obtain the technology needed to construct a nuclear submarine from Paris. However, France will only sell marginally-related, non-nuclear technology, and does so warily, to the frustration of Brazilian officials. Similarly, the restrictions on the sale of United States military hardware have angered officials.

The advent of the CSD and its anticipated increase in arms sales comes amidst the heated climate of a recently mounting arms race in South America; the continent’s powerhouses Colombia, Chile, Brazil and Venezuela are all significantly increasing their arms spending. Of this group, Bogotá’s spending constitutes the highest proportion of its GDP compared to the others.

The Attack Against the FARCThis arms race has recently taken on a new dimension. On March 1st, Colombia bombed a site just within Ecuador’s territory in which a secret camp occupied by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) had been layed out. The resulting flap eventually also implicated Venezuela. Interpol’s vouchsafing of the integrity of thousands of files, found on several FARC laptops that had been apprehended (but not necessarily their contents) makes the case that the Chávez government could have been

somehow involved in supplying both finances and arms to the FARC. The political radicalization of these three regional antagonists is manifested in the broadening nature of the Colombia face-off against Venezuela and Ecuador. All three countries were slated to join the CSD, but Bogotá’s withdrawal shows the extent to which the existing rift among the countries has grown, and that the nature of the diplomatic price being paid is mounting.

If Colombia as well as Venezuela had joined the CSD, it would have symbolized an easing of tensions between the two increasingly ferocious foes. For this to happen, it would have required Brazil to have increased its commitment to playing the role of the area’s pivotal mediator. Brazil’s Lula would seem to have been in a good position to broker such a deal, as he is seen as being a socialist and the leader of the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) Workers’ Party. But he also is a lame duck president and a man with profound leadership ambitions constrained by adverse local factors. In both of Brazil’s parliamentary houses he must appease conservative-dominated, multi-party bodies. Lula’s administration is also, by necessity, bipartisan or multi-partisan, with ministers in Lula’s cabinet (who are fueled by various political leanings) operating with a high degree of autonomy. Again, this may help to provide a compass function to Brazil’s role and gain credibility for it to be a pluralistic factor when it comes to the arbitration of regional disputes.

Lula’s foreign policy stance has been based on the determination to maintain cordial relations with all parties, while trying to promote the country’s emergence as a military and economic power. He seeks economic growth for the country through encouraging foreign investment in Brazil and its expansion as a major export platform. But, Lula also reflects a profound strain in the country’s ambition to maintain its admittedly meteoric emergence as a country that thinks in global terms and which is out to obtain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, yet at the same time not appear as projecting any threat to its neighbors.

The moving force behind the CSD in Lula’s government has been defense minister Nestor Jobim, who has traveled the continent meeting with local leaders to promote CSD’s maturation. Jobim is more conservative than Lula but has made known his desire to distance Brazil from dependence on the United States. When questioned whether the CSD would allow a place for Washington, a seemingly flustered Jobim answered that the United States will not be asked to join the alliance as it is not located in South America. Brazil and other South American signatory members need not ask the White House’s approval to form such an alliance.

CSD will be good for South America’s StabilitySimply put, regional stability is of transcendent importance for a country that borders all but two of South America’s other states. One goal of Brazil’s foreign policy is to maintain stability along its borders, especially along its sparsely populated Amazonian boundaries. Of these, the border with Colombia currently has been of greatest concern. In early May, the Brazilian armed forces announced plans to station 21,000 troops along the Colombian border to ensure that insurgents did not infiltrate the Brazilian Amazon. These

forces will operate with the mandate to shoot all rebels entering the country.

Brasília is also interested in coordinating with other South American militaries to control the massive influx of drugs which are being trafficked into and through Brazil in increasing volume. The country’s federal police director for fighting organized crime, Roberto Troncon, has welcomed the inception of the CSD, saying that the coordination of the South American armed forces should indirectly help in the battle against organized crime, particularly in relation to drug trafficking. However, the withdrawal of Colombia from the pact eliminates the cooperation of a major drug-fighting military in the most notorious drug producing country, in a hugely strategic part of the continent.

