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Labor

MUST READ CASES (LABOR LAW)

LABOR STANDARDS

Estrellita G. Salazar vs Philippie D!pli"at#rs$ %"$ G.R. N#. &'*+ De"e,-er $ *

The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress

employers. The commitment under the fundamental law is that the cause of labor does not

prevent us from sustaining the employer when the law is clearly on its side.

Pe#ple #/ the Philippies vs. Teresita 0Tessie1 La#2#. G.R. N#. &3* 4a!ar5 &$ *&&

Article 38(a) of the Labor Code as amended specifies that recruitment activities underta!en by

non"licensees or non"holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. #hen the

illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group then it

is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a

form of economic sabotage. $ut to prove illegal recruitment it must be shown that the accused

without being duly authori%ed by law gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the

power or ability to send them abroad for wor! such that the latter were convinced to part with

their money in order to be employed. &t is important that there must at least be a promise or offer

of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad.

SAMEER O6ERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENC7 %NC. v. CAB%LES$ G.R. N#. &3&89$

A!2!st '$ *&

&n 'errano v. allant aritime 'ervices &nc. and arlow *avigation Co. &nc. this court ruled

that the clause +or for three (3) months for every year of the une,pired term whichever is less+ is

unconstitutional for violating the e-ual protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. &t +confers no rights it

imposes no duties it affords no protection it creates no office it is inoperative as if it has not

been passed at all.+

#hen a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution thenullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or

provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such

unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

S5"ip$ G#rres$ 6ela5# : C#,pa5 vs. Car#l De Rae;t. G.R. N#. &&8< 4!e &$ *9

To determine the e,istence of an employer"employee relationship case law has consistently

applied the four"fold test to wit/ (a) the selection and engagement of the employee (b) the

payment of wages (c) the power of dismissal and (d) the employer0s power to control the

employee on the means and methods by which the wor! is accomplished. The so"called +control

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Labor

test+ is the most important indicator of the presence or absence of an employer"employee

relationship.

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Maila Water C#,pa5$ %". vs. 4#se 4. Dal!,pies. G.R. N#. &3''&< O"t#-er $ *&

&t should be remembered that the control test merely calls for the e,istence of the right to control

and not necessarily the e,ercise thereof. &t is not essential that the employer actually supervisesthe performance of duties of the employee. &t is enough that the former has a right to wield the

power.

Ma"arth!r Mali";e, a; =er,ei2il;# >l#res vs. Mar!las %;!strial C#rp#rati#. G.R.

N#. *< >e-r!ar5 *$ *&

The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between

the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the

employer.

?ASAMMA@CCO v. C#!rt #/ Appeals. G.R. N#. &'9+*+< April &9$ *

A casual employee is only casual for one year and it is the passage of time that gives him a

regular status.

4#se 7. S#za vs. ABS@CBN Br#a;"asti2 C#rp#rati#$ G.R. N#. &8+'&$ 4!e &$ *

Television"radio talent is not an employee. 1elationship of a big name talent and a television"

radio broadcasting company is one of an independent contracting arrangement. A$'"C$*

engaged 'on%a0s services specifically to co"host the +el 2 ay+ programs. A$'"C$* did not

assign any other wor! to 'on%a. To perform his wor! 'on%a only needed his s!ills and talent.

4ow 'on%a delivered his lines appeared on television and sounded on radio were outside A$'"

C$*0s control. 'on%a did not have to render eight hours of wor! per day. The Agreement

re-uired 'on%a to attend only rehearsals and tapings of the shows as well as pre" and post"

production staff meetings. A$'"C$* could not dictate the contents of 'on%a0s script.

Gapa5a# v >!l#$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &9898 (*&8)

5arm wor!ers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. The Court has

consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees. 1egular

seasonal employees are those called to wor! from time to time. The nature of their relationship

with the employer is such that during the off season they are temporarily laid off but

reemployed during the summer season or when their services may be needed. They are in

regular employment because of the nature of their 6ob and not because of the length of time they

have wor!ed.

This rule however is not absolute. 'easonal wor!ers who have wor!ed for one season only may

not be considered regular employees. Also when seasonal employees are free to contract their

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services with other farm owners then the former are not regular employees. 5or regular

employees to be considered as such the primary standard used is the reasonable connection

between the particular activity they perform and the usual trade or business of the employer.

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>6R Sills a; Servi"es Ep#ets$ %". (S?%LLE)$ et al. v. 4#vert Seva$ et al.$ G.R. N#.

*+'3$ O"t#-er **$ *&

5or an employee to be validly categori%ed as a pro6ect employee it is necessary that the specific

pro6ect or underta!ing had been identified and its period and completion date determined and

made !nown to the employee at the time of his engagement. This provision ensures that the

employee is completely apprised of the terms of his hiring and the corresponding rights and

obligations arising from his underta!ing. *otably the petitioner7s service contract with

1obinsons was from anuary to 9ecember 3 :;;8. The respondents were only as!ed to sign

their employment contracts for their deployment with 1obinsons halfway through :;;8 when

the petitioner7s service contract was about to e,pire.

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GMA Net#r$ %". v Pa-ri2a$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &3&9 (*&8)

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>etitioner0s allegation that respondents were merely substitutes or what they call pinch"hitters

(which means that they were employed to ta!e the place of regular employees of petitioner who

were absent or on leave) does not change the fact that their 6obs cannot be considered pro6ects

within the purview of the law. very industry even public offices has to deal with securing

substitutes for employees who are absent or on leave. 'uch tas!s whether performed by theusual employee or by a substitute cannot be considered separate and distinct from the other

underta!ings of the company. #hile it is management0s prerogative to device a method to deal

with this issue such prerogative is not absolute and is limited to systems wherein employees are

not ingeniously and methodically deprived of their constitutionally protected right to security of

tenure.

Aveli# La,-# vs NLRC. G.R. N#. &&&* O"t#-er *$ &999

There is no dispute that petitioners were employees of private respondents although they were

paid not on the basis of time spent on the 6ob but according to the -uantity and the -uality of

wor! produced by them. There are two categories of employees paid by results/ () those whose

time and performance are supervised by the employer. (4ere there is an element of control and

supervision over the manner as to how the wor! is to be performed. A piece"rate wor!er belongs

to this category especially if he performs his wor! in the company premises.) and (:) those

whose time and performance are unsupervised. (4ere the employer0s control is over the result of

the wor!. #or!ers on pa!yao and ta!ay basis belong to this group.) $oth classes of wor!ers are

paid per unit accomplished. >iece"rate payment is generally practiced in garment factories where

wor! is done in the company premises while payment on pa!yao and ta!ay basis is commonly

observed in the agricultural industry such as in sugar plantations where the wor! is performed inbul! or in volumes difficult to -uantify. >etitioners belong to the first category i.e. supervised

employees.

PCL Shippi2 Philippie$ %". a; U@Mi2 Marie Trasp#rt C#rp#rati#$ vs NLRC. G.R.

N#. &'88&$De"e,-er &$ *

#ith respect however to the award of overtime pay the correct criterion in determining

whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board and cannot

leave ship beyond the regular eight wor!ing hours a day but whether they actually rendered

service in e,cess of said number of hours. &n the present case the Court finds that private

respondent is not entitled to overtime pay because he failed to present any evidence to prove that

he rendered service in e,cess of the regular eight wor!ing hours a day.

Bisi2 Ma22aa sa Tr5"#$ et al. vs. NLRC$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &'&89 O"t#-er &'$ *+

9.B. *o. : sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in consideration of the benefits that the employees

will derive from the adoption of a compressed wor!wee! scheme thus/ The compressed

wor!wee! scheme was originally conceived for establishments wishing to save on energy costs

promote greater wor! efficiency and lower the rate of employee absenteeism among others.