Last February, the UN declared that Brazil has become a major “thoroughfare” for cocaine trafficking. According to the UN’s finding, cocaine is smuggled from drug producing countries (Bolivia, Peru and Colombia) into Brazil, where 15% of the world’s cocaine is consumed. Rates of domestic drug use in Brazil are high and climbing; cocaine usage alone increased 30% last year. Domestic use, however, only comprises half of the cocaine that reaches Brazil soil. The other half (of the estimated 80 tons of cocaine entering the country per year) is then shipped to Africa, largely to be redistributed throughout Europe.

Chávez Links CSD to BolívarVenezuela’s President Hugo Chávez shows enthusiasm for the CSD. He applauds Brazil’s efforts for a continental defense organization and has invoked the aspirations of Simón Bolívar—the historical figure for whom he named and dedicated his movement—saying it was Bolívar’s wish to form a political, economic, and military union among all the nations of South America. Chávez has said with enthusiasm that the alliance will help in the formation of a “big South America.” To Chávez and the like-minded leaders, the CSD means greater autonomy for South America from the United States.

But an inconsistency may exist between Chávez championing a “big South America,” while simultaneously continuing his attacks against the Uribe government. This ongoing assault (which one can appreciate given Uribe’s persistence, negativity, and obstructionism) reflects Bogotá’s refusal to seek membership in the organization and instead its turn to the United States for military aid and diplomatic ardency. The cost is not cheap for this sort of politics; Colombia is being increasingly identified as a super-gringo country by its increasingly critical, Latin American neighbors.

Chávez’s Vision ThinsSome would say that Chávez’s vision of a “big South America” is illusory because Jobim and perhaps Lula are really seeking a specifically Brazilian caste to their country’s efforts to seek independence from the United States. They would rather see this relative autonomy from the U.S. on its own than be part of a broader geopolitical development that has implications for the entirety of South America. It is not that Jobim and Lula (for that matter) would want to discourage other countries from seeking their autonomy from Washington individually, but that they look to the CSD more as a vehicle that helps Brazil in its goal to achieve self-development rather than focusing on how it helps South

America as a whole to do the same.

Chávez, for his part, has a much more synoptic view of the arrangement. He invokes Bolívar in the CSD discussions in order to promote the idea of exporting the Bolivarian movement throughout the continent. Ideally, Chávez has said he hopes that the CSD will come to mean more than the transference of military logistics and intelligence between nations. This is why he begins his Bolivarian invocation by stating that Bolívar sought the political and economic unification of “big South America” in addition to the region’s military unification. This dream of a greater Bolivarian South America is most likely one in which Venezuela, like a force of nature, would be pre-eminent—Brasília is not likely to subscribe to this leftist sloganizing with enthusiasm, feeling that the Venezuelans have not copyrighted “Bolívar.” Brazil also seeks some degree of autonomy from Spanish-speaking South America in order for it to take better advantage of opportunities elsewhere.

In dealing with Chávez and the CSD, Jobim has not responded with a Bolivarian invocation of his own. Brasília simply sought Chávez’s signature and knew there would be a price to pay, in terms of a call to arms, for his Bolivarian exhortations.

The Fourth Fleet in part a Likely U.S. Response to the CSDAlthough U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, stated that Washington welcomes the creation of the CSD, the recent executive order re-founding the Fourth Fleet is likely to have been, at least in part, a response to the regional arms race and the outlining of the Brasília-led, new alliance. It also serves as a political statement indicating that Washington is capable of projecting its authority throughout the hemisphere—particularly against left-leaning nations and leaders it sees as being recalcitrants to its cause including: Chavéz, Morales of Bolivia, Correa of Ecuador and, of course, Raúl Castro of Cuba.

But the development of the Fourth Fleet was also likely to be seen by some Washington strategists as a counter to the Brazilian initiative. As recently as late April, the Bush administration has said that it considers Brazil a great ally. Nonetheless, Washington’s activation of the Fourth Fleet must be interpreted in Brasília as a partial response to Brazil’s armament drive and its de facto influence over the region. It was most likely influenced by the advent of the CSD—representing one more step in the direction of regional autonomy, shucking Latin America’s traditional tendency to automatically defer to Washington.

Colombia’s Policy Change, a bow to Washington, a slap in the face Against BrazilThe recent 180 degree turn in Colombia’s policy highlights the depth of the Bush administration’s financial tug on Bogotá and its ability to influence some parts of the region, particularly when it deals with like-minded conservative governments, like those of Colombia and Peru. Unfortunately for Brazil, and its desire to secure its borders through cooperation with the Colombian military, Bogotá has concluded that it stands to gain more from military cooperation with the United States than it could collect from any other arrangements at this time. At this point, there are few who believe that if

Washington wants a replacement for Manta, Uribe, unlike Correa, will prove to be a flexible servitor. It is more than likely that Bogotá will agree to facilitate a U.S. military base in Colombia in order to continue to receive U.S. assistance rather than join its neighbors in an act of regional solidarity that is not being particularly welcomed by the White House.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Jared Ritvo May 28th, 2008 Word Count: 2300

http://www.coha.org/2008/05/brazil-spearheads-unasur-defense-council-but-in-a-surprise-move-colombia-withdraws/

S American officials meet to discuss creation of defense council

www.chinaview.cn 2008-07-25 14:28:54   Print

    SANTIAGO, July 24 (Xinhua) -- The working group for the proposed Defense Council of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) held their second meeting here on July 22-23, the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry said in a statement Thursday.

    The meeting came following Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's announcement on July 19 that his country would join the council.

    The incorporation of Colombia was welcomed by all participants at the council's working group formed of representatives of the 12UNASUR countries' defense and foreign ministries.

    The debate on the principles, objectives, nature, functions and structure of the council began a month ago, when the working group was created, in compliance with a presidential agreement on May 23in the Brazilian capital of Brasilia.

    At the working group meeting, a consensus was reached to define the council as a mechanism of political dialogue and cooperation to preserve South America as a peace zone, and a base for democratic stability and the social and economic development of the people of the region, Chile's Foreign Affairs Ministry said.

    Colombia had earlier refused to approve the regional defense council proposal made by Brazil in May.

    President Uribe had said that the Colombian government was experiencing a difficult time in its fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels, and such a regional defense body would not offer solutions to the country's

problems.

    The next working group meeting will take place on Aug. 25-26 to continue the formulation of the founding document of the council.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/25/content_8768216.htm

Says Peru's Defense Minister

11:42 South American Defense Council proposal to be deeply evaluated

Lima, May 24 (ANDINA).- The Peruvian Minister of Defense guaranteed today a deep evaluation of the Brazilian proposal to constitute the South American Defense Council with the participation of the 12 members of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur).

“This is a proposal of a brother country (…), we are evaluating it meticulously and then the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Relations will publish their analysis”, said Flores-Aráoz to CPN radio, alocal radio broadcaster.

He also indicated its sector will evaluate the proposal carefully because it is an initiative of Brazil, a country that maintains solid relations with Peru. Both countries share a strategic association agreement to develop integration projects.

Flores-Aráoz added the Defense and Foreign Trade ministries have 90 days to evaluate this proposal.

(END) JCP/FPQ/GCJ/LVT

http://www.andina.com.pe/Espanol/Noticia.aspx?id=76lTtapRw34=

Japan, India, Germany, Brazil Push for UN Security Council Enlargement

Peru's minister of Defense, Ántero Flores-Aráoz.

United Nations07 July 2005

Brazil, Germany, Japan and India have submitted a resolution to the U.N. General Assembly calling for 10 new seats on the Security Council. A vote on the measure could come as early as next week.

The so-called Group of Four countries seeking permanent Security Council seats formally presented their enlargement proposal Wednesday. They are asking for an open General Assembly debate, beginning

as early as next Monday.

The G-four plan calls for creating 10 new Council seats, raising the total membership from 15 to 25.

Six of the new seats would be permanent, but the new permanent members would not have veto power for at least 15 years.

The G-four countries - Brazil, Germany, Japan and India - are jointly lobbying for four of those new permanent seats. Two others would go to as yet unselected African countries.