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#or!ers favor the scheme considering that it would mean savings on the increasing cost of

transportation fares for at least one () day a wee! savings on meal and snac! e,penses longer

wee!ends or an additional : off"days a year that can be devoted to rest

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leisure family responsibilities studies and other personal matters and that it will spare them for

at least another day in a wee! from certain inconveniences that are the normal incidents of

employment such as commuting to and from the wor!place travel time spent e,posure to dust

and motor vehicle fumes dressing up for wor! etc. Thus under this scheme the generally

observed wor!wee! of si, (D) days is shortened to five () days but prolonging the wor!inghours from onday to 5riday without the employer being obliged for pay overtime premium

compensation for wor! performed in e,cess of eight (8) hours on wee!days in e,change for the

benefits abovecited that will accrue to the employees. oreover the adoption of a compressed

wor!wee! scheme in the company will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused the

petitioners by their transfer to a farther wor!place.

R#sari# A. Gaa vs CA G.R. N#. L@&9 De". 8$ &9+'

The term +wages+ differs from the term +salary.+ #ages apply to compensation for manual labor

s!illed or uns!illed paid at stated times and measured by the day wee! month or season while

salary denotes a higher grade of employment or a superior grade of services and implies a

position or office. $y contrast the term +wages+ indicates a considerable pay for a lower and less

responsible character of employment while +salary+ is suggestive of a larger and more important

service

The distinction between salary and wage in aa vs CA was only for the purpose of Art. E;8 of

the Civil Code which provides that +the laborers7 wage shall not be sub6ect to e,ecution or

attachment e,cept for debts incurred for food shelter clothing and medical attendance.

O!r =a!s Realt5 Devel#p,et C#rp#rati# v. Alea;er Paria$ et al.$ G.R. N#. *'&$

A!2!st *&

The benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an e,tra remuneration above

and over his basic or ordinary earning or wage is supplement and when said benefit or privilege

is part of the laborers7 basic wages it is a facility. The distinction lies not so much in the !ind of

benefit or item (food lodging bonus or sic! leave) given but in the purpose for which it is

given. &n the case at bench the items provided were given freely by 'LL for the purpose of

maintaining the efficiency and health of its wor!ers while they were wor!ing at their respective

pro6ects.

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The Bmnibus 1ules &mplementing the Labor Code meanwhile provides/

'CT&B* F. 9eduction for loss or damage. " #here the employer is engaged in a

trade occupation or business where the practice of ma!ing deductions or re-uiringdeposits is recogni%ed to answer for the reimbursement of loss or damage to tools

materials or e-uipment supplied by the employer to the employee the employer may

ma!e wage deductions or re-uire the employees to ma!e deposits from which

deductions shall be made sub6ect to the following conditions/

(a) That the employee concerned is clearly shown to be responsible for the loss ordamage

(b) That the employee is given reasonable opportunity to show cause why deduction

should not be made(c) That the amount of such deduction is fair and reasonable and shall not e,ceed the

actual loss or damage and(d) That the deduction from the wages of the employee does not e,ceed :; percent of the

employee7s wages in a wee!.

>etitioner failed to sufficiently establish that steban was responsible for the negative variance it

had in its sales for the year :;; to :;;D and that steban was given the opportunity to show

cause why the deduction from her last salary should not be made. The Court cannot accept the

petitioner0s statement that it is the practice in the retail industry to deduct variances from an

employee0s salary without more.

Lilia P. La-a;a vs. >#rest =ills A"a;e,5. G.R. N#. &3**9' De"e,-er *8$ *+

1especting petitioner0s claim for holiday pay 5orest 4ills contends that petitioner failed to prove

that she actually wor!ed during specific holidays. Article =F of the Labor Code provides

however that (a) very wor!er shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays

e,cept in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (;) wor!ers (b)

The employer may re-uire an employee to wor! on any holiday but such employee shall be paid

a compensation e-uivalent to twice his regular rate. The provision that a wor!er is entitled to

twice his regular rate if he is re-uired to wor! on a holiday implies that the provision entitling a

wor!er to his regular rate on holidays applies even if he does not wor!.

BP% E,pl#5ees !i#@Dava# Cit5@>UBU v Ba #/ the Philippie %sla;s$ et al.$ G.R. N#.

&39&* (*&8)

Contracting out of services is not illegal per se. &t is an e,ercise of business 6udgment or

management prerogative. Absent proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary

manner the Court will not interfere with the e,ercise of 6udgment by an employer. $>&0s policy

of contracting out cashiering and boo!!eeping services was considered as a valid e,ercise of

management prerogative which is further authori%ed by the Central $an! in C$> Circular *o.

388 'eries of ==.

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Cetral Az!"arera De Tarla" vs. Cetral Az!"arera De Tarla" La-#r Ui#@NLU. G.R.

N#. &++99$ 4!l5 *$ *&

Article ;; of the Labor Code otherwise !nown as the *on"9iminution 1ule mandates that

benefits given to employees cannot be ta!en bac! or reduced unilaterally by the employer

because the benefit has become part of the employment contract written or unwritten. The rule

against diminution of benefits applies if it is shown that the grant of the benefit is based on an

e,press policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time and that the practice is

consistent and deliberate. *evertheless the rule will not apply if the practice is due to error in the

construction or application of a doubtful or difficult -uestion of law. $ut even in cases of error it

should be shown that the correction is done soon after discovery of the error.

Netli C#,p!ter %"#rp#rate; v Eri" Del,#$ G.R. N#. &+*3$ &+ 4!e *&

#ith regard to the length of time the company practice should have been observed to constitute avoluntary employer practice that cannot be unilaterally reduced diminished discontinued or

eliminated by the employer we find that 6urisprudence has not laid down any rule re-uiring a

specific minimum number of years. &n 9avao 5ruits Corporation v. Associated Labor ort 'tevedoring 'ervices v.

Abar-ue% the employer for three years and nine months approved the commutation to cash of

the unen6oyed portion of the sic! leave with pay benefits of its intermittent wor!ers. &n Tiangco

v. Leogardo r. the employer carried on the practice of giving a fi,ed monthly emergency

allowance from *ovember =ED to 5ebruary =8; or three years and four months. &n 'evilla

Trading Company v. 'emana the employer !ept the practice of including non"basic benefits suchas paid leaves for unused sic! leave and vacation in the computation of their 3th"month pay for

at least two years.

#ith the payment of hilippine currency determined at the time of the sales. To rule otherwise would be to cause an

un6ust diminution of the commissions due and owing to 9elmo.

Baar; E,pl#5ees Ui#@W#rers Allia"e Tra;e Ui#s vs NLRC. G.R. N#. &+9

>e-r!ar5 &3$ *

ven assuming that there is a decrease in the wage gap between the pay of the old employees and

the newly hired employees to Bur mind said gap is not significant as to obliterate or result in

severe contraction of the intentional -uantitative differences in the salary rates between the

employee group. As already stated the classification under the wage structure is based on the

ran! of an employee not on seniority. 5or this reason wage distortion does not appear to e,ist.

R#2eli# Re5es vs NLRC. G.R. N#. &*88$ A!2!st +$ *3

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residential 9ecree 8 the following

compensations are deemed not part of the basic salary/

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a) Cost"of"living allowances granted pursuant to >residential 9ecree : and Letter of &nstruction

*o. EF b) >rofit sharing payments c) All allowances and monetary benefits which are not

considered or integrated as part of the regular basic salary of the employee at the time of the

promulgation of the 9ecree on 9ecember D =E.

Pr#;!"ers Ba v. NLRC. G.R. N#. &3&. Mar"h *+$ *&

$onus is not demandable as a matter of right. &t is a management prerogative given in addition

to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due to the recipient.

Philipiie Tele2raph vs. Laplaa. G.R. N#. 3'< 4!l5 *8$ &99&

&t is the employers0 prerogative based on its assessment and perception of its employees0

-ualifications aptitudes and competence to move them around in the various areas of its

business operations in order to ascertain where they will function with ma,imum benefit to the

company. #hen an employee0s transfer is not unreasonable nor inconvenient or pre6udicial to

him and it does not involve a demotion in ran! or diminution of his salaries benefits and other

privileges the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.

UE v. PEPAN%O$ G.R. N#. &98+93$ 4a!ar5 *8$ *&8

The re-uirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The

operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to

ensure that only -ualified persons in possession of sufficient academic !nowledge and teaching

s!ills are allowed to teach in such institutions. overnment regulation in this field of human

activity is desirable for protecting not only the students but the public as well from ill"prepared

teachers who are lac!ing in the re-uired scientific or technical !nowledge. They may be

re-uired to ta!e an e,amination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prere-uisite to

employment.

Philippie Airlies$ %". vs. NLRC. G.R. N#. &*'39*< N#ve,-er 9$ &99+

&n legitimate 6ob contracting no employer"employee relation e,ists between the principal and the

6ob contractor7s employees. The principal is responsible to the 6ob contractor7s employees onlyfor the proper payment of wages. $ut in labor"only contracting an employer"employee relation

is created by law between the principal and the labor"only contractor7s employees such that the

former is responsible to such employees as if he or she had directly employed them

6i2illa$ et al. v Philippie C#lle2e #/ Cri,i#l#25$ %".$ G.R. N#. *9 (*&8)

&n legitimate 6ob contracting the principal employer becomes 6ointly and severally liable with

the 6ob contractor only for the payment of the employees7 wages whenever the contractor fails to

pay the same. Bn the other hand in labor"only contracting the principal employer becomes

solidarily liable with the labor"only contractor for all the rightful claims of the employees. &n this

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case the releases waivers and -uitclaims e,ecuted by employees in favor of the labor"only

contractor redounded to the benefit of the principal.

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Sa Mi2!el C#rp. vs. MAERC %te2rate; S5ste,s. G.R. N#. &3*< 4!l5 &$ *8

The employer is deemed the direct employer and is made liable to the employees of the

contractor for a more comprehensive purpose (wages monetary claims and all other benefits inthe Labor Code such as '''GedicareG>ag"&big). The labor"only contractor is deemed merely an

agent. A finding that a contractor is a ?labor"only@ contractor is e-uivalent to declaring that there

is an 1" relationship between the principal and the employees of the ?labor"only@ contractor.

Cher5ll Sat#s Le!s v St. S"h#lasti"aFs C#lle2e West2r#ve$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &+3**$ *+

4a!ar5 *&'

That an employee was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not absolutely

determine whether her pregnancy out of wedloc! is disgraceful or immoral. There is still a

necessity to determine whether the petitioner0s pregnancy out of wedloc! is considereddisgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct. To stress pre"

marital se,ual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each

other and conse-uently conceiving a child out of wedloc! gauged from a purely public and

secular view of morality does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under 'ection

=F(e) of the ==: 1>'.

D!"a vs. Gla# Well"#,e. G.R. N#. &*99< Septe,-er &3$ *

>rohibition of marriage or e,isting or future relationships between employees of competingcompanies is not violative of the e-ual protection clause.

%tel Te"h#l#25 Philippies$ %". v Nati#al La-#r Relati#s C#,,issi#$ et al.$ G.R. N#.

*'3' (*&)

Cabiles0 contention that his employment with &ntel 4H is a continuation of his service with &ntel

>hil alleging that it was but an assignment by his principal employer similar to his assignments

to &ntel Ari%ona and &ntel Chengdu is untenable.

E!2ee Ara-it$ et al. v 4ar;ie Pa"i/i" >ia"e$ %".$ G.R. N#. &+&3&9$ *& April *&

&t is illogical for ardine to terminate the petitioners0 employment and replace them with

contractual employees. The replacement effectively belies ardine0s claim that the petitioners0

positions were abolished due to superfluity. 1edundancy could have been 6ustified if the

functions of the petitioners were transferred to other e,isting employees of the company.

To dismiss the petitioners and hire new contractual employees as replacements necessarily give

rise to the sound conclusion that the petitioners0 services have not really become in e,cess of

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what ardine0s business re-uires. To replace the petitioners who were all regular employees with

contractual ones would amount to a violation of their right to security of tenure.

S!pre,e Steel Pipe C#rp. vs. Bar;ae$ G.R. N#. &3+&&< April *$ *3

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Although fighting within company premises may constitute serious misconduct (possible ground

for disciplinary actions) not every fight with in company premises in which an employee is

involved automatically warrant dismissal from service.

P!zal vs. ETS% Te"h#l#2ies. G.R. N#. &38+@+'. Mar"h 9$ *3

4alloween invitation sent out by employee for office tric!"or"treating without clearance from

higher management is considered misbehavior. The circumstances in the case were differentiated

from 'amson vs. *L1C where the offensive remar!s were verbally made during informal

Christmas gathering.

L#res Realt5 Eterprises$ %". v. 6ir2iia E. Pa"ia$ Mar"h *&&

>etitioner employer ordered the respondent employee to prepare chec!s for payment of

petitioner0s obligations. 1espondent did not immediately comply with the instruction since

petitioner employer had no sufficient funds to cover the chec!s. >etitioner employer dismissed

respondent employee for willful disobedience. The Court held that respondent employee was

illegally dismissed. Though there is nothing unlawful in the directive of petitioner employer to

prepare chec!s in payment of petitioner0s obligations respondent employee0s initial reluctance to

prepare the chec!s although seemingly disrespectful and defiant was for honest and well

intentioned reasons. >rotecting the petitioner employer from liability under the $ouncing Chec!s

Law was foremost in her mind. &t was not wrongful or willful. *either can it be considered an

obstinate defiance of company authority. The Court too! into consideration that respondentemployee despite her initial reluctance eventually did prepare the chec!s on the same day she

was tas!ed to do it.

G#zales vs. NLRC. G.R. N#. &8&'8< Mar"h *$ *&

The act constituting the breach must be ?wor!"related@ such as would show the employee

concerned to be unfit to continue wor!ing for the employer.

4ar;ie Davies vs. NLRC. G.R. N#. &9&'< A!2!st 8&$ &998

5or abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment there must be a

deliberate un6ustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. This refusal must be

clearly shown. ere absence is not sufficient it must be accompanied by overt acts pointing to

the fact that the employee simply does not want to wor! anymore.

SME Ba$ %".$ et al. v De G!z,a$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &+'&3 (*&8)

#hile resignation letters containing words of gratitude may indicate that the employees were not

coerced into resignation this fact alone is not conclusive proof that they intelligently freely and

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voluntarily resigned. To rule that resignation letters couched in terms of gratitude are by

themselves conclusive proof that the employees intended to relin-uish their posts would open

the floodgates to possible abuse. &n order to withstand the test of validity resignations must be

made voluntarily and with the intention of relin-uishing the office coupled with an act of

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relin-uishment. Therefore in order to determine whether the employees truly intended to resign

from their respective posts we cannot merely rely on the tenor of the resignation letters but must

ta!e into consideration the totality of circumstances in each particular case.

Sa#h >!lt# Phils.$ %".$ et al. v Berar;#$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &+3*& (*&8)

A lull caused by lac! of orders or shortage of materials must be of such nature as would severely

affect the continued business operations of the employer to the detriment of all and sundry if not

properly addressed. 'anoh asserts that cancelled orders of wire condensers led to the phasing out

of the #ire Condenser 9epartment which triggered retrenchment. 'anoh presented the letters of

cancellation given by atsushita and 'anyo as evidence of cancelled orders. The evidence

presented by 'anoh barely established the connection between the cancelled orders and the

pro6ected business losses that may be incurred by 'anoh.

=#"he2 Philippies C#rp#rati# v At#i# M. >arrales$ G.R. N#. *&&93$ &+ Mar"h *&'

Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer if proven by

substantial evidence is a cause analogous to serious misconduct. The misconduct to be serious

must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. 'uch

misconduct however serious must nevertheless be in connection with the employee0s wor! to

constitute 6ust cause for his separation.

E,erit!s Se"!rit5 a; Maitea"e S5ste,s$ %". v 4arie C. Daili2$ G.R. N#. *3&$ *

April *&

A floating status of a security guard for more than si, months constitutes constructive dismissal.

The temporary inactivity or +floating status+ of security guards should continue only for si,

months. Btherwise the security agency concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal. The

failure of petitioner to give respondent a wor! assignment beyond the reasonable si,"month

period ma!es it liable for constructive dismissal.

E#"et Se"!rit5 a; Allie; Servi"es C#rp#rati# a;#r Ma. Teresa Mar"el# v Ar,a;# D.