G-four ambassadors are hoping for three days of debate on their enlargement proposal in the General Assembly, with a vote by the end of next week. Adoption would require approval of two-thirds of the U.N. membership, or 128 countries.

Chances for approval were thrown into doubt this week when African Union heads of state meeting in Libya suggested the G-four proposal would give Africa too little representation on the Council. Africa's more than 50 votes are critical to adoption of any General Assembly measure.

Despite the A.U. move, Germany's U.N. Ambassador Gunter Pleuger tells VOA he is confident the G-four measure can win the necessary votes. He called the G-four proposal "the only alternative on the table", and said he thinks African leaders will realize that backing the G-four is the only way they can get what they want.

"We have presented and negotiated for one-half year also with the Africans a resolution which we believe caters to the interests of everybody, of all regions, and all regions are profiting from this resolution and we are convinced that a vast majority of member states recognize that and will vote for the resolution,"  Mr. Pleuger says.

There is wide support among the general U.N. membership for the idea of updating the Security Council to reflect 21st century reality. But a diplomat from a G-four country admitted Wednesday that the road to expansion is a difficult one.

UN security council (file photo)

Several of the five current veto-wielding permanent members and many other countries oppose the G-four plan. The United States says it would support only "two or so" new permanent members, one of them Japan.

But China strongly opposes Japan's candidacy, and has spoken out against any move to rush the expansion process. Russia has also been cool to the idea of enlargement.

Even if 128 votes can be found to approve the principle of expansion, a second vote will be needed to choose which countries will be given permanent Council seats.

Once those issues are settled, the third and toughest hurdle will be amending the U.N. Charter. That would require ratification of the legislatures of two-thirds of the General Assembly countries, including all five permanent Security Council members.

http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-07/2005-07-07-voa1.cfm

John McCain backs Brazil's UN Security Council bidBy Rich Bowdenon June 16, 2008 4:25 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

Republican presumptive nominee John McCain has declared he will back Brazil's inclusion on an expanded U.N. Security Council, according to an interview conducted by the Brazilian press.

The International Herald Tribune reports that, in an interview published with the presidential contender by the newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo, McCain said he, "supports a permanent seat on the UN Security Council for Brazil and an increased participation for the country in the G-8," while also reiterating his view that India should

also be granted a place.

Despite the Arizona senator's welcome support, Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva meanwhile has refused to endorse either candidate for president though said a Barack Obama win would be a "watershed moment" for the United States.

He told Reuters that the time was ripe for better relations between the U.S. and Brazil and called for a new "positive approach".

"The United States needs to stop viewing Latin America with a conspiratorial eye. There is no one left pushing for revolution in Latin America anymore," he said.

http://www.monstersandcritics.com/blogs/globaleye/2008/06/john-mccain-backs-brazils-un-s.php

Brazil Gets Australia's Backing for UN Security Council Seat Written by Michèlle Canes    Thursday, 05 January 2006

The Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, Alexander Downer, declared that he is in favor of Brazilian participation as a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

According to the Australian Minister, reform of the Council is necessary to bring the organization abreast of today's world. Downer was in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, in Brasília, Wednesday, January 4.

"I believe the reform is necessary. The international community should press for this to happen, because we require a Council that represents the world as it is nowadays. The world is not the same as in 1945 [the year in which the UN was founded]. That is why I defend the entry of Brazil, Japan, and an African country, because that's the way the world is now," Downer said.

The Brazilian minister of Foreign Relations, Celso Amorim, observed that the two countries share certain viewpoints. "Regarding the international agenda, I would say that our perspectives on the United Nations and multilateralism, including the need to reform the Security Council as well as other UN bodies, are very similar."

According to the Brazilian Minister, expanding the Security Council could be a form of democratizing the UN. "It is important for the reforms to be made in such a way as to make the UN more democratic. Criticisms are sometimes made, even concerning Security Council reform, that countries are after more privileges. That is not the case. Expanding the number of countries with seats on the Security Council is one of the ways

to enlarge democratic spaces," he affirms.

As for the UN's role in current international conflicts, the Australian minister said that the organization will not resolve all the problems but that it should protect lives.