Serra#$ G.R. N#. &9+'8+$ *9 Septe,-er *&

&t is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately declare the mere lapse of the si,"month

period of floating status as a case of constructive dismissal without loo!ing into the peculiar

circumstances that resulted in the security guard0s failure to assume another post. This is

especially true in the present case where the security guard0s own refusal to accept a non"I&>

detail was the reason that he was not given an assignment within the si,"month period. The

security agency ,ocet should not then be held liable for constructive dismissal.

Philippie Sheet Metal W#rersF Ui# vs. C%R. G.R. N#. L@**+< April *+$ &99

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1eduction of the number of wor!ers in a company0s factory made necessary by the introduction

of machinery in the manufacture of its products is 6ustified. There can be no -uestion as to the

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right of the manufacturer to use new labor"saving devices with a view to effecting more

economy and efficiency in its method of production.

Orietal Petr#le!, : Mierals C#rp. vs. >!etes. G.R. N#. &'&+&+. O"t#-er &$ *'

'tandards to ustify 1etrenchment/

. The losses e,pected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in e,tent

:. The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent. &t be reasonably

necessary and li!ely to effectively prevent the e,pected losses

3. The employer should have ta!en other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to

forestall losses

F. The alleged losses if already reali%ed and the e,pected imminent losses must be proved

by sufficient and convincing evidence.

BP% v. BP% EMPLO7EES UN%ON DA6AO$ G.R. N#. &8&$ O"t#-er &9$ *&&

$y upholding the automatic assumption of the non"surviving corporation0s e,isting employment

contracts by the surviving corporation in a merger the Court strengthens 6udicial protection of

the right to security of tenure of employees affected by a merger and avoids confusion regarding

the status of their various benefits which were among the chief ob6ections of our dissenting

colleagues. 4owever nothing in this 1esolution shall impair the right of an employer to

terminate the employment of the absorbed employees for a lawful or authori%ed cause or the

right of such an employee to resign retire or otherwise sever his employment whether before or

after the merger sub6ect to e,isting contractual obligations. &n this manner ustice $rion0s

theory of automatic assumption may be reconciled with the ma6ority0s concerns with the

successor employer0s prerogative to choose its employees and the prohibition against involuntary

servitude.

?i2 #/ ?i2s Trasp#rt vs. Ma,a". G.R. N#. &*+. 4!e *9$ *3

&n order to intelligently prepare the employees for their e,planation and defenses the notice

should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as the basis for

the charge against the employee J a general description of the change will not suffice.

Es2!erra vs. 6alle 6er;e C#!tr5 Cl!-. G.R. N#. &38&*. 4!e &8$ *&*

The law does not re-uire that an intention to terminate one0s employment should be included in

the first notice. &t is enough that employees are properly apprised of the charges brought against

them so they can properly prepare their defenses it is only during the second notice that the

intention to terminate one0s employment should be e,plicitly stated

Lava;#r vs. 041 Mareti2 C#rp#rati# a; S#5a#. G.R. N#. &'33'3< 4!e *+$ *'

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A hearing or conference should be held during which the employee concerned with the

assistance of counsel if the employee so desires is given the opportunity to respond to the

charge present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.

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AGABON v. NLRC$ G.R. N#. &'+98$ N#ve,-er &3$ *

The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants

the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages isaddressed to the sound discretion of the court ta!ing into account the relevant circumstances.

Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar we deem it proper to fi, it at

>3;;;;.;;. #e believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future

violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least it provides a

vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code

and its &mplementing 1ules.

4aa >##; Pr#"essi2 v. Pa"#t. G.R. N#. &'&83+.Mar"h *+$ *'

&f the dismissal is based on a 6ust cause under Article :8: but the employer failed to comply with

the notice re-uirement the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the

dismissal process was in effect initiated by an act imputable to the employee. Bn the other

hand if the dismissal is based on an authori%ed cause under Article :83 but the employer failed

to comply with the notice re-uirement the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal

process was initiated by the employer0s e,ercise of his management prerogative.

Ta22a@a v Philippie Tras,arie Carriers$ %".$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &+8 (*&8)

Article :E= of the Labor Code mandates that an employee0s full bac!wages shall be inclusive ofallowances and other benefits or their monetary e-uivalent. &t is the obligation of the employer to

pay an illegally dismissed employee or wor!er the whole amount of the salaries or wages plus

all other benefits and bonuses and general increases to which he would have been normally

entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped wor!ing.

Re5es$ et al. v RP G!ar;iaFs Se"!rit5 A2e"5$ %".$ G.R. N# &983' (*&8)

$ac!wages and reinstatement are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed

employee in order to alleviate the economic damage brought about by the employee0s dismissal.

?1einstatement is a restoration to a state from which one has been removed or separated@ while

?the payment of bac!wages is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of

the unlawful dismissal.@ Therefore the award of one does not bar the other.

Crisat# >. Castr#$ 4r. vs Atee# De Na2a Uiversit5$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &3'*98$ *8 4!l5 *&

The Court holds that the order of reinstatement of the petitioner was not rendered moot and

academic. 4e remained entitled to accrued salaries from notice of the LA7s order of reinstatement

until reversal thereof. &n &slri% Trading v. Capada we even clarified that the employee could be

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barred from claiming accrued salaries only when the failure to reinstate him was without the

fault of the employer.

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Considering that the respondents reinstated the petitioner only in *ovember :;;: and that their

inability to reinstate him was without valid ground they were liable to pay his salaries accruing

from the time of the decision of the LA (i.e. 'eptember 3 :;;) until his reinstatement in

*ovember :;;:. &t did not matter that the respondents had yet to e,ercise their option to choose

between actual or payroll reinstatement at that point because the order of reinstatement wasimmediately e,ecutory.

Philippie Airlies$ %". v. Re5al;# 6. Paz$ G.R. N#. &9*9*$ * N#ve,-er *&

The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement salaries notwithstanding the reversal of

the LA decision granting him said relief. The test is two"fold/ () there must be actual delay or

the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not e,ecuted prior to its reversal and

(:) the delay must not be due to the employer0s un6ustified act or omission. &f the delay is due to

the employer0s un6ustified refusal the employer may still be re-uired to pay the salaries

notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiter0s decision.

A scrutiny of the circumstances however will show that the delay in reinstating the respondent

was not due to the un6ustified refusal of >AL to abide by the order but because of the constraints

of corporate rehabilitation. The inopportune event of >AL0s entering rehabilitation receivership

6ustifies the delay or failure to comply with the reinstatement order of the LA. &n light of the fact

that >AL0s failure to comply with the reinstatement order was 6ustified by the e,igencies of

corporation rehabilitation the respondent may no longer claim salaries which he should have

received during the period that the LA decision ordering his reinstatement is still pending appeal

until it was overturned by the *L1C.

Gl#-e Ma"a5 v. NLRC. G.R. N#. +*'&&< Mar"h 8$ &99*

#hen the employer can no longer trust the employee and vice"versa or there were imputations

of bad faith to each other reinstatement could not effectively serve as a remedy. This doctrine

applies only to positions which re-uire trust and confidence.

Wephil C#rp#rati# vs. A-i2$ G.R. N#. *39+8$ 3 April *&

ven outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into the mundane realities of human

e,perience the +refund doctrine+ easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor

Arbiter could harm more than help a dismissed employee. The employee to ma!e both ends

meet would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the pendency of the appeal

only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a final unfavorable decision. &t is mirage of a

stop"gap leading the employee to a ris!y cliff of insolvency.

Uilever Philippies v Rivera$ G.R. N#. *&3& (*&8)

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As a general rule an employee who has been dismissed for any of the 6ust causes enumerated

under Article :8: of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. &n e,ceptional cases

however the Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of

?social 6ustice@ or on ?e-uitable grounds.@ &n both instances it is re-uired that the dismissal ()

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was not for serious misconduct and (:) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee. &n

this case the transgressions were serious offenses that warranted employees0 dismissal from

employment. 4ence employee is not entitled to separation pay.

A2ri"!lt!ral a; %;!strial S!pplies C#rp. et al vs. 4!e-er P. Siazar$ G.R. N#. &3393A!2!st *'$ *&

&n awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement the

amount to be awarded shall be e-uivalent to one month salary for every year of service rec!oned

from the first day of employment until the finality of the decision. >ayment of separation pay is

in addition to payment of bac!wages. And if separation pay is awarded instead of reinstatement

bac!wages shall be computed from the time of illegal termination up to the finality of the

decision.

Heai;a Paz v N#rther T#-a""# Re;r5i2 C#.$ %".$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &99''$ &+ >e-r!ar5*&'

The award of financial assistance to an employee who rendered almost three decades of

dedicated service to an employer without a single transgression or malfeasance of any company

rule or regulation coupled with her old age and infirmity which now wea!en her chances of

employment is 6ustified and allowed under special circumstances. These circumstances

indubitably merit e-uitable concessions via the principle of ?compassionate 6ustice@ for the

wor!ing class.

Cetral Pa2asia Ele"tri" C##perative %". vs NLRC. G.R. N#. &8'&$ 4!l5 *$ *3

Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation

benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination this case is

not the appropriate instance for generosity under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions.

The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative

record prior to his dismissal in our view of this case does not call for such award of benefits

since his violation reflects a regrettable lac! of loyalty and worse betrayal of the company. &f an

employee0s length of service is to be regarded as a 6ustification for moderating the penalty of

dismissal such gesture will actually become a pri%e for disloyalty distorting the meaning of

social 6ustice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ran!s of undesirables.

C#ra;# A. Li, v. =MR Philippies$ %".$ et al.$ G.R. N#. *&+8$ A!2!st *&

*o essential change is being made (in a final 6udgment) by a recomputation because such is a

necessary conse-uence which flows from the nature of the illegality of the dismissal. To

reiterate a recomputation or an original computation if no previous computation was made as

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in the present case is a part of the law that is read into the decision namely Article :E= of the

Labor Code and established 6urisprudence. Article :E= provides for the conse-uences of illegal

dismissal one of which is the payment of full bac!wages until actual reinstatement -ualified

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only by 6urisprudence when separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed where the finality

of the illegal dismissal decision instead becomes the rec!oning point.

The nature of an illegal dismissal case re-uires that bac!wages continue to add on until full

satisfaction. The computation re-uired to reflect full satisfaction does not constitute an alterationor amendment of the final decision being implemented as the illegal dismissal ruling stands.

Thus in the present case a computation of bac!wages until actual reinstatement is not a

violation of the principle of immutability of final 6udgments.

H!elli2 Phar,a C#rp#rati# v Si-al$ et al.$ G.R. NO. &38'+3 (*&8)

&n the present case the C$A contains specific provisions which effectively bar the availment of

retirement benefits once the employees have chosen separation pay or vice versa. 'ection : of

Article K&I e,plicitly states that any payment of retirement gratuity shall be chargeable against

separation pay. Clearly respondents cannot have both retirement gratuity and separation pay as

selecting one will preclude recovery of the other. To illustrate the mechanics of how 'ection :

of Article K&I bars double recovery if the employees choose to retire whatever amount they

will receive as retirement gratuity will be charged against the separation pay they would have

received had their separation from employment been for a cause which would entitle them to

severance pay. These causes are enumerated in 'ection 3 Article K&I of the C$A (i.e.

retrenchment closure of business merger redundancy or installation of labor"saving device).

4owever if the cause of the termination of their employment was any of the causes enumerated

in said 'ection 3 they could no longer claim retirement gratuity as the fund from which the same

would be ta!en had already been used in paying their separation pay. >ut differently employeeswho were separated from the company cannot have both retirement gratuity and separation pay

as there is only one fund from which said benefits would be ta!en. &narguably 'ection : of

Article K&I effectively disallows recovery of both separation pay and retirement gratuity.

Conse-uently respondents are entitled only to one. 'ince they have already chosen and accepted

redundancy pay and have e,ecuted the corresponding 1elease and uitclaim they are now

barred from claiming retirement gratuity.

Gra"e Christia =i2h S"h##l$ represete; -5 its Pri"ipal$ Dr. 4a,es Ta v >ilipias A.

Lava;era$ G.R. N#. &33+'$ * A!2!st *&

1A EDF which was enacted on 9ecember = ==: amended Article :8E of the Labor Code

providing for the rules on retirement pay to -ualified private sector employees in the absence of

any retirement plan in the establishment. The said law states that ?an employee0s retirementbenefits under any collective bargaining Magreement (C$A)N and other agreements shall not be

less than those provided@ under the same J that is at least one"half (O) month salary for every

year of service a fraction of at least si, (D) months being considered as one whole year J andthat ?MuNnless the parties provide for broader inclusions the term one"half (O) month salary shall

mean fifteen () days plus one"twelfth (G:) of the 3th

month pay and the cash e-uivalent ofnot more than five () days of service incentive leaves.@

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The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no C$A or other applicable agreement

providing for retirement benefits to employees or (b) there is a C$A or other applicable

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agreement providing for retirement benefits but it is below the re-uirement set by law. Ierily

the determining factor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in terms

of benefits provided.

The Court in the case of legir v. >hilippine Airlines &nc. has recently affirmed that ?one"half(O) month salary means ::. days/ days plus :. days representing one"twelfth (G:) of the

3th month pay and the remaining days for M'&LN.@ The Court sees no reason to depart from

this interpretation. C4'0 argument therefore that the days '&L should be li!ewise pro"rated to

their G: e-uivalent must fail.

N#riel R. M#tierr# v Ri",ers Marie A2e"5 Phils.$ %".$ G.R. N#. *&8$ 4a!ar5 &$

*&'

#hen a seafarer sustains a wor!"related illness or in6ury while on board the vessel his fitness for

wor! shall be determined by the company"designated physician. The physician has :; days or

:F; days if validly e,tended to ma!e the assessment. &f the physician appointed by the seafarer

disagrees with the assessment of the company"designated physician the opinion of a third doctor

may be agreed 6ointly between the employer and the seafarer whose decision shall be final and

binding on them.

Sealaes Marie Servi"es$ %".$ et al. v Arel G. Dela T#rre$ G.R. N#. *&&8*$ &+ >e-r!ar5

*&'

5or the purpose of determining ?temporary total disability@ the seafarer shall submit himself to a

post"employment medical e,amination by a company"designated physician within three wor!ing

days upon his return e,cept when he is physically incapacitated to do so in which case a written

notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. 5ailure of the seafarer to

comply with the mandatory reporting re-uirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to

claim the above benefits. &f a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment a

third doctor may be agreed 6ointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor0s

decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

LABOR RELAT%ONS

Sta. L!"ia East C#,,er"ial C#rp#rati# vs. =#. Se"retar5 #/ La-#r a; E,pl#5,et$ et

al.$ G.R. N#. &*8''$ A!2!st &$ *9

Article ::(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organi%ation as ?any union or association of

employees which e,ists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing

with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.@

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entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organi%ations upon

issuance of the certificate of registration.

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T:= Sh#p/itters C#rp#rati#Gi I!ee C#rp#rati#$ et al. v T:= Sh#p/itters

C#rp#rati# C#rp#rati#Gi I!ee W#rers Ui#$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &9&3& (*&)

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees in the e,ercise of

their right to self"organi%ation is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may

reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free e,ercise of employees0 rights and that it is not

necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by

statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that the anti"union

conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self"organi%ation and collective

bargaining.

Sta. L!"ia East C#,,er"ial C#rp#rati# vs. =#. Se"retar5 #/ La-#r a; E,pl#5,et$ et

al.$ G.R. N#. &*8''$ A!2!st &$ *9

A bargaining unit is a ?group of employees of a given employer comprised of all or less than all

of the entire body of employees consistent with e-uity to the employer indicated to be the best

suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining

provisions of the law.@ The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective

bargaining unit are/

() the will of the employees (lobe 9octrine) (:) affinity and unity of the employees0 interest

such as substantial similarity of wor! and duties or similarity of compensation and wor!ing

conditions ('ubstantial utual &nterests 1ule) (3) prior collective bargaining history and (F)

similarity of employment status.

C#astal S!-i" Ba5 Ter,ial$ %".$ vs DOLE. G.R. N#. &'3&&3$N#ve,-er *$ *

##;s$ %". vs. Sa Mi2!el C#rp. S!pervis#rs a; Ee,pt Ui#. G.R. N#.