"There is an awareness on the part of the member countries that a modicum of responsibility exists. We know that the UN will not resolve everything; countries, too, must deal with their problems, and the cooperation is important," he affirmed.

In Amorim's view, the two countries have acted positively and cooperated in the solution of other disputes. "Australia played a significant role in East Timor, and Brazil played an important part in Angola and now in Haiti."

Amorim went on to say that Brazil has acted with forthrightness in the area of human rights. "In the case of human rights, it was Brazil, for example, that proposed a resolution in the Human Rights Commission stating that racism is incompatible with democracy."

Agência Brasil

http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/5039/53/

Japan, Brazil to cooperate on permanent U.N. Security Council seatsJapan Policy & Politics,  Sept 20, 2004  

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BRASILIA, Sept. 16 Kyodo

Japan and Brazil agreed Thursday to support each other's bids for permanent seats in the U.N. Security Council.

The accord was reached during summit talks between visiting Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

''Both leaders share the understanding that it is of great importance to enhance the effectiveness and credibility of multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations and

its Security Council, particularly through expanding the membership of the Security Council, both in the permanent and nonpermanent categories,'' Koizumi and Lula said a communique issued following their talks in Brasilia.

Related ResultsBrazil's Lula to host poverty, hunger summitBrazil, Germany, India, Japan launch joint bid for UN Council seatsRussia throws weight behind Brazil space ambitionsRice in Brazil, kicks off four-nation tour of Latin AmericaChina favors Brazil's UN bid: Lula

''Japan and Brazil are legitimate candidates for a permanent seat in the Security Council and, in light of the current reality of the international system, will support each other's candidacy in the upcoming reform of the institution,'' the communique noted.

The Security Council, one of the most powerful bodies of the United Nations, is responsible for keeping international peace and security, investigating any dispute that might lead to international friction and recommending methods of adjusting such disputes.

Koizumi said on the last day of his two-day tour that Brazil and Japan should not only to strengthen their bilateral relationship, but also cooperate in international affairs.

''Brazil, under the administration of President Lula, actively contributes to the reform of the United Nations,'' Koizumi said, adding Japan and Brazil share common interests in this area and may cooperate more as ''global partners.''

Lula focused his speech on international multilateralism, apparently making, according to local analysts, an indirect reference to the increasing global influence of the United States after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.

''(Brazil and Japan) bet on multilateralism as a tool for dialogue and cooperation among nations and peoples,'' the Brazilian president said, adding the two countries reject ''the apocalyptic force of mass destruction weapons.''

''Brazil and Japan have an unquestionable vocation to have permanent seats at a renewed Security Council,'' Lula said.

Brazil and Japan are willing to take over ''such responsibility and support each other in the process of updating the United Nations for the demands of the contemporary world,'' he said.

Lula reminded the attendees at a luncheon that Brazil and Japan are the two countries that most often have been elected to a seat among the 10 nonpermanent members of the UNSC.

Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States are the five permanent members in the council, who have the power of veto for decisions made at the world body.

Brazil, India, Germany and Japan will hold a meeting in New York on Sept. 21 to discuss reforming the council, said Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim shortly after attending the bilateral meeting.

''Ten years ago this reform was a vague issue, but now it is a concrete possibility,'' Amorim said.

Amorim said Koizumi has invited President Lula to visit Japan next year and there is a possibility the Brazilian President will be in Tokyo in May.

Koizumi is on an 11-day, three-nation tour, which also takes him to Mexico and the United States.

COPYRIGHT 2004 Kyodo News International, Inc.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0XPQ/is_2004_Sept_20/ai_n6282383

Brazilian President courts West African leaders

afrol News, 12 April - Brazil's popular President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on a current roundtrip to four West African countries is seeking support for an enlarged South-South trade and for his country's plea to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. President Lula yesterday visited Cameroon and Nigeria, a new major trade partner for Brazil, and is now in Ghana. Tomorrow, he heads for Guinea-Bissau and then finally Senegal.

The Brazilian President has indeed strengthened his country's relations with Africa since he came to power. With this roundtrip, President Lula will have been on an official visit to a total of 14 African countries. After tomorrow's visit to Guinea-Bissau, he will also have visited all the five Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa since he was elected by a landslide in October 2002.

The five-country roundtrip started on Sunday in Cameroon, where President Lula was received by his counterpart, President Paul Biya. Several accords were underway to strengthen ties between Cameroon, and Brazil, according to government sources in Yaoundé. These in particular include technical aid from Brazil in the sectors of cocoa production, health and education. Also, the reopening of the Brazilian embassy in Cameroon was announced.

Yesterday, he arrived in Nigeria, a country that has become Brazil's major trade partner in Africa. In Abuja, the Nigerian capital, President Lula met with his Nigerian counterpart,

President Olusegun Obasanjo. One of the main aims during this visit has been to consolidate and strengthen these trade links, which include large-scale exports of fish from Brazil to Nigeria.

President Lula yesterday urged President Obasanjo to help strengthening these South-South trade links. "Our commercial relations could be infinitely improved, our cultural relations could be infinitely improved and our political relations could be infinitely improved," President Lula told his Nigerian counterpart at a gala luncheon in Abuja yesterday.

Brazilian trade links with Ghana are still limited but observed to have a great potential given Ghana's rapid growth and stabile business environment. Ways to strengthen these ties will be the key issue when Ghanaian President John Agyekum Kufuor receives Mr Lula at the Accra International Conference Centre this evening, hosting a major banquette in honour of the Brazilian President. Tomorrow, the two state leaders will inaugurate the Brazil-Ghana Chamber of Commerce.

Tomorrow's visit to Guinea-Bissau will have a more political character, given the still dysfunctional economy in that country and the preparations for the upcoming presidential polls in Bissau. President Lula, also representing the Portuguese speaking "commonwealth" (the CPLP), which is offering election aid to Guinea-Bissau in addition to political advise.

The next day, President Lula moves on to Senegal, where trade and economy again will dominate the agenda. Senegal also receives some technical aid from Brazil and new cooperation accords are expected to be signed in Dakar when Mr Lula meets with Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade.

In addition to the commercial agenda of President Lula, the Brazilian leader was also seeking to boost his country's diplomatic standing as a representative from the South. Brazil is seeking a permanent chair in the UN Security Council as the UN now is reforming. For that, President Lula will need the support of all current Security Council members and a majority of the UN's member countries.

According to Brazilian press reports, President Lula has achieved support for his country's campaign to get a permanent UN Security Council seat. In Cameroon, President Biya was reported to have promised his support. Also in Nigeria, President Lula was reported to have been successful. There are no reports of what the Brazilian leader had to promise in exchange, but Nigeria is also a possible candidate for a permanent UN Security Council membership, being Africa's most populous country.

The Brazilian President further achieved support for his country's presentation of a candidate to the post of Director-General of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The Cameroonian President already has promised his country's support for the Brazilian candidacy. Brazil has stood united with many African nations during the last rounds of free trade negotiations hosted by the WTO.

On economic cooperation with West Africa, President Lula was quoted as saying that he lamented that the Brazilian government did not have enough resources to launch major projects in Africa. The state could only contribute with technical assistance.

Larger investments, according to President Lula, had to be left to Brazil's private sector, which however until now has shown little interest in investing in Africa. Not even in Portuguese-speaking countries, where Brazilian companies have competitive advantages, do investments from Brazil play a major role so far. Pleas by the government of São Tomé and Príncipe, for example, for Brazilian private investments in its new oil sector have not led to anything.

Brazilian trade with Africa is nevertheless increasing rapidly, according to the government in Brasilia. While the total trade between Africa and Brazil was valued at US$ 6.1 billion in 2003, it increased to an estimated total of US$ 10.4 billion last year, according to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade.

http://www.afrol.com/articles/16110

General Assembly President wraps up South America visit with stop in Brazil

Srgjan Kerim, President of the 62nd session of the General Assembly

6 August 2008 – The President of the General Assembly held discussions on climate change, development and the food crisis with officials in Brazil, the last stop on a three-nation visit to South America that also took him to Chile and Argentina.