&*. A!2!st &$ *&&

The general rule is that an employer has no standing to -uestion the process of certification

election since this is the sole concern of the wor!ers. Law and policy demand that employers

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ta!e a strict hands"off stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of

employees should be chosen free from any e,traneous influence of management. The only

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e,ception is where the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article :8 of the Labor

Code because of a re-uest to bargain collectively.

=#l5 Chil; Cath#li" S"h##l v =#. St# T#,as$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &39& (*&8)

A certification election is the sole concern of the wor!ers e,cept when the employer itself has to

file the petition pursuant to Article := of the Labor Code as amended but even after such filing

its role in the certification process ceases and becomes merely a bystander. The employer clearly

lac!s the personality to dispute the election and has no right to interfere at all therein.

&nclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organi%ation see!ing to represent the bargaining

unit of ran!"and"file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organi%ation.

NUW=RA%N MP=C v. SLE. G.R. N#. &+&'8&$ 4!l5 8&$ *9

&t is well settled that under the ?double ma6ority rule@ for there to be a valid certification

election ma6ority of the bargaining unit must have voted and the winning union must have

garnered ma6ority of the valid votes cast. 5ollowing the ruling that all the probationary

employees0 votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory es should be

e,cluded it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase.

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The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in the

organi%ational meeting would not to our mind provide a valid reason to cancel respondent0s

certificate of registration. The cancellation of a union0s registration doubtless has an impairing

dimension on the right of labor to self"organi%ation. 5or fraud and misrepresentation to be

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grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code the nature of the fraud and

misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a ma6ority of

union members.

Cirte E,pl#5ees La-#r Ui#@>e;erati# #/ >ree #rers vs. Cirte Ele"tr#i"s$ %".$G.R. N#. &9'&'. 4!e $ *&&

A local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation absent any showing that

the same is prohibited under its constitution or rules. 'uch disaffiliation however does not result

in it losing its legal personality. A local union does not owe its e,istence to the federation with

which it is affiliated. &t is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the

will of its members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of its own

personality neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the

local union. &t only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in representation of

the latter. &n the present case whether the 55# went against the will of its principal (the

member"employees) by pursuing the case despite the signing of the BA is not for the Court

nor for respondent employer to determine but for the

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The duty to bargain does not compel any party to accept a proposal or to ma!e any concession.

#hile the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement between the employer

and the employee0s union resulting in a binding contract between the parties the failure to reach

an agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does not mean lac! of good

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faith. The laws invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract but do not compel one.

5or after all a C$A li!e any contract is a product of mutual consent and not of compulsion. As

such the duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.

Sa,aha2 Ma22a2aa sa T#p >#r, Ma!/a"t!ri2 Uite; W#rers #/ the Phils v.NLRC. G.R. N#. &&8+'$ Sept. 3$ &99+

There is no perfect test of good faith (5) in bargaining. The 5 or $5 is an inference to be

drawn from the facts and is largely a matter for the *L1C0s e,pertise. The charge of $5 should

be raised while the bargaining is in progress. #ith the e,ecution of the C$A $5 can no longer

be imputed upon any of the parties thereto. All provisions in the C$A are supposed to have been

6ointly and voluntarily incorporated therein by the parties. This is not a case where private

respondent e,hibited an indifferent attitude towards C$ because the negotiations were not the

unilateral activity of petitioner union. The C$A is good enough that private respondent e,erted

?reasonable effort of 5 bargaining.

>6C La-#r Ui#@Philippie Trasp#rt a; Geeral W#rers Or2aizati# (>6CLU@

PTGWO) 6s. Sa,a@sa,a2 Na2aaisa2 Ma22a2aa sa >6C@S#li;arit5 #/

%;epe;et a; Geeral La-#r Or2aizati# (SANAMA@>6C@S%GLO. G.R. N#. &3*9$

N#ve,-er *3$ *9

#hile the parties may agree to e,tend the C$A0s original five"year term together with all other

C$A provisions any such amendment or term in e,cess of five years will not carry with it a

change in the union0s e,clusive collective bargaining status. $y e,press provision of the above"

-uoted Article :3"A the e,clusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the

representation status is a legal matter not for the wor!place parties to agree upon. &n other words

despite an agreement for a C$A with a life of more than five y ears either as an original

provision or by amendment the bargaining union0s e,clusive bargaining status is effective only

for five years and can be challenged within si,ty (D;) days prior to the e,piration of the C$A0s

first five years.

Mi;aa# Ter,ial a; Br#era2e Servi"es %".$ v. C#/ess#r. G.R. N#. &&&+9$ Ma5 '$

&993

The signing of the C$A does not determine whether the agreement was entered into within the D

month period from the date of e,piration of the old C$A. &n the present case there was already a

meeting of the minds between the company and the union prior to the end of the D month period

after the e,piration of the old C$A. 4ence such meeting of the mind is sufficient to conclude

that an agreement has been reached within the D month period as provided under Art. :3 A of

the LC.

Te#;#r# S. Mira;a$ 4r. vs. Asia Ter,ials$ %". a; C#!rt #/ Appeals$ G.R. N#. &38&$

4!e *8$ *9

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A shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a position within the union and not within the

company. A shop steward is appointed by the union in a shop department or plant and serves as

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representative of the union charged with negotiating and ad6ustment of grievances of employees

with the supervisor of the employer. 4e is the representative of the union members in a building

or other wor!place. $lac!0s Law 9ictionary defines a shop steward as a union official elected to

represent members in a plant or particular department. 4is duties include collection of dues

recruitment of new members and initial negotiations for the settlement of grievances. A6udgment of reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of union 'hop 'teward would have no

practical legal effect since it cannot be enforced. $ased on the re-uirements imposed by law and

the A>C#

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employees from other foreign ban!s doing business in the >hilippines and other branches of the

ban! in the Asian region. 4ence it cannot be said that the union was guilty of for blue"s!y

bargaining.

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Geeral Sat#s C#"a C#la Plat >ree W#rers Ui#@T!pas vs. COCA@COLA BOTTLERS

P=%LS.$ %NC. G.R. N#. &3+3. >e-. &8$ *3

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The &mplementing 1ules of the Labor Code states the company0s counter"proposal shall be

attached to the notice of stri!e +as far as practicable.+ &n this case attaching the counter"proposal

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of the company to the notice of stri!e of the union was not practicable. &t was absurd to e,pect

the union to produce the company7s counter"proposal which it did not have. &ndeed compliance

with the re-uirement was impossible because no counter"proposal e,isted at the time the union

filed a notice of stri!e.

NS>W vs. Oveera. G.R. N#. '938$ Ma5 8&$ &9+*

The cooling off period in Art. :DF(c) and the E day stri!e ban after the stri!e vote report

prescribed in Art. :DF (f) were meant to be mandatory. The law provides that ?the labor union

may stri!e@ should the dispute ?remain unsettled until the lapse of the re-uisite number of days

from the filing of the notice@ this clearly implies that the union may not stri!e before the lapse

of the cooling off period. The cooling off period is for the inistry of Labor and mployment

to e,ert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. The mandatory

character of the E day stri!e ban is manifest in the provision that ?in every case@ the union shall

furnish the BL with the results of the voting ?at least E days before the intended stri!e.@ This

period is to give time to verify that a stri!e vote was actually held.

&n the event the result of the stri!eGloc!out ballot is filed within the cooling off period the E

day re-uirement shall be counted from the day following the e,piration of the cooling off

period.

Mala5a2 Sa,aha 2 ,2a Ma22a2aa sa Gree/iel; v. Ra,#s. G.R. N#. &&893$ >e-.

*+$ *

A no stri!eGloc!out clause is legal but it is applicable only to economic stri!es not stri!es.

As a provision in the C$A it is a valid stipulation although the clause may be invo!ed by an

employer (r) only when the stri!e is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force

wage or other concessions from the r that are not mandated to be granted by the law itself. &t

would be inapplicable to prevent a stri!e which is grounded on .