Srgjan Kerim met yesterday in the capital, Brasilia, with the Brazilian Minister of External Relations, Celso Amorim, with whom he discussed some of the most pressing issues on the UN agenda, including climate change, the global food crisis and development.

The two leaders also discussed the importance of regional integration efforts, such as UNASUR, for the future development of the international system. They both recognized

the need to strengthen multilateral institutions, with the UN at its core, and agreed on the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including of its Security Council.

In a lecture delivered at the Brazilian diplomatic academy, Mr. Kerim reiterated the call he made last week in Chile for a new culture of international relations based on the empowerment of the individual.

He highlighted the contributions of Brazil to the history of the UN and the important role of the country in shaping the future of the Organization in his address to the gathering, which also included the UN Resident Coordinator in Brazil, Kim Bolduc, and other representatives of the UN Country Team.

During his stay in Brazil, Mr. Kerim also visited São Paulo, where he met representatives of the Brazilian business community, who stressed the need to increase the involvement of the business community in UN affairs, particularly in finding solutions to complex global problems such as climate change.

In this context, they recognized that public-private partnerships are essential for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – the set of anti-poverty targets world leaders have pledged to try to achieve by 2015.

The Assembly President also met with representatives of the sugar cane sector in Brazil, and learned about the latest developments in biofuel technology and the opportunities in terms of increasing energy production and developing cleaner energy.

Mr. Kerim arrived in Brazil from Argentina, where his programme included a meeting with the President of the Senate and Vice-President of Argentina, Julio Cobos, and a working luncheon with the Minister of External Relations, Jorge Taiana.

They discussed a range of issues, including climate change, food security, regional integration and UN reform, with Mr. Kerim stressing the important role played by Argentina at the UN as one of its founding nations. The active participation of the country in peacekeeping operations, particularly in the UN mission in Haiti, was also highlighted.

While in Argentina, the Assembly President also participated in a conference at the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI), where he spoke about the importance of building effective multilateralism to face up to the current global challenges, and, in this regard, the need to strengthen the UN.

Mr. Kerim also met with the UN Country Team and briefed the staff on the current status of the consultations on UN reform at Headquarters in New York. The UN Resident Coordinator, Carlos Martinez, briefed the President on the work of the UN in Argentina, and the challenges and opportunities for the Organization in middle-income countries.

News Tracker: past stories on this issue

In Santiago, General Assembly President calls for new culture of global relations

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27602&Cr=Kerim&Cr1=

Brazil, India, Germany Present Resolution

on UNSC Expansion Xinhuanet

January 7, 2006

Brazil, India and Germany have submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly calling for the expansion of the Security Council, but this time they failed to win the sponsoring of Japan.

The draft, made available to the press on Friday, is the same as the one tabled by the so-called Group of Four, composed of Brazil, India, Germany and Japan, last summer. It proposes enlarging the Security Council membership from 15 to 25 by adding six permanent members and four non-permanent members.

The Security Council, the only UN organ whose decisions are legally binding on all governments, presently consists of five veto-holding permanent members and 10 elected members with two-year terms.

In an explanatory note attached to the draft, Brazil, India and Germany said the objective of re-tabling the G-4 resolution on Thursday is "to instill positive dynamics into the process of Security Council reform."

The three countries will maintain the cooperative framework of the G-4 with Japan and are open to possible amendments to the draft, the note said, adding that they do not aim at a vote on the resolution in the immediate future.

Media reports quoted Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe as saying on Friday that Japan decided against sponsoring the fresh bid by Brazil, India and Germany because it is impossible for them to win sufficient support.

There have been speculations that Tokyo is drawing up a draft resolution on the Security Council expansion which would be acceptable to the United States, a strong opponent to the G-4 proposal.

The Group of Four, the African Union and a group of countries opposed to an increase of permanent council members introduced rival measures to the General Assembly last summer on the Security Council reform. But none of them was put to a vote because of lack of support.

In late December Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana and Senegal re-submitted the proposal of the African Union to the assembly in the name of the four countries. They have not yet requested the 191-nation body to take action on the draft.

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1/2006/0107resolution.htm