%terphil La-#rat#ries Ees Ui# >>W v. %terphil La-#rat#ries$ %". G.R. N#. &*+*$

De". &9$ *&

The concept of a slowdown is a +stri!e on the installment plan.+ &t is a willful reduction in therate of wor! by concerted action of wor!ers for the purpose of restricting the output of the

employer (r) in relation to a labor dispute as an activity by which wor!ers without a complete

stoppage of wor! retard production or their performance of duties and functions to compel

management to grant their demands. 'uch a slowdown is generally condemned as inherently

illicit and un6ustifiable because while the employees (es) +continue to wor! and remain at their

positions and accept the wages paid to them+ they at the same time +select what part of their

allotted tas!s they care to perform of their own volition or refuse openly or secretly to the r7s

damage to do other wor!+ in other words they +wor! on their own terms.

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Ba2#2 Pa2aaisa 2 Ma22a2aa 2 Tri!,ph %terati#al$ et al. vs. Se"retar5 #/

Depart,et #/ La-#r a; E,pl#5,et$ et al.Tri!,ph %terati#al (phils.)$ %". vs.

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Ba2#2 Pa2aaisa 2 Ma22a2aa 2 Tri!,ph %terati#al$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &3&$

4!l5 '$ *&

The assumption of 6urisdiction powers granted to the Labor 'ecretary under Article :D3(g) is not

limited to the grounds cited in the notice of stri!e or loc!out that may have preceded the stri!e or

loc!out nor is it limited to the incidents of the stri!e or loc!out that in the meanwhile may have

ta!en place. As the term ?assume 6urisdiction@ connotes the intent of the law is to give the Labor

'ecretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose

out of the stri!e or loc!out including cases over which the labor arbiter has e,clusive

6urisdiction.

Sar,iet# v. T!i"#. G.R. N#s. 3'*3& 38$ 4!e *3$ &9++

#here the return to wor! order is issued pending the determination of the legality of the stri!e it

is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the stri!e is legal and may be disregarded if

illegal. >recisely the purpose of the return to wor! order is to maintain the status -uo while the

determination is being made.

Maila Dia,#; =#tel Ees Ui# v. SLE$ G.R. N#. &'&+$ De". &$ *

>ayroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement but there must be showing of special

circumstances rendering actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not conducive to

attaining the purpose of the law in providing for assumption of 6urisdiction by the 'L in a labor

dispute that affects the national interest.

S#li; Ba C#rp. Erest# U. Ga,ier$ et al. a; S#li; Ba C#rp.$ et al. vs. S#li; Ba

Ui# a; its Dis,isse; O//i"ers a; Me,-ers$ et al. G.R. N#. &'9 a; G.R. N#.

&'9&$ N#ve,-er &'$ *&

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course of the arch = ==8 stri!e. The use of unlawful means in the course of a stri!e renders

such stri!e illegal. Therefore pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of 6udgment the arch

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= ==8 stri!e was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a petition to declare the stri!e illegal was thus

unnecessary.

7#lit# >a;riJ!ela$ et al. vs. M#tere5 >##;s C#rp#rati#M#tere5 >##;s C#rp#rati# v.

B!l!ra 2 ,2a Ma22a2aa sa M#tere5@%LAW$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &3+9G.R. N#.

&3+8$ 4!e +$ *&&

A distinction e,ists between the ordinary wor!ers0 liability for illegal stri!e and that of the union

officers who participated in it. The ordinary wor!er cannot be terminated for merely participating

in the stri!e. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. Bn the other

hand a union officer can be terminated upon mere proof that he !nowingly participated in the

illegal stri!e. oreover the participating union officers have to be properly identified. &n the

present case with respect to those union officers whose identity and participation in the stri!e

having been properly established the termination was legal.

G#l; Cit5 %te2rate; P#rt Servi"es$ %". v. NLRC. G.R. N#. +$ Sep. *&$ &99

*o bac!wages will be awarded to union members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal

stri!e. As for the union officers for !nowingly participating in an illegal stri!e the law mandates

that a union officer may be terminated from employment and they are not entitled to any relief.

MS> Tire : R!--er v. CA$ G.R. &*+8*$ A!2. '$ &999

The innocent by stander must show/ Compliance with the grounds specified in 1ule 8 of the

1ules of Court and That it is entirely different from without any connection whatsoever toeither party to the dispute and therefore its interests are totally foreign to the conte,t thereof.

6i"t#r Mete#r#$ et al. v. Creative Creat!res$ %". G.R N#. &3&*3'$ 4!l5 &8$ *9

&n sum respondent contested the findings of the labor inspector during and after the inspection

and raised issues the resolution of which necessitated the e,amination of evidentiary matters not

verifiable in the normal course of inspection. 4ence the 1egional 9irector was divested of

6urisdiction and should have endorsed the case to the appropriate Arbitration $ranch of the

*L1C. Considering however that an illegal dismissal case had been filed by petitioners wherein

the e,istence or absence of an employer"employee relationship was also raised the CA correctly

ruled that such endorsement was no longer necessary.

=#;a Cars Philippies$ %". v. =#;a Cars Te"hi"al Spe"ialist a; S!pervis#rs Ui#$

G.R. N#. *&*$ &9 N#ve,-er *&

The Ioluntary Arbitrator has no 6urisdiction to settle ta, matters. The Ioluntary Arbitrator has no

competence to rule on the ta,ability of the gas allowance and on the propriety of the withholding

of ta,. These issues are clearly ta, matters and do not involve labor disputes. To be e,act they

involve ta, issues within a labor relations setting as they pertain to -uestions of law on the

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application of 'ection 33 (A) of the *&1C. They do not re-uire the application of the Labor Code

or the interpretation of the BA andGor company personnel policies.

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The Uiversit5 #/ the %,,a"!late C#"epti#$ et al. vs. NLRC$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &+&&$

4a!ar5 *$ *&&

Article :E of the Labor Code states that unfair labor practices and termination disputes fall

within the original and e,clusive 6urisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. As an e,ception under Article

:D: the Ioluntary Arbitrator upon agreement of the parties shall also hear and decide all other

labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadloc!s. 5or the e,ception to

apply there must be agreement between the parties clearly conferring 6urisdiction to the

voluntary arbitrator. 'uch agreement may be stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement.

4owever in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement it is enough that there is evidence

on record showing the parties have agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration.

Sa,ar@Me; Distri-!ti# v Nati#al La-#r Relati#s C#,,issi#$ G.R. N#. &*8+' (*&8)

The non"inclusion in the complaint of the issue of dismissal did not necessarily mean that thevalidity of the dismissal could not be an issue. The rules of the *L1C re-uire the submission of

verified position papers by the parties should they fail to agree upon an amicable settlement and

bar the inclusion of any cause of action not mentioned in the complaint or position paper from

the time of their submission by the parties. &n view of this respondent0s cause of action should

be ascertained not from a reading of his complaint alone but also from a consideration and

evaluation of both his complaint and position paper.

Easter Me;iterraea Mariti,e Lt;.$ et al. vs. Estaisla# S!ri#$ et al. G.R. N#. &'*&8$

A!2!st *8$ *&*

Although 1epublic Act *o. 8;F: through its 'ection ; transferred the original and e,clusive

6urisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas 5ilipino wor!ers from the

>BA to the Labor Arbiters the law did not remove from the >BA the original and e,clusive

6urisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative

in character involving such wor!ers. The obvious intent of 1epublic Act *o. 8;F: was to have

the >BA focus its efforts in resolving all administrative matters affecting and involving such

wor!ers. The *L1C had no appellate 6urisdiction to review the decision of the >BA in

disciplinary cases involving overseas contract wor!ers.

Pe#pleFs Br#a;"asti2 Servi"e vs. The Se"retar5 #/ La-#r a; E,pl#5,et. G.R. N#.

&39'*$ Mar"h $ *&*

&f the 9BL finds that there is no employer"employee relationship the 6urisdiction is properly

with the *L1C. &f a complaint is filed with the 9BL and it is accompanied by a claim for

reinstatement the 6urisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter under Art. :E(3) of the Labor

Code which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and e,clusive 6urisdiction over those

cases involving wages rates of pay hours of wor! and other terms and conditions of

employment if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. &f a complaint is filed with the *L1C

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and there is still an e,isting employer"employee relationship the 6urisdiction is properly with the

9BL. The findings of the 9BL however may still be -uestioned through a petition for

certiorari under 1ule D of the 1ules of Court.

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R#la;# L. Cervates vs. PAL Mariti,e C#rp#rati# a;#r Wester Shippi2 A2e"ies.

G.R. N#. &3'*9. 4a!ar5 &$ *&8

There was substantial compliance with the *L1C 1ules of >rocedure when the respondents >AL

aritime Corporation and #estern 'hipping Agencies >te. Ltd. filed albeit belatedly the oint

9eclaration etition for Certiorari despite the prescribed

otion for 1econsideration with the *L1C the 'C found that the CA committed error when it

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entertained the petition for certiorari and e,plained that when respondent failed to file a otion

for 1econsideration of the *L1C0s 3; *ovember :;;D 1esolution within the reglementary

period the 1esolution attained finality and could no longer be modified by the Court of Appeals.

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UNERAL =OME v. NLRC$ G.R. N#. &8+$ Septe,-er &$ &99+

Therefore all references in the amended 'ection = of $.>. *o. := to supposed appeals from the

*L1C to the 'upreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions

for certiorari under 1ule D. Conse-uently all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed

in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the

appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Maila Pavili# =#tel$ et". vs. =er5 Dela;a. G.R. N#. &+993$ 4a!ar5 *'$ *&&

&n 'ime 9arby >ilipinas &nc. v. 9eputy Administrator agsalin the 'upreme Court ruled that

the voluntary arbitrator had plenary 6urisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to

arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority J sub6ect only in a proper case to the

certiorari 6urisdiction of this Court. &t was also held in that case that the failure of the parties to

specifically limit the issues to that which was stated allowed the arbitrator to assume 6urisdiction

over the related issue. &n Ludo 2 Luym Corporation v. 'aornido the 'upreme Court recogni%ed

that voluntary arbitrators are generally e,pected to decide only those -uestions e,pressly

delineated by the submission agreement that nevertheless they can assume that they have the

necessary power to ma!e a final settlement on the related issues since arbitration is the final

resort for the ad6udication of disputes. Thus the 'upreme Court ruled that even if the specificissue brought before the arbitrators merely mentioned the -uestion of ?whether an employee was

discharged for 6ust cause@ they could reasonably assume that their powers e,tended beyond the

determination thereof to include the power to reinstate the employee or to grant bac! wages. &n

the same vein if the specific issue brought before the arbitrators referred to the date of

regulari%ation of the employee law and 6urisprudence gave them enough leeway as well as

ade-uate prerogative to determine the entitlement of the employees to higher benefits in

accordance with the finding of regulari%ation. &ndeed to re-uire the parties to file another action

for payment of those benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the

constitutional mandate providing full protection to labor and speedy labor 6ustice.

Philippie Ele"tri" C#rp#rati# v C#!rt #/ Appeals$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &+&*$ & De"e,-er

*&

The rule is that a Ioluntary Arbitrator0s award or decision shall be appealed before the Court of

Appeals within ; days from receipt of the award or decision. 'hould the aggrieved party choose

to file a motion for reconsideration with the Ioluntary Arbitrator the motion must be filed

within the same ;"day period since a motion for reconsideration is filed ?within the period for

ta!ing an appeal.

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Pe#pleFs Br#a;"asti2 (B#,-# Ra;5# Phils) v. Se"retar5 #/ La-#r$ et al.

GR N#. &39'*$ Ma5 +$ *9

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&t can be assumed that the 9BL in the e,ercise of its visitorial and enforcement power

somehow has to ma!e a determination of the e,istence of an employer"employee relationship.

'uch prerogatival determination however cannot be coe,tensive with the visitorial and

enforcement power itself. &ndeed such determination is merely preliminary incidental and

collateral to the 9BL0s primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. Thedetermination of the e,istence of employer"employee relationship is still primarily lodged with

the *L1C. This is the meaning of the clause ?in cases where the relationship of employer"

employee still e,ists@ in Art. :8(b).

Thus if a complaint is brought before the 9BL to give effect to the labor standards provisions

of the Labor Code or other labor legislation and there is a finding by the 9BL that there is an

e,isting employer"employee relationship the 9BL e,ercise 6urisdiction to the e,clusion of the

*L1C. &f the 9BL finds that there is no employer"employee relationship the 6urisdiction is

properly with the *L1C. &f a complaint is filed with the 9BL and it is accompanied by a

claim for reinstatement the 6urisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter under Art. :E(3) of

the Labor Code which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and e,clusive 6urisdiction

over those cases involving wages rates of pay hours of wor! and other terms and conditions of

employment if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. &f a complaint is filed with the *L1C

and there is still an e,isting employer" employee relationship the 6urisdiction is purely with the

9BL. The findings of the 9BL however may still be -uestioned through a petition for

certiorari under 1ule D of the 1ules of Court.

Ma#lit# Barles$ et al. v. =#. Bee;i"t# Bit#i#$ et al. GR N#. &**3$ 4!e &$ &999

The $L1 shall have original and e,clusive authority to act at their own initiative or upon re-uest

of either or both parties on all inter"union and intra"union conflicts. As already held by the Court

in La Tondena #or!ers

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Ara!ll# v O//i"e #/ the O,-!;s,a$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &9&9 (*&8)

The #rit of ,ecution in the instant case was procedurally irregular as it pre"empted the *L1C

1ules which re-uire that where further computation of the award in the decision is necessary

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during the course of the e,ecution proceedings no #rit of ,ecution shall be issued until after

the computation has been approved by the Labor Arbiter in an order issued after the parties have

been duly notified and heard on the matter. #hen the writ was issued there was as yet no order

approving the computation made by the *L1C Computation and ,amination

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redress of a private right but rather is in the nature of a command upon the employer to

ma!e public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code.+

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Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are li!ewise actions +upon an in6ury to the rights of

the plaintiff.+ Article FD of the Civil Code of the >hilippines therefore governs these actions.

SOC%AL LEG%SLAT%ON

SSS v. A2!as. G.R. N#. &''< >e-r!ar5 *3$ *

A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be +dependent for

support+ upon the husband absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely if it is proved that

the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death it would be safe to

presume that she was dependent on the husband for support unless it is shown that she is capable

of providing for herself.

Berar;ia P. Bart#l#,e v S#"ial Se"!rit5 S5ste,$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &9*'8&$ &* N#ve,-er*&

Cornelio0s adoption of ohn without more does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the

benefits stemming from ohn0s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio0s untimely demise

during ohn0s minority. 'ince the parent by adoption already died then the death benefits under

the mployees7 Compensation >rogram shall accrue solely to herein petitioner ohn7s sole

remaining beneficiary. The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is

contrary to law.

The phrase +dependent parents+ should therefore include all parents whether legitimate or

illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption.

=a"ie;a Cata5a$ et al. v R#sari# L#rez#$ G.R. N#. &39$ &+ Mar"h *&')

To be e,empted from the coverage of ''' Law on the basis of casual employment the services

must not merely be irregular temporary or intermittent but the same must not also be in

connection with the business or occupation of the employer. The primary standard therefore of

determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity

performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The test iswhether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the

employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the wor! performed

and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.

GS%S vs. De Le#. G.R. N#. &+'< N#ve,-er &3$ *&

Thus where the employee retires and meets the eligibility re-uirements he ac-uires a vested

right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. 1etirees en6oy a protected property

interest whenever they ac-uire a right to immediate payment under pre"e,isting law. Thus a

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pensioner ac-uires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of

the public employees0 pension statute. *o law can deprive such person of his pension rights

without due process of law that is without notice and opportunity to be heard.

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GS%S vs. C#!rt #/ Appeals. G.R. N#. &*+'*< April *$ &999

The :F"hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances

causing the death of a police officer but only to those which although not on official line of duty

are nonetheless basically police service in character.

%l#il# D#" : E2ieeri2 C#. vs. ECC. G.R. N#. L@*8&. N#v. *3$ &9+

#hen the in6ury is sustained when the employee is proceeding to or from his wor! on the

premises of the employer the in6ury is compensable.

Ea# v. ECC G.R. N#. L@< April '$ &9+'

The company which provides the means of transportation in going to or coming from the place

of wor! is liable to the in6ury sustained by the employees while on board said means oftransportation.